GROUND & SEA REALITIES

B.RAMAN

I found during my recent interactions in New Delhi that our strategic thinking continues to be largely enchained to ground-based perceptions and that we are unable to reach for the skies and the seas. The skies and the seas have realities of their own distinct from ground realities. Unless we are able to perceive them in due measure and make them an integral part of our strategic thinking and planning, any exercise to modernise the national security mechanism will remain unsatisfactory.

2.Yes, there is a greater appreciation of the importance of cyber space as a new dimension of our strategic biosphere, but beyond that the thinking is largely uni-dimensional and classic. The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai have imparted a welcome tactical dimension to our seaward security vision, but there is still no strategic seaward vision.

3.My references during these interactions to the need to give a seaward dimension to our intelligence capabilities found no enthusiastic takers and thinkers.

4. The recent statements of Mr.Leon Panetta, the US Defence Secretary, during his swing across Asia covering Singapore, Vietnam, India and Afghanistan have triggered off a fascinating debate among the strategic and tactical thinkers of China. They have been taken by surprise by the US decision to reverse the thinning out of its naval presence in the Asia-Pacific region and to work for a graduated naval surge under which by 2020, 60 per cent of the US naval fleet will be around the Asia-Pacific as against 50 per cent presently.

5. It will be a mobile and not a stationery strategy and one of its important objectives will be to limit the scope available for the new activism of the Chinese Navy in the South and the East China Seas and the Indian Ocean. Euphoric Chinese perceptions of the past regarding their naval strength consequent upon the induction of a re-conditioned aircraft-carrier and missiles capable of immobilising US aircraft carriers have received a jolt. Chinese expectations that the US role in countering the Chinese designs in the South China Sea will be confined to a mix of the diplomatic and naval muscles of the US have been belied. Panetta has made it clear that China will have to reckon with the US naval muscle if it does not play the game by the rules laid down by the international community.

6. There is some confusion in Chinese strategic circles. There is a tacit admission that they have been taken by surprise and that this is because Chinese strategic thinking is largely influenced by ground and not sea realities. Despite the emergence of China as a major economic and military power, their understanding of the sea realities remains limited and inadequate.

7. This is true in the case of India too though we may not admit it as readily as the Chinese do in between the lines. Strategic thinking can never be static. It has to be constantly evolving in keeping with the times and ahead of the times.

8. Our naval strategy has not been static. It has been dynamic though one may miss the required measure of dynamism befitting an aspiring power facing a multitude of threats. It has evolved since 1994 from the focus on the waters to the East of India to cover the waters to the West too after the brunt of the threat from piracy moved from the East to the West.

9. The new US naval strategy outlined by Mr.Panetta has led to a re-think in China. Its objective is how to counter it in order to protect Chinese interests. There is a need for a quick re-think in India too, but its objective should be how to benefit from it in order to facilitate our pursuit of our national interests.

10. The proposed US emphasis on mobility and not fixed bases, more frequent joint naval exercises and bilateral naval partnerships could provide scope for India to have a parallel strategy to work in tandem with the US Navy without creating an impression of ganging up with the US Navy against China.

11. There is a need for a new naval strategy that would take into account the US plans by 2020 and our assessment of how the Chinese are likely to respond  and come out with a new naval strategy with Indian characteristics. This has to be a time-bound exercise to be undertaken by our Naval Headquarters in order to identify options available to India. (12-6-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

VIOLENCE IN RAKHINE STATE OF MYANMAR : LIKELY IMPLICATIONS

B.RAMAN

A Buddhist girl belonging to the ethnic Rakhine community was allegedly  raped and murdered by three Muslims at a village near Kyaukphyu  in the Rakhine State (old Arakan State ) of Myanmar on May 28,2012.

2. On June 3,2012, over 100 Buddhists (Rakhines) stopped a bus in Taunggote in the  Rakhine state, allegedly dragged out 10 Muslims and killed them. They suspected that these Muslims were involved in the rape and murder of the Buddhist girl. Only two of the Muslims killed were locals. The remaining eight were from Yangon (Rangoon). They were returning to Yangon after visiting a mosque in the Rakhine State on pilgrimage.

3. The same evening hundreds of Muslims  gathered outside  a police station in the capital town of Sittwe and threw stones. The Police managed to disperse them after using tear-gas and opening fire with rubber bullets.

4. The next day, Aung San Suu Kyi met representatives of the Muslim community in Yangon and urged them to remain calm and let the law take its course against the Buddhist culprits.

5. The Maungdaw  Township of the Rakhine State, where the Muslims constitute about 96 per cent of the population, saw serious incidents of anti-Government and anti-Buddhist violence on June 8 and 9. Muslims, coming out of a mosque after prayers, went on a rampage attacking a government building, a police station and some primary schools for Buddhist children. Seven Buddhists were killed and an estimated 500 houses were burnt down. The Police shifted the Buddhist residents to refugee camps. Incidents of arson were reported from Sittwe. The Police opened fire at Maungdaw and imposed a curfew. But this did not improve the situation.

6. In the meanwhile, there were reports of rival demonstrations in Yangon by small groups of local Buddhists and Muslims.

7. On the night of June 10,2012, President Thein Sein  declared a state of emergency in the State, authorising the Army to assist the civilian authorities to restore law and order.

8.In a nine-minute speech televised nationally, Thein Sein said that the violence in the Rakhine State was fanned by dissatisfaction harbored by different religious and ethnic groups, hatred and the desire for revenge.

9.He added: “I would like to call upon the people, political parties, religious leaders and the media to join hands with the government with a sense of duty, to help restore peace and stability and to prevent further escalation of violence.

10."If both sides kill each other in hatred and revenge, putting anarchy before everything, the violence is in danger of spreading outside Rakhine State.

11."I would like everyone to take special care because of the damage that could be done to the peace, stability, democratic process and development of our country during its period of transformation, if the unrest spreads," he said.

12.Buddhists constitute about 89 per cent of Myanmar’s total population and Muslims about four per cent. The remaining seven per cent consist of Christians and animists.

13.The Muslims in Myanmar are of Indian, Chinese and Bangladeshi origin. The Muslims of Indian and Chinese origin have had no problems in integrating themselves with the rest of the society. The Muslims of Bangladeshi origin, known as Rohingyas,  who speak Bengali, and who live in the Rakhine State in the areas bordering Bangladesh ( about 750,000), have not been able to integrate themselves with the local Buddhists though Muslims in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh generally have no problems in living together with Bengali Buddhists.

14.The Rohingyas have not been given full citizenship rights by successive Myanmar Governments. International human rights organisations such as the Amnesty International describe the Rohingyas as a highly persecuted ethnic and religious minority group in Myanmar. The feelings of alienation of the Rohingyas had led to violent clashes with the local Buddhists in February 2001 resulting in the  imposition of curfew.

15.The Myanmar authorities look upon the Rohingya Muslims as illegal Bengali immigrants from BD and do not treat them on par with other ethnic groups. There is a feeling among the Rohingyas that even Suu Kyi, who has been supportive of the ethnic rights of other minority groups, has not shown much empathy for the Rohingyas.

16.The Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami  of Bangladesh, normally referred to as HUJI (B), had played an active role in the jihad against the Soviet and Afghan troops in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Its members studied in the Pakistani madrasas and fought as members of different Afghan mujahideen groups, after having been trained by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The HUJI (B) also recruited a number of Rohingya Muslims from the Arakan area of Myanmar and took them to Afghanistan for fighting against the Soviet and Afghan troops.

17.If there is an aggravation of the feelings of alienation of the Rohingyas there could be a danger of its being exploited by HUJI (B) to revive its activities in the areas across the Myanmar-Bangladesh border.

18.The Rakhine State has rich oil and gas resources and has attracted many oil/gas companies from China, India and other countries. The Chinese, who have already struck gas, have undertaken the construction of an oil/gas terminal port at Kyaukphyu, gas/oil pipelines from the port to Yunnan and a railway line connecting Yunnan with the Rakhine State.

19.From the point of view of Myanmar’s economy, the Rakhine State is important and no Myanmar Government can afford instability there. The only saving grace is that the present incidents were started by the Buddhists and not by the Muslims. If the clashes continue and threaten to spread to areas outside the Rakhine State, the position of President Thein Sein, who has initiated a policy of political and economic reforms and reconciliation with Suu Kyi, may be weakened  tempting the pro-China hardline elements in the Army to stage a comeback. (11-6-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

INDIA & SCO: NEED FOR CAUTION

B.RAMAN

India, like Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, is presently an observer of the  Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), which has completed 10 years. Like Pakistan and Iran, it has sought full membership of an organisation over which China is seeking to establish its hegemony. The request for full membership was reiterated by Shri S.M.Krishna, our Minister For External Affairs, during his visit to Beijing earlier this week to represent India in the SCO summit held on June 6 and 7,2012.

2. While carefully orchestrating the further evolution of the organisation in a direction that would facilitate the pursuit of Chinese interests in Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics---particularly a greater role for China in the economic reconstruction and security modernisation of Afghanistan after the thinning-out of the US-led NATO presence post-2014—China has sought to maintain a certain lack of transparency regarding the security dimensions of the SCO.

3. While seeking to remove any impression that China is trying to develop the SCO into a NATO-like military alliance in the Afghanistan-Central Asian region to counter the US presence and interests in the region, the Chinese have been projecting it as a co-operative security mechanism to meet internal security threats to the member-countries from global and regional non-State actors.

4. Among such non-State actors targeted by them through this co-operative mechanism, they have given prominence to the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan, an Uighur separatist organisation based in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and active in the Xinjiang province of China. This mechanism also targets Al Qaeda and its associates active in this region.

5. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which are among the members of the SCO, also look upto this mechanism to help them in countering indigenous extremist elements posing a threat to their internal security. Only Russia has not so far shown any interest in seeking the help of this mechanism for dealing with the internal security problems in Chechnya.

6. While China has been trying to use the security mechanism of the SCO for dealing with organisations which are perceived as posing a threat to China and the Central Asian Republics, it does not look upon  anti-India organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), the Harkt-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which are sponsored by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), or the Afghan Taliban or the Haqqani Network, which are the allies of Pakistan, as coming within the ambit of the SCO security mechanism.

7. Because of the lack of transparency carefully maintained by China without being challenged by Russia and the Central Asian member-States of the SCO, one does not know the details of this security mechanism. All one could gather is that this mechanism covers arrangements for intelligence sharing, joint anti-terrorism exercises and plans for raising a joint rapid reaction force to deal with emergencies caused by terrorist organisations.

8.The State-owned Xinhua news agency of China reported on June 7, 2012, that the  SCO summit recommitted itself to closer security ties by adopting a 2013-15 anti-terrorism plan and establishing a swift response mechanism. It said that the  mechanism would allow SCO members to request the help of other members to handle domestic emergencies.

9.According to the Agency, President Hu Jintao told the summit that "we should establish and improve a system of security cooperation". Hu  said the SCO aimed to become a "fortress of regional security and stability and a driving force of regional economic development".

10.In an interview to Xinhua, Kazakhstan's Foreign Minister Yerzhan Kazykhanov said that the SCO members had in the past 11 years developed a legal norm and a coordination mechanism, which make it possible for them to carry out anti-terror joint military exercises and to provide security for major political or sports events in member countries. He suggested  that  the SCO should set up a police unit within the SCO framework to crack down on Internet-based crimes.

11.This year’s joint military exercise of the member-countries coinciding with the summit, titled  "Peace Mission 2012" , was held in  the "Chorukh-Dayron"  area in the  Khujand city of Tajikistan. About 2000 members of the security forces of the member-countries participated of whom 369 came from China. Beijing sent two units---one of army aviation and the other of the infantry. The army aviation unit took off from the Kashi Airport of Xinjiang  on June 5 and arrived at the exercise area by way of Kyrgyzstan  the same day. The ground troops  left Atushi in  Xinjiang  on June 3 and arrived at the exercise area on June 5 via Kyrgyzstan by road.

12.Briefing the media on the exercise on May 31,Yang Yujun, spokesman of the Chinese  Ministry of National Defense, , stated that the joint military exercises in the past had greatly enhanced the cohesion of the SCO. He added that   defense and security cooperation was one of the important cooperative programs within the SCO. Through the defense and security cooperation, the mutual trust in military security among the SCO member countries had been greatly strengthened, and their ability to jointly cope with new challenges and new threats had been significantly enhanced. The scale of the  military exercises had developed from the initial company-level tactical exercise to this year’s combat exercise of all services and arms which integrated strategic consultation, battle preparation and battle execution. The exercises location had been expanded from the border port, border area and coastal area to  strategic depth and hinterland, he added.

13.While seeking full membership of the SCO, India should carefully consider to what extent it would be advisable for it to participate in an internal security co-operation mechanism of which China and Pakistan would be members. There would be very little compatibility between our internal security concerns and interests and those of China and Pakistan and it could be counter-productive for us to participate in this mechanism. Moreover, our internal security  strategy is based on the principle that except in border areas, the police should be the weapon of first resort and the Army the weapon of last resort. The SCO mechanism operates on the principle that the Army should be the weapon of first resort with the police playing only a supportive role.

14.The internal security co-operation mechanism of the SCO is now proposed to be  extended to the area of cyber security. The main threats to our cyber security will arise from China. It will not be in our interest to participate in any connectivity and inter-operability mechanism relating to cyber security with China.

15.These issues have to be carefully examined before we decide on the extent of our participation in the SCO internal security mechanism which is now dominated by China. ( 10-6-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

ZARDARI IN CHINA: FOCUS ON SINDH

B.RAMAN

President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan was in Beijing from June 5 to 7,2012, to attend the summit of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) of which Pakistan, like India, Iran and Afghanistan, is an observer. It has sought regular membership of the SCO on which no decision has so far been taken.

2. Zardari combined his visit for the SCO summit with a bilateral visit for talks with Chinese leaders and businessmen on bilateral relations. Among the Chinese leaders he met for bilateral discussions were President Hu Jintao and Vice-President Xi Jinping.

3. The official Xinhua news agency reported that during his meeting with  Zardari on June 7, Hu said  that China encouraged and supported its enterprises to participate in energy and electric power projects in Pakistan. He hoped that the two countries would deepen pragmatic cooperation, especially in the sectors of trade, energy, transportation infrastructure construction, agriculture, telecommunications, aerospace and technology. Xinhua quoted Hu as saying: “China will continue to provide assistance for Pakistan's economic and social development within our capacity."

4.According to the Agency, Hu called on the two countries to improve law-enforcement and security cooperation, and jointly fight the "three evil forces" of terrorism, separatism and extremism.

5.Zardari thanked China for its support of Pakistan's maintenance of domestic stability and development as well as China's assistance to Pakistan when the country was affected by floods and earthquakes. He invited  Chinese enterprises to expand their investments in Pakistan, especially in infrastructure construction and the energy sector.

6.As Pakistani leaders normally do during their interactions with their Chinese counterparts, Zardari was reported to have re-affirmed continued Pakistani support to China’s core interests without specifying what those interests are. The Associated Press of Pakistan reported that during his meeting with Hu, Zardari proposed the creation of an Energy Fund to finance energy-related projects in Pakistan to be undertaken by Chinese companies.

7.During Zardari’s stay in Beijing, officials of the two countries signed three  memoranda of understanding (MoUs) covering supply of water from Tarbela to Islamabad, the establishment of a Special Economic Zone in the proposed new city Zulfikarabad in Sindh and the building there of 6,000 flats   on private public partnership basis. They also signed  an agreement for Chinese assistance in the  de-silting of canals and barrages in the Sindh province.

8.The APP reported that during his meeting with Vice-President Xi, Zardari conveyed  the gratitude of the people and the Government of Pakistan for China’s unflinching support to Pakistan’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

9.During the previous visits of Zardari to China, the focus of the discussions was on Chinese assistance to Pakistan for infrastructure development in Pakistan-occupied Gilgit-Baltistan and for the construction of oil-gas pipelines and a railway line connecting   Xinjiang with the Chinese-constructed Gwadar port on the Mekran coast of Balochistan.

10.During the present visit, the focus was on possible Chinese assistance for infrastructure and development projects in Sindh. Due to the deteriorating  security situation in Balochistan, the proposed projects to connect Gwadar with Xinjiang seem to be held up. The Chinese appear to be going ahead only with the upgradation of the Karakoram Highway across Gilgit-Baltistan and construction of roads to improve connectivity inside Gilgit-Baltistan.

11.Due to the continuing activities of the Uighur separatists in Xinjiang from sanctuaries in Pakistan’s Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the Chinese have restrained their enthusiasm for projects to improve connectivity between Xinjiang and the jihadi belt in Pakistan. ( 8-6-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )