B.RAMAN
The tussle between Shri Narendra Modi, the Chief Minister of Gujarat, and Shri Sanjiv Bhatt, an Indian Police Service Officer of the Gujarat cadre presently posted in Junagadh, is becoming murkIer and murkier---not reflecting well on either Modi or Bhatt.
2. The tussle has given rise to suspicions of petty-mindedness and vindictiveness on the part of Modi and a motivated unprofessional agenda on the part of Bhatt.
3. The present tussle started with an affidavit reportedly filed by Bhatt before the Supreme Court, alleging that Modi had instructed officers during a late night meeting held on February 27, 2002, to allow Hindus "to vent out their anger" during the clashes as he wanted Muslims to be "taught a lesson" after the massacre of some Hindu pilgrims by some Muslims at the Godhra railway station. There is nothing new about these allegations. Such allegations had repeatedly been made by the detractors of Modi from time to time since 2002 without their being able to prove them. Nor has Modi been able to disprove them in a convincing manner.
4.The only way of convincingly disproving them is by producing the minutes of the meeting held on February 27,2002, and the Roznamcha (General Diary) entries of the relevant police stations after the reported meeting of Modi.If the allegations against Modi are correct, this would be reflected in the lack of any reference in the Roznamchas to additional police deployments. If the allegations against Modi are wrong, such additional deployments would be reflected in the Roznamcha entries. The silence of the Gujarat Government all these years regarding entries in relevant records would give ground for suspicion that for some hours after the Godhra incident no written records were kept, particularly of the meeting reportedly held by Modi.
5.Bhatt's motive comes under suspicion for two reasons. Firstly, his belated action in coming out with these allegations. Secondly, the questions that have been raised regarding the correctness of his claim that he was present at Modi's meeting whereas some participants have reportedly denied it. Bhatt and his supporters have produced a statement of Bhatt's driver to show that Bhatt did attend the meeting, According to the driver, Bhatt travelled to the meeting in the car of a colleague and the driver drove Bhatt's car behind them. If this is so, this should have been reflected in the duty register of Bhatt's car. If there is an entry in the duty register of Bhatt's car, Bhatt is probably right and Modi's supporters are telling a lie. If there is no entry, Modi's supporters are probably right and Bhatt is telling a lie. Why has the Gujarat Government not released so far the relevant entries in the duty register of Bhatt's car ?
6. The tussle has been made more complicated by Bhatt's allegation that his security cover has been withdrawn after he filed his affidavit. This has been denied by the office of the Director-General of Police, according to which Bhatt's security entitlement has been reduced, but not withdrawn. Bhatt had been given a security entitlement of five security personnel of which four have been withdrawn.
7.The relevant question is when were they withdrawn. If they had been withdrawn before Bhatt filed his affidavit, Bhatt's complaint has no basis, If they had been withdrawn after he filed his affidavit, a strong presumption will be that there was a link between his filing his affidavit and a re-examination of the threat perception resulting in a dilution of the security provided to him.This would smack of petty-mindedness and vindictiveness towards Bhatt because of the affidavit.
8. A large number of Tweets recveived by me have claimed that this was purely a professional decision taken in the police department and that it will, therefore, be incorrect to blame Modi for it. Bhatt's case is unique----whatever be his motives in filing the affidavit. He had made serious allegations against Modi. If Modi was sensitive enough, he would have ensured that nothing was done either by his office or by the DGP's office which could be misconstrued as vindictiveness. By failing to act till now, Modi has strengthened the impression that there is more than meets the eye in the dilution of the security provided to Bhatt.
9. In recent months, Modi has been trying to project a positive image of himself as a good and progressive Chief Minister---with some success. The way Bhatt's case has been handled---it is immaterial whether it was done by his office or by the DGP's office--- would provide credibility to those who have not been convinced of the genuiness of this positive image and have been arguing that it is the same old vindictive Modi who has been ruling Gujarat.
10. The shadow of his alleged post-Godhra vindictive reflexes continues to follow Modi wherever he goes and whatever he does.He may not be able to shake off this shadow unless he comes out with a white paper giving details of all actions taken by him and the police after the Godhra massacre, supported by relevant records of his office and the police. (30-4-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, April 29, 2011
GOVT. OF INDIA'S REPORTED REJECTION OF A US AIRCRAFT FOR ITS AIR FORCE
The following is in reply to a reader's question received by E-Mail on the above subject:
I think the Government's decision on the choice of the aircraft was made purely on the basis of the recommendation of the Air Force. I write so much that I don't remember when and in what context, but I had written some months ago that while our Army and our Navy are increasingly enthusiastic about the prospects of closer Army-Army and Navy-Navy relationship with the US, our Air Force is not. During my participation in various seminars bearing on Indo-US strategic relations, I had noticed that the participation of our Air Force officers---serving and retired--- was low and without much enthusiasm. It is my impression that our Air Force officers continue to retain the skepticism of the cold war days relating to strategic partnership with the US. They continue to feel more comfortable with Russia and Europe than with the US. Of course, there are many joint exercises between the Air Forces of the two countries, but the enthusiasm generated by these exercises is more tactical than strategic. The decision regarding the choice of the aircraft reflects on the comfort level of our Air Force vis-a-vis the US and not on the comfort level of the Government as a whole. (29-4-11)
I think the Government's decision on the choice of the aircraft was made purely on the basis of the recommendation of the Air Force. I write so much that I don't remember when and in what context, but I had written some months ago that while our Army and our Navy are increasingly enthusiastic about the prospects of closer Army-Army and Navy-Navy relationship with the US, our Air Force is not. During my participation in various seminars bearing on Indo-US strategic relations, I had noticed that the participation of our Air Force officers---serving and retired--- was low and without much enthusiasm. It is my impression that our Air Force officers continue to retain the skepticism of the cold war days relating to strategic partnership with the US. They continue to feel more comfortable with Russia and Europe than with the US. Of course, there are many joint exercises between the Air Forces of the two countries, but the enthusiasm generated by these exercises is more tactical than strategic. The decision regarding the choice of the aircraft reflects on the comfort level of our Air Force vis-a-vis the US and not on the comfort level of the Government as a whole. (29-4-11)
Thursday, April 28, 2011
INDIAN MEDIA: A CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE
B.RAMAN
The initial draft of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the Parliament, chaired by Dr.Murali Manohar Joshi, on the 2G scam and matters relating to it has not yet been considered and adopted by the PAC. Only when it is so adopted after discussion in the Committee will it become the findings or conclusions of the PAC. Till then, it will remain a draft prepared by the staff of the PAC for consideration by the PAC as a whole.
2. It will be inappropriate to comment one way or the other on the draft. One has to observe restraint till the final report as approved by the PAC is released to the public after it has been cleared for release by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha.
3. In the meanwhile, sections of the media---print as well as electronic---have managed to get hold of the initial draft and have given wide publicity to it. It is up to them to decide in this matter. The purpose of this article is to draw the attention of responsible sections of the Indian media not only to the continuing attempts of Arnab Goswami of the Times Now news channel to exploit certain observations in the initial draft on the role of some journalists who were in touch with Niiru Radia, the professional lobbyist, to carry on what appears to be a campaign against Barkha Dutt, the highly-reputed journalist of the NDTV’s news channel , but also to the current controversy in “The Hindu” group of Chennai which, in my view, has a bearing on ethics in journalism.
4. This campaign has been going on for some time since December last year. The professional jealousy of some journalists has been compounded by a vicious campaign being carried on against her and her channel by small sections of Hindutva groups, which are strongly opposed to her views on Shri Narendra Modi, the Chie Minister of Gujarat, Kashmir, terrorism and India’s relations with Pakistan.
5. As one could see from the beginning of this campaign in December last, Barkha as well as her channel have been maintaining a dignified silence on this issue in adherence to certain core values to which they are attached and have scrupulously avoided any resort to any campaign which could degenerate into mutual mud-slinging.
6. Uninfluenced by this restraint, the Times Now has maintained its subtle, but vicious campaign against Barkha that ought to be deplored by all right-thinking people who are attached to restraint in behaviour.
7.This viciousness in projection has been accompanied by a disturbing silence by many senior journalists on allegations regarding the contacts of Radia with senior journalists of the Times Now channel and other media houses--- these contacts were allegedly not of an innocent nature--- and on the controversy now going on in “The Hindu” regarding certain allegedly objectionable features of the management and editorship of N.Ram, its Editor-in-Chief. These features have been brought to light by N.Ravi, the Editor of “The Hindu” and a relative of N.Ram, in two letters ---one addressed to the staff and the other to Ram---both of which are available in the professional web site devoted to journalists at www.thehoot.org. The latest of the letters of Ravi addressed to Ram is annexed.
8. Ram was in the forefront of the senior journalists who initially spearheaded the campaign against Barkha and even wondered why she had not been removed from her post by her channel. The blatant double standards of Ram in matters relating to journalistic propriety have been exposed by the controversy concerning him.
9. One would have expected that the allegations regarding the role of certain journalists, including a senior journalist of the Times Now channel, in maintaining contacts with Radia and regarding the objectionable features of Ram’s management and editorship would have received the scrutiny they called for in order to ascertain the truth. Instead, they have been pushed under the carpet and there is a deafening silence on these allegations from the senior members of the journalists’ fraternity.
10. This conspiracy of silence regarding the hypocrisy and double standards prevalent in our journalistic community should be a matter of concern to all right-thinking persons who believe in fair-play. I hold no brief for Barkha. She is quite capable of defending herself. At the same time I do feel I will not be worth my salt and will be guilty of cowardice if I keep quiet in the face of what seems to me to be a vicious campaign against her because she outshines many in our TV world. Throughout my life, I have taken the lead in supporting talented people and encouraging them. No one can deny that she is one of our highly talented TV professionals. ( 28-4-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
N.Ravi’s rejoinder to N.Ram's defence of The Hindu's coverage of the 2G scam, and the denial of a quid pro quo. (http://www.thehoot.org/web/home/story.php?storyid=5260&mod=1&pg=1§ionId=1&valid=true )
Dear Ram,
The Hindu of April 23, 2011 carried on Page 15 of the Chennai edition your refutation of a report that was not carried in The Hindu. Fairness demands that you publish my account of the issue of the coverage of A. Raja relating to the Telecom licences and 2G spectrum allocation that is given below:
At the meeting of the Board of directors of Kasturi and Sons in January, I had specifically raised the issue of the biased coverage of the 2G spectrum scandal. While Raja was in office, even as evidence was mounting and there were widespread calls for his resignation, The Hindu did not demand his resignation. On the other hand, it functioned as an apologist for Raja and even on the day of his resignation carried an interview with him on the front page, with the transcript published inside. In this interview as well as the one on May 22, 2010, there were no hard questions but only the obvious ones designed to elicit ready, scripted answers. The entire coverage up to the point of his resignation was tailored to make him look good.
This unexplained softness towards Raja contrasted sharply with the coverage and editorial stand on other scams including those relating to the Commonwealth Games, Adarsh Society and land allotment in Karnataka. In those instances, The Hindu was quick to demand the resignations of Suresh Kalmadi, Ashok Chavan and Yeddyurappa even at a stage when the evidence was far less compelling than the material that was in the public domain on the 2G scam before Raja resigned. All the editorial outrage was reserved for the period after Raja’s resignation.
With regard to the advertisement that was published in The Hindu of May 22, 2010 along with his interview on the front page with the full transcript inside, records in the Central Government, particularly in the Ministry of Telecommunications relating to the clearance of this particular advertisement and of some others would go to establish by whom and how this advertisement was cleared. Of all the newspapers that are said to have carried the advertisement, only The Hindu published a friendly interview and not the others. People in the media are aware that promotional advertisements of this type unrelated to any occasion or to any specific announcements are issued as much as rewards to the media as for publicity for the Minister. The Minister’s intention to hugely reward The Hindu that had been so friendly to him in its coverage was obvious. Publication in other newspapers was just a cover, it would have been untenable for any Ministry to have issued an advertisement to just one newspaper.
Yours sincerely,
Ravi
The initial draft of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the Parliament, chaired by Dr.Murali Manohar Joshi, on the 2G scam and matters relating to it has not yet been considered and adopted by the PAC. Only when it is so adopted after discussion in the Committee will it become the findings or conclusions of the PAC. Till then, it will remain a draft prepared by the staff of the PAC for consideration by the PAC as a whole.
2. It will be inappropriate to comment one way or the other on the draft. One has to observe restraint till the final report as approved by the PAC is released to the public after it has been cleared for release by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha.
3. In the meanwhile, sections of the media---print as well as electronic---have managed to get hold of the initial draft and have given wide publicity to it. It is up to them to decide in this matter. The purpose of this article is to draw the attention of responsible sections of the Indian media not only to the continuing attempts of Arnab Goswami of the Times Now news channel to exploit certain observations in the initial draft on the role of some journalists who were in touch with Niiru Radia, the professional lobbyist, to carry on what appears to be a campaign against Barkha Dutt, the highly-reputed journalist of the NDTV’s news channel , but also to the current controversy in “The Hindu” group of Chennai which, in my view, has a bearing on ethics in journalism.
4. This campaign has been going on for some time since December last year. The professional jealousy of some journalists has been compounded by a vicious campaign being carried on against her and her channel by small sections of Hindutva groups, which are strongly opposed to her views on Shri Narendra Modi, the Chie Minister of Gujarat, Kashmir, terrorism and India’s relations with Pakistan.
5. As one could see from the beginning of this campaign in December last, Barkha as well as her channel have been maintaining a dignified silence on this issue in adherence to certain core values to which they are attached and have scrupulously avoided any resort to any campaign which could degenerate into mutual mud-slinging.
6. Uninfluenced by this restraint, the Times Now has maintained its subtle, but vicious campaign against Barkha that ought to be deplored by all right-thinking people who are attached to restraint in behaviour.
7.This viciousness in projection has been accompanied by a disturbing silence by many senior journalists on allegations regarding the contacts of Radia with senior journalists of the Times Now channel and other media houses--- these contacts were allegedly not of an innocent nature--- and on the controversy now going on in “The Hindu” regarding certain allegedly objectionable features of the management and editorship of N.Ram, its Editor-in-Chief. These features have been brought to light by N.Ravi, the Editor of “The Hindu” and a relative of N.Ram, in two letters ---one addressed to the staff and the other to Ram---both of which are available in the professional web site devoted to journalists at www.thehoot.org. The latest of the letters of Ravi addressed to Ram is annexed.
8. Ram was in the forefront of the senior journalists who initially spearheaded the campaign against Barkha and even wondered why she had not been removed from her post by her channel. The blatant double standards of Ram in matters relating to journalistic propriety have been exposed by the controversy concerning him.
9. One would have expected that the allegations regarding the role of certain journalists, including a senior journalist of the Times Now channel, in maintaining contacts with Radia and regarding the objectionable features of Ram’s management and editorship would have received the scrutiny they called for in order to ascertain the truth. Instead, they have been pushed under the carpet and there is a deafening silence on these allegations from the senior members of the journalists’ fraternity.
10. This conspiracy of silence regarding the hypocrisy and double standards prevalent in our journalistic community should be a matter of concern to all right-thinking persons who believe in fair-play. I hold no brief for Barkha. She is quite capable of defending herself. At the same time I do feel I will not be worth my salt and will be guilty of cowardice if I keep quiet in the face of what seems to me to be a vicious campaign against her because she outshines many in our TV world. Throughout my life, I have taken the lead in supporting talented people and encouraging them. No one can deny that she is one of our highly talented TV professionals. ( 28-4-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
N.Ravi’s rejoinder to N.Ram's defence of The Hindu's coverage of the 2G scam, and the denial of a quid pro quo. (http://www.thehoot.org/web/home/story.php?storyid=5260&mod=1&pg=1§ionId=1&valid=true )
Dear Ram,
The Hindu of April 23, 2011 carried on Page 15 of the Chennai edition your refutation of a report that was not carried in The Hindu. Fairness demands that you publish my account of the issue of the coverage of A. Raja relating to the Telecom licences and 2G spectrum allocation that is given below:
At the meeting of the Board of directors of Kasturi and Sons in January, I had specifically raised the issue of the biased coverage of the 2G spectrum scandal. While Raja was in office, even as evidence was mounting and there were widespread calls for his resignation, The Hindu did not demand his resignation. On the other hand, it functioned as an apologist for Raja and even on the day of his resignation carried an interview with him on the front page, with the transcript published inside. In this interview as well as the one on May 22, 2010, there were no hard questions but only the obvious ones designed to elicit ready, scripted answers. The entire coverage up to the point of his resignation was tailored to make him look good.
This unexplained softness towards Raja contrasted sharply with the coverage and editorial stand on other scams including those relating to the Commonwealth Games, Adarsh Society and land allotment in Karnataka. In those instances, The Hindu was quick to demand the resignations of Suresh Kalmadi, Ashok Chavan and Yeddyurappa even at a stage when the evidence was far less compelling than the material that was in the public domain on the 2G scam before Raja resigned. All the editorial outrage was reserved for the period after Raja’s resignation.
With regard to the advertisement that was published in The Hindu of May 22, 2010 along with his interview on the front page with the full transcript inside, records in the Central Government, particularly in the Ministry of Telecommunications relating to the clearance of this particular advertisement and of some others would go to establish by whom and how this advertisement was cleared. Of all the newspapers that are said to have carried the advertisement, only The Hindu published a friendly interview and not the others. People in the media are aware that promotional advertisements of this type unrelated to any occasion or to any specific announcements are issued as much as rewards to the media as for publicity for the Minister. The Minister’s intention to hugely reward The Hindu that had been so friendly to him in its coverage was obvious. Publication in other newspapers was just a cover, it would have been untenable for any Ministry to have issued an advertisement to just one newspaper.
Yours sincerely,
Ravi
PURULIA ARMS DROP: A SHAMEFUL EPISODE IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN INTELLIGENCE
( Triggered by an interview of the pilot telecast by the Times Now news channel since this morning )
B.RAMAN
The clandestine Purulia arms drop of December 1995, in which an aircraft piloted by a group of mercenaries hired by an unidentified extremist organisation---suspected to be the Anand Marg--- managed to fly right across the Indian air space to Purulia in West Bengal, air-drop a consignment of arms and ammunition to a collecting party on the ground and fly to Pattaya in Thailand unprevented and unintercepted by the Indian intelligence and security agencies and the Air Force despite the availability of precise advance intelligence is a shameful episode in the history of Indian intelligence.
2. A few weeks before the actual air-drop, the extremist organisation which had procured the arms and ammunition had approached a retired pilot of the British Air Force and offered to pay him handsomely if he organised the air-drop successfullly. Even though tempted by the sum offered, he did not initially agree to carry it out. He asked for time to think over it. He then contacted an official of the British Defence Ministry and told him about the approach made to him by the extremists. The official advised him not to reject the officer and wait for further instructions.
3. The Defence Ministry official then told the MI-5, the British Security Service, about it. The MI-5 immediately informed the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), with which it had a liaison relationship, about it.The R&AW, after examining the matter, asked the MI-5 to advise the pilot to accept the task and to keep the MI-5 informed of all his meetings with the extremist organisation and the detailed plans for the air-drop including the date and time, the place of the air-drop and the flight path.
4. The pilot faithfully carried out the instructions and kept the MI-5 informed of all the details at every stage. These details were passed on by the MI-5 to the R&AW which, in turn, passed them on to the Intelligence Bureau, which was responsible for follow-up action. It was reported that the R&AW passed on the details given by the pilot through the MI-5 to the IB as if it had collected them on its own from one of its sources instead of specifying that the details were coming from the pilot himself through the MI-5.If the R&AW had taken the IB into confidence and told it that the details were coming from the pilot himself through the MI-5, the IB might have taken the details more seriously.
5.Normally, in such cases, if the matter had been handled professionally, the R&AW would have taken the clearance of the Prime Minister for flying out a team of officers of the IB and the R&AW to the UK to meet the piliot secretly with the help of the MI-5 and the British Defence Ministry and take his co-operation for organising a trap on the ground so that the collecting party could have been arrested while collecting the air-dropped arms and ammunition and the identity of the extremist organisation established.
6. Nothing of that sort was done. The R&AW passed on the information in a routine manner to the IB without specifying that it was coming from the pilot through the MI-5. The IB, instead of organising the follow-up action itself, passed it on to the West Bengal Police in an equally routine manner. The then Chief Secretary of the West Bengal Government later on complained that the IB had sent the information by registered post and that it was received after the air drop had taken place and the aircraft had flown out of India.
7. One does not know whether the R&AW and the IB kept the Indian Air Force in the picture so that the IAF could have kept track of the plane and made sure that the pilot did not play any tricks. The plane entered the air space over Mumbai from Pakistan, flew to the air space over Purulia, air-dropped the arms and ammunition and then flew on to Pattaya in Thailand.
8. In the meanwhile,most of the air-dropped arms and ammunition had been removed by unidentified elements. The IB issued an alert to all concerned to look for the plane if it flew over the Indian air space again while flying back to the UK. After a couple of days, the British pilot and his Latvian crew took off from Pattaya, flew to Chennai, landed at the airport there, got the aircraft refuelled there and then took off. Only after the aircraft had taken off from Chennai did the intelligence and airport officials realise that it was the same plane that had air-dropped the arms and ammunition.
9. The IAF intercepted the aircraft before it could leave the Indian air space and forced it to land at Mumbai. One person on board the plane, who reportedly belonged to the extremist organisation, managed to quietly walk out of the airport without being stopped by the security and the immigration. The British pilot and crew were arrested. Sections of the media had reported that the pilot was in a very violent mood and abused the police and intelligence officials.
10. No wonder. He had taken the initiative in alerting the intelligence agencies and keeping them informed of all the details. He expected that he would be honoured and rewarded. Instead, he was allegedly treated roughly, prosecuted and jailed.
11. A few weeks after this incident, the then British Home Secretary had come to India on a scheduled visit. In his interaction with our local media, he pointed out how the British intelligence had kept its Indian counterpart informed.
12. I have been writing about this shameful episode off and on since 1996. In my book "Intelligence---Past, Present and Future" published in 2001 ( Lancer Publishers of New Delhi), I had stated as follows on Page 233: " The normal response of any professional counter-terrorism agency, on the receipt of such precise information, would have been to organise a trap in co-operation with the pilot who had reportedly volunteered the information, for catching the terrorists on the ground while they were collecting the arms and ammunition after the air-drop. Till now, no satisfactory explanation has been forthcoming from the security agencies as to why this was not done."
13. We do not know the answer to this even today. (28-4-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi )
B.RAMAN
The clandestine Purulia arms drop of December 1995, in which an aircraft piloted by a group of mercenaries hired by an unidentified extremist organisation---suspected to be the Anand Marg--- managed to fly right across the Indian air space to Purulia in West Bengal, air-drop a consignment of arms and ammunition to a collecting party on the ground and fly to Pattaya in Thailand unprevented and unintercepted by the Indian intelligence and security agencies and the Air Force despite the availability of precise advance intelligence is a shameful episode in the history of Indian intelligence.
2. A few weeks before the actual air-drop, the extremist organisation which had procured the arms and ammunition had approached a retired pilot of the British Air Force and offered to pay him handsomely if he organised the air-drop successfullly. Even though tempted by the sum offered, he did not initially agree to carry it out. He asked for time to think over it. He then contacted an official of the British Defence Ministry and told him about the approach made to him by the extremists. The official advised him not to reject the officer and wait for further instructions.
3. The Defence Ministry official then told the MI-5, the British Security Service, about it. The MI-5 immediately informed the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), with which it had a liaison relationship, about it.The R&AW, after examining the matter, asked the MI-5 to advise the pilot to accept the task and to keep the MI-5 informed of all his meetings with the extremist organisation and the detailed plans for the air-drop including the date and time, the place of the air-drop and the flight path.
4. The pilot faithfully carried out the instructions and kept the MI-5 informed of all the details at every stage. These details were passed on by the MI-5 to the R&AW which, in turn, passed them on to the Intelligence Bureau, which was responsible for follow-up action. It was reported that the R&AW passed on the details given by the pilot through the MI-5 to the IB as if it had collected them on its own from one of its sources instead of specifying that the details were coming from the pilot himself through the MI-5.If the R&AW had taken the IB into confidence and told it that the details were coming from the pilot himself through the MI-5, the IB might have taken the details more seriously.
5.Normally, in such cases, if the matter had been handled professionally, the R&AW would have taken the clearance of the Prime Minister for flying out a team of officers of the IB and the R&AW to the UK to meet the piliot secretly with the help of the MI-5 and the British Defence Ministry and take his co-operation for organising a trap on the ground so that the collecting party could have been arrested while collecting the air-dropped arms and ammunition and the identity of the extremist organisation established.
6. Nothing of that sort was done. The R&AW passed on the information in a routine manner to the IB without specifying that it was coming from the pilot through the MI-5. The IB, instead of organising the follow-up action itself, passed it on to the West Bengal Police in an equally routine manner. The then Chief Secretary of the West Bengal Government later on complained that the IB had sent the information by registered post and that it was received after the air drop had taken place and the aircraft had flown out of India.
7. One does not know whether the R&AW and the IB kept the Indian Air Force in the picture so that the IAF could have kept track of the plane and made sure that the pilot did not play any tricks. The plane entered the air space over Mumbai from Pakistan, flew to the air space over Purulia, air-dropped the arms and ammunition and then flew on to Pattaya in Thailand.
8. In the meanwhile,most of the air-dropped arms and ammunition had been removed by unidentified elements. The IB issued an alert to all concerned to look for the plane if it flew over the Indian air space again while flying back to the UK. After a couple of days, the British pilot and his Latvian crew took off from Pattaya, flew to Chennai, landed at the airport there, got the aircraft refuelled there and then took off. Only after the aircraft had taken off from Chennai did the intelligence and airport officials realise that it was the same plane that had air-dropped the arms and ammunition.
9. The IAF intercepted the aircraft before it could leave the Indian air space and forced it to land at Mumbai. One person on board the plane, who reportedly belonged to the extremist organisation, managed to quietly walk out of the airport without being stopped by the security and the immigration. The British pilot and crew were arrested. Sections of the media had reported that the pilot was in a very violent mood and abused the police and intelligence officials.
10. No wonder. He had taken the initiative in alerting the intelligence agencies and keeping them informed of all the details. He expected that he would be honoured and rewarded. Instead, he was allegedly treated roughly, prosecuted and jailed.
11. A few weeks after this incident, the then British Home Secretary had come to India on a scheduled visit. In his interaction with our local media, he pointed out how the British intelligence had kept its Indian counterpart informed.
12. I have been writing about this shameful episode off and on since 1996. In my book "Intelligence---Past, Present and Future" published in 2001 ( Lancer Publishers of New Delhi), I had stated as follows on Page 233: " The normal response of any professional counter-terrorism agency, on the receipt of such precise information, would have been to organise a trap in co-operation with the pilot who had reportedly volunteered the information, for catching the terrorists on the ground while they were collecting the arms and ammunition after the air-drop. Till now, no satisfactory explanation has been forthcoming from the security agencies as to why this was not done."
13. We do not know the answer to this even today. (28-4-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi )
Wednesday, April 27, 2011
INCRIMINATING SPOTLIGHT ON ISI IN THE US
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO. 712
B.RAMAN
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate has come under incriminating spotlight in the US as a result of the ongoing judicial proceedings in a Chicago court against Tahawwur Hussain Rana of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in connection with the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai and certain leaked WikiLeaks cables relating to the interrogation of Al Qaeda suspects detained at the Guantanamo Bay detention centre in Cuba.
2.Rana along with fellow accomplice David Coleman Headley had allegedly played an active role in facilitating the 26/11 terrorist strikes by visiting India to collect targeting information and providing logistics help such as opening an office of Rana’s Chicago-based immigration consultancy agency in Mumbai to provide an ostensibly legitimate professional cover for Headley during his frequent trips to India to collect information for the LET.
3. Headley has already made a plea bargain before a Chicago court and a ruling on this is still awaited. In his depositions in connection with his plea bargain, Headley had given a total reconstruction of the preparations before the terrorist strikes and his role in facilitating them. Rana has not made a plea bargain. He has totally denied till now that he has had any links with the LET, which is a designated terrorist organization under the US laws. Media reports give reason to believe that his lawyers may argue when his trial starts on May 16 that Rana’s contacts were with the ISI and not with the LET and that he has not committed any breach of the US laws by helping the ISI in its covert war against India. His lawyers may also cite the close relations of the CIA with the ISI in this connection to underline their stand that co-operating with the ISI against India does not amount to an offence.
4. In his detailed statement in connection with the plea bargain, Headley had referred to the active role played by five individuals based in Pakistan in connection with the planning and execution of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. The FBI documents filed before the Chicago court did not till now give their identifying particulars. Instead, they described them as LET members A,B.C and D and person A. Nor did the FBI till now choose to indict them and seek their arrest and extradition from Pakistan.
5. In a supplementary indictment to the main indictment against Rana filed before the Chicago court on April 25,2011, the FBI has for the time given the identifying particulars of LET members A,B,C and D , but not Person A. They have been sought to be prosecuted along with Rana for their role in the 26/11 terrorist strikes. By combining the trial of these four persons with the trial of Rana, the FBI seems to be trying to highlight the role of the LET and to undercut the expected defence of Rana that he had helped the ISI and not the LET.
6. One has strong grounds for suspecting that the belated decision of the FBI to disclose the identities of these four persons and try them along with Rana is meant to help the ISI in avoiding any embarrassment due to its role in the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The US intelligence may have many differences with the ISI because of its perceived non-co-operation against Al Qaeda, the Jallaludin Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban, but it is not prepared to initiate any action against the ISI for its role in the 26/11 terrorist strikes.
7. The leaked WikiLeaks cables relate to a list of terrorism indicators given to the US interrogators in the Guantanamo Bay detention centre to enable them to identify and zero in on people who could have been involved in acts of terrorism. These indicators give the names of all Foreign Terrorist Organisations figuring in the annual reports of the counter-terrorism division of the USA’s Directorate of National Intelligence plus the names of the intelligence agencies of Pakistan (ISI), Iran and Yemen which are known to be using terrorist organizations for achieving their national objectives.
8. The guidance given to the interrogators is that anyone found having links with these intelligence agencies could be involved in terrorism and would hence need to be intensely interrogated. The terrorism indicators seem to have been prepared between 2001 and 2007. The inclusion of the ISI as a suspect organization in the list is not a matter for surprise. We had seen for years that while the US officials were privately and informally prepared to admit the role of the ISI in sponsoring terrorism, they were not prepared to admit it formally in public. If they admitted it in public, the question of action against the State of Pakistan would arise.
9. The indictment filed against the four Pakistanis in the Chicago court and the leaked WikiLeaks cables raise two important questions: Firstly, will the US pressure Pakistan to arrest and extradite these persons or will it merely get them convicted in absentia without making serious efforts for their extradition? Secondly, is the US gradually moving towards officially declaring the ISI as a sponsor of terrorism? There is no reason to believe it is.
10. Whatever be the official US line in respect of these developments, the additional details of the ISI’s role that have become available could strengthen the case against the ISI in the petition filed in a New York Court by a relative of the Israeli woman who was killed in Narriman House by the terrorists involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The relatives of the Indian victims of the 26/11 terrorist strikes should draw the attention of the petitioner in the New York case against the ISI and suggest to the petitioner and his lawyer that they should use these additional details. In fact, the relatives of the Indian victims should designate an Indian lawyer to co-ordinate with the lawyer of the Israeli family.
11. This may please be read in continuation of my article of April 27,2011, titled “Real Masterminds of 26/11 Still At Large In Pakistan” at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers45%5Cpaper4448.html
(28-4-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate has come under incriminating spotlight in the US as a result of the ongoing judicial proceedings in a Chicago court against Tahawwur Hussain Rana of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in connection with the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai and certain leaked WikiLeaks cables relating to the interrogation of Al Qaeda suspects detained at the Guantanamo Bay detention centre in Cuba.
2.Rana along with fellow accomplice David Coleman Headley had allegedly played an active role in facilitating the 26/11 terrorist strikes by visiting India to collect targeting information and providing logistics help such as opening an office of Rana’s Chicago-based immigration consultancy agency in Mumbai to provide an ostensibly legitimate professional cover for Headley during his frequent trips to India to collect information for the LET.
3. Headley has already made a plea bargain before a Chicago court and a ruling on this is still awaited. In his depositions in connection with his plea bargain, Headley had given a total reconstruction of the preparations before the terrorist strikes and his role in facilitating them. Rana has not made a plea bargain. He has totally denied till now that he has had any links with the LET, which is a designated terrorist organization under the US laws. Media reports give reason to believe that his lawyers may argue when his trial starts on May 16 that Rana’s contacts were with the ISI and not with the LET and that he has not committed any breach of the US laws by helping the ISI in its covert war against India. His lawyers may also cite the close relations of the CIA with the ISI in this connection to underline their stand that co-operating with the ISI against India does not amount to an offence.
4. In his detailed statement in connection with the plea bargain, Headley had referred to the active role played by five individuals based in Pakistan in connection with the planning and execution of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. The FBI documents filed before the Chicago court did not till now give their identifying particulars. Instead, they described them as LET members A,B.C and D and person A. Nor did the FBI till now choose to indict them and seek their arrest and extradition from Pakistan.
5. In a supplementary indictment to the main indictment against Rana filed before the Chicago court on April 25,2011, the FBI has for the time given the identifying particulars of LET members A,B,C and D , but not Person A. They have been sought to be prosecuted along with Rana for their role in the 26/11 terrorist strikes. By combining the trial of these four persons with the trial of Rana, the FBI seems to be trying to highlight the role of the LET and to undercut the expected defence of Rana that he had helped the ISI and not the LET.
6. One has strong grounds for suspecting that the belated decision of the FBI to disclose the identities of these four persons and try them along with Rana is meant to help the ISI in avoiding any embarrassment due to its role in the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The US intelligence may have many differences with the ISI because of its perceived non-co-operation against Al Qaeda, the Jallaludin Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban, but it is not prepared to initiate any action against the ISI for its role in the 26/11 terrorist strikes.
7. The leaked WikiLeaks cables relate to a list of terrorism indicators given to the US interrogators in the Guantanamo Bay detention centre to enable them to identify and zero in on people who could have been involved in acts of terrorism. These indicators give the names of all Foreign Terrorist Organisations figuring in the annual reports of the counter-terrorism division of the USA’s Directorate of National Intelligence plus the names of the intelligence agencies of Pakistan (ISI), Iran and Yemen which are known to be using terrorist organizations for achieving their national objectives.
8. The guidance given to the interrogators is that anyone found having links with these intelligence agencies could be involved in terrorism and would hence need to be intensely interrogated. The terrorism indicators seem to have been prepared between 2001 and 2007. The inclusion of the ISI as a suspect organization in the list is not a matter for surprise. We had seen for years that while the US officials were privately and informally prepared to admit the role of the ISI in sponsoring terrorism, they were not prepared to admit it formally in public. If they admitted it in public, the question of action against the State of Pakistan would arise.
9. The indictment filed against the four Pakistanis in the Chicago court and the leaked WikiLeaks cables raise two important questions: Firstly, will the US pressure Pakistan to arrest and extradite these persons or will it merely get them convicted in absentia without making serious efforts for their extradition? Secondly, is the US gradually moving towards officially declaring the ISI as a sponsor of terrorism? There is no reason to believe it is.
10. Whatever be the official US line in respect of these developments, the additional details of the ISI’s role that have become available could strengthen the case against the ISI in the petition filed in a New York Court by a relative of the Israeli woman who was killed in Narriman House by the terrorists involved in the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The relatives of the Indian victims of the 26/11 terrorist strikes should draw the attention of the petitioner in the New York case against the ISI and suggest to the petitioner and his lawyer that they should use these additional details. In fact, the relatives of the Indian victims should designate an Indian lawyer to co-ordinate with the lawyer of the Israeli family.
11. This may please be read in continuation of my article of April 27,2011, titled “Real Masterminds of 26/11 Still At Large In Pakistan” at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers45%5Cpaper4448.html
(28-4-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
CHINA STARTS DEMONISATION OF KIRTI MONASTERY MONKS
B.RAMAN
The authorities of the Aba County in the Aba Tibetan-Qiang Autonomous Prefecture of the Sichuan province where the Kirti monastery is located, have started a demonisation campaign against the monks of the monastery. They have been blamed for the death of a 16-year-old monk, who committed self-immolation on March 16,2011, in protest against the Chinese colonisation of Tibet and the monks living in the monastery have been accused of indulging in illegal activities, including visiting prostitutes. A copy of a statement on the developments in the monastery disseminated by the Government-owned Xinhua news agency on April 26,2011, is annexed below.
2.Reliable reports indicate that the Chinese authorities continue to use food as a weapon to force the monks protesting against the re-education classes to attend the classes. Only those attending the classes are given a full meal. Others are given only a partial meal. (27-4-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail:seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
PRESS STATEMENT DISSEMINATED BY THE XINHUA NEWS AGENCY ON APRIL 26,2011
Lama's self-immolation carefully planned
Police in Aba County of southwest China's Sichuan Province said Friday that the self-immolation of a lama in Kirti Monastery last month was carefully planned and aimed at triggering disturbances.
Rigzin Phuntsog, a 16-year-old lama at the Kirti Monastery in Aba County, died on March 17, after setting himself on fire on March 16.
Police said the self-immolation was a carefully planned and implemented criminal case, which aimed at triggering disturbances.
Investigations showed that in the evening of March 15, Rigzin Phuntsog, accompanied by Lhadan, a monk in the monastery, bought three bottles of gasoline at a parking lot of Laolongzang Road, police said.
At around 9:00 am on March 16, Rigzin Phuntsog told Lhadan and other lamas that he was ready and would set fire on himself on the day.
In the afternoon, Rigzin Phuntsog set himself on fire after making sure that the lamas had finished reciting scriptures and many of them would be on street.
After police on patrol put out the fire, a group of monks from the Kirti Monastery forcibly took Rigzin Phuntsog away and held him for nearly 11 hours.
After hours of negotiation, the lamas agreed to allow Rigzin Phuntsog to be taken to hospital at around 3 am on March 17, but he died in hospital due to cardiorespiratory failure, according to the county government.
Soinam, head of the People's Hospital in Aba County, said Rigzin Phuntsog died from serious burns that caused heart and lung failures, and no gunshot wounds or injuries from blunt utensils or sharp tools were found on his body during treatment or post-mortem examination of body surface.iF Rigzin Phuntsog had been sent to hospital timely, he could have been saved, Soinam said.
Local law experts said that the lamas, fully aware that Rigzin Phuntsog was seriously burned and might die without immediate medical treatment, refused to send him to hospital. As Rigzin Phuntsog died due to delayed treatment, those lamas were on suspicion of intentional homicide.
The local government of Aba County of Aba Tibetan-Qiang Autonomous Prefecture said in a circular issued early Friday that the government decided to give legal education in Kirti Monastery and the decision was made in light of the "problems" in the monastery as well as illegal activities committed by some of its lamas over the years.
The lamas would study the country's laws and regulations as well as religious disciplines and commandments, it said.
The county government said a small number of lamas in the monastery have, for a long time, repeatedly disrupted social order. Since 2008, some lamas in the monastery have been found possessing guns and ammunition, committing criminal activities involving beating, smashing property, looting and arson, and carrying out self-immolation.
According to the circular, some lamas in the monastery had repeatedly violated Buddhist disciplines and commandments and were found visiting prostitutes, getting drunk and kicking up rows, and being engaged in gambling. And some even disseminated pornographic videos.
Those activities "have corrupted social values and tarnished the image of Tibetan Buddhism," the circular reads. Xinhua
The authorities of the Aba County in the Aba Tibetan-Qiang Autonomous Prefecture of the Sichuan province where the Kirti monastery is located, have started a demonisation campaign against the monks of the monastery. They have been blamed for the death of a 16-year-old monk, who committed self-immolation on March 16,2011, in protest against the Chinese colonisation of Tibet and the monks living in the monastery have been accused of indulging in illegal activities, including visiting prostitutes. A copy of a statement on the developments in the monastery disseminated by the Government-owned Xinhua news agency on April 26,2011, is annexed below.
2.Reliable reports indicate that the Chinese authorities continue to use food as a weapon to force the monks protesting against the re-education classes to attend the classes. Only those attending the classes are given a full meal. Others are given only a partial meal. (27-4-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail:seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
PRESS STATEMENT DISSEMINATED BY THE XINHUA NEWS AGENCY ON APRIL 26,2011
Lama's self-immolation carefully planned
Police in Aba County of southwest China's Sichuan Province said Friday that the self-immolation of a lama in Kirti Monastery last month was carefully planned and aimed at triggering disturbances.
Rigzin Phuntsog, a 16-year-old lama at the Kirti Monastery in Aba County, died on March 17, after setting himself on fire on March 16.
Police said the self-immolation was a carefully planned and implemented criminal case, which aimed at triggering disturbances.
Investigations showed that in the evening of March 15, Rigzin Phuntsog, accompanied by Lhadan, a monk in the monastery, bought three bottles of gasoline at a parking lot of Laolongzang Road, police said.
At around 9:00 am on March 16, Rigzin Phuntsog told Lhadan and other lamas that he was ready and would set fire on himself on the day.
In the afternoon, Rigzin Phuntsog set himself on fire after making sure that the lamas had finished reciting scriptures and many of them would be on street.
After police on patrol put out the fire, a group of monks from the Kirti Monastery forcibly took Rigzin Phuntsog away and held him for nearly 11 hours.
After hours of negotiation, the lamas agreed to allow Rigzin Phuntsog to be taken to hospital at around 3 am on March 17, but he died in hospital due to cardiorespiratory failure, according to the county government.
Soinam, head of the People's Hospital in Aba County, said Rigzin Phuntsog died from serious burns that caused heart and lung failures, and no gunshot wounds or injuries from blunt utensils or sharp tools were found on his body during treatment or post-mortem examination of body surface.iF Rigzin Phuntsog had been sent to hospital timely, he could have been saved, Soinam said.
Local law experts said that the lamas, fully aware that Rigzin Phuntsog was seriously burned and might die without immediate medical treatment, refused to send him to hospital. As Rigzin Phuntsog died due to delayed treatment, those lamas were on suspicion of intentional homicide.
The local government of Aba County of Aba Tibetan-Qiang Autonomous Prefecture said in a circular issued early Friday that the government decided to give legal education in Kirti Monastery and the decision was made in light of the "problems" in the monastery as well as illegal activities committed by some of its lamas over the years.
The lamas would study the country's laws and regulations as well as religious disciplines and commandments, it said.
The county government said a small number of lamas in the monastery have, for a long time, repeatedly disrupted social order. Since 2008, some lamas in the monastery have been found possessing guns and ammunition, committing criminal activities involving beating, smashing property, looting and arson, and carrying out self-immolation.
According to the circular, some lamas in the monastery had repeatedly violated Buddhist disciplines and commandments and were found visiting prostitutes, getting drunk and kicking up rows, and being engaged in gambling. And some even disseminated pornographic videos.
Those activities "have corrupted social values and tarnished the image of Tibetan Buddhism," the circular reads. Xinhua
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
THIRD JIHADI ATTACK ON PAK NAVY SINCE LAL MASJID RAID
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO. 711
B.RAMAN
Two Pakistani naval personnel--- a commissioned officer of the rank of Sub-Lieutenant and a sailor--- were among four persons killed in two separate but coordinated explosions in Karachi on April 26,2011.The explosions targeted two buses of the Pakistan Navy which were transporting naval personnel to their places of work.According to available indications, the improvised explosive devices, which struck the buses, had been planted along routes normally taken by the buses and activated through mobile telephones.
2 According to the " Daily Times" of Lahore ( April 27,2011), the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as the Pakistani Taliban is known, has claimed the responsibility for the blasts, and threatened more attacks on security forces. The claim was made in a telephone call to a foreign news agency by a person who identified himself as Ehsanullah Ehsan, a spokesman of the Taliban. He reportedly said : "Security forces will be targeted in the future as well, because they are killing their own people in Waziristan and elsewhere at the behest of the United States.”
3.This is the third time that the Pakistan Navy has been targeted by jihadi terrorists since the raid into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad by the Pakistan Army in July 2007, triggered off a wave of terrorist attacks on the Pakistani Armed Forces by suspected elements from the TTP.
4.The first attack on a naval establishment took place on March 4, 2008. Two unidentified suicide bombers, operating in tandem, attacked the prestigious Naval War College located in a high security area of Lahore. They were both on motor-cycles. One of them rammed his motor-cycle against the security gate at the rear of the building breaking it open. The other drove through this opening into the parking area and blew himself up. Their target was the naval institution and not any particular individual or individuals inside. They wanted to demonstrate their ability to penetrate the campus and cause damage. Six persons were killed--- one of them a naval officer, three members of the security guards at the gate and the two suicide bombers.
5.The second attempted attack was reported from Islamabad on December 2,2009.An alert official of the Pakistani naval intelligence in plain clothes and a naval security guard in uniform deployed outside the building of the Pakistan Navy Headquarters in Islamabad prevented what could have been a major terrorist strike against the Naval Headquarters by an unidentified suicide bomber. Spotting a suspicious-looking individual outside the NHQ, they stopped him and searched him. He turned out to be a suicide bomber wearing a concealed suicide vest. However, they could not prevent him from activating the explosive device in the vest. One person was killed on the spot and another succumbed to his injuries later.
6. The Pakistan Navy has had no role to play in the operations in the Lal Masjid, the FATA (Federally-Administered Tribal Areas) and Swat. However, the logistic supplies for the NATO forces are brought to the Karachi port, unloaded there under the protection of the Pakistani Navy and then transported to Afghanistan by trucks. While the Pakistani Army and Air Force have no operational role to play in the US-led military operations in the Afghan territory against Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban, the Pakistani Navy is a member of the US-led international naval force which patrols the seas to the west of Pakistan to prevent any hostile activity which could hamper the operations in Afghan territory. The Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, established at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, comprises naval forces from France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The task force conducts maritime security operations (MSO) in the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. The leadership of the Task Force is rotated amongst the participating navies. A Pakistani naval officer has been commanding it off and on when the turn of the Pakistan Navy comes. ( 27-4-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Two Pakistani naval personnel--- a commissioned officer of the rank of Sub-Lieutenant and a sailor--- were among four persons killed in two separate but coordinated explosions in Karachi on April 26,2011.The explosions targeted two buses of the Pakistan Navy which were transporting naval personnel to their places of work.According to available indications, the improvised explosive devices, which struck the buses, had been planted along routes normally taken by the buses and activated through mobile telephones.
2 According to the " Daily Times" of Lahore ( April 27,2011), the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as the Pakistani Taliban is known, has claimed the responsibility for the blasts, and threatened more attacks on security forces. The claim was made in a telephone call to a foreign news agency by a person who identified himself as Ehsanullah Ehsan, a spokesman of the Taliban. He reportedly said : "Security forces will be targeted in the future as well, because they are killing their own people in Waziristan and elsewhere at the behest of the United States.”
3.This is the third time that the Pakistan Navy has been targeted by jihadi terrorists since the raid into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad by the Pakistan Army in July 2007, triggered off a wave of terrorist attacks on the Pakistani Armed Forces by suspected elements from the TTP.
4.The first attack on a naval establishment took place on March 4, 2008. Two unidentified suicide bombers, operating in tandem, attacked the prestigious Naval War College located in a high security area of Lahore. They were both on motor-cycles. One of them rammed his motor-cycle against the security gate at the rear of the building breaking it open. The other drove through this opening into the parking area and blew himself up. Their target was the naval institution and not any particular individual or individuals inside. They wanted to demonstrate their ability to penetrate the campus and cause damage. Six persons were killed--- one of them a naval officer, three members of the security guards at the gate and the two suicide bombers.
5.The second attempted attack was reported from Islamabad on December 2,2009.An alert official of the Pakistani naval intelligence in plain clothes and a naval security guard in uniform deployed outside the building of the Pakistan Navy Headquarters in Islamabad prevented what could have been a major terrorist strike against the Naval Headquarters by an unidentified suicide bomber. Spotting a suspicious-looking individual outside the NHQ, they stopped him and searched him. He turned out to be a suicide bomber wearing a concealed suicide vest. However, they could not prevent him from activating the explosive device in the vest. One person was killed on the spot and another succumbed to his injuries later.
6. The Pakistan Navy has had no role to play in the operations in the Lal Masjid, the FATA (Federally-Administered Tribal Areas) and Swat. However, the logistic supplies for the NATO forces are brought to the Karachi port, unloaded there under the protection of the Pakistani Navy and then transported to Afghanistan by trucks. While the Pakistani Army and Air Force have no operational role to play in the US-led military operations in the Afghan territory against Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban, the Pakistani Navy is a member of the US-led international naval force which patrols the seas to the west of Pakistan to prevent any hostile activity which could hamper the operations in Afghan territory. The Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, established at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, comprises naval forces from France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The task force conducts maritime security operations (MSO) in the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. The leadership of the Task Force is rotated amongst the participating navies. A Pakistani naval officer has been commanding it off and on when the turn of the Pakistan Navy comes. ( 27-4-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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