B.RAMAN
( Based on observations made by me at the inaugural
session of a seminar on Maritime Security and Challenges in the Indian Ocean
Region jointly organised on August 8,2012, by
the Stella Maris College, Chennai, and the Centre for Asia Studies,
Chennai, at the Stella Maris College)
Maritime security, which was a two-dimensional
concept before 2000 focussing essentially on likely threats and challenges from
State actors and pirates, has now become a three dimensional concept as a
result of the increasing threats of maritime terrorism with a global or
trans-national reach.
2.Till 2000, the concept was seen largely through the prism of possible
confrontations and conflicts between the competing interests of State actors in
the region such as between India and
Pakistan or between India and China
or between the US and China.
3.The attack by an explosive-laden boat of Al Qaeda
against US naval ship USS Cole in Aden in October,2000, and the unsuccessful
attempt by Al Qaeda to blow up and sink a French oil tanker Limburg in the same
area in October,2002, expanded the scope of the concept to cover likely future
threats to maritime trade and navigation and to sensitive coastal
establishments from non-State actors with the motivation and capability for
attacking targets on or from the seas.
4. The interrogation of Al Qaeda suspects arrested
during the investigation of the attacks on USS Cole and Limburg revealed the
plans of Al Qaeda to target maritime choke points like the Straits of Gibraltar
and Hormuz and the Malacca Straits by blowing up sea-borne vessels laden with
explosives and container ships to block the choke points.
5. As a result, maritime counter-terrorism became
an important component of maritime security. Counter-piracy was an important
component of maritime security even before 2000 due to the activities of
pirates based in the ASEAN countries in the Malacca Straits, but the threat was
limited in scope due to the fact that the pirates operating in the South-East
Asian region, despite being well-equipped in modern means of communications,
had a limited capability for operating
in high seas far from the Malacca Straits.
6. The advent of the Somali pirates in the
post-2005 years totally changed the complexion of piracy and the complexity of
counter-piracy operations. The Somali pirates, though not as well equipped as
the pirates of South-East Asia in modern means of communication, demonstrated a
capability for operating in high seas far away from their bases in Somalia
through the technique of using small boats launched from mother ships.
Consequently, the techniques of counter-piracy called for a capability to deal
with sea-borne non-State actors off the coast as well as in high seas.
7. The degradation of the capabilities of Al Qaeda
in recent years as a result of the relentless campaign of attrition waged by
the US against it and the strengthening of maritime security measures relating
to ports and container traffic have prevented the major threats to maritime
security from Al Qaeda apprehended in
the wake of the attacks on USS Cole and Limburg from materialising.
8.However, new threats have arisen from attempts of
other terrorist organisations to copy-cat Al Qaeda’s acquisition of a
capability for maritime terrorism. The sea-borne attack by the Lashkar-e-Toiba
on targets in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, showed that the capability
for maritime terrorism is no longer confined to Al Qaeda alone. Moreover, the
role of the State of Pakistan in helping the LET to carry out a
devastating sea-borne terrorist attack
on targets in Mumbai underlined the new threats from State-sponsored maritime
terrorism.
9.The conventional naval techniques and
capabilities developed over the years to protect ourselves against threats from
State actors and their navies would no longer be sufficient to protect
ourselves against maritime threats from non-state actors, whether it be
terrorists or pirates, and their State-sponsors. Naval doctrines now have to
contend with threats from State as well as non-State maritime actors.
10. Dealing with threats from non-State actors, who
pose a threat to the maritime security of many nations, calls for techniques
based on mutual assistance and intelligence sharing among the navies of the
affected countries. Despite political differences and competing economic
interests among the State actors, they find it necessary to engage and
co-operate with each other to face and neutralise threats from the non-State
actors.
11. Despite
the continuing border dispute and despite suspicions and apprehensions
over the implications to India of China’s strategic co-operation with Pakistan and the implications to China of India’s
strategic co-operation with Vietnam, the Indian and Chinese navies have found
ways of co-operating with each other in dealing with the Somali pirates. There
is a triangular co-operation mechanism involving the Navies of India, China and
Japan and there is a talk of the South Korean Navy being brought into this
co-operation mechanism. The serious differences between China and Japan on the
question of sovereignty over the East China Sea islands have not come in the
way of ideas towards a counter-piracy strategy based on mutual assistance and
intelligence sharing.
12.A reference to the coming into shape of a
trilateral co-operation mechanism was made by Chief Admiral Nirmal Verma, the
retiring chief of the Indian Navy, in his final briefing of the Indian media at
New Delhi on August 7,2012. According to “The Hindu” of August 8,2012, he said:
“ Our anti-piracy operations have thus far been co-ordinated trilaterally with
the Chinese and Japanese and, in the near future, this initiative could include
the South Korean Navy.”
13.Engagement and co-operation against maritime
terrorism has not made the same progress as co-operation against the Somali
pirates because of the role of Pakistan in sponsoring organisations such as the
LET, which pose a threat to our maritime security. Unless and until Pakistan
gives up its policy of using terrorism as a weapon against India, the scope for
co-operation between the Indian and Chinese Navies against Pakistani terrorist
organisations taking to sea-borne terrorism will remain limited. There is,
however, scope for co-operation between the Navies of India and China against
global terrorist organisations such as
Al Qaeda when they operate on or from the seas.
14.Engagement and co-operation against non-State
actors should not be allowed to weaken
our national will and determination to assert our national core interests
against State actors. One has to see the activism of the Chinese and US Navies in
the South China Sea area in this context. The US has not allowed its developing
economic and other cooperation with China to come in the way of the assertion
of its national interests in the Pacific and East and South China Seas. Similarly,
China has not allowed its co-operation with the ASEAN countries in various
fields to come in the way of an assertion of its claims of sovereignty over the
South China Sea islands.
15. Thus, one finds the evolution of a new naval
doctrine in different countries of the region based on the twin pillars of
engagement and co-operation to the extent possible against threats from
non-State actors and assertion of national interests against State actors
without allowing the importance of engagement and co-operation against
non-State actors weaken the national will and determination to assert national interests
against State actors endangering such interests.
16.Our naval doctrine to deal with the three
dimensions of maritime security should provide for capabilities that would
enable us to deal effectively with threats from non-State actors, by our acting
either alone or in co-operation with other navies, and threats from State
actors to our national interests. While discussing Maritime Threats and
Challenges, one has to clearly identify likely threats from State as well as
non-State actors and the techniques required for dealing with them. The ability of our Navy to deal
with the three-dimensional threat to our maritime security will depend on the back-up
support from our intelligence agencies.
17. There is a need for not only a new and smart
naval doctrine to deal with the three components of maritime security, but also
for a new and smart intelligence doctrine to enable the R&AW , the
Directorate-General of Naval Intelligence and the Defence Intelligence Agency
(DIA) provide effective back-up support to the Navy and the Coast Guard.
18. Unfortunately, the R&AW continues to be
largely a land-struck intelligence agency using traditional police methods of
collecting, analysing and assessing intelligence. It does not have an adequate
understanding of the sea and sea-borne threats and does not have the capability
for collecting intelligence about them. The importance of imparting a sea-borne
orientation to the R&AW has not received much attention. This state of
affairs needs to be corrected without further loss of time.
19. We have had many Task Forces to look into our
capabilities for dealing with threats to our national security---whether such
threats be from the land, the seas or the air. In view of the rapidly changing
dimensions of the threats to maritime security, the time has come for a separate Task Force to
deal exclusively with threats to our maritime security. It should identify the
doctrinal, strategic and tactical deficiencies relating to our maritime
capabilities and recommend measures to remove those deficiencies. (8-8-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director,
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China
Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
