B.RAMAN
( To be read in continuation of my article of
November 6,2012, titled “Chinese Checkers” carried by “Outlook” in its online
edition at http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?282899
)
The continuing (since April 15,2013) Chinese troop
intrusion ( about 20 troops) 10 kms into Indian territory near Burthe in the
Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) area of Eastern Ladakh in the western sector of the
Sino-Indian border should be a matter for careful analysis and concern, but not
alarm.
2.A spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Office has
denied any Chinese intrusion into Indian territory in this area. The Government
of India, for the present, has been treating it as one of those intrusions
which take place sometimes due to differing perceptions of the Line of Actual
Control (LAC) in this area and trying to deal with it through the normal
mechanism for handling such issues without disturbing peace and tranquillity
across the border.
3. There is no evidence to show that this could be
a prelude to a major Chinese assertion of territorial sovereignty in this area.
The Chinese aim seems to be to re-assert their claim of sovereignty over this
area without disturbing peace and tranquillity. The Chinese troops are
presently camping in the area in a tent. We will have reasons to be more than
concerned only if they stay put there and construct permanent defences as they
often do in the uninhabited islands of the South China Sea.
4. Since last year, the Chinese have been a little
more assertive of their sovereignty claims over the islands of the South and
East China Seas. They have reportedly constructed permanent defensive and
administrative structures on some of the islands over which they have disputes
with Vietnam and the Philippines.
5. In the East China Sea, where they have
sovereignty disputes with Japan, they have avoided any such construction, but
stepped up seemingly aggressive air and naval patrols of the areas in the
vicinity of these islands. The Chinese Navy has also stepped up its visits to
the islands in the South China Sea claimed by Beijing.
6.Till now we have seen greater Chinese activism in
the enforcement of their sovereignty claims only in the South and East China
seas, but not across the Sino-Indian border. If the Chinese troops stay put in
the Burthe area and construct defensive structures in the area, that will be an
indicator of their deciding to follow a similar policy of activism across the
Sino-Indian border too. That should add to our border concerns. We may have to
revisit our peace and tranquillity strategy and think of a more activist policy
to face the Chinese activism.
7. In the Western sector of the border, which is
largely unpopulated, the status quo favours the Chinese. Since 1962, they are
already in occupation of whatever territory they have claimed. We have very few
options to re-assert our sovereignty in any area of this sector which is under
Chinese control.
8. In the Eastern sector ( Arunachal Pradesh, which
the Chinese call Southern Tibet), the area is populated and the status quo
favours India. Even though our defensive and administrative infrastructure in the
Arunachal Pradesh area is not comparable with the Chinese infrastructure in the
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), we are in a much stronger position in the
Eastern sector than in the Western.
9.While the Chinese continue to repeat from time to
time their claims to the Arunachal Pradesh area, they have avoided in the
Eastern sector the kind of ground activism that one comes across in the Western
sector. There is a noticeable keenness on the part of both China and India to
avoid any provocative incident either in the Eastern or Western sector.
10.The Chinese are unlikely to relent in their
claims to Indian territory in the Eastern sector till after they have succeeded
in imposing on the Tibetans a Dalai Lama chosen by the Communist Party of China
(CPC) with the help of the Panchen Lama chosen by the CPC.
11.The wave of self-immolations (115 incidents so
far) in the Tibetan areas of China since March 2009 has created concerns in
Chinese mind of possible political instability in the Tibetan areas after His
Holiness the Dalai Lama when the CPC imposes its nominee on the Tibetans.
12. The older generation of Tibetans continues to
abide by His Holiness’ exhortations for peaceful means of protest. The Chinese
are worried that the GenNext of Tibetans represented by organisations such as
the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) may take to violent means to resist the
imposition of a Dalai Lama chosen by the CPC.
13. In their calculation,this may necessitate
action by the PLA in the populated areas of Arunachal Pradesh. Till Tibet is
pacified without fears of any further trouble and the Chinese have forced the
Tibetans to accept their nominee as the Dalai Lama, Beijing would like to
maintain its claim to Arunachal Pradesh to justify action by the PLA in that
area to contain trouble, if need be.
14. If they now make a deal with India recognising
Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of India, they will not be able to act in
that area. By recognising Tibet as an integral part of China we have given up
our options for action in Tibet. The Chinese would not want to commit the same
mistake by recognising Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of India.
15. They will, therefore, keep the Arunachal
Pradesh issue alive till they have forced the Tibetans to accept their decision
regarding succession of His Holiness. We should factor this into our border
strategies relating to China. (23-4-13)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director,
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For
China Studies. @SORBONNE75 )
