B.RAMAN
The war of nerves and words between China and Japan over the ownership of the Senkaku Islands (the Chinese call it the Diayou Islands) in the East China Sea continues despite the Japanese release of the Captain of a Chinese fishing trawler whom they had arrested on September 8,2010, for criminal trespass into the Japanese territorial waters around the Japanese-administered islands.
2.The Chinese are yet to release one of the four Japanese employees of a construction company whom they had arrested apparently in retaliation for the Japanese arrest of the fishing trawler's Captain. The abrupt Japanese release of the Captain after having initially given evidence of its intention to prosecute him followed the Chinese arrest of the four Japanese employees.
3.Rightly or wrongly, this has given rise to a perception in Japan that its Prime Minister Naoto Kan has let himself be bullied by China. The whole incident as it has been handled by the Kan Government has been seen by sections of the media and public in Japan as a humiliation of Japan by China.As if this perceived humiliation is not enough, Bejing is insisting that before the relations between the two countries could be normalised, Japan should apologise for the "illegal" arrest of the Captain and for his "wrongful" detention.If Mr.Kan concedes this demand, it would amount to his admitting indirectly that the group of islands is Chinese and not Japanese territory.
4.There is disappointment in Japan over the failure of the Barack Obama Administration to come out strongly in support of Japan in this war of nerves with China. The US recognises the Senkaku as Japanese-administered since 1972, but has not recognised Japanese claims of sovereignty over the Islands. At the same time, there is no denial of the interpretation that the protective provisions of the US-Japan security treaty cover the Senkaku islands too.
5. The Japanese were hoping that the US would come out as strongly against Chinese machinations in respect of the East China Sea islands as Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, did in respect of the South China Sea islands during her intervention at a meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi earlier this year. Surprisingly and inexplicably, the US has contented itself with statements merely calling for a peaceful resolution of the Sino-Japanese differences.
6. Attention has not been drawn by analysts to the blatant double standards in Chinese diplomacy as seen from its policy towards India on the Kashmir issue and its policy towards Japan on the Senkaku issue. The Chinese have been saying that the recent changes in favour of Pakistan in their stance on Kashmir is an individual issue which should not be allowed to have an impact on the over-all relations between India and China. But, they have refused to treat the arrest of the Chinese Captain by the Japanese as an individual issue which should not affect the over-all Sino-Japanese relations.
7. They have made the entire Sino-Japanese relations a hostage to this single issue. They have allegedly stopped the export of rare earth elements to Japan on which the Japanese high-tech industries are dependent. They have suspended high-level contacts between the two countries. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao declined to meet the Japanese Prime Minister when the two were in New York last week for the UN General Assembly session. Beijing has discouraged its tourists from visiting Japan. It has cancelled the visit of Japanese delegations to the Shanghai Expo.
8. The only factors that have acted as a check on the Chinese bullying of Japan are Beijing's uncertainty over the implications of the US-Japan security treaty in so far as the Senkaku group is concerned and fears that if Beijing continued to over-react it might provide fresh oxygen to Japanese militarists.
9. In a statement before the Japanese Parliament on October 1, Prime Minister Kan said: "The rise of China has been remarkable in recent years,but we are concerned about its strengthening defence capabilities without transparency and accelerating maritime activities spanning from the Indian Ocean to the East China Sea. The Senkaku islands are an integral part of our country, historically and under international law.Good relations with China - Japan's largest trading partner - are vital to both countries, but China must act as a responsible member of the international community. Japan needed to adopt more active foreign and defence policies to deal with uncertainty and instability that exist in areas surrounding our country."
10. His statement followed remarks by China's Foreign Ministry spokesman the previous day urging Japan to "stop making irresponsible remarks and safeguard the larger interests of bilateral relations with concrete actions". The spokesman, Jiang Yu, said: "We are willing to resolve our disputes through friendly negotiations but the Chinese Government's and people's will and resolve are unswerving on issues involving China's territorial integrity and sovereignty."
11. The regional "uncertainty and instability" consequent upon China's over-assertiveness in matters relating to territorial disputes should be of concern not only to Japan, but also to India, Vietnam and the Philippines. India's concerns over its long-pending border dispute with China and over the stepped-up Chinese support to Pakistan in the nuclear field and in the construction of road and rail infrastructure in Pakistan-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan are legitimate. So are the concerns of Vietnam and the Philippines regarding the Chinese intentions and capabilities in the South China Sea.
12. The perceptions and concerns of India, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines relating to China should bring them together to discuss among themselves as to how to counter the over-assertiveness of China without creating a confrontational situation and without damaging the positive dimensions of their respective bilateral relations with China. Their discussions among themselves should cover the strong as well as the weak points of China--- the strong points against which they should protect themselves and the weak points which they could exploit.
13. An editorial carried by the Chinese Communist Party controlled "Global Times" on September 21 under the title "Finding the Achilles' Heel of Japan" (annexed below) said: "Provoking China comes with a heavy price tag. Finding Japan's soft spot will help end its hostile policies against China during its rise."
14. There is a need for India, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines to find the soft spots of China. Pakistan could turn out to be one such soft spot. India knows Gilgit-Baltistan and the Chinese-controlled Xinjiang better than the Chinese. North Korea, where a new leadership is emerging, could be another. The Japanese know North Korea as well as the Chinese do. India, Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines should make overtures to the new, emerging leadership in North Korea and help it to free North Korea of its linkages with China and develop its prosperity. This is the time for India to seriously consider establishing contacts with the new North Korean leadership and invite Kim Jong-Un, the heir-apparent to Kim Jong-il, to India.
15. New Delhi's Look East policy as it has evolved till now has over-focussed on our relations with the ASEAN. The relations with the ASEAN countries continue to be important. It is time to give an East Asia dimension too to our Look East policy. (3-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
Editorial carried by the "Global Times" on September 21,2010
FINDING THE ACHILLES' HEEL OF JAPAN
When a diplomatic conflict breaks out between China and Japan, China often lacks sophisticated countermeasures to use against its neighbor. Strong public sentiment and vague counteractions may cost more with less effect.
Bilateral relations between the two countries have plunged recently due to Japan's diplomatic recklessness. It is still unknown how this latest conflict over the Diaoyu Islands will end.
China needs a more focused effort in studying and analyzing Japan, which has inflicted great suffering upon China throughout history. For centuries, Japan has put China under the microscope to study its strong and weak spots, but China has not found the Achilles' heel of Japan.
China's Japan policy has been based on friendly ties stressing warm public communication since the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two in 1972. But the public emotions of Japanese society toward China have altered significantly recently. It seems that conflicts originating from Japan are continually escalating. China's responses mostly only deal with short-term solutions or resolutions.
Now is the time to seriously examine Japan. It should be apparent by now that China will be forced to endure long-term conflicts with Japan, and emphasizing only friendly relations is not prudent. In addition, China needs to be certain of Japan's soft spots for clearly targeted reactions.
The pain has to be piercing. Japanese politicians need to understand the consequences - votes will be lost, and Japanese companies have to be aware of the loss of business involved. Japanese citizens will feel the burden due to the downturn in the economy. China's domestic law, business regulations and consumers can all be maneuvered.
There is a lingering question in China: Why do hawkish Japanese politicians who are obviously against China emerge one after another without China provoking Japan? The claim that the situation is a result of the Japanese becoming disillusioned over China's fast growth is not a convincing argument. Deeper explanations need to be explored and key organizations and figures have to be investigated.
China needs to think very hard about the motives of Japan and its government, and learn to counter Japan's moves with effective diplomatic measures. It is time now to include strong countermeasures into China's foreign policy toward Japan.
Provoking China comes with a heavy price tag. Finding Japan's soft spot will help end its hostile policies against China during its rise.
Saturday, October 2, 2010
AFGHANISTAN: THE LOOMING LOGISTICS DILEMMA
B.RAMAN
Twenty-seven oil tankers carrying diesel and other fuel for NATO forces in Afghanistan and 14 private vehicles were burnt to ashes following rocket attacks by unidentified persons in the early hours of the morning of October 1,2010, near a petrol pump station on the Shikarpur-Sukkur National Highway in Sindh. The drivers had stopped there for rest during the night. The vehicles did not have any police or military escort. The oil tankers were on their way to Quetta from Karachi. There were 37 tankers in the convoy of which 10 had left before the convoy was attacked. No group has claimed responsibility for the incident. In another incident, two persons, including the driver of an oil tanker, were burnt alive in an attack on NATO tankers near Khuzdar.
2. This is the fourth attack by unidentified elements on NATO logistic convoys in Sindh this year. Of the previous three incidents, two were reported from Karachi and one on the road from Karachi to Balochistan. Though none of these incidents has resulted in a successful investigation and prosecution by the Police, the following organisations were suspected: the Pakistani Taliban known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi which is an associate of Al Qaeda and the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam (F).Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the Amir of the JUI (F), is known as one of the mentors of Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Afghan Taliban. He also used to be close to Osama bin Laden. The close links of the JUI (F) with Al Qaeda and the two Talibans have not prevented President Asif Ali Zardari's Pakistan People's Party from taking its help for forming the coalition Government in Islamabad.
3.Karachi has more Pashtuns than Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunwa. They have prospered in the road transport business. They largely support the secular Awami National Party, which is the head of the coalition Government in Khyber Pakhtunkwa. It is also a member of the ruling coalition in Islamabad. The last two years have seen an influx of many internally displaced Pakistani Pashtuns from Swat and other areas of the Malakand Division of Khyber Pakhtunkwa into Sindh. While some of them have settled down in Karachi, others have settled down in other towns of Sindh such as Sukkur. These Pashtuns are largely supporters of the JUI (F). When the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) of Mr.Altaf Hussein alleges a creeping Talibanisation of Karachi it has in mind the influx of the internally displaced Pashtuns. It suspects that the ANP has also been supporting them. Hence, the frequent clashes between the MQM and the ANP despite both being secular parties.
4. Since the beginning of this year, there have been 55 attacks on NATO logistic convoys proceeding from Karachi to Afghanistan either via Balochistan or via Khyber Pakhtunkwa. Twenty-two of these attacks took place in September. The steep increase in attacks during September coincided with a steep increase in Drone (pilotless plane) strikes carried out by the US in North and South Waziristan. September also saw an increase in anti-US feelings in Pakistan despite the generous US assistance for flood relief following the conviction and sentencing by a US court of Aafia Siddiqui, a US-educated Pakistani scientist, on a charge of attempted murder of some US military personnel in Afghanistan. She is from Karachi and there was a huge demonstration in support of her in Karachi on September 24. The alleged helicopter raids by NATO forces into Pakistani territory during September while pursuing some fleeing Taliban insurgents also contributed to the anger against the NATO.
5.September also saw a bench of the Pakistan Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury taking up for enquiries the role of the NATO logistic convoys following allegations that these convoys have not been paying customs duty to the Pakistan Government, that nearly 10,000 NATO containers have gone missing, that some containers transported by the trucks hired by the NATO were found to contain alcohol and that there has been considerable smuggling by Pakistani intermediaries associated with the transport of NATO's logistic supplies.
6. As a result of these developments, the anti-US anger is getting increasingly focussed on the logistic convoys of the NATO. The feeling in the Pakistan Army that the US-led NATO forces cannot win the war in Afghanistan without the logistic transport support by Pakistan has given it a confidence that the NATO will not act against it for allowing the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda and its associates in its territory. it has suspended some of the convoys near the Afghan border following the NATO copter raids into its territory.
7. The US and its NATO allies face a dilemma. Despite three alternate supply routes now available through the Central Asian Republics, they are still dependent to a considerable extent on the transport movement through Pakistan for keeping their forces fighting against the Taliban in Afghanistan sustained. Their dependence on the Pakistan Army reduces their ability to exercise pressure on it to force it to act against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban in its territory. Unless they are able to exercise pressure on the Pakistan army, the attacks on the NATO and Afghan forces from sanctuaries in Pakistani territory will continue.
8. However, because of the alternate routes through the CARs being developed by them and their ability for air-lift from Bahrain, they are able to manage despite the increasing attacks on the convoys in Pakistani territory. When the US and other NATO forces start thinning down their presence in Afghanistan, the Afghan National Army (ANA) would not enjoy these benefits. The Pakistan Army and the Taliban acting in tandem would be able to choke the ANA by interfering with its logistic supplies. Even if the US plays a diminishing role in ground operations after July 2011, it cannot reduce its logistics role in support of the ANA. Otherwise, the ANA could collapse.
9. How to keep the supplies flowing to the ANA in the face of Pakistani and Taliban attempts to stop them is a question that deserves the immediate attention of the Pentagon strategists. (2-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Twenty-seven oil tankers carrying diesel and other fuel for NATO forces in Afghanistan and 14 private vehicles were burnt to ashes following rocket attacks by unidentified persons in the early hours of the morning of October 1,2010, near a petrol pump station on the Shikarpur-Sukkur National Highway in Sindh. The drivers had stopped there for rest during the night. The vehicles did not have any police or military escort. The oil tankers were on their way to Quetta from Karachi. There were 37 tankers in the convoy of which 10 had left before the convoy was attacked. No group has claimed responsibility for the incident. In another incident, two persons, including the driver of an oil tanker, were burnt alive in an attack on NATO tankers near Khuzdar.
2. This is the fourth attack by unidentified elements on NATO logistic convoys in Sindh this year. Of the previous three incidents, two were reported from Karachi and one on the road from Karachi to Balochistan. Though none of these incidents has resulted in a successful investigation and prosecution by the Police, the following organisations were suspected: the Pakistani Taliban known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi which is an associate of Al Qaeda and the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam (F).Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the Amir of the JUI (F), is known as one of the mentors of Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Afghan Taliban. He also used to be close to Osama bin Laden. The close links of the JUI (F) with Al Qaeda and the two Talibans have not prevented President Asif Ali Zardari's Pakistan People's Party from taking its help for forming the coalition Government in Islamabad.
3.Karachi has more Pashtuns than Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunwa. They have prospered in the road transport business. They largely support the secular Awami National Party, which is the head of the coalition Government in Khyber Pakhtunkwa. It is also a member of the ruling coalition in Islamabad. The last two years have seen an influx of many internally displaced Pakistani Pashtuns from Swat and other areas of the Malakand Division of Khyber Pakhtunkwa into Sindh. While some of them have settled down in Karachi, others have settled down in other towns of Sindh such as Sukkur. These Pashtuns are largely supporters of the JUI (F). When the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) of Mr.Altaf Hussein alleges a creeping Talibanisation of Karachi it has in mind the influx of the internally displaced Pashtuns. It suspects that the ANP has also been supporting them. Hence, the frequent clashes between the MQM and the ANP despite both being secular parties.
4. Since the beginning of this year, there have been 55 attacks on NATO logistic convoys proceeding from Karachi to Afghanistan either via Balochistan or via Khyber Pakhtunkwa. Twenty-two of these attacks took place in September. The steep increase in attacks during September coincided with a steep increase in Drone (pilotless plane) strikes carried out by the US in North and South Waziristan. September also saw an increase in anti-US feelings in Pakistan despite the generous US assistance for flood relief following the conviction and sentencing by a US court of Aafia Siddiqui, a US-educated Pakistani scientist, on a charge of attempted murder of some US military personnel in Afghanistan. She is from Karachi and there was a huge demonstration in support of her in Karachi on September 24. The alleged helicopter raids by NATO forces into Pakistani territory during September while pursuing some fleeing Taliban insurgents also contributed to the anger against the NATO.
5.September also saw a bench of the Pakistan Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury taking up for enquiries the role of the NATO logistic convoys following allegations that these convoys have not been paying customs duty to the Pakistan Government, that nearly 10,000 NATO containers have gone missing, that some containers transported by the trucks hired by the NATO were found to contain alcohol and that there has been considerable smuggling by Pakistani intermediaries associated with the transport of NATO's logistic supplies.
6. As a result of these developments, the anti-US anger is getting increasingly focussed on the logistic convoys of the NATO. The feeling in the Pakistan Army that the US-led NATO forces cannot win the war in Afghanistan without the logistic transport support by Pakistan has given it a confidence that the NATO will not act against it for allowing the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda and its associates in its territory. it has suspended some of the convoys near the Afghan border following the NATO copter raids into its territory.
7. The US and its NATO allies face a dilemma. Despite three alternate supply routes now available through the Central Asian Republics, they are still dependent to a considerable extent on the transport movement through Pakistan for keeping their forces fighting against the Taliban in Afghanistan sustained. Their dependence on the Pakistan Army reduces their ability to exercise pressure on it to force it to act against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban in its territory. Unless they are able to exercise pressure on the Pakistan army, the attacks on the NATO and Afghan forces from sanctuaries in Pakistani territory will continue.
8. However, because of the alternate routes through the CARs being developed by them and their ability for air-lift from Bahrain, they are able to manage despite the increasing attacks on the convoys in Pakistani territory. When the US and other NATO forces start thinning down their presence in Afghanistan, the Afghan National Army (ANA) would not enjoy these benefits. The Pakistan Army and the Taliban acting in tandem would be able to choke the ANA by interfering with its logistic supplies. Even if the US plays a diminishing role in ground operations after July 2011, it cannot reduce its logistics role in support of the ANA. Otherwise, the ANA could collapse.
9. How to keep the supplies flowing to the ANA in the face of Pakistani and Taliban attempts to stop them is a question that deserves the immediate attention of the Pentagon strategists. (2-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, October 1, 2010
AFTER AYODHYA JUDGEMENT
B.RAMAN
The following replies have been sent by me in response to queries from an Indian journalist:
1- What are likely repercussions of Ayodhya judgement on internal security issues of India?
The younger elements in organisations such as the SIMI and the Indian Mujahideen will see the judgement as another instance of injustice against the Muslims. Their anger and motivation could increase. I do apprehend more acts of terrorism by them.There will be no communal riots like one saw after the demolition of the Babri Masjid, but incidents of reprisal terrorism could increase.
2- Do you think the security arrangement will be able to take care of it?
Normally, yes, but it will be difficult to prevent sporadic acts of terrorism when anger increases in the community.
3- Do you think some package for Muslim community to give them better opportunities would help diffuse anguish?
Economic measures like more jobs etc won't help when the increased anger is due to perceptions of wrongs against the Muslim community.The Govt. should seek the co-operation of the elder members of the community to soften the anger of the younger elements. ( 1-10-10)
The following replies have been sent by me in response to queries from an Indian journalist:
1- What are likely repercussions of Ayodhya judgement on internal security issues of India?
The younger elements in organisations such as the SIMI and the Indian Mujahideen will see the judgement as another instance of injustice against the Muslims. Their anger and motivation could increase. I do apprehend more acts of terrorism by them.There will be no communal riots like one saw after the demolition of the Babri Masjid, but incidents of reprisal terrorism could increase.
2- Do you think the security arrangement will be able to take care of it?
Normally, yes, but it will be difficult to prevent sporadic acts of terrorism when anger increases in the community.
3- Do you think some package for Muslim community to give them better opportunities would help diffuse anguish?
Economic measures like more jobs etc won't help when the increased anger is due to perceptions of wrongs against the Muslim community.The Govt. should seek the co-operation of the elder members of the community to soften the anger of the younger elements. ( 1-10-10)
Thursday, September 30, 2010
ACTION AGAINST HAQQANI & ILYAS NETWORKS: CIA CHIEF’S AGENDA
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER No 681
B.RAMAN
Mr.Leon Panetta, the Director of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), arrived in Islamabad on September 29,2010, for talks with Lt.Gen.Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He was also scheduled to meet President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani and Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff ( COAS).
2. Ever since he took over as the head of the CIA last year, Mr.Panetta had been periodically visiting Pakistan for talks with Pakistani leaders and officials on action against Al Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans and other affiliates of Al Qaeda operating from Pakistani territory. He has also been utilizing these visits for discussing with his own officers based in the Af-Pak area the operations of the Drones (pilotless planes), which are co-ordinated by the CIA.
3. His latest visit is, therefore, not a matter for surprise. However, it has assumed more than the usual significance because of indicators that the Jalaluddin Haqqani network, which has been the bete noire of the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan, has been operating increasingly from new sanctuaries in the Kurram Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This area, which has seen some bloody fighting between the Shias and the Sunnis during the last two years, has not been the focus of the intensified Drone strikes, which have been confined to North Waziristan ( an estimated 64 strikes this year) and South Waziristan (an estimated six).
4.Because of the sensitive Shia-Sunni angle in the Kurram Agency, the US has till now left the responsibility for action against the Taliban sanctuaries in the Agency to the Pakistan Army, which has been claiming to have mounted ground and air strikes against them. Despite the Pakistani claims, there has been no reduction in cross-border raids into Afghanistan by well-trained elements of the Afghan Taliban, including the Haqqani network, from sanctuaries in the Kurram Agency.
5. It is dissatisfaction with the operations which the Pakistan Army claims to have launched in the Agency which has resulted in the decision of the NATO forces in Afghanistan to exercise the right of hot pursuit against the Taliban and Haqqani network elements fleeing back into the Kurram Agency after ambushing/attacking the NATO forces in Afghanistan. This hot pursuit is being exercised in helicopters and not through ground operations. In one such hot pursuit this week, a Pakistani checkpost came under fire from a NATO helicopter resulting in the alleged death of three Pakistani security personnel.
6. According to well-informed Pakistani sources, one of the purposes of the latest visit of the CIA chief is to remonstrate with the ISI and Pakistani Army officials over their failure to act against the sanctuaries in the Kurram Agency and caution them that continued inaction or inadequate action by the Pakistan army could force the US to extend its Drone strikes to the Kurram Agency.
7.According to the same sources, the US continues to be unhappy with the Pakistani inaction in North Waziristan and inadequate action in South Waziristan. The stepped-up Drone strikes have disrupted the functioning of Al Qaeda from North Waziristan, but have not had much of an impact on the operations of the so-called 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), another Uzbek group, which has been drawing followers from persons of Turkish origin, including Kurds, living in Germany.
8. Ever since the publication of some cartoons of the Prophet by a Danish paper in 2005, Al Qaeda and its associates based in Pakistan’s tribal belt have been exploring ways of mounting terrorist attacks in reprisal against Western targets in Europe. Ilyas Kashmiri has been playing an important role in this regard. Evidence of his role in looking for opportunistic attacks on behalf of Al Qaeda in Europe came from the interrogation of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), who was arrested by the FBI in October last year.
9. His interrogation brought out that he had helped the LET in preparing the groundwork for the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai and was similarly helping Ilyas Kashmiri in preparing the groundwork for terrorist strikes in Denmark. In fact, Ilyas Kashmiri was reported to have told Headley that he controlled operational assets in Europe whom Headley could use without having to depend on the LET for the European operations.
10.A Press release issued on January 14,2010, by the Public Affairs Division of the US Justice Department had said as follows: “Headley allegedly traveled in January 2009, from Chicago to Copenhagen, Denmark, to conduct surveillance of the Jyllands-Posten newspaper offices in Copenhagen and Aarhus and to videotape the surrounding areas In late January 2009, Headley traveled to Pakistan and met separately to discuss the planning with Abdur Rehman and Lashkar Member A. In February 2009, Abdur Rehman allegedly took Headley to meet with Kashmiri in the Waziristan region of Pakistan. During the meeting, Kashmiri allegedly indicated that he had reviewed the surveillance videos made by Headley and suggested using a truck bomb in the operation. Kashmiri further indicated that he could provide manpower for the operation and that Lashkar’s participation was not necessary, the indictment alleges. Subsequently, in March 2009, Lashkar Member A advised Headley that Lashkar put the newspaper attack on hold because of pressure in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, according to the charges. In May 2009, Headley and Abdur Rehman met again with Kashmiri in Waziristan and Kashmiri allegedly directed Headley to meet with his European contacts who could provide Headley with money, weapons, and manpower for the newspaper attack. In late July and early August 2009, Headley traveled from Chicago to various places in Europe, including Copenhagen, attempting to obtain assistance from Kashmiri’s contacts and, while there, made approximately 13 additional surveillance videos, according to the charges.” ( My comment: Abdur Rehman is a retired Major of the Pakistan Army, who was acting as a cut-out between Headley and Ilyas Kashmiri)
11.The Islamic Jihad Union or Group (IJU), an Uzbek group based in North Waziristan and closely allied to Al Qaeda, has some followers in Germany among persons of Turkish origin as well as white German converts to Islam. Some arrests were made in Germany in August-September 2007 in connection with investigations into the activities of the IJU and its suspected plots for terrorist strikes in Germany against German as well as American targets.
12. The Norwegian police announced on July 8,2010, the arrest of three men suspected of having ties to Al Qaeda on charges of preparing terrorist attacks. One of them is a Norwegian citizen of Uighur origin. The other two are permanent residents in Norway of Uzbek and Iraqi-Kurdish origin. Two of them (the Uzbek and the Uighur) are reported to have been arrested in Norway and the third (Iraqi-Kurd with a permanent residence permit of Norway) in Germany. The Norwegian police had been keeping them under surveillance for investigation for about a year. The arrests appear to have been made even though the investigation was incomplete because of the leakage of the news about the investigation against them to the media. They apparently decided to arrest them before the media came out with the news. Media reports indicated that the arrested persons were suspected of involvement in plots for terrorist strikes in Norway and of having links with some terrorist suspects under investigation in the US and the UK.
13. The latest reports emanating from the US and the UK about the alleged plans of Al Qaeda to mount Mumbai-style terrorist strikes in the UK, France and Germany have come in the wake of these developments relating to the use of Headley by Ilyas and the arrests in Norway and Germany. The same sources as mentioned above say that the US feels that the ISI has been dragging its feet in taking action against Ilyas and his contacts in the Pakistan Army. Sections of the Pakistani media have been alleging since 2008 that Ilyas had served for some time as a commando in the Special Services Group of the Pakistan Army before drifting into the world of terrorism. He, therefore, enjoys protection from the ISI. Like the Haqqanis father and son, Ilyas is another valued operational asset of the ISI, which uses the Haqqanis in Afghanistan and Ilyas against India.
14. Growing indicators of the role which Ilyas has been playing as facilitator for the Euopean operations of Al Qaeda and its Uzbek associates have made the US step up pressure on the ISI for neutralizing Ilyas and his 313 Brigade. The sources say that this is another important reason for the visit of the CIA chief to Pakistan.
15. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier articles cited below:
(a). Article of September 18,2010, titled HAQQANI NETWORK IN PARACHINAR at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4047.html
(b).Article of July 9,2010, titled “Al Qaeda In Norway” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3915.html
(1-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Mr.Leon Panetta, the Director of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), arrived in Islamabad on September 29,2010, for talks with Lt.Gen.Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He was also scheduled to meet President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani and Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff ( COAS).
2. Ever since he took over as the head of the CIA last year, Mr.Panetta had been periodically visiting Pakistan for talks with Pakistani leaders and officials on action against Al Qaeda, the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans and other affiliates of Al Qaeda operating from Pakistani territory. He has also been utilizing these visits for discussing with his own officers based in the Af-Pak area the operations of the Drones (pilotless planes), which are co-ordinated by the CIA.
3. His latest visit is, therefore, not a matter for surprise. However, it has assumed more than the usual significance because of indicators that the Jalaluddin Haqqani network, which has been the bete noire of the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan, has been operating increasingly from new sanctuaries in the Kurram Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This area, which has seen some bloody fighting between the Shias and the Sunnis during the last two years, has not been the focus of the intensified Drone strikes, which have been confined to North Waziristan ( an estimated 64 strikes this year) and South Waziristan (an estimated six).
4.Because of the sensitive Shia-Sunni angle in the Kurram Agency, the US has till now left the responsibility for action against the Taliban sanctuaries in the Agency to the Pakistan Army, which has been claiming to have mounted ground and air strikes against them. Despite the Pakistani claims, there has been no reduction in cross-border raids into Afghanistan by well-trained elements of the Afghan Taliban, including the Haqqani network, from sanctuaries in the Kurram Agency.
5. It is dissatisfaction with the operations which the Pakistan Army claims to have launched in the Agency which has resulted in the decision of the NATO forces in Afghanistan to exercise the right of hot pursuit against the Taliban and Haqqani network elements fleeing back into the Kurram Agency after ambushing/attacking the NATO forces in Afghanistan. This hot pursuit is being exercised in helicopters and not through ground operations. In one such hot pursuit this week, a Pakistani checkpost came under fire from a NATO helicopter resulting in the alleged death of three Pakistani security personnel.
6. According to well-informed Pakistani sources, one of the purposes of the latest visit of the CIA chief is to remonstrate with the ISI and Pakistani Army officials over their failure to act against the sanctuaries in the Kurram Agency and caution them that continued inaction or inadequate action by the Pakistan army could force the US to extend its Drone strikes to the Kurram Agency.
7.According to the same sources, the US continues to be unhappy with the Pakistani inaction in North Waziristan and inadequate action in South Waziristan. The stepped-up Drone strikes have disrupted the functioning of Al Qaeda from North Waziristan, but have not had much of an impact on the operations of the so-called 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), another Uzbek group, which has been drawing followers from persons of Turkish origin, including Kurds, living in Germany.
8. Ever since the publication of some cartoons of the Prophet by a Danish paper in 2005, Al Qaeda and its associates based in Pakistan’s tribal belt have been exploring ways of mounting terrorist attacks in reprisal against Western targets in Europe. Ilyas Kashmiri has been playing an important role in this regard. Evidence of his role in looking for opportunistic attacks on behalf of Al Qaeda in Europe came from the interrogation of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), who was arrested by the FBI in October last year.
9. His interrogation brought out that he had helped the LET in preparing the groundwork for the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai and was similarly helping Ilyas Kashmiri in preparing the groundwork for terrorist strikes in Denmark. In fact, Ilyas Kashmiri was reported to have told Headley that he controlled operational assets in Europe whom Headley could use without having to depend on the LET for the European operations.
10.A Press release issued on January 14,2010, by the Public Affairs Division of the US Justice Department had said as follows: “Headley allegedly traveled in January 2009, from Chicago to Copenhagen, Denmark, to conduct surveillance of the Jyllands-Posten newspaper offices in Copenhagen and Aarhus and to videotape the surrounding areas In late January 2009, Headley traveled to Pakistan and met separately to discuss the planning with Abdur Rehman and Lashkar Member A. In February 2009, Abdur Rehman allegedly took Headley to meet with Kashmiri in the Waziristan region of Pakistan. During the meeting, Kashmiri allegedly indicated that he had reviewed the surveillance videos made by Headley and suggested using a truck bomb in the operation. Kashmiri further indicated that he could provide manpower for the operation and that Lashkar’s participation was not necessary, the indictment alleges. Subsequently, in March 2009, Lashkar Member A advised Headley that Lashkar put the newspaper attack on hold because of pressure in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, according to the charges. In May 2009, Headley and Abdur Rehman met again with Kashmiri in Waziristan and Kashmiri allegedly directed Headley to meet with his European contacts who could provide Headley with money, weapons, and manpower for the newspaper attack. In late July and early August 2009, Headley traveled from Chicago to various places in Europe, including Copenhagen, attempting to obtain assistance from Kashmiri’s contacts and, while there, made approximately 13 additional surveillance videos, according to the charges.” ( My comment: Abdur Rehman is a retired Major of the Pakistan Army, who was acting as a cut-out between Headley and Ilyas Kashmiri)
11.The Islamic Jihad Union or Group (IJU), an Uzbek group based in North Waziristan and closely allied to Al Qaeda, has some followers in Germany among persons of Turkish origin as well as white German converts to Islam. Some arrests were made in Germany in August-September 2007 in connection with investigations into the activities of the IJU and its suspected plots for terrorist strikes in Germany against German as well as American targets.
12. The Norwegian police announced on July 8,2010, the arrest of three men suspected of having ties to Al Qaeda on charges of preparing terrorist attacks. One of them is a Norwegian citizen of Uighur origin. The other two are permanent residents in Norway of Uzbek and Iraqi-Kurdish origin. Two of them (the Uzbek and the Uighur) are reported to have been arrested in Norway and the third (Iraqi-Kurd with a permanent residence permit of Norway) in Germany. The Norwegian police had been keeping them under surveillance for investigation for about a year. The arrests appear to have been made even though the investigation was incomplete because of the leakage of the news about the investigation against them to the media. They apparently decided to arrest them before the media came out with the news. Media reports indicated that the arrested persons were suspected of involvement in plots for terrorist strikes in Norway and of having links with some terrorist suspects under investigation in the US and the UK.
13. The latest reports emanating from the US and the UK about the alleged plans of Al Qaeda to mount Mumbai-style terrorist strikes in the UK, France and Germany have come in the wake of these developments relating to the use of Headley by Ilyas and the arrests in Norway and Germany. The same sources as mentioned above say that the US feels that the ISI has been dragging its feet in taking action against Ilyas and his contacts in the Pakistan Army. Sections of the Pakistani media have been alleging since 2008 that Ilyas had served for some time as a commando in the Special Services Group of the Pakistan Army before drifting into the world of terrorism. He, therefore, enjoys protection from the ISI. Like the Haqqanis father and son, Ilyas is another valued operational asset of the ISI, which uses the Haqqanis in Afghanistan and Ilyas against India.
14. Growing indicators of the role which Ilyas has been playing as facilitator for the Euopean operations of Al Qaeda and its Uzbek associates have made the US step up pressure on the ISI for neutralizing Ilyas and his 313 Brigade. The sources say that this is another important reason for the visit of the CIA chief to Pakistan.
15. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier articles cited below:
(a). Article of September 18,2010, titled HAQQANI NETWORK IN PARACHINAR at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4047.html
(b).Article of July 9,2010, titled “Al Qaeda In Norway” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3915.html
(1-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, September 29, 2010
KIM JONG-UN----WILL HE LAST? WILL HE CHANGE NORTH KOREA?
B.RAMAN
In a dispatch from Pyongyang, the Capital of North Korea, the Government and Chinese Communist Party controlled Xinhua news agency of China reported on September 29,2010, that a one-day conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) held on September 28, 2010, had taken the following “significant decisions” regarding the party leadership:
* Kim Jong Il, who had served as the General Secretary of the Party since October 1997, was reelected to the post.
* It elected a 124-member Central Committee, which included among others, Kim Jong-il himself, his 27-year-old youngest son Kim Jong Un ( pronounced Kim Jong-Woon) and Kim Kyong Hui, the 64-year-old sister of Kim Jong-Il.
* At a plenary session of the new Central Committee, attended by Kim Jong Il, the party's innermost leading core, the Presidium of the Politburo of the WPK Central Committee, “came into being”. Beside Kim Jong Il there are four other senior members in the Presidium, known as the Standing Committee of the Politburo, including Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, and Ri Yong Ho, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army (KPA). Choe Yong Rim and Jo Myong Rok would be the other members of the Presidium. The Politbureau includes these five members of the Presidium plus Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Yong Chun, Choe Thae Bok, Yang Hyong Sop and eight others. The alternate members include Jang Song Thaek, Kim Yong Il and 13 others. Kim Jong-Un has not been elected to the Polibureau, but his aunt Kim Kyong Hui has been.
* Also at the Central Committee meeting, Kim Jong Un was elected to the 19-member Central Military Commission.
* Kim Jong Un will serve as one of the two Vice-Chairmen of the powerful commission, headed by his father. Ri Yong Ho will be the other Vice-Chairman. A day earlier, Kim Jong Il had issued an order in his capacity of the supreme commander of the KPA promoting Ri Yong Ho to the rank of Vice- Marshal and Kim Jong Un to that of General, a rank below Vice- Marshal and above Colonel- General.
* In the amendments made to the WPK Charter, "the duties of a party member and the contents of the work of party organizations at different levels are comprehensively revised and supplemented." The revision also adds a new charter to the current charter regulating the party's logo and flag and further stresses the need to strengthen the party's leadership over the civilians as well as the military. The participants in the conference were convinced that the modifications "will provide a sure guarantee for strengthening and developing the party ... and victoriously advance the revolutionary cause."
* In a report seemingly indicating that the WPK conference has concluded, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said that the conference "was held with success in Pyongyang on Sept 28" and that "Kim Yong Nam made a closing speech."
2. The Xinhua dispatch added: “The historic gathering was the third of its kind in the party's history and the first in 44 years. Outside the country, the international community is also closely watching the development in the DPRK, as the country is trying to secure a peaceful international environment for its economic development and has recently repeated its intent to resume the Six-Party Talks for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. Contributing to the wariness of international players are the high tensions that have clouded the region since the March sinking of a South Korean warship that killed 46 sailors. Seoul accuses Pyongyang of torpedoing the vessel and has since carried out several military drills with the United States off the Korean coast, while the DPRK denies any involvement and has repeatedly warned that the "provocative" exercises would threaten regional security. “
3. According to the Wikipedia, the Conference also re-constituted the National Defence Commission as follows:
* Chairman: Marshal of the DPRK Kim Jong-il (1993-)
* 1st Vice Chairman: Vice Marshal of the KPA Ri Yong-ho, Chief of the KPA General Staff
* 2nd Vice Chairman: General of the Army Kim Jong-un
* Assistant Vice Chairmen:
o Chang Sung-taek, Secretary, WPK Administrative Department. He is the husband of Kim Kyong-Hui.
o Vice Marshal of the KPA Kim Yong-Chun, Minister of the People's Armed Forces
o Vice Marshal of the KPA Ri Yong-mu
o General of the Army O Kuk-ryol, Secretary, WPK Department of Operations
* Members of the Commission
o General of the Army Ju Sang-song, Minister of People's Security
o General of the Army Kim Jong-gak, 1st Deputy Director, KPA.
o Colonel General U Tong-chuk
o Jon Pyong-ho, Secretary of Military Industries
o Ju Kyu-chang, 1st Deputy Secretary, Department of Military Industries
o Paek Se-bong, Chairman, WPK 2nd Economic Committee.
o Pak Myong-chol , Councillor of the Commission.
4. The Xinhua dispatch, which was based on the press releases issued by the KCNA, did not report the reconstitution of the National Defence Commission. The National Defense Commission (NDC) of the State, which is different from the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the WPK, is defined by the 1998 constitution as “the highest guiding organ of the military and the managing organ of military matters.” The chairman of the NDC controls the armed forces. It is responsible for the management and direction of all military affairs and defense projects under the commission's authority. The NDC, though nominally under the Supreme People's Assembly, is the highest state body, with ultimate executive power (including responsibility for the armed forces) resting with its chairman, Kim Jong-il. It takes all decisions relating to nuclear and missile development.
5. The Central Military Commission is an organ of the WPK and is responsible for coordinating the Party organizations within the Korean People's Army. Its full and official name is the Commission for Military Affairs of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. Its functions are similar to those of the Communist Party of China's CMC. In addition to Kim Jong-il and Kom Jong-Un, the Commission has another 16 members, including Kim Yong Chun, Kim Jong Gak, and Jang Song Taek.
6. The elevation of Kim Jong-un to the rank of a General and his election as a member of the Party Central Committee and as one of the two Vice-Chairmen of the NDC of the State and the CMC of the party clearly places him in a position to succeed his father as the ruler of North Korea. Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in August 2008 and has reportedly been in poor health since then. Since January last year, the South Korean intelligence agency and media have been saying that after the stroke Kim Jong-Il had decided to groom Kim Jong-Un as his successor after superseding his two elder brothers and as the first step towards this, a special party conference would entrust him with important responsibilities relating to the State and the Party.
7. They have been proved right. However, there are still certain questions to which even the well-informed South Korean Intelligence agency and media do not have answers: Why did Kim Jong-il send Kim Jong-Un to Switzerland for three years of schooling? According to one unconfirmed report, all the three brothers had done part of their schooling in Switzerland. Did Kim Jong-Un study in China too, where Kim Jong-Il was himself educated? What impact his three-year stay in Switzerland have on his thinking? Would his exposure to the Swiss society, political system and economy have any influence on his policies? Would he gradually open up North Korea and take it on the road to economic liberalization and eradicate its image of a “rogue state” and a “state of concern”?
8. Kim Jong-Un was reportedly in Berne, the capital of Switzerland, from the age of 12 to 15 studying in the local international school where he was, according to some media accounts, enrolled as the son of the chauffeur of the North Korean Embassy in Berne. He returned to North Korea in 1998 and subsequently attended the Kim Il-sung Military University. He was reported to have accompanied his father to China in August 2010. Apart from that, it is not known whether he had ever stayed in China and if so, in what capacity.
9. The fact that China itself may not be well informed about the happenings in the North Korean Government and Party became evident from two factors. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao was earlier this year reported to have dismissed South Korean and Western speculation that Kim Jong-Il had decided that Kim Jong-Un should succeed him. Chinese newspapers such as the “Global Times” have often been reporting on North Korea on the basis of South Korean and Western speculation.
10. Chinese views over what could happen in North Korea after Kim Jong-il were reflected in a “Global Times” article of September 28, which said: “Despite varied versions of the successor choice and to which post the figure will be elevated to at the meeting, some analysts are dismissing the possibility of political chaos as a result of such a transition, saying the country won't undergo any significant policy change that could pose downsides on the security situation of the Korean Peninsula and northeast Asia. A stable North Korea is in China's national interests, regardless of who will be the next leader, experts say. Some cautious analysts also suggested that Jong-un's ascendancy could still be undone by political infighting, The New York Times reported. Xu Baokang, an expert on Korean Peninsula issues, told the Global Times that "any major shifts in its existing economic, social or foreign policies look impossible to take place." "North Korea's policies will remain to be strictly in line with Kim Il-sung's ideas. Intensive speculations in Western media that Pyongyang is likely to adjust its policies dramatically are incorrect," he said, adding that North Korea "can't endure risks stemming from major reforms." While predicting that the north will be politically stable, Lü Chao, a researcher of Korean studies at the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that "China supports North Korea to be part of the international community, and the Chinese side will actively create favorable conditions so as to help the North get rid of its isolated situation in the world, which also serves China's national interests."
11.Will Kim Jong-un be able to consolidate his position and emerge as the unquestioned leader of North Korea? The answer to this question will depend on how soon his father leaves the political scene----either due to death or poor health. If his father manages to continue in power for some years, that could enable Kim Jong-Un to consolidate his position in the Army and the Party. If his father leaves earlier than expected, he may find it difficult to deal with his potential adversaries in the army and the party. Among his adversaries will be his two superseded brothers and Chang Song-Taek, the husband of his aunt, who is today reputed to be the second most powerful man in North Korea after Kim Jong-il. Other Army officers may not like working under a 27-year-old person with very little exposure to the army and the world of diplomacy. Any infighting in the party and/or the army could lead to an active Chinese involvement in internal politics to prevent the country coming under the influence of elements not well-disposed towards China.
12. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier articles cited below:
(a). Article dated August 27,2010, titled “Chinese Concerns over North Korea & Vietnam” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4002.html
(b).Article of August 31,2010, titled “Visit of Kim Jong-IL to China---An Assessment “ at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4013.html
(30-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
In a dispatch from Pyongyang, the Capital of North Korea, the Government and Chinese Communist Party controlled Xinhua news agency of China reported on September 29,2010, that a one-day conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) held on September 28, 2010, had taken the following “significant decisions” regarding the party leadership:
* Kim Jong Il, who had served as the General Secretary of the Party since October 1997, was reelected to the post.
* It elected a 124-member Central Committee, which included among others, Kim Jong-il himself, his 27-year-old youngest son Kim Jong Un ( pronounced Kim Jong-Woon) and Kim Kyong Hui, the 64-year-old sister of Kim Jong-Il.
* At a plenary session of the new Central Committee, attended by Kim Jong Il, the party's innermost leading core, the Presidium of the Politburo of the WPK Central Committee, “came into being”. Beside Kim Jong Il there are four other senior members in the Presidium, known as the Standing Committee of the Politburo, including Kim Yong Nam, president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, and Ri Yong Ho, chief of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army (KPA). Choe Yong Rim and Jo Myong Rok would be the other members of the Presidium. The Politbureau includes these five members of the Presidium plus Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Yong Chun, Choe Thae Bok, Yang Hyong Sop and eight others. The alternate members include Jang Song Thaek, Kim Yong Il and 13 others. Kim Jong-Un has not been elected to the Polibureau, but his aunt Kim Kyong Hui has been.
* Also at the Central Committee meeting, Kim Jong Un was elected to the 19-member Central Military Commission.
* Kim Jong Un will serve as one of the two Vice-Chairmen of the powerful commission, headed by his father. Ri Yong Ho will be the other Vice-Chairman. A day earlier, Kim Jong Il had issued an order in his capacity of the supreme commander of the KPA promoting Ri Yong Ho to the rank of Vice- Marshal and Kim Jong Un to that of General, a rank below Vice- Marshal and above Colonel- General.
* In the amendments made to the WPK Charter, "the duties of a party member and the contents of the work of party organizations at different levels are comprehensively revised and supplemented." The revision also adds a new charter to the current charter regulating the party's logo and flag and further stresses the need to strengthen the party's leadership over the civilians as well as the military. The participants in the conference were convinced that the modifications "will provide a sure guarantee for strengthening and developing the party ... and victoriously advance the revolutionary cause."
* In a report seemingly indicating that the WPK conference has concluded, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said that the conference "was held with success in Pyongyang on Sept 28" and that "Kim Yong Nam made a closing speech."
2. The Xinhua dispatch added: “The historic gathering was the third of its kind in the party's history and the first in 44 years. Outside the country, the international community is also closely watching the development in the DPRK, as the country is trying to secure a peaceful international environment for its economic development and has recently repeated its intent to resume the Six-Party Talks for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. Contributing to the wariness of international players are the high tensions that have clouded the region since the March sinking of a South Korean warship that killed 46 sailors. Seoul accuses Pyongyang of torpedoing the vessel and has since carried out several military drills with the United States off the Korean coast, while the DPRK denies any involvement and has repeatedly warned that the "provocative" exercises would threaten regional security. “
3. According to the Wikipedia, the Conference also re-constituted the National Defence Commission as follows:
* Chairman: Marshal of the DPRK Kim Jong-il (1993-)
* 1st Vice Chairman: Vice Marshal of the KPA Ri Yong-ho, Chief of the KPA General Staff
* 2nd Vice Chairman: General of the Army Kim Jong-un
* Assistant Vice Chairmen:
o Chang Sung-taek, Secretary, WPK Administrative Department. He is the husband of Kim Kyong-Hui.
o Vice Marshal of the KPA Kim Yong-Chun, Minister of the People's Armed Forces
o Vice Marshal of the KPA Ri Yong-mu
o General of the Army O Kuk-ryol, Secretary, WPK Department of Operations
* Members of the Commission
o General of the Army Ju Sang-song, Minister of People's Security
o General of the Army Kim Jong-gak, 1st Deputy Director, KPA.
o Colonel General U Tong-chuk
o Jon Pyong-ho, Secretary of Military Industries
o Ju Kyu-chang, 1st Deputy Secretary, Department of Military Industries
o Paek Se-bong, Chairman, WPK 2nd Economic Committee.
o Pak Myong-chol , Councillor of the Commission.
4. The Xinhua dispatch, which was based on the press releases issued by the KCNA, did not report the reconstitution of the National Defence Commission. The National Defense Commission (NDC) of the State, which is different from the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the WPK, is defined by the 1998 constitution as “the highest guiding organ of the military and the managing organ of military matters.” The chairman of the NDC controls the armed forces. It is responsible for the management and direction of all military affairs and defense projects under the commission's authority. The NDC, though nominally under the Supreme People's Assembly, is the highest state body, with ultimate executive power (including responsibility for the armed forces) resting with its chairman, Kim Jong-il. It takes all decisions relating to nuclear and missile development.
5. The Central Military Commission is an organ of the WPK and is responsible for coordinating the Party organizations within the Korean People's Army. Its full and official name is the Commission for Military Affairs of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. Its functions are similar to those of the Communist Party of China's CMC. In addition to Kim Jong-il and Kom Jong-Un, the Commission has another 16 members, including Kim Yong Chun, Kim Jong Gak, and Jang Song Taek.
6. The elevation of Kim Jong-un to the rank of a General and his election as a member of the Party Central Committee and as one of the two Vice-Chairmen of the NDC of the State and the CMC of the party clearly places him in a position to succeed his father as the ruler of North Korea. Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in August 2008 and has reportedly been in poor health since then. Since January last year, the South Korean intelligence agency and media have been saying that after the stroke Kim Jong-Il had decided to groom Kim Jong-Un as his successor after superseding his two elder brothers and as the first step towards this, a special party conference would entrust him with important responsibilities relating to the State and the Party.
7. They have been proved right. However, there are still certain questions to which even the well-informed South Korean Intelligence agency and media do not have answers: Why did Kim Jong-il send Kim Jong-Un to Switzerland for three years of schooling? According to one unconfirmed report, all the three brothers had done part of their schooling in Switzerland. Did Kim Jong-Un study in China too, where Kim Jong-Il was himself educated? What impact his three-year stay in Switzerland have on his thinking? Would his exposure to the Swiss society, political system and economy have any influence on his policies? Would he gradually open up North Korea and take it on the road to economic liberalization and eradicate its image of a “rogue state” and a “state of concern”?
8. Kim Jong-Un was reportedly in Berne, the capital of Switzerland, from the age of 12 to 15 studying in the local international school where he was, according to some media accounts, enrolled as the son of the chauffeur of the North Korean Embassy in Berne. He returned to North Korea in 1998 and subsequently attended the Kim Il-sung Military University. He was reported to have accompanied his father to China in August 2010. Apart from that, it is not known whether he had ever stayed in China and if so, in what capacity.
9. The fact that China itself may not be well informed about the happenings in the North Korean Government and Party became evident from two factors. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao was earlier this year reported to have dismissed South Korean and Western speculation that Kim Jong-Il had decided that Kim Jong-Un should succeed him. Chinese newspapers such as the “Global Times” have often been reporting on North Korea on the basis of South Korean and Western speculation.
10. Chinese views over what could happen in North Korea after Kim Jong-il were reflected in a “Global Times” article of September 28, which said: “Despite varied versions of the successor choice and to which post the figure will be elevated to at the meeting, some analysts are dismissing the possibility of political chaos as a result of such a transition, saying the country won't undergo any significant policy change that could pose downsides on the security situation of the Korean Peninsula and northeast Asia. A stable North Korea is in China's national interests, regardless of who will be the next leader, experts say. Some cautious analysts also suggested that Jong-un's ascendancy could still be undone by political infighting, The New York Times reported. Xu Baokang, an expert on Korean Peninsula issues, told the Global Times that "any major shifts in its existing economic, social or foreign policies look impossible to take place." "North Korea's policies will remain to be strictly in line with Kim Il-sung's ideas. Intensive speculations in Western media that Pyongyang is likely to adjust its policies dramatically are incorrect," he said, adding that North Korea "can't endure risks stemming from major reforms." While predicting that the north will be politically stable, Lü Chao, a researcher of Korean studies at the Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that "China supports North Korea to be part of the international community, and the Chinese side will actively create favorable conditions so as to help the North get rid of its isolated situation in the world, which also serves China's national interests."
11.Will Kim Jong-un be able to consolidate his position and emerge as the unquestioned leader of North Korea? The answer to this question will depend on how soon his father leaves the political scene----either due to death or poor health. If his father manages to continue in power for some years, that could enable Kim Jong-Un to consolidate his position in the Army and the Party. If his father leaves earlier than expected, he may find it difficult to deal with his potential adversaries in the army and the party. Among his adversaries will be his two superseded brothers and Chang Song-Taek, the husband of his aunt, who is today reputed to be the second most powerful man in North Korea after Kim Jong-il. Other Army officers may not like working under a 27-year-old person with very little exposure to the army and the world of diplomacy. Any infighting in the party and/or the army could lead to an active Chinese involvement in internal politics to prevent the country coming under the influence of elements not well-disposed towards China.
12. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier articles cited below:
(a). Article dated August 27,2010, titled “Chinese Concerns over North Korea & Vietnam” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4002.html
(b).Article of August 31,2010, titled “Visit of Kim Jong-IL to China---An Assessment “ at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4013.html
(30-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
CHINA: INDIA'S STRATEGIC STRANGULATION
B.RAMAN
Like a homing pigeon, China is pressing ahead with the implementation of its plans for railway link-ups with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nepal. It is only a question of time before Chinese railway planners and strategic thinkers come out with a plan for a railway link-up with Bangladesh via Myanmar. The initiative for these link-ups came not from China, but from these countries. Once their interest in a railway link-up with China became evident, Beijing pounced on the opportunity and seriously took up a feasibility study and came up with ideas regarding the implementation if the projects were found feasible.
2. It has projected these projects as dictated by purely economic requirements and not by strategic or geopolitical intentions. Though these projects, when finally implemented, would have an enormous military significance, the military aspect is played down and their economic benefits are highlighted. A study of the evolution of the ideas for railway link-ups across India’s periphery shows that while China does not seek to create for itself a capability for the strategic strangulation of India, it never misses an opportunity to develop such a capability if it presents itself.
3. I have already written separately about the feasibility studies that have been initiated regarding railway link-ups with Pakistan and Afghanistan. This article is about a possible railway link-up between Tibet and Nepal. On January 18, 2008, less than two years after China commissioned the railway line to Lhasa, its online Tibet news service (en.tibet.cn) quietly announced that the Lhasa-Xigaze Section of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway's extension line “is expected to start construction this year”. The next day, the Government and party-controlled Xinhua news agency quoted the then Chairman Qiangba Puncog of the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region as stating that it would be one of the region’s ten key construction projects involving an investment of 28 billion yuan ($3.7 billion). The Xinhua further quoted him as saying as follows: “"Experts are still working on the designs and environmental assessments of the extension line and government officials have started calculating compensations to those who will lose their land and properties to the railway." It added that the 254-km Lhasa-- Xigaze will be the first feeder line for the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and would cost 11 billion yuan and be completed in 2010. As pointed out by the “Tibetan Review” of January 23,2008,Xigaze is located 280 km southwest of Lhasa and borders Nepal, Bhutan and India.
4.Mr.Cheng Xia Ling, the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal, said in an interview the same day: "The China -Tibet railway link will not end in Lhasa, as we have plans to expand it up to the Nepalese border." He added that he was aware of the difficulty of supplying oil to Nepal from China. “It is not an easy task to supply petrol from China as we need to cross thousands of kilometres of distance and Tibet having border with Nepal is at an altitude of 4,000 metres." In an interview to “Nepal Weekly”, he said : "We are even planning to link it to Kathmandu in not too distant future." The “ China Daily” said on January 23, 2008,that a Sichuan-Tibet Railway would be built to create a network linking Sichuan's western passageway with Tibet, Qinghai province and Chinese-controlled Xinjiang. It said that it would be part of China’s six new railway projects costing 140 billion yuan ($19.3 billion) to be included in the national railway network plan. An agreement for this purpose was signed on January 10,2008,by Sichuan’s party secretary Mr. Liu Qibao and Governor Jiang Jufeng with China’s Railway Minister, Mr. Liu Zhijun.
5.In the last week of April,2008, the Chinese told the Nepalese authorities about their plans for extending the railway line to Lhasa inaugurated in 2006 up to Khasa a town on the Tibet-Nepal border. Mr.Aditya Baral, Adviser on Foreign Policy to then Nepalese Prime Minister Mr.Girija Prasad Koirala, told the media as follows: “Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala was told by a visiting Chinese delegation during a meeting that the Chinese Government has begun a railway extension project on its side to link with the Nepal-China border." According to Mr.Baral,the Chinese Communist Party delegation told Nepalese officials that the railway link would be ready in five years time. The Nepal border town of Khasa lies some 80 kilometres (50 miles) north of Kathmandu. "The railway network will be important for increasing trade and tourism for both countries," Mr.Baral added. The delegation reportedly told Mr. Koirala that Beijing had included the railway line extension in its ongoing eleventh five-year plan.
6. On August 17, 2008, a spokesman of the Chinese railways confirmed plans to add six more rail lines to the Qinghai-Tibet railway. Of these, one will be from Lhasa to Nyingchi and one from Lhasa to Xigaze, both in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region. Three lines will originate from Golmud in the Qinghai province and connect Chengdu in the Sichuan province, Dunhuang in the Gansu province, and Kuerle in Chinese-controlled Xinjiang. The sixth will link Xining , capital of Qinghai, with Zhangye in the Gansu province. He said that the six lines were expected to be completed and commissioned before 2020.
7. Subsequent reports indicated that under the Development Strategy for Western China, the Chinese were planning to connect Lhasa to Zhangmu vis Xigaze to the West and to Dali via Nyingchi to the East and that they were planning further to link Xigaze with Yadong near the Sino-Indian border . Inaugurating a Chinese cultural festival at Kathmandu on October 10,2009, then Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal requested China to extend the Beijing-Lhasa railway line to Kathmandu. He said: "The economic ties between Nepal and China could be taken to a new height if the railway line that has reached upto Lhasa from mainland China could be extended upto Kathmandu, and economic infrastructure could be developed on the Himalayan transit points between Nepal and China."
8. In the wake of these reports has come a report about the beginning of the construction on the extension of the railway line beyond Lhasa towards Tibet’s border with Nepal, India and Bhutan. The “China Daily” of September 27,2010, has reported as follows:” “China on Sunday ( September 26) began construction on an extension to the world's highest rail link, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway. The construction will connect the Tibetan capital of Lhasa to Xigaze, Tibet's second largest city. The extension, in the southwestern part of the autonomous region, will create a 253-km railway line. The work will take four years, with a budget of 13.3 billion yuan ($1.98 billion), Zhang Ping, head of the National Reform and Development Commission, said at Lhasa.
9. It further reported: “The extension from Lhasa to Xigaze is the first extension of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, which opened in July 2006. The new section will pass through five counties and over the 90-km long Yarlung Zangbo Grand Canyon, to reach Xigaze, a city with a history of more than 600 years and the traditional seat of the Panchen Lamas. "It will play a vital role in boosting tourism in the southwestern part of Tibet and promoting the rational use of resources along the line," Liu Zhijun, Minister of Railways, said at a conference. The extended rail line will be a single line with a speed of 120 km per hour. Nearly half of the line, or 115 km, will be laid in tunnels or on bridges. "Laying rail tracks in tunnels in the mountains can avoid passing through the fragile natural reserves in Tibet," Wang Mengshu, a railway tunnel expert and member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, told “China Daily”
10. It added: “A news release from the Ministry of Railways said that the extension line avoids four natural reserves in the area. In addition, using tunnels can help reduce damage to the railway by earthquakes, since Tibet is prone to earthquakes, Wang said. "But the tunnels will add to the difficulty of construction, as it will be impossible to lay the tracks as fast as in the previous construction of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, which was built on top of permafrost," he said. The Qinghai-Tibet Railway is the world's highest railway. Some 960 km of its tracks are located 4,000 meters above sea level. About 550 km of the tracks run on frozen earth, the longest of any of the world's plateau railways. The Qinghai-Tibet Railway's first section from Xining, capital of Qinghai province, to Golmud of Qinghai was completed and opened to traffic in 1984. Its second section from Golmud to Lhasa started construction in 2001 and opened to traffic in 2006.
11. It added further: “A spokesman with the Ministry of Railways said that the future railway network in Tibet will have a "Y" shape, with two extensions planned. In addition to the extension from Lhasa to Xigaze, the other is from Lhasa to Nyingchi in the southeastern part of Tibet. Previous media reports said construction will begin in 2013 at the earliest. Xigaze city is the administrative center of the Tibetan prefecture of the same name, a 182,000-sq-km area that neighbors India, Nepal and Bhutan. It is also famous for Qomolangma (known as Mount Everest in the West), which rises up from it.”
12. Former Nepalese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Khadga Prasad Oli, had indicated that the Government of Nepal would undertake a feasibility study on a possible railway link from Xigaze to Panchkhal of Kavre or Trishuli of Rasuwa. He said that the Government was thinking of developing Panchkhal or Trishuli as a special economic zone and added, "I am optimistic that the railway line will link Nepal via Kerung."
13. Only when the new line reaches Xigaze are the Chinese expected to take up the question of its further extension to Nepal’s border and possibly from there to Kathmandu. This could materialize only by about 2020.
14. The extended railway line from Lhasa and its projected further extension into Nepal would have the following implications:
* Stengthen the Chinese capability for continued suppression of the Tibetans.
* Strengthen the military-related infrastructure in the region which would enable rapid movement of troops in the event of a military confrontation with India.
* Give the Chinese a third military pressure point against India in addition to the direct pressure point across the Sino-Indian border and a second pressure point across Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.
* Strengthen China’s economic links with Nepal at the expense of its links with India.
15. The Chinese concept of comprehensive national security regards infrastructure as an important component of national security. Hence, the Chinese emphasis on the development of road, rail and air infrastructure. The Chinese are worried about the security of their peripheral areas---particularly Tibet and Xinjiang---- ever since the fresh Tibetan revolt in 2008 and the revolt in Chinese-controlled Xinjiang last year. Infrastructure development in the peripheral areas has been receiving high priority.
16. Their interest in infrastructure development now extends to areas in Nepal and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir beyond their periphery. The Governments of Nepal and Pakistan are not in a position to find the necessary funds for infrastructure development. Hence they look up to China for financial and technical assistance in this regard. The Chinese are taking full advantage of this to get actively involved in infrastructure development in POK and Nepali areas bordering India.
17. While the question of India competing with China in the POK does not arise, India could have competed with China in Nepal provided it had the necessary funds and technical capability. India is already involved in road development in certain areas of Nepal, but there is considerable fascination not only in Nepal, but also in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka for the Chinese engineering skills for the development of infrastructure. This fascination has increased further after the Chinese construction of the railway line to Lhasa.
18. Even in the past, the reputation of Indian engineers in this region was not as high as that of their Chinese counterparts. Now, these countries are seeing that India itself has been importing an increasing number of Chinese engineers for infrastructure development. How can we object to Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka seeking the assistance of Chinese engineers when we are ourselves doing so.
19. India is finding itself in a position where its infrastructure development has not been able to keep pace with that of the Chinese and its ability to compete with China in neighbouring countries has been diminishing. How are we going to get out of this situation? The crash development of our own infrastructure and making it of a quality which would impress the countries of this region should receive immediate priority. An outcome of our fascination with the information technology sector has been a decline in the number and the quality of the construction engineers produced by us. Unless this is reversed, China will continue to score over us in the field of infrastructure. ( 28-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Like a homing pigeon, China is pressing ahead with the implementation of its plans for railway link-ups with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nepal. It is only a question of time before Chinese railway planners and strategic thinkers come out with a plan for a railway link-up with Bangladesh via Myanmar. The initiative for these link-ups came not from China, but from these countries. Once their interest in a railway link-up with China became evident, Beijing pounced on the opportunity and seriously took up a feasibility study and came up with ideas regarding the implementation if the projects were found feasible.
2. It has projected these projects as dictated by purely economic requirements and not by strategic or geopolitical intentions. Though these projects, when finally implemented, would have an enormous military significance, the military aspect is played down and their economic benefits are highlighted. A study of the evolution of the ideas for railway link-ups across India’s periphery shows that while China does not seek to create for itself a capability for the strategic strangulation of India, it never misses an opportunity to develop such a capability if it presents itself.
3. I have already written separately about the feasibility studies that have been initiated regarding railway link-ups with Pakistan and Afghanistan. This article is about a possible railway link-up between Tibet and Nepal. On January 18, 2008, less than two years after China commissioned the railway line to Lhasa, its online Tibet news service (en.tibet.cn) quietly announced that the Lhasa-Xigaze Section of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway's extension line “is expected to start construction this year”. The next day, the Government and party-controlled Xinhua news agency quoted the then Chairman Qiangba Puncog of the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region as stating that it would be one of the region’s ten key construction projects involving an investment of 28 billion yuan ($3.7 billion). The Xinhua further quoted him as saying as follows: “"Experts are still working on the designs and environmental assessments of the extension line and government officials have started calculating compensations to those who will lose their land and properties to the railway." It added that the 254-km Lhasa-- Xigaze will be the first feeder line for the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and would cost 11 billion yuan and be completed in 2010. As pointed out by the “Tibetan Review” of January 23,2008,Xigaze is located 280 km southwest of Lhasa and borders Nepal, Bhutan and India.
4.Mr.Cheng Xia Ling, the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal, said in an interview the same day: "The China -Tibet railway link will not end in Lhasa, as we have plans to expand it up to the Nepalese border." He added that he was aware of the difficulty of supplying oil to Nepal from China. “It is not an easy task to supply petrol from China as we need to cross thousands of kilometres of distance and Tibet having border with Nepal is at an altitude of 4,000 metres." In an interview to “Nepal Weekly”, he said : "We are even planning to link it to Kathmandu in not too distant future." The “ China Daily” said on January 23, 2008,that a Sichuan-Tibet Railway would be built to create a network linking Sichuan's western passageway with Tibet, Qinghai province and Chinese-controlled Xinjiang. It said that it would be part of China’s six new railway projects costing 140 billion yuan ($19.3 billion) to be included in the national railway network plan. An agreement for this purpose was signed on January 10,2008,by Sichuan’s party secretary Mr. Liu Qibao and Governor Jiang Jufeng with China’s Railway Minister, Mr. Liu Zhijun.
5.In the last week of April,2008, the Chinese told the Nepalese authorities about their plans for extending the railway line to Lhasa inaugurated in 2006 up to Khasa a town on the Tibet-Nepal border. Mr.Aditya Baral, Adviser on Foreign Policy to then Nepalese Prime Minister Mr.Girija Prasad Koirala, told the media as follows: “Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala was told by a visiting Chinese delegation during a meeting that the Chinese Government has begun a railway extension project on its side to link with the Nepal-China border." According to Mr.Baral,the Chinese Communist Party delegation told Nepalese officials that the railway link would be ready in five years time. The Nepal border town of Khasa lies some 80 kilometres (50 miles) north of Kathmandu. "The railway network will be important for increasing trade and tourism for both countries," Mr.Baral added. The delegation reportedly told Mr. Koirala that Beijing had included the railway line extension in its ongoing eleventh five-year plan.
6. On August 17, 2008, a spokesman of the Chinese railways confirmed plans to add six more rail lines to the Qinghai-Tibet railway. Of these, one will be from Lhasa to Nyingchi and one from Lhasa to Xigaze, both in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region. Three lines will originate from Golmud in the Qinghai province and connect Chengdu in the Sichuan province, Dunhuang in the Gansu province, and Kuerle in Chinese-controlled Xinjiang. The sixth will link Xining , capital of Qinghai, with Zhangye in the Gansu province. He said that the six lines were expected to be completed and commissioned before 2020.
7. Subsequent reports indicated that under the Development Strategy for Western China, the Chinese were planning to connect Lhasa to Zhangmu vis Xigaze to the West and to Dali via Nyingchi to the East and that they were planning further to link Xigaze with Yadong near the Sino-Indian border . Inaugurating a Chinese cultural festival at Kathmandu on October 10,2009, then Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal requested China to extend the Beijing-Lhasa railway line to Kathmandu. He said: "The economic ties between Nepal and China could be taken to a new height if the railway line that has reached upto Lhasa from mainland China could be extended upto Kathmandu, and economic infrastructure could be developed on the Himalayan transit points between Nepal and China."
8. In the wake of these reports has come a report about the beginning of the construction on the extension of the railway line beyond Lhasa towards Tibet’s border with Nepal, India and Bhutan. The “China Daily” of September 27,2010, has reported as follows:” “China on Sunday ( September 26) began construction on an extension to the world's highest rail link, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway. The construction will connect the Tibetan capital of Lhasa to Xigaze, Tibet's second largest city. The extension, in the southwestern part of the autonomous region, will create a 253-km railway line. The work will take four years, with a budget of 13.3 billion yuan ($1.98 billion), Zhang Ping, head of the National Reform and Development Commission, said at Lhasa.
9. It further reported: “The extension from Lhasa to Xigaze is the first extension of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, which opened in July 2006. The new section will pass through five counties and over the 90-km long Yarlung Zangbo Grand Canyon, to reach Xigaze, a city with a history of more than 600 years and the traditional seat of the Panchen Lamas. "It will play a vital role in boosting tourism in the southwestern part of Tibet and promoting the rational use of resources along the line," Liu Zhijun, Minister of Railways, said at a conference. The extended rail line will be a single line with a speed of 120 km per hour. Nearly half of the line, or 115 km, will be laid in tunnels or on bridges. "Laying rail tracks in tunnels in the mountains can avoid passing through the fragile natural reserves in Tibet," Wang Mengshu, a railway tunnel expert and member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, told “China Daily”
10. It added: “A news release from the Ministry of Railways said that the extension line avoids four natural reserves in the area. In addition, using tunnels can help reduce damage to the railway by earthquakes, since Tibet is prone to earthquakes, Wang said. "But the tunnels will add to the difficulty of construction, as it will be impossible to lay the tracks as fast as in the previous construction of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, which was built on top of permafrost," he said. The Qinghai-Tibet Railway is the world's highest railway. Some 960 km of its tracks are located 4,000 meters above sea level. About 550 km of the tracks run on frozen earth, the longest of any of the world's plateau railways. The Qinghai-Tibet Railway's first section from Xining, capital of Qinghai province, to Golmud of Qinghai was completed and opened to traffic in 1984. Its second section from Golmud to Lhasa started construction in 2001 and opened to traffic in 2006.
11. It added further: “A spokesman with the Ministry of Railways said that the future railway network in Tibet will have a "Y" shape, with two extensions planned. In addition to the extension from Lhasa to Xigaze, the other is from Lhasa to Nyingchi in the southeastern part of Tibet. Previous media reports said construction will begin in 2013 at the earliest. Xigaze city is the administrative center of the Tibetan prefecture of the same name, a 182,000-sq-km area that neighbors India, Nepal and Bhutan. It is also famous for Qomolangma (known as Mount Everest in the West), which rises up from it.”
12. Former Nepalese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Khadga Prasad Oli, had indicated that the Government of Nepal would undertake a feasibility study on a possible railway link from Xigaze to Panchkhal of Kavre or Trishuli of Rasuwa. He said that the Government was thinking of developing Panchkhal or Trishuli as a special economic zone and added, "I am optimistic that the railway line will link Nepal via Kerung."
13. Only when the new line reaches Xigaze are the Chinese expected to take up the question of its further extension to Nepal’s border and possibly from there to Kathmandu. This could materialize only by about 2020.
14. The extended railway line from Lhasa and its projected further extension into Nepal would have the following implications:
* Stengthen the Chinese capability for continued suppression of the Tibetans.
* Strengthen the military-related infrastructure in the region which would enable rapid movement of troops in the event of a military confrontation with India.
* Give the Chinese a third military pressure point against India in addition to the direct pressure point across the Sino-Indian border and a second pressure point across Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.
* Strengthen China’s economic links with Nepal at the expense of its links with India.
15. The Chinese concept of comprehensive national security regards infrastructure as an important component of national security. Hence, the Chinese emphasis on the development of road, rail and air infrastructure. The Chinese are worried about the security of their peripheral areas---particularly Tibet and Xinjiang---- ever since the fresh Tibetan revolt in 2008 and the revolt in Chinese-controlled Xinjiang last year. Infrastructure development in the peripheral areas has been receiving high priority.
16. Their interest in infrastructure development now extends to areas in Nepal and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir beyond their periphery. The Governments of Nepal and Pakistan are not in a position to find the necessary funds for infrastructure development. Hence they look up to China for financial and technical assistance in this regard. The Chinese are taking full advantage of this to get actively involved in infrastructure development in POK and Nepali areas bordering India.
17. While the question of India competing with China in the POK does not arise, India could have competed with China in Nepal provided it had the necessary funds and technical capability. India is already involved in road development in certain areas of Nepal, but there is considerable fascination not only in Nepal, but also in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka for the Chinese engineering skills for the development of infrastructure. This fascination has increased further after the Chinese construction of the railway line to Lhasa.
18. Even in the past, the reputation of Indian engineers in this region was not as high as that of their Chinese counterparts. Now, these countries are seeing that India itself has been importing an increasing number of Chinese engineers for infrastructure development. How can we object to Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka seeking the assistance of Chinese engineers when we are ourselves doing so.
19. India is finding itself in a position where its infrastructure development has not been able to keep pace with that of the Chinese and its ability to compete with China in neighbouring countries has been diminishing. How are we going to get out of this situation? The crash development of our own infrastructure and making it of a quality which would impress the countries of this region should receive immediate priority. An outcome of our fascination with the information technology sector has been a decline in the number and the quality of the construction engineers produced by us. Unless this is reversed, China will continue to score over us in the field of infrastructure. ( 28-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, September 27, 2010
INDIA: LESSONS FROM CWG MISMANAGEMENT
B.RAMAN
The humiliating embarrassment faced by us due to the unsatisfactory state of preparations for the Commonwealth Games (CWG) starting on October 3 could be attributed to the failure of the political leadership to realise the importance of well-conducted CWG from the point of view of our national pride and image; corruption and cronyism; a casual approach to the preparations; lack of supervision at all levels; the national inability to stick to time-schedules; over-confidence; and denial of the existence of serious problems when those problems were exposed by the media.
2. When Beijing was chosen as the host of the 2008 Olympics and Guangzhou as the host of the 2010 Asian Games being held in November, the Communist Party of China and their Government saw it as an opportunity to show-case China and its organising skills to the world and to convince the world that China has arrived as a major power. The self-confidence gained by the Party and the Government as a result of the spectacular success of the Olympics is partly behind China's increasing assertiveness in the world stage after the Olympics. All sections of the Chinese civil society and Government worked together with total dedication to demonstrate that China can do it. And China did it.
3. In India, the political leadership and the Government totally failed to grasp the political significance of New Delhi being chosen to host the CWG. The world, which has been keenly watching the competition for regional leadership between India and China, wanted India to be given an opportunity to show that what China can do, it can do equally well, if not better. Let there be no mistake about it. The good wishes of the democratic world were with India. It wanted India to make a success of the CWG and would have helped India in any way it could to make a success of it.
4.The political significance of the CWG from the point of view of our national stature, pride and image was not grasped in time by the political leadership. The CWG was treated by the political leadership as one more mega sports event to be handled by the Organising Committee with the help of the Delhi Government. It failed to look upon it as a national task requiring the active involvement of the Government of India. Only in the last few days the political importance of the Games as image-builder and projector has been realised by the Government of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh and it has been moving heaven and earth to make the CWG a success even at this late hour. Even if we succeed, it will not erase from the minds of the international community and our own citizens the extreme embarrassment and humiliation that we had to face due to the images of a "Filthy and Incompetent India" and not a "Shining and Leading India" that were transmitted across the world. What we saw was not "Chindia In Action" with China and India in a friendly competition to project to the world the best in each of them, but "India In Inaction" like a python after a heavy meal.
5. The Government of India left everything in the hands of the Organising Committee, which was packed with people without a sense of pride. If they had national pride, they would not have allowed corruption and cronyism take hold of the Committee and come in the way of timely and effective preparations. The Committee projected to the outside world not only the image of a "Filthy and Incompetent India", but also a "Corrupt India" for whose political and bureaucratic class acquiring money by hook or by crook was more important than preserving national honour.
6. The preparations were politicised. The head of the Organising Committee and of the Delhi Administration were both blue-eyed individuals of the ruling Congress (I). For the Congress (I), they can do no wrong. The Congress party and its Government failed to take notice of even the most serious allegations being made against them. Even today after all the national humiliation and embarrassment, the Government and the Congress (I) are not prepared to act against them. They have been marginalised, but an exercise is on to preserve their honour despite their misdeeds and failures.
7.Many national deficiencies, which have become part of our psyche, made matters worse. The Organising Committee had about seven years to prepare for the Games. It did nothing for nearly four years and stirred itself up only after much time had been wasted. There was a plethora of organizations to attend to various aspects of the preparations, but no co-ordination among them. The Government failed to appoint a high-power apex body to co-ordinate as Indira Gandhi had done to make a success of the 1982 Asian Games. She did not see the Asian Games purely as a sports event. She also saw it as an event which could make or mar India’s prestige if not properly managed. She was not interested in how many medals India would win. She was interested in ensuring that the Games were conducted with clock-like precision without worrying about who won and who lost.
8. Despite the late start of the preparations for the CWG and despite serious failures to adhere to time schedules, an over-confident Organising Committee sought to give the impression that like the proverbial tortoise, Indians would somehow make a last-minute dash and make the Games a resounding success. Their over-confidence might prove misplaced.
9. The supervision, as always it happens, was shoddy. The impressive Games Village was completed in time, but many of the apartments were apparently left unlocked and unguarded. The bathrooms were misused by strangers making them filthy. One does not seem to have realized the serious security implications of leaving the apartments unlocked and unguarded.
10. For the annual Republic Day parade, we hold rehearsals every alternate day for two weeks so that everybody is familiar with his or her security duties and the participants in the parade gain confidence. It is stated that China, which does not face a serious problem of terrorism in Beijing, started holding rehearsals of the opening and closing ceremonies and the security drill six months before the Games. It initiated many security measures like bans on the sale and carriage of substances such as nitrogenous fertilizers which could be used as explosives a month before the Games.
11. There are five days to go before the Games and we are yet to hold a single comprehensive rehearsal. Our over-confidence is not only in respect of administrative matters, but also security matters. We are supremely confident that we will be able to prevent any security breaches. Most probably, we will, but we are taking unnecessary risks by not following in a timely manner the drill necessary for such events.
12. Once the Games are over ----hopefully successfully---- the Government should hold a detailed enquiry into the sins of commission and omission and take corrective measures to ensure that such deficiencies are not repeated in future.( 27-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The humiliating embarrassment faced by us due to the unsatisfactory state of preparations for the Commonwealth Games (CWG) starting on October 3 could be attributed to the failure of the political leadership to realise the importance of well-conducted CWG from the point of view of our national pride and image; corruption and cronyism; a casual approach to the preparations; lack of supervision at all levels; the national inability to stick to time-schedules; over-confidence; and denial of the existence of serious problems when those problems were exposed by the media.
2. When Beijing was chosen as the host of the 2008 Olympics and Guangzhou as the host of the 2010 Asian Games being held in November, the Communist Party of China and their Government saw it as an opportunity to show-case China and its organising skills to the world and to convince the world that China has arrived as a major power. The self-confidence gained by the Party and the Government as a result of the spectacular success of the Olympics is partly behind China's increasing assertiveness in the world stage after the Olympics. All sections of the Chinese civil society and Government worked together with total dedication to demonstrate that China can do it. And China did it.
3. In India, the political leadership and the Government totally failed to grasp the political significance of New Delhi being chosen to host the CWG. The world, which has been keenly watching the competition for regional leadership between India and China, wanted India to be given an opportunity to show that what China can do, it can do equally well, if not better. Let there be no mistake about it. The good wishes of the democratic world were with India. It wanted India to make a success of the CWG and would have helped India in any way it could to make a success of it.
4.The political significance of the CWG from the point of view of our national stature, pride and image was not grasped in time by the political leadership. The CWG was treated by the political leadership as one more mega sports event to be handled by the Organising Committee with the help of the Delhi Government. It failed to look upon it as a national task requiring the active involvement of the Government of India. Only in the last few days the political importance of the Games as image-builder and projector has been realised by the Government of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh and it has been moving heaven and earth to make the CWG a success even at this late hour. Even if we succeed, it will not erase from the minds of the international community and our own citizens the extreme embarrassment and humiliation that we had to face due to the images of a "Filthy and Incompetent India" and not a "Shining and Leading India" that were transmitted across the world. What we saw was not "Chindia In Action" with China and India in a friendly competition to project to the world the best in each of them, but "India In Inaction" like a python after a heavy meal.
5. The Government of India left everything in the hands of the Organising Committee, which was packed with people without a sense of pride. If they had national pride, they would not have allowed corruption and cronyism take hold of the Committee and come in the way of timely and effective preparations. The Committee projected to the outside world not only the image of a "Filthy and Incompetent India", but also a "Corrupt India" for whose political and bureaucratic class acquiring money by hook or by crook was more important than preserving national honour.
6. The preparations were politicised. The head of the Organising Committee and of the Delhi Administration were both blue-eyed individuals of the ruling Congress (I). For the Congress (I), they can do no wrong. The Congress party and its Government failed to take notice of even the most serious allegations being made against them. Even today after all the national humiliation and embarrassment, the Government and the Congress (I) are not prepared to act against them. They have been marginalised, but an exercise is on to preserve their honour despite their misdeeds and failures.
7.Many national deficiencies, which have become part of our psyche, made matters worse. The Organising Committee had about seven years to prepare for the Games. It did nothing for nearly four years and stirred itself up only after much time had been wasted. There was a plethora of organizations to attend to various aspects of the preparations, but no co-ordination among them. The Government failed to appoint a high-power apex body to co-ordinate as Indira Gandhi had done to make a success of the 1982 Asian Games. She did not see the Asian Games purely as a sports event. She also saw it as an event which could make or mar India’s prestige if not properly managed. She was not interested in how many medals India would win. She was interested in ensuring that the Games were conducted with clock-like precision without worrying about who won and who lost.
8. Despite the late start of the preparations for the CWG and despite serious failures to adhere to time schedules, an over-confident Organising Committee sought to give the impression that like the proverbial tortoise, Indians would somehow make a last-minute dash and make the Games a resounding success. Their over-confidence might prove misplaced.
9. The supervision, as always it happens, was shoddy. The impressive Games Village was completed in time, but many of the apartments were apparently left unlocked and unguarded. The bathrooms were misused by strangers making them filthy. One does not seem to have realized the serious security implications of leaving the apartments unlocked and unguarded.
10. For the annual Republic Day parade, we hold rehearsals every alternate day for two weeks so that everybody is familiar with his or her security duties and the participants in the parade gain confidence. It is stated that China, which does not face a serious problem of terrorism in Beijing, started holding rehearsals of the opening and closing ceremonies and the security drill six months before the Games. It initiated many security measures like bans on the sale and carriage of substances such as nitrogenous fertilizers which could be used as explosives a month before the Games.
11. There are five days to go before the Games and we are yet to hold a single comprehensive rehearsal. Our over-confidence is not only in respect of administrative matters, but also security matters. We are supremely confident that we will be able to prevent any security breaches. Most probably, we will, but we are taking unnecessary risks by not following in a timely manner the drill necessary for such events.
12. Once the Games are over ----hopefully successfully---- the Government should hold a detailed enquiry into the sins of commission and omission and take corrective measures to ensure that such deficiencies are not repeated in future.( 27-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)