Can the history of our humiliation at the hands of
China in 1962 repeat itself?
2.As we approach the 50th anniversary of
the humiliation next month, we have to analyse this question in depth in our
governmental national security community as well as outside. It is important
for the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) to organise a series of
brainstorming on this subject with the participation of experts on China from
the Government and outside.
3. The starting-point of such a brainstorming has
to be a presumption that the present efforts to solve our border dispute with
China through talks may not succeed and
that we may be confronted with a fresh military confrontation in the
future.
4.Should such a confrontation arise, are we better
prepared to face it today than we were
in 1962? If not, what are the deficiencies still existing and how to remove them?
5.It is important for us to objectively identify the factors that led to the 1962
humiliation and examine to what extent they have been removed. It is also
important to foresee what kind of new factors not seen in 1962 could arise and
what implications they could have for our capabilities.
6. It is my view that our ability to prevent
another humiliation in future would depend upon our trans-Himalayan military
strategy and capability as it did in 1962. The roles of the Army and the Air
Force in such a strategy will be pre-eminent. The role of the Navy will be
marginal. It will be our trans-Himalayan strategic mindset and tactical
thinking that will determine the future course of any new military
confrontation with China as it did in 1962.
7. I would identify the following as the basic
causes of our humiliation of 1962:
( a ). Though our civilian and military
intelligence agencies had a satisfactory capability for the collection of
infrastructure intelligence from Tibet, their capability for the collection of
war indicators from Tibet was very poor. They detected in time the clandestine
Chinese construction of roads such as the Aksai Chin road in the Western
sector, but they missed the Chinese preparations for a military foray into our
territory. The Chinese attack on our positions must have been preceded by
weeks, if not months, of preparations on the ground in Tibet. The war
indicators caused by such preparations were missed by our intelligence
agencies.
( b ).Our capability for the analysis and assessment
of China-related intelligence was
inadequate. Even the limited intelligence flowing from Tibet from human and
technical sources was not subjected to vigorous analysis and assessment. Our
knowledge and assessment of the Chinese military thinking and mindset were
poor. We hardly knew anything about the India expertise in the PLA and the
Chinese intelligence. As a result, we seriously underestimated the Chinese
political and military will to assert their ground interests across the
Himalayas and over-assessed and over-projected our capability to anticipate and
neutralise any Chinese assertion of their will.
( c ). Inadequate professionalism in our Armed
Forces and their inability to foresee different scenarios that could arise and
identify the available options. This lack of professionalism was seen right
across the board --- from the failure to procure the military stores that would
be required for a trans-Himalayan war to readapting the training of our officers.
The Army went into war with very little training and experience in mountain
warfare and with very few equipment for such a warfare.
( d ). The inexperience of our political leadership
in military-related decision-making and in enforcing the implementation of the
decisions taken.
8. My assessment of the present position regarding
these factors is as follows:
( a ).Our intelligence collection capability in
Tibet has improved. Our intelligence agencies are unlikely to miss war
indicators in Tibet as badly as they did in 1962.
( b ). Our analysis and assessment capability has
improved over what it was in 1962, but continues to be inadequate. The Chinese
language capability of our national security community is worse than what it
was in 1962 and in the years immediately thereafter. Our ability to understand
and analyse the Chinese military mind-set and thinking continues to be poor.
Whatever capability we have built up in this regard has been largely influenced
by Western thinking and analysis without an independent application of our
mind. Our analysis and assessment infrastructure in respect of China-related
intelligence lags behind our analysis and assessment infrastructure in respect
of Pakistan-related intelligence. We can anticipate, analyse and counter Pakistan
better than we can China. There are wild swings in our assessments on
China----- from alarmism on the one side to total complacency on the other.
( C ).The professionalism of our Armed Forces has
improved. They are better equipped, better trained and better led for a
trans-Himalayan warfare today. But, there is a lack of convergence of thinking
between the Army and the Air Force on the one side and the Navy on the other as
to what China implies for our national security and Armed Forces. There is
inadequate integrated joint staff thinking in the Armed Forces as a whole on China. There
is a newly-acquired fascination for naval power and an inadequate appreciation of the continuing importance of
military (Army related) and air power.
( d ). The understanding of our political class in
matters relating to strategic decision-making on China is inadequate though it
is better than what it was in 1962 and the years before. There is a clear
understanding in our political class of China as a political and economic
competitor, but inadequate comprehension of China as a military factor.
9.Two new factors that have made their appearance
since 1962 have not received adequate attention in our national security
community:
( a ). The Chinese search for alternate means of
taking India by surprise. In 1962, they took us by surprise because our
intelligence agencies had little capability for collecting war indictors from
the ground in Tibet. The Chinese no longer enjoy this advantage. The increasing
Chinese emphasis on the role of the helicopter-borne operations of their Army
has to be seen in the context of their search for new means of taking India by
surprise--- particularly in Arunachal Pradesh. The equipping and training of
the copter wing of their Army is receiving increasing attention with some major
exercises already noticed.
( b ). The Chinese testing and fine-tuning of
integrated techniques of an Army-Air Force role in defending Tibet from external threats and in asserting their
will trans Himalayas. There has been an increase in the number of Air Force
exercises in Tibet. Not adequate knowledge of Chinese Air Force exercises in
Yunnan is available, but my surmise is that in any future military
confrontation with India, the Chinese will use their Air Force defensively from Tibet and offensively from Yunnan.
10.In 1962, the entire North Myanmar was a
political, administrative and military vacuum. The Myanmar Government presence
has since improved in the Rakhine (old Arakan) and Chin areas bordering
Bangladesh, but remains the same in the Kachin State bordering Yunnan. The
Kachin State and Yunnan are very important in any trans-Himalayan military
strategy. We continue to neglect these two important regions from the point of
view of our intelligence coverage as we were doing before 1962. The Kachin State is important for defending our
North East in any new confrontation with China. The Rakhine State is important
for our Indian Ocean objectives and our energy security.
11. I do not consider it necessary to touch upon
the nuclear aspect in this analysis. It has to be discussed in camera. (
17-9-12)
(The writer
is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi,
and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate
of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter @SORBONNE75)
