OPERATION NEPTUNE SPEAR : MY COMMENTS

 

 

 

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO 764

B.RAMAN

 

RedState, a largely visited  web site of the US, describes itself as “ the most widely read right of center blog on Capitol Hill, is the most often cited right of center blog in the media, and is widely considered one of the most influential voices of the grassroots on the right….At RedState, we are conservatives in primaries and Republican in general elections and we aim to win. RedState’s day to day efforts are led by its Editor, Erick Erickson.”

2.Coinciding with the anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist strikes by Al Qaeda in the US homeland, it has carried an article dated  September 10,2012, by one Jeff Emanuel titled “India, Abbottabad, and Osama bin Laden: Did New Delhi Assist the U.S. on Operation Neptune Spear?’

3. The article is a commentary on the book titled “No Easy Day” written by Mark Owen ( assumed name), one of the Navy Seals who formed a member of the team that successfully raided the hide-out of Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad in Pakistan on the night of May 1/2,2011, and killed OBL. The book is his account of the operation code-named Neptune Spear carried out by a team of the Navy Seals under the supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), then headed by Mr.Leon Panetta, the present Defence Secretary.

4. After the successful raid, Owen was decorated along with other members of the team, but seems to have taken premature retirement. The reasons for his premature retirement are not known. It is not clear whether it was due to any grievances he might have had in connection with the recognition of his role in the raid.

5.Mr.Panetta has been quoted by the US media as having demanded action against Owen for having disclosed sensitive operational secrets in his book. This would indicate a large measure of truth in his account, if not the entire truth.

6.The article by Jeff Emanuel has caused  considerable interest in India because of its inference, after studying the flight path of the helicopters that carried the Navy Seals as indicated by Owen, that one of the helicopters crossed Indian air space over Jammu and Kashmir on its way to and back from Abbottabad.

7. To quote the relevant observations of Emanuel:

“The fourteenth page of images in No Easy Day contains a map showing the routes taken by the two flights of helicopters: the Black Hawks taking the assaulters to Abbottabad, and the MH-47 Chinooks carrying a quick reaction force (QRF) and forward area refueling point (FARP) team. While the latter flew due east to a staging area northwest of Abbottabad, the former flight is shown on Owen’s map as crossing over Pakistan’s eastern border with India before looping around and approaching Abbottabad from the southeast, rather than approaching directly from the west (or west-northwest).

“This apparent use of Indian airspace on the infiltration route raises some obvious questions, including:

 1.What foreknowledge (if any) did the Indian government have about the mission into Pakistan?

 2.If clearance to use Indian airspace was requested (and granted), what was the Indian government told, either about the real objective of Operation Neptune Spear or as a cover story?

“What other assistance did India provide, either in terms of aerial diversion or supplying the U.S. with guidance on the best route back into Pakistan? (It seems clear that the latter would involve providing the U.S. some insight into India’s intelligence and route planning for a possible strike on Pakistan should hostilities resume between the two states.)

“It’s important to note at this point that this discussion is based on a single low-detail graphic  from an account that was neither vetted nor confirmed by the U.S. government. At no  point in the text of No Easy Day is the route to Abbottabad discussed (as opposed to the return trip, which is dealt with in some detail); in fact, Owen writes, most of the team slept on the way in.

 

“Owen’s map appears to define Pakistan’s eastern border as the western boundary of Kashmir, the disputed territory that is bisected into Pakistani- and Indian-administered territories by the Line of Control, established in 1972, and it is difficult to tell whether the image was intended to show that the helicopters’ route crossed the LOC. However, the route appears to take the Americans in the vicinity of Uri, in Indian territory.

“It goes without saying that crossing over the LOC would have been an exceedingly dangerous undertaking, and one which, while crossing eastward, would almost certainly have required providing prior notice to the Indian government. Likewise, passing back across the LOC into Pakistan would have been a dangerous undertaking, as that is the direction in which Pakistan’s air defenses are largely oriented. This goes back to point 3 above: if the assaulters’ route to Abbottabad included crossing over the Indian border and back again, it seems likely that weaknesses in Pakistan’s eastward-oriented air defences known to India were communicated to the U.S. and exploited on this mission.”

8. I have the following comments on the analysis of Emanuel:

(a). In covert operations of this kind, the principle of restrictive security is strictly followed. The crew of the helicopters would not know what the Navy Seals would be doing after they are dropped on the ground. The Navy Seals would not know what flight path the crew would be following. How did Owen come to know the details of the flight path and the exact points at which the helicopter would be crossing the Line of Control (LOC) twice while going to Abbottabad ?

( b ).In planning operations of this nature involving air and missile action, the US is always worried that if the Pakistanis detect the action they may misinterpret that the action had been originated by India and this could lead to a war between the two nuclear powers. They never undertake any secret action from the Indian side. When the US launched the Cruise missile attacks on OBL’s camps in Afghanistan in October 1998, Anthony Zinni, the then head of the Central Command, flew to the Chaklala Air Force base in Pakistan and informed Gen.Jehangir Karamat, the then Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), of the impending action. He later said that he did not want the Pakistanis to think that the missiles were of India and launch a counter-attack on India.

( C).After the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US Homeland, the A.B.Vajpayee Government then in power had offered to the US the secret use of Indian Air Force bases for retaliatory strikes against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The Bush Administration declined the offer due to fears of unpredictable reaction by Pakistan resulting in a nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

( d ). The anxiety not to  undertake any operation from the Indian side that might trigger off panic reactions by Pakistan against India continues to be an important element in US covert action planning in this region.

( e ).Any operation of this nature involving an approach from the Indian air space  contained in it, whether the Government of India was kept informed or not, the seeds of the danger that Pakistan might detect the approach of the helicopter from the Indian air space and react unpredictably against India.

( f). After the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, there was a discussion in India by well-informed persons about India’s option of mounting a copter strike on the training camps of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. The US pressured India not to undertake such an operation due to its fears of unpredictable reactions of Pakistan. It was reported at that time that the Indian Special Forces were confident that they would be able to undertake copter-borne strikes in POK without being detected by Pakistani radars. Were the details of the flight path which the Indian Special Forces intended using if they had been permitted by the political leadership to undertake the strikes shared with the CIA for its operation on Abbottabad?

9. Owen’s account will neither be proved correct nor disproved till the US one day declassifies the details of the operation. Till then, it will be difficult to find definitive answers to the points raised by me.

10.The account of Owen would make sense only if the US had kept both India and Pakistan informed beforehand, taken India’s consent for the copter to cross into Indian air space and Pakistan’s consent for the copter to take a flight path across Indian air space.

11. In this connection, please see my following comments in my article dated May 3,2011, on the operation at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers45/paper4463.html

“Till now the indications are that it was an exclusive US operation. Since it involved the ingress of the US specal forces into Pakistani territory by air in helicopters, it was likely that Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), was informed before the helicopters with the special forces took off from Afghanistan for the raid even though US officials have reportedly been asserting that Pakistan was informed only after the helicopters had taken off at the end of the operation. When the Bill Clinton Administration launched the Cruise missile strikes on the training camps of Al Qaeda in the Jalalabad area of Afghanistan in 1998 they followed a similar procedure. Gen Anthony Zinni, the then Commanding Officer of the US Central Command, flew to Islamabad from a US naval ship and informed Gen.Jehangir Karamat, the then COAS, about the impending raid. The US did so to make sure that Pakistan did not interpret that the missile had been launched by India and order a missile strike against India. A similar precaution was likely to have been taken this time too. Moreover, Abbotabad, an important military garrison town, has high air defence cover. It was important to prevent   a messy air defence action by Pakistan against the US helicopters if its radars had  detected their approach. The entire operation lasted a little over two hours. During this period, one of the helicopters crashed. It was blown up and destroyed by the special forces. A newsletter disseminated by a retired US naval officer says: "Source says actual crash sight was on Kakul Road, Abbottabod, Pakistan just down from the Pakistan Military Academy exercise grounds. See image for road, which was reportedly blocked off by local security after the incident. Folks in the city mentioned on Twitter at the time that the action was very, very close to the PMA." This would indicate that during the entire operation on the ground, which lasted over 90 minutes if one excludes the time taken by the choppers for their to and fro journey, the Pakistani security forces did not intervene and try to find out what was going on. The local police blocked the stretch of the road where the helicopter had crashed to prevent onlookers rushing there till the Americans had destroyed the chopper. All this clearly shows that the Pakistanis must have had advance knowledge of the operation and had instructions from above not to intervene.”( 11-9-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

 

 

MY TAKE ON XI RUMOURS

 

 

 

B.RAMAN

Xi Jinping,59, Chinese Vice-President, who is expected to take over from Hu Jintao as the head of the Communist Party of China (CPC) at the 18^th Party Congress next month, has not been attending to his protocol duties for a week now.

2.During the last one week, the Chinese Foreign Office is reported to have cancelled his pre-scheduled meetings with Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, (scheduled for September 5), Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong,a Russian official and Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt of Denmark (scheduled for September 10).

3.While Chinese officials have not given any reason for the cancellation of these appointments, a U.S. official was quoted by the media as saying that Mr. Xi cancelled his meeting with Mrs. Clinton  because of a back problem.

4. These cancellations have given rise to considerable rumours in Chinese microblogs and in web sites of overseas Chinese organisations. Despite the attempts  of the Chinese authorities to block these microblogs and web sites, rumours and speculation regarding Mr.Xi continue to circulate.

5. These rumours and speculation fall under two categories. The first is that he is undergoing treatment for a back problem either due to natural causes or as a result of an accident. The second is that he escaped with minor injuries in an assassination attempt.

6.  Radio Free Asia (RFA), which is funded by the US Congress, reported, inter alia, as follows on September 10 while discussing the various rumours under circulation:

“China's Internet censors on Monday blocked searches about vice-president and presumed leader-in-waiting Xi Jinping and the ruling Chinese Communist Party's discipline czar He Guoqiang following rumors that they had been injured in separate car accidents.

“The U.S.-based Chinese news website Boxun reported over the weekend that Xi and He were being treated at Beijing's 301 Military Hospital after being injured in two separate road accidents on the evening of Sept. 4, sparking media speculation and rumours that the two were the targets of assassination attempts by allies of ousted Chongqing Party boss Bo Xilai and national security chief Zhou Yongkang.

“In an article that was removed within hours of being posted, Boxun reported that Xi's car was sandwiched by off-road vehicles, leaving him in hospital with a spinal injury.

 “It said He Guoqiang, the secretary of the Commission for Discipline Inspection, was also involved in a separate road accident on the same night, when a truck traveling at high speed hit his car from behind, causing it to turn over.

“The website, whose reports are not always validated, said He was in critical condition, while Xi sustained minor injuries.

“However, the report sparked a wave of rumours that military officers and supporters of Bo and Zhou may have carried out attacks on the two officials.

“Such reports about the whereabouts and plans of China's heavily-guarded top officials are notoriously hard to confirm, and RFA was unable to do so.

“Boxun reported that two military officers have since been detained for questioning.”

7. I am disinclined for the present to accept the credibility of the rumours regarding a possible assassination attempt. In view of the forthcoming 18^th Party Congress, physical security had been considerably stepped up in Beijing and Chongqing for the last one month. It would have been difficult for any group of conspirators to plot an assassination undetected and attempt to carry it out.

8.If an attempt had been made on September 4 as alleged by the rumours, there would have been a further upgradation of security after the alleged attempt. My impression is that the security alert in Beijing and Chongqing continues to be at the same level as it was before September 4.One does not notice any sign of security nervousness or panic in Beijing. ( 11-9-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

 

DENIAL OF PAKISTANI VISA TO PRAVEEN SWAMI

 

B.RAMAN

 

There are no saints in matters relating to visas. And there are no heroes either.

2.We should avoid an immature and juvenile song and dance over the refusal of a visa by the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi to Shri Praveen Swami, who heads the Delhi office of “The Hindu”, to enable him to accompany Shri S.M.Krishna, our Foreign Minister, during his just concluded visit to Pakistan.

3. Travel visa is not a fundamental or human right. Countries have a right to refuse visas to individuals and they don’t have to give reasons for their refusal. Visas are often refused by all countries of the world on unadmitted political or national security grounds.

4. After we carried out our nuclear tests in 1998, our retired nuclear scientists wanting to travel to the US found it impossible to get a US visa. A retired Chairman of our Atomic Energy Commission found that the US Embassy in New Delhi, without saying no, sat over his application for a visa to attend a non-governmental conference in the US. He took the hint and withdrew his application.

5. Another retired nuclear scientist could not get a visa from the US Embassy in New Delhi because he had once visited Iran after retirement.

6. We are not trail-blazers in this matter. We can be as over-restrictive as any other country in the consideration of visa applications from journalists and academics. We have not only refused visas to journalists and academics---even from the US, our strategic partner--- but even harassed one or two after issuing them visas and allowing them to work from New Delhi.

7. A typical example is that of Alex Perry, the New Delhi correspondent of the “Time” magazine, when Shri A.B.Vajpayee was the Prime Minister. We issued him a visa to report from New Delhi, but when one of his reports was perceived to be uncharitably critical of Shri Vajpayee, the NDA Government had him harassed and humiliated through the Foreigners’ Regional Registration Office on some ground or the other.

8.We have refused visas to journalists and academics from the ASEAN countries because of our adverse perception of their views relating to the Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism against India.

9. For a journalist, refusal of visa by a foreign country is an occupational hazard. Praveen and the rest of the country should take it in our stride instead of projecting it as one more instance of Pakistani cussedness towards India.

10. Praveen is one of our well-known reporters on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. There are others too who report on this subject, but they were issued visas to go with our Foreign Minister. One has an impression that the Pakistanis are unhappy with his reporting and TV interviews on Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism because they feel he is vicious in his reporting and interviews. We may not agree with this, but it is their perception.

11. Some ill-informed analysts have criticised the journalists, who had accompanied our Foreign Minister, for not raising the refusal of the visa to Praveen. One of the analysts has pointed out that only Ms Sheela Bhatt, the Executive Editor, Rediff, had the courage to raise it during her interactions in Islamabad.

12. Kudos to Sheela for her professional  courage, but the fact that other journalists did not raise it does not make them professional cowards. If they feel the refusal of visa to Praveen is a matter between Pakistan and “The Hindu”, one cannot blame them. They had a job to do in reporting on the FM’s visit and their focus was on the larger dimension of their visit to Pakistan.

13.When the NDA Government harassed and humiliated Alex, other foreign journalists based in Delhi did not rush to his defence. There is now a slanging match between our PMO and the “Washington Post” on a negative report on Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh sent by its correspondent in New Delhi. Other foreign journalists in New Delhi are discreetly following the controversy without getting actively involved in it.

14.If at all foreign newspapers find it necessary to take a stand in such matters, their headquarters will do it and not individual journalists. ( 10-9-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

BENGALURU:A ‘TERRORIST’ MODULE WITH A DIFFERENCE

 

 

 

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO. 763

( Written at the request of the “Times of India”. Published by them on September 9,2012, at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-toi/all-that-matters/Doctor-techie-scientist--terrors-new-recruits/articleshow/16318255.cms  )

 

B.RAMAN

The 18 Muslim suspects arrested since August 29 in  operations co-ordinated by the Bengaluru Police are presently under interrogation.

The indications till now are that the suspects, who have been picked up from Bengaluru and Hubli in Karnataka, Hyderabad and Maharashtra, had come together with the objective of assassinating certain individuals identified with the Hindutva ideology.

Though there seems to be some suspicion of their contacts with the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) of Pakistan and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) of Bangladesh, they constituted a new indigenous group with no suspected links with any of the indigenous terrorist/extremist organisations that have been active so far such as Al Umma of Tamil Nadu, the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the Indian Mujahideen (IM).

The Bengaluru Police seem to have succeeded in penetrating and dismantling them even before they could give themselves an organisational infrastructure and an ideological basis.

It was a group of individuals self-motivated by visiting jihadi sites in the Internet  such as that of Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and brought together by shared anger against Hindutva elements without attempts to form a central command and control.

The conspiracy seems to have been squashed by the Police at a very early stage. This is evident from the absence of any major recoveries of arms and ammunition and explosive material from them

Whereas other jihadi organisations that had operated in India in the past had made a dual use of hand-held weapons and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), this group was still in the stage of hand-held weapons and had not started thinking in terms of IEDs.

Commonly binding anger due to social and religious discrimination and communal grievances generally tend to motivate the educated, thinking  elements more than others.

It is, therefore, not surprising that all the suspects came from the educated segments of the Muslim community. It is also to be noted that the educated elements had studied or were studying subjects such as medicine, computer science, journalism etc and not humanities.

This trend towards the gravitation of such elements to leadership positions in the jihadi organisations had been noticed in the case of the IM too, which had some good IT experts, including one of Pune who had occupied an important position in the Indian branch of a well-known foreign  IT  company.

Examples of  enraged students belonging to such professions or aspiring to join them gravitating to extremism had been seen in the past not only in India, but also in Indonesia and Western countries.

A disquieting fact is a junior scientist of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) joining this group. It is not yet clear whether he joined it on his own or whether he was spotted, motivated and recruited and what was the purpose.

If he had joined on his own because of anger against some Hindutva elements, that is understandable. But, if he had been recruited to penetrate the DRDO, that would be ominous.

According to the police, they made a breakthrough after keeping some of the suspects under surveillance for four months. There has been no indication of any significant electronic intelligence through interception of their telephone conversations.

It has been reported that the suspects were communicating with each other through Skype. This could be the reason for the evidently meagre ELINT. This would indicate that our capability for the interception of communications through the Internet continues to be inadequate. This needs attention.

As regards external ramifications, there are suspicions of links with  elements in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia----with the training possibly coming from elements in  Pakistan and the co-ordination from individuals in Saudi Arabia. These suspicions need to be developed further.

The motivation of the group is still to be determined. Did they have a strategic motivation of sustained terrorism or had they merely come together due to common anger over the grievances of Muslims in order to carry out some assassinations, which one may not be able to characterise as terrorism.

The conspiracy has spread over three states. The forensic evidence available so far is not adequate to reconstruct the conspiracy in a manner that will carry conviction to the courts and the Muslim community.

Keeping all this in view, it might be better for the Government  of India to direct the National Investigation Agency to take over the investigation after reaching a consensus with the three State Governments.

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Research & Analysis Wing, Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India.

 

HAQQANI NETWORK AS FTO: WHAT IMPACT?

 

 

 

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO. 762

B.RAMAN

In a report to the US Congress on September 7,2012, Mrs.Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State, intimated it of her decision to designate the Haqqani Network, an affiliate of the Afghan Taliban operating from the Kurram—North Waziristan areas of Pakistan, as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

2. She said in a separate statement:

“Today, I have sent a report to Congress saying that the Haqqani Network meets the statutory criteria of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). This action meets the requirements of the Haqqani Network Terrorist Designation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-168). Based on that assessment, I notified Congress of my intent to designate the Haqqani Network as an FTO under the INA. I also intend to designate the organization as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity under Executive Order 13224.

“The consequences of these designations include a prohibition against knowingly providing material support or resources to, or engaging in other transactions with, the Haqqani Network, and the freezing of all property and interests in property of the organization that are in the United States, or come within the United States, or the control of U.S. persons. These actions follow a series of other steps that the U.S. government already has taken against the Haqqanis. The Department of State previously designated key Haqqani Network leaders under E.O. 13224, and the Department of the Treasury has designated other militants with ties to the Haqqanis under the same authority. We also continue our robust campaign of diplomatic, military, and intelligence pressure on the network, demonstrating the United States’ resolve to degrade the organization’s ability to execute violent attacks.

“I take this action in the context of our overall strategy in Afghanistan, the five lines of effort that President Obama laid out when he was in Afghanistan in May: increasing the capacity of Afghan security forces to fight insurgents; transitioning to Afghan security lead; building an enduring partnership with Afghanistan; pursuing Afghan-led reconciliation; and putting together an international consensus to support peace and stability in the region. We will continue to work with both Afghanistan and Pakistan to move these efforts forward and build a more peaceful and secure future.”

3. For some weeks now, the State Department had been under pressure from sections of the Congress to declare the Haqqani Network as an FTO because of its role in killing US and other NATO troops in Afghanistan. The State Department was resisting the pressure because US intelligence reportedly believed that Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl of the US Army, who disappeared from southern Afghanistan in June,2009, might be in the custody of the Network. They  were worried that the designation of the Network as an FTO could hamper efforts to rescue him. The decision now to designate the Network as an FTO would indicate that the US intelligence is pessimistic about its chances of being able to rescue him.

4. The Agence France Presse (AFP) reported as follows on September 8,2012:

“The network’s founder is Jalaluddin Haqqani, a disciplined Afghan guerrilla leader bankrolled by the US to fight Soviet troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s and now based with his family in Pakistan.

“In the 1980s, Jalaluddin was close to the CIA and Pakistani intelligence. He allied himself to the Taliban after they took power in Kabul in 1996, serving as a cabinet minister under the militia’s supreme leader, Mullah Omar.

“When American troops arrived after the 9/11 attacks, Haqqani looked up old friends and sought refuge in North Waziristan, becoming one of the first anti-US commanders based in Pakistan’s border areas.

“He has training bases in eastern Afghanistan, is close to al Qaeda and his fighters are active across east and southeastern Afghanistan and in Kabul.

“Militarily the most capable of the Taliban factions, the network operates independently but remains loyal to Omar and would probably fall behind any peace deal negotiated by the Taliban.

“Now in his late 70s and frail, Jalaluddin’s seat on the Afghan Taliban leadership council has passed to his son Sirajuddin, who effectively runs a fighting force of at least 2,000 men.

“The United States blames the network for some of the most spectacular attacks in Afghanistan, such as a 2011 siege on the US embassy and, in 2009, the deadliest attack on the CIA in 25 years.

“Washington has long since designated Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin “global terrorists” but in July Congress urged the State Department to blacklist the entire network.

“Supporters of the designation say the financial sanctions will help disrupt the Haqqani network’s fundraising activities in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

“But Pakistanis fear it could further worsen ties between Islamabad and Washington just as cooperation had resumed after a series of major crises in 2011, particularly the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan.

“Any such decision will take the relationship back to square one, ruining the improvement seen in ties between the two countries during the last couple of months,” a senior Pakistani security official said.

“Last year, the outgoing top US military officer, Admiral Mike Mullen, called the Haqqanis the “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s ISI, although other American officials later distanced themselves from the remarks.”

5.The designation  of an organisation as an FTO impairs its ability to collect funds from the diaspora in the US. Where an organisation does not depend on flow of funds from the diaspora in the US, it has very little impact on its operational capabilities.

6. The US started the practice of declaring foreign terrorist set-ups as FTOs in 1997. Since then, there has not been a single instance of any terrorist organisation withering away due to drying-up of funds because of its being declared an FTO. All organisations declared by the US as FTO continued to maintain their terrorist activities without any problem.

7.The US declared the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as an FTO in 1997. It had no impact on the activities of the LTTE. The LTTE was crushed 12 years later in May 2009 not by the US designation, but by the counter-insurgency operations of the Sri Lankan Army.

8. Since 1997, the US has declared the Harkat-ul-Ansar also known as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) of Bangladesh as FTOs. The declarations have had no impact on their activities. They continue to be as active as before

9. This is because the jihadi terrorist organisations based in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan get their funds not from the diaspora in the US, but from the diaspora in the Gulf, from so-called charitable organisations in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries and from the intelligence agencies sponsoring them such as those of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. They also get their funds from the narcotics trade in the Af-Pak region.

10. Unless these real sources of funding are tackled, just designating an organisation as an FTO and making it illegal for persons in the US to help it financially will not help.

11. The US war of attrition  based on precise intelligence, which has been effective against Al Qaeda in the tribal areas, has not been that effective against the Haqqani Network. Al Qaeda is perceived largely as an Arab organisation. Some Pashtuns have had no qualms over co-operating with the US against Al Qaeda as one saw in the case of the Pashtun doctor, now in Pakistani custody, who allegedly collaborated against Osama bin Laden. But the Haqqani Network is a Pashtun organisation. It has been more difficult to find Pashtun sources willing to collaborate against the leadership of the Network.

12. Only the Shias of Kurram, who have been suffering due to the atrocities committed by the Afghan Taliban and the Network, and the Tajik remnants of Ahmed Shah Masood’s  pre-2001 organisation might be in a position to help in neutralising the Haqqani Network through  ground and air operations. The suspicions between the US and the former followers of Masood have come in the way of such operations. The US has been reluctant to seek the co-operation of the Shias of Kurram because of their reported links with Iran.

13. New ideas, new operational methods and new allies are required to neutralise the Network without having to depend on Pakistan. The US has been bereft of such ideas, methods and allies.Designating the Haqqani Network an FTO alone will not help.

14.The US and other NATO forces have been facing problems in Afghanistan because of the mix of conventional and terrorist strikes adopted by the Afghan Taliban and the commando style complex terrorist strikes in which the Haqqani Network specialises. Unless an effective answer is found to the capabilities and techniques of the Afghan Taliban, there is unlikely to be an improvement in the ground situation in Afghanistan.

15. Only punitive pressure against Pakistan can help in neutralising the Haqqani Network. The Network operates from sanctuaries in North Waziristan and Kurram. It maintains close links with the ISI, which is well-informed regarding the location and movements of its leaders. The ISI is in a position to help the US in neutralising the Network, but is hesitant to do so as it looks upon the Network as its strategic ally for recovering its influence in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the US and other NATO forces from there.

16. The US is not prepared to declare Pakistan a state-sponsor of terrorism for its collusion with the Network. Declaration of Pakistan as a State-sponsor of terrorism could entail follow-up steps such as a rupture of diplomatic relations with Pakistan, termination of all military-military and intelligence-intelligence co-operation and suspension of all economic and military assistance. No US Government would be prepared to take such actions. The US has to tolerate Pakistan and find ways of getting along with it whatever the difficulties and consequences of such a policy.

17. In the absence of a capability to mount an Abbottabad style unilateral strike against the Haqqani leadership, the only transit option left to the US is to have the Network designated as an FTO. That is what it has done without any illusions that it will lead to the neutralisation of the Network. ( 8-9-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

 

 

   

  

 

 

INDIA & PAKISTAN: DIMINISHING MALICE

 

B.RAMAN

Diminishing  malice is becoming the defining characteristic of Indo-Pakistan relations as our Foreign Minister, Shri S.M.Krishna, flies to Islamabad  on the morning of Septembr 7,2012, for another joint review with Ms Hina Rabbani Khar, his Pakistani counterpart, of the state of the continuing talks between officials of the two countries on  bilateral issues that have been the stumbling block of better relations.

2. The bilateral issues remain as they were defying a substantive movement forward in the efforts to find a solution. This is so whether in respect of Jammu and Kashmir or the Siachen and Sir Creek issues or Pakistani inaction against the terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), who masterminded the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai and are now supposed to be facing trial before an anti-terrorism court in Rawalpindi.

3.What has been changing is not the contours and the complexities of the bilateral issues, but the lingo and the rhetoric. The lingo is increasingly marked less by malice and more by friendship. The rhetoric is less  mutually accusatory.

4. The periodic exchanges of allegations continue. India continues to level allegations of Pakistani insincerity in prosecuting the masterminds of the 26/11 terrorist strikes and of Islamabad not acting against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory. Pakistan continues to level allegations of foreign involvement in its internal security problems in Balochistan, without naming India

5. Despite this, there is a discernible attempt by the two countries not to level fresh allegations that could add new poison to the bilateral relations. One saw this in the aftermath of the recent violent incidents in Mumbai and Lucknow and the departure of a large number of people from India’s North-East living in South India and Pune for their home in the North-East due to nervousness caused by threats of retaliation against them for the recent anti-Muslim violence in Assam.

6.India continues to suspect that the psy-jihad propaganda backed by consciously exaggerated stories and morphed images, which led to the violence and the nervous exodus, originated from Pakistan, but the usual urge to blame the State of Pakistan for such anti-Indian impulses has been kept under control. There has been an admission that the initial allegations made against the State of Pakistan by officials of India’s Ministry of Home Affairs have not been corroborated by subsequent evidence. It was because of this that our Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Sigh did not raise this issue, as he was originally expected to, in his talks with President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan in the margins of the recent NAM summit in Tehran.

7. There have been fresh suspicions of possible Pakistani State involvement in the activities of 18 Indian Muslim suspects taken into custody since August 29 in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra on charges of planning to assassinate some Hindu personalities in Bengaluru and Hyderabad. But, these suspicions are being articulated in a muted form and not from the roof-top so that they do not come in the way of the improving bilateral vibrations.

8. The vibrations are becoming better and better----whether between the political leaders or civilian officials of the two countries. One could see a growing conviction among the political leaders and civilian officials of Pakistan that their anti-India reflexes have started becoming counter-productive. There is as yet no evidence to show that this conviction is shared by the Pakistan Army, which continues to dominate decision-making in matters relating to India.

9. There is continuing suspicion in Pakistan’s Army and Inter-services Intelligence about the intentions of India towards Pakistan. The diminution of anti-Indian malice is yet to be felt in the Armed Forces and the military intelligence agencies. Unless they realise the importance and benefits of relations marked less by malice and more by friendship, the increasing hopes of a better tomorrow in Indo-Pakistan relations may still be belied.

10. But even in the Army and the ISI there has been no attempt to create complications in the efforts to find solutions to bilateral issues. The Army and the ISI have kept the terrorist weapon intact, but have not used it in Indian territory after 26/11.They have been creating for themselves fresh capabilities for violence and instability in Jammu and Kashmir as evidenced by the recent discovery of their attempts to construct tunnels for infiltration of terrorists into J&K, but they have refrained from creating fresh pockets of violence in the State.

11. The improvement in the ambiance marked by the greater focus on opportunities for bilateral trade and easier visa procedures shows a welcome shift away by the political and civilian leadership in both  the countries from the past policy of not letting new areas of convergence emerge till the areas of  divergence have been satisfactorily tackled.

12. The divergence on traditional issues remains, but there is a search for new areas of convergence. The talks of Shri Krishna in Islamabad should keep the focus on this search for new areas of convergence.

13. The Pakistanis continue to be keen for an early visit by Dr.Manmohan Singh to their country. Since the visit of Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Islamabad in January 2004 to attend the SAARC summit, no Indian Prime Minister has gone there. The hopes that were there that he might now consider going despite the lack of progress on substantive issues and Pakistani inaction against terrorism have somewhat dimmed because of the uncertain political situation in India. One had the impression of seeing in Tehran an extra-cautious Dr.Manmohan Singh. His usually warm vibrations towards Pakistan were kept under check.

14. If political developments in India make an early poll inevitable, the handling of relations with Pakistan could acquire a different dimension and different priority.

15. Despite this, one could hope for a continuance of the trend towards less malice in the bilateral relations  as a result of the visit of our Foreign Minister. ( 7-9-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)

PM AND THE MEDIA

 

B.RAMAN

 

I can’t claim to know Mr.Simon Denyer, the New Delhi correspondent of  the “Washington Post”. I had met him and his headquarters-based News Editor during a long off-the-record discussion at New Delhi in April.

2. His News Editor had come to India for doing a story and he and  Simon went around meeting people in important positions for a discussion on the state of India.

3. I found them to be pleasant and friendly. They were both very well-informed on India. They came well-prepared for the discussions. On the whole, I had an impression that they were professionals to their finger-tips, well disposed towards India.

4.A despatch of Simon on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh carried by his paper on September 5,2012, has received mixed comments in New Delhi. It has been very critical of the Prime Minister’s style of leadership. Official circles in the entourage of the Prime Minister are reported to have been unhappy about the way the despatch has projected the Prime Minister in negative colours.

5. There is ill-concealed glee among the Prime Minister’s critics and political adversaries over the despatch. Their attitude seems to be: “:It serves the Prime minister right.”

6. For over a year now, the Prime Minister has come under severe criticism even from non-political persons in India over what is seen as his ineffective leadership style, marked by an inability to formulate and articulate policies and to interact with confidence with the people and the media.

7. In recent weeks, this criticism is being increasingly reflected in foreign media. As a result, the halo that he had acquired in his first term as one of the economic wizards of the world whose views are sought even by the developed countries of the world is slowly disappearing.

8. In all international summits on the state of the global economy during his first term, he had the pride of place in the head table as the Prime Minister of India taking the country forward with wisdom and determination. He  still has a place in the head table, but minus the aura. There is an  anxiety  in official circles in Delhi that the “Washington Post” despatch could add to the attrition of the aura.

9.From a perusal of some tweets sent to his followers by Simon, one could see that his despatch was based on his assessment and insights. He did not have the benefit of a discussion with the Prime Minister or any of the senior officials in the Prime Minister’s Office. According to his tweets, he did seek a meeting  with them before sending his despatch, but there was no response. He had no other option but to send his despatch without the views of the Prime Minister or his entourage.

10. The case brings out in bold relief the defective media strategy of the PMO in his second term as the Prime Minister. During his first term, he had in Dr.Sanjaya Baru, an activist and always-on-the-go media advisor, who compensated for the Prime Minister’s reticence to interact with the media.

11. Dr. Baru did manage to organise two Press conferences during which the Prime Minister gave a charming assessment of his own performance since he assumed charge. He hardly gave any one-to-one interview, either on or off the record, but Dr. Baru sought to make up for this by actively interacting off-the-record with senior journalists to explain the Prime Minister’s thinking and policies. The senior journalists were not able to get the Prime Minister’s version from the horse’s mouth, but got it indirectly through Dr.Baru.

12. In 2008, Dr. Baru joined a Singapore think tank. The media advisors, who succeeded him in the PMO, were not proactive as Dr. Baru was. They were unduly defensive and protective and did not realise the importance of perception projection and correction through regular interactions with the media. Instead of encouraging the Prime Minister to give up his propensity for silence and reticence, they tended to strengthen it by failing to adopt a proactive media interaction policy.

13. The only occasion journalists had for interacting with him was on board his aircraft during his foreign travels, Since foreign correspondents did not accompany him on his foreign travels, they had no opportunity of interacting with the Prime Minister and picking his brains.

14. During the last one year, there has been an increasingly negative projection of the Prime Minister partly due to his bad style of leadership at a time of cascading crises and partly due to the lack of interactions between the media and the Prime Minister or senior officials of his office.

15.The Prime Minister and his officials do not seem to realise the importance of such interactions in order to let the media and the people in India and abroad have a clear perception of the state of the nation and what the Prime Minister intends doing to deal with the various issues confronting the Government.

16. The lack of a corrective due to the unwillingness of the Prime Minister or his senior officials to meet Simon has resulted in a one-sided despatch, which reflects the views of people outside the PMO without projecting the views of the PMO.

17. Many of us have been repeatedly stressing the importance of a new and more open media strategy to prevent wrong perceptions of the state of the nation and the Prime Minister’s ability to overcome the crises confronting the nation.

18. Unfortunately, the Prime Minister and his officials have been continuing in their old ways, hoping that somehow these negative perceptions will dissipate on their own. It is hoped that the discomfiture caused by Simon’s despatch will lead to the adoption of a proactive media strategy.

19. This may please be read in continuation of my article of January 27,2012, suggesting the appointment of a Task Force on a new media strategy available at  http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.in/2012/01/need-for-task-force-on-pms-media.html ( 5-9-12)

(The  writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com  Twitter @SORBONNE75)