B.RAMAN
China, which already has a new party leadership
since the Party Congress in November last, will be having a new State
leadership from next month.
2.Mr.Xi Jinping, who took over as the General
Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chairman of its Central
Military Commission (CMC) in November last, will be taking over as the State
President from Mr.Hu Jintao at the end of the National People’s Congress (NPC)
next month. Mr.Li Kekiyang will be taking over as the Prime Minister from
Mr.Wen Jiabao.
3. One does not know much about the personal leadership
style of Li , but from what one had seen since November, Xi will not be a
carbon copy of Hu. He is more smiling and relaxed, more forthcoming, less
bureaucratic and less formal in his interactions with his colleagues and
juniors.
4. He believes that military strength comes out of
economic strength and that further developing the Chinese economy should have
the primacy of attention. He also realises that China’s economic gains might be
diluted if corruption is not controlled and that corruption among public
servants comes not only out of greed, but also out of an unhealthy desire for
status. Austerity in personal and public
life is, therefore, stressed by him..
5. During his first visit to Guangdong after taking
over, many noticed the conscious lack of ostentation in his travels and
interactions. Lack of ostentation is emerging as a defining characteristic of
his leadership style. It remains to be seen whether he is able to retain it as
the State President.
6.In China, the leadership transition takes
different routes in the Centre at Beijing and in the provinces. At Beijing, it
takes place first in the party and then in the State. In the provinces, it
often takes place first in the provincial administration and then in the Party.
As a result, one can err in assessments.
7. In Tibet, for example, hardliners owing loyalty
to Hu and his policies, have moved into new leadership positions in the
administration. From this, it will be wrong to conclude that the hardline
policies of Hu will be followed by Xi too. In the provinces as in Beijing it is
the party that exercises the command and control over the administration. We
have to wait to see what kind of party leadership emerges in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia before
assessing whether we might see new minority policies with Xi characteristics.
8. Under the leaderships of Mr.Jiang Zemin and Hu
for nearly two decades, one had seen two constants in Chinese foreign policy----
the anxiety to keep in step with the US and the EU in economic matters sans
allowing nationalistic urges to distort its economic policies and to keep
testing the waters for a more assertive role in the region without needlessly
provoking the US. These constants, which are adjudged by the CPC as in its
national interests, are likely to continue under Xi too.
9. Four other constants are also likely to
continue---- the strengthening of strategic and economic relations with Russia
and India, keeping a wary eye on Japan and slowly expanding its interests in
Pakistan. Pakistan will continue to be an important factor in China’s South
Asia policy and we have to keep a wary eye on it. It will be suicidal to think
that China’s interest in Pakistan will ultimately decline. It won’t.
10. The new Party leadership has already made it
clear that there will be no dilution of its territorial sovereignty claims
vis-à-vis Japan in the East China Sea, some ASEAN countries in the South China
Sea and India across the Himalayan border. It will follow nuanced approaches in
relation to Japan, the ASEAN countries and India. While it has not hesitated to
make vigorous policy moves in relation to its claims in East and South China
Sea, it has avoided a confrontational posture towards India.
11. China, under the new leadership, will continue
to maintain peace and tranquility across the Sino-Indian border without making
any unilateral concessions in the Arunachal Pradesh sector. Keeping the issue
alive without letting it become a tinder-box will be the policy.
12.China does not have a policy of countering India
by developing a foothold in South Asia. Rather South Asian countries have a policy of countering India
by inviting China to their lands. China has no policy of a necklace of pearls
in the region, but the countries of the region have separately and independently been following a policy of
putting a Chinese shackle on Indian hegemonistic urges. How are we going to
deal with it?
13.It is in our interest to keep the Tibetan heart
beating in this region. Decades of suppressive policy from the days Hu was
posted as the party in charge for Tibet
have not been able to crush the independent spirit of the Tibetan youth and
monks and their desire for the return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Lhasa. The
self-immolations since 2009, which have reached the figure of 99, are an
indication of the total failure of the Chinese suppressive policy in the Tibetan
areas. Suppressive policies towards the Uighurs in the Xinjiang province have
also failed to produce results. One hears reports of stirrings of
ethnic/Buddhist separatism in Inner
Mongolia.
14. Under the leaderships of Jiang and Hu which
came to power after Deng Xiao-Ping, China has emerged as a major economic and
military power of the region, but the suppressive minority policies inspired
and fashioned by Hu with his experience of association with Tibet have made
China’s peripheral areas inhabited by ethnic, religious and cultural
minorities, despite their economic development, pockets of increasing anti-Han alienation.
Hu’s rigid line on talks with the representatives of His Holiness has led to an indefinite
suspension of these talks.
15. Without
more liberal and empathetic minority policies China’s periphery will
continue to be its Achilles Heel. Now that Hu will no longer be there, can one
expect a policy change in a positive direction? Xi has not given an indication
on this subject so far either at the November Party Congress or subsequently.
He seems to believe like other Han leaders that rapid economic development and
integration will weaken separatist sentiments. Tibet has shown that this is
unlikely to happen.
16. Without showing an open interest in
developments in the Tibetan areas, India has to find ways of quietly working
for more empathetic policies by the new Chinese leadership.
17.There have to be two constants in India’s relations
with China. We must continue to expand and strengthen the economic bridges with
China and the regional co-operation mechanisms with which both countries are
associated. Secondly, taking advantage of the more nuanced Chinese attitude to
India in relation to the border dispute, which is less contentious as compared
to its attitude to its sovereignty disputes in the East and South China Seas,
we should be exploring the possibility of mutually acceptable border adjustments in the
Arunachal Pradesh Sector instead of depending on an eternal status quo.
18.China prefers the status quo presently because
its military position in Tibet, while steadily improving, does not give it
overwhelming superiority against us. It should be the objective of our military
policies that China, either on its own or through its increasing presence in
Pakistan, is not able to achieve such overwhelming superiority. China’s
interest in the status quo and in peace and tranquility across the Himalayan
border will remain only so long as it has no asymmetric advantage over India.
To deny it such an asymmetric advantage should be the aim of our quest for new
dimensions of strategic relations with the US, Vietnam, Japan, and Australia. Our head-start over China in
the Indian Ocean Region has to be maintained in co-operation with the US and
Australia.
19. How to achieve a new web of strategic
relationships without weakening the present momentum towards better bilateral
relations is the challenge before our diplomacy and military strategists as we
seek to engage the new Chinese leadership. (3-2-13)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for
Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China
Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
