SHOULD R&AW HAVE LIAISON INTERACTIONS WITH ISI?

B.RAMAN

( Written at the request of Editor, Rediff.com : http://www.rediff.com/news/column/why-it-is-tough-to-trust-the-isi/20120814.htm )

According to the “Express Tribune” of Pakistan, as cited by Rediff on August 13,2012, a proposal, possibly originating from the US, for an interaction between the chiefs of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and India’s Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) is presently under examination by the Pakistani authorities.

2.Rediff has reported as follows: “The proposal is among "numerous mechanisms" being explored to reduce the trust deficit between the two neighbours, The Express Tribune quoted official sources as saying. It quoted a source as claiming that the US was instrumental in persuading the two countries to discuss the possibility of a meeting between the heads of the Research and Analysis Wing and Inter-Services Intelligence. A Pakistani official was quoted as saying that several proposals, including regular interactions between the security agencies of the two countries, were on the table.”

3. There is no way of knowing whether the report of the “Express Tribune” is correct; if so, whether a similar proposal has been received by the Government of India and what has been the reaction of New Delhi to it.

4. Regular liaison relationships and sporadic liaison interactions, without involving a regular relationship, between the external intelligence agencies  of even adversary states are not uncommon. At the height of the cold war, the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was reported to have had liaison interactions with its counterparts in the erstwhile USSR and China

5.From the limited information available in the public domain regarding these interactions, it appeared that these interactions were used by the US as a mechanism for discussing sensitive issues away from the glare of publicity and for providing the political leadership with deniable  means of remaining in touch with its counterparts in the USSR and China without the media coming to know about it. Though intelligence of mutual interest might have been exchanged during these interactions, that was probably not the primary purpose of it.

6. Information is available in the public domain regarding at least three past liaison interactions of a sporadic nature between the chiefs of the R&AW and the ISI. Two of these were when Rajiv Gandhi was the Prime Minister and the third when Chandrasekhar was the Prime Minister. The initiative for these sporadic interactions, which were held at the height of the Khalistan terrorist movement, came from the then Crown Prince of Jordan, who was a good friend of Rajiv Gandhi and Gen.Zia ul-Haq, then in power in Pakistan.

7. India was making serious allegations, in private and public, regarding  ISI assistance to the Khalistani terrorists. The Crown Prince reportedly felt that it would be better to discuss such allegations in deniable  meetings between the chiefs of the two agencies instead of voicing them in public. These three interactions did not have any impact on the ISI’s support for the Khalistan terrorist movement, which continued to be as strong as ever.

8.The only seemingly beneficial outcomes of these three meetings were the Pakistani expulsion of four Sikh deserters from the Indian Army who had sought political asylum in Pakistan and informal discussions on certain ideas emanating from the two sides on possible ways of solving the Siachen dispute.

9. These three interactions were not followed up in subsequent years due to strong misgivings in the minds of the political leadership in India regarding the utility of such interactions from the point of view of our national security. In the case of the US, the intelligence agencies of the USSR and China were not engaged in attempts to destabilise the US through the use of terrorism in the US territory as a strategic weapon.

10. In the case of India and Pakistan, the issue is complicated due to the role of the ISI in fomenting terrorism against Indian nationals and interests. Moreover, there was a fear that the ISI might exploit liaison interactions and relationships to penetrate the Indian intelligence and security set-up.

11. Proposals for the revival of the sporadic liaison interactions between the heads of the R&AW and the ISI did come from the US after the Mumbai blasts of March 1993, but Narasimha Rao, the then Prime Minister, did not react to them positively. One understands that from time to time the US continues to float suggestions for a revival of the liaison interactions to reduce the hostility and suspicions between the intelligence communities of India and Pakistan. There were reports of such ideas being floated around after the ISI-backed Jihadi attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 and after the ISI-backed terrorist strikes by the Lashkar-e-Toiba I(LET) in Mumbai in the last week of November,2008.These ideas probably remained a non-starter due to lack of enthusiasm from Islamabad as well as New Delhi.

12.One finds it difficult to understand why the US should revive these ideas now when there is a serious trust deficit between the intelligence communities of the US and Pakistan. Over 60 years of intense, formal liaision relationship between the ISI and the CIA did not come in the way of the ISI stabbing the CIA in the back by giving clandestine shelter to Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad. The shelter given to OBL demonstrated clearly the perfidious mindset of the ISI, whether towards friends or foes.

13. One should not now be open to such ideas as in the past due to two reasons. The first is the incident relating to OBL. The second is the book on the penetration of the R&AW by the CIA through Major Rabinder Singh written by Amar Bhushan, the then No 3 in the R&AW who was, inter alia, responsible for counter-intelligence.

14. Amar Bhushan has given his book titled “Escape To Nowhere” the cloak of a fiction, but everyone reading it will know it is about the way the R&AW’s then leadership, including Amar himself, dealt with Rabinder Singh before he managed to escape to the US in May 2004 after giving a slip to the R&AW’s surveillance teams.

15. Even though the book is a mix of facts and fiction, any intelligence professional reading it between the lines would not fail to notice that the CIA managed to penetrate the R&AW and ultimately to whisk Rabinder Singh out of India right under the nose of the R&AW by noticing and exploiting  serious weaknesses  in the counter-intelligence and security armour of the R&AW. One does not know whether these weaknesses have since been addressed and removed and whether the R&AW and the rest of our intelligence community are now in a better position to prevent penetration of their set-up by hostile agencies like the ISI.

16. Unless and until these deficiencies are removed and a professional culture of acting in unison becomes the accepted norm in our intelligence community, we should not rush into reacting positively to any ideas for liaison interactions and relationships with the ISI. ( 14-8-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi)

MY TAKE ON THE HINDUS OF PAKISTAN

B.RAMAN

Maya Mirchandani of NDTV had an interesting discussion on the Hindu citizens of Pakistan on the night of August 11,2012. She needs to be complimented for focussing with finesse and delicacy on this sensitive issue in the context of the recent arrival of a large number of Hindu citizens of Pakistan in India for doing their annual pilgrimage to the Hindu holy places.

2.The Indian visa rules relating to Pakistan permit group pilgrimages by the Hindus as well as Muslims and individual family visits to India. Both Hindus and Muslims avail of the rules relating to pilgrimages and the Mohajirs, who migrated from India, avail of the rules relating to family visits. The Hindu pilgrimage groups generally come to India around Janmashtami, visit a number of holy places and go back to Pakistan.

3. The Hindu pilgrimage visits this year acquired sensational (to us) and worrisome ( to Pakistan Government) connotations because of reports in some sections of the Pakistani media that some of the Hindus from Sindh are actually fleeing from Pakistan because of various forms of harassment and may not come back.

4. This is a sensitive question. It would have been better if Maya and her reporters had not posed it to some of the pilgrims in front of the cameras. It was obvious from their replies that they were in two minds and had not decided what they should do. They have kept open the possibility of their going back to Pakistan. If they did, their answers could be exploited by the Islamic fundamentalist elements to harass and intimidate them when they return. The threat to the Hindus of Pakistan is from the  Islamic fundamentalist elements and the inability of the Pakistan State, particularly its Police, to control the fundamentalist elements and protect the Hindus from harassment and intimidation by the fundamentalists.

5. This harassment is high particularly in the case of the Dalits, who constitute the majority of the Hindu community, and even more particularly Hindu women. Some women are forced to embrace Islam and marry Muslims. There are also instances of the fundamentalist elements seizing the land and other property attached to Hindu temples in the rural areas without the Police intervening to stop it. There are also instances of well-to-do Hindus,  many of them belonging to the so-called upper castes, being harassed and intimidated in relation to their property by the fundamentalists without the police protecting them. They come away to India and seek political asylum. It is the poor Dalits who suffer in silence because they find it difficult to come away to India and seek asylum .They have no relatives or means of livelihood in India.

6.When Pakistan was formed in 1947, there were millions of Hindus, sons of the Pakistani soil, all over what constitutes Pakistan of today. Those in Punjab were driven out to India by the Punjabi Muslims. In the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)---now called Khyber- Pakhtoonkwa--- some were driven out by the pro-Muslim League Pashtun Muslims and some others enjoyed the protection of the Awami National Party of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his successors.

7. Even though there were atrocities against the Hindus in Sindh and Balochistan too, they were not comparable to the atrocities on the Hindus in Punjab. While a large number of Hindus from Sindh and Balochistan came away because of the atrocities of the fundamentalists, some who enjoyed the protection of India-friendly nationalist parties stayed behind and were protected by the nationalists.

8. After the death of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, a Baloch nationalist leader, at the hands of the Pakistan Army in August 2005, the harassment of the Hindus of Balochistan by the security agencies as well as the fundamentalist elements increased because of suspicion of their sympathy for the Baloch nationalists who have launched a new freedom struggle after the murder of Nawab Bugti by the Army. As a result, many Hindus of Balochistan have either come away to India or shifted to Sindh.

9. The main concentration of Hindus in Pakistan today is in Sindh. Pakistan has not had an accurate census since the birth of Bangladesh in 1971. One does not know exactly how many Hindus are there in Sindh. There are varying estimates between one and four million. These are not descendants of Hindus who migrated from the rest of India. Barring those who came from Balochistan, these are the sons and daughters of the Sindhi soil, the descendants of Hindus who were living in Sindh long before Islam came there and have proudly remained devoted to their Hindu religion and culture despite all the harassment they have faced since the birth of Pakistan in 1947. The Hindus of Sindh are the original Sindhis and not the Muslims, but they are treated as second class citizens in their own homeland.

10. The Government of India’s interest and responsibility for ensuring the welfare of the Sindhi Hindus arises from the fact that they are Hindus. The Nehru-Liaquat Ali Pact signed in April 1950 after Pakistan was born gave the Government of India a locus standi for looking after the welfare of the Hindus and Sikhs  all over Pakistan. The Government of India was not able to adequately exercise this responsibility in respect of Pakistani Punjab, the NWFP (now called KP) and Balochistan because it did not have a consular presence in any of these areas.

11. But till 1994, the Government of India did have a Consulate in Karachi, which used to, inter alia, monitor the welfare of the Sindhi Hindus. The Consulate also closely interacted with the Sindhi nationalist parties and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which had many Hindu cadres, and persuaded them to pay better attention to the protection of the Hindus.

12. In 1994, Benazir Bhutto, then Prime Minister, on the advice of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), ordered the Consulate to close down. The result: Our ability to monitor the welfare of the Sindhi Hindus has been affected. Moreover, after Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao, successive Governments that held office in  New Delhi have neglected our past policy of active interaction with the Sindhi nationalists, who are the well-wishers of India and the Sindhi Hindus. Our hopes and those of the Sindhi Hindus that a PPP Government will better protect their rights have been belied. The PPP has given ministerial berths to some of its Hindu members, but there is a feeling that they have not done much to protect the Hindu community.

13. There are limits to what the Government of India can do to protect the Hindus except periodically exercising  pressure on Islamabad to look after them and protect them from the fundamentalists. Whatever limited role the Government of India could play in the past has been greatly diluted  in the absence of a Consulate in Karachi and the drying-up of our interactions with the Sindhi nationalists, the traditional opponents of the fundamentalists and protectors of the Hindus in whatever limited way they can.

14. Since 1994, from time to time, the Government of India has taken up with Islamabad the question of its re-opening the Consulate in Karachi. As a quid pro quo, Pakistan has reportedly been insisting on a Pakistani Consulate in Mumbai to be located in the Jinnah House. It is understood that while the Government of India has no objection to a Pakistani Consulate in Mumbai, it has reservations about its being located in the Jinnah House.

15. The re-opening of the Indian Consulate in Karachi and better protection for the Hindus and Sikhs living in Pakistan should be taken up by our Prime Minister with President Asif Ali Zardari. We should revive our dried-up interactions with the Sindhi nationalists. We should also examine whether the Nehru-Liaquat Ali Pact needs updating. ( 13-8-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

MUMBAI VIOLENCE: CALL FOR GREATER ALERTNESS

B.RAMAN

The Muslim holy fasting period of Ramadan, which started on July 20,2012, is expected to end on August 18.Muslims all over the world will be observing the International Quds  ( Arabic name for Palestine) Day on August 17, the last Friday of the fasting period to express solidarity with the Palestinians and renew calls for the liberation of Jerusalem from Israeli control. The call for the observance of Al Quds Day was given by Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran in 1979 and is followed by all Muslims, Sunnis as well as Shias, every year.

2. Muslim feelings of solidarity with each other and grieving for the sufferings of fellow-Muslims anywhere in the world tend to remain intense during Ramadan. A careful mapping of violent incidents involving Muslims across the world would show that many of these incidents took place during Ramadan. The serial blasts of March 1993 In Mumbai, which are seen by some terrorism analysts as the first act of catastrophic jihadi terrorism in the world, were carried out by Dawood Ibrahim’s group, with the help of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),  during Ramadan.

3. The police and counter-terrorism agencies in many countries of the world, affected by jihadi terrorism, remain extra alert and watchful during Ramadan. It is, therefore, quite likely that the Indian intelligence agencies and the police in different States would also be in a high state of alert during the present Ramadan.

4.Two persons were killed and 55 , 45 of them policemen, were injured in Mumbai on August 11,2012, when a group of Muslims demonstrating against alleged anti-Muslim incidents of violence in Assam turned violent, clashed with the police and burnt down a number of vehicles, including some reportedly belonging to the media.

5. The Mumbai Police need to be complimented for bringing the situation quickly under control, though they seem to have been initially taken by surprise. Our media also deserves to be congratulated for reporting on the violence with restraint and balance.

6.This year’s Ramadan has coincided with a period of  suffering for the Muslims because of the anti-Muslim incidents reported from the Rakhine State of Myanmar and Assam State of India. Our media has been covering these incidents with its usual caution, restraint and balance. Some sensational stories, including pics regarding the anti-Muslim incidents in the Rakhine State, have been circulating through the Internet.

7.While our media has refrained from disseminating these sensational stories and pictures, one cannot say the same thing of the TV media in Pakistan and the West Asian countries. Al Jazeera, for example, disseminated a story on August 9 regarding alleged atrocities against Muslims in the Rakhine State. While the text of the story was about alleged discrimination against Muslims in the Rakhine State, the headline spoke of regional discrimination against Muslims. The West Asian media is not yet giving the same focus to Assam, but one should  keep a watch for distorted stories about Assam making their appearance there.

8. The important question is not whether these stories telecast are accurate or inaccurate. It is what impact such dissemination will have on the reactions of the ordinary Muslims. The reach of the Internet in the Islamic world is limited, but that of the Arabic TV channels is extensive. The dissemination of such stories could have unpredictable impact on the emotions and reactions of the ordinary Muslims.

9.Till the communal situation returns to normal in the Rakhine State of Myanmar and in our Assam State, it is important for our police and intelligence agencies to step up their vigilance and security alert. It is equally important for our political leadership and administration to closely interact with the leaders of our Muslim community, keep them informed of the measures taken by the Government for the relief of the Muslims affected by the recent violence in Assam and urge them to exercise restraint and not to exploit the situation for their narrow religious interests which could be detrimental to broader national interests.

10. If any Indian Muslim leader does not accepts this advice for moderation and tries to exploit the situation for narrow ends, the police should not hesitate to act against him or her appropriately under the law. The political leadership should not interfere with the actions of the police. (12-8-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

SELF-MOTIVATED TIBETANS KEEP THEIR CAUSE ALIVE

B.RAMAN

“Here is a community, which is trying very hard to preserve its culture, its traditions, and its language in the hope that one day when it gets free from the most tyrannous regime of the world, it will take it all back to its homeland where it all belongs. This community has immense faith in its leader His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, that he will bring them home one day, who sometimes himself faces moral conflicts as a political and a spiritual leader but still manages to bind them so well. They know that they are just 6 million in front of China’s population of 1.3 billion, but they hold on to hope and faith that someday they will go back and will live freely, will breathe freely, will smile freely. Till then they are in the country of their refuge, carving an identity for themselves, fighting each day to mingle with the people here who sometimes don’t welcome them , doing their best to evolve their community as a whole in the land of their exile where they came with nothing; but at the same time working towards their freedom, slowly and steadily.”

----- From the  Web Site of Students For A Free Tibet

The global attention today is not on the Tibetan areas of China  or on Xinjiang, the homeland of the Uighurs. It is on Beijing.

2. The world needs Chinese co-operation for dealing with the current global economic decline. It needs Chinese co-operation for ensuring peace in the Pacific and the South China Sea.

3. The global attention is presently more on Beijing than on the Tibetan areas and Xinjiang because a new Party and Government leadership is to take over in China  in the coming months. At the 18^th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) expected in October, a new party leadership headed by   Xi Jinping is  to take over from the present team headed by  Hu Jintao. At the session of the National People’s Congress scheduled to be held next March, a new Government headed by Xi as the President in place of Hu and  Li Keqiang as the new Prime Minister in place of Wen Jiabao is expected to  take over.

4. China analysts will know that changes in party and Government leadership in China do not necessarily lead to major policy changes---domestic and foreign. There may be changes in style due to new incumbents coming to office and new nuances depending on the inner-party and inner-Government equations. If at all there are any changes, it will be changement dans la continuite--- change in continuity.

5. And the world is curious to find out what shape Chinese policies could take under the new leadership. What impact that will have on the Chinese and global economy and on regional peace and harmony?

6.As a result of the increasing global focus on the coming Party and Government changes in Beijing, there is diminishing attention to the Tibetan issue. Continuing violations of the human rights of the Tibetans  and the stepped-up Chinese efforts to  impart legitimacy to the so-called Panchen Lama selected by the party in place of the Panchen Lama chosen by the Tibetans under the guidance of His Holiness the Dalai Lama who has been in jail for many years now, are no longer receiving the global attention they deserve.

7.His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-exile headed by Harvard-educated Prime Minister Lobsang Sangay, who completed one year in office on August 8,2012, realise that there will be no forward movement on the Tibetan issue till the new party and Government leadership assumes office in Beijing and comes to grips with issues of governance. That is why talks between the CPC and the representatives of His Holiness, which were going on intermittently, are in a state of suspension. The special negotiators of His Holiness have resigned due to their disenchantment with the continued rigidity in the CPC’s policy on Tibet and their successors have not yet been named by the Government-in-exile.

8.The policies of the CPC and the Chinese Government are based on the following conditions:

·        

 Any talks will be on the future of His Holiness and not on the future of the Tibetans which has already been decided. His Holiness has no locus standi to talk on the future of the Tibetans.

·        

 There is no question of granting autonomy to the Tibetan areas of China and re-merging them into one entity as they were before the Chinese occupied Tibet.

·        

 The legitimacy of the Panchen Lama designated by the CPC has to be accepted.

·        

 The religious process for the selection of the next Dalai Lama after the death of His Holiness will be co-ordinated by the CPC-designated Panchen Lama under the guidance of the CPC. The next Dalai Lama has to have the approval of the CPC.

9. These conditions cannot be acceptable to any self-respecting Tibetan. His Holiness has toned down his original demand by agreeing to accept autonomy for Tibet without insisting on independence. The Chinese are not prepared to make any concessions and are waiting for the day when His Holiness will be no more and they can proclaim the installation of the CPC-designated Dalai Lama and the end of the Tibetan problem

10. But, the problem is showing no signs of ending and it is unlike to end even if the Chinese succeed in their machinations. Despite undoubted economic progress in Tibet, the Tibetans’ devotion to His Holiness and their attachment to their culture, religion and self-respect remain as strong as ever. It is so among the Tibetans living in exile as well as among those living in China under severe Chinese repression. It is so among the older generation of Tibetans as among  the GenNext.

11. The new generation of Tibetans growing  to adulthood in exile as well as in the Tibetan areas of China, many of whom in China have never even met His Holiness, is determined to see that the Tibetan cause will not perish and that the Tibetans will once again be masters of their culture, religion and destiny. There is a rare unity among the Tibetan monks and the lay people in keeping the cause alive.

12. This is not an externally-motivated and orchestrated movement. It is a spontaneous, self-motivated and self-generated movement. The continuing reports of self-immolation by monks and lay people---many of them from the new generation--- speak of the high level of self-motivation of young individuals. There have been 46 instances of self-immolation since March last year---most of them from Sichuan where the Kirti monastery, the epi-centre of the neo-Tibetan resistance movement started--- and some from the Gansu province and the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region. The latest to self-immolate on August 7 was a 26-year-old Tibetan mother of two children in the Gansu province. These are the young heroes of the neo-Tibetan resistance movement who have been bravely keeping the movement alive by sacrificing their lives.

13.For the Tibetan cause to prevail, it is important for it to have global support---moral and material. In a world increasingly dependent on China for economic prosperity and peace and harmony, this global support has been increasingly tentative and hesitant. The older generation, which used to support His Holiness and the Tibetan cause, remains steadfast in its support.

14. The older generation of supporters like me and countless others in India and other countries will soon be passing away. The new generation has to come forward to express its solidarity with the GenNext of Tibetans and encourage them in their attempts to keep their cause alive. In the Western countries, particularly in the US, many young people have been expressing their moral support to the Tibetan cause. But, unfortunately in India, the younger generation is showing dwindling interest in the Tibetan cause. This has to be reversed. (10-8-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

DANGER OF EMERGENCE OF AN EPI-CENTRE OF MUSLIM ANGER

B.RAMAN

Humanitarian laws make no distinction on grounds of religion and ethnicity. Nor do they make any distinction between legal and illegal residents. Even a dangerous criminal, including terrorist suspects, are entitled to food and medical assistance when they are in the custody of the police.

2. Under international laws, every State has a right to prevent illegal migration through legitimate means. It can fence the border, deploy the army and empower the army to shoot at individuals seeking to cross the border illegally. If despite these measures some people manage to cross the border illegally, the State has a right to arrest and deport them in accordance with the due process of the law.

3. However, so long as those illegals are in our territory, the State cannot escape the responsibility for protecting them from acts of violence and extending to them food and medical assistance under the international humanitarian laws.

4.There are disturbing reports of the non-observance of humanitarian obligations not only by the Governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh, but also by the Government of Assam in India in respect of the Muslims, perceived as illegal entrants, who have been affected by recent incidents of anti-Muslim violence in this area.

5.The Rohingya Muslims affected by the recent clashes between  the Buddhists and the Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine State of Myanmar have been complaining that they have been denied humanitarian assistance by the Myanmar Government and Army on the ground that they are illegal migrants from Bangladesh. Some Western Governments such as that of France have urged the Myanmar Government to attend to the humanitarian plight of the Rohingyas.

6. The Bangladesh Government has not only refused to extend any humanitarian assistance to new entrants fleeing the violence in the Rakhine State, but has even ordered the suspension of humanitarian assistance to Rohingyas who had crossed over in the 1990s and are living in camps as registered refugees. Since the last week of July, it has ordered two French and one British humanitarian organisations to suspend the supply of humanitarian assistance to past entrants from Myanmar due to a fear that this could  induce more Rohingyas to re-enter Bangladesh from Myanmar. The US Government and the UN High Commission for Refugees, Geneva, have expressed concern over this and urged the Bangladesh Government to reverse the suspension.

7. The recent incidents of violence in the Kokrajhar and adjoining Bodo areas of Assam have led to a large number of Muslim victims of the incidents taking shelter in relief camps set up by the authorities. There is a disturbing impression that the local authorities are seeking to make a distinction between Muslim victims who are our citizens and victims who are illegals who had come to Indian territory from Bangladesh. If true, such a distinction will be unwise, counterproductive and unsustainable under international humanitarian laws.

8. India has always had an exemplary record in observing humanitarian laws and in meeting humanitarian obligations. We have legitimate fears regarding possible threats to our national security and integrity due to the presence of a large number of Bangladeshi illegals in our territory. We have every right to deal with them in accordance with the law. Till we are able to do so, we should not derogate from our humanitarian obligations to those in our territory by making an unsustainable distinction in the distribution of humanitarian relief.

9. Impressions among the Muslim victims of violence in this region that the States and Governments concerned have been following a policy of discrimination against the Muslim victims in the matter of humanitarian relief could drive some of them into the hands of the Islamic fundamentalist and other extremist organisations active in the affected areas.( 9-8-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

FRESH VIOLENCE IN RAKHINE STATE: TURKISH PM TO VISIT MYANMAR

B.RAMAN

Fresh clashes between Arakanese Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims  were reported on August 6,2012, from the Kyauktaw township in the Rakhine State of Myanmar bordering Bangladesh. The violence was triggered off by  claims of  the alleged recovery of some guns from a boat belonging to some Rohingyas by Arakanese Buddhists belonging to the village Ywar Nyar.

2. The Buddhists undertook searches for guns suspected to have been smuggled in by the Rohingyas following an incident in which some Rohingyas were accused by the Buddhists of burning down a Buddhist-owned rice factory in the Taung Pauk village.

3. The violence led to the burning down of houses belonging to both the communities in  Apauk Wa, Shwe Haling, Gut Pi Taung and Ywar Nyar villages. Earlier, the situation in the Kyauktaw area started getting serious on August 2, 2012, the full moon day of Buddhist Lent, when a group of Rohingyas allegedly destroyed an Arakanese Buddhist-owned bus station.

4. The 88 Generation Students Group sent a team to the Rakhine State to make an on the spot study of the situation. On its return to Yangon, Ko Ko Gyi, its leader, said he would be prepared to support the call of the UN Special Rapporteur For Myanmar for a Truth Commission to find out the truth provided it enquired into the allegations made by the Buddhists as well as the Rohingya Muslims and its enquiry covered not only allegations of violations of the human rights of the two communities, but also Myanmar’s concerns over the impact of the Rohingya problem on Myanmar’s national security.

5.Ko Ko Gyi said: “We found during our trip to Arakan State that local Arakanese aid groups put up signboards saying ‘Unwelcome UN and NGOs Aid’ in front of their refugee camps. This will continue to happen if [the UN] treats local people unequally.”

6.In a statement issued in Paris on August 6,French Deputy Foreign Minister Vincent Floreani called on Myanmar to find a peaceful solution to the  conflict in the Rakhine State. He said: “We call on the Burmese authorities to protect all civilian populations, without discrimination, and to investigate possible abuses.”  Meanwhile, there were reports that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will travel to Myanmar on August 9 to meet President Thein Sein and discuss how to provide humanitarian aid to the displaced.

7. Prominent members of the Buddhist community in the Rakhine State have expressed their unhappiness over what they allege as the pressure being exercised by Catholic and other Christian organisations on Western Governments to exercise pressure on the Myanmar Government to show a more sympathetic and accommodating attitude to the Rohingya Muslims.

8.The United States has endorsed an appeal of the UN High Commission For Refugees (UNHCR),Geneva, urging the Bangladesh Government to reverse its order asking two French and one British humanitarian relief organisation to stop providing relief to any fresh group of Rohingyas illegally crossing over into Bangladesh. The Bangladesh’s contention is that these organisations had been permitted to provide relief to Rohingyas who had crossed over in the past and who are registered as refugees.

9.The three organisations ordered to stop the distribution of humanitarian relief are France’s  Doctors Without Borders and  Action Against Hunger and the UK’s Muslim Aid, all of which had set up humanitarian relief distribution centres in  Cox’s Bazar, near the border with Myanmar.

10.The Bangladesh  authorities have  said their country is already struggling to cope with the hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees who fled ethnic violence in the 1990s and are living in camps near Cox’s Bazar. They say the NGOs are undermining the government’s efforts to deter more refugees from entering the country.

11.In a statement issued on August 7, the US State Department said it was “deeply concerned” over the Bangladesh ban. The same day, the UNHCR appealed to Bangladesh “to ensure that NGO assistance continues to be provided to unregistered people from Myanmar’s Rakhine state. If the order is implemented, it will have a serious humanitarian impact on some 40,000 unregistered people who had fled Myanmar in recent years and settled in the Leda and Kutupalong makeshift sites.”

12. Sentu Mian, an official of the NGO Affairs Bureau of the Bangladesh Government, said the aid provided by these three organisations to Rohingyas had served to encourage an influx of refugees from the latest clashes between the  Muslims and the Buddhists. He added: “We found that they [the NGOs] have offered rations and financial support to unregistered Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. These activities work against the interests of Bangladesh and so we decided to impose a ban on them.”

13.The Dhaka Police are reported to have arrested  nine Rohingyas  who had been brought in by agents. Monirul Islam of the Detective Branch of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police, told the local media that an investigation was underway regarding hundreds of stolen passports, in a case believed to have “a Rohingya link.”

14.In the meanwhile, the local media in the Rakhine State has alleged that Radical Indonesian cleric Abu Bakr Bashir, who is currently imprisoned for supporting a jihadi training camp in Aceh, northern Sumatra, has  demanded that the Myanmar  Government stop harming Muslims or face the anger of his fighters. While the Muslim Governments of the region have been cautious in their statements on the situation in the Rakhine State, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Jemaah Islamiya of Indonesia have reportedly expressed their solidarity with the Rohingyas. (8-8-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

TIME FOR SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON MARITIME SECURITY

B.RAMAN

( Based on observations made by me at the inaugural session of a seminar on Maritime Security and Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region jointly organised on August 8,2012, by  the Stella Maris College, Chennai, and the Centre for Asia Studies, Chennai, at the Stella Maris College)

Maritime security, which was a two-dimensional concept before 2000 focussing essentially on likely threats and challenges from State actors and pirates, has now become a three dimensional concept as a result of the increasing threats of maritime terrorism with a global or trans-national reach.

2.Till 2000, the concept  was seen largely through the prism of possible confrontations and conflicts between the competing interests of State actors in the region such  as between India and Pakistan or  between India and China or  between the US and China.

3.The attack by an explosive-laden boat of Al Qaeda against US naval ship USS Cole in Aden in October,2000, and the unsuccessful attempt by Al Qaeda to blow up and sink a French oil tanker Limburg in the same area in October,2002, expanded the scope of the concept to cover likely future threats to maritime trade and navigation and to sensitive coastal establishments from non-State actors with the motivation and capability for attacking targets on or from the seas.

4. The interrogation of Al Qaeda suspects arrested during the investigation of the attacks on USS Cole and Limburg revealed the plans of Al Qaeda to target maritime choke points like the Straits of Gibraltar and Hormuz and the Malacca Straits by blowing up sea-borne vessels laden with explosives and container ships to block the choke points.

5. As a result, maritime counter-terrorism became an important component of maritime security. Counter-piracy was an important component of maritime security even before 2000 due to the activities of pirates based in the ASEAN countries in the Malacca Straits, but the threat was limited in scope due to the fact that the pirates operating in the South-East Asian region, despite being well-equipped in modern means of communications, had a  limited capability for operating in high seas far from the Malacca Straits.

6. The advent of the Somali pirates in the post-2005 years totally changed the complexion of piracy and the complexity of counter-piracy operations. The Somali pirates, though not as well equipped as the pirates of South-East Asia in modern means of communication, demonstrated a capability for operating in high seas far away from their bases in Somalia through the technique of using small boats launched from mother ships. Consequently, the techniques of counter-piracy called for a capability to deal with sea-borne non-State actors off the coast as well as in high seas.

7. The degradation of the capabilities of Al Qaeda in recent years as a result of the relentless campaign of attrition waged by the US against it and the strengthening of maritime security measures relating to ports and container traffic have prevented the major threats to maritime security  from Al Qaeda apprehended in the wake of the attacks on USS Cole and Limburg from materialising.

8.However, new threats have arisen from attempts of other terrorist organisations to copy-cat Al Qaeda’s acquisition of a capability for maritime terrorism. The sea-borne attack by the Lashkar-e-Toiba on targets in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, showed that the capability for maritime terrorism is no longer confined to Al Qaeda alone. Moreover, the role of the State of Pakistan in helping the LET to carry out a devastating  sea-borne terrorist attack on targets in Mumbai underlined the new threats from State-sponsored maritime terrorism.

9.The conventional naval techniques and capabilities developed over the years to protect ourselves against threats from State actors and their navies would no longer be sufficient to protect ourselves against maritime threats from non-state actors, whether it be terrorists or pirates, and their State-sponsors. Naval doctrines now have to contend with threats from State as well as non-State maritime actors.

10. Dealing with threats from non-State actors, who pose a threat to the maritime security of many nations, calls for techniques based on mutual assistance and intelligence sharing among the navies of the affected countries. Despite political differences and competing economic interests among the State actors, they find it necessary to engage and co-operate with each other to face and neutralise threats from the non-State actors.

11. Despite  the continuing border dispute and despite suspicions and apprehensions over the implications to India of China’s strategic co-operation with Pakistan  and the implications to China of India’s strategic co-operation with Vietnam, the Indian and Chinese navies have found ways of co-operating with each other in dealing with the Somali pirates. There is a triangular co-operation mechanism involving the Navies of India, China and Japan and there is a talk of the South Korean Navy being brought into this co-operation mechanism. The serious differences between China and Japan on the question of sovereignty over the East China Sea islands have not come in the way of ideas towards a counter-piracy strategy based on mutual assistance and intelligence sharing.

12.A reference to the coming into shape of a trilateral co-operation mechanism was made by Chief Admiral Nirmal Verma, the retiring chief of the Indian Navy, in his final briefing of the Indian media at New Delhi on August 7,2012. According to “The Hindu” of August 8,2012, he said: “ Our anti-piracy operations have thus far been co-ordinated trilaterally with the Chinese and Japanese and, in the near future, this initiative could include the South Korean Navy.”

13.Engagement and co-operation against maritime terrorism has not made the same progress as co-operation against the Somali pirates because of the role of Pakistan in sponsoring organisations such as the LET, which pose a threat to our maritime security. Unless and until Pakistan gives up its policy of using terrorism as a weapon against India, the scope for co-operation between the Indian and Chinese Navies against Pakistani terrorist organisations taking to sea-borne terrorism will remain limited. There is, however, scope for co-operation between the Navies of India and China against global  terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda when they operate on or from the seas.

14.Engagement and co-operation against non-State actors  should not be allowed to weaken our national will and determination to assert our national core interests against State actors. One has to see the activism of the Chinese and US Navies in the South China Sea area in this context. The US has not allowed its developing economic and other cooperation with China to come in the way of the assertion of its national interests in the Pacific and East and South China Seas. Similarly, China has not allowed its co-operation with the ASEAN countries in various fields to come in the way of an assertion of its claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea islands.

15. Thus, one finds the evolution of a new naval doctrine in different countries of the region based on the twin pillars of engagement and co-operation to the extent possible against threats from non-State actors and assertion of national interests against State actors without allowing the importance of engagement and co-operation against non-State actors weaken the national will and determination to assert national interests against State actors endangering such interests.

16.Our naval doctrine to deal with the three dimensions of maritime security should provide for capabilities that would enable us to deal effectively with threats from non-State actors, by our acting either alone or in co-operation with other navies, and threats from State actors to our national interests. While discussing Maritime Threats and Challenges, one has to clearly identify likely threats from State as well as non-State actors and the techniques required for dealing  with them. The ability of our Navy to deal with the three-dimensional threat to our maritime security will depend on the back-up support from our intelligence agencies.

17. There is a need for not only a new and smart naval doctrine to deal with the three components of maritime security, but  also  for a new and smart intelligence doctrine to enable the R&AW , the Directorate-General of Naval Intelligence and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) provide effective back-up support to the Navy and the Coast Guard.

18. Unfortunately, the R&AW continues to be largely a land-struck intelligence agency using traditional police methods of collecting, analysing and assessing intelligence. It does not have an adequate understanding of the sea and sea-borne threats and does not have the capability for collecting intelligence about them. The importance of imparting a sea-borne orientation to the R&AW has not received much attention. This state of affairs needs to be corrected without further loss of time.

19. We have had many Task Forces to look into our capabilities for dealing with threats to our national security---whether such threats be from the land, the seas or the air. In view of the rapidly changing dimensions of the threats to maritime security,  the time has come for a separate Task Force to deal exclusively with threats to our maritime security. It should identify the doctrinal, strategic and tactical deficiencies relating to our maritime capabilities and recommend measures to remove those deficiencies. (8-8-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )