Wednesday, December 9, 2009
HEADLEY & DHIREN BAROT : THE JIHADI MOLES
B.RAMAN
David Coleman Headley, the middle-aged US citizen of Pakistani origin born to a former Pakistani public servant posted in the US and his American wife, who is facing investigation and prosecution before a Federal court in Chicago on charges relating to the Mumbai 26/11 terrorist attack of last year and a planned terrorist attack on a Danish newspaper in Copenhagen, is not a home-grown jihadi on the model of the British residents of Pakistani origin who carried out the suicide acts of terrorism in London in July,2005.
2.He was not an ill-integrated American like the Pakistani terrorists were ill-integrated British who hated the society in which they had grown up. He did not nurse any grievance or anger against the country of his adoption. There is so far no evidence to show even that he was a practising Muslim with a fundamentalist mindset. His original anger arose from the publication of some cartoons of the Holy Prophet by a Danish newspaper in 2005. He strongly felt the need for a Muslim retaliation against the paper.
3. It was this anger and the urge to retaliate, which seemed to have driven him first into the arms of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in 2005 and then into the fold of the so-called 313 Brigade based in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and headed by Ilyas Kashmiri, a Pakistani of suspected Army links, who had initially served in the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) and then gravitated towards Al Qaeda along with his organisation.
4. The British suicide bombers were not recruited by Al Qaeda or any of its affiliates. Driven by anger against the British role in Iraq and Afghanistan, they volunteered themselves for a suicide attack, got trained in Pakistan and carried out the attack in London. They targeted innocent British civilians and wanted them to die.
5. There is so far no evidence to show that Headley's anger had anything to do with the US role in Iraq or Afghanistan or with the militant movement in India's Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). His anger was triggered off by a perceived insult to the Holy Prophet and to Islam and a strongly-felt urge to avenge it.
6. He was not recruited by the LET and the 313 Brigade. He volunteered himself to help them --- not for personally carrying out an act of terrorism in US territory against US nationals, but for facilitating an act of terrorism in Copenhagen by undertaking reccee missions to Denmark under the cover of an employee of a Chicago-based immigration consultation company, which ostensibly wanted to open an office in Copenhagen.
7. The LET and the 313 Brigade welcomed him with open arms. The LET diverted his anger to India and used him as a mole with an assumed non-Pakistani Christian/Jewish identity for undertaking frequent visits to India of long duration to reccee targets and the Mumbai sea front for its planned sea-borne terrorist attack. He willingly became a facilitator of the conspiracy, which resulted in the death of 166 persons---- 25 of them foreign nationals, including six American nationals.
8. The LET's decision to use the willingness of Headley to conceal his Pakistani/Muslim identity and highlight his American/ Christian identity helped it in overcoming the suspicions of Indian immigration authorities against Muslims of Pakistani origin. In the wake of the growing closeness of India to the US, an American passport holder with a non-Muslim identity hardly created any suspicion in India. On the contrary, the features of a White American inherited by him from his mother helped him in ingratiacting himself with different sections of the urban Indian elite. He managed to create an image of himself as a "jolly good American", who wished well of India.
9.Headley knew that the LET was planning to target Jewish people and a Jewish religious-cultural centre in Mumbai because it had asked him to reccee the Nariman House in which the Jewish centre was located. But one does not know as yet whether he knew that the LET was also planning to target and kill non-Jewish foreigners, including Americans.
10. Headley willingly and painstakingly undertook the reccee missions for the LET in India, but his heart was in Copenhagen where he wanted to help the 313 Brigade in attacking the Danish paper. It was his enthusiasm for the planned attack in Copenhagen by Ilyas Kashmiri, which brought him to the notice of the FBI and ultimately led to his arrest along with the arrest of his associate Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a Canadian citizen of Pakistani origin. living and working in Chicago.
11. Headley was helping the LET since 2005 and the 313 Brigade since 2008, but his admiration for Ilyas Kashmiri and his poor opinion of the LET despite his association with it come out clearly from his intercepted communications produced by the FBI in the court. He looked upon the LET as lacking the courage to undertake a major terrorist strike in Copenhagen.
12. The LET's interest in recruiting US residents of Pakistani origin and White converts to Islam for terrorist attacks in India was known to the FBI since 2003. What must have come as a surprise to it was the first-time use by the LET of dissimulation as part of its modus operandi.
13. The question that US and Indian investigators would be asking themselves is---- is Headley a lone fish or are there other Headleys who remain undetected in the US and India?
14. Headley's case brings to mind the attempt of Al Qaeda to use Dhiren Barot also known as Esa-al-Hindi, a Hindu convert to Islam living in the UK, to undertake reccee missions to New York to collect operational intelligence about US financial institutions which could be used for another terrorist attack in US territory. Barot's Indian origin and British passport did not ring the same alarm bell in the minds of the US immigration as Arabs and Pakistanis did. Al Qaeda sought to exploit this.
15. Barot was not recruited by Al Qaeda. Angered by reports of the alleged suppression of Muslims in J&K and other parts of India and the anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat in 2002, he volunteered himself to help Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Al Qaeda welcomed him and turned his anti-India anger to the US and the UK and tried unsuccessfully to use him for its operations in those countries. He was detected by the joint efforts of the US and British intelligence, arrested and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment.
16. Home-grown jihadi moles, who act as facilitators of terrorist conspiracies, without personally participating in a terrorist attack, are going to be more difficult to detect than home-grown jihadi terrorists. The close co-operation of the FBI and the Indian intelligence in the Headley case should form the starting block for a joint drive to guard them against this phenomenon.(10-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, December 7, 2009
HEADLEY'S ROLE IN MUMBAI 26/11 CONSPIRACY & HIS PAKISTANI HANDLERS
B.RAMAN
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) filed before a Federal court in Chicago on December 7,2009, a Criminal Information Report charging David Coleman Headley previously known as Daood Gilani, a US national of Pakistani origin normally resident in Chicago, on 12 counts. Six of these counts related to participating in a conspiracy to bomb public places in India, murder and maim persons in India and Denmark, providing material support to foreign terrorist plots and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). The remaining six counts related to participating in a conspiracy to aid and abet the murder of US citizens in India. This refers to the massacre of six US nationals by the LET in Mumbai during the terrorist strike of 26/11 last year.
2. It is learnt that it has been called a Criminal Information Report and not yet an indictment because the charges relating to India are largely based on voluntary admissions made by him during his interrogation after he was arrested by the FBI on October 3,2009, on a charge of conspiring with Pakistan-based elements to carry out a terrorist attack in Copenhagen against a Danish journal which had published caricatures of Prophet Mohammad in 2005. The FBI had originally filed a criminal affidavit giving details of evidence collected on the basis of technical intelligence which justified his arrest and interrogation. Subsequently, they submitted to the court in a sealed cover information obtained during his initial interrogation to justify his continued custody. This sealed cover has now been opened and its contents incorporated in the Criminal Information Report.
3. The FBI has described the investigation against Headley as still active. A formal indictment would follow after the investigations into his disclosures in India and Pakistan. The National Investigation Agency of the Government of India has already started an investigation into his activities in India during his periodic visits, but no arrests would appear to have been made as yet during this investigation. Rahul Bhatt, the film world personality and son of Mahesh Bhatt, film producer/director, who was the only Indian whose name had figured in the E-mails exchanged by Headley with his Pakistani handlers, could be a material witness during the investigation and prosecution in the US as well as India. The Criminal Information Report against Headley, however, does not refer to Rahul.
4. The FBI has also filed a separate Criminal Information Report on two counts in the same court on December 7,2009, against Major (retd) Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed, a Pakistani citizen based in Pakistan. The two counts relate to conspiring to attack the Danish newspaper and its employees. The Criminal Information Report against the retired Pakistani Major does not refer to Mumbai 26/11. In the affidavit filed earlier by the FBI against Headley, there were references to two handlers of Headley in Pakistan--- a person referred to as Individual A and an LET office-bearer referred to as LET member A. Headley was allegedly in touch with Individual A in connection with the Copenhagen conspiracy and with LET member A in connection with the Indian and Copenhagen conspiracies. Individual A appeared in the earlier affidavit as an associate of Ilyas Kashmiri of the 313 Brigade. He had introduced Headley to Ilyas Kashmiri and was acting as a cut-out between the two.
5. The earlier affidavits had not identified Individual A and the LET member A. The Criminal Information Report filed on December 7 has identified Individual A as Major (retd) Abdur Rehman. While the Report does not say anything about the arrest of the Major, media reports have said that he has been arrested by the Pakistani authorities at the request of the FBI. For reasons which are not clear, no Criminal Information Report has been filed against Ilyas, who seemed to have initiated the conspiracy relating to Copenhagen. The FBI has not yet named the LET handler of Headley called LET member A.
6.A careful reading of the earlier affidavits, the criminal information reports filed on December 7 and the media reports in the US and Canada would indicate that Headley played a role in two conspiracies unrelated to each other. The first conspiracy was initiated by the LET in 2006 for the terrorist strike in Mumbai. In this connection, he visited India five times spending long periods to reccee the targets ultimately attacked by the LET, including the two hotels, the railway terminus and the Jewish centre, took video photographs and then carried them to Pakistan. The details of his participation in the Mumbai 26/11 related conspiracy are as follows:2005:
The LET, of which he had become a member, asked him to "travel to India to perform surveillance."
Feb. 2006: He changed his name from his original "Daood Gilani" in order to "present himself in India as an American who was neither Muslim nor Pakistani."
June 2006: Obtained permission from friend and businessman, Tahawwur Hussain Rana, to open an ostensible consultancy franchise in India. Rana is a Canadian national of Pakistani origin living in Chicago, who was running an immigration consultancy service.
Sept. 2006: Visited India for several weeks, then Pakistan.
Feb. 2007: Visited India for several weeks, then Pakistan.
Sept. 2007: Visited India for several weeks, then Pakistan.
April 2008: Visited India for several week, making a surveillance video as he took a boat ride through the Mumbai harbour.
July 2008: Visited India for several weeks, then Pakistan.
7. The FBI's Criminal Information Report does not refer to any Indian visit by Headley in November,2008. There is also no reference to any role of his in connection with the July 2006 explosions in some suburban trains of Mumbai.
8. The second conspiracy related to the planned terrorist attack in Copenhagen for which Headley had visited Copenhagen earlier this year on behalf of Ilyas Kashmiri and Major Abdur Rehman. It is known that Ilyas heads the so-called 313 Brigade based in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas. Maj.Abdur Rehman also probably belonged to the 313 Brigade.
9. The LET and the 313 Brigade were aware of each other's conspiracies relating to India and Denmark respectively and of the role of Headley in both the conspiracies, but their focus of interest was different. The LET was more interested in a spectacular operation in India than in Denmark. The 313 Brigade was more interested in a spectacular operation in Denmark than in India. It was the FBI's successful monitoring of the plans for an attack in Copenhagen which led to the arrest of Headley and the subsequent discovery of his role in India.
10. The FBI has not filed any Criminal Information Report against Rana in connection with Mumbai 26/11.
11.This may please be read in continuation of my earlier paper titled RE-VISITING MUMBAI 26/11 INVESTIGATION available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3504.html (8-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, December 6, 2009
OSAMA, ARE YOU THERE?
( An updated version of an article titled "The Oracle of Al Qaeda" written by me on October 3,2003, available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers9/paper808.html )
"Watch out if you are over six feet tall. The CIA's Predator aircraft have been programmed to kill all those above six feet, hoping one of them would turn out to be bin Laden." So said the graffiti in villages in the Pashtun tribal belt of Pakistan in 2003, reflecting the extent to which the US hunt for Osama bin Laden had become a butt of ridicule amongst the tribals.
Osama, Osama everywhere, yet nowhere to be found. The US has been desperately hunting for him ever since he reportedly escaped from the exotic-sounding Tora Bora caves of Afghanistan in 2002, injured and slightly incapacitated by a sharpnel, but alive and kicking.
And leading. So claimed his followers. His hand was felt, but not seen from Bali to Mombasa, from Riyadh to Casablanca, from Madrid to London.
He became like Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Feared, but not seen. Hunted relentlessly, but not found.
Offers of rewards of millions of dollars did not help. Naturally, said an intelligence analyst. The tribals are so poor and illiterate that they don't know what is a million dollar reward. If one offered them instead a plot of land or a few dozen goats they would join the hunt with gusto. So it was said. And so it was done. But without results. Neither offers of dollars nor plots nor goats would interest the tribals.
Why? The answer is simple, my dear Americans, wrote Mr.Afrasiab Khattak, a well-known Pashtun leader of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), in the "Dawn" of May 10, 2003. Osama was nowhere in the tribal belt, according to him.
He wrote: "The myth of no-man's land and the wild north-west comes quite handy as a spin and as a diversion when the Government fails to muster the required political will for taking the bull of terrorism right by the horns."
Gen.Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's then military dictator, sent the Americans on a wild goose chase in the forbidding tribal land. "Osama can't be alive," he said in 2002. He always moved around with a large entourage to protect him. Even if one failed to notice him, one would not fail to notice his retinue. So he used to say.
Then, tricky Mush, as his retired seniors in the Army used to call him, had a different spin. He was alive, he admitted, but in the no-go land of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), where no British soldier had ever gone and come back alive. "We Pakistanis are of a different mettle," said the legendary commando. "We will go where no British dared. And we will find him dead or alive. "
The Americans were duly impressed. Gave him another three billion dollars at Camp David.
Lollipops kept pouring into Pakistan in the expectation that Musharraf would help the US rid the world of Osama and his terrorist hordes. Hadn't he already delivered nearly 500 Al Qaeda types?
What he did was to round up many poor Arabs living in Pakistan who had become a social pest and make them a charge on the US tax-payers' money. Only five Al Qaeda leaders of real consequence were caught and handed over to the US. And that too, only after the US intelligence came to know of their sanctuaries in Pakistan and he had no other option but to arrest them.
Where were they found? asked the Pashtun leader. Abu Zubaidah in Faislabad in Pakistani Punjab;Ramzi Binalshibh and Waleed bin Attash in Karachi, Musharraf's home town after he migrated to Pakistan from India, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, the so-called master-mind of 9/11, in Rawalpindi, where the Army's GHQ is located. Nowhere in the tribal belt. Only Abu Faraj al-Libi was found in the tribal belt in 2005.
And in Karachi was harboured the injured Osama till August ,2002. In the Binori madrasa, which has produced more terrorists than all the other madrasas of Pakistan put together. That was the one place where Musharraf should have searched for him, if he was really sincere about wanting to help the US.
And that was one place where he did not search for him. Why? Because he knew Osama was there. And the Americans did not.
After Osama knew that the US intelligence traced his presence in Tora Bora through his communications with his followers, he totally stopped using modern means of communications.
After Binalshibh was caught in a different hide-out in Karachi in September 2002, because he had indiscreetly used the telephone, Osama was whisked out of Binori and possibly Karachi.
Is Osama still alive or dead? If alive, where is he? There are only three who know the answers to these questions definitively. Allah, the ISI and those who produce and disseminate through Al Jazeera videos and audios purporting to be his provided they are authentic.
Why doesn't the ISI arrest and hand him over to the US and get a few more billions of dollars? Because of a fear that he might spill the beans about his links with the ISI.
Why doesn't the ISI get him killed and be rid of this nuisance? Because of a fear that Osama's terrorist hordes may no longer help Pakistan in India and Afghanistan. And an equally strong fear that Pakistan may lose its importance in the eyes of the US, if Osama and Al Qaeda were no longer there.
The Pakistanis know their Americans. How naive and trusting, the Americans can be. Didn't Ahmed Chalabi and other anti-Saddam money-makers make millions from the CIA and the DIA by feeding imaginary reports about Saddam's WMD and by telling the then US Vice-President Dick Cheney and the then Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that the Iraqi people would welcome the US troops as liberators.
And since November 2002 an oracle started getting disseminated one tape after another purportedly of Osama and his No.2 Ayman al-Zawahiri. These tapes started coming out of Pakistan and reaching Al Jazeera and other Arab channels like rabbits out of a magician's hat.
The tapes kept coming at periodic intervals. The Congressional committees kept holding one session after another with testimonies by the top guns of the US intelligence and Armed Forces regarding the whereabouts of bin Laden. We know now he is in North Waziristan, they said.
US Drones went after him----attacking one suspected hide-out after another. They killed a lot of people. The world was told they were top guns of Al Qaeda. "We may not have got OBL, but we are eliminating others around him".
"Al Qaeda is weakened even if we have not caught or killed OBL," said one Al Qaeda watcher.
The then President George Bush came out with his own gem: " The fact that Osama has not yet been caught shows that he is trying desperately not to get caught."
Many Al Qaeda cadres---- each of them projected at the time of their capture as the No.3 of Al Qaeda--- were caught in different cities of Pakistan. " We will now know where OBL is. The No.3 will know. We will get it during the interrogation."
Apparently, their interrogation revealed nothing. Either they were tough nuts to crack or they themselves did not know where the hell was OBL.
So the hunt goes on. There has been no business like Al Qaeda and OBL business. How many Al Qaeda watchers must have minted fortunes by claiming to know all that is fit to be known about them!
How many billions Islamabad must have made by pretending to help the US in its search! How much of that must have gone into the jihad chest of Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban!
In an interview to the ABC news on December 6,2009, a sheepish Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, has finally admitted: "The US has had no reliable information on the whereabouts of al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden in years. Well, we don't know for a fact where Osama Bin Laden is. If we did, we'd go get him."
Well, Mr.Gates, search for him where you have not searched for him so far. You are till now looking for him in the sparsely populated tribal areas of the FATA. Start looking for him in the populated tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province and in the other provinces of Pakistan. Set up a special group to re-interrogate all the top guns of Al Qaeda arrested in Pakistan. Find out how the tapes are reaching Al Jazeera from Pakistan. Trace them back to wherefrom they started their journey. Seek the co-operation of the Sindhis, the Mohajirs, the Balochs and the Shias of Pakistan in the search for him.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi,and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, December 4, 2009
WANTON BRUTALITY OF PINDI MOSQUE ATTACK
B.RAMAN
Thirty-six devout Muslims, all of them with links to the Pakistani armed forces either as serving or retired officers or their relatives or friends, were killed on December 4,2009, in a commando-style raid by a group of four to seven terrorists into a mosque in Parade Lane off the Peshawar Road in Rawalpindi where the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army, a number of other military establishments and residential houses of serving and retired military officers, including the Chief of the Army Staff, are located. The terrorists attacked at the time of the Friday prayers.
2. Of those killed, 17 were children, who had accompanied their parents for the prayers and four were the terrorists. The “Friday Times” of Lahore has published the following list of the fatalities on December 5: “Major General Umer Bilal, Brigadier Abdul Rauf, Colonel Mansoor, Lieutenant Colonel Fakhar, Lieutenant Colonel Manzoor Saeed, Major Zahid, Major (retired) Shoaib, Naik Masood, Sepoy Sarwar and Sepoy Abdul Qayyum. Children killed in the attack included Bilal Riaz, son of Major General Nasim Riaz; Ali Hasan, son of Colonel Shabbir; Hassan, son of Colonel Shukhran; Sadaul Hasan, son of Lieutenant Colonel Fakhar; Zamin, son of Akmal Hussain; Qaiser Khan, son of Syed Akbar; Adil Rauf, son of Abdul Rauf; Muhammad Khan, son of Sultan Bakhsh; Fazal Khan, son of Madad Khan; and Hashim, son of Peshawar Corps Commander Lieutenant Colonel (Lt.Gen?) Masood Aslam. Names of seven children, who according to the Inter-Services Public Relations, were sons of senior army officials, were yet to be ascertained. Father of Major General Awais Mustafa, father of Colonel Kaleem Zubair and father of Lieutenant Colonel Farooq Awan were also killed in the attack. According to the ISPR, the civilians killed in the terrorist attack included NLC Deputy Director Taskeen, Khalid Javed, Ghulam Mujtaba, Javed, Muhammad Fiaz and Asad. Names of the remaining people killed were yet to be ascertained.”
3. Details available so far indicate that at the time of the prayers, two of the terrorists carrying explosive devices entered the mosque and blew themselves up. As the surviving worshippers rushed out, two other terrorists at the gate opened fire and threw hand-grenades. They then took cover inside one of the remaining buildings and engaged in an exchange of fire with the security forces who managed to kill them after about an hour. The Army has been saying that only four terrorists were involved and that all of them are dead, but the local police suspect that there were at least two or three more, who managed to escape.
4. Details of the attack carried by the “News” on December 5,2009, give the following significant information:
“The mosque is predominantly frequented by serving and retired Army officers, Jawans and members of their families and is not open to civilians living in the area.”
“This attack bears the signatures of the terror strike on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore as here also these terrorists were carrying back-packs full of arms and ammunition and targeting innocent victims while standing openly in the grounds and shouting commands and orders to each other. Later, when challenged, they engaged the law-enforcement agencies, both the Army and the police, in crossfire and some even got holed up in hideouts in houses close to the mosque. We are trying to locate them and kill or arrest them,” the sources in the Rawalpindi Police and intelligence agencies told The News on condition of anonymity.”
5. Some media reports speak of wanton brutality such as the terrorists at the gate catching hold of some fleeing worshippers by the hair and killing them. Generally, Sunni terrorist organizations exhibit such acts of brutality only against known Shias and non-Muslims. The attack definitely had an anti-military angle to wreak vengeance against military personnel for the military operations against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the Pashtun tribal belt and for not stopping the US drone (pilotless planes) strikes in the area.
6. Suspicion that the attack might have also had a sectarian anti-Shia angle arises from the following factors. Firstly, the report that civilians were not allowed to pray in the mosque. A Muslim has a right to pray in any mosque unless it be located in a sensitive military area. The mosque was not located in a sensitive area. However, Shias because of the repeated attacks on them by Sunni extremists, carefully regulate entry into their places of worship.
7. Secondly, the TTP is reported to have claimed responsibility for the attack. The “Daily Times” has reported as follows: “Claiming responsibility for Friday’s attack, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) said the Parade Lane mosque was similar to Masjid-e-Zarrar built in Madina by the munafiqeen, and was “demolished on the orders of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)”. Talking to BBC, TTP chief Waliur Rehman Mehsud said his men attacked senior army officers. “Our militants attacked the military officers (our primary target) and we will continue to attack the army,” he said, adding that the civilians killed in the attack were relatives of army personnel and their deaths did not matter”.
8. To quote from an Islamic source on why the Masjid-e-Zarrar was demolished: “During the time of the Rasoolullah himself, some faction-mongers constructed a new mosque. The intensity with which the Quran opposed this construction can be gauged from the relevant verses of the Sura Taubah. Pause and reflect for what the Quran says in this matter. (9: 107) “Those who put up the mosque with this intention that loss be incurred to the Millat-e-Islamia and the Deen itself." "and kufr be favoured or the path of kufr be hiked." (9:107) " i.e., with the purpose that dissention be created in the Muslims." Do you think of it as a mosque? No, it is not a mosque. (9:107) "It is that ambush from which those who were the enemy of Allah and His Rasool (i.e., The Divine System) shall attack the Millat." It means this is not a mosque; this is the fort where the enemies of Allah and His Rasool will lie in ambush to demolish the structure of Deen. “They will indeed swear that their intention by constructing this mosque is nothing but good. We do never desire destruction of the Deen." "Do not be taken in. God stands witness to this stark fact that they are out and out liars." (9:108) "O Rasool! Never take a single step into this mosque." This mosque, so as to say, is just on the verge of hell. Whoso have constructed it or whosoever entered into it this will let all crumble down into the abyss of hell (9: 107-109). Hence history stands witness to this fact that Rasoolullah demolished this mosque through his associates. Imagine from this incidence how heinous and horrendous the crime of sectarianism in Islam is! Even if the construction of a mosque casts any speck of factionalism, the demolishing of this mosque becomes imperative. Mosque can be demolished but the foundation of sectarianism can never be laid. It is because factionalism, in express terms, is anathema (Shirk), and is anathema of a conspicuous nature. (http://www.parvez-video.com/insight/Islam/sects_islam/index.asp)
9. The Masjid-e-Zarrar was demolished because the followers of the Holy Prophet suspected that it had been constructed by hypocrite (Munafiqeen) Christians and Jewish people, who posed as Muslims, in order to create a divide among the followers of the Holy Prophet. By attacking the military worshippers in the Rawalpindi mosque, the jihadis have sought to convey a message to the Sunnis of the Armed Forces and the civil society that military officers collaborating with the US are no different from the Shias, the Christians, and the Jewish people and killing them is justified. ( 5-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
THE SOMALI FRONT OF THE GLOBAL JIHAD
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO.584
B.RAMAN
Al Qaeda looks upon its continuing jihad against the so-called Crusaders --- thereby meaning essentially the US, Israel and their supporters--- as a global intifada waged on many fronts and through many means. In this global jihad, Afghanistan, Somalia and Algeria are seen as battle fronts, which will determine the ultimate outcome. Afghanistan is seen as the core of the battle, Somalia as its southern front and Algeria as the Western front.
2. In a message disseminated on December 20,2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No.2 to Osama bin Laden in Al Qaeda, said: “Brothers in Islam and Jihad in Somalia: know that you are on the southern garrison of Islam, so don’t allow Islam to be attacked from your flank, and know that we are with you, and that the entire Muslim Ummah is with you. So don’t lose heart, or fall into despair, for you must dominate if you are true in faith. And know that you are fending off the same Crusade which is fighting your brothers in Islam in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. So be resolute, be patient and be optimistic, for by Allah beside whom there is no other God, even if your enemies possess thousands of tons of iron and explosives, in their chests lie the hearts of mice. So be severe against them like Muhammad was. "
3. To keep the jihad going in Somalia is one of its important objectives. For this purpose, it uses not only recruits from the impoverished local population, but also from the Somali diaspora in the West----including the US--- as well as jihad-hardened cadres sent from the battle fronts in the Af-Pak region. The Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) of Pakistan has had a long history of contacts with the Muslim population in Somalia and East African countries just as it has with the Muslim population of Chechnya and Dagestan. Though the TJ itself does not indulge in acts of terrorism, it plays an important role in facilitating the ideological motivation of the population on behalf of Al Qaeda.
4. In September 2009, Al Shabaab, meaning “The Lads”, an organization of Somali youths, was reported to have disseminated through Islamic web sites usually identified with Al Qaeda a 48-minute video documentary in which it proclaimed its allegiance to Osama bin Laden. It derives its name “The Lads” from the fact that it used to be the youth wing of a fundamentalist organization called the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which had established control over some parts of Somalia and was ultimately crushed by invading Ethiopian troops in 2006. While the elders of the UIC disappeared after being defeated by the better trained and better armed Ethiopian troops allegedly inspired and aided by the US, the Al Shabaab replaced the UIC as a born-again jihadi organization, which was determined to continue the jihad against the troops of the African Union, which had replaced the Ethiopian troops, and of the UN-backed local Government, which it viewed as apostate.
5. Though Somalis had participated in acts of suicide terrorism on behalf of Al Qaeda in other countries, suicide terrorism was unknown in Somalia itself till Al Shabaab made its appearance in 2006. Even though it proclaimed its loyalty to bin Laden only in September,2009, it had carried out a number of acts of suicide terrorism against local Government targets as well as the peace-keeping troops of the African Union ever since the AU troops took over their peace-keeping responsibility in Somalia. Al Shabaab has been waging a two-front jihad---- against the AU troops and the local Government being protected by the AU troops. The first act of suicide terrorism took place on September 18,2006. Since then, there have been 13 suicide attacks--- two in 2006, four in 2007, two in 2008 and five this year.
6. The Al Shabaab cadres, many of whom had allegedly served with the Afghan Mujahideen, the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the Af-Pak region, look upon their jihad as similar to the jihad waged by the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet troops and those of the Government of the then President Najibullah in the 1980s and the early 1990s.
7. In a serious attack of suicide terrorism, a male suicide bomber dressed as a woman managed to find his way into a graduation ceremony of medical students in a Mogadishu hotel on December 3,2009, and blew himself up killing 19 persons, including three Ministers of the Cabinet of Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke of the UN-backed Government. Even though no organization has so far claimed responsibility for the attack, Al Shabaab is strongly suspected by the local authorities.
8. Though there is so far no evidence of any nexus between Al Shabaab and the Somali pirates, the dangers of money earned from piracy going to the coffers of Al Qaeda and the availability in Somalia of sea-faring people who could be used by Al Qaeda for future acts of maritime terrorism cannot be ignored.
9. A Reuters report carried on December 4,2009, by the “Daily Times” of Lahore has quoted Bethuel Kiplagat, who used to be Kenya’s special envoy to the Somalia peace process from 2003 to 2005, as saying as follows: “Suicide bombings are a worrying trend not only for Somalia but also the region. There has been a rise in fundamentalism in Somalia coming from the Middle East and Pakistan. There’s a worry Al Qaeda may be looking at Somalia as a new sanctuary.”
10. On March 16,2009, Mohamed Mohamed of the BBC’s Somali section, reported as follows: “As well as alleged links to al-Qaeda it is said to have Arabs, Asians, other Africans and - America's FBI believes - Westerners among its ranks. These foreigners are said to be involved in training Al Sabaab recruits in various aspects of guerrilla warfare, including suicide bombings and booby traps.”
11. On February 29, 2008, the then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated Al Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act . (4-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Thursday, December 3, 2009
WHY DID ZARDARI KEEP HIMSELF OUT OF NUCLEAR COMMAND AUTHORITY?
B.RAMAN
On February 2, 2000, Pakistan's National Security Council (NSC), chaired by Gen.Pervez Musharraf, set up a National Command Authority (NCA) to co-ordinate and control policy-making relating to nuclear weapons. It consisted of an Employment Control Committee, a Development Control Committee and a Strategic Plans Division to act as the Secretariat of the NCA.
2.The Employment Control Committee was chaired by the head of the Government and included the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Deputy Chairman), Defence and the Interior, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), the three Service Chiefs and the Director-General of the Strategic Plans Division, who acted as its Secretary. The Chairman was empowered to co-opt technical and other advisers.
3.The Development Control Committee was also chaired by the head of the Government and included the CJCSC (Deputy Chairman), the three Service Chiefs, the Director-General of the Strategic Plans Division and representatives of strategic organizations and the scientific community. This Committee controlled the development of strategic assets. Political personalities holding important Cabinet posts were excluded from it.
4.The Strategic Plans Division, headed by a senior army officer, was established in the Joint Services Headquarters under the CJCSC to act as the Secretariat for the NCA and perform functions relating to planning, coordination, and establishment of a reliable command, control, communication, computers and intelligence network.
5. The security division of the NCA was made responsible not only for the physical security of the assets and installations, but also for personnel security. It now reportedly has more than 10,000 personnel and is headed by a 3-star General. It has a personnel reliability programme (PRP) directorate.
6.The NCA thus constituted functioned for over seven years without any legislative authority. Just before the elections to the National Assembly held in the beginning of 2008, Musharraf promulgated an ordinance called the NCA Ordinance 2007 on December 13, 2007, which sought to give it the required legislative authority. This was one of the many ordinances issued by Musharraf, which remained unapproved by the two Houses of the Parliament when he left office and was succeeded by Asif Ali Zardari as the President last year.
7. Earlier this year, this ordinance came up for consideration by a 17-member committee of the newly-elected National Assembly headed by the Chairperson of the NA Standing Committee on Defence Azra Fazal Pechuho, who incidentally is the sister of President Asif Ali Zardari.
8.Contrary to the widespread public speculation on the subject, neither the charter of the NCA as laid down when Musharraf was in power nor the subsequent proceedings in the Committee of the NA and then in the NA itself dealt with the question of who will have the ultimate power to press the nuclear button in case of a war with an adversary. From the beginning in the days of Zia ul-Haq, the Army had made it clear that the nuclear button would be under its control and was not prepared to share this control with any elected political leader----whether he or she be the head of State or Govt.
9.When Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party won the elections of 1988 after the death of Zia ul-Haq, the Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agreed to let her become the Prime Minister only after she agreed to let herself be excluded from all decision-making in nuclear-related matters. The Army insisted that it would report directly to the then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in nuclear matters and not to her and she had to agree to it.
10.During her two terms as the Prime Minister (1988-90 and 1993-96) and during his first term as the Prime Minister (1990-93), neither Benazir nor Nawaz was in a position to over-rule the Army in nuclear matters because the then Presidents had the power to dismiss the Prime Minister and they were afraid that if they decided to be assertive in nuclear matters, the Army might pressure the President to dismiss them. This fear disappeared in 1996 when Nawaz won a two-thirds majority in the elections to the National Assembly. He used this majority to abolish the powers of the President to dismiss the Prime Minister. Thereafter, he tried to be more assertive in nuclear matters. His desire that the elected Prime Minister should co-ordinate the decision-making process in nuclear matters became one of the bones of contention between him and Musharraf, who was the Chief of the Army Staff. He was reportedly taken by surprise when the Americans allegedly informed him that at the height of the Kargil conflict, Musharraf had alerted the nuclear forces on his own without keeping Nawaz in the picture.
11.After seizing power in October 1999, Musharraf ensured that whatever be the set-up of the NCA and whoever chaired it, the final decision in all nucear-related matters would be taken by him and not by his Prime Minister-----initially Zulfiquar Ali Magsi and then Shaukat Aziz, who succeeded Magsi. Musharraf also re-introduced the 17th Amendment of the Constitution of 1973 under which the President has the power to dismiss the elected Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly. Zardari inherited from Musharraf the powers assumed by him in respect of the dismissal of the Prime Minister and the dissolution of the National Assembly. He also inherited Musharraf’s powers relating to the NCA. Nawaz Sharif and other leading political leaders belonging to parties other than the PPP have been demanding that the 17th Amendment should again be abolished. While accepting this ostensibly in principle, Zardari has been avoiding it by taking advantage of the fact that no party has a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly to be able to implement this.
12.After Zardari took over as the President last year, the powers and methods of functioning of the NCA became a subject of international concern because of growing fears over the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. What concerned the US was not so much as to who will have control over the nuclear button in case of a war, but as to who will be responsible for the security of the nuclear arsenal. This concern over the security of the arsenal had become magnified after the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the various other Punjabi jihadi organisations commonly referred to as the Punjabi Taliban stepped up their activities after the Lal Masjid raid of July,2007 and after the TTP started attacking the security forces.
13.The emergence of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) as a terrorist organisation with capabilities on par with Al Qaeda---- as demonstrated by the Mumbai 26/11 terrorist strike--- increased these concerns even more. In the past, the US concerns regarding the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal mainly related to the reported attempts of Al Qaeda to acquire weapons of mass destruction material. After Mumbai 26/11, the US is increasingly concerned over likely threats to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal from organisations such as the TTP and the LET and others of Pakistani origin.
14.Reports of the infiltration of the Pakistani armed forces by these organisations---- as demonstrated by the alleged involvement of junior and middle level Air Force and Army personnel in the two attempts to kill Musharraf in Rawalpindi in December, 2003 --- created fears of such infiltration into Pakistan's nuclear set-up and into the Division under the NCA responsible for the physical security of the nuclear arsenal.
15.The post-2003 discussions between the US and Pakistani officials on the security of the nuclear arsenal focussed attention not only on the physical security of the arsenal in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of terrorists, but also on preventing the infiltration of the nuclear set-up by the terrorist organisations in order to obtain nuclear and other technologies.
16.As a result of these concerns, the major part of the discussions in the 17-member committee came to be devoted not to the question of the control over the nuclear button, but to the question of how to meet the US concerns over the physical security of the nuclear arsenal and over the dangers of the infiltration of the nuclear set-up by jihadi elements.
17.Reflecting this change of focus, the "Daily Times" of Lahore wrote in an editorial as follows: " A report of the standing committee on defence regarding the National Command Authority (NCA) bill 2007 has been laid before the National Assembly. The timing of the report’s presentation suggests to some observers the urgency of allaying the fears expressed by the Western media, veteran journalist Seymour Hersh’s piece in the New Yorker being only the latest significant case in point, regarding the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The greater concern is not about any external force gaining access to the arsenal. The apprehension being expressed concerns internal leakage of technology and/or the weapons themselves. The beneficiaries of such a hypothetical leakage, according to Western media reports, could be the terrorists operating within and around Pakistan. The concerns of the Western media and even some governments have to be seen in the context of the track record of the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The least likely scenario would be that a weapon/s could actually be spirited away by some inimical personnel. A nuclear weapon is not a piece of candy or a lollipop that can be secreted away in a pocket to be calmly taken away under the nose of tight security. Our weapons have been dispersed and rendered impossible to use without proper authorisation precisely to pre-empt any such possibility and even prevent the accidental use of these deadly weapons. The real apprehension in the minds of those fundamentally hostile to the existence of this capability is that the very personnel charged with the responsibility to ensure their security may be infected sufficiently by jihadi ideology to consider leaking vital information and/or equipment to the terrorists currently battling against the Pakistani state. From Musharraf onwards and downwards, officials in positions of high authority have been emphasising consistently that no such threat exists or will be allowed to rear its head. While knowledgeable US officials have been saying much the same thing, the Western media seems not to be inclined to let the facts stand in the way of a good story. The proposed bill to give legal cover to the NCA would have the President as the ex-officio chairman of the Authority, with the Prime Minister as the ex-officio deputy chairman. The bill proposes to give retrospective cover to all acts by officials of the NCA committed before the bill becomes law. It seeks to institute vigilance not only against external threats but also to keep an eye on the officials and employees of the NCA to prevent any breach of security, which has been held punishable with a jail term extending up to 25 years."
18.When everybody was expecting that as recommended by the 17-member committee, Zardari would take over as the Chairman of the NCA after the approval of the committee's report by the National Assembly, he sprang a surprise on November 27,2009, by issuing an ordinance which designated the Prime Minister as the Chairman. "Transferring the chairmanship of the National Command Authority to the Prime Minister is a giant leap forward to empowering the elected parliament and the Prime Minister," presidential spokesman Farhatullah Babar said in a statement.
19.Why did Zardari do so? There is no satisfactory answer to this question. According to some, it reflects the weakening position of Zardari, who is increasingly distrusted not only by the Army, but also by important sections of political and public opinion because of the perception that he is amenable to American pressure. According to others, who are in the PPP, Zardari took this decision not due to political or military pressure but due to a desire to avoid getting involved in a sensitive controversy over the security of the nuclear arsenal in the light of the growing US pressure on the subject.
20.As is evident from the “New Yorker” article of Hersh, the secret US talks on the security of the nuclear arsenal are being held with the military leadership and not with the elected political leadership. Whether the NCA is chaired by the President or the Prime Minister, it is apparent that the US would like to deal directly with the Army on this subject instead of through the President or the Prime Minister. Zardari has chosen to come to terms with this harsh reality as Benazir did in 1988 instead of making an issue of it which he is bound to lose if he did. ( 3-12-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
ANOTHER JIHADI ATTACK ON PAK NAVY
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO. 583
An alert official of the Pakistani naval intelligence in plain clothes and a naval security guard in uniform deployed outside the building of the Pakistan Navy Headquarters in Islamabad prevented what could have been a major terrorist strike against the Naval Headquarters by an unidentified suicide bomber on December 2,2009. Spotting a suspicious-looking individual outside the NHQ, they stopped him and searched him. He turned out to be a suicide bomber wearing a concealed suicide vest. However, they could not prevent him from activating the explosive device in the vest.One person was killed on the spot and another succumbed to his injuries later.
2. This was the second jihadi terrorist attack on a naval target since the commando raid into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July,2007. The Lal Masjid raid made the Pakistani Taliban known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) turn against the Pakistani security forces.Since July 2007, there have been many suicide and suicidal attacks on personnel of the Armed Forces and the police----not only in the tribal areas, but also in non-tribal areas , including in Islamabad and Rawalpindi and in heavily guarded cantonments.
3.The first attack on a naval establishment took place on March 4, 2008. Two unidentified suicide bombers, operating in tandem, attacked the prestigious Naval War College located in a high security area of Lahore. They were both on motor-cycles. One of them rammed his motor-cycle against the security gate at the rear of the building breaking it open. The other drove through this opening into the parking area and blew himself up. Their target was the naval institution and not any particular individual or individuals inside. They wanted to demonstrate their ability to penetrate the campus and cause damage. Six persons were killed--- one of them a naval officer, three members of the security guards at the gate and the two suicide bombers.
4.The Pakistan Navy has had no role to play in the operations in the Lal Masjid, the FATA ( Federally-Administered Tribal Areas) and Swat.However,the logistic supplies for the NATO forces are brought to the Karachi port, unloaded there under the protection of the Pakistani Navy and then transported to Afghanistan by trucks. While the Pakistani Army and Air Force have no operational role to play in the US-led military operations in the Afghan territory against Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban, the Pakistani Navy is a member of the US-led international naval force which patrols the seas to the west of Pakistan to prevent any hostile activity which could hamper the operations in Afghan territory. The Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, established near the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, comprise naval forces from France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The task force conducts maritime security operations (MSO) in the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. The leadership of the Task Force is rotated amongst the participating navies. A Pakistani naval officer has been commanding it off and on when the turn of the Pakistan Navy comes.
5.During the election campaign of 2008, one of the issues raised by Mr. Nawaz Sharif, former Prime Minister, was the need to re-examine the implications of the US declaring Pakistan a non-NATO ally. He apparently felt that this declaration was meant to facilitate the involvement of the Pakistani Navy in the Afghanistan-related joint naval operations of the NATO and wanted a re-think on it. He has not been raising this issue in recent months. The TTP has not raised this issue either.( 3-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail -- seventyone2@gmail.com )