WIKILEAKS: INFORMATION OF INTEREST TO INDIA---PRE-2010 DOCUMENTS

B.RAMAN

Wikileaks has claimed to have received from its source 251,287 documents, which are mainly diplomatic cables of a classification lower than “Top Secret” exchanged between the US State Department and its diplomatic missions abroad. It has given advance access to these documents to “The New York Times”, the “Guardian” of the UK, “Der Spiegel” of Germany, “Le Monde” of France and “El Pais” of Spain. They have already come out on November 28 with a summary of the significant points in the documents given to them. The summaries published by “The New York Times” and “the Guardian” have been reproduced by “The Hindu” of Chennai on November 29. These summaries do not contain any information or comments, which could embarrass India. According to the media, 3038 of the cables in the possession of Wikileaks were exchanged between the US State Department and the US Embassy in New Delhi. These cables have not been uploaded by Wikileaks . In fact, it has uploaded only 220 of the 251,287cables so far. None of them was from the US Embassy in New Delhi. I had earlier extracted information of interest to India contained in the cables of January and February,2010. Wikileaks does not appear to have received from its source or sources any cables from March, 2010 onwards. Information of interest to India extracted from the cables uploaded by the Wikileaks, which relate to the period between 1966 and December,2009, is extracted below.

2009
At the regular meeting of G-5 Ambassadors in Beijing
May 8, French DCM Nicholas Chapuis reported that State
Councilor Dai Bingguo told visiting former French President
Chirac that the West would not gain from more sanctions on
North Korea. Dai reportedly said that "the lever of economic
development" had not been used effectively in Six-Party Talks
and that a U.S.-DPRK dialogue was "the only way to make
progress." German Ambassador Michael Schaefer reported that
Germany had informed China of the U.S. request to accept some
Uighur detainees held at Guantanamo and had been subsequently
warned by China of "a heavy burden on bilateral relations" if
Germany were to accept any detainees. Japanese DCM Kunio
Umeda reported that Premier Wen Jiabao was "tired and seemed
under a lot of pressure" during his meeting with visiting
Prime Minister Taro Aso, while President Hu Jintao was
"relaxed and confident." According to UK DCM Chris Wood,
China had requested the UK not allow the Dalai Lama to
transit London or meet with any government officials. Wood
reported that local authorities in Gansu Province had
detained a British Consul, reflecting the authorities' angst
over foreigners traveling to the Tibetan regions of the
province. End Summary.

Participants
------------

¶2. (C) French DCM Nicholas Chapuis hosted German Ambassador
Dr. Michael Schaefer, Japanese DCM Kunio Umeda, UK DCM Chris
Wood and Acting DCM May 8 for the regular gathering of
Beijing-based G-5 Chiefs of Mission.

Chirac's Visit to China, DPRK, Africa
-------------------------------------

¶3. (C) French DCM Nicholas Chapuis reported that President Hu
had not mentioned Tibet in his meeting with visiting former
French President Jacques Chirac. State Councilor Dai Bingguo
had told Chirac that the West would not gain from more
sanctions on North Korea and that a U.S.-DPRK dialogue was
"the only way to make progress" in Six-Party Talks. Dai
reportedly said that North Korea wanted to open up
economically and that the "lever of economic development" had
not been used effectively in Six-Party Talks. Dai suggested
to Chirac that, given China and France's "conflict of
interests" in Africa, the two countries should have a
dialogue on Africa.

Germany and Guantanamo Uighurs
------------------------------

¶4. (C) German Ambassador Schaefer said the German State
Secretary had informed China of the U.S. request to accept
some Uighur detainees held at Guantanamo, noting that Germany
had not made a decision regarding the Uighurs. He noted that
no German state had yet agreed to accept the detainees.
Ambassador Schaefer said China had not officially demarched
Germany but had warned Germany that accepting any Uighur
detainees would "put enormous pressure on Beijing and a heavy
burden on bilateral relations."

Sino-Japanese Relations
-----------------------

¶5. (C) Japanese DCM Kunio Umeda reported that PM Taro Aso,
who had visited Beijing April 29-30, had said Premier Wen
Jiabao was "very tired and seemed under a lot of pressure"
from dealing with the economic crisis, while President Hu
Jintao had seemed "confident and relaxed." PM Aso had
requested China not implement its planned compulsory
certification of IT products in China, while Premier Wen had
insisted the law was consistent with China's WTO commitments.

Dalai Lama
----------

¶6. (C) UK DCM Chris Wood reported that China had requested
the UK not allow the Dalai Lama to transit London but
softened the demarche by requesting that government officials
not meet the Dalai Lama if he were to transit the country.
French DCM Nicholas Chapuis said China's demarche was part of a campaign to limit the Dalai Lama's travel and noted that
the Beijing city government had threatened to break its
sister-city relationship with Paris if the Dalai Lama were to
receive an honorary citizen award from the French capital.
Ambassador Schaefer said Germany had not received such
demands from the Chinese, in spite of the Dalai Lama's
frequent trips to Germany.

Harassment of UK Embassy Staff in Gansu
---------------------------------------

¶7. (C) UK DCM Wood said UK Energy and Climate Change
Secretary Ed Miliband had recently visited Gansu Province and
had been accompanied by a British journalist from "The
Guardian." According to Woodward, local Chinese authorities
had briefly detained a British Consul to express displeasure
with the accompanying journalist, who had stayed in Gansu
without the authorities' permission after Secretary Miliband
had departed. "Local goons" had come to the traveling
delegation's hotel and threatened to follow a UK Embassy
female staffer (but did not). In addition, a British
"Financial Times" reporter in Sichuan had been harassed by
local authorities who were apparently upset by the
journalist's interest in reporting on schools destroyed
during the Sichuan earthquake.

Climate Change
--------------

¶8. (C) UK DCM Wood said the UK Environment and Science
Minister had recently had talks with Chinese officials on
climate change. In the llead up to Copenhagen, China would
not agree to targets on emissions but was willing to be
constructive and would come to Copenhagen with a package of
action items related to nuclear power, renewable energy and
reforestation. Wood said his impression was that China could
be induced to do more on climate change.

Rule of Law
-----------

¶9. (C) Ambassador Schaefer reported that German Minister of
Justice Brigitte Zypries recently had visited China to attend
a three-day rule of law dialogue on social security and
pensions that was attended by 45 Chinese lawyers and judges.
Schaefer said Germany and China would have another dialogue
on a proposed law on regulating lawyers, noting that the
Chinese Government was looking to give lawyers "more space"
without giving up control.


IRANIAN BALOCHISTAN

“Iran view from Baku” is the first in an occasional series from Embassy Baku Iran Watcher that will report on short and/or partially documented items of interest to Iran information consumers, but not necessarily warranting separate cables. This cable includes information on reported increasing security problems in Iranian Baluchistan, including alleged disruption of Iran-Pakistan railroad links; a message from a senior GOAJ military offical about the dangers of stirring up Iranian minorities; the apparent quadrupling in first quarter 2009 (compared to first quarter 2008) seizures in Azerbaijan of Iranian- transited heroin; and skepticism about Iranian gas export contracts, related by industry participants at the recently-completed Baku Oil and Gas show. End Summary.
Baluchi Violence Obstructing Iran-Pakistan Rail Link?
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶2. (C) Several Iranian contacts, including apolitical businessmen, have told Baku Iran watcher that the recent suicide bombing of a Sh’ia mosque, and subsequent attack on a campaign center in Zahedan, reflect a surge in Baluchi violence in the border area and inside Pakistan that has been building steadily over several years. According to one source, the Iranian security forces may be losing effective control over growing areas in the countryside. All noted that the rising violence in Iranian Baluchistan is mirrored and influenced by similar events on the Pakistani side of the border (recently described in ref(a)).
¶3. (C) One alleged result is the apparent postponement of completion of the long-planned improved rail link between Pakistan and Iran, designed to run through or near Baluchi territory on both sides of the border. The current rail connection, running between Quetta, Pakistan and Zahedan, Iran is in poor condition and has low freight-carrying capacity. Moreover, according to reports it has recently been repeatedly subject to rocket attacks and other disruption by Baluchi tribes. An improved link also traversing Iranian and Pakistani Baluchi areas was originally supposed to have been inaugurated in March, 2009, with container train service beginning in August. According to Iranian sources in Baku, this deadline is unlikely to be achieved, and regular use of the Iran-Pakistan railway for significant cargo shipment is unlikely in the foreseeable future.
¶4. (S)[Source removed] quoted the Ministry source as saying that in 2008 Iran asked Pakistan to establish a new, “more secure and modern” route, but that Pakistan has so far refused. The source added that Tehran is rife with rumors about the increasing lack of safety in Baluchi areas, and claimed that many guard and police posts in Sistan-Baluchistan areas are no longer occupied at night due to the increased danger of attack.
¶5. (C) Another source, [Source removed] blamed the Ahmadinejad administration for pursuing provocative anti-Sunni practices (including harassment of Sunni clergy and congregations and raids on Sunni mosques) and other “arrogant” crackdowns over the last few years. He claimed that these practices, combined with high unemployment, perceived discrimination,
and few government services, has increased anger among Baluchis, and identification of the central government as an “enemy.” He cited the appointment of Ahmadinejad ally Habibullah Dehmordah as a Governor of Sistan-Baluchistan as a typical insensitive blunder, calling him a “stupid, brutal, Sunni-hater.” (Note: Dehmordah was replaced as Governor in 2008 by Ali-Mohammed Azad. End Note).
GOAJ Military Figure Opposes Promoting Unrest in Iran
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶6. (S) At a 12 May meeting with a visiting group of 16 U.S. military general officers, the GOAJ’s Special Assistant to the President for Defense, General Vahid Aliyev, related that he had recently met in Iranian Azerbaijan with (unnamed) high-ranking &Iranian General.8 Although he did not provide details, Aliyev strongly implied that the Iranian General raised alleged “foreign-sponsored” efforts to foment unrest among Iranian ethnic groups, including Iranian Azerbaijanis (who make up nearly thirty percent of the Iranian population). Commenting on this issue, Aliyev asserted that “there have been four attempts by Iranian Azerbaijanis to assert autonomy in the last hundred years all of which were crushed” by the Iranian state. As an example, Aliyev cited the Soviet effort during World War II to establish a breakaway “Republic of South Azerbaijan.” The Soviets forces pulled back in 1946, after a “Truman-Stalin Agreement,” which Aliyev depicted as a cynical “betrayal” of collaborating Iranian Azerbaijanis. He recounted that the resulting repression by Tehran resulted in the deaths of 60,000 Azeris, and the flight of many more into Soviet Azerbaijan.
¶7. (S) U.S. military participants agreed that Aliyev appeared to be implicitly signaling that outside fomenting of unrest in Iranian Azerbaijan is opposed by the GOAJ. Aliyev similarly told the U.S. officers that any foreign war with Iran will be bad for Azerbaijan, and result in a flood of refugees entering the country. (Note: The three other “failed Azerbaijani autonomy struggles” cited by Aliyev presumably refer to the early 20th century Constitutional Revolution, Azerbaijani resistance to Reza Shah’s centralization policies in the 1920’s, and efforts by senior Azerbaijani clerics and activists to obtain local autonomy in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. End note).
GOAJ Iran-Origin Heroin Seizures Continue Rise
--------------------------------------------- -
¶8. (C) According to [Source removed], export of narcotics from Iran into Azerbaijan continue to skyrocket (see ref b). According to statistics provided to Baku Iran watcher on June 3, 2009 by the UNODC-sponsored counter-narcotics “Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center” (CARICC) headquarters in Tashkent, Iran-origin heroin seizures (i.e., heroin derived from Afghani and Pakistani opium that entered Azerbaijan from Iran) in Azerbaijan nearly quadrupled during the first quarter of 2009, as compared to the first quarter of 2008. According to the GOAJ, virtually all of this heroin had been fully processed in labs and was “ready for market.” Total heroin seizures in Azerbaijan during the first quarter of 2008 reflected a sharp increase over the first quarter of 2007; while in 2006 only twenty kilograms of such heroin was officially reported seized in Azerbaijan during the entire year. In contrast, reported GOAJ seizures of Iran-origin heroin during the first quarter of 2009 amounted to nearly 59,000 kilos, as compared to approximately 15,000 kilos of heroin seized in the first quarter of 2008.


CHINA-IRAN

China is biding its time until the political
crisis in Iran reaches a clearer resolution and the
Ahmadinejad government consolidates power, and will signal
its renewed engagement by sending a high-level delegation to
Tehran once the political situation has been resolved,
according to an MFA official. Our contact reaffirmed China's
commitment to the P5-plus-1 process and assessed that Iran is
attempting to keep the door to negotiation with the United
States open despite the turmoil surrounding the June
election, but cautioned that a complete halt to uranium
enrichment is an unattainable goal. China continues to urge
Iran to respond positively to the P5-plus-1 offer for talks,
and these entreaties have been passed directly to Supreme
Leader Khamenei. Iran reportedly requested to upgrade its
relationship with Beijing to a "strategic partnership," but
China refused. A Communist Party official told us that the
CCP is seeking to increase its relations with six major
political parties and factions in Iran and deepen its
understanding of U.S. policy in the Middle East. He repeated
China's standard position on the Iran nuclear issue and
suggested that the U.S. offer economic incentives to persuade
the Iranians to enter into talks on the nuclear issue. He
dismissed concerns that negative perceptions in the Middle
East of China after the July violence in Xinjiang province
would affect China's diplomacy with Iran. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) PolOff discussed Iran-China relations with MFA West
Asian Affairs Department Iran Division Deputy Director Ni
Ruchi August 31. In a separate meeting the same day, Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee International Liaison
Department (CCID) Third Bureau (West Asia and North Africa)
Director Wu Baocai gave PolOff the Party's perspective on
Iran and the nuclear issue.

Holding Back Bilaterally until Political Dust Settles
--------------------------------------------- --------

¶3. (C) MFA Iran Division Deputy Director Ni said that the
political turmoil in Iran had yet to settle and that China
was still waiting for the situation to calm further before
re-engaging fully in bilateral relations. He argued that the
internal divisions that had played out in the June
presidential elections had existed well before the violent
aftermath of the June election. China had been aware of the
potential for conflict among those divisions to spill into
the street and had taken a cautious approach before the
election. He said that the Chinese government understood
that the election was a strong indication of deep-seated
divisions within the Iranian government, but stressed that
the contested election had not fundamentally undermined the
current government and that China would continue with its
normal engagement with Tehran.

¶4. (C) China would signal its re-engagement, Ni reported,
with a high-level delegation to Tehran, but there was no
timetable for such a visit yet because the leadership in
Tehran was still fully focused on consolidating power. He
noted that during his mid-August visit to Iran, protestors
had continued to take to the selection. Ni reaffirmed China's
commitment to the P5-plus-1 process, stressing that the U.S.
and China not only had common interests in Iran, but the
scope of this common interest was increasing.

Iran Keeping the Door Open?
---------------------------

¶5. (C) Ni said that China had taken note of efforts by the
Iranian government to keep a path open to direct negotiations
despite the ongoing political turmoil. He claimed that
Tehran had refrained from overplaying its accusations of the
U.S. role in the election turmoil, preferring to point the
finger at European countries, indicating that the Iranian
leadership was interested in maintaining the possibility of
direct talks. Ni said that the election had caused the
Iranian leadership to reexamine seriously its foreign policy,
particularly on the nuclear issue, adding that Iran's nuclear
development had suffered technical setbacks recently, which
had also forced the leadership to consider how to move
forward.

China Lobbying but Total Halt to Enrichment Unattainable
--------------------------------------------- -----------

¶6. (C) Ni reported that China continued to urge Iran at every
level of their engagement to respond positively to the
P53-plus-1 offer of direct talks and cease uranium enrichment
activities. He said that Chinese leaders had pointed out to
their Iranian counterparts on many occasions that the United
States had shown "restraint" in its public comments during
the June election aftermath, and that Iran was missing an
important opportunity by refusing to respond to the P5-plus-1
offer. Ni said that China's message encouraging greater
engagement had been passed directly to Supreme Leader
Khamenei. He cautioned that Tehran would not be able to
respond positively to P5-plus-1 overtures until it had
reinforced its position at home, and that a "100-percent"
halt to uranium enrichment had become an unattainable goal.
Ni said that China continued to believe that fresh sanctions
would be ineffective in persuading Iran to cease enrichment
activities and would be counter-productive by increasing the
unity of the various factions in Iran behind the nuclear
program and the current government. Ni argued that the
regime in Iran would emerge from the crisis in a weakened
position and thus more likely to negotiate with the P5-plus-1
on the nuclear issue.

Iran Seeks "Strategic Partnership" with an Unwilling PRC
--------------------------------------------- -----------

¶7. (C) Ni said that Iran had requested that Beijing upgrade
its relationship with Tehran, presumably to counter Western
pressure, by lobbying Beijing to label its relationship with
Iran a "strategic partnership" as it does for Russia and
other countries. Ni said that China had so far refused to do
so and Iran was frustrated with China's continuing insistence
that the two countries shared merely "normal" relations.

Party Seeks to Increase its Interaction with Iran
--------------------------------------------- ----

¶8. (C) CCP Central Committee International Liaison Department
(CCID) Third Bureau (West Asia and North Africa) Director Wu
Baocai told PolOff August 31 that the CCP was seeking to
increase its relations with six major political parties and
factions in Iran. He noted that links between the CCP and
Iranian political parties had lagged behind the growth in
relations between executive branches and far behind the
increase in economic links. He said that deepening
understanding among the CCP leadership of the U.S.
position
on Iran was another emerging priority for his office and that
he was open to continued exchanges with the U.S. on the
nuclear issue.

CCP Perspective on Iran Nuclear Program
---------------------------------------

¶9. (C) Wu said that CCP officials were increasingly concerned
through 2008 at the possibility of the United States taking
military action against Iran's nuclear program but assessed
that such a possibility was much lower in 2009. He noted
that sanctions had not only failed to change Iranian behavior
and create meaningful effects in Iran but were negatively
affecting the countries joining in the international effort
to persuade Iran to stop its nuclear activities, citing as an
example constraints placed on Chinese banks from doing
business with Iran. He said that he believed the
international community was unlikely to be able to persuade
Iran to fully abandon its enrichment activities and suggested
the U.S. offer modest economic benefits as an incentive to
persuade Iran to enter into dialogue. Wu reiterated China's
strong opposition to Iran using its nuclear technology to
develop nuclear weapons but stressed the right of all
countries to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

FRENCH LEAKS TO CHINA

In the interest of transparency and enhanced cooperation
on nonproliferation matters, we would like to share the
following information:

-- We have information that the French firm Sofradir and its
subsidiary Ulis continue to sell both cooled and uncooled
infrared detectors to China's Zhejiang Dali Technology
Company Ltd for incorporation into thermal imaging systems.

-- Our information indicates the Chinese firm is actively
selling its thermal imaging systems to Iranian defense
entities.

-- Iranian military access to Chinese thermal imaging systems
that rely on high-grade French infrared detectors could
increase the threat to US and allied forces operating in the
Gulf region.

-- Infrared detectors (IRD) are sensors and critical
components of high performance thermal imaging systems. IRDs
are controlled under Wassenaar Arrangement, Section 6.A.2.a.3.

-- IRDs are used in the core assemblies for advanced
targeting pods, long-range reconnaissance systems, gimbaled
imaging systems in manned and unmanned airborne
reconnaissance and combat aircraft, Forward Looking Infrared
(FLIR) sensors, tank targeting systems, submarine periscopes,
and missile seekers.

-- Diversion of the subject components could be harmful to
our shared national security interests. If these IRDs were
included in the optical targeting mechanism for tanks and air
defense systems, they could potentially be used to degrade US
superiority in night combat operations.

-- We ask that you carefully consider the consequences of
such sales.

-- We also welcome any further information about this case
that may come to light in the course of any French
investigation into the matter.


2007

In an August 17 meeting, Israeli Mossad Chief Meir
Dagan thanked Under Secretary Burns for America's support of
Israel as evidenced by the previous day's signing of an MOU
that provides Israel with USD 30 billion in security
assistance from 2008-2018. Dagan provided his assessment of
the Middle East region, Pakistan and Turkey,

PAKISTAN: ISRAEL WORRIED ABOUT MUSHARRAF
-----------------------------------------

¶16. (S) On Pakistan, Dagan said that President Musharraf is
losing control, and that some of his coalition partners could
threaten him in the future. The key question, Dagan said, is
whether Musharraf retains his commander-in-chief role in
addition to his role as president. If not, he will have
problems. Dagan observed that there has been an increase in
the number of attempts on Musharraf's life, and wondered
whether he will survive the next few years. Under Secretary
Burns replied that South Asia has assumed vital importance in
American foreign policy since September 11. The U.S. is
committed to denying Afghanistan as a safe-haven for Taliban
and Al-Qaeda activity. The USG will continue to support
Pakistani President Musharraf, and is seeking to boost his
military defensive capabilities. At the same time, the U.S.
is encouraging Pakistan and Afghanistan to work with each
other militarily. Turning to India, Under Secretary Burns
noted that U.S.-Indian economic cooperation is growing, and
that the USG is working effectively to reduce tensions
between India and Pakistan.

CHINA-IRAN

IN SEPTEMBER DURING THEIR
MEETING AT THE APEC SUMMIT IN SYDNEY AUSTRALIA, PRESIDENT
BUSH DISCUSSED WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT HU STRONG CONCERNS
RELATING TO THE ONGOING TRANSSHIPMENT VIA BEIJING OF KEY
BALLISTIC MISSILE PARTS FROM NORTH KOREA TO IRAN'S MISSILE
PROGRAM. PRESIDENT BUSH PLEDGED TO RESPOND TO PRESIDENT
HU'S REQUESTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. EMBASSY SHOULD ON
NOVEMBER 3 AT THE MOST EFFECTIVE LEVEL POSSIBLE, DELIVER
THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 8 WHICH RELATES TO SPECIFIC, TIME-
SENSITIVE INFORMATION ABOUT AN IMMINENT TRANSSHIPMENT. IN
ADDITION, AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY POST SHOULD DELIVER
THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 9 TO MFA AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL
POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY BY THE AMBASSADOR SINCE THIS IS IN
RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS.

----------
OBJECTIVES
----------

¶2. (S/REL CHINA) Post should:


--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Request China to stop an
imminent shipment to Iran's ballistic missile program. This is the
same cargo that the Ambassador shared about on October 25 (ref E). It
is now scheduled to leave Beijing airport on November 4.

--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Note the importance of this
demarche since it relates to a topic discussed by Presidents Bush and
Hu in Sydney. Embassy should further note that the Embassy will be
seeking an appointment at the highest level possible to convey a more
extensive presentation on this topic of ballistic missile parts from
North Korea to Iran.

--Remind Chinese officials that President Bush has been personally
engaged on the issue of the transshipment of ballistic missile parts
between North Korea and Iran via Beijing and that he raised this issue
with President Hu at the APEC Summit.

-- Seek information on the steps China has taken since the APEC
discussion to address this issue and impress on them the necessity for
China to take immediate strong action.

-- Stress that the credibility of UN Security Council actions must be
maintained by vigorous implementation by UN Member States of UNSC
resolutions calling for Chapter VII sanctions, particularly 1718,
1737, and 1747.

--Indicate that the U.S. believes that the proliferation of missile
technology between North Korea and Iran will increase and that these
two countries will attempt to conduct these trantransfers through Chinese
territory.

--Emphasize the need to inspect cargo and personal goods on regularly
scheduled flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to Iran in order
to detect and deter these shipments.

--Explain to Chinese officials that the U.S. carefully reviews the
intelligence material that we have on shipments before we share it,
and we ask that Chinese authorities respect this and act on our
information accordingly and appropriately.

--Indicate that the United States believes that we can work together
cooperatively and effectively on these issues.

--Express our willingness to continue to share as much information as
possible to assist China's efforts to uphold these UN Security Council
resolutions.

--------------------------------------------- -------------
Background: Ballistic Missile Parts Shipped via Beijing Between North
Korea and Iran.
--------------------------------------------- -------------

¶3. (S/Rel China) Iran and North Korea have continued their
longstanding cooperation on ballistic missile technology, via air-
shipments of ballistic-missile related items. We assess that some of
these shipments consist of ballistic missile jet vanes that frequently
transit Beijing on regularly scheduled flights on Air Koryo and Iran
Air. We believe that the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is
the probable end user for these parts. SBIG is listed in the annex to
UNSCR 1737 and these jet vanes are controlled under Item 10.A.2 of the
Missile Technology Control Regime and Item 6 of China's missile-
related export control regulations. Moreover, UNSCRs 1718 and 1737
prohibit the transfer to or from North Korea or Iran, respectively, of
jet vanes and any other item listed in UNSC document S/2006/815.
These shipments therefore represent violations of UNSCRs 1718 and
¶1737.

¶4. (S/Rel China) The U.S. has raised this issue with China at the
highest levels several times in the last few months. In May 2007, the
United States informed China of imminent shipments on three separate
occasions (Refs A,B and C). Though Chinese officials informed Embassy
Beijing that China's investigations have found no evidence of these
transfers, it appears that these shipments did occur and are
continuing to transit via Beijing. In addition this issue was raised
by ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney during bilateral nonproliferation talks
in August 2007 (Ref D). The Deputy Secretary also raised this issue
with Executive Vice Foreign Minister (EVFM) Dai Bingguo via during a
telephone conversation in August. Finally, in September 2007,
President Bush discussed this issue with Chinese President Hu at the
APEC summit in Sydney. The two leaders agreed that the USG would
provide the PRC with further information on these transfers.

¶5. (S/Rel China) On October 25 the U.S. provided PRC officials with
detailed information, including the airway bill and flight number, of
another imminent shipment of military related goods from North Korea
to Iran via Beijing. This shipment was also assessed as destined for
Iran's solid propellant missile development organization, the Shahid
Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG). We now have information that the
goods will be shipped on November 4 and insist on a substantive
response from China to this information.

¶6. (S/Rel China) Our information indicates that at least 10 air
shipments of jet vanes have transited Beijing thus far and that these
shipments will not only continue but will also grow in volume. We
have encouraged the Chinese to undertake frequent inspections of cargo
on Air Koryo or Iran Air flights transiting Beijing from North Korea
to both deter and detect these shipments.

¶7. (S/Rel China) The Department is seeking both immediate action on
this new information and a strategic approach with regards to this
critical issue. We assess that the best way to prevent these
shipments in the future is for Chinese authorities to take action,
such as those identified in para 9, that will make the Beijing airport
a less hospitable transfer point.

--------------------------------------------- --------
NON-PAPER ON URGENT MATTER TO BE DELIVERED NOVEMBER 3
--------------------------------------------- --------

¶8. (S/Rel China) Begin points:

-- Last week we raised with you information regarding North Korean
plans to send a shipment, probably for Iran's ballistic missile
program, to Iran. We believe the cargo is intended for Iran's Shahid
Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran's
solid-propellant ballistic missile program. You had requested
additional information.

-- We now have reason to believe that the items above will be shipped
to Iran via scheduled Iran Air flight on November 4.

--If these goods are missile-related, North Korea is prohibited under
UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile-related items and UN Member States
are prohibited from importing those items. In addition, North Korea
would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring
these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components
included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they
would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery
systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the
mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these
concerns in mind we are asking that Chinese authorities investigate
this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran.

------------------------------------------
BEGIN NON-PAPER FOR DELIVERY BY AMBASSADOR
------------------------------------------

¶9. (S/REL CHINA) Begin Points:

--Over the past several months we have raised with Chinese officials
the problem of ballistic missile-related transfers between Iran and
North Korea being transshipped through China. President Bush raised
U.S. concerns on this matter with President Hu during the APEC summit
in Sydney, demonstrating the importance of the issue to the United
States. In response to President Hu's request for additional details,
we are providing you further information regarding these activities.
Specifically, we are urgently providing information regarding an
imminent shipment of serious concern.

-- North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile-
related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those
items. In addition, North Korea would potentially be precluded under
UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the
missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or
China determines that they would contribute to the development of
nuclear weapon delivery systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such,
is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution.
With these concerns in mind we are insisting that Chinese authorities
urgently investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to
Iran.

--We are very concerned that North Korean shipments of jet vanes occur
on regularly scheduled commercial air flights transiting through
Beijing. We believe this has been the case on about 10 flights.

--These items are likely intended for Iran's solid propellant missile
development organization, the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG).

--These cargo shipments probably include front companies.

--We have identified a large number of shipments beginning late last
year of what are probably ballistic missile-related items that have
transited Beijing, and we would like to share further information on
these shipments.

--14 December 2006: A delegation from SBIG returned from Pyongyang
probably via Beijing and transported what we assess to be jet vanes
for a solid propellant medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) under
development in Iran.

--On or about 15 January 2007: North Korea delivered what were
probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to
SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger
flights.

--On or around 23 January 2007: North Korea delivered what were
probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to
SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger
flights.

--On or about 16 May 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled
commercial passenger flights.

--On or about 24 May 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled
commercial passenger flights.

--On or about 6 June 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled
commercial passenger flights.

-- On or about 12 June 2007: An air shipment composed of five what
were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was
scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-
scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about 14 June 2007: An air shipment composed of three what
were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was
scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-
scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about 14 July 2007: An air shipment composed of ten what were
probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to
depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled
commercial passenger flights.

--On or about 26 July 2007: An air shipment possibly composed of an
unknown number of jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was
scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-
scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about 22 August: An air shipment possibly composed of one jet
vane from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North
Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger
flights.

--We believe that the number of jet vanes sent to Iran will increase
dramatically in the future.

--To date we believe that about 40 probable jet vanes have been sent
from North Korea to Iran.

--The contract for these components called for a total number of 500
and we assess that shipments of these may increase to a rate of 100-
160 per month.

--In addition, our information indicates that a second order of 1,500
components - possibly additional jet vanes - was agreed to in December
of last year.

-- We believe that this trade will continue to utilize regularly-
scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--As we have discussed on several occasions, Iran also has been
seeking probable tungsten-copper alloy plates from China's Dalian
Sunny Industries, also known as LIMMT. Dalian Sunny Industries
shipped part of an order for this material in September. These plates
are suitable for Iranian domestic production of jet vanes or as an
insulator for ballistic missile components. Iran could be seeking
these plates in case North Korea is unable to provide the quantity or
quality of jet vanes required.

--We urge you to prevent such shipments via whatever action you deem
appropriate, including frequent inspection of Iran Air and Air Koryo
flights. The use of regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights
indicates that frequent regular inspections of Iran Air flights and
Air Koryo flights are in order and would help deter these shipments in
the future.

--We will continue to provide you with relevant information to help
end this proliferation.

2006

UAE--PAKISTAN

Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed,s weekly
Sunday "VIP Majlis" provided an excellent opportunity for a
visiting National Defense University delegation to observe
first-hand the UAEG,s informal consultative process. MbZ,
brothers MinState Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan and Interior
Minister Sheikh Saif, and Labor Minister al Ka'abi were
joined by several dozen prominent Abu Dhabi officials and
businessmen for the weekly gathering at Bateen Palace.
Pakistan
--------

¶5. (C) Ambassador asked about MbZ's visit the week before to
Lahore to meet with Pakistani President Musharraf. MbZ
chuckled and asked why the USG "always" convinced the
Pakistanis to delay news of the capture of senior Al Qaeda
operatives such as Abu Faraj al Libbi. MbZ went on to
congratulate Washington for its decision to allow U.S. firms
to bid for contracts to provide F-16s and other defense
technology to Pakistan. It was important to support
Musharraf as he battled the terrorists, he emphasized. While
the Indians had and would continue to balk at the decision,
the region needed Musharraf to stay strong. There was no
alternative leader in sight, MbZ opined. Besides, he
continued, the F-16 decision would not tip the military
balance between India and Pakistan. Even if it had, India's
strength as a stable democracy would ensure that it would not
ever be in as "risky" a situation as its neighbor. MbZ then
slapped his knee and said "you,ll never guess what Musharraf
asked me...he asked me whether the UAE had received approval
for the Predator!" (Note: the USG's inability to meet the
UAE's request for an armed Predator remains a sore point for
MbZ, although he has not directly raised the issue with us
for some time.)





Iran Relations Unaffected by Xinjiang Violence
--------------------------------------------- -

¶10. (C) Wu dismissed concerns that dismay in Iran and other
parts of the Middle East over China's treatment of ethnic
Uighurs in Xinjiang province would complicate China's
diplomacy with Iran. While acknowledging that some
high-level religious leaders in Iran had been highly critical
of China in the wake of the July violence in Xinjiang, he
said that Beijing was seeking to counter the danger of China
becoming a target for anger in the Muslim world by
significantly increasing its media outreach in the Middle
East, citing the recent establishment of an Arabic-language
version of government-run CCTV.

WIKILEAKS: INFORMATION OF INTEREST TO INDIA---2010

B.RAMAN

The documents so far uploaded by Wikileaks relate to the period from the year 1966 to February-end, 2010. There are no documents relating to the period after February,2010. Information of interest to India taken from the documents of 2010 is extracted below. There are no documents relating to India during this period.

The U.S. has information indicating that in December 2009, the Chinese company Hong
Kong 4 Star Electronics Ltd. offered to sell gyroscopes
produced by a Russian company to Iran's Isfahan Optics
Industries. Our information indicates that these gyroscopes
could be delivered to Iran in early February 2010 and that
Isfahan Optics Industries was coordinating this transaction
through an intermediary named Iran Business (IBco). Because
key missile development organizations in Iran previously have
attempted to procure similar gyroscopes, we are concerned
this equipment potentially could be diverted to
missile-related end-users. We therefore want to alert
Chinese officials to this information and ask that they
investigate this activity with a view to preventing Hong Kong
4 Star Electronics Ltd. from facilitating missile-related
exports to Iran.

In December 2009, the United States shared with China information regarding attempts by
the Malaysia-based firm Electronics Component Limited (ECL)
to buy TRS-500 gyroscopes from the Chinese firm VibTel
Industrial Co. Inc. (Ref A). These gyroscopes, which are
controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
and China's missile-related export controls, would be
suitable for use in the guidance systems of ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. We
requested China investigate this information because ECL is
associated with a network of Iranian-controlled front
companies that procure sensitive goods on behalf of a number
of Iranian entities of proliferation concern.

¶3. (S) Chinese officials agreed to investigate this
information, but asked for additional details on ECL's
relationships with firms in Iran (Ref B). To support their
efforts in this case, we would like to inform them that ECL
is part of a network of Iranian-controlled front companies
that includes the Iranian firm Shahin Sefid Esta and the
Malaysia-based front company Skylife Worldwide Sdn Bhd. This
network procures sensitive goods on behalf of a number of
Iranian entities of proliferation concern, including the
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
1737-designated entities Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
(SHIG) and Ya Mahdi Industries. We want to provide this
information to Chinese officials and emphasize that we
believe the transfer of this controlled equipment to a
company linked to UNSCR-designated entities would be
prohibited pursuant to UNSCR 1737.

CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with King
Abdullah and FM Prince Saud Al-Faisal on January 13, during
the last stop of a five nation Africa and Middle East tour.
During the visit, FM Yang discussed deepening Saudi-Chinese
ties in a variety of fields, emphasizing trade, in
particular, with his Saudi counterparts. Responding to
statements made by FM Saud, Yang also briefly discussed
Chinese support for Iraq, concern about Iranian nuclear
ambitions, and hopes for the Middle East Peace Process. FM
Yang's foray into regional political commentary appears to
have been a result of FM Saud's prodding, both publicly and
behind closed doors, and is a reflection of the developing
Saudi-Chinese relationship.
END SUMMARY.


TRADE TAKES PRECEDENCE
----------------------

¶2. (U) FM Yang arrived in Riyadh on January 13, the first
high-level visit since Chinese President Hu Jintao's February
2009 "Trip of Friendship and Cooperation." FM Yang's visit
coincided with the 20th anniversary of Saudi-Chinese
diplomatic relations, and followed three days after Chinese
Trade Minister Chen Deming co-chaired the 4th session of the
Saudi-Chinese Joint Commission in Riyadh.

¶3. (U) The Chinese Foreign Minister has traditionally made
his first overseas trip of the new year to Africa, visiting
with African leaders and expressing Chinese goodwill and
improvements in trade relations. This year, FM Yang extended
his visit to include not only major trading partners like
Nigeria, Kenya and Morocco, but also Saudi Arabia. In a
January 13 statement to the press, FM Yang stressed the
importance of strengthening cooperation in "energy,
infrastructure, finance and science and
technology." He said that both sides should carry out
cultural and education exchanges to deepen the bilateral
relationship and pressed the need for closer relations
between China and the GCC.

¶4. (U) These statements echoed similar announcements from
Chinese Trade Minister Chen who, in a January 10 press
conference, called for finalizing the Chinese-GCC free trade
agreement and increasing bilateral trade by 50%, from a total
annual value of $40 billion to $60 billion, over the next
five years (ref A). During the Joint Commission meeting,
Saudi Minister of Finance Ibrahim Al-Assaf reportedly urged
the Chinese to participate in more joint ventures, noting
that while bilateral trade increased 25 times over the past
ten years, the two countries only have 19 joint projects.
Al-Assaf also welcomed China's 44 billion riyal ($11.7
billion) worth of infrastructure projects in the Kingdom.


DUMPING CAUSES A BUMP
---------------------

¶5. (C) This call to increase Sino-Saudi trade comes on the
heels of a December 24 announcement that China would impose
anti-dumping tariffs of up to 13.6 percent on Saudi and
Taiwan-produced butanediol. Beijing began a dumping probe on
methanol and butanediol (BDO) from Saudi Arabia in July,
which caused an unusually public trade spat between the two
countries (ref B). Methanol and butanediol make up 10 to 15
percent of Saudi Arabia's $2 billion in annual non-oil
exports to China. A Ministry of Commerce and Industry
official told Econoffs on January 13 that Saudi Arabia was
able to convince the Chinese not to impose tariffs on
methanol, but said the BDO case was still pending. The
Ministry recently appointed a new Deputy Minister for
Technical Affairs, Dr. Hamad Al-Awfy, who will handle all
anti-dumping issues, he said.Al-Awfy previously complained
to EconCouns that the SAG was increasingly frustrated by the
growing number of Saudi companies complaining about Chinese
dumping in Saudi Arabia. Other senior SAG officials have
caustically complained about the low quality of Chinese
construction and the "short-term, extractive" approach of
Chinese companies to investments in Saudi Arabia.






A MATURING ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP?
---------------------------------

¶6. (C) China recently surpassed the U.S. as the largest
importer of Saudi oil. Saudi Arabia's investments in China
have increased significantly over the last few years,
including a $3.5 billion refinery in Fujian and a $2.86
billion joint-venture petrochemical complex in Tianjin.
Additionaly, President Hu Jintao commemorated the opening of
a cement plant when he visited Saudi Arabia in February 2009.
Saudi Arabia,s more forward-leaning approach, including
large-scale investments in China, indicates a maturing of the
bilateral relations and assumes a more pro-active, rather
than reactive, role towards economic engagement. (Note:
China is now the SAG's number two trade partner after the
U.S. Saudi-Chinese bilateral trade was estimated at $40
billion in 2008, while Saudi-U.S. trade was estimated at $67
billion during the same time period. End note.)

FM SAUD PRODS, FM YANG RESPONDS
-------------------------------

¶7. (U) While trade issues dominated FM Yang's agenda, both he
and FM Prince Saud-Al Faisal commented on the regional
political landscape in a press conference that followed their
bilateral meeting. FM Saud spoke out against Israeli
defiance of UN Security Council resolutions and called on
China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to
"deal with world disputes in accordance to international
legitimacy...as stipulated in the Arab Peace Initiative."
The meetings with FM Yang were "part of a framework of
coordination and consultation," FM Saud continued, that
included not only the Palestinian cause but also Iran's
nuclear file, Iraq and Yemen. In particular, he emphasized
China's role as a member of the P5 plus 1 group and their
responsibility "to solve the (Iranian nuclear) crisis through
dialogue and peaceful means. "Our two nations are keen that
the Middle East and the Gulf should be free of all weapons of
mass destruction, including nuclear weapons," he stressed.

¶8. (U) In response to FM Saud's comments, FM Yang said China
called for serious negotiations between Israel and Palestine
that would carry out the peace process and establish the
State of Palestine. "China is ready for cooperation with the
world community to work for stability in the Middle East," he
added. In regard to Iraq, he said that China extended
assistance by reducing Iraqi debt obligations to China and
forging trade agreements between Iraqi and Chinese companies.
With respect to Iran, FM Yang said the Iranian file should
be solved through "political diplomatic channels which help
stabilize the situation in the region."


FM SAUD: CHINA NEEDS TO MORE ACTIVELY COUNTER
IRANIAN NUKES
---------------------------------------------

¶9. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Prince Torki told visiting
NEA A/S Feltman on January 26 (ref C) that FM Saud had
pressed the Chinese Foreign Minister hard on the need to be
more active in working with the rest of the international
community and the UN Security Council to counter the threat
of Iran developing a nuclear weapon. FM Saud told FM Yang
that Saudi Arabia was convinced Iran intended to develop a
nuclear weapon, despite its assurances, and that only
concerted international action could stop that. While no
explicit bargain was discussed, Dep FM Torki explained that
Saudi Arabia understood China was concerned about having
access to energy supplies, which could be cut off by Iran,
and wanted to attract more trade and investment. Saudi
Arabia was willing to provide assurances on those scores to
China, but only in exchange for tangible Chinese actions to
restrain Iran,s drive for nuclear weapons.


COMMENT:
--------

¶9. (C) Since King Abdullah's historic visit to Beijing in
January 2006, the Saudi-Chinese relationship has focused
predominantly on energy and trade. However, the relationship
may be showing signs of political evolution. While the
Chinese would likely prefer to stay away from political
controversy, their economic power and permanent seat on the
UN Security Council has made it more and more difficult for
them to avoid politics altogether.

¶10. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The incentives for the Saudis to
try and leverage their economic relationship with China for
political gain with respect to sensitive regional issues,
such as Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are
significant and growing. After patiently focusifocusing on
building the economic relationsip since 2006, FM Saud,s
public and private prodding of FM Yang indicates the Saudis
are ready to try and cash in some political chips.

CORRUPTION TO BE FOCUS OF NEXT INSTALMENT OF WIKILEAKS?

B.RAMAN

Wikileaks announced through Twitter on November 22,2010, that it will be shortly releasing its third instalment of classified US documents.

2. The first instalment of 77,000 documents related to Afghanistan. The second instalment of 400,000 documents related to Iraq. According to the Twiiter message, its third instalment will contain a much larger number of documents.

3. Wikileaks did not say in its message what will be the subject-matter of the third instalment. However, a Reuters despatch from Washington DC said that classified US diplomatic cables reporting corruption allegations against foreign governments and leaders are expected in the official documents that Wikileaks plans to release. It added: "Three sources familiar with the US State Department cables held by Wikileaks say the corruption allegations in them are major enough to cause serious embarrassment for foreign governments and politicians named in them. They said the release was expected next week, but it could come earlier. The detailed, candid reports by US diplomats also may create foreign policy complications for the administration of US President Barack Obama, the sources said. Among the countries whose politicians feature in the reports are Russia, Afghanistan and former Soviet republics in Central Asia. But other reports also detail potentially embarrassing allegations reported to Washington from US diplomats in other regions, including East Asia and Europe. State Department spokesman Philip J. Crowley said Washington was assessing the implications of what Wikileaks may reveal and was notifying foreign governments about the possible release. "We wish that this would not happen, but we are obviously prepared for the possibility that it will," he said.

4.The media has reported that the US has warned India and other key governments across the world about the expected release. Crowley has been quoted as saying: "We have reached out to India to warn them about a possible release of documents." Among other Governments reportedly cautioned are those of Israel, Russia, Turkey, Canada and the UK.

5. After October last year when Wikileaks reportedly developed electronic access to the data bases of the US State Department and the Pentagon and the US military formations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US authorities were reported to have tightened document security to prevent further leaks. If this tightening has been effective, it is likely that the latest load of documents acquired by Wikileaks related to the period before October last year.

6.While corruption allegations as collected by the US Embassis in these countries could form a part of these documents, it is likely that considering the large number of documents mentioned by Wikileaks, the documents also cover US Embassy reporting on other subjects. Previously, Pakistan's relations with the US were the focus of Wikileaks. It now seems to be focusing on India's relations with the US too. It is, therefore, possible that in addition to corruption involving Indian personalities, the documents about India which have reached Wikileaks also relate to India's policies on Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran.

7. Among the various events relating to Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran in which India figured during this period, four could be sensitive from India's point of view. Firstly, the pressure on the Atal Behari Vajpayee Government by the administration of George Bush to send a Division of the Indian Army to Iraq. By July,2003, the Vajpayee Government had decided to say no to Washington DC, but there was a lot of voices in Delhi in favour of accepting the US request. Secondly, the papers captured by the US intelligence after the occupation of Iraq from the Iraqi Government Departments showing or corroborating the alleged involvement of a leader or leaders of the Congress (I) in contacts with the Saddam Hussein Government for acquiring preferential quotas for the import of oil from Iraq (the oil for food scandal). Thirdly, the pressure exercised by the Bush Administration on the Manmohan Singh Government for voting against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. The Government of India succumbed to this pressure as a quid pro quo for the Indo-US civil nuclear co-operation agreement of July,2005. Fourthly, the analysis and assessment made in the State Department and the Pentagon regarding Pakistani allegations of Indian involvement in Balochistan.

8. Is it possible that Wikileaks might have also got hold of diplomatic cables between the US Embassy in New Delhi and Washinton DC on Indian political leaders, bureaucrats and policy-making? Has it also got hold of messages sent by the US Embassy in New Delhi to Washington DC about the escape of Major Rabinder Singh, the mole of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Research & Analysis Wing, to the US in 2004 and about the detection by the Indian counter-intelligence of a US mole in the sensitive National Security Council Secretariat in 2006? The documents to be released by Wikileaks need to be carefully scrutinised.. ( 28-11-10)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )