B.RAMAN
( Written at the request of the Economic Times, New
Delhi, and carried by it on February 23,2013)
The two blasts in the Dilsukhnagar area of
Hyderabad on February 21,2013, in which 14 persons are reported to have died,
cannot be categorized as mass fatality terrorism. The blasts were directed at
soft targets in a crowded area. Details available so far do not indicate what
could have been the motive or who might have been the perpetrators. The police
as well as the public should refrain from speculation that could mislead and
distort the investigation.
2. The improvised explosive devices (IEDs) did not
have any unique signature. The explosive used does not appear to have been of a
sophisticated kind . Fertiliser-based ammonium nitrate, which is easy to
procure and which can be lethal when mixed with certain chemicals, is the main
suspect for the present. For many years now, terrorists in many countries have
been using ammonium nitrate-based IEDs, for their acts of terrorism.
3. Expertise in the fabrication of IEDS using
ammonium nitrate as the core material is available in many web sites run by
terrorist organisations. No special training is required in the matter. In
Western countries, the counter-terrorism agencies have been able to reduce the
use of ammonium nitrate by terrorists by imposing strict regulations on their
storage and sale to persons who are not genuine farmers. We are yet to impose
and enforce similar regulations in India.
4. If it turns out that ammonium nitrate has been
used once again for an act of terror, priority should be given to measures for
imposing such regulations in India.
5. Our counter-terrorism agencies continue to face
the threat of sporadic acts of terrorism carried out by individuals or groups
wanting to give vent to their anger against the State or other communities. While
our police and intelligence agencies are able to collect intelligence regarding
sustained acts of terrorism by groups with known objectives, targets and modus
operandi, they face difficulty in monitoring the activities of individuals and
groups indulging in sporadic acts of terrorism triggered by anger of the moment
due to some reason or the other.
6.While sustained domestic terrorism of the kind
witnessed before 2008 is by and large under control, sporadic attacks of the
kind witnessed in Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad pose a problem for our
intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies.
7. The State Police have to play a more active role
in preventing sporadic acts of terrorism and they have to be assisted by the
central agencies. The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), which has
remained a non-starter due to reservations from some States ruled by
non-Congress parties, might have strengthened the joint capability of the
Centre and the States for preventing sporadic terrorism. The absence of a
political consensus on the NCTC leaves a big gap in our counter-terrorism
architecture.
8. We face three kinds of
terrorism--- state-sponsored terrorism emanating from Pakistan, domestic
terrorism of a sustained nature and
domestic terrorism of a sporadic kind. While the threat of state-sponsored
terrorism from Pakistan continues, it has not repeated itself after the 26/11
terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Domestic terrorism of a sustained nature of the
kind that we witnessed in 2007 and 2008 due to the activities of the Indian
Mujahideen has been disrupted by the action taken by our central agencies and
the State police to identify and disrupt their sleeper cells. Terrorism of the
sporadic kind continues as seen in Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad
9. Shri P.Chidambaram, who took over as the Home
Minister after the 26/11 terrorist strikes, managed to strengthen our
capabilities against all the three kinds of terrorism. His drive, though
sometimes controversial as in the case of the NCTC, kept our agencies on their
toes. The kind of vigorous leadership that he provided to our counter-terrorism
efforts, has been missing since Shri Sushil Kumar Shinde took over from him
last year. Counter-terrorism leadership is once again in a state of decline as it was before 26/11.
10. Terrorists---whether the Pakistan
State-sponsored or the domestic kind---- are looking for weaknesses in our
counter-terrorism architecture which they can exploit to step up their
activities. Incidents like those of Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad and our
inability to detect them and identify the perpetrators definitively, will
enable them as well as Pakistan to take advantage of the weaknesses that seem
to be re-emerging in our counter-terrorism capabilities.
11. Without effective and dynamic leadership, even
the best of counter-terrorism machinery will fail to deliver. Such leadership
and drive have been missing under Shri Shinde’s stewardship of the Ministry of
Home Affairs.
12. The Prime Minister, assisted by his National
Security Adviser and the National Security Council Secretariat, which is part
of the PMO, has to play a more active role for reversing this decline. Otherwise,
we may be in for another nasty surprise as we faced on 26/11.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India. )
