INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.714
B.RAMAN
At a media briefing held in Washington on May 2,2011, John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, answered questions regarding the chopper-borne special operations carried out by the US Navy Seals on the night of May 1,2011, during which Osama bin Laden was killed. There were a large number of questions regarding the likely implications of OBL being found living at Abbotabad, an important garrison town in which the Pakistan Military Academy is located. There were also questions regarding when Pakistan was informed about the operation and other operational details. In this note, I have extracted details of the likely implications of OBL being found living in Abbotabad.
2.From the answers given by him three points are clear: Firstly, the US has been interacting with Pakistani officials to determine whether there was any prior knowledge or complicity at any level of the Pakistani administration. Secondly, the US continues to attach importance to its strategic relations with Pakistan.Counter-terrorism co-operation is one component of that strategic relationship. Thirdly, incidents keep arising in the counter-terrorism co-operation.OBL being found living in Abbotabad is the latest such incident.He praised Pakistan's over-all co-operation in counter-terrorism. (3-5-2011)
EXTRACTS
Question:And if I could just ask, have you been able to determine how bin Laden was able to hide in this relatively prominent location, and do you believe the Pakistanis when they say that they had no idea that he was there?
John Brennan: People have been referring to this as hiding in plain sight. Clearly this was something that was considered as a possibility. Pakistan is a large country. We are looking right now at how he was able to hold out there for so long, and whether or not there was any type of support system within Pakistan that allowed him to stay there.
We know that the people at the compound there were working on his behalf, and that’s how we ultimately found our way to that compound. But we are right now less than 24 hours after this operation, so we are talking with the Pakistanis on a regular basis now, and we're going to pursue all leads to find out exactly what type of support system and benefactors that bin Laden might have had.
Q.But you don’t necessarily take them at their word that they didn’t know?
John Brennan: We are pursuing all leads in this issue.
Q.Just to follow on that, is it really credible that Pakistani authorities had no idea that this compound was being built and that it existed -- such an elaborate compound?
John Brennan: I think it’s inconceivable that bin Laden did not have a support system in the country that allowed him to remain there for an extended period of time. I am not going to speculate about what type of support he might have had on an official basis inside of Pakistan. We are closely talking to the Pakistanis right now, and again, we are leaving open opportunities to continue to pursue whatever leads might be out there.
Q.Can you tell us more about the role that the U.S. -- more of the role of how the U.S. is interacting with Pakistan and are we actively investigating what they knew and didn’t know about Osama bin Laden being there or not?
John Brennan: Well, a couple things. One, the President mentioned yesterday that he spoke to President Zardari, and a number of senior U.S. officials are in regular contact now with their Pakistani counterparts. We are continuing to engage with them -- we’re engaging with them today -- as we learn more about the compound and whatever type of support system bin Laden had.
I would point out that we’ve had differences of view with the Pakistani government on counterterrorism cooperation, on areas of cooperation, and what we think they should and shouldn’t be doing. At the same time, I’ll say that Pakistan has been responsible for capturing and killing more terrorists inside of Pakistan than any country, and it’s by a wide margin. And there have been many, many brave Pakistani soldiers, security officials, as well as citizens, who have given their lives because of the terrorism scourge in that country. So although there are some differences of view with Pakistan, we believe that that partnership is critically important to breaking the back of al Qaeda and eventually prevailing over al Qaeda as well as associated terrorist groups.
Q.And so today lawmakers are urging -- possibly reconsidering or reevaluating aid to Pakistan, maybe attaching strings to military aid there. Was the White House --
John Brennan: I think people are raising a number of questions, and understandably so. Again, we’re in just the first day after the operation, and he was found in Abbottabad outside of Islamabad. I’m sure a number of people have questions about whether or not there was some type of support that was provided by the Pakistani government. So I think people are raising these questions and how we’re going to have to deal with them.
QCan I ask one follow? You mentioned that questions are going to be raised about Pakistan, understandably, and the role of Pakistan. For you and your counterterrorism job, given now the history of the Raymond Davis episode and the fact that this was done without consultation, are you concerned that in just in your line of work it will be very difficult to reestablish a good working relationship with the ISI or the intelligence authorities there?
John Brennan: There’s dialogue going on with our counterterrorism counterparts in the aftermath of this. They’re expressing understanding about the reasons why we did this. They are appreciative that it was done without having Pakistani casualties outside of that compound. The U.S.-Pakistani relationship, which is a strategic relationship, goes on a number of different areas and levels; counterterrorism is one of them. It can be a complicated matter. As I say, we don’t always agree on some of the things that we want to do. But through that continued dialogue and communication, I think we get where we need to be.
This is one more incident that we’re going to have to deal with, and we look forward to continue to work with our Pakistani colleagues, because they are as much, if not more, on the front lines of the battle against terrorism.
Q.Since the death of bin Laden, what is the thought of this administration -- do you believe that the Pakistani government was transparent and being honest and forthcoming, given the information that they have now on Osama bin Laden -- what they knew, or going in to finding out more about this situation?
John Brennan: There are a lot of people within the Pakistani government, and I’m not going to speculate about who or if any of them had prior knowledge about bin Laden being in Abbottabad. But certainly his location there outside of the capital raises questions. We are talking to the Pakistanis about this. But they, at least in our discussions with them, seem as surprised as we were initially that bin Laden was holding out in that area.
q.You spoke earlier about using this as kind of a pivot point to demonstrate to the people of Pakistan that al Qaeda has passed, that there's a different future. Is the President still firmly committed to visiting Pakistan this year to make that message in person?
John Brennan: I’m not going to address the President’s schedule. I think there's a commitment that the President has made that he is intending to visit Pakistan. A lot depends on availability, scheduling, whatever. The President feels very strongly that the people of Pakistan need to be able to realize their potential to have a life that is full of security as well as prosperity. And because of the al Qaeda menace as well as other militant organizations in that country, too many Pakistanis have suffered and have died because of that. And what the President is wanting to do and what we’re doing with the Pakistani government is to see what we can do to help the Pakistani government provide that type of lifestyle for their populace in the future.
Mr. Brennan, in light of the size of this -- the unique features and the size of this compound, is it likely that the neighbors had known anything about this, who lived there?
John Brennan: When you look at the features of this compound, these very high walls -- 12-, 16-, 18-foot walls, barbed wire on the top, this was a family, this was a compound that had very limited interaction, to the best of our knowledge and observation, with the surrounding houses. But it clearly was different than any other house out there. It had the appearance of sort of a fortress, so it does raise questions about --
q.Did they help them -- basically?
John Brennan: Well, I think there was -- we have had some indications that the family that was there tried to remain anonymous and tried not to have that interaction. But again, it does raise questions about a compound of that size in this area not raising suspicions previously.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, May 2, 2011
OSAMA BIN LADEN'S DEATH : Q & A
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.713
B.RAMAN
Question:Was the operation that was carried out by the US Special Forces against Osama bin Laden resulting in his death at Abbotabad in Pakistan on the night of May1 an exclusive US operation or was it a joint US-Pak operation?
A: Till now the indications are that it was an exclusive US operation. Since it involved the ingress of the US specal forces into Pakistani territory by air in helicopters, it was likely that Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), was informed before the helicopters with the special forces took off from Afghanistan for the raid even though US officials have reportedly been asserting that Pakistan was informed only after the helicopters had taken off at the end of the operation. When the Bill Clinton Administration launched the Cruise missile strikes on the traininmg camps of Al Qaeda in the Jalalabad area of Afghanistan in 1998 they followed a similar procedure. Gen Anthony Zinni, the then Commanding Officer of the US Central Command, flew to Islamabad from a US naval ship and informed Gen.Jehangir Karamat, the then COAS, about the impending raid. The US did so to make sure that Pakistan did not interpret that the missile had been launched by India and order a missile strike against India. A similar precaution was likely to have been taken this time too. Moreover, Abbotabad, an important military garrison town, has high air defence cover. It was important to prevent a messy air defence action by Pakistan against the US helicopters if its radars had detected their approach. The entire operation lasted a little over two hours. Durung this period, one of the helicopters crashed. It was blown up and destroyed by the special forces.A newsletter disseminated by a retired US naval officer says:"Source says actual crash sight was on Kakul Road, Abbottabod, Pakistan just down from the Pakistan Military Academy exercise grounds. See image for road, which was reportedly blocked off by local security after the incident. Folks in the city mentioned on Twitter at the time that the action was very, very close to the PMA." This would indicate that during the entire operation on the ground, which lasted over 90 minutes if one excludes the time taken by the choppers for their to and fro journey, the Pakistani security forces did not intervene and try to find out what was going on. The local police blocked the stretch of the road where the helicopter had crashed to prevent onlookers rushing there till the Americans had destroyed the chopper. All this clearly shows that the Pakistanis must have had advance knowledge of the operation and had instructions from above not to intervene.
Has the US undertaken similar operations deep inside Pakistan before?
A. Yes thrice before. Twice in 2002 in Faislabad and Karachi to capture Abu Zubaida and Ramzi Binalshibh respectively and once in 2003 in Rawalpindi to capture Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM).
How did those operations differ from the latest operation to kill OBL?
A. The three previous operations were joint US-Pakistan operations with the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) playing the leadership role. The raids were organised on the basis of technical intelligence (TECHINT) collected by the US agencies due to the careless use of mobile telephones by the three arrested persons. The latest operation against OBL seems to have been an exclusive US operation with the prior knowledge of Pakistan, but with no Pakistani role in its planning and execution. Since OBL was not using any communication equipment such as mobile telephone, Internet etc in his hide-out, no Technical Intelligence would have been possible. It seems to have been mounted purely on the basis of Human Intelligence (HUMINT). The success of the operation speaks very highly of the improvement in the HUMINT capability of the US agencies.
Wherefrom could the HUMINT have come?
A.Abbotabad is a Hazara town. The Hazaras are strongly against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban because of the massacre of the Hazaras, many of whom are Shias, in East Afghanistan when the Taliban was in power in Kabul. It is likely that the local Hazara community might have played a role in assisting the US in its OBL hunt. In fact, it is surprising that OBL took shelter in that town despite the strong presence of the Hazaras there. No explanation for this has been forthcoming so far.
Is it possible that the ISI might have played a role in the collection of the HUMINT?
A. Difficult to answer this question.
How come the huge mansion in which OBL was reportedly living did not attract suspicion as it was being constructed in 2005?
A.Difficult to explain it unless the mansion had been constructed by a retired senior General of the Army as his farm house and then given on rent to OBL's family with or without the knowledge that it was the family of OBL.
For how long OBL must have been living in the mansion?
A.According to US media reports, the house had been under watch by the US since Auguat last year. Obama gave the order for the operation on April 29 on the receipt of precise information that OBL was inside the mansion. This would give rise to the possibility that Osama's family had been living in the mansion at least since last August, that OBL had been visiting them off and on and that Obama gave the order for the operation after receiving information in the last week of April that OBL had come to visit his family. This is what happened in the case of Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) who was killed in a Drone strike. His wife and children were living with her father. Baitullah was visiting them off and on. The Americans had reportedly managed to find out the details of the car of Baitullah. One day they received information that Baitullah's car was parked outside his in-laws' house. They directed a missile strike at it. Baitullah was among those killed. In the case of OBL, they did not make a missile strike. Instead, they sent a spl. forces team to kill OBL in a fire-fight.
Was there an official Pakistani complicity in OBL's living in Abbotabad?
A.The evidence till now is circumstantial and not direct. Why did OBL choose to live in Abbotabad despite the presence of a large number of Hazaras there? The only possible answer is because he felt confident his security would be assured there. He could have got this confidence only if had the support of some sections of the local security agencies and/or the police and also of some local elements of the non-Hazara segment of the population. This is more speculative than of any evidentiary value. The direct evidence could come from the interrogation of those arrested alive from the mansion by the US spl forces.
What impact this will have on US relations with Pakistan?
The US already has considerable suspicion that Pakistan has been playing a double game by dragging its feet on the issue of action against Al Qaeda. This suspicion will now be further strengthened. The smoking gun in the form of OBL's dead body has clearly established that OBL was living in an urban town of Pakistan. Was he living there with the knowledge or collusion of the Pakistani security agencies? There is no smoking gun on this yet. Unless that becoms available, the US would find it difficult to act against the State of Pakistan. The relations will continue as before with ups and downs and with alternating praise for action taken and reprimands for actions not taken.
Will the death of OBL be the end of Al Qaeda?
A. No.Since 9/11, Al Qaeda is already a weakened organisation due to repeated Drone strikes on its hide-outs and capture of some of its leaders on the ground in Pakistan. This process of weakening that has been there since 2002 could acquire pace and strength as a result of the death of OBL. Despite this, Al Qaeda, by itself, will remain a potent force for some years to come until it suffers more attrition.
Will it have any impact on Obama's plans to start thinning out troops from Afghanistan? Will it enable or tempt Obama to accelerate the process?
A. No. Obama's decisions relating to Afghanistan will depend on the evolution of the ground situation in Afghanistan and on the proved ability of the Afghan National Army to withstand pressure from the Taliban.
What are the dangers of reprisal attacks by Al Qaeda and its affiliates?
A.High in the Af-Pak region. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al Qaeda affiliates like the Lashksar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) will presume that the Pakistani security forces must have co-operated with the US. Acts of suicide terrorism against the Pakistani security forces and US nationals and interests in Pakistan could increase.
High against US nationals and interests in other countries.
Medium to low in the US homeland. ( 2-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Question:Was the operation that was carried out by the US Special Forces against Osama bin Laden resulting in his death at Abbotabad in Pakistan on the night of May1 an exclusive US operation or was it a joint US-Pak operation?
A: Till now the indications are that it was an exclusive US operation. Since it involved the ingress of the US specal forces into Pakistani territory by air in helicopters, it was likely that Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), was informed before the helicopters with the special forces took off from Afghanistan for the raid even though US officials have reportedly been asserting that Pakistan was informed only after the helicopters had taken off at the end of the operation. When the Bill Clinton Administration launched the Cruise missile strikes on the traininmg camps of Al Qaeda in the Jalalabad area of Afghanistan in 1998 they followed a similar procedure. Gen Anthony Zinni, the then Commanding Officer of the US Central Command, flew to Islamabad from a US naval ship and informed Gen.Jehangir Karamat, the then COAS, about the impending raid. The US did so to make sure that Pakistan did not interpret that the missile had been launched by India and order a missile strike against India. A similar precaution was likely to have been taken this time too. Moreover, Abbotabad, an important military garrison town, has high air defence cover. It was important to prevent a messy air defence action by Pakistan against the US helicopters if its radars had detected their approach. The entire operation lasted a little over two hours. Durung this period, one of the helicopters crashed. It was blown up and destroyed by the special forces.A newsletter disseminated by a retired US naval officer says:"Source says actual crash sight was on Kakul Road, Abbottabod, Pakistan just down from the Pakistan Military Academy exercise grounds. See image for road, which was reportedly blocked off by local security after the incident. Folks in the city mentioned on Twitter at the time that the action was very, very close to the PMA." This would indicate that during the entire operation on the ground, which lasted over 90 minutes if one excludes the time taken by the choppers for their to and fro journey, the Pakistani security forces did not intervene and try to find out what was going on. The local police blocked the stretch of the road where the helicopter had crashed to prevent onlookers rushing there till the Americans had destroyed the chopper. All this clearly shows that the Pakistanis must have had advance knowledge of the operation and had instructions from above not to intervene.
Has the US undertaken similar operations deep inside Pakistan before?
A. Yes thrice before. Twice in 2002 in Faislabad and Karachi to capture Abu Zubaida and Ramzi Binalshibh respectively and once in 2003 in Rawalpindi to capture Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM).
How did those operations differ from the latest operation to kill OBL?
A. The three previous operations were joint US-Pakistan operations with the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) playing the leadership role. The raids were organised on the basis of technical intelligence (TECHINT) collected by the US agencies due to the careless use of mobile telephones by the three arrested persons. The latest operation against OBL seems to have been an exclusive US operation with the prior knowledge of Pakistan, but with no Pakistani role in its planning and execution. Since OBL was not using any communication equipment such as mobile telephone, Internet etc in his hide-out, no Technical Intelligence would have been possible. It seems to have been mounted purely on the basis of Human Intelligence (HUMINT). The success of the operation speaks very highly of the improvement in the HUMINT capability of the US agencies.
Wherefrom could the HUMINT have come?
A.Abbotabad is a Hazara town. The Hazaras are strongly against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban because of the massacre of the Hazaras, many of whom are Shias, in East Afghanistan when the Taliban was in power in Kabul. It is likely that the local Hazara community might have played a role in assisting the US in its OBL hunt. In fact, it is surprising that OBL took shelter in that town despite the strong presence of the Hazaras there. No explanation for this has been forthcoming so far.
Is it possible that the ISI might have played a role in the collection of the HUMINT?
A. Difficult to answer this question.
How come the huge mansion in which OBL was reportedly living did not attract suspicion as it was being constructed in 2005?
A.Difficult to explain it unless the mansion had been constructed by a retired senior General of the Army as his farm house and then given on rent to OBL's family with or without the knowledge that it was the family of OBL.
For how long OBL must have been living in the mansion?
A.According to US media reports, the house had been under watch by the US since Auguat last year. Obama gave the order for the operation on April 29 on the receipt of precise information that OBL was inside the mansion. This would give rise to the possibility that Osama's family had been living in the mansion at least since last August, that OBL had been visiting them off and on and that Obama gave the order for the operation after receiving information in the last week of April that OBL had come to visit his family. This is what happened in the case of Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) who was killed in a Drone strike. His wife and children were living with her father. Baitullah was visiting them off and on. The Americans had reportedly managed to find out the details of the car of Baitullah. One day they received information that Baitullah's car was parked outside his in-laws' house. They directed a missile strike at it. Baitullah was among those killed. In the case of OBL, they did not make a missile strike. Instead, they sent a spl. forces team to kill OBL in a fire-fight.
Was there an official Pakistani complicity in OBL's living in Abbotabad?
A.The evidence till now is circumstantial and not direct. Why did OBL choose to live in Abbotabad despite the presence of a large number of Hazaras there? The only possible answer is because he felt confident his security would be assured there. He could have got this confidence only if had the support of some sections of the local security agencies and/or the police and also of some local elements of the non-Hazara segment of the population. This is more speculative than of any evidentiary value. The direct evidence could come from the interrogation of those arrested alive from the mansion by the US spl forces.
What impact this will have on US relations with Pakistan?
The US already has considerable suspicion that Pakistan has been playing a double game by dragging its feet on the issue of action against Al Qaeda. This suspicion will now be further strengthened. The smoking gun in the form of OBL's dead body has clearly established that OBL was living in an urban town of Pakistan. Was he living there with the knowledge or collusion of the Pakistani security agencies? There is no smoking gun on this yet. Unless that becoms available, the US would find it difficult to act against the State of Pakistan. The relations will continue as before with ups and downs and with alternating praise for action taken and reprimands for actions not taken.
Will the death of OBL be the end of Al Qaeda?
A. No.Since 9/11, Al Qaeda is already a weakened organisation due to repeated Drone strikes on its hide-outs and capture of some of its leaders on the ground in Pakistan. This process of weakening that has been there since 2002 could acquire pace and strength as a result of the death of OBL. Despite this, Al Qaeda, by itself, will remain a potent force for some years to come until it suffers more attrition.
Will it have any impact on Obama's plans to start thinning out troops from Afghanistan? Will it enable or tempt Obama to accelerate the process?
A. No. Obama's decisions relating to Afghanistan will depend on the evolution of the ground situation in Afghanistan and on the proved ability of the Afghan National Army to withstand pressure from the Taliban.
What are the dangers of reprisal attacks by Al Qaeda and its affiliates?
A.High in the Af-Pak region. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al Qaeda affiliates like the Lashksar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) will presume that the Pakistani security forces must have co-operated with the US. Acts of suicide terrorism against the Pakistani security forces and US nationals and interests in Pakistan could increase.
High against US nationals and interests in other countries.
Medium to low in the US homeland. ( 2-5-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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