An Open Letter To PM
Dear Mr.Prime Minister,
Casse-croute is a French word meaning a frugal bite ---generally of a baguette sandwich--- taken in between work. Nothing elaborate or ostentatious about it.
2. When you have genuine friendship with someone, you don’t feel the need to offer an elaborate sumptuous meal. You just say: “Come and have a casse-croute with me.” He or she accepts it with pleasure. A casse-croute binds friendships stronger which no State lunches or dinners can do.
3. I want to compliment you for inviting President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan to stop over in Delhi and have a casse-croute with you while on his way to Ajmer Sharif on April 8. It is a remarkable gesture with more significance than any State honour can have.
4.It is a recognition of the fact that things are changing in Pakistan---ever so slowly, but ever so surely. Like a moving glacier.
5.The negatives are still there---their obsession with Kashmir, the terrorist training camps in their territory, and an Army which continues to be suspicious of India,
6. But there are signs of emerging positives---- a small flicker of light at the end of the tunnel. There is less and less venom in their rhetoric towards India. There is a willingness to consider new options such as delinking trade from the Kashmir issue. We have had no evidence of the involvement of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in any of the post-26/11 terrorist strikes in our territory.
7. In our reservations over the continuing negatives, let us not be chary of hailing the positives. If we allow the negatives to blind our vision, we may not get another moment like this to try a new road together--- a road of greater goodwill and greater comfort.
8.As you bite your casse-croute with Mr.Zardari, please don’t look for or expect any spectacular result. Expectations of a spectacular outcome will be unwise. Look for or try for a little more goodwill, a little less venom.
9. I have been advocating for more than a year a visit by you to Pakistan without expectations. I have also been advocating a beginning of interactions between senior Army officers of the two countries so that they know each other in flesh and blood instead of through characterisations in the media or source reports. Nothing like personal interactions to dissipate misperceptions.
10. Let the New Delhi casse-croute be followed by a casse-croute between you and the Pakistani leaders in Islamabad. Propose to Mr.Zardari that the Army chiefs of the two countries should start exchanging informal visits.
11. What we need in Indo-Pakistani relations is not the big and spectacular, but the small and significant.
With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
B.Raman, Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Friday, April 6, 2012
Tuesday, April 3, 2012
MY QUICK TAKE ON SUPPOSED US BOUNTY FOR SAYEED
B.RAMAN
It is important to carefully study the language of the notices issued by the US Justice Department announcing bounties of US $ 25 million for Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of Al Qaeda, and US $ 10 million each for Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Afghan Taliban, and Prof-Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the head of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD).
2.In the case of Zawahiri and Omar, the announcement says :" Wanted Zawahiri" and "Wanted: Omar". That means the reward is for anyone who will help in locating them and assist in their capture or elimination.
3.In the case of Sayeed, the announcement says:"Wanted information leading to the arrest and conviction of Sayeed." The reward has been announced in continuation of a Red Corner Notice issued by India through the Interpol for his arrest for prosecution in connection with the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai.
4.In the case of Zawahiri and Omar, the bounty is on their head. In the case of Sayeed, the bountry is not on his head. It is for information which would facilitate his arrest and conviction in the 26/11 terrorist strikes.
5.Pakistan has been claiming that India has not been able to provide any smoking gun evidence that could warrant the arrest and prosecution of Sayeed in connection with the 26/11 strikes. The US has announced a huge reward for anyone who will provide such information.
6.The question of the US undertaking an Abbottabad style operation to kill Sayeed does not arise.For that the US President has to record a finding that Sayeed poses a serious threat to US nationals and interests and authorise the CIA to undertake any operation against him even if that would involve his death.No such finding has been recorded by the US President in the case of Sayeed.
7. One should avoid unnecessary euphoria on the US announcement. ( 3-4-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
It is important to carefully study the language of the notices issued by the US Justice Department announcing bounties of US $ 25 million for Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of Al Qaeda, and US $ 10 million each for Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Afghan Taliban, and Prof-Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the head of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD).
2.In the case of Zawahiri and Omar, the announcement says :" Wanted Zawahiri" and "Wanted: Omar". That means the reward is for anyone who will help in locating them and assist in their capture or elimination.
3.In the case of Sayeed, the announcement says:"Wanted information leading to the arrest and conviction of Sayeed." The reward has been announced in continuation of a Red Corner Notice issued by India through the Interpol for his arrest for prosecution in connection with the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai.
4.In the case of Zawahiri and Omar, the bounty is on their head. In the case of Sayeed, the bountry is not on his head. It is for information which would facilitate his arrest and conviction in the 26/11 terrorist strikes.
5.Pakistan has been claiming that India has not been able to provide any smoking gun evidence that could warrant the arrest and prosecution of Sayeed in connection with the 26/11 strikes. The US has announced a huge reward for anyone who will provide such information.
6.The question of the US undertaking an Abbottabad style operation to kill Sayeed does not arise.For that the US President has to record a finding that Sayeed poses a serious threat to US nationals and interests and authorise the CIA to undertake any operation against him even if that would involve his death.No such finding has been recorded by the US President in the case of Sayeed.
7. One should avoid unnecessary euphoria on the US announcement. ( 3-4-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, April 2, 2012
SUU KYI : WHAT NEXT? CO-OPTION OR INDEPENDENCE?
B.RAMAN
Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) has won a landslide victory in bye-elections to the Parliament. It is reported to have won at least 40 of the 45 seats for which the bye-elections were held. It had contested 44 of them. Suu Kyi herself has comfortably won the seat for which she contested.
2. Suu Kyi, her party and international observers of the election campaign and the voting process have acknowledged the fairness of the elections. The fairness was even otherwise obvious in the number of seats won by the NLD which was up to its expectations.
3. The bye-elections were caused by the resignation of those elected in last November’s elections who were nominated to the Council of Ministers as was required under the Constitution. The NLD, which had boycotted last year’s elections, decided to register itself as a political party and contest the bye-elections to these seats after the Government decided to amend certain provisions of the Constitution and regulations regarding party registration to which the NLD had objected.
4. There was a certain lack of transparency regarding the talks or negotiations between Suu Kyi and President Thein Sein that preceded the agreement which facilitated the decision of the NLD to seek registration as a political party and contest the bye-elections. It was not clear whether it was an unconditional acceptance by the Government of the demands of Suu Kyi or whether there were concessions on both sides. If so, what were they?
5.Fears that the serving officers of the Army and other former Army strongmen like Than Shwe, who had ruled the country before last year’s elections, may force a reconsideration of the concessions made by Thein Sein have been belied so far. Serving officers and former Army strongmen have not come in the way of the implementation of the political reforms initiated by Thein Sein. The fact that they did not try to influence the results of the bye-polls to the detriment of the NLD is an indicator that they have accepted the reforms initiated so far.
6. The additional fact that China and Pakistan have taken the initiative for building up contacts with Suu Kyi and her party----- President Asif Ali Zardari had officially visited Myanmar and during his stay had met her---- was also an indicator that in the Chinese and Pakistani assessments there is no opposition to the reforms from the serving officers and former Army strongmen.
7. The Myanmar Army has always been worried over the possibility of internal political instability resulting in violence and a weakening of the Army’s counter-insurgency operations against the various insurgencies of the ethnic minorities. Whenever the serving officers have apprehended such threats they have not hesitated to intervene and strengthen their hold over the State and security apparatus.
8. In Suu Kyi’s post-victory statements advising her followers to observe restraint and moderation in celebrating the bye-poll victory, one could sense an anxiety to ensure that over-exuberance in celebrating the victory doesn’t lead to law and order situations that might be exploited by those unhappy with the reforms. She has been stressing the need for reconciliation and national unity.
9.Now that Suu Kyi and her party have won a significant victory, what next in the political process? Will she and her party be satisfied with playing the role of a constructive opposition till the next general elections in 2015 without prematurely trying to play a larger political role not warranted by their limited presence in the Parliament?
10. Will the Government try to co-opt her into the system by offering her an official role that she may find it difficult to resist such as the post of the Foreign Minister or Chairperson of an important Parliamentary Committee? If such an offer is made, will she accept it thereby running the risk of creating an impression that she has been softened by the regime and has let herself be co-opted or will she choose to maintain her political independence by not accepting any role under the present Government, which is still dominated by the Army? These are important questions to which answers are not available and will not be available for some weeks till the results are officially declared and the NLD members take their seats in the Parliament.
11.From a dogged and determined opponent of the Army and the military regime, Suu Kyi has mellowed down into a pragmatic leader who understands the Army’s determination to maintain a certain political role in the form of reservation of 25 per cent of the seats in the Parliament for the Armed Forces and to ensure that the various insurgencies do not lead to a disintegration of the country.
12. She also understands the geo-political and the geo-strategic considerations that make the Army follow a policy of equi-distance and equi-proximity in relation to China and India. While she has empathy for the West---which is reciprocated by the West--- she would most probably avoid any foreign and strategic policy initiatives or demands that could create alarm in China or among the large number of pro-Beijing officers in the Army.
13. There are indications that now that the bye-polls are over, our Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh has decided to visit Myanmar for two days next month. By then, a clearer indication of the vision of Suu Kyi should be available. Suu Kyi, who grew up in India and went to college in New Delhi, has been an admirer of Indian democracy and Indian political leaders of the independence struggle. At the same time, she has had reasons to be disappointed by India’s over-cautious attitude to the struggle for democracy led by her. It would be unrealistic to expect any overflow of bonhomie for India from her. She will be friendly and correct---nothing more. ( 3-4-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) has won a landslide victory in bye-elections to the Parliament. It is reported to have won at least 40 of the 45 seats for which the bye-elections were held. It had contested 44 of them. Suu Kyi herself has comfortably won the seat for which she contested.
2. Suu Kyi, her party and international observers of the election campaign and the voting process have acknowledged the fairness of the elections. The fairness was even otherwise obvious in the number of seats won by the NLD which was up to its expectations.
3. The bye-elections were caused by the resignation of those elected in last November’s elections who were nominated to the Council of Ministers as was required under the Constitution. The NLD, which had boycotted last year’s elections, decided to register itself as a political party and contest the bye-elections to these seats after the Government decided to amend certain provisions of the Constitution and regulations regarding party registration to which the NLD had objected.
4. There was a certain lack of transparency regarding the talks or negotiations between Suu Kyi and President Thein Sein that preceded the agreement which facilitated the decision of the NLD to seek registration as a political party and contest the bye-elections. It was not clear whether it was an unconditional acceptance by the Government of the demands of Suu Kyi or whether there were concessions on both sides. If so, what were they?
5.Fears that the serving officers of the Army and other former Army strongmen like Than Shwe, who had ruled the country before last year’s elections, may force a reconsideration of the concessions made by Thein Sein have been belied so far. Serving officers and former Army strongmen have not come in the way of the implementation of the political reforms initiated by Thein Sein. The fact that they did not try to influence the results of the bye-polls to the detriment of the NLD is an indicator that they have accepted the reforms initiated so far.
6. The additional fact that China and Pakistan have taken the initiative for building up contacts with Suu Kyi and her party----- President Asif Ali Zardari had officially visited Myanmar and during his stay had met her---- was also an indicator that in the Chinese and Pakistani assessments there is no opposition to the reforms from the serving officers and former Army strongmen.
7. The Myanmar Army has always been worried over the possibility of internal political instability resulting in violence and a weakening of the Army’s counter-insurgency operations against the various insurgencies of the ethnic minorities. Whenever the serving officers have apprehended such threats they have not hesitated to intervene and strengthen their hold over the State and security apparatus.
8. In Suu Kyi’s post-victory statements advising her followers to observe restraint and moderation in celebrating the bye-poll victory, one could sense an anxiety to ensure that over-exuberance in celebrating the victory doesn’t lead to law and order situations that might be exploited by those unhappy with the reforms. She has been stressing the need for reconciliation and national unity.
9.Now that Suu Kyi and her party have won a significant victory, what next in the political process? Will she and her party be satisfied with playing the role of a constructive opposition till the next general elections in 2015 without prematurely trying to play a larger political role not warranted by their limited presence in the Parliament?
10. Will the Government try to co-opt her into the system by offering her an official role that she may find it difficult to resist such as the post of the Foreign Minister or Chairperson of an important Parliamentary Committee? If such an offer is made, will she accept it thereby running the risk of creating an impression that she has been softened by the regime and has let herself be co-opted or will she choose to maintain her political independence by not accepting any role under the present Government, which is still dominated by the Army? These are important questions to which answers are not available and will not be available for some weeks till the results are officially declared and the NLD members take their seats in the Parliament.
11.From a dogged and determined opponent of the Army and the military regime, Suu Kyi has mellowed down into a pragmatic leader who understands the Army’s determination to maintain a certain political role in the form of reservation of 25 per cent of the seats in the Parliament for the Armed Forces and to ensure that the various insurgencies do not lead to a disintegration of the country.
12. She also understands the geo-political and the geo-strategic considerations that make the Army follow a policy of equi-distance and equi-proximity in relation to China and India. While she has empathy for the West---which is reciprocated by the West--- she would most probably avoid any foreign and strategic policy initiatives or demands that could create alarm in China or among the large number of pro-Beijing officers in the Army.
13. There are indications that now that the bye-polls are over, our Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh has decided to visit Myanmar for two days next month. By then, a clearer indication of the vision of Suu Kyi should be available. Suu Kyi, who grew up in India and went to college in New Delhi, has been an admirer of Indian democracy and Indian political leaders of the independence struggle. At the same time, she has had reasons to be disappointed by India’s over-cautious attitude to the struggle for democracy led by her. It would be unrealistic to expect any overflow of bonhomie for India from her. She will be friendly and correct---nothing more. ( 3-4-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, April 1, 2012
PM WANTS TO ENCOURAGE WHAT HE HOPES IS BEGINNING OF CHANGE OF PAK MINDSET
B.RAMAN
The Prime Minister, Dr.Manmohan Singh, is keen to encourage what he hopes is the beginning of a change of the Pakistani mindset towards India----- at least in the political class if not in the Army. That is the message behind his decision to transform the planned religious pilgrimage of President Asif Ali Zardari to Ajmer into a soft political visit to add to the improving ambiance in bilateral relations.
2.According to present indications, President Zardari is expected to arrive by air in Delhi on April 8, have an early lunch with the PM, visit Ajmer and fly back to Islamabad from there. The programme is still tentative. There is unlikely to be any joint statement at the end of the lunch. It has not yet been decided whether there should be a joint interaction with the media.
3.Protocol demands that an important State personality should receive Mr.Zardari on his arrival at Ajmer, accompany him to the Ajmer Sharif and see him off. It has not yet been decided whether this would be done by the Governor of Rajasthan or somebody from Delhi should go to Ajmer.
4. The visit will reflect the improving comfort level between the leaderships of the two countries as noticed during the brief interactions between Dr.Manmohan Singh and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani of Pakistan in the margins of the recent nuclear security summit in Seoul.
5.The Government of India has noted with interest the benign rhetoric in recent references of the Pakistani leadership towards India and the initiative taken by the Gilani Government for breaking the issue of bilateral trade relations with India from being a hostage to the Kashmir issue.
6. More significantly, there has been no evidence of any involvement of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in any of the jihadi terrorist strikes that have taken place in different cities of India since the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. It is too early to assess whether there would be any change in the ISI’s proxy war against India under its new chief Lt.Gen.Zahir-ul-Islam.
7. While reacting positively to Mr.Zardari’s planned pilgrimage to Ajmer, one has to note with concern indications of a further strengthening of Pakistan’s relations with China as seen during the current visit of Mr.Gilani to China to attend a regional security forum.
8. The Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) has reported that Gilani and the Chinese Vice-Premier Li Keqiang, who met on April 1 agreed to stand with each other “in all circumstances” and vowed to uphold their sovereignty and territorial integrity at all costs. Gilani was reported to have told the Chinese leader: “China’s friend is our friend and China’s enemy is our enemy.” The APP quoted the Chinese Vice-Premier as saying that China would also support Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in all situations. “No matter what changes take place at international level, we will uphold Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” he reportedly said. ( 2-4-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The Prime Minister, Dr.Manmohan Singh, is keen to encourage what he hopes is the beginning of a change of the Pakistani mindset towards India----- at least in the political class if not in the Army. That is the message behind his decision to transform the planned religious pilgrimage of President Asif Ali Zardari to Ajmer into a soft political visit to add to the improving ambiance in bilateral relations.
2.According to present indications, President Zardari is expected to arrive by air in Delhi on April 8, have an early lunch with the PM, visit Ajmer and fly back to Islamabad from there. The programme is still tentative. There is unlikely to be any joint statement at the end of the lunch. It has not yet been decided whether there should be a joint interaction with the media.
3.Protocol demands that an important State personality should receive Mr.Zardari on his arrival at Ajmer, accompany him to the Ajmer Sharif and see him off. It has not yet been decided whether this would be done by the Governor of Rajasthan or somebody from Delhi should go to Ajmer.
4. The visit will reflect the improving comfort level between the leaderships of the two countries as noticed during the brief interactions between Dr.Manmohan Singh and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani of Pakistan in the margins of the recent nuclear security summit in Seoul.
5.The Government of India has noted with interest the benign rhetoric in recent references of the Pakistani leadership towards India and the initiative taken by the Gilani Government for breaking the issue of bilateral trade relations with India from being a hostage to the Kashmir issue.
6. More significantly, there has been no evidence of any involvement of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in any of the jihadi terrorist strikes that have taken place in different cities of India since the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. It is too early to assess whether there would be any change in the ISI’s proxy war against India under its new chief Lt.Gen.Zahir-ul-Islam.
7. While reacting positively to Mr.Zardari’s planned pilgrimage to Ajmer, one has to note with concern indications of a further strengthening of Pakistan’s relations with China as seen during the current visit of Mr.Gilani to China to attend a regional security forum.
8. The Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) has reported that Gilani and the Chinese Vice-Premier Li Keqiang, who met on April 1 agreed to stand with each other “in all circumstances” and vowed to uphold their sovereignty and territorial integrity at all costs. Gilani was reported to have told the Chinese leader: “China’s friend is our friend and China’s enemy is our enemy.” The APP quoted the Chinese Vice-Premier as saying that China would also support Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in all situations. “No matter what changes take place at international level, we will uphold Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” he reportedly said. ( 2-4-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, March 31, 2012
HAS TIME COME FOR A STRONG DA NOTICE SYSTEM IN INDIA?
B.RAMAN
The current controversy relating to Gen.V.K.Singh, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), has led to some worrisome aspects in the media coverage of the controversy. The likely impact on national security has not been kept in view not only by some sections of the media, but even by some retired public servants who have been commenting on the controversy in TV debates.
2. Some sections of the media and some individual journalists as well as some public servants, who have held senior positions in the Government, have crossed the Laxman Rekha in their reporting and panel comments.
3. The Government has also been a passive spectator of the way the controversy has crossed one Laxman Rekha after another. It is generally the tradition in other countries that when a sensitive document indicating deficiencies in defence preparedness leaks out, the Governments deny in public their authenticity, but enquire into the leakage in secret.
4. When the contents of the COAS’ letter of March 12, 2012, on the defence preparedness leaked out, the immediate reflex of a clued-up Government would have been to deny its authenticity in public and order a secret enquiry.
5. Instead, many responsible members of the Government including the Defence Minister and the COAS have made public comments tending to corroborate its authenticity, thereby providing official confirmation to our adversaries that the serious deficiencies mentioned in the letter are correct.
6. In the UK whenever serious controversies and leakages likely to affect National Security break out, the Defence Ministry immediately moves and issues what is called a Defence Advisory (DA) notice requesting the media, the journos and others to exercise restraint in reporting and commenting so that national security is not damaged.
7. The DA Notices cannot be legally enforced. Whoever doesn’t observe them does not commit any offence. But it is a strong reminder to all concerned of their ethical responsibility in the matter. Fears that they may fall foul of the public by not paying heed to the DA notices act as a check on the journos and others.
8. There are certain standing DA notices which are of a permanent nature. Some others are issued from time to time whenever a controversy breaks out.
9. The standing DA Notices relate to the following:
DA-Notice 01: Military Operations, Plans & Capabilities
DA-Notice 02: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapons and Equipment
DA-Notice 03: Ciphers and Secure Communications
DA-Notice 04: Sensitive Installations and Home Addresses
DA-Notice 05: United Kingdom Security & Intelligence Special Services.
10. In recent years, DA Notices have also been issued relating to terrorism and documents leaked by Wikileaks.
11. The time has come for the Government to institute a DA Notice system in India. Australia follows a similar practice. ( 1-4-12 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The current controversy relating to Gen.V.K.Singh, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), has led to some worrisome aspects in the media coverage of the controversy. The likely impact on national security has not been kept in view not only by some sections of the media, but even by some retired public servants who have been commenting on the controversy in TV debates.
2. Some sections of the media and some individual journalists as well as some public servants, who have held senior positions in the Government, have crossed the Laxman Rekha in their reporting and panel comments.
3. The Government has also been a passive spectator of the way the controversy has crossed one Laxman Rekha after another. It is generally the tradition in other countries that when a sensitive document indicating deficiencies in defence preparedness leaks out, the Governments deny in public their authenticity, but enquire into the leakage in secret.
4. When the contents of the COAS’ letter of March 12, 2012, on the defence preparedness leaked out, the immediate reflex of a clued-up Government would have been to deny its authenticity in public and order a secret enquiry.
5. Instead, many responsible members of the Government including the Defence Minister and the COAS have made public comments tending to corroborate its authenticity, thereby providing official confirmation to our adversaries that the serious deficiencies mentioned in the letter are correct.
6. In the UK whenever serious controversies and leakages likely to affect National Security break out, the Defence Ministry immediately moves and issues what is called a Defence Advisory (DA) notice requesting the media, the journos and others to exercise restraint in reporting and commenting so that national security is not damaged.
7. The DA Notices cannot be legally enforced. Whoever doesn’t observe them does not commit any offence. But it is a strong reminder to all concerned of their ethical responsibility in the matter. Fears that they may fall foul of the public by not paying heed to the DA notices act as a check on the journos and others.
8. There are certain standing DA notices which are of a permanent nature. Some others are issued from time to time whenever a controversy breaks out.
9. The standing DA Notices relate to the following:
DA-Notice 01: Military Operations, Plans & Capabilities
DA-Notice 02: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapons and Equipment
DA-Notice 03: Ciphers and Secure Communications
DA-Notice 04: Sensitive Installations and Home Addresses
DA-Notice 05: United Kingdom Security & Intelligence Special Services.
10. In recent years, DA Notices have also been issued relating to terrorism and documents leaked by Wikileaks.
11. The time has come for the Government to institute a DA Notice system in India. Australia follows a similar practice. ( 1-4-12 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, March 30, 2012
ACTION TO REASSURE THE ARMED FORCES & THE PUBLIC
An Open Letter To The PM
Dear Mr.Prime Minister,
The Government needs to be complimented for maintaining its cool and dignity in the face of some of the recent ill-advised actions and public comments of Gen.V.K.Singh, the outgoing Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), who will be retiring on May 31,2012. Any hasty action against him or slanging match with him will lower the dignity of the office of the COAS. National interest demands that this dignity of this high office must be maintained in the eyes of the officers and jawans of the Army as well as the public. An Army marches and fights on its pride in itself, in its officers and in its chief and this pride should not be damaged.
2. Whatever be his ill-advised actions and comments, Gen.Singh enjoys a high reputation for his personal integrity and his professionalism. These positive qualities of his have to be recognised and respected. In the Government’s feelings of hurt over his ill-advised actions and public comments, his record as an officer in leading his men and serving the country should not be forgotten.
3. Certain worrisome issues have come to the fore during this controversy. These relate to the slowing down of the procurement process in the Armed Services as a whole which seems to have had an impact on the arms and ammunition and other equipment holdings of the Army and the casual and non-serious manner in which allegations of corruption are handled both in the Army Headquarters and the Defence Ministry. There have been serious sins of commission and omission in both and by both, which have at least partly contributed to the present controversy.
4.Not only members of the public, but also the soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces in their barracks and cantonments would be discussing and analysing the merits of some of the issues raised by the COAS, the validity of which cannot and should not be questioned. These issues have to be addressed seriously and the public and the Armed Forces convinced that the Government has not been and will not be indifferent to the serious and worrisome issues projected by the COAS----whatever might have been his motive in projecting them from the roof top instead of across the table within the confines of the offices of the South Block.
5.The Government should immediately initiate action to address the deficiencies in the state of our defence preparedness pointed out by the COAS. The action has to be two-fold--- immediate procurement on an emergency basis of the various items mentioned by the COAS in his letter of March 12 to you and short and medium term measures for removing the bottler-necks and speed-breakers that seem to have crept into our procurement process during the last 10 years.
6. I would strongly recommend the appointment of an Eminent Chiefs Group of the Armed Forces consisting of one past chief each of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy headed by the nominee of the Army to go into the contents of the COAS letter of March 12 and recommend a time-bound plan of action.
7. While it is important to establish how the contents of the letter leaked to the media and initiate disciplinary action against the person found responsible for the serious breach of security, the Government should not allow its anger and discomfiture over the leak to divert its attention from the need to address immediately the worrisome state of affairs pointed out by the COAS.
8. Another issue calling for action is to go into the procedure adopted by the Armed Forces Headquarters and the Defence Ministry for dealing with complaints of corruption so that the public and the three forces are reassured that there is no attempt to cover them up . This enquiry could be entrusted to an eminent retired Judge of the Supreme Court. He could go into various issues such as the role of the Central Vigilance Commissioner in checking corruption in the Armed Forces and the Defence Ministry, the existing vigilance mechanism in them and the trigger mechanism by which action is triggered when there is a complaint. While it is important to weed out corruption, it is equally important to ensure that motivated allegations and suspicions planted with an ulterior motive do not slow down the procurement process to the detriment of the Armed Forces.
9. During the course of the public debate on the sequel to L’Affaire COAS certain lingering issues from the past have also been raised---such as the non-implementation of the recommendations of the Arun Singh Task Force regarding the reorganisation and modernisation of defence management and an alleged disuse of the past practice of the Prime Minister personally interacting with the three chiefs on various issues relating to the three services and the state of our defence preparedness.
10. Shri Arun Singh is a highly regarded expert on matters relating to the modernisation of defence management and enjoys tremendous respect in the Armed Forces as well as among the civilian bureaucracy. I would suggest that he should be requested to go into this aspect once again and suggest remedial measures. It is important for the Prime Minister to take the initiative for periodically interacting with the three service chiefs.
11. Many countries including Japan and China have the practice of periodically issuing a White Paper on Defence to create greater transparency about defence matters. This is a practice which is worthy of emulation by us. The Government should quickly come out with a White Paper on the various measures already taken or proposed to be taken for the modernisation of the Armed Forces and the defence management.
12. I know personally that some of the allegations being made projecting the civilian bureaucracy as the villain of the piece in the tardy implementation of the recommendations of the Arun Singh Task Force are due to misperceptions for want of transparency and accurate information. The well-informed among us know that the non-implementation of some of the recommendations was not due to any stonewalling by the civilian bureaucracy, but because of a lack of consensus on the follow-up action among the three services.
13. A White Paper and a debate on it in the Parliament and outside would go some way in removing these misperceptions.
With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
B.Raman,
Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India.
Dr.Manmohan Singh,
Prime Minister,
New Delhi.
Dear Mr.Prime Minister,
The Government needs to be complimented for maintaining its cool and dignity in the face of some of the recent ill-advised actions and public comments of Gen.V.K.Singh, the outgoing Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), who will be retiring on May 31,2012. Any hasty action against him or slanging match with him will lower the dignity of the office of the COAS. National interest demands that this dignity of this high office must be maintained in the eyes of the officers and jawans of the Army as well as the public. An Army marches and fights on its pride in itself, in its officers and in its chief and this pride should not be damaged.
2. Whatever be his ill-advised actions and comments, Gen.Singh enjoys a high reputation for his personal integrity and his professionalism. These positive qualities of his have to be recognised and respected. In the Government’s feelings of hurt over his ill-advised actions and public comments, his record as an officer in leading his men and serving the country should not be forgotten.
3. Certain worrisome issues have come to the fore during this controversy. These relate to the slowing down of the procurement process in the Armed Services as a whole which seems to have had an impact on the arms and ammunition and other equipment holdings of the Army and the casual and non-serious manner in which allegations of corruption are handled both in the Army Headquarters and the Defence Ministry. There have been serious sins of commission and omission in both and by both, which have at least partly contributed to the present controversy.
4.Not only members of the public, but also the soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces in their barracks and cantonments would be discussing and analysing the merits of some of the issues raised by the COAS, the validity of which cannot and should not be questioned. These issues have to be addressed seriously and the public and the Armed Forces convinced that the Government has not been and will not be indifferent to the serious and worrisome issues projected by the COAS----whatever might have been his motive in projecting them from the roof top instead of across the table within the confines of the offices of the South Block.
5.The Government should immediately initiate action to address the deficiencies in the state of our defence preparedness pointed out by the COAS. The action has to be two-fold--- immediate procurement on an emergency basis of the various items mentioned by the COAS in his letter of March 12 to you and short and medium term measures for removing the bottler-necks and speed-breakers that seem to have crept into our procurement process during the last 10 years.
6. I would strongly recommend the appointment of an Eminent Chiefs Group of the Armed Forces consisting of one past chief each of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy headed by the nominee of the Army to go into the contents of the COAS letter of March 12 and recommend a time-bound plan of action.
7. While it is important to establish how the contents of the letter leaked to the media and initiate disciplinary action against the person found responsible for the serious breach of security, the Government should not allow its anger and discomfiture over the leak to divert its attention from the need to address immediately the worrisome state of affairs pointed out by the COAS.
8. Another issue calling for action is to go into the procedure adopted by the Armed Forces Headquarters and the Defence Ministry for dealing with complaints of corruption so that the public and the three forces are reassured that there is no attempt to cover them up . This enquiry could be entrusted to an eminent retired Judge of the Supreme Court. He could go into various issues such as the role of the Central Vigilance Commissioner in checking corruption in the Armed Forces and the Defence Ministry, the existing vigilance mechanism in them and the trigger mechanism by which action is triggered when there is a complaint. While it is important to weed out corruption, it is equally important to ensure that motivated allegations and suspicions planted with an ulterior motive do not slow down the procurement process to the detriment of the Armed Forces.
9. During the course of the public debate on the sequel to L’Affaire COAS certain lingering issues from the past have also been raised---such as the non-implementation of the recommendations of the Arun Singh Task Force regarding the reorganisation and modernisation of defence management and an alleged disuse of the past practice of the Prime Minister personally interacting with the three chiefs on various issues relating to the three services and the state of our defence preparedness.
10. Shri Arun Singh is a highly regarded expert on matters relating to the modernisation of defence management and enjoys tremendous respect in the Armed Forces as well as among the civilian bureaucracy. I would suggest that he should be requested to go into this aspect once again and suggest remedial measures. It is important for the Prime Minister to take the initiative for periodically interacting with the three service chiefs.
11. Many countries including Japan and China have the practice of periodically issuing a White Paper on Defence to create greater transparency about defence matters. This is a practice which is worthy of emulation by us. The Government should quickly come out with a White Paper on the various measures already taken or proposed to be taken for the modernisation of the Armed Forces and the defence management.
12. I know personally that some of the allegations being made projecting the civilian bureaucracy as the villain of the piece in the tardy implementation of the recommendations of the Arun Singh Task Force are due to misperceptions for want of transparency and accurate information. The well-informed among us know that the non-implementation of some of the recommendations was not due to any stonewalling by the civilian bureaucracy, but because of a lack of consensus on the follow-up action among the three services.
13. A White Paper and a debate on it in the Parliament and outside would go some way in removing these misperceptions.
With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
B.Raman,
Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India.
Dr.Manmohan Singh,
Prime Minister,
New Delhi.
Tuesday, March 27, 2012
FROM AN ISLAMIC BOMB TO A JIHADI BOMB
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.745
B.RAMAN
The second Nuclear Security Summit currently being held in Seoul, South Korea, would make a fresh evaluation , inter alia, of the security of nuclear materials in the possession of many countries.
2. Threats to nuclear security arise from two factors--- accidents in nuclear establishments arising from natural or man-made causes and illegal acquisitions of nuclear materials and technology by State as well as non-State actors.
3. While there is a laid down and frequently tested drill for coping with nuclear accidents, preventive and protective measures to prevent the illegal acquisition of nuclear materials and know-how by State and non-State actors have not been satisfactory.
4.While Pakistan and North Korea are two instances of State actors illegally acquiring nuclear capability, Iran is threatening to join their ranks as a result of past complicity of Pakistan and North Korea.
5. Fears of non-State actors clandestinely acquiring nuclear materials and technology acquired a new dimension in the late 1990s after the famous interviews given by Osama bin Laden to US journalists from Kandahar, where he was then based, justifying the right of Muslims to acquire a nuclear weapon and to use it, if necessary, to protect Islam.
6. Since then fears of Pakistan‘s Islamic bomb, as it is referred to by Pakistani Islamic fundamentalist organisations, being transformed into a jihadi bomb in the hands of Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been preoccupying the minds of nuclear security experts. These fears were aggravated after the US troops which defeated the Taliban after 9/11 unearthed evidence to show that Sultan Bashiruddin and Abdul Majid, two retired nuclear scientists of Pakistan, were in touch with OBL and had visited him in Kandahar. The two were arrested by the Pakistanis and interrogated by the Americans.
7. The interrogation did not unearth any incriminating evidence against them. Despite this, the fact that two Pakistani nuclear scientists, who had occupied important positions in its nuclear establishments, were in contact with OBL, showed that jihadi and other terrorist organisations might be able acquire a nuclear capability not only through theft or other illegal means, but also by the complicity of the personnel of Pakistan’s nuclear establishments. This fear would now extend to the personnel of Iran’s nuclear establishments. In the case of North Korea, the dangers of non-State actors getting hold of its capability are not rated high.
8.The death of OBL on May 2 last year has not removed or diluted the threat of jihadi terrorist organisations acquiring a nuclear capability. True, there has been no statement from Al Qaeda or its associates or their leaders after the initial statements of OBL in the 1990s, about the right of the Muslims to acquire a nuclear capability.
9. The absence of statements on this subject by jihadi leaders and their organisations cannot and should not be interpreted as indicating that these organisations and their present leaders did not attach the same priority to this jihadi task as OBL did.
10. Al Qaeda has definitely suffered a set-back as a result of the death of OBL and other leaders in the Af-Pak region and Yemen due to special operations undertaken by the US. Despite the decimation of its leadership, its GenNext continues to show a high level of motivation as was seen by the recent terrorist incidents in France. There has been a geographic spread of its activities.
11. The threat from Al Qaeda and its affiliates and the dangers of their acquiring a nuclear capability have to be factored into in any security planning for nuclear establishments and personnel. The discussions in conferences such as the first Nuclear Security Summit in Washington and the present one in Seoul focus on physical security measures to prevent acquisitions through thefts and other illegal means.
12. With countries such as Pakistan participating in their deliberations, it would not be possible for them to have any meaningful discussions to prevent acquisition of nuclear capability by terrorist organisations through the complicity of personnel in nuclear establishments. This is a matter that has to be discussed in more restricted meetings of experts of intelligence agencies from India, the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Russia and the EU countries. This would require a high level of HUMINT and TECHINT capability, joint operations to collect intelligence and arrangements for sharing and analysing the collected intelligence. India should take the leadership in working for such a mechanism if it has not already done so. (27-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
B.RAMAN
The second Nuclear Security Summit currently being held in Seoul, South Korea, would make a fresh evaluation , inter alia, of the security of nuclear materials in the possession of many countries.
2. Threats to nuclear security arise from two factors--- accidents in nuclear establishments arising from natural or man-made causes and illegal acquisitions of nuclear materials and technology by State as well as non-State actors.
3. While there is a laid down and frequently tested drill for coping with nuclear accidents, preventive and protective measures to prevent the illegal acquisition of nuclear materials and know-how by State and non-State actors have not been satisfactory.
4.While Pakistan and North Korea are two instances of State actors illegally acquiring nuclear capability, Iran is threatening to join their ranks as a result of past complicity of Pakistan and North Korea.
5. Fears of non-State actors clandestinely acquiring nuclear materials and technology acquired a new dimension in the late 1990s after the famous interviews given by Osama bin Laden to US journalists from Kandahar, where he was then based, justifying the right of Muslims to acquire a nuclear weapon and to use it, if necessary, to protect Islam.
6. Since then fears of Pakistan‘s Islamic bomb, as it is referred to by Pakistani Islamic fundamentalist organisations, being transformed into a jihadi bomb in the hands of Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been preoccupying the minds of nuclear security experts. These fears were aggravated after the US troops which defeated the Taliban after 9/11 unearthed evidence to show that Sultan Bashiruddin and Abdul Majid, two retired nuclear scientists of Pakistan, were in touch with OBL and had visited him in Kandahar. The two were arrested by the Pakistanis and interrogated by the Americans.
7. The interrogation did not unearth any incriminating evidence against them. Despite this, the fact that two Pakistani nuclear scientists, who had occupied important positions in its nuclear establishments, were in contact with OBL, showed that jihadi and other terrorist organisations might be able acquire a nuclear capability not only through theft or other illegal means, but also by the complicity of the personnel of Pakistan’s nuclear establishments. This fear would now extend to the personnel of Iran’s nuclear establishments. In the case of North Korea, the dangers of non-State actors getting hold of its capability are not rated high.
8.The death of OBL on May 2 last year has not removed or diluted the threat of jihadi terrorist organisations acquiring a nuclear capability. True, there has been no statement from Al Qaeda or its associates or their leaders after the initial statements of OBL in the 1990s, about the right of the Muslims to acquire a nuclear capability.
9. The absence of statements on this subject by jihadi leaders and their organisations cannot and should not be interpreted as indicating that these organisations and their present leaders did not attach the same priority to this jihadi task as OBL did.
10. Al Qaeda has definitely suffered a set-back as a result of the death of OBL and other leaders in the Af-Pak region and Yemen due to special operations undertaken by the US. Despite the decimation of its leadership, its GenNext continues to show a high level of motivation as was seen by the recent terrorist incidents in France. There has been a geographic spread of its activities.
11. The threat from Al Qaeda and its affiliates and the dangers of their acquiring a nuclear capability have to be factored into in any security planning for nuclear establishments and personnel. The discussions in conferences such as the first Nuclear Security Summit in Washington and the present one in Seoul focus on physical security measures to prevent acquisitions through thefts and other illegal means.
12. With countries such as Pakistan participating in their deliberations, it would not be possible for them to have any meaningful discussions to prevent acquisition of nuclear capability by terrorist organisations through the complicity of personnel in nuclear establishments. This is a matter that has to be discussed in more restricted meetings of experts of intelligence agencies from India, the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Russia and the EU countries. This would require a high level of HUMINT and TECHINT capability, joint operations to collect intelligence and arrangements for sharing and analysing the collected intelligence. India should take the leadership in working for such a mechanism if it has not already done so. (27-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
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