B.RAMAN
I found during my recent interactions in New Delhi
that our strategic thinking continues to be largely enchained to ground-based
perceptions and that we are unable to reach for the skies and the seas. The
skies and the seas have realities of their own distinct from ground realities. Unless
we are able to perceive them in due measure and make them an integral part of
our strategic thinking and planning, any exercise to modernise the national
security mechanism will remain unsatisfactory.
2.Yes, there is a greater appreciation of the importance
of cyber space as a new dimension of our strategic biosphere, but beyond that
the thinking is largely uni-dimensional and classic. The 26/11 terrorist
strikes in Mumbai have imparted a welcome tactical dimension to our seaward
security vision, but there is still no strategic seaward vision.
3.My references during these interactions to the
need to give a seaward dimension to our intelligence capabilities found no
enthusiastic takers and thinkers.
4. The recent statements of Mr.Leon Panetta, the US
Defence Secretary, during his swing across Asia covering Singapore, Vietnam,
India and Afghanistan have triggered off a fascinating debate among the
strategic and tactical thinkers of China. They have been taken by surprise by
the US decision to reverse the thinning out of its naval presence in the
Asia-Pacific region and to work for a graduated naval surge under which by
2020, 60 per cent of the US naval fleet will be around the Asia-Pacific as
against 50 per cent presently.
5. It will be a mobile and not a stationery
strategy and one of its important objectives will be to limit the scope available
for the new activism of the Chinese Navy in the South and the East China Seas
and the Indian Ocean. Euphoric Chinese perceptions of the past regarding their
naval strength consequent upon the induction of a re-conditioned
aircraft-carrier and missiles capable of immobilising US aircraft carriers have
received a jolt. Chinese expectations that the US role in countering the
Chinese designs in the South China Sea will be confined to a mix of the
diplomatic and naval muscles of the US have been belied. Panetta has made it
clear that China will have to reckon with the US naval muscle if it does not
play the game by the rules laid down by the international community.
6. There is some confusion in Chinese strategic
circles. There is a tacit admission that they have been taken by surprise and
that this is because Chinese strategic thinking is largely influenced by ground
and not sea realities. Despite the emergence of China as a major economic and
military power, their understanding of the sea realities remains limited and
inadequate.
7. This is true in the case of India too though we
may not admit it as readily as the Chinese do in between the lines. Strategic
thinking can never be static. It has to be constantly evolving in keeping with
the times and ahead of the times.
8. Our naval strategy has not been static. It has
been dynamic though one may miss the required measure of dynamism befitting an
aspiring power facing a multitude of threats. It has evolved since 1994 from
the focus on the waters to the East of India to cover the waters to the West too
after the brunt of the threat from piracy moved from the East to the West.
9. The new US naval strategy outlined by Mr.Panetta
has led to a re-think in China. Its objective is how to counter it in order to
protect Chinese interests. There is a need for a quick re-think in India too,
but its objective should be how to benefit from it in order to facilitate our
pursuit of our national interests.
10. The proposed US emphasis on mobility and not
fixed bases, more frequent joint naval exercises and bilateral naval
partnerships could provide scope for India to have a parallel strategy to work
in tandem with the US Navy without creating an impression of ganging up with
the US Navy against China.
11. There is a need for a new naval strategy that
would take into account the US plans by 2020 and our assessment of how the
Chinese are likely to respond and come
out with a new naval strategy with Indian characteristics. This has to be a
time-bound exercise to be undertaken by our Naval Headquarters in order to
identify options available to India. (12-6-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director,
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China
Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )