B.RAMAN
Is there a neo-LTTE emerging nearly four years
after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was wiped out in May, 2009,
by the Sri Lankan Security Forces? That is a question that needs the attention
of the intelligence agencies in the wake of the growing support for the Sri
Lankan Tamils’ political and human rights in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora
abroad and among large sections of the international community.
2.India had reasons to be gratified with the total
elimination of the LTTE, which had become a Frankenstein’s Monster, by the Sri
Lankan security forces. Indian intelligence and security agencies had played an active, but low profile role in helping
in the counter-LTTE operations of the Sri Lankan security forces through means
such as exchange of intelligence, monitoring the movement of LTTE's commercial ships
used for smuggling arms and ammunition, strengthening the anti-aircraft defence
of the Sri Lankan forces, training etc.
3.While one has to concede that the uprooting of
the LTTE was largely due to the excellent counter-insurgency operations of the
Sri Lankan Security Forces, the unadmitted contribution of India was not
insignificant.
4. While the Governments of India and Sri Lanka
were on the same wave length before the elimination of the LTTE in May 2009,
nagging differences cropped up post-May 2009, due to various reasons. Firstly,
the Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa sought to impose a dictated peace
on the Sri Lankan Tamil population in total breach of the various promises
regarding political accommodation with the Tamils which the Rajapaksa
Govdernment and its predecessors had made over a period of years. India’s
counter-insurgency help to Sri Lanka was in the expectation that the Sri Lankan
Government would implement these commitments.
5. Secondly, after the operations against the LTTE
were over, evidence, at least some of it credible, started emerging regarding
alleged disproportionate use of force by the Sri Lankan Security Forces not
only against the LTTE, but also against the civilian Tamil population living in
areas controlled by the LTTE. Instead of addressing these complaints and taking
corrective action where required, the Rajapaksa Government started dragging its
feet in the matter. Backed by countries like China and Pakistan, it became
increasingly indifferent to nudgings not only from the US and the EU countries,
but even India to attend to these complaints before they became a major international
issue.
6. Thirdly, one found that the admiration of the
world for the successful counter-insurgency operations of the Sri Lankan
Government gave way to pressures from various quarters for attending to these
complaints.
7. Fourthly, the successful counter-insurgency
operations destroyed the LTTE’s support base in Sri Lankan territory, but not
among the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora abroad. This diaspora had played a very
important role in keeping the LTTE sustained through funds and clandestine
supply of arms and ammunition. After lying low for a while after May 2009, the
Sri Lankan Tamil political activists in the diaspora became active once again
in giving fresh oxygen to the objective of an independent Tamil Eelam. The
unaddressed complaints of serious violations of the human rights of the Sri
Lankan Tamils were exploited by these elements to give a fresh lease of life to
the movement with the help of Western human rights organisations which
exercised pressure on their Governments to act against the Rajapaksa
Government.
8. Fifthly, a new generation of Tamil activists
mushroomed in Tamil Nadu, who acted in tandem with the activists in the Sri
Lankan Tamil diaspora, for reviving the Tamil Eelam objective. Growing number
of members of GenNext in the Tamil Community in Tamil Nadu, which had become
disillusioned with the opportunistic politics of the traditional Dravidian
parties, found themselves attracted to the ranks of neo-Dravidian parties which
sought to develop a political base in Tamil Nadu by taking up the cause of the
Sri Lankan Tamils and by projecting Prabakaran once again as a Tamil icon.
9. Sixthly, unnerved by the support of GenNext for
the neo-Dravidian parties, the traditional Dravidian parties found themselves
obliged to indulge in competitive political extremism by taking up the cause of
the Sri Lankan Tamils once again.
10. As a result of all these factors, the
Government of India and the mainstream Indian political parties find themselves
confronted with a welter of extremist forces, which have been exploiting legitimate complaints and demands regarding
the human rights of the Tamils, for creating a volatile situation across the
Tamil belt in India and Sri Lanka.
11. The situation calls for deft handling by the
Ministries of External Affairs and Home acting together. It has the germinating
seeds of new political violence. In the past, whenever the Sri Lankan Tamil
issue assumed importance in our policy-making, the political leadership in New
Delhi had the benefit of sound advice and inputs from the Congress in Tamil
Nadu which had its feet and ears close to the ground in Tamil Nadu as well as
the Eastern and Northern Provinces of
Sri Lanka.
12. Today, the Congress is practically non-existent
in Tamil Nadu.it has no leader of stature who attracts the GenNext. New Delhi’s
handling of the post-May 2009 situation
has been drifting from one faux pas to another, from one bungling to another. Only
India can and should play the leadership role in dealing with the complex
situation. Instead of dong so, the Manmohan Singh Government has surrendered
all political initiative internationally to the US and the EU countries and
locally to parties such as the DMK, motivated by political opportunism.
13.If the Government of India does not play a more
proactive role in this matter, a neo-LTTE is waiting to take over the ground
situation. ( 20-3-13)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet
Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For
Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China
Studies. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
