Wednesday, April 7, 2010



1. Start a crash programme for the development of road and telecommunications infrastructure in the entire tribal belt of Central India. The Chinese realised that without effective road and rail communications, the internal security will be weak. They poured billions of dollars into infrastructure development programmes in the areas with internal security vulnerabilities. If one has only one usable road in a district, it will be unfair to blame the police for using the same road for their to and fro movements.

2.Provide effective security to road construction engineers and workers. They will become the target of attacks by Maoists to disrupt the construction.

3.It will be futile for the present to undertake operations to free the so-called liberated zones from the control of the Maoists. The State will incur large casualties without making headway. Prevent the terrorists from expanding the "liberated zones" which they have already set up by strengthening the State's presence and control in the areas where the Maoists have not yet been able to make inroads. The programme for the prevention of the expansion of the "liberated zones" should provide for physical security enhancements and a development-cum-humanitarian component to address the grievances and needs of the inhabitants. Maintenance of internal security and prompt identification and redressal of grievances should go hand in hand. Strengthen the grievances redressal machinery in the areas still under the State control.

4. Every district in the tribal belt should have two Additional Collectors. One should focus exclusively on internal security and the other exclusively on development and grievances redressal. They should work under the overall supervision of the Collector.

5.Undertake a programme for the rapid expansion of the police presence and capacity in the tribal areas still under the control of the State. Widely scattered police stations with small strengths will be counter-productive. Have a smaller number of well-located and well-connected police stations with substantial strengths and a good communications network. Issue mobile phones to all police station staff to facilitate quick communications. Connect all police stations with each other and with the District Police Headquarters through video-conferencing link-ups.

6. Prepare an urgent database of the modus operandi used by the Maoists in different incidents for setting off landmines, explosive devices and booby-traps. The Maoists are learning their modus operandi and skills not from the Internet and from Al Qaeda and other jihadi terrorist groups. They are learning them by studying the MO used by the Chinese PLA, by the Vietcong in Vietnam, by the Pathet Lao in Laos, by the White Flag Communists in Myanmar, by the Communists in Malaya and by the Maoists in the Philippines and Nepal. The jihadis' MO are urban-specific for use in urban conglomerations. The Maoists' MO are jungle-specific. They are making effective use of material available in the jungles for their booby-traps. Update this data-base after every incident and create widespread awareness of these MO in the police force. Teach the police force appropriate techniques for countering these MO.

7.The Maoists are building up their holdings of hand-held weapons through successful raids on police stations and armouries. It is a matter of serious concern that they are repeatedly able to do it. Enhance physical security in all police establishments where weapons are kept. Hold officers in charge of armouries responsible and take action against them every time the Maoists launch a successful raid for the capture of arms and ammunition.

8. Don't make an unintelligent foray into Maoists "liberated zones" and strongholds and get trapped. Think of ways of trapping the Maoists by goading them into attacking the strongholds of the State and be prepared to inflict heavy casualties on them when they do so.

9. Think of ways of preventing the flow of essential articles like rice etc into the Maoists "liberated zones" and strongholds in order to starve them.

10. Set up an Auxiliary Intelligence Corps like the Territorial Army or the Auxiliary Air Force. It should consist of part-time volunteers for intelligence collection by people in other professions who want to or are willing to help the intelligence agencies. Their links with the intelligence agencies must be protected by making the training of short duration and one-to-one instead of in a class where everyone becomes aware of the identities of others. After the training, give them mobile telephones and instruct them as to how to remain in touch with their controlling officers in guarded SMS messages using domestic codes. Pay them well---- a certain amount unrelated to their production of intelligence plus an additional amount for each piece of useful intelligence collected by them. They should be capable of operating autonomously without the need for frequent briefings by their controllers. This would be the State's answer to the sleeping cells of the insurgents.

11. Decimation operations inside the "liberated zones" should be centrally planned and implemented without the local formations taking the initiative for such operations. In this way, operational security could be better maintained. (8-4-10)

( The writer is Additional Secretary ( retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail:


zookybeans said...

Very valid points made. But where will you get the political will to carry out this action plan from? Until & unless the political bosses give the go ahead, nothing can be accomplished. Late CM Beant Singh & K P S Gill got together in 1991. CM gave the green signal to DGP Gill & militancy in Punjab was wiped out by early 1993. Something similar has to happen in all the red corridor states & the results will be for all to see. Nothing till then, sorry.

Sarang said...

Zookybeans is absolutely right! Analysts and strategists like Raman Sir may give tons of valuable advice and suggestions...but until the political will is absent no progress in eliminating the maoists will happen. Period!

Do you remember, when 9 CIA agents were killed by the Taliban in Afghanistan through suicide attack, America immediately unleashed a relentless and savage drone attack on TTP not resting untill Hakeemullah was eliminated (or atleast silenced). How impressed Raman Sir was at this display of courage and strong will on the part of the Americans. Now they know how to BOUNCE BACK!! Its been three of four days since the maoists attack. Has the UPA government even moved? NO!! It is still shaking with fear. Even the newspapers have stopped reporting on the attack. Soon the UPA government will forget and that's that.

Sorry to disappoint you Raman Sir and all viewers of this thread...if this approach of the UPA government goes on, Democratic Republic of India will cease to exist long before its 100th birthday!

China will gobble up the North East, Pakistan will slice off the North West. Both important sources of the most valuable Indian rivers. Maosists will control the mineral rich central India. Every state will act on its own and Delhi will soon lose control of the Union. Foreign governments will start making pacts and deals with state governmentas instead of the titular central government in Delhi and slowly the beautiful concept of democratic, secular, big and strong India will vanish as though it never existed. This scenario does not look so unimginable and distant when one looks at the way UPA is running the country.

rahul kumar jha said...

Nice diagnosis ......

Ram said...

Dear Mr.Raman,

There is hope for big country like India if it learns from its mistakes and works seriously on fast track program of development and upgrading lives of our tribal people and enhanced security.

Hopefully all these measures suggested by you will be implemented quickly within next few months to start with. PC and PM Singh must work as one team to achieve optimal results.The effort must be lead by experienced police officers like former Punjab DGP KPS Gill and with expertise from the Indian Army who have extensive experience in North East and J&K in such hostile terrain.

Warm Regards


Subu said...

Congress and communists are strange bedfellow... rather regular bedfellows of convenience

Similarly Communists and Maoists are strange bedfellows....regular as well

Now what political will is possible in this country ?

I read a report stating that approx 15% of the country is maoist infected... probably some one can clarify

More at
Tuesday attack rattled entire anti-Maoist operation police force. They are reluctant to enter landmine protected terrain

more on the morale of the forces at

Ram said...

Army chief says jawans killed by Maoists never learnt jungle warfare
Aloke Tikku & Rahul Singh, Hindustan Times
Email Author
New Delhi, April 09, 2010
First Published: 00:27 IST(9/4/2010)
Last Updated: 01:29 IST(9/4/2010)

1)The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) company that was slaughtered by Maoists in Dantewada on Tuesday had not undergone any intensive training at the army’s jungle warfare schools before being deployed in forests to combat the Naxals, Army chief General V K Singh said on Thursday.

2)Of the 82 security men who set out from their Chintalnar base camp, only seven returned alive, on stretchers.

Government sources said that the battalion — deployed in Chhattisgarh in March 2009 to assist the state government fight Maoists — missed out on the specialised jungle warfare training that was introduced later.

3)The army has trained nearly 39,000 security personnel in jungle warfare under a plan drawn up at Home Minister P Chidambaram’s initiative, but these men were not among them.

4)On Thursday, Chidambaram instituted an inquiry into the massacre that would map the sequence of events.

One of the terms of reference for the one-man inquiry is to assess the adequacy of training to the personnel.

Government officials, however, insist the problem of training was deeper and more serious in the absence of adequate training capacities at the central as well as state level.

For instance, the last training institute set up — by the Border Security Force for its personnel — was in 1966.

Government officials indicated the CRPF was marginally better placed but was yet to transform itself completely from a central police force into a counter-insurgency force.

5)This is one reason why the home ministry is planning to earmark dedicated units within the force to be deployed on counter-insurgency duties.

General Singh suggested there were other problems as well.

"We do not get homogeneous entities for training. The problem is a company does not come as a company and neither is it deployed as a unit," he said.

Andhra Pradesh’s Greyhounds also train their commandos in groups of 18, who are later deployed as a group.

"Everyone knows what their particular task is, whose back they have to watch and who will watch theirs. This isn’t the case with us," admitted a senior government official.

6)But excessive deployment of central forces – that should have been done by the state police – however, took a toll on their training plans.

For instance, the Punjab chief minister Prakash Singh Badal recently pushed the Centre into agreeing to pull out six companies that were on training and recuperation break to deal with the possible damage power utility employees unions who might protest the state’s power privatisation plans.

7)The deployment of National Security Guard commandos to maintain inflated egos of politicians was another example.
"Recently when the home ministry rotated the Black Cat commandos for some politicians, one of them vehemently insisted on retaining one particular set, arguing that he had trained them to take care of his farms," a senior home ministry official said.