B.RAMAN
The "China Daily" carried the following report on February 18,2010, the day on which President Barack Obama received His Holiness the Dalai Lama in the map room of the White House for what was described as a private meeting with the Tibetan spiritual leader:
"China drastically slashed its holdings of United States government debt last December, allowing Japan to retake its place as the largest foreign holder of US Treasury bonds. China sold more than $34 billion in short- and long-term bonds, leaving its total holdings at $755.4 billion, according to US Treasury data released on Tuesday (February 16).The country sold about $45 billion in US Treasuries in the last five months, Alan Ruskin, chief international strategist for RBS Securities Inc, said in a research note. He said it was a "long enough period to hint strongly at a trend". Liu Yuhui, an economist with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), said now is a good time to cut holdings of US Treasuries as recent European debt concerns have driven up the US dollar. "China has chosen the right strategy in slashing its huge holdings of US government debt as the greenback rebounds," said Liu, adding that there is no sign of change to the long-term weakness of the US dollar.Massive US deficit spending and near-zero interest rates would also further erode the value of US bonds, said Cao Honghui, director of financial market research at CASS. The White House released a budget plan on Feb 1 that predicted the deficit for this year would total a record $1.56 trillion, surpassing last year's $1.4 trillion, which re-ignited China's concern about its dollar assets. As one of the US' biggest creditors, China has sought to diversify its portfolio of foreign exchange reserves over the past year as the share of US dollar-dominated assets is too large. "
2. The Chinese decision to cut down its investments in the US Treasury Bonds seemed to have been taken weeks before Mr.Obama sought Congressional approval for the sale of a fresh arms package to Taiwan and the White House announced that he intended receiving His Holiness during the latter's visit to Washington in February, but the prominent publication by the "China Daily" of the Chinese sale of some of its investments in the Treasury Bonds on the day His Holiness met Mr.Obama has given rise to speculation as to whether Beijing was seeking to convey a message to the US that in view of Mr.Obama's decision to sell arms to Taiwan and to receive the Dalai Lama, the US can no longer count on China for helping it out of its financial crisis by stepping up investments in the US bonds.
3. It needs to be underlined that long before the recent tensions in Sino-US relations, Prime Minister Wen Jiabo had been speaking of the Chinese worries about the strength of the US dollar and Chinese economists had been talking of the need for China to diversify the investments of its foreign exchange reserves. Suggestions had been made even last year that China should emulate India and invest more in gold.
4. Moreover, while US announcements on the arms sale to Taiwan and Mr.Obama's meeting with His Holiness were made in January, US spokesmen had been saying that Mr.Obama had mentioned about these things to President Hu Jintao when he met him in Beijing in November last. Thus, the US contention was that the public announcements of Mr.Obama's decisions should not have come as a surprise to Beijing.
5.Against this background, there is no reason to believe that there is any linkage between the Chinese decision to downsize its holdings in the US Treasury bonds and the decisions of Mr.Obama to which China has reacted adversely.
6.It is however, interesting to note that the "China Daily" itself has drawn attention to the fact that while one expert sees a linkage, others don't.
7. As expected, the Chinese Government has strongly protested against Mr.Obama's receiving the Dalai Lama, but at the same time avoided any threatening language. The comments made by the Chinese Foreign Office spokesman in his daily media briefing were restrained in language. Chinese analysts have described the meeting as reflecting the continuing cold war mentality on certain issues affecting China in the US.
8. The Chinese have continued to follow their recently-noticed policy of avoiding any demonisation of His Holiness, (19-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, February 19, 2010
Thursday, February 18, 2010
COVERT ACTIONS
B.RAMAN
The strongly-presumed hand of Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence agency, in the successful neutralisation of a Damascus-based leader of the Hamas (Mahmoud al- Mabhouh ) while he was on a visit to Dubai in January last has come in the wake of other suspected covert actions of the Mossad in recent months, which were directed against Iranian nuclear scientists, who were reportedly playing a role in the development of the uranium enrichment technology.
2.While all these operations succeeded in eliminating the intended targets who posed a threat to Israel's national security, those directed against the Iranian scientists were copybook examples of covert actions whereas the one against the Hamas leader was not.The Mossad was able to maintain the total deniability of its strikes against the Iranian scientists.Till today, Iranian intelligence officials and police investigators have not been able to find out what happened. Apart from allegations, they have no evidence of the involvement of the Mossad, which has taken care not to leave any trace of its involvement.
3. In the case of the Dubai operation, the deniability has been weak and many tell-tale traces left behind by those who participated in the alleged elimination of the Hamas leader have enabled the Dubai Police to reconstruct in a fairly convincing manner what happened.The employment of an unusually large team of agents for carrying out the action and their inability to make the closed circuit TV in the hotel non-functional have enabled the Dubai police to make a break-through in the investigation.
4. The fact that the Mossad agents decided to go ahead with the operation despite their inability to make the CCTV non-functional strongly speaks of local collusion in the covert action. Since the CCTV was presumably functioning, those in the security control room of the hotel who would have been monitoring the CCTV, would have definitely noticed the Mossad agents forcing their way into the room of the Hamas leader. The fact that they did not raise an alarm for hours, which enabled the Mossad agents to flee Dubai without being intercepted, is an indicator of collusion in the hotel.
5.Even when they travel incognito, Hamas leaders are usually accompanied by at least one person from their security set-up who takes up a room opposite the room occupied by the leader so that they could keep a look-out for any attempt to break into the room of the leader. The fact that no one intervened as the Mossad agents forced their way into the room indicates that either there was collusion by Hamas elements too or the Mossad agents had neutralised the security detail of the Hamas leader before attacking him.
6.The entire story of the covert action will never come out.Particulars of any collusion will remain unknown for some time to come.
7.The Dubai operation of the Mossad was not copy-book perfect, but it was a successful operation in the sense that the agency eliminated a worrying threat to Israel's national security and to the lives of Israeli citizens and other Jewish persons.It was an attack carried out in exercise of the right of self-defence of the Israeli nation and people.
8. Laws of all countries---including India---- provide this right of self-defence and this rigt can be exercised by individuals as well as States.
9. Those opposed to covert actions might argue that despite the repeated resort to covert actions against identified enemies of the State of Israel and its people, Israel has not succeeded in eliminating terrorism and in countering effectively States like Iran which are determined to destroy Israel. Another way of looking at it is that but for such covert actions Israel and the Jewish people might have been forced to their knees by now by their enemies. It is such successful covert actions which have enabled the State of Israel to survive and even flourish.
10.The importance of selective covert actions to ensure the security of a State and its people has been recognised by many States----democratic and authoritarian. Some States----such as the US and Israel---admit that they have a covert action capability. Others don't, but they maintain the capability clandestinely. Pakistan is an example of a State in Asia which has over the years maintained an effective covert action capability for use against India. It has followed the model of other rogue States such as North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iraq of Saddam Hussain and Sudan in using terrorism as a way of waging a covert warfare.
11. Since 1997, India has been a pathetic victim of Pakistan's covert actions waged through different terrorist organisations. Pakistan has been using terrorism as a means of covert action against India since 1981.Between 1981 and 1997, India was retaliating in its own limted manner. The policy of covert retaliation was stopped in 1997 and has been totally discarded since then.
12. None of the Indian Prime Ministers in office since 1997 has had the political will to revert to a policy of at least limited retaliation against the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and its terrorist surrogates. The result has been that our national security has been continuously endangered and our people have been dying in their hundreds. When Pakistan, through its intelligence agencies and terrorist surrogates, has been waging a relentless covert warfare against India, we cannot protect the State and the people merely by revamping our counter-terrorism atchitecture.
13. Unless we create a capability for retaliatory covert actions in a deniable manner and use that capability we will continue to bleed.
14. Between 1981 and 1997, the Prime Ministers in office followed a dual policy of "talk, talk, hit, hit" against Pakistan. They never fought shy of talking to Pakistani leaders and officials. At the same time, they never missed an opportunity to undermine the State of Pakistan covertly in retaliation against its covert actions against India.
15. Since 1997, our policy has been reduced to one of talk, talk and more talk with no retaliation even covertly. Our political leadership and large sections of our bureaucracy have no concept of the importance of covert action in an assymetric proxy war.That is the tragedy of our country. ( 19-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The strongly-presumed hand of Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence agency, in the successful neutralisation of a Damascus-based leader of the Hamas (Mahmoud al- Mabhouh ) while he was on a visit to Dubai in January last has come in the wake of other suspected covert actions of the Mossad in recent months, which were directed against Iranian nuclear scientists, who were reportedly playing a role in the development of the uranium enrichment technology.
2.While all these operations succeeded in eliminating the intended targets who posed a threat to Israel's national security, those directed against the Iranian scientists were copybook examples of covert actions whereas the one against the Hamas leader was not.The Mossad was able to maintain the total deniability of its strikes against the Iranian scientists.Till today, Iranian intelligence officials and police investigators have not been able to find out what happened. Apart from allegations, they have no evidence of the involvement of the Mossad, which has taken care not to leave any trace of its involvement.
3. In the case of the Dubai operation, the deniability has been weak and many tell-tale traces left behind by those who participated in the alleged elimination of the Hamas leader have enabled the Dubai Police to reconstruct in a fairly convincing manner what happened.The employment of an unusually large team of agents for carrying out the action and their inability to make the closed circuit TV in the hotel non-functional have enabled the Dubai police to make a break-through in the investigation.
4. The fact that the Mossad agents decided to go ahead with the operation despite their inability to make the CCTV non-functional strongly speaks of local collusion in the covert action. Since the CCTV was presumably functioning, those in the security control room of the hotel who would have been monitoring the CCTV, would have definitely noticed the Mossad agents forcing their way into the room of the Hamas leader. The fact that they did not raise an alarm for hours, which enabled the Mossad agents to flee Dubai without being intercepted, is an indicator of collusion in the hotel.
5.Even when they travel incognito, Hamas leaders are usually accompanied by at least one person from their security set-up who takes up a room opposite the room occupied by the leader so that they could keep a look-out for any attempt to break into the room of the leader. The fact that no one intervened as the Mossad agents forced their way into the room indicates that either there was collusion by Hamas elements too or the Mossad agents had neutralised the security detail of the Hamas leader before attacking him.
6.The entire story of the covert action will never come out.Particulars of any collusion will remain unknown for some time to come.
7.The Dubai operation of the Mossad was not copy-book perfect, but it was a successful operation in the sense that the agency eliminated a worrying threat to Israel's national security and to the lives of Israeli citizens and other Jewish persons.It was an attack carried out in exercise of the right of self-defence of the Israeli nation and people.
8. Laws of all countries---including India---- provide this right of self-defence and this rigt can be exercised by individuals as well as States.
9. Those opposed to covert actions might argue that despite the repeated resort to covert actions against identified enemies of the State of Israel and its people, Israel has not succeeded in eliminating terrorism and in countering effectively States like Iran which are determined to destroy Israel. Another way of looking at it is that but for such covert actions Israel and the Jewish people might have been forced to their knees by now by their enemies. It is such successful covert actions which have enabled the State of Israel to survive and even flourish.
10.The importance of selective covert actions to ensure the security of a State and its people has been recognised by many States----democratic and authoritarian. Some States----such as the US and Israel---admit that they have a covert action capability. Others don't, but they maintain the capability clandestinely. Pakistan is an example of a State in Asia which has over the years maintained an effective covert action capability for use against India. It has followed the model of other rogue States such as North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iraq of Saddam Hussain and Sudan in using terrorism as a way of waging a covert warfare.
11. Since 1997, India has been a pathetic victim of Pakistan's covert actions waged through different terrorist organisations. Pakistan has been using terrorism as a means of covert action against India since 1981.Between 1981 and 1997, India was retaliating in its own limted manner. The policy of covert retaliation was stopped in 1997 and has been totally discarded since then.
12. None of the Indian Prime Ministers in office since 1997 has had the political will to revert to a policy of at least limited retaliation against the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and its terrorist surrogates. The result has been that our national security has been continuously endangered and our people have been dying in their hundreds. When Pakistan, through its intelligence agencies and terrorist surrogates, has been waging a relentless covert warfare against India, we cannot protect the State and the people merely by revamping our counter-terrorism atchitecture.
13. Unless we create a capability for retaliatory covert actions in a deniable manner and use that capability we will continue to bleed.
14. Between 1981 and 1997, the Prime Ministers in office followed a dual policy of "talk, talk, hit, hit" against Pakistan. They never fought shy of talking to Pakistani leaders and officials. At the same time, they never missed an opportunity to undermine the State of Pakistan covertly in retaliation against its covert actions against India.
15. Since 1997, our policy has been reduced to one of talk, talk and more talk with no retaliation even covertly. Our political leadership and large sections of our bureaucracy have no concept of the importance of covert action in an assymetric proxy war.That is the tragedy of our country. ( 19-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
MAKING A SUCCESS OF SPORTS EVENTS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO DEFEAT OF TERRORISM
B.RAMAN
Three prestigious global sports events are scheduled to take place in India between now and the end of the year---the World Cup Hockey, the IPL Cricket League and the Commonwealth Games.
2. These events will atract the attention of not only the sports enthusiasts of the world, but also of the terrorists with a global oran anti-Indian agenda who will look upon the events as an opportunity to publicise their cause and to demonstrate their capability to take the intelligence and security agencies by surprise. Even if they are not able to carry out any terrorist strike on the ground, they will try to create feelings of insecurity in the minds of sports enthusiasts and the general public by the spread of rumours, issue of threats and other means.
3.The Internet and the E-mail have placed at their disposal means of spreading nervousness through threats disseminated electronically in the names of well-known terrorist organisations. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to establish the authenticity of such mails and the seriousness of such threats. At the same time, it will be unwise not to factor them into our security planning just because their authenticity could not be established.
4. It is incumbent on all those------ whether governmental or non-governmental experts, sports enthusiasts or the general public--- who are determined to defeat terrorism not to let themselves be intimidated by such rumours and threats. They should go ahead with their administrative, logistics and security arrangements for these events and ensure that these events are held successfuly undeterred by the despicable attempts of the terrorists to sow the seeds of fear.
5. The moment we let ourselves be intimidated and unnerved by the tactics of the terrorists we will be paving the way for more terrorism in the world. Defiance in the face of intimidation should be our motto.
6. While thus maintaining our equanimity, we should ensure that our security planning leaves nothing to chance and that every security-related contingency is catered for. The intelligence and the physical security agencies of the Government should work in tandem and in close co-ordination with those in the organisations responsible for organising these events, who would be in charge of physical security.
7. Access control, venue security, route security and the security of the general public in the towns and cities where these events will be held should receive priority attention from those responsible for security. Strict access control at the place of stay of the participants, along the routes by which they will be moving to and fro, and at the venue of the events would go a long way in thwarting any plans by terrorists or other mischievous elements to disrupt the events.
8. The intelligence agencies will have, as always, an important role to play in enabling the physical security agencies to provide effective security by stepping up their intelligence collection efforts through intensified street patrolling, thorough local enquiries at transport hubs and places of stay such as hotels, inns etc and through technical means. We should not fight shy of seeking the assistance and co-operation of intelligence agencies of friendly countries well disposed towards India for supplementing our intelligence collection efforts.
9.Any equipment and other technical capacity shortages should be immediately identified and the deficiencies removed through our own efforts and resources or through the co-operation of friendly governments.
10. We are fotunate that these events will be taking place at a time when we will not be preoccupied with other high-level security commitments. We should be able to devote our undivided and undiluted attention to the security of the coming events and there should be no shortage of manpower for this purpose.
11. The quality of the supervision over the security arrangements would be of the highest importance. The Government of India, in consultation with the State Governments and the central intelligence and security agencies, should mobilise the services of the best officers in physical security, who have proved themelves in the past, for supervising the arrangements. (18-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Three prestigious global sports events are scheduled to take place in India between now and the end of the year---the World Cup Hockey, the IPL Cricket League and the Commonwealth Games.
2. These events will atract the attention of not only the sports enthusiasts of the world, but also of the terrorists with a global oran anti-Indian agenda who will look upon the events as an opportunity to publicise their cause and to demonstrate their capability to take the intelligence and security agencies by surprise. Even if they are not able to carry out any terrorist strike on the ground, they will try to create feelings of insecurity in the minds of sports enthusiasts and the general public by the spread of rumours, issue of threats and other means.
3.The Internet and the E-mail have placed at their disposal means of spreading nervousness through threats disseminated electronically in the names of well-known terrorist organisations. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to establish the authenticity of such mails and the seriousness of such threats. At the same time, it will be unwise not to factor them into our security planning just because their authenticity could not be established.
4. It is incumbent on all those------ whether governmental or non-governmental experts, sports enthusiasts or the general public--- who are determined to defeat terrorism not to let themselves be intimidated by such rumours and threats. They should go ahead with their administrative, logistics and security arrangements for these events and ensure that these events are held successfuly undeterred by the despicable attempts of the terrorists to sow the seeds of fear.
5. The moment we let ourselves be intimidated and unnerved by the tactics of the terrorists we will be paving the way for more terrorism in the world. Defiance in the face of intimidation should be our motto.
6. While thus maintaining our equanimity, we should ensure that our security planning leaves nothing to chance and that every security-related contingency is catered for. The intelligence and the physical security agencies of the Government should work in tandem and in close co-ordination with those in the organisations responsible for organising these events, who would be in charge of physical security.
7. Access control, venue security, route security and the security of the general public in the towns and cities where these events will be held should receive priority attention from those responsible for security. Strict access control at the place of stay of the participants, along the routes by which they will be moving to and fro, and at the venue of the events would go a long way in thwarting any plans by terrorists or other mischievous elements to disrupt the events.
8. The intelligence agencies will have, as always, an important role to play in enabling the physical security agencies to provide effective security by stepping up their intelligence collection efforts through intensified street patrolling, thorough local enquiries at transport hubs and places of stay such as hotels, inns etc and through technical means. We should not fight shy of seeking the assistance and co-operation of intelligence agencies of friendly countries well disposed towards India for supplementing our intelligence collection efforts.
9.Any equipment and other technical capacity shortages should be immediately identified and the deficiencies removed through our own efforts and resources or through the co-operation of friendly governments.
10. We are fotunate that these events will be taking place at a time when we will not be preoccupied with other high-level security commitments. We should be able to devote our undivided and undiluted attention to the security of the coming events and there should be no shortage of manpower for this purpose.
11. The quality of the supervision over the security arrangements would be of the highest importance. The Government of India, in consultation with the State Governments and the central intelligence and security agencies, should mobilise the services of the best officers in physical security, who have proved themelves in the past, for supervising the arrangements. (18-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, February 17, 2010
POST-PUNE BLAST DEVELOPMENTS---ATTEMPT TO INTIMIDATE FOREIGN SPORTS TEAMS
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.620
B.RAMAN
Two developments originating from Pakistan after the explosion in the German Bakery of Pune on February 13,2009, call for comments.
2. The first is the claim reportedly made by an individual to Ms.Nirupama Subramanian, the Islamabad-based correspondent of "The Hindu", the daily newspaper published from Chennai, claiming responsibility for the explosion on behlaf of an organisation called the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET)--Al Alami meaning international.
3. To quote from the paper (February 17): " Identifying himself as a spokesperson of a group calling itself the LET--Al Almi, an individual using the code name Abu Jindal said the bombing was carried out because of India's refusal to discuss the Kashmir issue in the coming talks with Pakistan. Abu Jindal said he was calling from Miramshah in North Waziristan and the telephone number used to make the call carried an area code common to the Waziristan tribal area and Bannu, the adjoining district in the North-West Frontier Province. When The Hindu tried calling back, though, a recorded voice message said the number was temporarily not in use. No past communique was issued by the LET--al Almi and terrorism experts in New Delhi told The Hindu that no such group was known to exist."
4. The expression "Al Alami" meaning "International" had been used in the past by Pakistan-based terrorist organisations, which claim to have an international presence. Two examples are the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which is a founding member of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People and the Jamiatul-Mujahideen. After 9/11, there were some terrorist strikes in Pakistani territory directed against the US and other foreign targets----such as the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the reporter of the "Wall Street Journal ", the murder of the wife and daughter of a US diplomat with a hand grenade in an Islamabad church, a suicide attack outside the US consulate in Karachi etc. Pakistani investigators attributed these attacks as well as an unsuccessful attempt to kill Gen. Pervez Musharraf in Karachi to an organisation called the HUM--Al Alami.
5. On different occasions, Pakistani police officers gave different accounts of its background. Sometimes, they described it as the international wing of the HUM. Some other times, they described it as the wing of the HUM which represents it in the IIF. On other occasions, they described it as a spinter group of the HUM, which had split from it due to differences. They also said that the the HUM itself had started functioning under the name HUM--Al Alami after it was declared a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the US in 1997 because of its involvement in the kidnapping of some Western tourists in Jammu and Kashmir under the name Al Faran in 1995.
6.The HUM had never made a secret of its extensive presence abroad outside India, including in Southern Philippines, the Central Asian Republics, the Gulf countries, and Chechnya. In fact, it used to brag about it in interviews to Pakistani media. Next to the HUM, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the LET have a presence abroad outside India. While the HUJI's presence is confined to Bangladesh, the Arakan area of Myanmar, Southern Thailand, the Central Asian Republics, the Gulf countries and Chechnya, the LET is the only Pakistani organisation, which has a presence not only in Indonesia, Singapore and the Gulf countries, but also in the US and West Europe.
7. Whereas the HUM talks openly about its international presence, neither the HUJI nor the LET do so. The LET, in particular, which is close to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), never talks of its activities in the West lest the ISI be embarrassed.Till today, it has not admitted that David Coleman Headley and Hussain Rana, presently facing trial in Chicago, belonged to it.
8. The only occasions when the LET had referred to its interests in overseas targets other than India were with reference to the need for a jihad against the US troops in Iraq and the need for action against the Danish newspaper and its cartoonist for publishing cartoons of Prophet Mohammad in 2005. One never found in the past any reference to an Al Alami wing of the LET.
9. It will be difficult to establish the authenticity of the telephone call received by The Hindu correspondent as having really originated from a designated representative of an organisation called the LET--- Al Alami. If one presumes that such an organisation exists and that the call did originate from its spokesman, it would mark an attempt by elements based in Pakistan to project the LET---Al Alami as part of bin Laden's IIF unconnected with the Jamaat-ud-Dawa of Pakistan headed by Prof-Hafeez Mohammad Sayeed. It is similar to the attempt made after the 26/11 terrorist strikes to project them as having been carried out by a group of Indian Muslims called the Deccan (Southern) Mujahideen.
10. The second development calling for comments is the E-Mail received by the Karachi-based correspondent of "Asiatimes Online" purporting to be from Ilyas Kashmiri, a Pakistani national, who has been indicted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) along with Headley and Rana for conspiring to launch a terrorist attack on the offices of the Danish journal which carried the cartoons. According to well-informed Pakistani journalists such as Hamid Mir, Ilyas used to be in the Special Services Group (SSG) of the Pakistan Army before drifting into the world of terrorism----initially in Afghanistan, then In Kashmir and now in North Waziristan.
11. Till some years ago, he used to be responsible for the operations of the HUJI in J&K. He has since fallen out with the HUJI and now heads as organisation called the 313 Brigade based in North Waziristan. Headley, who had met Ilyas in Norh Waziristan, was a common cut-out of the LET and Ilyas. He was helping the LET in its acts of terrorism in India and Ilyas in his planned attack on the Danish journal. For details of Ilyas and his 313 Brigade, please see my earlier two articles titled :LET Revives 2003 Plan to Use US As Launching Pad for Terrorism in India at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers35%5Cpaper3481.html and The 313 Brigade at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.com/2009/11/313-brigade.html .
12.In the past, Ilyas had come to notice for his activities on behalf of the HUJI in J&K, but not in Indian territory outside Kashmir. But, HUJI cadres---from Pakistan as well as Bangladesh--- have been active in Indian territory outside J&K for many years.In the E-mail, Ilyas has sought to intimidate intending foreign participants in the World Cup Hockey league, the IPL Cricket League and the Commonwealth Games in India in the comming months into cancelling their participation by warning them of the consequences of their participation.
13. Since the terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore last year, foreign sports teams are not prepared to participate in any events in Pakistan, which has been totally boycotted. Ilyas' attempt to intimidate is part of a Pakistan-inspired Psywar to create similar nervousness among foreign sportsmen and sports officials about the likely dangers of participating in sports events in India.
14. Three prestigious sports events are to take place in India this year.The terrorists will look upon these events as providing an opportunity to publicise their cause and embarrass India. A similar attempt to intimidate sportsmen was made by the Khalistani terrorists at the time of the Asian Games in New Delhi in 1983.On getting information of their plans, Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, personally monitored the security arrangements through Rajiv Gandhi and Arun Singh and requested R.N.Kao, former chief of the R&AW, to co-ordinate the physical security. Kao did so with the help of K. Sankaran Nair, who had succeeded him as the chief of the R&AW.
15. Keeping in view the likely threats and the high-profile attempts at intimidation initiated by Ilyas, the Government should constitute a high-power committee of senior officials to monitor the situation on a day-to-day basis and coordinate the physical security. The matter should not be handled in a routine manner as the follow-up action on Headley's visits to India seem to have been handled . (17-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd ), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Two developments originating from Pakistan after the explosion in the German Bakery of Pune on February 13,2009, call for comments.
2. The first is the claim reportedly made by an individual to Ms.Nirupama Subramanian, the Islamabad-based correspondent of "The Hindu", the daily newspaper published from Chennai, claiming responsibility for the explosion on behlaf of an organisation called the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET)--Al Alami meaning international.
3. To quote from the paper (February 17): " Identifying himself as a spokesperson of a group calling itself the LET--Al Almi, an individual using the code name Abu Jindal said the bombing was carried out because of India's refusal to discuss the Kashmir issue in the coming talks with Pakistan. Abu Jindal said he was calling from Miramshah in North Waziristan and the telephone number used to make the call carried an area code common to the Waziristan tribal area and Bannu, the adjoining district in the North-West Frontier Province. When The Hindu tried calling back, though, a recorded voice message said the number was temporarily not in use. No past communique was issued by the LET--al Almi and terrorism experts in New Delhi told The Hindu that no such group was known to exist."
4. The expression "Al Alami" meaning "International" had been used in the past by Pakistan-based terrorist organisations, which claim to have an international presence. Two examples are the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which is a founding member of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People and the Jamiatul-Mujahideen. After 9/11, there were some terrorist strikes in Pakistani territory directed against the US and other foreign targets----such as the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the reporter of the "Wall Street Journal ", the murder of the wife and daughter of a US diplomat with a hand grenade in an Islamabad church, a suicide attack outside the US consulate in Karachi etc. Pakistani investigators attributed these attacks as well as an unsuccessful attempt to kill Gen. Pervez Musharraf in Karachi to an organisation called the HUM--Al Alami.
5. On different occasions, Pakistani police officers gave different accounts of its background. Sometimes, they described it as the international wing of the HUM. Some other times, they described it as the wing of the HUM which represents it in the IIF. On other occasions, they described it as a spinter group of the HUM, which had split from it due to differences. They also said that the the HUM itself had started functioning under the name HUM--Al Alami after it was declared a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the US in 1997 because of its involvement in the kidnapping of some Western tourists in Jammu and Kashmir under the name Al Faran in 1995.
6.The HUM had never made a secret of its extensive presence abroad outside India, including in Southern Philippines, the Central Asian Republics, the Gulf countries, and Chechnya. In fact, it used to brag about it in interviews to Pakistani media. Next to the HUM, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and the LET have a presence abroad outside India. While the HUJI's presence is confined to Bangladesh, the Arakan area of Myanmar, Southern Thailand, the Central Asian Republics, the Gulf countries and Chechnya, the LET is the only Pakistani organisation, which has a presence not only in Indonesia, Singapore and the Gulf countries, but also in the US and West Europe.
7. Whereas the HUM talks openly about its international presence, neither the HUJI nor the LET do so. The LET, in particular, which is close to the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), never talks of its activities in the West lest the ISI be embarrassed.Till today, it has not admitted that David Coleman Headley and Hussain Rana, presently facing trial in Chicago, belonged to it.
8. The only occasions when the LET had referred to its interests in overseas targets other than India were with reference to the need for a jihad against the US troops in Iraq and the need for action against the Danish newspaper and its cartoonist for publishing cartoons of Prophet Mohammad in 2005. One never found in the past any reference to an Al Alami wing of the LET.
9. It will be difficult to establish the authenticity of the telephone call received by The Hindu correspondent as having really originated from a designated representative of an organisation called the LET--- Al Alami. If one presumes that such an organisation exists and that the call did originate from its spokesman, it would mark an attempt by elements based in Pakistan to project the LET---Al Alami as part of bin Laden's IIF unconnected with the Jamaat-ud-Dawa of Pakistan headed by Prof-Hafeez Mohammad Sayeed. It is similar to the attempt made after the 26/11 terrorist strikes to project them as having been carried out by a group of Indian Muslims called the Deccan (Southern) Mujahideen.
10. The second development calling for comments is the E-Mail received by the Karachi-based correspondent of "Asiatimes Online" purporting to be from Ilyas Kashmiri, a Pakistani national, who has been indicted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) along with Headley and Rana for conspiring to launch a terrorist attack on the offices of the Danish journal which carried the cartoons. According to well-informed Pakistani journalists such as Hamid Mir, Ilyas used to be in the Special Services Group (SSG) of the Pakistan Army before drifting into the world of terrorism----initially in Afghanistan, then In Kashmir and now in North Waziristan.
11. Till some years ago, he used to be responsible for the operations of the HUJI in J&K. He has since fallen out with the HUJI and now heads as organisation called the 313 Brigade based in North Waziristan. Headley, who had met Ilyas in Norh Waziristan, was a common cut-out of the LET and Ilyas. He was helping the LET in its acts of terrorism in India and Ilyas in his planned attack on the Danish journal. For details of Ilyas and his 313 Brigade, please see my earlier two articles titled :LET Revives 2003 Plan to Use US As Launching Pad for Terrorism in India at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers35%5Cpaper3481.html and The 313 Brigade at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.com/2009/11/313-brigade.html .
12.In the past, Ilyas had come to notice for his activities on behalf of the HUJI in J&K, but not in Indian territory outside Kashmir. But, HUJI cadres---from Pakistan as well as Bangladesh--- have been active in Indian territory outside J&K for many years.In the E-mail, Ilyas has sought to intimidate intending foreign participants in the World Cup Hockey league, the IPL Cricket League and the Commonwealth Games in India in the comming months into cancelling their participation by warning them of the consequences of their participation.
13. Since the terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore last year, foreign sports teams are not prepared to participate in any events in Pakistan, which has been totally boycotted. Ilyas' attempt to intimidate is part of a Pakistan-inspired Psywar to create similar nervousness among foreign sportsmen and sports officials about the likely dangers of participating in sports events in India.
14. Three prestigious sports events are to take place in India this year.The terrorists will look upon these events as providing an opportunity to publicise their cause and embarrass India. A similar attempt to intimidate sportsmen was made by the Khalistani terrorists at the time of the Asian Games in New Delhi in 1983.On getting information of their plans, Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, personally monitored the security arrangements through Rajiv Gandhi and Arun Singh and requested R.N.Kao, former chief of the R&AW, to co-ordinate the physical security. Kao did so with the help of K. Sankaran Nair, who had succeeded him as the chief of the R&AW.
15. Keeping in view the likely threats and the high-profile attempts at intimidation initiated by Ilyas, the Government should constitute a high-power committee of senior officials to monitor the situation on a day-to-day basis and coordinate the physical security. The matter should not be handled in a routine manner as the follow-up action on Headley's visits to India seem to have been handled . (17-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd ), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2gmail.com )
Tuesday, February 16, 2010
US LOOKING FOR TALIBAN HIDE-OUTS IN NON-TRIBAL AREAS
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.619
B.RAMAN
US intelligence agencies have widened their hunt for the leaders of the Afghan Taliban in the non-tribal areas of Pakistan, particularly in Karachi.
2. This is reminiscent of the widening of the hunt for the leaders and senior operatives of Al Qaeda in the non-tribal areas in 2002-03 after they fled into Pakistan from Tora Bora in Afghanistan. This, inter alia, led to the capture of Abu Zubaidah in Faislabad in Pakistani Punjab in March,2002, Ramzi Binalshib in Karachi in September 2002 and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad in Rawalpindi in March,2003.The success of the US agencies in tracing them in the non-tribal areas and pressuring the Pakistani agencies to arrest them and hand them over to the US forced the other leaders, who had evaded capture, to flee to North Waziristan and take shelter there. They are now being hunted there by the Drones (unmanned planes) of the CIA.
3.Originally, the US agencies believed that the surviving leaders of the Afghan Taliban, including Mulla Mohammad Omar, were operating from the Pashtun majority areas of Balochistan, particularly from the refugee camps in the Quetta area. The collusion of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) with the Quetta-based leaders led to suggestions from the US field commanders in Afghanistan for extending the Drone strikes to the Quetta area to hit at the hide-outs of the Afghan leaders there.
4. In the wake of these suggestions, there were reports that the ISI has shifted the Afghan Taliban leaders to Karachi and helped them to get sanctuaries among the pro-Taliban elements in the local Pashtun community. Karachi is estimated to have more Pashtuns than Peshawar, the capital of the Pashtun-majority North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the party of Mohajirs headed by Altaf Hussain, who lives in exile in the UK, has been alleging for some months now that not only Afghan Taliban, but even some Pakistani Taliban leaders have taken shelter in the Pashtun community in Karachi and have been operating from there.
5.Till recently, the US was not taking these allegations seriously. It is now paying more attention to these allegations and US agencies have stepped up their intelligence collection efforts in Karachi-----particularly after attacks on NATO logistics convoys in the Karachi area.
6. The reported capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Afghan Taliban's operational commander and the deputy to Mullah Omar, in Karachi some days ago by the ISI at the instance of the US agencies has to be viewed in this context. The reports of his arrest have been denied by Mr.Rehman Mallik, the Pakistani Interior Minister,and Afghan Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid.
7.Other reports purported to be emanating from Taliban commanders have been quoted as claiming that Baradar has in fact been captured by the Americans, but in the Helmand province of Afghanistan where the US has launched an offensive against the Afghan Taliban and not in Karachi.
8. The report of his arrest in Karachi, if confirmed, would embarrass both the Pakistani authorities and the Afghan Taliban as this would lend some substance to the allegations of the MQM that the Taliban leadership is now operating from Karachi.
9. The speculation that the reported arrest of Baradar is a US-engineered charade and is part of its exercise to create a split in the Afghan Taliban by winning over associates of Mulla Omar does not carry conviction at present. ( 17-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
US intelligence agencies have widened their hunt for the leaders of the Afghan Taliban in the non-tribal areas of Pakistan, particularly in Karachi.
2. This is reminiscent of the widening of the hunt for the leaders and senior operatives of Al Qaeda in the non-tribal areas in 2002-03 after they fled into Pakistan from Tora Bora in Afghanistan. This, inter alia, led to the capture of Abu Zubaidah in Faislabad in Pakistani Punjab in March,2002, Ramzi Binalshib in Karachi in September 2002 and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad in Rawalpindi in March,2003.The success of the US agencies in tracing them in the non-tribal areas and pressuring the Pakistani agencies to arrest them and hand them over to the US forced the other leaders, who had evaded capture, to flee to North Waziristan and take shelter there. They are now being hunted there by the Drones (unmanned planes) of the CIA.
3.Originally, the US agencies believed that the surviving leaders of the Afghan Taliban, including Mulla Mohammad Omar, were operating from the Pashtun majority areas of Balochistan, particularly from the refugee camps in the Quetta area. The collusion of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) with the Quetta-based leaders led to suggestions from the US field commanders in Afghanistan for extending the Drone strikes to the Quetta area to hit at the hide-outs of the Afghan leaders there.
4. In the wake of these suggestions, there were reports that the ISI has shifted the Afghan Taliban leaders to Karachi and helped them to get sanctuaries among the pro-Taliban elements in the local Pashtun community. Karachi is estimated to have more Pashtuns than Peshawar, the capital of the Pashtun-majority North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the party of Mohajirs headed by Altaf Hussain, who lives in exile in the UK, has been alleging for some months now that not only Afghan Taliban, but even some Pakistani Taliban leaders have taken shelter in the Pashtun community in Karachi and have been operating from there.
5.Till recently, the US was not taking these allegations seriously. It is now paying more attention to these allegations and US agencies have stepped up their intelligence collection efforts in Karachi-----particularly after attacks on NATO logistics convoys in the Karachi area.
6. The reported capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Afghan Taliban's operational commander and the deputy to Mullah Omar, in Karachi some days ago by the ISI at the instance of the US agencies has to be viewed in this context. The reports of his arrest have been denied by Mr.Rehman Mallik, the Pakistani Interior Minister,and Afghan Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid.
7.Other reports purported to be emanating from Taliban commanders have been quoted as claiming that Baradar has in fact been captured by the Americans, but in the Helmand province of Afghanistan where the US has launched an offensive against the Afghan Taliban and not in Karachi.
8. The report of his arrest in Karachi, if confirmed, would embarrass both the Pakistani authorities and the Afghan Taliban as this would lend some substance to the allegations of the MQM that the Taliban leadership is now operating from Karachi.
9. The speculation that the reported arrest of Baradar is a US-engineered charade and is part of its exercise to create a split in the Afghan Taliban by winning over associates of Mulla Omar does not carry conviction at present. ( 17-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, February 15, 2010
INDIA-PAKISTAN: TO TALK OR NOT TO TALK?
B.RAMAN
Should India talk to Pakistan when it continues to use terrorism as a weapon to keep us destabilized?
This question has been confronting us for nearly 30 years since Pakistan started supporting Khalistani terrorism in 1981 and extended this support subsequently to terrorist groups in Kashmir and other parts of India.
This question has conceptual and tactical dimensions. The conceptual aspect is: Should we talk at all? Can talks and terrorism go together?
The tactical dimension is if we decide to talk when, how and under what circumstances.
Conceptually, different Prime Ministers have maintained a certain flexibility of approach. The seven hijackings of Indian Airlines aircraft to Pakistan between 1981 and 1984 and the blowing up of the Kanishka aircraft of Air India in June 1985 by Khalistani terrorists did not prevent the so-called cricket diplomacy when Gen.Zia-ul-Haq and Rajiv Gandhi were in power in the two countries. Rajiv Gandhi accepted a proposal from the then Crown Prince of Jordan for secret meetings between the heads of the R&AW and the ISI to discuss Indian complaints against Pakistan.
The fact that nothing came out of this exercise did not inhibit Narasimha Rao from meeting Nawaz Sharif, the then Pakistani Prime Minister, thrice at Davos, Jakarta and Harare in the margins of international conferences to discuss bilateral relations with specific reference to Pakistani involvement in Punjab and Kashmir.
Similarly, Atal Behari Vajpayee did not hesitate to meet Nawaz Sharif in Lahore in February,1999, and Gen.Pervez Musharraf at Agra as our guest in 2001 despite Islamabad’s failure to satisfy our demands for the arrests and handing-over for trial of 20 Khalistani, Kashmiri and other jihadi terrorists, including many hijackers and those involved in the March,1993, serial blasts in Mumbai.
The initiatives taken by Vajpayee in 1999 and again in 2001 despite the Kandahar hijacking and the Kargil conflict were devoid of results just as those of Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao were.
Does that mean they were wrong in having taken those initiatives? The hard-liners will say yes, but those, who advocate a more nuanced approach, will see such initiatives as part of a necessary dual policy---- a firm line to make Pakistan realize that terrorism will damage it more than India tempered by a flexibility to enable Pakistan come out of the jihadi trap which it has created for itself.
The fact that wisdom has not so far prevailed on Pakistan does not mean that one was wrong in trying a mix of powers of persuasion and coercion, with the support of the international community where available.
The tactical dimension involves the timing of our shift from firmness to flexibility. If the timing is not carefully decided, one might create a wrong impression in the minds of the Pakistani leadership that its use of terrorism has paid and that India has blinked.
We rightly took a firm line after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai that there will be no more formal composite dialogue with Pakistan till Pakistan gave us satisfaction on the question of terrorism. It has taken some action under US pressure, but not to our complete satisfaction.
While taking note of the action taken by it, we should have kept up the pressure through our own efforts as well as through the US for giving full satisfaction.
Our tactical decision to propose a meeting of the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries on February 25 not for resuming the formal dialogue, but to discuss the progress in the action against terrorism taken by Pakistan was wrongly timed.
There are indications of fresh political instability in Pakistan, with pressure for the exit of President Asif Ali Zardari mounting. Pakistan has also been under increasing pressure from the US to do more against Al Qaeda and the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans. By proposing fresh talks at this stage, we have enabled the Pakistani leaders to divert attention away from their own troubles and re-focus on what they project as their problems with India and their perceived success in making India blink.
This was a serious tactical mistake committed by us. We should have waited at least till Shri P. Chidambaram’s visit to Islamabad for the SAARC Home Ministers’ meeting to see the outcome before considering new initiatives.
Having committed this mistake, we will be compounding it further by giving in to public pressure for the cancellation of the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries because of the Pune terrorist attack of February 13. By doing so, we will be handing over a propaganda victory to the terrorists.
We should go ahead with the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries and use it to reinforce our firm line that there can be no forward movement in Indo-Pakistan relations without effective action by Pakistan against the anti-India terrorists.
This is not the time for rhetoric, which could prove counter-productive. This is the time for an intelligent approach to the problem so that neither our firmness is diluted nor any scope for meaningful flexibility is damaged. ( 16-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Should India talk to Pakistan when it continues to use terrorism as a weapon to keep us destabilized?
This question has been confronting us for nearly 30 years since Pakistan started supporting Khalistani terrorism in 1981 and extended this support subsequently to terrorist groups in Kashmir and other parts of India.
This question has conceptual and tactical dimensions. The conceptual aspect is: Should we talk at all? Can talks and terrorism go together?
The tactical dimension is if we decide to talk when, how and under what circumstances.
Conceptually, different Prime Ministers have maintained a certain flexibility of approach. The seven hijackings of Indian Airlines aircraft to Pakistan between 1981 and 1984 and the blowing up of the Kanishka aircraft of Air India in June 1985 by Khalistani terrorists did not prevent the so-called cricket diplomacy when Gen.Zia-ul-Haq and Rajiv Gandhi were in power in the two countries. Rajiv Gandhi accepted a proposal from the then Crown Prince of Jordan for secret meetings between the heads of the R&AW and the ISI to discuss Indian complaints against Pakistan.
The fact that nothing came out of this exercise did not inhibit Narasimha Rao from meeting Nawaz Sharif, the then Pakistani Prime Minister, thrice at Davos, Jakarta and Harare in the margins of international conferences to discuss bilateral relations with specific reference to Pakistani involvement in Punjab and Kashmir.
Similarly, Atal Behari Vajpayee did not hesitate to meet Nawaz Sharif in Lahore in February,1999, and Gen.Pervez Musharraf at Agra as our guest in 2001 despite Islamabad’s failure to satisfy our demands for the arrests and handing-over for trial of 20 Khalistani, Kashmiri and other jihadi terrorists, including many hijackers and those involved in the March,1993, serial blasts in Mumbai.
The initiatives taken by Vajpayee in 1999 and again in 2001 despite the Kandahar hijacking and the Kargil conflict were devoid of results just as those of Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao were.
Does that mean they were wrong in having taken those initiatives? The hard-liners will say yes, but those, who advocate a more nuanced approach, will see such initiatives as part of a necessary dual policy---- a firm line to make Pakistan realize that terrorism will damage it more than India tempered by a flexibility to enable Pakistan come out of the jihadi trap which it has created for itself.
The fact that wisdom has not so far prevailed on Pakistan does not mean that one was wrong in trying a mix of powers of persuasion and coercion, with the support of the international community where available.
The tactical dimension involves the timing of our shift from firmness to flexibility. If the timing is not carefully decided, one might create a wrong impression in the minds of the Pakistani leadership that its use of terrorism has paid and that India has blinked.
We rightly took a firm line after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai that there will be no more formal composite dialogue with Pakistan till Pakistan gave us satisfaction on the question of terrorism. It has taken some action under US pressure, but not to our complete satisfaction.
While taking note of the action taken by it, we should have kept up the pressure through our own efforts as well as through the US for giving full satisfaction.
Our tactical decision to propose a meeting of the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries on February 25 not for resuming the formal dialogue, but to discuss the progress in the action against terrorism taken by Pakistan was wrongly timed.
There are indications of fresh political instability in Pakistan, with pressure for the exit of President Asif Ali Zardari mounting. Pakistan has also been under increasing pressure from the US to do more against Al Qaeda and the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans. By proposing fresh talks at this stage, we have enabled the Pakistani leaders to divert attention away from their own troubles and re-focus on what they project as their problems with India and their perceived success in making India blink.
This was a serious tactical mistake committed by us. We should have waited at least till Shri P. Chidambaram’s visit to Islamabad for the SAARC Home Ministers’ meeting to see the outcome before considering new initiatives.
Having committed this mistake, we will be compounding it further by giving in to public pressure for the cancellation of the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries because of the Pune terrorist attack of February 13. By doing so, we will be handing over a propaganda victory to the terrorists.
We should go ahead with the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries and use it to reinforce our firm line that there can be no forward movement in Indo-Pakistan relations without effective action by Pakistan against the anti-India terrorists.
This is not the time for rhetoric, which could prove counter-productive. This is the time for an intelligent approach to the problem so that neither our firmness is diluted nor any scope for meaningful flexibility is damaged. ( 16-2-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, February 14, 2010
AN ANTI-TERROR WAKE-UP CALL
FEBRUARY 14, 2010, 12:47 P.M. ET
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704543804575065023879360664.html?mod=WSJ-World-LEFTSecondNews
An Antiterror Wake-Up Call
By BAHUKUTUMBI RAMAN
India suffered its first major terrorist attacks since the 2008 Mumbai massacre Saturday with the bombing of a popular bakery in Pune. While the death toll, currently at nine, doesn't approach the 166 killed in Mumbai, the incident should provoke a rethink of the speed with which New Delhi revamps its approach to the war on terror.
Saturday's attack was a single act of terrorism directed at a soft target. It was not an act of suicidal terrorism, as the bomber left a backpack under a table and then left the building. The device may have been timed or remotely activated. The explosion took place when one of the bakery's clients tried to open the backpack. Such attacks require access to explosive material and basic knowledge of how to assemble a bomb. The terrorist may not have had any special expertise or training.
The Pune incident is unfortunately not a single event. India suffered a wide range of terrorist attacks by different individuals and groups over the years. The 2008 Mumbai massacre was a commando-style attack perpetrated by 10 Pakistani terrorists on multiple targets, and lasted three days. Between November 2007 and September 2008, a group of Muslims calling themselves the Indian Mujahedeen carried out a series of well-orchestrated serial explosions in various cities, including Jaipur and Bangalore.
After the Mumbai attacks, the Congress Party-led government considerably strengthened the country's counterterrorism machinery. Home Minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram has strengthened the capability of the special intervention forces, such as the National Security Guards, to put down commando-style attacks quickly by deploying them in important cities, instead of keeping them concentrated in New Delhi as was done before the Mumbai massacre. Mr. Chidambaram has introduced greater cohesion in the functioning of the intelligence agencies and personally coordinated follow-up action on the data collected.
Further, he has created a National Investigation Agency to investigate serious terrorist attacks with national ramifications. He has proposed the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center and a Ministry for Internal Security patterned after America's Department of Homeland Security. When these institutions are eventually created, all agencies responsible for counterterrorism would function under a single command. Mr. Chidambaram himself would oversee the entire apparatus.
Saturday's successful explosion at Pune shows the measures already taken by the government have not been as effective as hoped. Pune was known to be a target for terrorists. America's Federal Bureau of Investigation has been looking into frequent visits to India by David Headley, a U.S. citizen of Pakistani origin based in Chicago who belonged to the Lashkar-e-Taiba network and is alleged to have played a role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Mr. Headley is alleged to have scouted out possible targets in New Delhi and Pune, including an ashram close to the bakery attacked Saturday.
India's own National Investigation Agency undertook a separate investigation into Mr. Headley. The NIA's investigation identified other potential targets, such as a Jewish religious and cultural center—also located close to Saturday's attack—that was similar to the center attacked in Mumbai in 2008.
Pune has many technical universities and other institutions of learning which attract Muslim students from abroad. Many of Pune's Muslim youths interact with these students, and are becoming radicalized. Three members of the Indian Mujahedeen—information technology experts—were drawn from Pune's Muslim community.
Given this evidence, the government should have moved proactively to strengthen physical security in the area, in coordination with the owners of the vulnerable private establishments. According to Mr. Chidambaram, they were alerted about their vulnerability, but nothing more seems to have been done to help them in preventing a terrorist attack. There were too few arrests and interrogations of individuals associated with Mr. Headley.
All this shows that Mr. Chidambaram might have created the right institutional infrastructure for dealing with terrorism, but this infrastructure is yet to start working in a coordinated and effective manner. The result is that India's preventive capability continues to be weak. Institutions are important, but it is even more important to make them work as they should.
Mr. Raman served in India's external intelligence agency from 1968 to 1994 and on the National Security Advisory Board of the government of India from 2000 to 2002.
Copyright 2009 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704543804575065023879360664.html?mod=WSJ-World-LEFTSecondNews
An Antiterror Wake-Up Call
By BAHUKUTUMBI RAMAN
India suffered its first major terrorist attacks since the 2008 Mumbai massacre Saturday with the bombing of a popular bakery in Pune. While the death toll, currently at nine, doesn't approach the 166 killed in Mumbai, the incident should provoke a rethink of the speed with which New Delhi revamps its approach to the war on terror.
Saturday's attack was a single act of terrorism directed at a soft target. It was not an act of suicidal terrorism, as the bomber left a backpack under a table and then left the building. The device may have been timed or remotely activated. The explosion took place when one of the bakery's clients tried to open the backpack. Such attacks require access to explosive material and basic knowledge of how to assemble a bomb. The terrorist may not have had any special expertise or training.
The Pune incident is unfortunately not a single event. India suffered a wide range of terrorist attacks by different individuals and groups over the years. The 2008 Mumbai massacre was a commando-style attack perpetrated by 10 Pakistani terrorists on multiple targets, and lasted three days. Between November 2007 and September 2008, a group of Muslims calling themselves the Indian Mujahedeen carried out a series of well-orchestrated serial explosions in various cities, including Jaipur and Bangalore.
After the Mumbai attacks, the Congress Party-led government considerably strengthened the country's counterterrorism machinery. Home Minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram has strengthened the capability of the special intervention forces, such as the National Security Guards, to put down commando-style attacks quickly by deploying them in important cities, instead of keeping them concentrated in New Delhi as was done before the Mumbai massacre. Mr. Chidambaram has introduced greater cohesion in the functioning of the intelligence agencies and personally coordinated follow-up action on the data collected.
Further, he has created a National Investigation Agency to investigate serious terrorist attacks with national ramifications. He has proposed the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center and a Ministry for Internal Security patterned after America's Department of Homeland Security. When these institutions are eventually created, all agencies responsible for counterterrorism would function under a single command. Mr. Chidambaram himself would oversee the entire apparatus.
Saturday's successful explosion at Pune shows the measures already taken by the government have not been as effective as hoped. Pune was known to be a target for terrorists. America's Federal Bureau of Investigation has been looking into frequent visits to India by David Headley, a U.S. citizen of Pakistani origin based in Chicago who belonged to the Lashkar-e-Taiba network and is alleged to have played a role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Mr. Headley is alleged to have scouted out possible targets in New Delhi and Pune, including an ashram close to the bakery attacked Saturday.
India's own National Investigation Agency undertook a separate investigation into Mr. Headley. The NIA's investigation identified other potential targets, such as a Jewish religious and cultural center—also located close to Saturday's attack—that was similar to the center attacked in Mumbai in 2008.
Pune has many technical universities and other institutions of learning which attract Muslim students from abroad. Many of Pune's Muslim youths interact with these students, and are becoming radicalized. Three members of the Indian Mujahedeen—information technology experts—were drawn from Pune's Muslim community.
Given this evidence, the government should have moved proactively to strengthen physical security in the area, in coordination with the owners of the vulnerable private establishments. According to Mr. Chidambaram, they were alerted about their vulnerability, but nothing more seems to have been done to help them in preventing a terrorist attack. There were too few arrests and interrogations of individuals associated with Mr. Headley.
All this shows that Mr. Chidambaram might have created the right institutional infrastructure for dealing with terrorism, but this infrastructure is yet to start working in a coordinated and effective manner. The result is that India's preventive capability continues to be weak. Institutions are important, but it is even more important to make them work as they should.
Mr. Raman served in India's external intelligence agency from 1968 to 1994 and on the National Security Advisory Board of the government of India from 2000 to 2002.
Copyright 2009 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved
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