B.RAMAN
In his first visit abroad as the President of China
since assuming office on March 14,2013, Mr.Xi Jinping is scheduled to visit
Russia, Tanzania, South Africa and the Republic of Congo from March 22-30 and
attend the fifth BRICS( Brazil,Russia,India,China and South Africa) summit on
March 26-27 in Durban, South Africa. In the margins of the summit, he is scheduled
to have bilateral talks with Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh.
2. The PLA Daily of March 21 has carried a report
disseminated by the official Xinhua news agency the previous day on an
interaction which Xi had before his visit with representatives of the Chinese
media as well as media representatives of the BRICS countries based in Beijing.
3.In addition to Xi’s views on the importance of
BRICs as an economic co-operation organization, the Xinhua report as published
by the PLA Daily highlights the views expressed by Xi on Sino-Indian relations.
4. To quote from the Xinhua report as published by
the PLA Daily:
“On Sino-Indian
ties, Xi said, to jointly follow a path of peaceful development and development
through cooperation not only meets the common interests of China and India, the
two largest developing countries in the world, but also does a great service to
Asia and the world at large.
“Speaking highly
of the important headway in bilateral ties in recent years thanks to concerted
efforts of the two sides, Xi urged both countries that are pursuing development
at a faster pace to seize the opportunities and take solid steps to bolster
cooperation and exchanges in all fields, accommodate each other's core concerns
and properly handle their problems and differences.
“On the boundary
problem, Xi said it is a complex issue left from history, and solving the issue
won't be easy. But he said he believes "as long as we keep up our friendly
consultations, we can eventually arrive at a fair, reasonable and mutually
acceptable settlement."
"Pending the
final settlement of the boundary question, the two sides should work together
to maintain peace and tranquility in border areas and prevent the boundary
question from affecting the overall development of bilateral relations,"
the President added.”
5. Two significant points in his observations need
to be underlined. Firstly, he talks of China’s “core concerns” vis-à-vis India
and not core interests. Xi and other Chinese leaders talk of “core interests
and major concerns” when they talk of China’s relations with the US, Japan and
the ASEAN countries. When they talk of core interests and major concerns, they
have in mind Taiwan and sovereignty issues relating to the islands in the South
and East China Seas.
6. While Xi has not spelt out what are the core
concerns of China vis-à-vis India, one could assess that these probably relate
to the activities of the Government-in-exile of His Holiness the Dalai Lama
from Indian territory, China’s sovereignty claims relating to Arunachal Pradesh
and India’s strategic relations with Vietnam and Japan.
7. Of late, the Chinese have been accusing the
Dalai Lama’s set-up of orchestrating the self-immolations in the Tibetan areas
of China. It is likely that the reported revival of the activities of the
Tibetan Youth League (TYC) and other pro-independence elements in the Tibetan
diaspora in the West could be interpreted by Beijing as adding to its concerns.
8.Even though the Chinese have not openly taken up
these issues, the likely impact of the Chinese concerns on this subject on our
bilateral relations with China has to be continuously monitored and assessed.
9. As I had pointed out in the past, the Chinese
attitude on the border dispute with India has been less confrontational than their
territorial sovereignty-related disputes with Japan and the ASEAN countries,
particularly Vietnam. In the case of India, they have accepted over the years
“mutual accommodation” as one of the principles that should be followed in any
border settlement. While they are prepared for mutual accommodation in a border
settlement with India, they never talk of mutual accommodation in their
disputes with Japan and the ASEAN countries. It is this Chinese acceptance of
mutual accommodation with India that should explain the absence of rhetoric
when they talk of the border dispute
with India as contrasted with the rhetoric in their statements on the South and
East China Seas.
10.China’s nuanced policy in matters relating to
sovereignty disputes with India is evident from Xi’s recognition of the border
issue as a complex problem on which the two countries should keep negotiating
while maintaining peace and tranquility across the border and without allowing
the dispute to affect the over-all development of the bilateral relations.
11. This is a formulation with` which India need have no quarrel. Neither
India nor China has been transparent on the progress in the border talks. As a
result, one does not know where the two countries are stuck up. The conventional
belief is that the lack of progress is due to India’s opposition to China’s
demand for the transfer of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh to China.
12. In the absence of details regarding the present
stage of the talks, there has been no contribution by the non-governmental
community of analysts to the search for options to find a compromise solution.
There is a need for the two Governments to be more forthcoming on the border
talks so that the search for a compromise solution could be intensified.
Ultimately, public and political opinion in India has to accept a border
settlement .Keeping them in the picture will facilitate this. Since India too
has accepted the principle of mutual accommodation, a compromise has to be
found which will not seriously affect the national interests of the two
countries. Why not the two Governments appoint a small core group of
non-Governmental experts from the two countries to come up with alternate ideas
that could be mutually acceptable?
13. On the question of China’s core concerns
regarding India’s strategic relations with Vietnam and Japan, there is no
reason for India to be defensive or apologetic about them. India’s relations with
Vietnam and Japan do not pose a threat to China whereas the increasing presence
of the Chinese Army in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Gilgit-Baltistan and
of the Chinese Navy in Gwadar in Balochistan do pose a threat to India’s
security. The Chinese have been indifferent to India’s core concerns on this.
There is no reason for India to be
sensitive to Chinese concerns regarding its relations with Vietnam and Japan.
(21-3-13)
( The writer is Additional Secretary ( retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi and, presently, Director,
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai
Centre for China Studies. Twitter:
@SORBONNE75)
