B.RAMAN
‘The Hindu” of February 26,2013, has carried an
article titled “
No Solace In This Quantum of Accountability” written by Samir Saran,
Vice-President, and Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, Programme Co-Ordinstor of the Observer
Research Foundation (ORF).It is about the accountability of the intelligence
agencies.
2. My views on accountability are well known and I
do not feel the need to repeat them. I wanted to comment on the following
observation by the two writers: “ If folklore has it right, if R&AW had a
charter, it would have legally pre-empted a former Prime Minister’s order to
abandon operations in Pakistan. It cost India 30 years worth of accumulated
ground assets and priceless reach.”
3. The reference is apparently to former Prime
Minister Inder Gujral. It is not correct that Gujral ordered the R&AW
operations in Pakistan to be abandoned. The R&AW had two kinds of
operations in Pakistan---- for intelligence collection and covert action.
4.He ordered only the operations for covert action
to be closed since he felt that such a gesture might facilitate his efforts to
improve relations with Pakistan under the so-called Gujral Doctrine. He did not
order the intelligence collection operations to be discontinued. It would have
been stupid on his part to have done so.
He, like all our Prime Ministers before and after him, understood the
importance of a good intelligence collection capability in Pakistan. What he
ordered to be closed accounted for only about 15 per cent of the R&AW’s
operations in Pakistan. He encouraged the remaining 85 per cent to continue.
5. There was a debate in the intelligence community
over the wisdom of his order to wind up the covert action operations. Many
senior officers met him and explained to him that building a covert action
capability took a long time. If one day the Government felt the need for
resuming covert actions, there would be no trained and experienced assets on
the ground. It was suggested to him that if he felt strongly on the subject,
the covert action operations should be suspended, but not discontinued. He
could not be convinced.
6. When the NDA Government under Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee
came to office, the intelligence community was hoping that he would cancel
Gujral’s decision and order the
resumption of covert action operations in Pakistan. To their surprise, they
found that Vajpayee too, like Gujral, wanted the R&AW to focus on
intelligence collection in Pakistan and avoid operations for covert action.
7. Some serving officers, who felt disappointed by
the reluctance of Vajpayee to resume
covert actions, arranged a meeting for me with Brajesh Mishra, the then
National Security Adviser. I met him in his office in New Delhi, and explained
to him the importance of resuming our covert action operations in Pakistan.
8. He gave me a patient hearing and said: “ I am
already convinced. You don’t have to convince me. But the Prime Minister
(Vajpayee) thinks otherwise. We have to carry out his wishes.”
9.There the matter ended. Even if the R&AW had
a charter, there was no question of its being able to pre-empt Gujral’s orders.
As R.N.Kao used to say, the R&AW and the IB are the two clandestine swords
of the Prime Minister. It is upto him to decide how they will be used. His
desires and orders have to be observed. No intelligence chief can overlook
them---charter or no charter. (26-2-13)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India)
