B.RAMAN
There has been some understandable curiosity and
puzzlement over a statement attributed to the Afghan Taliban which was
disseminated on June 17,2012, through the Internet.
2. The statement, provided it is authentic,
appeared to be a reaction to the recent visit of Mr.Leon Panetta, the US
Defence Secretary, to India and Afghanistan. During his stay in New Delhi,
there was speculation in the local media that Mr.Panetta, who made no secret of
the USA’s continuing exasperation with Pakistan, was keen that India should
play a greater role in the training of the Afghan Army. This, if true, was a reversal of the past
reluctance of the US to encourage an Indian military training role in
Afghanistan lest it add to the concerns of Pakistan.
3. These reports regarding Mr.Panetta’s interest in a greater Indian military
training role led to excited comments by non-governmental analysts, but the
Government of India itself maintained a discreet silence on the subject. This
discreet silence has now been interpreted by the Taliban in the statement
attributed to it as amounting to a rejection of the US nudging on this issue.
4.The Indian policy generally has been not to be
amenable to pressure from the US to play a military role in areas of strategic
interest to the US lest perceptions of Indian military collaboration with the
US affect India’s own interests. When
Mr.George Bush was the US President and Mr.Atal Behari Vajpayee was our Prime
Minister, the Government of India had resisted US pressure to send Indian
troops to Iraq. India did agree to allow
its naval ships to escort through the Malacca Straits US ships on way from the
Pacific to the Gulf, but beyond that declined to play any military role.
5. Now that the administration of President Barack
Obama is planning to reduce the US military’s operational role in Afghanistan
and to increasingly confine the US role to training the Afghan Security Forces,
it seems to be keen that India should supplement the US efforts in this regard
by undertaking more training missions. This, if correct, would be a reversal of
the past policies of the US.
6. US policies with regard to any Indian military
training role in Afghanistan have passed through various stages. In the days
when the US relations with Islamabad were good, the US was opposed to any
Indian military training role keeping in view the concerns of Pakistan.
Subsequently, the US did not oppose any training of Afghan military personnel in
India, but continued to have reservations about any Indian role on the ground
in Afghan soil. The reports on Mr.Panetta’s discussions in New Delhi carried by
the Indian media indicated that as a result of the US exasperation with
Pakistan over its stopping the transit of logistic supplies for the NATO forces
through its territory, the US was inclined to reduce its reservations and
encourage a more active Indian role. It is not clear whether the reported
change in the US views was tactical to spite Pakistan or strategic and would be
enduring.
7. The Government of India needs to be
congratulated for not jumping into responding positively to the US suggestions
and for taking time to examine the implications of an increased Indian military
training role. While there need be no reservations about increasing the
training of Afghan military personnel in Indian territory, increased ground
involvement of Indian military personnel in Afghan soil could have long-term
implications that need to be carefully examined with our feet firmly on the
ground.
8. The Taliban has chosen to interpret the lack of
open Indian enthusiasm for the ideas of Mr.Panetta as Indian rejection of the
US feelers on this issue. One should not be surprised if the Taliban statement encouraging India to
turn down the US feelers had been
drafted in consultation with Islamabad.
9. The Taliban statement goes beyond giving its
reactions to the perceived lack of positive outcome to Mr.Panetta’s discussions
in New Delhi. It repeats a formulation of September 1998 of the Taliban, issued
when it was in power in Kabul, in which it had expressed its benign intentions
towards India and sought to remove any impression that it might be hostile to
Indian interests because of India’s close association with the Government of
Najibullah. It had claimed in that statement that the Taliban did not believe
in exporting jihad to other countries and that while the Taliban supported the
right of the Kashmiris to self-determination, it would not get involved in the
insurgency on the ground in Jammu & Kashmir. An analysis made by me in
September 1999 on the attitude of the Taliban and Al Qaeda to India may be seen
at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers%5Cpaper83.html
10. Things have changed considerably on the ground
since then. Gulbuddin Heckmatyar’s Hizbe Islami, which was having serious
differences with the Taliban in 1998, is now its ally. The Hizbe Islami, close
to the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan, has been actively involved in training
ISI-sponsored Pakistani jihadi organisations that are active against India. The
Haqqani Network, which had no importance in 1998, has now come to the forefront
and has been acting in tandem with Al Qaeda on the one side and the Taliban on
the other.
11. Both the Hizbe Islami and the Haqqani Network
are implacably opposed to India. The involvement of the Haqqani Network in acts
of terrorism against the Indian Embassy in Kabul, in complicity with the
Lashkar-e-Toiba, was strongly suspected. The Taliban has done nothing to
dissociate itself from the anti-India activities of the Hizbe Islami and the
Haqqani Network. The Taliban may not believe in exporting jihad to other
countries, but it has not discouraged or condemned terrorist attacks on Indian
nationals and interests in Afghanistan.
12. Against this background, caution should be the
keyword in determining our reaction. Our interests in Afghanistan, which are
considerable and important, will be best served by strengthening the durability and the stability of the Hamid Karzai
Government which has entered into a strategic partnership with India. It is not
in our interest for the Taliban to prevail on the ground in Afghanistan.
13. We should continue to work in close co-operation
with the Hamid Karzai Government while examining whether we should expand our
supportive role in Afghanistan and how. At the same time, sense of realism
should indicate that the Taliban is not a spent force. It has shown tremendous
resilience. It is going to be an important factor in the ground situation. It
would, therefore, be in the common interest of India and the Karzai Government
not to spurn the positive-seeming feelers of the Taliban.
14. We should maintain a low level of backchannel
interaction with the Taliban by taking advantage of its presence in Qatar in
order to understand its positive feelers and encourage it on the path of
national reconciliation in Afghanistan. ( 18-6-12 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director,
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China
Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
