TERROR WITHOUT TRAIL

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO 736

B.RAMAN



The terrorism situation on the ground is more and more worrying. It is not just because the terrorists have become smarter than they were before. They have, of course, but that should not be the main cause of worry.


2. It is because they have become more invisible, more inaudible and more unquantifiable than before. After nine terrorist strikes since 26/11, three each in Mumbai and Delhi and one each in Pune, Bengaluru and Varanasi, we still do not have an idea of who they are, what is their ideology, what are their demands, how strong they are, how are they organised, are they home-grown or externally sponsored, where are their roots etc etc


3.After nearly three years, we are not in a position to make a meaningful assessment of the new post-26/11 terror threat faced by us for want of essential data. You get the data from the network of your human agents spread across the country and abroad, from your TECHINT set-up inside the country and along the international borders, from your interrogation and surveillance of suspects, from your local enquiries and from your interactions with different communities.


4. How come not one of these means of collecting data seems to be functioning? Our HUMINT was generally below par, but deficiencies in our HUMINT coverage used to be made up by our above par TECHINT coverage. Many sleeper cells of terrorist organisations were detected and neutralised before 26/11 and many terrorists were identified and arrested after the commission of a terrorist strike by intercepting their electronic chatter.


5. Why there has been no worthwhile electronic chatter after 26/11? Have the terrorists stopped using modern means of communication or are they using more modern means of communication which our TECHINT set-up is not able to identify and break through?


6. You could see that the counter-terrorism capability of our TECHINT set-up seems to have weakened from the fact that there have been very few instances---if at all there are any--- of new sleeper cells being tracked down and neutralised and new suspects being rounded up and interrogated.


7. What is this apparent weakening of our counter-terrorism TECHINT capability due to? Turf battles? Non-recruitment of qualified and motivated TECHINT experts? Non-investment in equipment?


8.Whatever be the reason, it is a worrisome development. HUMINT and TECHINT work in tandem. If one is weak, the other makes up for it. If both become weak simultaneously, we start groping in the dark unable to see or hear the terrorists and sense their furtive movements and actions across the country.


9.Counter-terrorism has three components---prevention through timely and actionable intelligence, prevention through effective physical security and attrition of the terrorists’ capability through successful investigation and prosecution.


10. The physical security should be so tight that even if intelligence fails or is not up to the mark, we are still able to thwart the terrorists. Physical security cannot be blamed for seven of the nine terrorist strikes that have taken place since 26/11.But, poor physical security has definitely contributed to the two strikes outside the Delhi High court in May and on September 7,2011.


11. Since November,2007, the Indian Mujahideen (IM) had been repeatedly criticising the Indian judiciary and on November 23,2007, it had carried out seven explosions outside courts in three cities of Uttar Pradesh. Yet, for four years, we do not have seem to have made any physical security audit of important courts---particularly in Delhi and Mumbai --- and taken necessary action to strengthen their physical security---either through governmental means or by putting private physical security agencies on the job.


12. It used to be said and believed before 26/11 that while our preventive capability was weak, our ability to cause attrition in the ranks and capability of terrorist organisations through good investigation and prosecution was high. Even this capability, about which we used to boast before 26/11, seems to have weakened with the result that we have not made much headway in the investigation of the post-26/11 terrorist incidents.


13.The series of terrorist strikes carried out by the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and Pakistani organisations across India outside Jammu & Kashmir since the Mumbai blasts of March,1993, made us realise that jihadi terrorism---whether home-grown or imported from abroad—had become a pan-Indian threat and that it cannot be dealt with in the same manner as we were dealing with cross-border terrorism in J&K, which was a different kettle of fish.


14. It was this realisation which brought into existence post-26/11 the National Investigation Agency (NIA), which functions under the control of the Home Minister of the Government of India. But the NIA as it has evolved is neither a donkey nor a mule. One does not know what it is.


15.Many of us---like me--- who had been advocating a new counter-terrorism investigation machinery to deal with the new pan-Indian terrorism, wanted some set-up similar to the counter-terrorism division of the USA’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI is exclusively responsible for all preliminary enquiries, investigation and prosecution in all terrorism incidents of a federal dimension.


16.It is for the Director of the FBI to assess whether an incident of violence amounted to an act of terrorism. Once he decides so, he asks the FBI to take over the investigation. He does not require any prior permission from the President or from any Governor of any State. The decision is his and his alone. As a result of this, the FBI has a total picture of the terrorism situation in the US.


17.The decision to set up the NIA in India was taken in haste after the traumatic events of November 26-28, 2008, in India. As a result, neither the ruling coalition nor the opposition carefully debated as to what kind of investigation mechanism we need to deal with this pan-Indian threat, what powers and responsibilities it should have and how to persuade the States to accept the creation of a pan-Indian investigation agency with teeth.


18. Under the procedure laid down, it is the Home Minister who decides what cases need to be entrusted to
the NIA and what cases need not be. Eight of the terrorist strikes after 26/11 were not entrusted to the NIA. Only the latest strike of September 7 has been. Why the previous cases were not entrusted to the NIA? How can the NIA investigate pan-Indian terrorism in an integrated manner if the MHA picks and chooses as to what cases will be investigated by the NIA and what cases need not be?


19. These are some of the issues that need crying attention after the terrorist strike of September 9. It is hoped at least now the Government and the opposition will start thinking of pan-Indian terrorism in an integrated and professional manner and not in a manner marked more by considerations of partisan politics than professionalism. ( 9-9-11)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

PAST THREATS OF INDIAN MUJAHIDEEN ( IM) AGAINST JUDICIARY

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO 735


B.RAMAN


( To be read in connection with the bomb blast outside the Delhi High Court on September 7 in which nine persons were reported to have been killed. )



Thirteen persons were killed in seven well-synchronised explosions near court premises in three cities of Uttar Pradesh---Lucknow, Varanasi and Faizabad---on the afternoon of November 23, 2007.


2.The explosions came in the wake of the judgements delivered in respect of the Mumbai serial blasts of March 1993 and the Coimbatore serial blasts of February,1998. In both the cases, a number of jihadi terrorists had been found guilty and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.


3.The explosions also came after the arrest of three suspected members of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) in UP, who were alleged to have planned to kidnap a dignitary in order to secure the release of Afzal Guru, who has been sentenced to death for his role in the attack on the Indian Parliament in December,2001. The arrested JEM terrorists were alleged to have been beaten up by some lawyers when they were brought to court. The local lawyers had also reportedly refused to defend terrorists in future.


4. An E-mail message purported to be from "Indian Mujahideen" received by some TV channels before the explosions indicated that these explosions were about to take place.


5.The message referred to the severe penalties awarded to the accused in the Mumbai blasts of March,1993, and the lack of action against Hindu police officers, who committed atrocities on Muslims. It also referred to the Gujrat riots of 2002 and the assault on arrested JEM suspects by some lawyers. The message which the sender sought to convey was that the Indian criminal justice system treated the Muslims severely, but was lenient to the Hindus.


6.Last year, there were two messages purported to have been issued by the Indian Mujahideen (IM) warning of its plans to carry out terrorist strikes.


7. The first message was disseminated by E-mail on September 19,2010. It was shown as having been signed by one Al Arbi the same day. It referred to certain anti-Muslim incidents which allegedly took place in Ratlam in Madhya Pradesh on the day of Eid (September 11). It also referred to the day( September 17) when the total number of people allegedly killed by the security forces in Jammu & Kashmir crossed 100.


8. Many of the religious allusions in the message had been taken from some past messages of Osama bin Laden, but bin Laden was not mentioned by name.


9. The statement did not directly claim responsibility on behalf of the IM for the attack in Delhi on September 19 in which two Taiwanese tourists were injured. However, it indirectly hinted at its responsibility by saying: "In the name of Allah we dedicate this attack of retribution...."

10. While over 75 per cent of the statement was about alleged atrocities against Muslims in Jammu & Kashmir, there were also condemnatory references to the death of two IM suspects during a raid by the Delhi police on September 19,2008, to the arrests of some alleged members of the IM by the Anti-Terrorism Squad of the Maharashtra Police in connection with the Pune Bakery blast of February 13 last and some alleged anti-Muslim incidents in Ratlam in Madhya Pradesh on Eid day. (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers41/paper4051.html)

11. A message dated December 6, 2010, purporting to be from the IM indirectly claiming responsibility for the explosion in Varanasi on December 7,2010, was received by some media outlets to which it was addressed after the explosion had taken place. It avoided any allusions to the messages of Osama bin Laden and was free of bin Laden like language and rhetoric. It had not borrowed from the past messages of bin Laden.

12.It projected the IM as a purely indigenous movement, but needing the support of the Islamic world. It warned the Hindus of continued attacks on Hindu holy places till all Masjids (mosques) belonging to the Muslims were restored to them. It was critical of the Indian criminal justice system, which was projected as anti-Muslim.

13.It criticised the Judiciary as follows: "The Supreme Court, the high courts, the lower courts and all the Commissions have utterly failed to play an impartial role regarding Muslim issues. Narendra Modi who presided over the 2002 massacres of Muslims in Gujarat is given a clean chit whereas the victims still run from pillar to post for justice. Even the 92 Mumbai culprits roam freely and enjoy Government security. All the anti-Muslim pre-planned riots, arson, rapes, losses of lives and properties are still awaiting justice. The list is endless!"
( 7-9-11)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

INFORMALITY OF STATE TO STATE INTERACTIONS: MAIN CASUALTY OF WIKILEAKS

B.RAMAN



Foreign offices and intelligence agencies of the world interact with each other and among themselves at two levels----formal and informal.


2. In the case of Foreign Offices, the formal component is much more than the informal. In the case of intelligence agencies, it is the other way round.


3. The formal component of Foreign Offices’ interactions consists of exchanges of notes verbales, memos, aides-memoires, non-papers etc. They remain as permanent records in the files of the respective Foreign Offices for purposes of future reference.


4. The informal component consists of chats between diplomats and officials and other interlocutors of the host Governments over a drink or a cup of tea. It does not involve exchanges of papers of any kind. The diplomat after going back to the Embassy will send a cable to his Foreign Office as to what transpired during such informal interactions.


5. Intelligence agencies having a liaison relationship also follow a similar procedure when exchanging intelligence, assessments etc. Certain exchanges do involve formal papers----for example, exchanges of forensic evidence and reports.


6. The intelligence agencies of India and the US have been having a liaison relationship almost since 1947, but you will not find many papers formally exchanged between them. Officers responsible for liaison will meet informally over a drink in a safe house or in the lobby of a hotel, orally brief each other and then take leave of each other. When they do exchange intelligence documents, they will not indicate which agency prepared the document.


7. An examination of State-to-State relations between countries will reveal that often breakthroughs are achieved and policies are better understood during such informal interactions and not during formal meetings.


8.People tend to speak much more freely when there is no paper trail and when the meetings are informal than during formal interactions with a lot of possible paper trail.


9. One of the major casualties of the WikiLeaks would be such informal tete-a-tete exchanges. After seeing the damage caused by the Wikileaks, all public servants----whether political leaders or Foreign Office bureaucrats or intelligence officers---- will hesitate to agree to informal meetings and to speak freely during such meetings.


10. To illustrate my point, I will give the example of the Cable sent by Timothy Roemer, the then US Ambassador, to the State Department on December 17,2009, after an interaction---that was apparently informal--- with M.K.Narayanan, the then National Security Adviser, on the question of David Coleman Headley, of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), who was involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai.


11. A careful reading of this cable would indicate that M.K. and the Ambassador were informally discussing the implications of an Indian request for his extradition. The Ambassador was hinting that this could create difficulties in the way of the FBI interrogating Headley and sharing the resulting intelligence with the Indian agencies.


12. MK, while showing some understanding of the point made by the Ambassador, was pointing out as to why India had to make a nam-ke-waste request for extradition. That is the way informal exchanges are conducted.


13. The US Ambassador then went back to his office and shot off a cable to the State Department. This cable has now been released by Julian Assange of WikiLeaks without editing the name of MK, thereby creating a personal embarrassment for MK and also for the Government of India in the eyes of the Indian public.


14. The cable shows the propensity of the GOI and its officials to exaggerate the usefulness of the Indo-US counter-terrorism co-operation when facts were otherwise. The leakage of the contents of an informal interaction would thus create political embarrassment for the host Government and the former NSA.


15. The result of such leakages would be a drying-up of informal interactions at the Foreign Office and intelligence agencies levels. State-to-State diplomacy and intelligence liaison would suffer as a result.


16. How to limit the damage and how to ensure that informal diplomatic exchanges do not suffer are questions that need to be discussed by all Foreign Offices.


17. An important ethical question is also involved. The media initially projected a wilful violator of the law (Assange) as a hero. Non-governmental organisations and the media created hurdles in the way of his arrest and prosecution for disseminating a large number of sensitive documents having implications for national security and State-to-State relations.


18. The hero has now turned a menace by releasing to the public hundreds of thousands of documents without editing them. He has become a Frankenstein’s monster. To discourage copy-cats of such monsters in future, the media and the non-Governmental organisations should at least now co-operate with the authorities to facilitate his arrest and prosecution. ( 5-9-11)



( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @ SORBONNE75 )

MY THOUGHTS ON EVE OF 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF 9/11

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO 734


B.RAMAN



The late Osama bin Laden never believed in carrying out terrorist strikes to mark important anniversaries in the history of Al Qaeda such as the anniversary of the terrorist strikes outside the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in August 1998, the attack on USS Cole, a US Navy ship, off Aden in October,2000, or the 9/11 strikes in the US Homeland.


2. According to a prevalent belief among tribal sources in Pakistan’s Pashtun belt, he believed tight physical security on important anniversaries such as these would make a successful strike very difficult.


3. It was, therefore, no surprise that he did not carry out any major terrorist strikes targeting the US on the anniversaries of 9/11 till now. Now that OBL is dead and has been succeeded by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian, as the Amir of Al Qaeda, can the position change? Can there be a terrorist strike coinciding with the 10th anniversary of 9/11? Will Zawahiri order a strike on this occasion to establish his ability to strike at the US and to demonstrate that despite the death of OBL, Al Qaeda remains as motivated as ever and remains determined to make the US pay a heavy price for the clandestine raid by US naval commandos at Abbottabad on the night of May 2, which resulted in the death of OBL?


4. A major reprisal attack by Al Qaeda or its affiliates directed against the US such as the catastrophic strike against seven CIA officers at Khost in Afghanistan on December 30, 2009, remains a strong possibility to be guarded against. After the death of OBL, there has been a major terrorist strike on August 5,2011, directed against a group of helicopter-borne US troops in Afghanistan in which 30 US troops, 22 of them US Navy SEALS, reportedly from the same unit that had participated in the Abbottabad raid, were reported to have been killed. This attack, which bore the hallmark of Al Qaeda’s conception and planning, was, however, believed to have been carried out by the Afghan Taliban, which did not project it as in reprisal for the Abbottabad raid.


5. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had projected the mysterious attack on the headquarters of the Pakistan naval air wing PNS Mehran in Karachi on May 22 as in reprisal for the death of OBL. Its claim could not be authenticated. Moreover, considering that Pakistani elements----governmental or non-Governmental or both--- had connived at OBL living in his Abbottabad hide-out for nearly five years, it is very unlikely that Al Qaeda would have targeted Pakistan in reprisal for the death of OBL.


6. The reprisal for the death of OBL is, therefore, yet to come and when it comes, Al Qaeda will ensure that it bears its signature and is worthy of it. When OBL was alive, it used to be believed that Zawahiri and some of his associates in Al Qaeda were unhappy over OBL’s decision to strike at the US in its homeland thereby inviting massive retaliation from the US in the Af-Pak region. They were reportedly of the view that Al Qaeda should have continued targeting the US outside its homeland as it did in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and in Nairobi, Dar-es-Salaam and Aden subsequently.


7. If Zawahiri continues to hold this view and if his close lieutenants also share this, the reprisal attack may not come in the US Homeland. It could come in an area that has a strategic US presence and where Al Qaeda feels confident of operating with success. Among such areas, one could think of the Af-Pak region, Aden once again, possibly India and Germany, where the Islamic Jihad Union had come to notice in the past for planning terrorist strikes against US military establishments that were thwarted by timely intelligence.


8. Al Qaeda has never operated in India before. There was a suspicion of an Al Qaeda brain behind the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai by the Lashkar-e-Toiba. This remained without concrete evidence to back it. Neither Al Qaeda nor its ideology has had many takers in the Indian Muslim community.


9. But India has undetected sleeping cells of jihadis of unproven origin who had carried out two major terrorist strikes after 26/11---in Pune in February,2010, and in Mumbai in July 2011. None of the terrorist strikes---major or minor--- in Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir after 26/11 has been detected. All this shows that India has in its midst jihadi terrorist elements well-trained in planning and executing a terrorist strike and remaining undetected.


10. In the absence of its own jihadi foot soldiers, Al Qaeda could turn to such jihadi elements which are able to operate in India with ease like fish in troubled waters for its act of reprisal if it considers India as a possible theatre for its reprisal against the US.


11. In the absence of human and technical intelligence and interrogation data from detected and arrested cell members, one has to rely on circumstantial analysis.


12. Such analysis underlines the need for heightened alert by the Indian counter-terrorism agencies in the days to come. It also underlines the need for close interaction between the counter-terrorism agencies of India and the US. ( 4-9-11)


( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and , presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

INDIA: IN FOR ANOTHER 26/11

B.RAMAN



INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.733



( Written at the request of the “Times of India”)




The soon-to-be 10-year war against Al Qaeda and its affiliates waged by the international community under US leadership has been partly successful and partly not so.



Its successes have been in eliminating Osama bin Laden and a number of other high value targets of Al Qaeda and its affiliates in the Af-Pak region, Yemen and Iraq and in repeatedly thwarting their attempts to mount another 9/11 style catastrophic terrorist strike in the US Homeland. The international community has also been able to prevent so far any major threat of maritime and weapons of mass destruction terrorism from materializing.



These successes could be attributed to the strengthening of physical security through improved national capabilities and international co-operation, modernization of counter-terrorism capabilities and techniques, improvement in the collection of human and technical intelligence and follow-up action thereon and stricter laws to deal with terrorism.



The failures have been in the inability of the international community to destroy the terrorist infrastructure in the Af-Pak region, Yemen and Iraq and in preventing its spread to other countries such as Algeria, Somalia and Indonesia. It has also failed thus far to counter the pernicious ideology of the terrorists and to prevent the flow of new recruits to the terrorist organizations. The successes in eliminating many leaders have not affected the morale of the organizations.



The morale, the infrastructure and the innovative and constantly improving modus operandi of the terrorists continue to pose a high level of threat, which is likely to continue in the short and medium terms. The terrorists might not have been able to mount another 9/11 style strike, but they have shown an ability to spread the areas of their operations and to take the intelligence and physical security agencies by surprise.



We saw proof of this in the terrorist strikes in Indonesia, India, the Af-Pak region, Spain and the UK. There has been a modernization of the techniques used by the terrorists----whether in respect of communication technologies, improvisation of explosive devices or finding ways of defeating improved physical security measures



Another development of concern has been in the availability to the terrorists of a much larger reservoir of potential recruits. In the initial years of the war against terrorism, terrorists for pan-global operations came mainly from amongst Arabs .Now they come increasingly from the Pakistani community in the Af-Pak region and in the West. International terrorism, which was largely an Arab phenomenon before 9/11, has now become a mixed Arab-Pak phenomenon with Pakistani organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) moving into the driving seat.



The successes in the ground and air-mounted counter-terrorism operations of the US have been mainly against the Arab and not the Pakistani component. Only after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai have the US and the rest of the world come to share India’s concerns regarding the emergence of Pakistan- origin terrorism as a major threat to international security. The pan-global Arab terrorism has found a new and equally capable ally in the pan-global Pakistani terrorism. The action against Pakistan -origin terrorism has been half-hearted so far due to the still prevailing mistaken perception that this terrorism is still focused on India and the world is not yet its theatre of operations. The continuing ambivalence in the attitude to Pak-origin terrorism stands in the way of an effective conclusion to the war against terrorism.



If the international community has to finally prevail in the war against terrorism, counter-terrorism operations in the Af-Pak region have to be directed as much against the terrorist infrastructure as against its leaders. Terrorist operations against leaders such as OBL are spectacular, but final success will come only if the spectacular is combined with painstaking and surgical strikes against the infrastructure.



The decision of the US to start thinning out its presence in Afghanistan even before prevailing finally against Al Qaeda and the Taliban is likely to pose a new danger of a trained and well-motivated crop of Afghan veterans of Pashtun--Punjabi origin spreading out across the region, including India, and stepping up terrorism.



The Arab veterans of the Afghan war of the 1980s against the Soviet troops were behind the wave of terrorism of the last decade. The Pashtun-cum Punjabi- cum- Arab veterans of the wars of the last decade against the US-led NATO troops in Afghanistan and Iraq are likely to be behind a new wave of terrorism as the US troops withdraw.



India has to be seriously concerned over the possibility of this scenario. A new wave of Afghan veterans is likely to provide fresh oxygen to cross-border terrorism. The various terrorist strikes faced by India during the last decade have shown that while the cross-border counter-terrorism capabilities in Jammu & Kashmir might have improved, our pan-Indian capabilities outside J&K have not kept pace with the evolving nature and magnitude of terrorism.



While investigation, forensic and physical security capabilities in the rest of the world have improved after 9/11, ours seem to be stagnating as seen from our failure to prevent the 26/11 and 10/7 strikes in Mumbai and the terrorist strike in Pune in February last year. Our inability to successfully investigate any of the post-26/11 strikes despite the availability of greater international cooperation is a matter of serious concern.



Our intelligence machinery and counter-terrorism agencies continue to suffer from major deficiencies. Action to revamp our agencies and counter-terrorism infrastructure has been more in rhetoric than in action.



Counter-terrorism leadership has to flow from the Prime Minister downwards. This has not happened. The opposition has totally failed to keep the debate focused on our deficiencies. Our counter-terrorism debate has been reduced to a meaningless slanging match marked more by partisan agendas than thoughtful ideas.(3-9-11)



( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

INS AIRAVAT INCIDENT : WHAT DOES IT PORTEND?

B.RAMAN


The “Financial Times” of London reported on September 1,2011, that an unidentified Chinese warship had demanded that an Indian naval vessel identify itself and explain its presence in the South China Sea waters off Vietnam in July. It identified the Indian naval ship as INS Airavat.


2. According to the FT report, INS Airavat had visited Nha Trang in south-central Vietnam and the northern port of Haiphong in the second half of July.


3. The FT said that the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry acknowledged that the Indian warship had visited the country from July 19-22, but claimed that it had no information about the incident.


4.Rediff.com reported as follows the same day:
“A spokesperson from the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi said:" The Ministry has seen news reports about an alleged confrontation between an Indian Navy ship and a Chinese vessel off the coast of Vietnam in July 2011. The Indian Naval vessel, INS Airavat paid a friendly visit to Vietnam between 19 to 28 July 2011.


“On July 22, INS Airavat sailed from the Vietnamese port of Nha Trang towards Hai Phong, where it was to make a port call. At a distance of 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in the South China Sea, it was contacted on open radio channel by a caller identifying himself as the "Chinese Navy" stating that "you are entering Chinese waters". “No ship or aircraft was visible from INS Airavat, which proceeded on her onward journey as scheduled.


“There was no confrontation involving the INS Airavat. India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law. These principles should be respected by all.”


5.Rediff added further as follows: “In Beijing , the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaox sought to obfuscate the issue by saying that inquiries have been made with the "competent authorities" about the reported incident but so far no information has been received. Nor had China "received any representation from any other country", he said, implying that that no protest has been received from India in this regard. “


6. The media reports on the incident figured in the daily press briefings of the US State Department and the Pentagon at Washington DC on September 1.Answering questions at the daily briefing, Mark Toner, the State Department spokesman, told journalists: “We are certainly aware of the media reports on an alleged encounter between Indian and Chinese naval vessels. “Our position on the South China Sea is very clear. We want a collaborative diplomatic process here.”


7.Col.Dave Lapan, a spokesman of the Pentagon, said in his daily briefing in response to questions from media personnel: “I do not know anything about that particular confrontation. Generally we have said that there are many nations that operate through international waters in the South China Sea. We recognize that there are disputes amongst countries in that region and it is our desire one to recognize the right of passage to those waters, but more important that those conflicts, those confrontations be resolved peacefully so there aren’t any misunderstanding or things that leads us to injuries or deaths.”


8. The visit of the Indian naval ship to two ports in Vietnam and the incident of July 22 coincided with the meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the post-ASEAN ministerial meetings in Bali in Indonesia from July 16 to 28.However, there is no reason to believe that the visit of the Indian ship to two Vietnamese ports had anything to do with the Bali ARF meeting during which the continuing dispute on the question of sovereignty over the South China Sea and over the island territories in the Sea figured once again as in previous meetings on the agenda.


9. The dispute involves the Chinese claim of sovereignty not only over the island territories, but also over the South China Sea, which China claims as its territorial waters. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan do not accept the Chinese claims on both counts. They reject the Chinese claim that the South China Sea is China’s territorial waters. At the same time, they claim some of the island territories as belonging to them.


10. Thus, there is a bilateral dispute between China on the one side and these countries on the other over the ownership of the island territories and a multilateral dispute over China’s claim of sovereignty over the Sea as a whole. In recent months, the dispute has led to incidents between China on the one side and Vietnam and the Philippines on the other over issues such as the exploitation of the Sea for fisheries and oil and mineral resources. While vigorously asserting its claims on both counts, China has refrained from any interference with the right of freedom of navigation and overflights in the South China Sea.


11. Concerned over the increasing assertiveness of the Chinese Navy in the area, the Philippines and Vietnam have been moving closer to the US. Their navies have been holding joint exercises with the US Navy in their respective coastal waters without unnecessarily provoking China. They have not allowed repeated Chinese protests over these exercises to come in their way.


12. The US has been following a two-pronged policy. It has taken up the stand that the bilateral disputes over the island territories are for the concerned countries to sort out peacefully in which the US has no role. At the same time, it has been vigorously asserting the right of freedom of navigation and overflights in the South China Sea.


13.The clarification issued by the spokesman of India’s Ministry of External Affairs indicates that there is a convergence of views between India and the US in rejecting Chinese claims of sovereignty over the entire South China Sea.


14. Two significant points emerge from his clarification: Firstly, “India supports freedom of navigation in international waters, including in the South China Sea, and the right of passage in accordance with accepted principles of international law.” Secondly, “ At a distance of 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in the South China Sea, it was contacted on open radio channel.”


15. What does it mean? It means that India has admitted that the Indian ship at the time it received a cautionary advice from a source purporting to be the Chinese Navy was in the South China Sea and that it had a right to be there because the South China Sea is international and not Chinese waters.


16. At the Bali ARF meeting and in its margins, the US and the Philippines vigorously articulated their concerns over the increasing Chinese assertiveness. Mrs.Hilary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, told the ARF meeting: “The United States is concerned that recent incidents in the South China Sea threaten the peace and stability on which the remarkable progress of the Asia-Pacific region has been built. These incidents endanger the safety of life at sea, escalate tensions, undermine freedom of navigation and pose risks to lawful unimpeded commerce and economic development.”


17.She warned all the rival claimants against using force to bolster their positions. She added: “Each of the parties should comply with their commitments to respect freedom of navigation and over-flight in the South China Sea in accordance with international law, to resolve their disputes through peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force.”


18. Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario said that his country had “suffered at least seven aggressive intrusions” in the disputed waters since February. These included Chinese forces shooting at Filipino fishermen, deploying navy patrol boats to intimidate an oil exploration vessel and placing markers on some of the islets.


19.Del Rosario said China's actions appeared motivated by a hunger for the region's natural resources, and were heightening fears about how the country intended to treat its neighbors as its military and economic might expanded.


20.He told the Agence France Presse:.“I think there is that concern that China is becoming more powerful. We support their progress and their growth ... but at the same time it is our expectation that their strength and their growth and their influence will be exercised in a responsible way.”


21.Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi assured that China would work to ensure that the tensions did not escalate into conflict. He told the journalists in Bali: “South China Sea and Asia as a whole are peaceful and stable, and this will continue through our joint efforts.China will continue to contribute to peace and stability in Asia.”



22.At a meeting with the 10 members of the ASEAN in Bali, China also agreed to a set of guidelines laying down a framework for an eventual code of conduct for the sea. However the Philippines maintained the guidelines lacked teeth and did not change the fundamental problem that China claimed all of the sea, even up to the coasts of other Southeast Asian countries. “How can you discuss anything bilaterally when you sit down with them and they say that they own everything?” del Rosario asked.


23. Till now the Chinese frictions in the South China Sea have been mainly with Vietnam, the Philippines and the US. Despite India’s developing strategic relations with Vietnam, the Chinese , while maintaining a close watch over India-Vietnam relations, had maintained a discreet silence and avoided any statements or actions which could impact on their bilateral relations with India.


24. Moreover, the Chinese assertiveness vis-à-vis Vietnam and the Philippines was mainly in relation to the exploitation of the fisheries and mineral resources in the sea adjoining the various island territories. They had avoided an assertive policy in relation to the freedom of navigation and over-flights which could bring the US more actively into the dispute.


25. This is the first time they have taken an assertive step against a country not from the region in order to test its reaction on the question of their claims of sovereignty over the sea as a whole. India has done well to assert that the South China Sea is international waters and that its naval ship had a right to transit the Sea. It is important for India to mobilise the support of the US and other members of the international community not from this region on this issue. ( 2-9-11)



( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

ZARDARI IN URUMQI: FOCUS ON CHINESE ROLE IN GILGIT-BALTISTAN & SINO-PAK MARITIME CO-OPERATION

B.RAMAN


Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari has been in Urumqi, the capital of the Chinese-controlled Xinjiang province, with a high-power ministerial and official delegation since August 30,2011. He has gone to Urumqi to attend the inauguration of the China-Eurasia Expo being held there from September 1 to 5. This is Zardari’s seventh visit to China since taking over as the President in 2008 to study the economic development of different regions of China.


2. Miss Bakhtawar Bhutto Zardari and Miss Aseefa Bhutto Zardari are also accompanying the President. Bilawal Bhutto, Zardari’s son, who is the President of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), is separately travelling to China later this week to attend an international political conference.


3. Among others accompanying him are Foreign Minister Ms. Hina Rabbani Khar, Commerce Minister Makhdoom Amin Fahim, Defence Minister Ch. Ahmed Mukhtar, Petroleum and Natural Resources Minister Dr. Asim Hussain, Chief Minister Gilgit-Baltistan Syed Mehdi Shah, Prime Minister of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) Chaudhary Abdul Majeed, Chairman Board of Investment Salim H. Manviwala, President of the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) Senator Haji Ghulam Ali and spokesperson to the President Farhatullah Babar.


4.This is the second time the Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan has accompanied Zardari on one of his China visits. Syed Mehdi Shah had accompanied Zardari to Guangdong in China to attend the inaugural function of the 16th Asian Games at Guangzhou in November last year. He was extended VIP treatment by the Chinese authorities on par with the other members of the Pakistani delegation.


5. Mehdi Shah was invited for a welcome banquet hosted by State Councillor Madam Liu Yangdong for the foreign dignitaries, who had come to participate in the inaugural ceremony of the Asian Games. He was also a member of the Pakistani delegation headed by Zardari which held bilateral talks on Sino-Pakistani relations on November 12, 2010, with a Chinese delegation headed by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.


6. While briefing Pakistani media personnel on Zardari’s talks with Chinese Vice-Premier Li Kequang on August 31, Farhatullah Babar claimed that Vice-Premier Li made a special mention of the inclusion of the Chief Minister of GB in Zardari’s delegation and described it as a gesture.


7.The lack of any Chinese reservation over the inclusion of the heads of Government of the POK and GB in Zardari’s delegation and over their participation as members of the Pakistani delegation in the talks with the Chinese delegation underlines once again that the Chinese no longer consider the POK and the GB as disputed territory whereas they continue to look upon Jammu & Kashmir as a disputed territory.


8. It is doubtful whether the Chinese would similarly welcome and accept the inclusion of any leader or official of the Government of J&K in an official delegation from India.


9.During the three days that Zardari has spent in Urumqi before the inauguration of the Expo, he has had three levels of talks. The first was with a delegation of leaders and officials of the Xinjiang provincial Government and Communist Party headed by the Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Xinjiang, Zhang Chunxian. The second was with a delegation from Beijing headed by Vice-Premier LI. The third was with a delegation of heads of Chinese companies assisting Pakistan in various infrastructure projects.


10.Four major themes figured in these discussions:


( a). Continuing Sino-Pak co-operation in counter-terrorism in general and in dealing with the activities of Uighur dissident/ terrorist elements operating from Pakistani territory. While assuring the Chinese authorities from Beijing as well as Xinjiang of continued Pakistani co-operation in this regard, Zardari was also reported to have thanked China for standing by Pakistan during the controversy with the US regarding the sincerity of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism track record after the death of Osama bin Laden in a US commando raid at OBL’s hide-out at Abbottabad on May 2.


( b) .Sino-Pak strategic relations: Zardari reportedly described China as Pakistan’s life-line. He told the Xinjiang delegation: “We offer our territory and ports for Chinese trade.” He was quoted as having told Vice-Premier Li that the two countries needed to expand existing maritime cooperation into a more comprehensive strategic maritime partnership. There was no clarification forthcoming from the Pakistani delegation as to what Zardari meant by this. Was he referring to more structured co-operation against piracy, which might involve Pakistani ports being used regularly by Chinese ships on anti-piracy patrols or was it a reference to Pakistan’s need for Chinese naval assistance in the wake of the gaps revealed by the success of some terrorists in attacking the headquarters of the Pakistan Naval Air wing (PNS Mehran) at Karachi in May? There was also a discussion on possible Sino-Pak co-operation in helping Afghanistan in the field of economic development.


( c ). Chinese assistance for infrastructure development projects in GB. In this connection, reference was made to three on-going projects for repairs to and upgradation of the Karakoram Highway (KKH), the construction of the 4500 MW Diamer Bhasha Dam and the 7000 MW Bunji Dam and the construction of a dry port at Sost on the KKH by SinTrans, a Chinese construction company, which has an equity stake in it. It was stated by Pakistani officials that the Government of Pakistan has accepted a proposal of the China Reconstruction Bridge Corporation (CRBC) for the construction of 13 kms of new route and rehabilitation of 22 kilometers of existing sections of KKH by lowering the water level in the lakes in the region.


( d ).A review of Chinese assistance for infrastructure development in the rest of Pakistan. The focus was on Chinese assistance for the development of mineral resources, for the expansion of Pakistan’s power production and transmission capacity and the construction of a new city in Sindh to be called Zulfiquarabad. There has been no reference to possible Chinese assistance for the construction of a railway line from Xinjiang.


11.Pakistan’s total trade with China is estimated at US $ 8.7 billion. Out of this, its trade with the Xinjiang province is estimated at about US $ 400 million only.( 1-9-11)



( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )