B.RAMAN
This is not meant to be a detailed critique of the
report of the three-member team of interlocutors headed by Shri Dileep
Padgaonkar constituted by the Government of India in October 2010 to suggest
ways forward in dealing with the various aspects of the alienation of the
people of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) which led to an anti-Government of
India insurgency there.
2. The insurgency was the result of accumulated
grievances and anger over a long period of time. There were various factors
responsible for this accumulation--- perceptions of a dilution of the special
status granted to the State when it acceded to India after the partition of the
country, malgovernance, perceptions of a distortion of the democratic process
by successive Governments of the National Conference without the Government of
India doing anything to check such distortions etc.
3. Political and not economic factors were at the
root of the insurgency. The Government of India and successive State Governments of the National Conference have
to share the blame in equal measure for wittingly or unwittingly creating a
negative political atmosphere marked by a growing alienation of the people that
was exploited by the Pakistan Government for sowing the seeds of an anti-India
insurgency in the State.
4. What started as an anti-Government insurgency
due to our mishandling of the affairs of the State was turned into an
anti-India insurgency by Pakistan with the collaboration of some elements in
the State which gave a religious dimension to what started as an essentially
political movement and took up the Pakistani cry of “Kashmir Banega Pakistan”.
5. The introduction of the religious dimension by
these elements led to brutal attacks on the Kashmiri Hindu Pandits and their
being ejected from their traditional homeland .Thus, what we faced in J&K
was a three dimensional problem consisting of a political dimension due to our
own mishandling, a religious dimension injected by Pakistan with the help of
its supporters in the State and an operational dimension caused by the widespread
outbreak of violence by elements instigated, trained, funded and armed by
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
6. After over 20 years, our security forces led by
the Army have succeeded in bringing the operational dimension under control.
There has been a significant decrease in violence and a steady movement towards
normalcy on the ground. The successful holding of State and Panchayat elections
and the resumption of the domestic tourist traffic to the State are indicators
of this movement.
7. The successful handling of the operational
aspects of the problem by the security forces so far should not be
over-assessed to mean that the original
causes of alienation in the hearts and minds of the people have disappeared and
that the Pakistani machinations in the State have been defeated once and for
all.
8. There has been an insurgency fatigue in the
State caused by the skilful campaign of attrition waged by the security forces
against the anti-Government and anti-India elements which had taken to violence
with the support of Pakistan. This fatigue indicates that these elements have
now been convinced that violence, with or without the support of Pakistan, has
not taken them anywhere.
9. While there is insurgency fatigue, there is no
political fatigue. The anti-Government and anti-India elements remain
politically active and there are no irreversible signs of a dilution of the
state of alienation of large sections of the people. Bringing the insurgency
under control was only one aspect of the problem. An equally important aspect
is to set in motion a process of dealienation through appropriate political and
psychological measures.
10. It was to address this important second stage
of dealienation that the Government of India set up the interlocutors’ team to
interact with large sections of the population and political and
non-governmental forces in the State in order to create a positive momentum
towards political normalisation in the State. The constitution of the
interlocutors’ team was indicative of a
clear recognition by the Government of India that operational normalisation
alone is not sufficient; it has to be followed by political normalisations so
that the feelings of alienation wither away.
11. The setting-up of the interlocutors’ team was
greeted with considerable scepticism by sections of the non-mainstream
Kashmiris who tended to view the exercise as an eyewash by the Government of
India to buy time. This scepticism ran the risk of being strengthened due to
the delay in the release of the report of the interlocutors by the Government.
12. In this context, one has to welcome the belated
release of the text of the report by the Ministry of Home Affairs of the
Government of India on May 24,2012. The report is both comprehensive and
complex. It is comprehensive in the sense of dealing with all aspects of the
problem---political, operational, economic, humanitarian etc. There is a huge
humanitarian aspect to the problem due to perceptions of unchecked and
unaddressed violations of the human rights of the people by the security forces
despite their better control of the ground situation now.
13. It is complex in the sense that the
interlocutors have come out with ideas and concepts--- the setting-up of the Constitutional
Review Committee is one such idea---- which may not be acceptable to all
sections of the people of the State and political forces in the rest of India. Now
that the text of the report has been released for widespread public discussion,
it is necessary for the Government of India to initiate steps to convince the
people of the State of its sincerity and determination to persist with this
process for achieving political normalisation in the State.
14. It needs to be admitted that some of the
recommendations of the team could be controversial and might be opposed by
those sections of the political forces who had always argued that the original
sin in the State was committed by the founding fathers of independent India who
agreed to grant a special constitutional status to the State. They are likely
to oppose firmly any attempt to reverse the process of the dilution of the special status. There could be other
issues relating to Jammu and Ladakh and the return of the Hindu Pandits to their
original homeland which might face opposition to their implementation.
15. Fears of likely controversies should not be
allowed to inhibit the implementation process. No sensitive report of this
nature can be implemented in toto. Political
compromises in the over-all State and national interest will be necessary. What
is important is to create a positive momentum towards implementation.
16. The creation of such a momentum will be
facilitated if the Government of India, in consultation with the State,
identifies those recommendations that can be implemented quickly through
executive orders without the need for
time-consuming political consultations and takes time-bound action to implement
them. Among such recommendations one could mention those relating to the re-deployment
of the security forces, re-evaluation of the need for special powers for the
Army and improving the human rights situation.
17. If this is done, it will restore the confidence
of the people in the sincerity of the Government and pave the way for a more
non-emotional examination of the other more complex and controversial recommendations.
18. We have a very short window of political
opportunity in the State. The thinning down of the NATO forces in Afghanistan
is likely to make available to the ISI surplus trained cadres and leaked arms
and ammunition from the dumps left by the departing NATO forces for diversion
to Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir in an attempt to re-kindle the dying insurgency.
The implicit Chinese recognition of Gilgit-Baltistan as Pakistani territory and
the increasing Chinese interest and presence in the Kashmiri territory under the illegal occupation of
Pakistan are likely to create new geostrategic dimensions of the problem and
our relations with Pakistan.
19. In my assessment, we may have a window of not
more than two years for creating a positive momentum towards political
normalisation in the State. We must pay serious attention to the process for
identifying the feasible follow-up action on the basis of the report and
initiating that action. Any impression that we are dragging our feet and were
never sincere in undertaking this exercise can be counter-productive. Don’t add
substance to the campaign of the separatists that the whole exercise was an
eyewash. (27-5-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director,
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For
China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
