B.RAMAN
There was a beautiful despatch by Barkha Dutt of NDTV from Cairo on March 1 as to how the Twitter had played a role in facilitating the evacuation of a group of stranded Indians from Eastern Libya through Egypt and the humanitarian assistance which they had received from the Pakistanis living in East Libya. One of the Indians from Kerala stranded in East Libya had tweeted the Foreign Minister, the Foreign Secretary, Shri Shashi Tharoor, MP, and Barkha seeking assistance. This set in motion the train of events that led to their crossing over into Egypt from East Libya and safe evacuation to India, thanks to the tremendous work put in by the Indian Embassy in Cairo ably headed by Shri Swaminathan, the Ambassador. Barkha and two of her technical crew from NDTV (Manoj and Ruby Dingra) were in Cairo to cover the event for NDTV.
2.After doing their reportage from Cairo, they decided to try their luck and make a 700-km, 15-hour dash to the Libyan border in order to enter the country with the help of one of Barkha’s contacts in the anti-Gaddafi rebel set-up in East Libya with its headquarters at Benghazi . The NDTV team, headed by Barkha, had two options---either enter Libya legally via Tripoli with valid visas or enter clandestinely via Egypt without visas despite the warning issued by the Libyan Government that anyone entering via East Libya without visas would be considered an “outlaw” .
3. The Libyan Government had initially banned all journalists from entering Libya. After some journalists belonging to the “Guardian” of London, the CNN and the BBC had clandestinely entered from Egypt, it relaxed the ban and decided to issue visas to journalists from the BBC, the CNN, Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya only. Since Indian journalists were not covered by this relaxation, Barkha and her team decided to try their luck from the Egyptian border and enter without a visa with the help of Barkha’s contact in the rebel set-up.
4. Barkha and her NDTV team made their way through nearly 700 kms of beautiful desert made famous during the second World War by the epic tank battle at El Alamein between the allied forces commanded by Field Marshal Montgomery and the Nazi German forces commanded by FM Rommel. Barkha has over 200,000 followers in her Twitter site. I am one of them. I keep exchanging Tweets with her from time to time on current developments.
5. On March 1, as the whole of India was still engrossed in watching the TV coverage of the Central budget, I and many others were excitedly keeping track of the team of Barkha as it made its way through the desert. The Twitter enabled us to follow Barkha and her team for nearly seven hours of their 15-hour journey. We kept encouraging her through Tweets and E-mails and advising her and her team to take good care of themselves and not to walk into a trap. I was touched by the gesture of even some critics of Barkha in praying for the safety of the team. One of her critics tweeted her: “May not agree with her opinions on matters ..but safety is paramount ..I pray for her safety”. There were so many others who prayed for their safety.” I tweeted Barkha: “ U see how many well-wishers U have in the sub-continent.”
6. Even people in Pakistan tweeted her “good luck.” Ms. Munizae Jahangir, a journalist, who is the proud daughter of Mrs.Asma Jahangir, the famous Pakistani human rights activist, tweeted Barkha to say that she was E-mailing to her the telephone numbers of some Pakistanis in Libya whom she could contact if she needed any assistance.
7. One of the constant worries of Barkha’s Twitterati was about the reliability of their communication equipment. Was it reliable? Was it good? Was it strong enough for its signals to reach India. One of the Twitterati, probably based in the US, asked Barkha what communication set she was carrying. Barkha tweeted back: “vodaphone. Don't know how much longer phones will work.”
8. There were so many Tweeters who were wanting and willing to help in whatever way they can. I tried to collect some topographic data about East Libya from the Internet so that I could tweet it to her. I could not get much. I tweeted my exasperation. One of the tweeters, who saw my tweet to Barkha, asked me : “what kind of information you are looking for.” I tweeted to him: “Looking for alternate ways of reaching Benghazi from Egyptian border---distances involved etc.” After a few minutes, he tweeted back URL details of sites containing Libyan maps.
9.In the meanwhile, Barkha tweeted to all her friends: “Leaving behind last city of marsa matrouh.libyan border 100kms away.ravaged nation on other side.” I collected some details of this city from the Wikipedia and tweeted them to her. The person, who had collected details of sites carrying Libyan maps, tweeted to Barkha with copy to me: “Go to el salaum , its between Libya & Egypt, you will get a Bus for Benghazi from there . Still working , am told.” He subsequently tweeted the telephone number of a border post where Barkha could any assistance she wanted.
10. At around 10 PM on March 1, we lost all contact with her. I don’t know why. Before this communication black-out occurred, I managed to send two Tweets to Barkha. In the first Tweet, I told her she should remain in touch with the Indian Ambassador in Cairo. I tweeted: “ He is a nice guy, am told. People talk highly of him.” Barkha tweeted back: “yes he is very nice.”
11. An Indian lady living in Egypt, who had seen my Tweet to Barkha about the Ambassador, tweeted Barkha with copy to me: “Mr. Swaminathan is really a gem of a person , I agree. I live in Egypt , am constantly in touch with him.”
12. My last Tweet to Barkha read: “Conserve your battery.Good night.” She did not acknowledge it. I was not sure whether it reached her. I was very tense. I couldn’t sleep. Every 60 minutes or so, I would get out of bed, go online and check whether there was any message or Tweet from Barkha. Nothing. From around 10 PM to 5-40 AM, no communication with her. I really got worried. As I got out of bed at about 5.40 AM to check once again, I told myself that I would alert the Foreign Secretary and the Ambassador if there was still no communication from her.
13. As I went online, my heart jumped with joy. There was an E-mail from Barkha: “We made it. We have entered Libya.” I E-mailed her: “Am thrilled. And worried. Take good care of yourself .”
14. And, I went to sleep after remaining awake the whole night. (3-3-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
WINDS OF HATRED CONTINUE TO SWEEP ACROSS PAKISTAN
B.RAMAN
At a time when winds of change have been sweeping across many Islamic countries with calls for greater freedom and democracy, winds of hatred continue to sweep across Pakistan.
2. Pakistan, which has become over the years a breeding ground of Islamic beliefs of the most irrational and extreme kind, is helpless in the face of these winds of hatred. These winds have distorted Islam beyond recognition and provided a breeding ground for Islamic extremism and jihadi terrorism of various hues.More murders and more crimes of various kinds are committed in Pakistan in the name of and for the sake of Islam than in any other Islamic country of the world.
3. Unless and until the breeding grounds of hatred from where these winds rise are eliminated, extremism and terrorism will continue to find nourishment in the soil of Pakistan. No amount of change in the other Islamic countries through which the winds of change have been sweeping would provide relief to the rest of the world from the scourge of Islamic extremism and jihadi terrorism. It is a plague over which the state of Pakistan has no control.
4. This plague claimed one more fatal victim on March 2,2011, when Shabaz Bhatti, a Christian belonging to President Asif Ali Zardari's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), who was holding the Minorities Affairs portfolio, was shot dead by a group of unidentified assassins as he was being driven to work in Islamabad. Reports from Islamabad indicate that he was travelling in his official car without being escorted by a security team despite the fact that he was one of the most threatened members of the Council of Ministers because of his criticism of the blasphemy law which provides for a mandatory death penalty to anyone insulting the Holy Prophet. The law has come in for strong criticism from liberal elements in the rest of the world because the rules of evidence governing trials under it are so flimsy that anyone can accuse anyone of insulting the Holy Prophet and get that person convicted without satisfactory corroborative evidence.
5. Previously, only insulting the Holy Prophet was considered an act of blasphemy, now, even criticising the law is treated an act of blasphemy by extremist elements which do not hesitate to kill anyone criticising the law. This was the second high-profile assassination this year of persons criticising the law. In January, Salman Taseer, a liberal Muslim, who was the Governor of Punjab, was assassinated by one of his own security guards because he dared to criticise the law and visited in jail a Christian who had been convicted under the law. Death threats have reportedly been held out against Mrs.Sherry Rehman, a Member of Parliament belonging to the PPP, for allegedly suggesting a re-look at the law.
6. How can one save Pakistan from the clutches of Islam of the most extreme kind when the assassin of Taseer was not condemned as a murderer, but was hailed as a saviour of Islam by some sections of the population, including lawyers? Organisations such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has claimed responsibility for the assassination of the Christian Minister, and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), the extremist Sunni organisation, look upon it as a God-ordained duty to eliminate anyone who is seen by them as insulting Islam even for criticising the obnoxious features of it in Pakistan.
7. One cannot hope for any salvation for Pakistan from these winds of hatred unless there is a mass uprising to break the stranglehold of these elements over the society and the State. Pakistan is a State governed by fear---not the fear of despots, but the fear of the irrational clergy and even more irrational extremist organisations. Unless the people are able to rid themselves of this fear and come out in the streets against these organisations, the winds of hatred will continue to blow across the country.
8. Unfortunately, Pakistan is a country where liberalism is merely a talking point in the drawing rooms of the elite and not a rallying cry for protests in the streets against the irrational and extremist elements. It is a gloomy situation from which no exit is in sight. ( 2-3-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
At a time when winds of change have been sweeping across many Islamic countries with calls for greater freedom and democracy, winds of hatred continue to sweep across Pakistan.
2. Pakistan, which has become over the years a breeding ground of Islamic beliefs of the most irrational and extreme kind, is helpless in the face of these winds of hatred. These winds have distorted Islam beyond recognition and provided a breeding ground for Islamic extremism and jihadi terrorism of various hues.More murders and more crimes of various kinds are committed in Pakistan in the name of and for the sake of Islam than in any other Islamic country of the world.
3. Unless and until the breeding grounds of hatred from where these winds rise are eliminated, extremism and terrorism will continue to find nourishment in the soil of Pakistan. No amount of change in the other Islamic countries through which the winds of change have been sweeping would provide relief to the rest of the world from the scourge of Islamic extremism and jihadi terrorism. It is a plague over which the state of Pakistan has no control.
4. This plague claimed one more fatal victim on March 2,2011, when Shabaz Bhatti, a Christian belonging to President Asif Ali Zardari's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), who was holding the Minorities Affairs portfolio, was shot dead by a group of unidentified assassins as he was being driven to work in Islamabad. Reports from Islamabad indicate that he was travelling in his official car without being escorted by a security team despite the fact that he was one of the most threatened members of the Council of Ministers because of his criticism of the blasphemy law which provides for a mandatory death penalty to anyone insulting the Holy Prophet. The law has come in for strong criticism from liberal elements in the rest of the world because the rules of evidence governing trials under it are so flimsy that anyone can accuse anyone of insulting the Holy Prophet and get that person convicted without satisfactory corroborative evidence.
5. Previously, only insulting the Holy Prophet was considered an act of blasphemy, now, even criticising the law is treated an act of blasphemy by extremist elements which do not hesitate to kill anyone criticising the law. This was the second high-profile assassination this year of persons criticising the law. In January, Salman Taseer, a liberal Muslim, who was the Governor of Punjab, was assassinated by one of his own security guards because he dared to criticise the law and visited in jail a Christian who had been convicted under the law. Death threats have reportedly been held out against Mrs.Sherry Rehman, a Member of Parliament belonging to the PPP, for allegedly suggesting a re-look at the law.
6. How can one save Pakistan from the clutches of Islam of the most extreme kind when the assassin of Taseer was not condemned as a murderer, but was hailed as a saviour of Islam by some sections of the population, including lawyers? Organisations such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has claimed responsibility for the assassination of the Christian Minister, and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), the extremist Sunni organisation, look upon it as a God-ordained duty to eliminate anyone who is seen by them as insulting Islam even for criticising the obnoxious features of it in Pakistan.
7. One cannot hope for any salvation for Pakistan from these winds of hatred unless there is a mass uprising to break the stranglehold of these elements over the society and the State. Pakistan is a State governed by fear---not the fear of despots, but the fear of the irrational clergy and even more irrational extremist organisations. Unless the people are able to rid themselves of this fear and come out in the streets against these organisations, the winds of hatred will continue to blow across the country.
8. Unfortunately, Pakistan is a country where liberalism is merely a talking point in the drawing rooms of the elite and not a rallying cry for protests in the streets against the irrational and extremist elements. It is a gloomy situation from which no exit is in sight. ( 2-3-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, March 1, 2011
COMMENTS FROM A KNOWLEDGEABLE WESTERN READER ON MY ARTICLE ON GADAFFI
I commend you on your writing regarding the complex nature of the struggles to topple Gaddafi against the background of matters peculiar or exclusive to Libya as against what transpired recently in Egypt. Your unbiased approach in your review of triggering events demonstrates your professionalism.
Monday, February 28, 2011
GADAFFI'S CONTINUING DEFIANCE
B.RAMAN
In assessing Col.Muammar Gadaffi’s continuIng defiance of the international pressure to force him to quit, the following facts have to be kept in mind:
• Firstly, what one is facing in Libya is not a revolutionary situation as one had seen in Egypt with mass participation by the youth and other sections of the population, but a civil war like situation with members of rival tribes taking a leading part in the fighting on both sides.
• Secondly, despite reports to the contrary, the involvement of youth in the fight against Gadaffi is not as widespread as it was in Egypt against Hosni Mubarak. The fight against Mubarak was led by innovative and enterprising youth who had nothing to do with his regime in the past, but the fight against Gadaffi is being led by a small group of ex-politicians, ex-bureaucrats, tribal leaders, lawyers and others, who had collaborated with Gaddafi’s oppressive regime, but had fallen out with him only recently. They do not command the same respect with the general population as the young leaders of Egypt did.
• Thirdly, Mubarak had only two forces at his command for dealing with the protest--- the riot police which comes under the Ministry of the Interior and the Army. The riot police got discredited in the initial days of the protest and the Army was not willing to use force against the protestors. Gadaffi has built up a multiplicity of forces to maintain his rule. If one force is unwilling to carry out his orders, there are others who are willing to.
• Fourthly, ever since he succeeded Anwar Sadat in 1981, Mubarak had enjoyed a cosy relationship with the West in general and the US in particular. He also enjoyed good relations with Israel. The intelligence agencies of the US and other Western countries had considerably penetrated and softened the Egyptian Armed Forces and intelligence agencies. This enabled the US to play successfully an activist role in bringing about a peaceful change in Egypt once it realized that Mubarak had to go. Ever since he came to power in 1969, Gaddafi and his forces had looked upon the US and Israel as Libya’s principal enemies. They had prepared themselves for over 40 years to confront the US and Israel. The US had not been able to penetrate the Libyan security forces and intelligence agencies in the same way as it had done in Egypt. It still does not know through whom it should and it can operate in Libya. The recent defectors such as the Libyan diplomats posted abroad and some of the Ministers are unknown quantities in Libya. They will have only limited value as assets for the US.
• Fifthly, there are many strands involved in the protest movement in Libya----anti-Gadaffi elements, rival tribes and anti-foreigner elements such as those who attacked Chinese and South Korean workers and construction sites. Resentment over the better quality of life enjoyed by foreign workers has been an important factor in complicating the situation in Libya. One has not so far seen attacks on foreign workers in Tunisia or Egypt or other countries affected by the current unrest.
• Sixthly, there are only two ways of bringing about the end of the Gaddafi regime---- by inciting a revolt against him by the multiple forces raised by him. The West has not so far been able to do this. The other way is by training and arming the protesters who have liberated large pockets of Eastern Libya, with Benghazi as the epicenter, and helping them to march on to Tripoli to get rid of Gaddafi. Distances involved are large and even if the West provides them with an air cover by enforcing a no-fly zone, the marchers have to cross areas inhabited by tribals who have till now been loyal to Gadaffi. If the fighting is fierce and continues for a long time, there could be a danger of a balkanization of Libya.
2. Gaddafi may not be another Mubarak, who left with his tail tucked between his legs. He may turn out to be another Saddam Hussein----defiant till he dies. ( 1-3-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
In assessing Col.Muammar Gadaffi’s continuIng defiance of the international pressure to force him to quit, the following facts have to be kept in mind:
• Firstly, what one is facing in Libya is not a revolutionary situation as one had seen in Egypt with mass participation by the youth and other sections of the population, but a civil war like situation with members of rival tribes taking a leading part in the fighting on both sides.
• Secondly, despite reports to the contrary, the involvement of youth in the fight against Gadaffi is not as widespread as it was in Egypt against Hosni Mubarak. The fight against Mubarak was led by innovative and enterprising youth who had nothing to do with his regime in the past, but the fight against Gadaffi is being led by a small group of ex-politicians, ex-bureaucrats, tribal leaders, lawyers and others, who had collaborated with Gaddafi’s oppressive regime, but had fallen out with him only recently. They do not command the same respect with the general population as the young leaders of Egypt did.
• Thirdly, Mubarak had only two forces at his command for dealing with the protest--- the riot police which comes under the Ministry of the Interior and the Army. The riot police got discredited in the initial days of the protest and the Army was not willing to use force against the protestors. Gadaffi has built up a multiplicity of forces to maintain his rule. If one force is unwilling to carry out his orders, there are others who are willing to.
• Fourthly, ever since he succeeded Anwar Sadat in 1981, Mubarak had enjoyed a cosy relationship with the West in general and the US in particular. He also enjoyed good relations with Israel. The intelligence agencies of the US and other Western countries had considerably penetrated and softened the Egyptian Armed Forces and intelligence agencies. This enabled the US to play successfully an activist role in bringing about a peaceful change in Egypt once it realized that Mubarak had to go. Ever since he came to power in 1969, Gaddafi and his forces had looked upon the US and Israel as Libya’s principal enemies. They had prepared themselves for over 40 years to confront the US and Israel. The US had not been able to penetrate the Libyan security forces and intelligence agencies in the same way as it had done in Egypt. It still does not know through whom it should and it can operate in Libya. The recent defectors such as the Libyan diplomats posted abroad and some of the Ministers are unknown quantities in Libya. They will have only limited value as assets for the US.
• Fifthly, there are many strands involved in the protest movement in Libya----anti-Gadaffi elements, rival tribes and anti-foreigner elements such as those who attacked Chinese and South Korean workers and construction sites. Resentment over the better quality of life enjoyed by foreign workers has been an important factor in complicating the situation in Libya. One has not so far seen attacks on foreign workers in Tunisia or Egypt or other countries affected by the current unrest.
• Sixthly, there are only two ways of bringing about the end of the Gaddafi regime---- by inciting a revolt against him by the multiple forces raised by him. The West has not so far been able to do this. The other way is by training and arming the protesters who have liberated large pockets of Eastern Libya, with Benghazi as the epicenter, and helping them to march on to Tripoli to get rid of Gaddafi. Distances involved are large and even if the West provides them with an air cover by enforcing a no-fly zone, the marchers have to cross areas inhabited by tribals who have till now been loyal to Gadaffi. If the fighting is fierce and continues for a long time, there could be a danger of a balkanization of Libya.
2. Gaddafi may not be another Mubarak, who left with his tail tucked between his legs. He may turn out to be another Saddam Hussein----defiant till he dies. ( 1-3-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
REPEATED CALLS FOR JASMINE STROLLS IN CHINA
B.RAMAN
Repeated calls for “Jasmine Strolls” in Chinese cities, including Beijing, emanating from overseas Chinese web sites have added to the nervousness of the Chinese authorities.
2.A Jasmine Stroll is a stroll undertaken by those responding to the calls at pre-indicated places at pre-indicated timings to quietly demonstrate, without shouting slogans, their demand for the end of the rule of the Chinese Communist Party and for democracy and human rights. The purpose of the Strolls is not to indulge in any noticeable protest activity, but just to get out into the streets in large numbers and take a Stroll as a silent mark of their demands.
3. Two such calls have so far been issued---the second one being for Jasmine Strolls on February 27. Nervous Chinese authorities deployed the police and officials of the Ministry of Public Security in large numbers in different cities. While there were no unusual crowds in the streets in addition to the usual Sunday strollers, the authorities have been rounding up suspicious persons for interrogation.
4. It has been reported that among those who took a stroll at the pre-indicated time in a pre-indicated street in Beijing was the outgoing US Ambassador Mr.Jon Huntsman. Following this, the Chinese authorities have blocked his name from all search engines. A call has now been disseminated for another Jasmine Stroll on March 6.
5. The Chinese authorities have stepped up security precautions in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region and in Chinese-Controlled Xinjiang. It has been reported that all mobile phones of Tibetans and Uighurs are being checked for any prohibited anti-Government songs. Mobile phones containing anti-Government tunes are being seized and the users detained for interrogation.
6. In Tibet and Xinjiang, shops selling books, newspapers and music CDs are being checked for any prohibited material or for cuttings or Xerox copies of reports regarding the unrest in Tunisia and Egypt.
7. The authorities’ security concerns have increased since many of the Chinese being evacuated from Libya in special air lifts following attacks on Chinese workers in Libya are Uighurs. They are apparently worried that these Uighurs, on their return to Xinjiang, might spread stories of the unrest in Egypt, Tunisia and other places and this could encourage the inhabitants of Xinjiang to come out in the streets.
8. The Chinese authorities have not yet informed their population of the details of the attacks on the Chinese workers in Libya. So far, there have been no attacks on Chinese workers in other countries affected by the present unrest. If there are similar incidents in other countries, the Government’s embarrassment could increase.
9. Radio Free Asia, funded by the US State Department, continues to disseminate guidance to the people of China as to how to circumvent Internet controls. ( 28-2-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Repeated calls for “Jasmine Strolls” in Chinese cities, including Beijing, emanating from overseas Chinese web sites have added to the nervousness of the Chinese authorities.
2.A Jasmine Stroll is a stroll undertaken by those responding to the calls at pre-indicated places at pre-indicated timings to quietly demonstrate, without shouting slogans, their demand for the end of the rule of the Chinese Communist Party and for democracy and human rights. The purpose of the Strolls is not to indulge in any noticeable protest activity, but just to get out into the streets in large numbers and take a Stroll as a silent mark of their demands.
3. Two such calls have so far been issued---the second one being for Jasmine Strolls on February 27. Nervous Chinese authorities deployed the police and officials of the Ministry of Public Security in large numbers in different cities. While there were no unusual crowds in the streets in addition to the usual Sunday strollers, the authorities have been rounding up suspicious persons for interrogation.
4. It has been reported that among those who took a stroll at the pre-indicated time in a pre-indicated street in Beijing was the outgoing US Ambassador Mr.Jon Huntsman. Following this, the Chinese authorities have blocked his name from all search engines. A call has now been disseminated for another Jasmine Stroll on March 6.
5. The Chinese authorities have stepped up security precautions in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region and in Chinese-Controlled Xinjiang. It has been reported that all mobile phones of Tibetans and Uighurs are being checked for any prohibited anti-Government songs. Mobile phones containing anti-Government tunes are being seized and the users detained for interrogation.
6. In Tibet and Xinjiang, shops selling books, newspapers and music CDs are being checked for any prohibited material or for cuttings or Xerox copies of reports regarding the unrest in Tunisia and Egypt.
7. The authorities’ security concerns have increased since many of the Chinese being evacuated from Libya in special air lifts following attacks on Chinese workers in Libya are Uighurs. They are apparently worried that these Uighurs, on their return to Xinjiang, might spread stories of the unrest in Egypt, Tunisia and other places and this could encourage the inhabitants of Xinjiang to come out in the streets.
8. The Chinese authorities have not yet informed their population of the details of the attacks on the Chinese workers in Libya. So far, there have been no attacks on Chinese workers in other countries affected by the present unrest. If there are similar incidents in other countries, the Government’s embarrassment could increase.
9. Radio Free Asia, funded by the US State Department, continues to disseminate guidance to the people of China as to how to circumvent Internet controls. ( 28-2-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, February 27, 2011
ORISSA: CAPITULATION TO INSURGENTS
B.RAMAN
The Orissa Government’s handling of the situation arising from the kidnapping on February 16,2011, of Shri Ravella Vineel Krishna, the popular District Collector of Malkangiri District, and a junior engineer Pabitra Majhi by the Maoists active in the District has evoked mixed reactions.
2.While some on the left of the political spectrum have showed understanding of the decision of the Orissa Government to accept 14 demands of the Maoists to secure the release of the kidnapped officers, political parties on the right of the spectrum such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its representatives and many retired officers of the security bureaucracy have strongly criticized the State Government for conceding the demands of the Maoists.
3. In an editorial titled “Lessons From the Kidnapping” published on February 26, “The Hindu” of Chennai, whose Editor N.Ram is known for his sympathies with the leftists, has praised the “astute handling” of the situation by the State Government. Even before the demands were conceded by the State Government, one saw examples of the hardline views during “The Buck Stops Here” programme of Barkha Dutt on NDTV on February 21. Shri A.K.Doval, former Director of the Intelligence Bureau, and Shri Kanchan Gupta, Associate Editor of the “Pioneer’, a daily close to the BJP, expressed themselves in favour of a “no concessions” approach. Shri Gupta, who is known to be an uncritical admirer of Israel’s no-holds-barred approach to terrorism and insurgency, was even prepared to face the risk of the death of the two officers if that was the outcome of a hardline approach.
4. There has to be an agreement on one point---it was extremely unwise on the part of the District Collector to have undertaken a village visit in an insurgency-affected area without a security escort. The District Collector probably thought that what he apparently looked upon as a brave gesture to the people of the area by touring without security would bring the people of the area closer to the administration. He did not seem to have realized that such gestures were ill-advised in insurgency-affected areas and could prove counter-productive. His action in dispensing with security while touring enabled the Maoists to kidnap him and the junior engineer accompanying him in order to secure their demands and thus placed the State in an unenviable position at the mercy of the insurgents. There are other ways of bringing the people closer to the administration without dispensing with necessary security measures. The hostage situation might not have arisen but for this ill-advised action of the Collector.
5. Once the kidnapping had taken place and the Maoists had taken advantage of the hostage-taking to exercise pressure on the State Government to concede their demands, the State Government was confronted with three difficult questions—Should it negotiate with the insurgents? If so, should it concede their demands? If it did not, what could be the public reaction to the possible death of two dedicated public servants?
6. The counter-terrorism doctrine of practically all countries of the democratic world, including the much-admired Israel, do not rule out negotiations. In fact, agreeing to negotiations is viewed as an essential first step in the strategy to deal with hostage-taking. That is why techniques of negotiations with terrorists or insurgents is included in the syllabus of counter-terrorism training courses in many countries. When Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister in the 1980s and the late R.N.Kao was her Senior Adviser, some officers of the IB and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) were got trained in negotiation techniques either in the UK or the US.
7.Negotiations, which are an essential part of the drill to deal with hostage situations, have two aspects---operational and psychological. The operational aspect is about giving time to the intelligence and security agencies to collect ground information in order to prepare themselves for physical intervention to rescue the hostages should such intervention become necessary or feasible.
8. The psychological aspect relates to exercising pressure on the insurgents or terrorists either directly or through intermediaries to release the hostages. India had been facing hostage situations since 1971 when two members of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKJLF) hijacked a plane of the Indian Airlines to Lahore. All Governments in power when these incidents took place had negotiated with the hostage-takers either directly or through intermediaries. It is, therefore, pointless to say that no negotiations should be held. Such a position would be unwisely rigid and come in the way of operational flexibility.
9. It is more difficult to answer the second question---should the demands of the hostage-takers be conceded? The basic principle of all counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency doctrines is that the demands should not be conceded, come what may. While this principle is generally adhered to in most countries even at the risk of the hostages being killed, history of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency has instances where the demands were conceded for some reason or the other even by countries such as Israel or the US even though they openly did not admit so. In India itself, there were two controversial instances of the demands being conceded---- to secure the release of the daughter of Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, the then Home Minister in the V.P. Singh Government, in 1989, and the release of some terrorists by the Government of Atal Behari Vajpayee in December 1999 to secure the release of an Indian Airlines Plane hijacked to Kandahar and its passengers. While the release of some terrorists to secure the release of the Mufti’s daughter was inexcusable, the release of some terrorists to secure the release of a large number of IAC passengers was understandable. Once the Vajpayee Government, through its mishandling of the situation, allowed the hijacked plane to leave the Indian airspace and go to Kandahar, it had only two options---either let the passengers die or concede the demands of the terrorists. Public reaction would have been strong had it allowed such a large number of civilians to be killed.
10. In the history of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, there have been instances where States had rejected the demands of the hostage-takers even at the risk of the hostages being killed when the number of hostages was small and their deaths would not have caused strong public reaction. Examples: The action of the V.P.Singh Government in refusing to concede the demands of the terrorists who kidnapped the Vice-Chancellor of the Kashmir University and one of his staff members in 1990 resulting in their death; the refusal of the Narasimha Rao Government in 1995 to concede the demands of the Al Faran terrorists who had kidnapped five foreign tourists, one of whom managed to escape and the others were allegedly killed by the terrorists; and the refusal of the US and Pakistan Governments to concede the demands of the terrorists who had kidnapped Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, in 2002, which resulted in his death. While the deaths of the tourists in 1995 and of Pearl in 2002 due to the strong line taken by the Governments did not result in strong public reaction, the deaths of the Vice-Chancellor and his staff member did create strong public reaction since it came soon after the surrender by the V.P.Singh Government to the demands of the terrorists to secure the release of the daughter of the then Home Minister. In other hostage situations, the hostages were got released through psychological pressure on the hostages during prolonged negotiations.
11. The major mistake committed by the Orissa Government in dealing with the kidnapping of the District Collector and the Junior Engineer is that it would appear to have concluded at the very beginning of the situation that it had no other option but to concede the demands of the hostage-takers. As a result, the principal aim of the negotiations became not giving the intelligence and security agencies time to prepare the ground for a possible rescue mission, but to reach a compromise with the hostage-takers on their demands. Once the Maoists realized that the State Government had no stomach for prolonged negotiations or intervention to rescue the hostages, they stuck to all their demands and forced the Government to capitulate. The Government seemed to have capitulated without any exercise to identify the various operational and psychological options available to it. Even if the Government was mentally prepared to concede some of the demands in order to save the lives of two dedicated public servants, it could have explored the option of conceding those demands of the Maoists relating to the welfare and grievances of the local people and rejecting those demands which could affect the counter-insurgency operations. It did not do so. It just capitulated without even seeming resistance to the demands of the Maoists. This is likely to affect adversely the effectiveness of future counter-insurgency operations in the State. (27-2-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The Orissa Government’s handling of the situation arising from the kidnapping on February 16,2011, of Shri Ravella Vineel Krishna, the popular District Collector of Malkangiri District, and a junior engineer Pabitra Majhi by the Maoists active in the District has evoked mixed reactions.
2.While some on the left of the political spectrum have showed understanding of the decision of the Orissa Government to accept 14 demands of the Maoists to secure the release of the kidnapped officers, political parties on the right of the spectrum such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its representatives and many retired officers of the security bureaucracy have strongly criticized the State Government for conceding the demands of the Maoists.
3. In an editorial titled “Lessons From the Kidnapping” published on February 26, “The Hindu” of Chennai, whose Editor N.Ram is known for his sympathies with the leftists, has praised the “astute handling” of the situation by the State Government. Even before the demands were conceded by the State Government, one saw examples of the hardline views during “The Buck Stops Here” programme of Barkha Dutt on NDTV on February 21. Shri A.K.Doval, former Director of the Intelligence Bureau, and Shri Kanchan Gupta, Associate Editor of the “Pioneer’, a daily close to the BJP, expressed themselves in favour of a “no concessions” approach. Shri Gupta, who is known to be an uncritical admirer of Israel’s no-holds-barred approach to terrorism and insurgency, was even prepared to face the risk of the death of the two officers if that was the outcome of a hardline approach.
4. There has to be an agreement on one point---it was extremely unwise on the part of the District Collector to have undertaken a village visit in an insurgency-affected area without a security escort. The District Collector probably thought that what he apparently looked upon as a brave gesture to the people of the area by touring without security would bring the people of the area closer to the administration. He did not seem to have realized that such gestures were ill-advised in insurgency-affected areas and could prove counter-productive. His action in dispensing with security while touring enabled the Maoists to kidnap him and the junior engineer accompanying him in order to secure their demands and thus placed the State in an unenviable position at the mercy of the insurgents. There are other ways of bringing the people closer to the administration without dispensing with necessary security measures. The hostage situation might not have arisen but for this ill-advised action of the Collector.
5. Once the kidnapping had taken place and the Maoists had taken advantage of the hostage-taking to exercise pressure on the State Government to concede their demands, the State Government was confronted with three difficult questions—Should it negotiate with the insurgents? If so, should it concede their demands? If it did not, what could be the public reaction to the possible death of two dedicated public servants?
6. The counter-terrorism doctrine of practically all countries of the democratic world, including the much-admired Israel, do not rule out negotiations. In fact, agreeing to negotiations is viewed as an essential first step in the strategy to deal with hostage-taking. That is why techniques of negotiations with terrorists or insurgents is included in the syllabus of counter-terrorism training courses in many countries. When Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister in the 1980s and the late R.N.Kao was her Senior Adviser, some officers of the IB and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) were got trained in negotiation techniques either in the UK or the US.
7.Negotiations, which are an essential part of the drill to deal with hostage situations, have two aspects---operational and psychological. The operational aspect is about giving time to the intelligence and security agencies to collect ground information in order to prepare themselves for physical intervention to rescue the hostages should such intervention become necessary or feasible.
8. The psychological aspect relates to exercising pressure on the insurgents or terrorists either directly or through intermediaries to release the hostages. India had been facing hostage situations since 1971 when two members of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKJLF) hijacked a plane of the Indian Airlines to Lahore. All Governments in power when these incidents took place had negotiated with the hostage-takers either directly or through intermediaries. It is, therefore, pointless to say that no negotiations should be held. Such a position would be unwisely rigid and come in the way of operational flexibility.
9. It is more difficult to answer the second question---should the demands of the hostage-takers be conceded? The basic principle of all counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency doctrines is that the demands should not be conceded, come what may. While this principle is generally adhered to in most countries even at the risk of the hostages being killed, history of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency has instances where the demands were conceded for some reason or the other even by countries such as Israel or the US even though they openly did not admit so. In India itself, there were two controversial instances of the demands being conceded---- to secure the release of the daughter of Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, the then Home Minister in the V.P. Singh Government, in 1989, and the release of some terrorists by the Government of Atal Behari Vajpayee in December 1999 to secure the release of an Indian Airlines Plane hijacked to Kandahar and its passengers. While the release of some terrorists to secure the release of the Mufti’s daughter was inexcusable, the release of some terrorists to secure the release of a large number of IAC passengers was understandable. Once the Vajpayee Government, through its mishandling of the situation, allowed the hijacked plane to leave the Indian airspace and go to Kandahar, it had only two options---either let the passengers die or concede the demands of the terrorists. Public reaction would have been strong had it allowed such a large number of civilians to be killed.
10. In the history of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, there have been instances where States had rejected the demands of the hostage-takers even at the risk of the hostages being killed when the number of hostages was small and their deaths would not have caused strong public reaction. Examples: The action of the V.P.Singh Government in refusing to concede the demands of the terrorists who kidnapped the Vice-Chancellor of the Kashmir University and one of his staff members in 1990 resulting in their death; the refusal of the Narasimha Rao Government in 1995 to concede the demands of the Al Faran terrorists who had kidnapped five foreign tourists, one of whom managed to escape and the others were allegedly killed by the terrorists; and the refusal of the US and Pakistan Governments to concede the demands of the terrorists who had kidnapped Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, in 2002, which resulted in his death. While the deaths of the tourists in 1995 and of Pearl in 2002 due to the strong line taken by the Governments did not result in strong public reaction, the deaths of the Vice-Chancellor and his staff member did create strong public reaction since it came soon after the surrender by the V.P.Singh Government to the demands of the terrorists to secure the release of the daughter of the then Home Minister. In other hostage situations, the hostages were got released through psychological pressure on the hostages during prolonged negotiations.
11. The major mistake committed by the Orissa Government in dealing with the kidnapping of the District Collector and the Junior Engineer is that it would appear to have concluded at the very beginning of the situation that it had no other option but to concede the demands of the hostage-takers. As a result, the principal aim of the negotiations became not giving the intelligence and security agencies time to prepare the ground for a possible rescue mission, but to reach a compromise with the hostage-takers on their demands. Once the Maoists realized that the State Government had no stomach for prolonged negotiations or intervention to rescue the hostages, they stuck to all their demands and forced the Government to capitulate. The Government seemed to have capitulated without any exercise to identify the various operational and psychological options available to it. Even if the Government was mentally prepared to concede some of the demands in order to save the lives of two dedicated public servants, it could have explored the option of conceding those demands of the Maoists relating to the welfare and grievances of the local people and rejecting those demands which could affect the counter-insurgency operations. It did not do so. It just capitulated without even seeming resistance to the demands of the Maoists. This is likely to affect adversely the effectiveness of future counter-insurgency operations in the State. (27-2-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, February 26, 2011
INDIA & THE INDIAN OCEAN
B.RAMAN
( Based on a talk delivered by me at a seminar on the Indian Ocean at Bangalore on February 26,2010. It was jointly organized by the Asia Centre, Bangalore, and the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi )
The main security threats to Indian interests in the Indian Ocean area arise from three factors---firstly, the gradual erosion of the Indian political influence in the area; secondly, the increase in the Chinese presence in the area; and thirdly, the uncontrolled activities of the Somali pirates.
2.Nowhere is the erosion of the Indian political influence more evident than in Sri Lanka where despite our assistance to the Government of Sri Lanka in its successful counter-insurgency operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) we have not been able to protect either the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils or the lives and livelihood of Indian Tamil fishermen, who have been repeatedly at the mercy of the Sri Lankan Navy.
3. Our repeated pleas for finding an early political solution to the grievances of the Sri Lankan Tamils and for stopping attacks---some of them brutal and fatal--- on Indian Tamil fishermen have had no impact on the Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa. Rajapaksa, while pretending to be sensitive to Indian interests, has been ignoring them without any fear of the likely consequences. He has no fear because he is confident that there will be no consequences. India’s core interests in the region to the south of India have been repeatedly ignored by Rajapaksa.
4. Our dilemma in Sri Lanka underlines the hard reality that having a strong Navy alone would not be sufficient to make our core interests prevail in the Indian Ocean region. There has to be a political courage and will to use our naval strength in support of our core interests. In the absence of such courage and will, the ships of our Navy will remain not a powerful arm of the Indian State ready to go into action if our core interests are threatened, but mere oceanic curios, exhibited in public and admired, but not feared.
5.The negative state of affairs that we are confronted with in Sri Lanka today could be repeated in the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles in the years-if not months-- to come if the Indian political leadership is not more assertive in protecting Indian interests in these Island countries.
6. Fortunately, in the Maldives, the Indian interests still prevail despite an increase in political and economic contacts between China and the Maldives. The Government of Maldives continues to look up to India for strengthening its capacity for meeting threats to its security, which presently mostly arise from non-State actors such as Pakistan-based jihadi elements and the Somali pirates. It is still attentive to Indian interests in the area.
7. So is the case in Seychelles. Despite the Chinese offer of help to Seychelles for strengthening its anti-piracy capabilities, which its has accepted, the Government of Seychelles continues to be as receptive to Indian offers of assistance and co-operation as it was before.
8. However, one has reasons to be concerned over recent developments in Mauritius since the visit of President Hu Jintao of China to Port Louis in February,2009. During his visit, China announced a credit at low interest of US $ 260 million to Mauritius to modernize and expand its airport. He said that trade between the two countries had increased by 11.7 per cent during 2008 to reach US $ 323 million. He also announced an interest-free loan of US $ 5.9 million and a grant of 30 million yuan ( about US $ 5 million ). Mauritian Prime Minister Navinchandra Ramgoolam said that the two countries had discussed possible further assistance to improve transport in and out of the island's congested capital.
9.Hu pledged to speed up the construction of the China-funded $730 million Economic and Trade Zone north of the capital. The Tianli project, as it is called, will be the largest single foreign-funded project in Mauritius creating about 40,000 jobs. Between the recognition of China by Mauritius in 1972 and Hu’s visit in February 2009, the total value of the Chinese assistance to Mauritius amounted to US $ 117 million. The fresh assistance extended since then has crossed US $ one billion--- an almost ten-fold increase. Thirteen Chinese companies operate in Mauritius in the textiles, construction and IT sectors.
10.The 521-acre economic and trade zone is an important part of what China calls the “going out” policy and its Africa strategy. The objective is to use Mauritius as a platform for servicing its construction and business projects in Southern Africa. The corporate headquarters of Chinese companies operating in Southern Africa are expected to be located in the new commercial city which China will construct outside Port Louis under this project. The zone with a modern Chinese-styled city is being built by a consortium consisting of the Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Co., Ltd., the state-controlled Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co. Ltd and the Taiyuan Iron & Steel Group Co. Ltd. The idea seems to be to convert Mauritius into a Singapore of Southern Africa to serve China’s Africa strategy. Since Mauritius does not have enough skilled workers to meet the requirements of the Chinese-aided projects, it has allowed China to bring its own nationals to work in these projects. As a result, about 50 per cent of Mauritius’ foreign labour force could be Chinese. There could be more Chinese than Indians working in Mauritius.
11.The corporate city being built by the Chinese will compete with the Ebene Cyber City constructed with Indian assistance. Huawei, the Chinese IT company, reportedly operates from the Cyber City. It provides financial services to Chinese companies in Southern Africa.
12.In an article titled “China makes foray into Mauritius” published on January 25,2010, the “Financial Times” of London wrote: “China’s state-led approach to foreign investment is muscling India aside in its traditional “backyard” by investing $700m in a special economic zone in the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius to service Beijing’s expansion in Africa. Ramakrishna Sithanen, the vice-prime minister of Mauritius and minister of finance, said China was “extremely aggressively” pursuing its objectives in Africa via Mauritius with a wave of strategic investments on the island. He said China’s “different approach”, which forcefully combined business and government interests, was in contrast to India’s more fragmented style that had less backing from the state. So strong was his government’s relationship with Beijing that he said the island had been able to call on the personal intervention of Hu Jintao, China’s president, to sort out problems. China’s participation in Mauritius is a key part of the island’s diversification away from a sugar cane and tourism economy into logistics, information technology and financial services. There are plans to build a logistics and services hub in the economic zone, together with a university and an oceanographic research centre. Mr Sithanen said the Mauritian government had secured China’s consent that the economic zone would not be exclusively for Chinese companies but could be used by others seeking to invest in the region.”
13. Having seen the gradual erosion of the Indian political influence in Sri Lanka, we are now seeing a similar erosion in Mauritius It used to be under Indian cultural and economic influence. It continues to be under the Indian cultural influence, but the economic influence is more and more Chinese. As the Chinese economic influence grows, so will its political influence. In protecting one’s core interests, it is the economic and political influence that matters and not the cultural influence.
14. The gradual decline in our political and economic influence in the Indian Ocean region---whether we admit it or not--- has been accompanied by a steady increase in the Chinese onshore presence in the countries of this region--- mainly for helping these countries in developing their infrastructure--- an airport and an economic and trade city in Mauritius, a commercial port and an international airport in Hambantota in Sri Lanka, expansion and modernization of the Colombo port, road and rail repairs and construction in others parts of Sri Lanka, construction of a new port at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, gas and oil pipelines connecting Kyaukpyu and Yunnan so that gas and oil produced locally and coming by tankers from West Asia and Africa could be moved to Yunnan without having to pass the Malacca Strait and construction of a rapid rail system connecting Rangoon (Yangon) with Yunnan. Talks are on with Bangladesh for Chinese assistance in the modernization of the Chittagong port and for connecting the rail systems of Bangladesh and Myanmar. China is the largest foreign investor in Mynmar today, with the total value of actual and promised investments already touching US $ three billion.
15. For expanding and strengthening its political and economic influence in the Indian Ocean region China has two precious assets which India is not in a position to match now and will not be in a position to match in the foreseeable future---- its vast cash reserves and its vastly superior infrastructure construction skills. There is a hunger for the development of the infrastructure in all these counties. When these countries think of expanding and modernizing their infrastructure, they think of China first and only then of India.
16. Even the best of Navies with a vast reach in the Indian Ocean region will be only of limited use in the absence of commensurate political and economic influence in the countries of the Ocean region. In building up its onshore presence and influence, China has taken a head-start over India. The Chinese Navy still cannot match and will not be in a position to match the off-shore presence of our Navy in the Indian Ocean area, but Beijing’s onshore presence and influence will pose increasing challenges to the Indian political leadership and diplomacy.
17.Periodic reports of a speculative nature regarding a Chinese interest in the acquisition of military base ---particularly naval---base--- facilities in the Indian Ocean region have not been corroborated. The present Chinese interest is in strengthening their economic presence in this area. When the economic presence goes up, political influence automatically goes up. Yes, the Chinese have been developing a robust military supply relationship of a strategic nature with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. One could see the beginnings of such a relationship with Bangladesh too. Do these relationships form part of a well thought-out strategy to acquire a permanent military presence in this area? There is no evidence at present in support of such a suspicion. The Chinese focus is on establishing a strong economic presence and through that a strong political influence. Their willingness to enter into military supply and capacity-building relationships with the countries of this region is a tactical move to strengthen their economic and political influence.
18 The Chinese have been taking care to prevent their growing on-shore influence in this area from being seen as a carefully calculated move to undermine the Indian influence. They project their moves as not inspired by a larger Indian Ocean strategy, but merely as responses to requests for assistance received from the countries of this region. Whether the Chinese are making calculated moves to undermine the Indian influence or not, the net effect will be an undermining of the Indian influence
19. The present Chinese focus is on the Pacific. Their efforts are concentrated towards building a strong Pacific presence for their Navy and Air Force so as to be able to counter the US presence and achieve parity with it. Building an equal Indian Ocean presence is not yet part of their short or medium term strategy. They are not in a position to achieve parity with the Indian Ocean presence of the US and India. I do not visualize a Chinese threat to the naval presence of the US and India in the short and medium terms.
20. Compared to their Pacific naval strategy, there is very little debate in China on the contours of an Indian Ocean strategy. They do not have the required material resources to be able to challenge the prominence presently enjoyed by the US and Indian Navies in the Indian Ocean region. Their interests are presently focused on protecting the security of their energy supplies and keeping Pakistan propped up as a credible threat to India.
21. The entry of Chinese naval ships on anti-piracy patrols into the Indian Ocean region and the Gulf of Aden has not created any adverse reactions in the region or in the West. The Chinese concerns over the growing threats from the Somali pirates to their ships and crew are accepted by the countries of the region and the West as natural. The regular anti-piracy patrols undertaken by ships of the Chinese Navy in this area ,without causing any regional concerns, have enabled the Chinese Navy to familiarize itself with operating conditions and difficulties in the waters of this region, build up Navy-Navy relationships and offer Chinese assistance in capacity-building.
22. Should their anti-piracy forays be used as the initial building block for a long-term Indian Ocean strategy? The Chinese are avoiding any open discussion on this question lest they give rise to unnecessary concerns in the region about Chinese naval assertiveness in the Indian Ocean region as a follow-up to their assertiveness in the Pacific. Occasional voices are heard from the community of retired Chinese naval officers on the need for a naval base in this region to meet the logistics and rest and recreation requirements of their anti-piracy patrols, but such voices have been discouraged by the Government and party leadership to prevent undue concerns. A long-term Chinese naval strategy for the Indian Ocean region is not yet in the making.
23. In working out an Indian strategy for the Indian Ocean region, the political, economic and naval aspects have to receive equal attention. So too the aspect of the Indian and US Navies co-operating with each other to maintain their present primacy in this region. Working out a national Indian Ocean Region strategy should go hand in hand with working out a joint Indo-US strategy to safeguard their interests in the Indian Ocean region. (26-2-11)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
( Based on a talk delivered by me at a seminar on the Indian Ocean at Bangalore on February 26,2010. It was jointly organized by the Asia Centre, Bangalore, and the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi )
The main security threats to Indian interests in the Indian Ocean area arise from three factors---firstly, the gradual erosion of the Indian political influence in the area; secondly, the increase in the Chinese presence in the area; and thirdly, the uncontrolled activities of the Somali pirates.
2.Nowhere is the erosion of the Indian political influence more evident than in Sri Lanka where despite our assistance to the Government of Sri Lanka in its successful counter-insurgency operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) we have not been able to protect either the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils or the lives and livelihood of Indian Tamil fishermen, who have been repeatedly at the mercy of the Sri Lankan Navy.
3. Our repeated pleas for finding an early political solution to the grievances of the Sri Lankan Tamils and for stopping attacks---some of them brutal and fatal--- on Indian Tamil fishermen have had no impact on the Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa. Rajapaksa, while pretending to be sensitive to Indian interests, has been ignoring them without any fear of the likely consequences. He has no fear because he is confident that there will be no consequences. India’s core interests in the region to the south of India have been repeatedly ignored by Rajapaksa.
4. Our dilemma in Sri Lanka underlines the hard reality that having a strong Navy alone would not be sufficient to make our core interests prevail in the Indian Ocean region. There has to be a political courage and will to use our naval strength in support of our core interests. In the absence of such courage and will, the ships of our Navy will remain not a powerful arm of the Indian State ready to go into action if our core interests are threatened, but mere oceanic curios, exhibited in public and admired, but not feared.
5.The negative state of affairs that we are confronted with in Sri Lanka today could be repeated in the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles in the years-if not months-- to come if the Indian political leadership is not more assertive in protecting Indian interests in these Island countries.
6. Fortunately, in the Maldives, the Indian interests still prevail despite an increase in political and economic contacts between China and the Maldives. The Government of Maldives continues to look up to India for strengthening its capacity for meeting threats to its security, which presently mostly arise from non-State actors such as Pakistan-based jihadi elements and the Somali pirates. It is still attentive to Indian interests in the area.
7. So is the case in Seychelles. Despite the Chinese offer of help to Seychelles for strengthening its anti-piracy capabilities, which its has accepted, the Government of Seychelles continues to be as receptive to Indian offers of assistance and co-operation as it was before.
8. However, one has reasons to be concerned over recent developments in Mauritius since the visit of President Hu Jintao of China to Port Louis in February,2009. During his visit, China announced a credit at low interest of US $ 260 million to Mauritius to modernize and expand its airport. He said that trade between the two countries had increased by 11.7 per cent during 2008 to reach US $ 323 million. He also announced an interest-free loan of US $ 5.9 million and a grant of 30 million yuan ( about US $ 5 million ). Mauritian Prime Minister Navinchandra Ramgoolam said that the two countries had discussed possible further assistance to improve transport in and out of the island's congested capital.
9.Hu pledged to speed up the construction of the China-funded $730 million Economic and Trade Zone north of the capital. The Tianli project, as it is called, will be the largest single foreign-funded project in Mauritius creating about 40,000 jobs. Between the recognition of China by Mauritius in 1972 and Hu’s visit in February 2009, the total value of the Chinese assistance to Mauritius amounted to US $ 117 million. The fresh assistance extended since then has crossed US $ one billion--- an almost ten-fold increase. Thirteen Chinese companies operate in Mauritius in the textiles, construction and IT sectors.
10.The 521-acre economic and trade zone is an important part of what China calls the “going out” policy and its Africa strategy. The objective is to use Mauritius as a platform for servicing its construction and business projects in Southern Africa. The corporate headquarters of Chinese companies operating in Southern Africa are expected to be located in the new commercial city which China will construct outside Port Louis under this project. The zone with a modern Chinese-styled city is being built by a consortium consisting of the Shanxi Tianli Enterprise Co., Ltd., the state-controlled Shanxi Coking Coal Group Co. Ltd and the Taiyuan Iron & Steel Group Co. Ltd. The idea seems to be to convert Mauritius into a Singapore of Southern Africa to serve China’s Africa strategy. Since Mauritius does not have enough skilled workers to meet the requirements of the Chinese-aided projects, it has allowed China to bring its own nationals to work in these projects. As a result, about 50 per cent of Mauritius’ foreign labour force could be Chinese. There could be more Chinese than Indians working in Mauritius.
11.The corporate city being built by the Chinese will compete with the Ebene Cyber City constructed with Indian assistance. Huawei, the Chinese IT company, reportedly operates from the Cyber City. It provides financial services to Chinese companies in Southern Africa.
12.In an article titled “China makes foray into Mauritius” published on January 25,2010, the “Financial Times” of London wrote: “China’s state-led approach to foreign investment is muscling India aside in its traditional “backyard” by investing $700m in a special economic zone in the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius to service Beijing’s expansion in Africa. Ramakrishna Sithanen, the vice-prime minister of Mauritius and minister of finance, said China was “extremely aggressively” pursuing its objectives in Africa via Mauritius with a wave of strategic investments on the island. He said China’s “different approach”, which forcefully combined business and government interests, was in contrast to India’s more fragmented style that had less backing from the state. So strong was his government’s relationship with Beijing that he said the island had been able to call on the personal intervention of Hu Jintao, China’s president, to sort out problems. China’s participation in Mauritius is a key part of the island’s diversification away from a sugar cane and tourism economy into logistics, information technology and financial services. There are plans to build a logistics and services hub in the economic zone, together with a university and an oceanographic research centre. Mr Sithanen said the Mauritian government had secured China’s consent that the economic zone would not be exclusively for Chinese companies but could be used by others seeking to invest in the region.”
13. Having seen the gradual erosion of the Indian political influence in Sri Lanka, we are now seeing a similar erosion in Mauritius It used to be under Indian cultural and economic influence. It continues to be under the Indian cultural influence, but the economic influence is more and more Chinese. As the Chinese economic influence grows, so will its political influence. In protecting one’s core interests, it is the economic and political influence that matters and not the cultural influence.
14. The gradual decline in our political and economic influence in the Indian Ocean region---whether we admit it or not--- has been accompanied by a steady increase in the Chinese onshore presence in the countries of this region--- mainly for helping these countries in developing their infrastructure--- an airport and an economic and trade city in Mauritius, a commercial port and an international airport in Hambantota in Sri Lanka, expansion and modernization of the Colombo port, road and rail repairs and construction in others parts of Sri Lanka, construction of a new port at Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, gas and oil pipelines connecting Kyaukpyu and Yunnan so that gas and oil produced locally and coming by tankers from West Asia and Africa could be moved to Yunnan without having to pass the Malacca Strait and construction of a rapid rail system connecting Rangoon (Yangon) with Yunnan. Talks are on with Bangladesh for Chinese assistance in the modernization of the Chittagong port and for connecting the rail systems of Bangladesh and Myanmar. China is the largest foreign investor in Mynmar today, with the total value of actual and promised investments already touching US $ three billion.
15. For expanding and strengthening its political and economic influence in the Indian Ocean region China has two precious assets which India is not in a position to match now and will not be in a position to match in the foreseeable future---- its vast cash reserves and its vastly superior infrastructure construction skills. There is a hunger for the development of the infrastructure in all these counties. When these countries think of expanding and modernizing their infrastructure, they think of China first and only then of India.
16. Even the best of Navies with a vast reach in the Indian Ocean region will be only of limited use in the absence of commensurate political and economic influence in the countries of the Ocean region. In building up its onshore presence and influence, China has taken a head-start over India. The Chinese Navy still cannot match and will not be in a position to match the off-shore presence of our Navy in the Indian Ocean area, but Beijing’s onshore presence and influence will pose increasing challenges to the Indian political leadership and diplomacy.
17.Periodic reports of a speculative nature regarding a Chinese interest in the acquisition of military base ---particularly naval---base--- facilities in the Indian Ocean region have not been corroborated. The present Chinese interest is in strengthening their economic presence in this area. When the economic presence goes up, political influence automatically goes up. Yes, the Chinese have been developing a robust military supply relationship of a strategic nature with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. One could see the beginnings of such a relationship with Bangladesh too. Do these relationships form part of a well thought-out strategy to acquire a permanent military presence in this area? There is no evidence at present in support of such a suspicion. The Chinese focus is on establishing a strong economic presence and through that a strong political influence. Their willingness to enter into military supply and capacity-building relationships with the countries of this region is a tactical move to strengthen their economic and political influence.
18 The Chinese have been taking care to prevent their growing on-shore influence in this area from being seen as a carefully calculated move to undermine the Indian influence. They project their moves as not inspired by a larger Indian Ocean strategy, but merely as responses to requests for assistance received from the countries of this region. Whether the Chinese are making calculated moves to undermine the Indian influence or not, the net effect will be an undermining of the Indian influence
19. The present Chinese focus is on the Pacific. Their efforts are concentrated towards building a strong Pacific presence for their Navy and Air Force so as to be able to counter the US presence and achieve parity with it. Building an equal Indian Ocean presence is not yet part of their short or medium term strategy. They are not in a position to achieve parity with the Indian Ocean presence of the US and India. I do not visualize a Chinese threat to the naval presence of the US and India in the short and medium terms.
20. Compared to their Pacific naval strategy, there is very little debate in China on the contours of an Indian Ocean strategy. They do not have the required material resources to be able to challenge the prominence presently enjoyed by the US and Indian Navies in the Indian Ocean region. Their interests are presently focused on protecting the security of their energy supplies and keeping Pakistan propped up as a credible threat to India.
21. The entry of Chinese naval ships on anti-piracy patrols into the Indian Ocean region and the Gulf of Aden has not created any adverse reactions in the region or in the West. The Chinese concerns over the growing threats from the Somali pirates to their ships and crew are accepted by the countries of the region and the West as natural. The regular anti-piracy patrols undertaken by ships of the Chinese Navy in this area ,without causing any regional concerns, have enabled the Chinese Navy to familiarize itself with operating conditions and difficulties in the waters of this region, build up Navy-Navy relationships and offer Chinese assistance in capacity-building.
22. Should their anti-piracy forays be used as the initial building block for a long-term Indian Ocean strategy? The Chinese are avoiding any open discussion on this question lest they give rise to unnecessary concerns in the region about Chinese naval assertiveness in the Indian Ocean region as a follow-up to their assertiveness in the Pacific. Occasional voices are heard from the community of retired Chinese naval officers on the need for a naval base in this region to meet the logistics and rest and recreation requirements of their anti-piracy patrols, but such voices have been discouraged by the Government and party leadership to prevent undue concerns. A long-term Chinese naval strategy for the Indian Ocean region is not yet in the making.
23. In working out an Indian strategy for the Indian Ocean region, the political, economic and naval aspects have to receive equal attention. So too the aspect of the Indian and US Navies co-operating with each other to maintain their present primacy in this region. Working out a national Indian Ocean Region strategy should go hand in hand with working out a joint Indo-US strategy to safeguard their interests in the Indian Ocean region. (26-2-11)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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