Monday, October 18, 2010

WHO IS USING THE JAPAN CARD IN CHINA?

B.RAMAN


Someone is using the Japan Card in China to keep up the tensions between the two countries over the recent incident in the East China Sea involving the capture and subsequent release of the crew of a Chinese fishing trawler by the Japanese Coast Guard. The trawler was intercepted by the Japanese Coast Guard because it had allegedly intruded into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku group of Islands. The Chinese reject Japanese claims of sovereignty over the group and claim it as their own. They have been demanding an official apology by Japan and payment of compensation for the allegedly wrongful action of the Japanese Coast Guard. Tokyo has fIrmly rejected this demand.

2. Despite the continuing differences over the legality of the action of the Japanese Coast Guard and over Tokyo's refusal to apologise and pay compensation, there were indications of an attempt to cool the tensions while maintaining their respective stand on the islands. Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, who reportedly refused to meet his Japanese counterpart Naoto Kan in September when the two were in New York to attend the UN General Assembly session, subsequently met him briefly in the margins of the Asia-Europe summit in Brussels in the first week of October. This was followed by a meeting between the Japanese Defence Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and his Chinese counterpart Liang Guanglie on October 11 in Hanoi where they had gone to attend a meeting of the Defence Ministers of ASEAN Plus Dialogue Partners hosted by Vietnam.It was reported by the media after the meeting that the two had agreed to set up a liaison system to try to avert future maritime confrontations.

3. There was a positive assessment of the meeting from Tokyo. Yoshito Sengoku, a Japanese Government spokesman, said in Tokyo on October 12: "Continued positive developments are creating an environment to pave the way for a bilateral summit.Prime Minister Naoto Kan and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, who met informally in Brussels last week, could hold an official summit at a meeting with Southeast Asian leaders this month." It was reported subsequently that a team of Japanese officials would be going to Beijing to prepare the ground for the summit.

4. When the tensions thus started showing signs of beginning to subside, there was a sudden flare-up of orchestrated (through the Internet and the People's Forum of the People's Daily) anti-Japanese emotions in some cities of China in the form of public demonstrations against Japan and the Japanese. These demonstrations followed an anti-China demonstration in Tokyo on October 16 believed to have been organised by conservative militarists.

5. Following the anti-China demonstrations in Tokyo, SMS and Internet messages flashed across China calling for demonstrations against the Japanese. Anti-Japanese demonstrations during which there were attacks on the properties of Japanese companies have been reported so far from Chengdu, Xian, Zhengzhou and Wuhan. The fresh tensions have been exacerbated by Chinese perceptions of a new anti-China assertiveness in Japan. In this connection, Chinese analysts have drawn attention to what they regard as the anti-China statements of the Japanese Foreign Minister, Seiji Maehara, who has been projected in the People's Forum columns of the "People's Daily " as a China hawk, "who has been known to warn against China's increased military presence in the region, saying in a 2005 speech to fellow members of parliament that "We can control (China's) expansion in its force only if we act firmly and resolutely." He has called China "a threat," saying that the country has developed missiles capable of reaching Japan and conducted maritime surveys around the Japanese waters. He has also said that deciding whether to establish friendly relations with China would be "Japan's major diplomatic test."

6. The Chinese have also been angered by a reported speech of Japan's conservative former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at Washington DC last week in which he accused China of following a modern-day policy of "lebensraum" with its growing assertiveness over disputed territories. He accused China of trying to expand its strategic frontier.He has been quoted by the media as having stated as follows in Washington DC: "This very dangerous idea ( Lebensraum) posits that borders and exclusive economic zones are determined by national power, and that as long as China's economy continues to grow, its sphere of influence will continue to expand. Some might associate this with the German concept of 'lebensraum.'

7. Intriguingly, the demonstrations and the orchestrated campaign against Japan have coincided with the plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, which was held in Beijing from October15 to 18. The Chinese authorities themselves seem to have been taken by surprise by the virulence of the anti-Japan campaign and demonstrations.

8. Were the campaign and demonstrations provoked by the anti-reformists to oppose demands for a faster pace of reforms by pointing out that at a time when the Japanese ill-will and threat to China seems to be increasing it will be unwise to loosen political controls? A search for an answer to this question needs attention. ( 19-10-10)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cebinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY SPRINGS NO SURPRISES

B.RAMAN


The four-day fifth plenary session of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concluded in Beijing on October 18,2010, without any surprises relating to personalities or political or economic policies.

2.It appointed Xi Jinping, Vice-President, as the Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, thereby strengthening his chances of succeeding Hu Jintao as the party chief in 2012 and as President the following year. Xi was promoted to the powerful nine-member standing committee of the party's political bureau in 2007 and was named China's Vice-President the following year. That was generally seen as an indication that he would succeed Hu. His appointment as the Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission is in the natural order of things and hence not a surprise. It would have been a surprise only if he had not been appointed to this post.

3. His bio-data as disseminated by the Xinhua news agency is attached. What would be of interest is his stand in the on-going debate in China on the need for political reforms.No indication of this is available. The recent comments of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao on the need for political reforms and on the importance of respecting the freedom of speech had given rise to speculation that his vehement remarks on the subject were probably addressed to some sections in the party who might be opposing political reforms and relaxation of the restrictions on the freedom of speech. If this was so, it has not been possible to identify those who might be opposing political reforms and relaxation.

4. A study of the writings in the Chinese media before the plenary of the Central Committee indicated that the debate was probably between those who advocated gradual political reforms without weakening the primacy of the Party and those who were in favour of a faster phase of reforms. As expected, the views of the gradualists appear to have been endorsed by the Central Committee. A communique issued at the end of the meeting said that the leadership of the Communist Party of China will be the "fundamental guarantee" for China to achieve the goals of economic and social development plan for the next five years. It added that work for improving the CPC ruling capacity and maintaining the Party's advanced nature should be strengthened to promote the Party's competence in leading the country's economic and social development. What this means is that the main objective while undertaking political reforms will be to improve the quality of the leadership exercised by the party. There is no alternative to the Party, but what China needs is a party better led and better functioning.

5. The main item on the agenda of the plenary was laying down guidelines for the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) . The communique issued at the end of the session said that efforts should be made to ensure and improve people's livelihoods, and gradually complete a sustainable, basic public service system that suits China's situation and covers both urban and rural areas. The party vowed to improve employment, construct "harmonious labor relations" and reasonably adjust income distribution. It added: "The share of personal income in the distribution of national income should be increased, and that of work remuneration in primary distribution should also be raised.The social security system covering both rural and urban regions should be strengthened and the pace of medical reform and development should be quickened.Improving basic public services will be a key task for China in the next five years.Building a comprehensive and sustainable fundamental service system that worked in line with China's overall situation would help improve people's lives.The system should cover urban and rural areas, and promote equal fundamental public services.Concrete measures to sustain social harmony and stability should also be taken". ( 18-10-10)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retired), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

ANNEXURE

Biodata of Xi Jinping as disseminated by the Xinhua news agency

Xi Jinping, male, ethnic Han, native of Fuping, Shaanxi Province, born in June 1953. He joined the CPC in January 1974 and began working in January 1969. Xi graduated from the School of Humanities and Social Sciences of Tsinghua University, majoring in Marxist theory and ideological education. He holds an LLD degree through an on-the-job postgraduate education program.

Xi is now a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, vice president of the People's Republic of China, vice chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission and president of Party School of the CPC Central Committee.

1969-1975 Worked as an educated youth sent to the countryside at Liangjiahe Brigade, Wen'anyi Commune, Yanchuan County, Shaanxi Province, and served as Party branch secretary

1975-1979 Student of basic organic synthesis at the Chemical Engineering Department of Tsinghua University

1979-1982 Secretary at the General Office of the State Council and the General Office of the Central Military Commission (as an officer in active service)

1982-1983 Deputy secretary of the CPC Zhengding County Committee, Hebei Province

1983-1985 Secretary of the CPC Zhengding County Committee, Hebei Province, first political commissar and first secretary of the Party committee of people's armed forces department of Zhengding County

1985-1988 Member of the Standing Committee of the Municipal Party Committee and vice mayor of Xiamen, Fujian Province

1988-1990 Secretary of the CPC Ningde Prefectural Committee, Fujian Province, first secretary of the Party committee of Ningde Sub-Military Area Command

1990-1993 Secretary of the CPC Fuzhou Municipal Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Fuzhou Municipal People's Congress, Fujian Province, first secretary of the Party committee of Fuzhou Sub-Military Area Command

1993-1995 Member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Fujian Provincial Committee, secretary of the CPC Fuzhou Municipal Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Fuzhou Municipal People's Congress, first secretary of the Party committee of Fuzhou Sub-Military Area Command.

1995-1996 Deputy secretary of the CPC Fujian Provincial Committee, secretary of the CPC Fuzhou Municipal Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Fuzhou Municipal People's Congress, first secretary of the Party committee of Fuzhou Sub-Military Area Command

1996-1999 Deputy secretary of the CPC Fujian Provincial Committee, first political commissar of antiaircraft artillery reserve division of Fujian Provincial Military Area Command

1999-2000 Deputy secretary of the CPC Fujian Provincial Committee and acting governor of Fujian Province, vice director of commission for national defense mobilization of Nanjing Military Area Command, director of Fujian Provincial commission for national defense mobilization, first political commissar of antiaircraft artillery reserve division of Fujian Provincial Military Area Command

2000-2002 Deputy secretary of the CPC Fujian Provincial Committee and governor of Fujian Province, vice director of commission for national defense mobilization of Nanjing Military Area Command, director of Fujian Provincial commission for national defense mobilization, first political commissar of antiaircraft artillery reserve division of Fujian Provincial Military Area Command (1998-2002 Studied Marxist theory and ideological education in an on-the-job postgraduate program at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences of Tsinghua University and graduated with an LLD degree)

2002-2002 Deputy secretary of the CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee and acting governor of Zhejiang Province, vice director of commission for national defense mobilization of Nanjing Military Area Command, director of Zhejiang Provincial commission for national defense mobilization

2002-2003 Secretary of the CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee and acting governor of Zhejiang Province, first secretary of the Party committee of Zhejiang Provincial Military Area Command, vice director of commission for national defense mobilization of Nanjing Military Area Command, director of Zhejiang Provincial commission for national defense mobilization

2003-2007 Secretary of the CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the Zhejiang Provincial People's Congress, first secretary of the Party committee of Zhejiang Provincial Military Area Command

2007-2007 Secretary of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee, first secretary of the Party committee of Shanghai Garrison

2007-2008 Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, president of Party School of the CPC Central Committee

2008- Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, vice president of the People's Republic of China and president of Party School of the CPC Central Committee

Alternate member of the Fifteenth CPC Central Committee, and member of the Sixteenth CPC Central Committee. Member of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee, member of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee, and member of the Secretariat of the Seventeenth CPC Central Committee. Xi was elected vice president of the People's Republic of China at the First Session of the 11th National People's Congress.

CHINA'S RAILWAY LINK-UP WITH CHITTAGONG VIA MYANMAR

B.RAMAN


The Government-controlled Xinhua news agency of China reported as follows on October 17,2010: "Myanmar has planned to construct a railroad that will link a deep-sea port, Kyaukphyu, in western Rakhine state with Kunming, southwest of China, the local Weekly Eleven News reported Saturday (My comment: It is possibly a weekly of Myanmar ).The Kyaukphyu-Kunming railroad, which is part of the Kyaukphyu- Ruili platform project and national railroad network, is targeted to be finished in 2015. The railroad will pass through Rakhine State, Magway Region, Mandalay Region and Shan State in Myanmar, the report said. The railroad project is divided into such sections as Kyaukphyu- Eann-Minbu, Minbu-Magway-Mandalay-Lashio-Muse and Muse-Jiegao trans-border railroad. After the project is implemented, Myanmar's Shan State and China's Yunnan province can be connected directly and the railroad will mainly facilitate the goods flow from China, the report said, adding that Magway and Mandalay regions will then become the main business towns. Meanwhile, China has also planned to invest in a special industrial zone to be established in Kyaukphyu."

2. The Xinhua report did not say how the Government of Myanmar is going to find the funds for the project. Unless China lends the amount at low interest, Myanmar itself will not be able to raise the money. The "China Daily" had reported as follows on November 24, 2009: " Myanmar has begun to build a new railroad that will connect its border town Muse with Jie Guo ( Jiegao) in the Yunnan Province, China. Initial rail track tracing work has already begun with the railway station slated for Sone Kwe village near Lashio-Muse Union Road.Upon completion, the railroad should improve bilateral border trade and transportation routes."

3. Thus, what the "China Daily reported was the construction of a small stretch of a railway line near the Shan State's border with Yunnan. The Government of Myanmar might be able to raise money for this stretch, but for a longer line extending up to Kyaukphyu, it is unlikely to have its own funds.

4.Proposals for a rail link connecting Kunming in Yunnan with Chittagong in Bangladesh via Myanmar have been under consideration for some years as part of the Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) project of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). China, which is the only country having the required funds and engineering experts for undertaking the projects in Myanmar and Bangladesh, has been taking interest in the implementation of the TAR project, which would benefit China economically and strategically.

5. This project figured during the discussions at the plenary session of the 11th People's Congress Standing Committee of the Yunnan Province held at Kunming in February 2009. Briefing the media on that occasion, Duan Gang, President and Research Fellow of the Yunnan Academy of Economics, said that China had already constructed a railway line connecting Kunming with Dali and that a line connecting Dali with Ruili on the border with Myanmar was under construction. He said that this segment should be ready by 2015. He added that from Ruili, the railway line would go up to Kyaukphyu in Myanmar from where it will connect with Bangladesh.

6. In April 2009, Syed Abdul Hossain, Bangladesh's Minister for Communications, had visited China. It was reported by the Bangladesh media that during his visit he had raised with his Chinese interlocutors a request earlier made by Bangladesh for Chinese financial and technical assistance for the construction of a 103-km railway line connecting Dohazari in Chittagong with Gundum in Myanmar via Ramu in Cox's Bazar. The Chinese response to this request is not known, but they are likely to jump on the opportunity and accept the Bangladesh request, if they have not already done so. According to the Bangladesh authorities, while the construction of a line connecting Dohazari with Gundum should pose no problem for the Chinese engineers, connecting Gundum with Yunnan would be more complex since tunnels will have to be constructed at some places.

7. While China has been projecting these projects as part of a project initiated by the UNESCAP, its strategic significance for China cannot be underestimated. India's lack of financial resources and a reservoir of high-grade engineering personnel capable of construction of major infrastructure projects of high quality in time is coming in the way of India being able to compete with China on equal terms.

8. This may please be read in continuation of my article of September 28,2010, titled "CHINA: India’s Strategic Strangulation" at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4069.html (18-10-10)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )