B.RAMAN
It is difficult to totally avoid collateral deaths
of innocent civilians in counter-insurgency operations, but it is important to
take every precaution possible to reduce such deaths.
2. When the security forces do not exercise the necessary care and caution to avoid collateral
deaths of innocent civilians, counter-insurgency operations themselves, instead
of putting down the insurgency, become a root cause of more insurgency.
3. The alienation of the people in the affected
areas that originally gave rise to the insurgency is further aggravated by the
deaths of innocent civilians. It tends to confirm the image of the Government
as projected by the insurgents as uncaring and insensitive. The credibility of
the Government and the security forces is damaged when the people come to know
that the version of an operation as officially put out is wrong---either
partially or totally and deliberately so.
4. This drives more people into the folds of the
insurgents and strengthens their motivation and determination to keep up the
fight against the Government.
5. Collateral deaths of innocent civilians take
place due to three reasons----- imprecise intelligence, over-reaction by the
security forces caused by exaggerated assessments of the threats posed by the
insurgents and deliberate acts of vindictiveness by the security forces to
teach a lesson to sections of the community perceived to be supporting the
insurgents.
6. Whenever the security forces claim to have
killed a large number of insurgents in an operation projected by them as
successful, the Government should verify their claims instead of immediately
praising them for their success.
7. Verification does not necessarily mean that the
Government distrusts the version of the security forces. It only means that the
Government wants to satisfy itself that there has been no collateral deaths ---
wanton or unavoidable--- of innocent civilians.
8. Such verification adds to the confidence of the people in the
fairness of the Government. The Government has a dual responsibility. To the
security forces, to reassure them that their rightful actions will have the
total support of the Government. To the people living in the affected area to
satisfy them that the Government cares for them and will not blindly support
the security forces if they indulge in wrongful actions or unjustified
operations.
9. If the Government does not take the precaution
of verifying the facts and circumstances of operations resulting in large
fatalities and if these prove to be wrong, the resulting embarrassment will
damage the future effectiveness of counter-insurgency operations.
10. One is already seeing this in the unfortunate
controversy following the claims of the security forces to have killed 20
Maoists in what was projected as an intelligence-driven and successful
counter-insurgency operation in Chattisgarh’s Bijapur District on June 29,2012.
The initial claims of a remarkably successful operation made by the Security
Forces and the Government of Chattisgarh were accepted without due verification
by Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister of the Government of India, and the
security forces complimented for their success.
11. Subsequently, doubts have been raised about the
veracity of the facts and circumstances of the operation not only by human
rights activists and sections of the local villagers, but also by some members
of the Congress Party, who have been quoted by the media as describing the
encounter as “completely fake” resulting in the death of many innocent civilians.
12.Our security forces are led by responsible officers
and I find it difficult to believe that they would have indulged in a fake
operation and tried to mislead not only the State Government, but also the
Government of India under which the central para-military forces come.
13. At the same time, from the kind of allegations
being made by sections of the public and
non-governmental activists against the security forces, one cannot totally
dismiss the possibility of an unacceptable number of collateral fatalities due
to reasons yet to be determined.
14. Instead of standing on false prestige and
instead of being influenced by considerations of having to maintain the morale
of the security forces by supporting them right or wrong, the Government
should hold an independent enquiry to
establish facts and make amends to the relatives of any innocent villagers
killed if such collateral deaths had taken place as alleged.
15.Since taking over as the Union Home Minister
after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, Shri Chidambaram has taken
commendable action to strengthen our counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency
capabilities and to improve the quality of the operations undertaken by the
security forces.
16. At the same time, he has shown an unfortunate
tendency to rush to the media with
unverified versions of operations instead of showing the patience to have the
facts verified before going public and identifying himself with the initial
version which may prove to be wrong on subsequent verification.
17. We saw it in the case of the interrogation of Zabiuddin Ansari aka Abu Jundal aka Abu Jindal
aka Abu Hamza, an Indian Muslim
suspected to be one of co-conspirators of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in
Mumbai. We are seeing it again in the case of the operation against the Maoists
in Chattisgarh.
18. The Home Minister is the supreme head of the
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency machinery of the Government of India.
His credibility in the eyes of the people and the international community is of
supreme importance. If his versions repeatedly prove to be wrong subsequently,
not only his personal credibility, but even the credibility of the Indian State
could be weakened.
19. The Home Minister of the Government of India
should be the last to brief the media after all facts and circumstances have
been verified to his total satisfaction. He should not be the first to rush to
the media. ( 2-7-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director,
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China
Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
3 comments:
It was a ridiculous operation. All were tribals and not maoists. In all home grown insurgency trouble, including Kashmir, only way to avoid maoist trouble is to win over the local populace. No other way. Other ways only serve to increase conflicts
Collateral Damage is a byproduct of any COvert Ops! No points pointed could be disputed! THe root cause is Political it does not mean the Maoist/Naxals can take up Arms struggle using Innocent(supposedly) Villagers as shield! The more attachment given to these kind of Ops! the more the wolf cry from the so called Human Activist! These Morins (Human Activist) have never shown their Protest when Maoist blow the trains and buses when the casualty runs into hundreds! Irrespective whether it is an Intelligence failure/ Not verifying the facts the simple theory is "Terrorize the Terrorist" No better Ailment to this menace!
A very well written and balanced article.I am reminded of what a former Chief Commissioner of a North Eastern State told me in the mid 1950s when I was a student,that every bullet that comes out of a gun creates seven insurgents for the person killed.
It is absolutely essential therefore that human lives are respected and public support in the area of operation regained/retained by imaginative measures.
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