INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO. 561
B.RAMAN
On April 1,2009, a pilotless plane (Drone) of the USA's Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) attacked with a missile the house of Hakimullah Mehsud in the Khadezai area of the Orakzai Agency in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Twelve persons were killed. Hakimullah himself, who was apparently one of the targets, escaped unhurt and warned of a retaliatory strike by the Pakistani
Taliban in Islamabad.
2. The retaliation through a suicide bomber came within three days. Late on the evening of April 4,2009, a suicide bomber blew himself up in front of the barracks of a company of the Frontier Constabulary (FC) from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), which was deployed in Islamabad on VIP security duties. At least eight members of the FC were killed by the explosion.The FC consists almost entirely of Pashtuns recruited in the NWFP, the FATA and the Pashtun majority areas of Balochistan. The FC has been in the forefront of the operations against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the Pashtun belt.
3.On October 4,2009, Hakimullah Mehsud, who has taken over as the Amir of the TTP after the death of Baitullah Mehsud in a Drone strike on August 5,2009, invited five Pashtun journalists to a hide-out in South Waziristan to dispel rumours spread by the Pakistani authorities after the death of Baitullah that at a shoora of the TTP held to choose the successor to Baitullah, fighting broke out between his followers and those of Waliur Rehman and that Hakimullah was killed in the exchange of fire. These rumours persisted even after two persons claiming to be Hakimullah and Waliur Rehman had rung up some journalists to repudiate these rumours and announce jointly that the TTP had elected Hakimullah as its Amir and Waliur as its Amir for the South Waziristan area. These rumours revived again recently through reports circulating
in Pakistan as well as orininating from the US.
4 Talking to these journalists, Hakimullah reportedly pledged to take revenge against the US for the Drone attacks and reiterated the previous TTP claim that the Pakistani Government was cooperating with the US for carrying out the missile strikes by Predators. However, he added that the TTP wasn’t against Pakistan or its people as its fight was with the pro-US rulers of the country.
5.On October 5,2009, at least five UN officials, a foreigner and two women among them, were killed and eight others injured when a suicide bomber dressed as a Frontier Constabulary soldier managed to enter the Islamabad office of the World Food Programme without being checked by security guards from a private company as well as an FC unit deployed in Islamabad to provide security to VIPs and important
establishments and blew himself up. The FC personnel guarding the building reportedly came from the same unit which was attacked by a suicide bomber of the TTP on April 4,2009.
6. The "Dawn" of Karachi reported as follows on October 6,2009: "Senior investigation officers said they had not ruled out the possibility that
the bomber was an FC man.The investigators detained an FC man on duty and a private security guard posted at the office’s gate. An official said it was premature to say anything about the bomber’s identity, but the possibility that he was a serving or ex-member of the paramilitary force could not be ruled out. Another top security official said if it was established that the attacker belonged to the FC, it might change the entire dynamics of not just the investigation, but the counter-terror operation."
7. If it is established that the suicide bomber was in fact a serving member of the FC, it would be an indicatior of the success of the TTP in penetrating FC units deployed outside the Pashtun tribal belt. In the past, there had been many instances of the TTP penetrating FC units deployed in the tribal belt and winning over its personnel. There had also been instances of FC personnel deployed in the tribal areas deserting from their units and joining the TTP.
8. If the TTP has succeeded in penetrating FC units deployed in Islamabad and other places, it should set an alarm bell ringing because the Pakistan Army uses FC units for physical security duties at nuclear establishments. This could provide an opportunity for the TTP and Al Qaeda to penetrate these establishments with the help of their moles. ( 6-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, October 6, 2009
Monday, October 5, 2009
OBAMA VEERING TOWARDS NEUTRALITY ON ARUNACHAL PRADESH?
B.RAMAN
In my article of September 16,2009, titled "Obama Ducks Dalai Lama" available at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers35/paper3418.html , I had reported as follows: "His Holiness is going ahead with his plans to visit Arunachal Pradesh in November, which could more or less coincide with Obama's visit to China. The US officials were reported to be worried that the Chinese anger over the Dalai Lama's visit to Arunachal Pradesh might come in the way of the success of Obama's promised efforts to persuade Beijing to resume its dialogue with His Holiness. It is not clear whether they gave any advice to His Holiness in this matter."
2. It is learnt that officials of the Obama Administration have stepped up pressure on the advisers of His Holiness to persuade the Dalai Lama not to raise any controversy over Arunachal Pradesh for the time being till he succeeds in persuading the Chinese to resume their dialogue with the representatives of His Holiness.
3. The Obama Administration is showing signs of greater sensitivity to the concerns and interests of China than those of India. Reliable reports indicate that it is veering towards a policy of neutrality on the issue of Arunachal Pradesh, which has been a major bone of contention between India and China. It is believed to be dragging its feet on the implementation of the understanding reached between the
preceding Bush Administration and the Govt. of India for the US Air Force to undertake searches in Arunachal Pradesh territory for US Air Force personnel, who were missing in action during the Second World War.
4. It is learnt that the formats of the joint exercices between the three wings of the Armed Forces of the two countries, which were agreed upon during the Bush Administration, are being reviewed in order to delete elements, which could cause concern to not only China, but also Pakistan--- such as joint exercises between the two armies in the Siachen area to enable US Army personnel to get exposed to high altitude conditions, joint naval exercises in the seas to the east of India etc.
5. While the Obama Administration wants to go ahead with the over-all format of the strategic relationship with India as laid down by the Bush Administration, it wants to have a second look at those aspects, which could cause concern to China.
6. There was one joint naval exercise off Japan involving ships of the navies of India, the US and Japan after Obama assumed office. Such exercises are likely to be avoided in future.
7. There is also a possibility of the US abstaining when the specific proposal for assistance from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for a flood control project in Arunachal Pradesh comes up for approval before the ADB.The ADB's Board of Governors had earlier this year, after Obama came to office, approved a basket of projects proposed by India despite opposition ftrom China. It is learnt that ADB officials have been saying that approval for the package as a whole did not mean approval of each individual item in the package and that each individual item has to be approved separately. Efforts are being made to scuttle ADB support for the individual proposal relating to Arunachal Pradesh.
8. The Obama Administration seems to be thinking that all that it needs to do to humour India and soften the blow due to its steady reversal of the pro-India policies initiated by the Bush Administration is to accord the honours of a State visit to Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh in November and play up the ceremonial honours accorded to him. In the last few days, officials of the US State Department have been briefing the media about the kind of honours which will be accorded to Dr.Manmohan Singh when he visits Washington. These are meant to show that there has been no change in the US policies towards India under the Obama Administration. The reality is that on every matter, which is of concern to India, greater attention is being paid to China's sensitivities and concerns. ( 5-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
In my article of September 16,2009, titled "Obama Ducks Dalai Lama" available at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers35/paper3418.html , I had reported as follows: "His Holiness is going ahead with his plans to visit Arunachal Pradesh in November, which could more or less coincide with Obama's visit to China. The US officials were reported to be worried that the Chinese anger over the Dalai Lama's visit to Arunachal Pradesh might come in the way of the success of Obama's promised efforts to persuade Beijing to resume its dialogue with His Holiness. It is not clear whether they gave any advice to His Holiness in this matter."
2. It is learnt that officials of the Obama Administration have stepped up pressure on the advisers of His Holiness to persuade the Dalai Lama not to raise any controversy over Arunachal Pradesh for the time being till he succeeds in persuading the Chinese to resume their dialogue with the representatives of His Holiness.
3. The Obama Administration is showing signs of greater sensitivity to the concerns and interests of China than those of India. Reliable reports indicate that it is veering towards a policy of neutrality on the issue of Arunachal Pradesh, which has been a major bone of contention between India and China. It is believed to be dragging its feet on the implementation of the understanding reached between the
preceding Bush Administration and the Govt. of India for the US Air Force to undertake searches in Arunachal Pradesh territory for US Air Force personnel, who were missing in action during the Second World War.
4. It is learnt that the formats of the joint exercices between the three wings of the Armed Forces of the two countries, which were agreed upon during the Bush Administration, are being reviewed in order to delete elements, which could cause concern to not only China, but also Pakistan--- such as joint exercises between the two armies in the Siachen area to enable US Army personnel to get exposed to high altitude conditions, joint naval exercises in the seas to the east of India etc.
5. While the Obama Administration wants to go ahead with the over-all format of the strategic relationship with India as laid down by the Bush Administration, it wants to have a second look at those aspects, which could cause concern to China.
6. There was one joint naval exercise off Japan involving ships of the navies of India, the US and Japan after Obama assumed office. Such exercises are likely to be avoided in future.
7. There is also a possibility of the US abstaining when the specific proposal for assistance from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for a flood control project in Arunachal Pradesh comes up for approval before the ADB.The ADB's Board of Governors had earlier this year, after Obama came to office, approved a basket of projects proposed by India despite opposition ftrom China. It is learnt that ADB officials have been saying that approval for the package as a whole did not mean approval of each individual item in the package and that each individual item has to be approved separately. Efforts are being made to scuttle ADB support for the individual proposal relating to Arunachal Pradesh.
8. The Obama Administration seems to be thinking that all that it needs to do to humour India and soften the blow due to its steady reversal of the pro-India policies initiated by the Bush Administration is to accord the honours of a State visit to Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh in November and play up the ceremonial honours accorded to him. In the last few days, officials of the US State Department have been briefing the media about the kind of honours which will be accorded to Dr.Manmohan Singh when he visits Washington. These are meant to show that there has been no change in the US policies towards India under the Obama Administration. The reality is that on every matter, which is of concern to India, greater attention is being paid to China's sensitivities and concerns. ( 5-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, October 4, 2009
OCTOBER 1: DAY OF MOURNING IN XINJIANG & TIBET
B.RAMAN
According to reliable source reports from Tibet and Xinjiang, October 1, 2009, which marked the 60the anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, was observed as a day of mourning by the Uighurs and the Tibetans in Xinjiang and Tibet.
2. Despite the strong security measures taken by the Public Security Bureau of Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, pamphlets purported to have been issued by the Munich-based World Uighur Congress (WUC) calling upon the Uighurs not to celebrate the day managed to circulate in the Uighur-majority areas of the city. The pamphlet said: "On October 1st, 1949 Mao proclaimed the People's
Republic of China and incorporated East Turkestan into its territory. Since the land had been conquered by the non-Chinese Manchu emperors of China in the later part of the 19th century and renamed 'Xinjiang' or 'New Dominion', the people of East Turkestan had tried more than three times to throw off the yoke of the foreign invaders. Replacing the rule of the Manchu emperor with Nationalist Chinese or
Communist Chinese did little to help the people of East Turkestan.On this 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China,the World Uyghur Congress does not celebrate the yoke of oppression or the 'dictatorship of the people.' This date conjures feelings of anguish and misery for the people who have endured the takeover and transformation of their homeland into another Chinese province."
3. The local authorities had made it a criminal offence to disseminate anything, which could weaken national unity and ethnic harmony.They were taken by surprise that despite the stepped-up vigilance some local sympathisers of the WUC managed to circulate these pamphlets. Some arrests have been made in this connection. SMS messages on mobile phone networks were ordered to be suspended during the whole of the week, apparently due to an apprehension that these messages could be used to organise a public demonstration on October 1 against Beijing's rule.
4. While the Chinese authorities denied any ban on the visits of foreign tourists to Urumqi and Lhasa, they had reportedly advised the travel agencies, which organise tours to these areas, to ensure that no foreign tourists would be present in Urumqi and Lhasa for a week from September 28.
5. As part of the security measures, kite-flying and sale of items which could be used by terrorists such as knives, syringe needles,fertilisers, certain women's cosmetics items etc were banned. A ban was also imposed on women carrying their cosmetic bags in public transport.
6. Worried over the non-participation of Uighurs and Tibetans in the celebration of the 60 th anniversary, the Public Security Bureau issued warnings that any Tibetan and Uighur public servant , who did not attend the celebrations, would be liable for disciplinary action.
7. A week before October 1, the Xinjiang's People's Congress Standing Committee passed a so-called "Information Promotion Bill" banning people in the region from using the Internet in any way that undermines national unity, incites ethnic separatism or harms social stability. (4-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
According to reliable source reports from Tibet and Xinjiang, October 1, 2009, which marked the 60the anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, was observed as a day of mourning by the Uighurs and the Tibetans in Xinjiang and Tibet.
2. Despite the strong security measures taken by the Public Security Bureau of Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, pamphlets purported to have been issued by the Munich-based World Uighur Congress (WUC) calling upon the Uighurs not to celebrate the day managed to circulate in the Uighur-majority areas of the city. The pamphlet said: "On October 1st, 1949 Mao proclaimed the People's
Republic of China and incorporated East Turkestan into its territory. Since the land had been conquered by the non-Chinese Manchu emperors of China in the later part of the 19th century and renamed 'Xinjiang' or 'New Dominion', the people of East Turkestan had tried more than three times to throw off the yoke of the foreign invaders. Replacing the rule of the Manchu emperor with Nationalist Chinese or
Communist Chinese did little to help the people of East Turkestan.On this 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China,the World Uyghur Congress does not celebrate the yoke of oppression or the 'dictatorship of the people.' This date conjures feelings of anguish and misery for the people who have endured the takeover and transformation of their homeland into another Chinese province."
3. The local authorities had made it a criminal offence to disseminate anything, which could weaken national unity and ethnic harmony.They were taken by surprise that despite the stepped-up vigilance some local sympathisers of the WUC managed to circulate these pamphlets. Some arrests have been made in this connection. SMS messages on mobile phone networks were ordered to be suspended during the whole of the week, apparently due to an apprehension that these messages could be used to organise a public demonstration on October 1 against Beijing's rule.
4. While the Chinese authorities denied any ban on the visits of foreign tourists to Urumqi and Lhasa, they had reportedly advised the travel agencies, which organise tours to these areas, to ensure that no foreign tourists would be present in Urumqi and Lhasa for a week from September 28.
5. As part of the security measures, kite-flying and sale of items which could be used by terrorists such as knives, syringe needles,fertilisers, certain women's cosmetics items etc were banned. A ban was also imposed on women carrying their cosmetic bags in public transport.
6. Worried over the non-participation of Uighurs and Tibetans in the celebration of the 60 th anniversary, the Public Security Bureau issued warnings that any Tibetan and Uighur public servant , who did not attend the celebrations, would be liable for disciplinary action.
7. A week before October 1, the Xinjiang's People's Congress Standing Committee passed a so-called "Information Promotion Bill" banning people in the region from using the Internet in any way that undermines national unity, incites ethnic separatism or harms social stability. (4-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, October 3, 2009
A SONIA GANDHI TYPE ROLE FOR AUNG SAN SUU KYI?
B.RAMAN
With the administration of President Barrack Obama of the US expanding bilateral official contacts with the Myanmar military junta and embarking on a policy of probing engagement without lifting sanctions for the present, interesting steps are being taken in the US-Myanmar political minuet.
2.The US seems to have realised that total democracy in Myanmar is not for tomorrow and that the Army cannot be expected to totally renounce power in the near future. A short-term plan of free elections to pave the way for a genuine sharing of the power between the military leadership and the elected political leaders accompanied by a mutually acceptable time-table for reducing the Army's role in governance will be a better workable option.
3. The probing engagement has been not only between the US and the Junta, but also simultaneously between Aung San Suu Kyi and the Junta. Her rhetoric as well as that of her party---the National League For Democracy---show signs of softening and she has made significant overtures to the Junta by not opposing the lifting of sanctions if a satisfactory arrangement for doing so can be found and has offered to make suggestions to the Junta as to how to go about its task of getting the international sanctions lifted.
4.Her decision to appeal against her recent conviction by a court in a case relating to a trespass into her Government-guarded house by an American national, which led to an extension of her house arrest by another 18 months, was another significant move. Though her appeal has been rejected by a lower court, she reportedly intends appealing against the rejection to a higher court. She is a very proud person and it was not in her nature to appeal against her extended house arrest. Normally, she would have ignored the extension with the contempt it deserved.
5. The fact that she appealed against it in a lower court and is now appealing to a higher court against the rejection by the lower court is an indicator of delicately-orchestrated moves by the Obama Administration, the Junta and her party to move towards a situation where her house arrest will stand lifted without the Junta suffering any loss of face.
6. Another significant development has been her October 3 meeting with Aung Kyi, the Labour Minister, who was designated by the Junta as the interlocutor with her on behalf of the Junta after the Buddhist monks' agitation in September,2007. He was so nominated by the Junta under international pressure to hold a dialogue with her . Immediately after his nomination, there were six meetings with her in quick
succession, but these meetings dried up after January,2008. Aung Kyi's decision to meet her after 21 months---whatever be the subjects they discussed--- was a message meant to be conveyed to the US by the Junta of its seriousness in wanting to press ahead with its search for a workable accommodation with the US. One should not be surprised if he had, inter alia, discussed with her a modus vivendi for ending her house arrest. Such a modus vivendi could be in the form of the Junta lifting the house arrest in return for an informal commitment by her not to travel outside Yangon for the present.
7. The US has its own agenda in seeking to try out a policy of engagement with the Junta. The most important of its objectives would be to find out details of Myanmar's nuclear co-operation with Russia, Pakistan and North Korea and to persuade the Junta to reverse this co-operation and to renounce its nuclear aspirations in return for the lifting of the sanctions. Agreement on a time-bound plan for the
restoration of a democratic process would be an equally important objective. Without any progress on the second objective, the Obama Administration might find it difficult to justify to the Congress and the US public its decision to engage the Junta.
8. The US is at the same time anxious to prevent its initiatives being seen in Beijing and New Delhi as likely to be detrimental to their long-standing presence and interests in Myanmar.Announcing the new policy at Washington on September 29,2009, Kurt Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, said:"We will intensify our engagement with Association of South East Asian Nations,
China, and India to press the Burmese leadership to reform and to participate responsibly in the international community.The dialogue will include specific discussion of democracy and human rights inside Burma, cooperation on international security issues such as nonproliferation and compliance with UN resolutions 1874 and 1718, and areas that could be of mutual benefit such as counter-narcotics
and recovery of World War II era remains.Lifting sanctions now would send the wrong signal. We will tell the Burmese that we will discuss easing sanctions only if they take actions on our core concerns. We will reserve the option to apply additional targeted sanctions, if warranted, by events inside Burma.We will continue to push for the immediate and unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners, an end to conflicts with ethnic minorities and gross human rights violations and initiation of a credible internal political dialogue with the democratic opposition and ethnic minority leaders on elements of reconciliation and reform.We will also press Burma to comply with its international obligations, including on nonproliferation, ending any prohibited military or proliferation-related cooperation with North Korea, and full compliance with United Nations 1874 and 1718.If Burma makes meaningful progress towards these goals, it will be possible to improve the relationship with the United States in a step-by-step process. We recognise that this will likely be a long and difficult process, and we are prepared to sustain our efforts on this front."
9. While the US has thus publicly articulated its view of the road ahead, the Junta-----apart from indicating a desire to improve relations with the US---is yet to do so. Any arrangement ultimately worked out between the Obama Administration and the Junta, to be effective, has to have the support of not only the US public and Congress, but also the Myanmar public and political class. Any agreement that does not provide for a honourable and meaningful political role for Aung San Suu Kyi is unlikely to be acceptable to large sections of public and political opinion in both countries. The Junta has already firmly ruled out any Governmental role for her by including in the Constitution a provision debarring a Myanmar citizen of foreign origin or a Myanmar citizen married to a foreigner from holding office as the head of State or Government.
10. There have been some indications that this bar against her because of her marriage to a foreigner need not apply to her role as the leader of her party and to any aspirations she may have of becoming a member of the new Parliament to be elected. The Junta is determined not to let her become the President or the Prime Minister. At the same time, it seems to be trying to keep the door open for her
playing a role similar to Mrs.Sonia Gandhi in India after the 2004 elections--- renouncing any Governmental status and power while continuing to retain her political status and power as the leader and guide of her party.
11. If the Junta offers this way out, will Aung San Suu Kyi accept it?Or will she herself make such an offer? (4-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
With the administration of President Barrack Obama of the US expanding bilateral official contacts with the Myanmar military junta and embarking on a policy of probing engagement without lifting sanctions for the present, interesting steps are being taken in the US-Myanmar political minuet.
2.The US seems to have realised that total democracy in Myanmar is not for tomorrow and that the Army cannot be expected to totally renounce power in the near future. A short-term plan of free elections to pave the way for a genuine sharing of the power between the military leadership and the elected political leaders accompanied by a mutually acceptable time-table for reducing the Army's role in governance will be a better workable option.
3. The probing engagement has been not only between the US and the Junta, but also simultaneously between Aung San Suu Kyi and the Junta. Her rhetoric as well as that of her party---the National League For Democracy---show signs of softening and she has made significant overtures to the Junta by not opposing the lifting of sanctions if a satisfactory arrangement for doing so can be found and has offered to make suggestions to the Junta as to how to go about its task of getting the international sanctions lifted.
4.Her decision to appeal against her recent conviction by a court in a case relating to a trespass into her Government-guarded house by an American national, which led to an extension of her house arrest by another 18 months, was another significant move. Though her appeal has been rejected by a lower court, she reportedly intends appealing against the rejection to a higher court. She is a very proud person and it was not in her nature to appeal against her extended house arrest. Normally, she would have ignored the extension with the contempt it deserved.
5. The fact that she appealed against it in a lower court and is now appealing to a higher court against the rejection by the lower court is an indicator of delicately-orchestrated moves by the Obama Administration, the Junta and her party to move towards a situation where her house arrest will stand lifted without the Junta suffering any loss of face.
6. Another significant development has been her October 3 meeting with Aung Kyi, the Labour Minister, who was designated by the Junta as the interlocutor with her on behalf of the Junta after the Buddhist monks' agitation in September,2007. He was so nominated by the Junta under international pressure to hold a dialogue with her . Immediately after his nomination, there were six meetings with her in quick
succession, but these meetings dried up after January,2008. Aung Kyi's decision to meet her after 21 months---whatever be the subjects they discussed--- was a message meant to be conveyed to the US by the Junta of its seriousness in wanting to press ahead with its search for a workable accommodation with the US. One should not be surprised if he had, inter alia, discussed with her a modus vivendi for ending her house arrest. Such a modus vivendi could be in the form of the Junta lifting the house arrest in return for an informal commitment by her not to travel outside Yangon for the present.
7. The US has its own agenda in seeking to try out a policy of engagement with the Junta. The most important of its objectives would be to find out details of Myanmar's nuclear co-operation with Russia, Pakistan and North Korea and to persuade the Junta to reverse this co-operation and to renounce its nuclear aspirations in return for the lifting of the sanctions. Agreement on a time-bound plan for the
restoration of a democratic process would be an equally important objective. Without any progress on the second objective, the Obama Administration might find it difficult to justify to the Congress and the US public its decision to engage the Junta.
8. The US is at the same time anxious to prevent its initiatives being seen in Beijing and New Delhi as likely to be detrimental to their long-standing presence and interests in Myanmar.Announcing the new policy at Washington on September 29,2009, Kurt Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, said:"We will intensify our engagement with Association of South East Asian Nations,
China, and India to press the Burmese leadership to reform and to participate responsibly in the international community.The dialogue will include specific discussion of democracy and human rights inside Burma, cooperation on international security issues such as nonproliferation and compliance with UN resolutions 1874 and 1718, and areas that could be of mutual benefit such as counter-narcotics
and recovery of World War II era remains.Lifting sanctions now would send the wrong signal. We will tell the Burmese that we will discuss easing sanctions only if they take actions on our core concerns. We will reserve the option to apply additional targeted sanctions, if warranted, by events inside Burma.We will continue to push for the immediate and unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners, an end to conflicts with ethnic minorities and gross human rights violations and initiation of a credible internal political dialogue with the democratic opposition and ethnic minority leaders on elements of reconciliation and reform.We will also press Burma to comply with its international obligations, including on nonproliferation, ending any prohibited military or proliferation-related cooperation with North Korea, and full compliance with United Nations 1874 and 1718.If Burma makes meaningful progress towards these goals, it will be possible to improve the relationship with the United States in a step-by-step process. We recognise that this will likely be a long and difficult process, and we are prepared to sustain our efforts on this front."
9. While the US has thus publicly articulated its view of the road ahead, the Junta-----apart from indicating a desire to improve relations with the US---is yet to do so. Any arrangement ultimately worked out between the Obama Administration and the Junta, to be effective, has to have the support of not only the US public and Congress, but also the Myanmar public and political class. Any agreement that does not provide for a honourable and meaningful political role for Aung San Suu Kyi is unlikely to be acceptable to large sections of public and political opinion in both countries. The Junta has already firmly ruled out any Governmental role for her by including in the Constitution a provision debarring a Myanmar citizen of foreign origin or a Myanmar citizen married to a foreigner from holding office as the head of State or Government.
10. There have been some indications that this bar against her because of her marriage to a foreigner need not apply to her role as the leader of her party and to any aspirations she may have of becoming a member of the new Parliament to be elected. The Junta is determined not to let her become the President or the Prime Minister. At the same time, it seems to be trying to keep the door open for her
playing a role similar to Mrs.Sonia Gandhi in India after the 2004 elections--- renouncing any Governmental status and power while continuing to retain her political status and power as the leader and guide of her party.
11. If the Junta offers this way out, will Aung San Suu Kyi accept it?Or will she herself make such an offer? (4-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
SUSPECTED DEATH OF YULDASHEV: GOOD NEWS FOR UZBEKISTAN,CHINA,GERMANY
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.560
B.RAMAN
In its relentless strikes with drones (pilotless planes) on suspected terrorist hide-outs in Pakistan's tribal belt, the US intelligence has been scoring two kinds of successes. The first is the kind of success where the US intelligence knows immediately after a strike whom it has targeted and killed. A good example was the drone strike on the house of the father-in-law of Baitullah Mehsud , the then Amir of the Pakistani Taliban known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in South Waziristan on August 5,2009. Immediately after the strike, the US intelligenvce knew and said with an 80 per cent certainty that it had killed Baitullah. The TTP initially denied the US claim, but subsequently had to admit his death.
2. The second is the kind of success of which the US intelligence becomes aware long after a strike. It attacks a place knowing it to be a terrorist hide-out without being aware of the identity of the inmates. After the strike, it realises through source information that one of the persons killed by it was someone important and becomes aware of his identity.
3. The reported death of Tohir Yuldashev, the Amir of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), would come in this category. On August 27,2009, there was a drone strike on a suspected terrorist hide-out at Kanigoram in South Waziristan. At that time, the US intelligence was not aware as to whom it had killed. Much later, on September 29,2009, a man claiming to be Yuldashev's bodyguard reportedly phoned
Radio Liberty in Prague to claim that Yuldashev was among those killed in this attack.This has subsequently been corroborated by tribal and Pakistani official sources cited in the Pakistani media, but not yet confirmed by the US intelligence. That is why I have called it a suspected death.
4. If ultimately confirmed, the death of Yuldashev would be the second instance in which drones have killed the Amirs (heads) of two dreaded terrorist organisations. US drones have killed many middle and even senior level leaders of Al Qaeda and other organisations, but not heads of organisations till their two successes in August----the confirmed death of Baitullah on August 5 and the reported, but not yet
confirmed death of Yuldashev on August 27.
5.The reported elimination of Yuldashev would be greeted with relief not only by the counter-terrorism agencies of Uzbekistan and China, but also by the agencies of the West European countries faced with threats arising from members of their Muslim diaspora trained by the IMU and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), another Uzbek organisation, in their training camps in North Waziristan. Germany, which was recently threatened repeatedly by Al Qaeda and some of its affiliates, would have particular reason to be happy since some of the Germans of Turkish or Moroccan origin , who pose a threat to German security, had been trained in the camps of the two Uzbek organisations in North Waziristan.
6.The first signs of Islamic fundamentalism appeared in Uzbekistan in December 1991, when some unemployed Muslim youth seized the Communist Party headquarters in the eastern city of Namangan, to protest against the refusal of the local Mayor to permit the construction of a mosque. The protest was organised by Tohir Abdouhalilovitch Yuldashev, a 24-year-old college drop-out, who had become a Mulla, and Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev, a former Soviet paratrooper who had served in Afghanistan and returned from there totally converted to Wahabism.
7. Yuldashev and Khojaev, who later adopted the alias Juma Namangani, after his hometown, became members of the Uzbekistan branch of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). Following the IRP's refusal to support their demand for the establishment of an Islamic State in Uzbekistan, they formed their own party called the Adolat (Justice) Party, which was banned by President Islam Karimov. They then fled to
Tajikistan. While Namangani fought in the local civil war, Yuldashev went to Chechnya to participate in the jihad there. In 1995, he went to Pakistan, where the jihadi organisations gave him shelter in Peshawar. From there, he re-named the Adolat Party as the IMU and was allegedly in receipt of funds from the intelligence agencies of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. After Osama bin Laden shifted to Jalalabad from Khartoum in Sudan in 1996, Yuldashev crossed over into Afghanistan.
8. After the end of the civil war in Tajikistan, Namangani settled down for a while as a road transport operator. He was also allegedly involved in heroin smuggling from Afghanistan. Subsequently, he too crossed over into Afghanistan and joined the IMU and became its leader. The IMU allegedly earns a major part of its revenue from heroin smuggling.
9. After the Taliban captured Kabul in September, 1996, Namangani and Yuldashev held a press conference at Kabul at which they announced the formation of the IMU with Namangani as the Amir and Yuldashev as its military commander. In 1998, the IMU joined the International Islamic Front (IIF) of Al Qaeda. bin Laden was reportedly greatly interested in the IMU because he was hoping to use it for getting nuclear material and know-how from Russia and other constituent States of the erstwhile USSR.
10. The IMU's initial goal was described as the overthrow of Uzbek President Islam Karimov and the establishment of an Islamic State in Uzbekistan. It changed its name to the Islamic Party of Turkestan (IPT) in June 2001, and called for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia consisting of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China's Xinjiang province. It has been recruiting members from all these areas, including Uighurs from Xinjiang. Initially, its recruits were trained by the Arab instructors of Al Qaeda in the training camps in Afghan territory and after 9/11 by Chechen and Pashtun instructors of the Taliban in the South Waziristan area of Pakistan. Despite its 2001 change of name as IPT, it continues to be known in Uzbekistan as the IMU. The name IPT is not widely known.
11. After the reported death of Namangani in a US air strike in Afghanistan post-9/11 Yuldashev took over the leadership of the IMU as its Amir and crossed over with the surviving members of the IMU into South Waziristan in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, where he and his Uzbek/Chechen instructors set up a training camp for training jihadi terrorists. In an operation launched by the
Pakistani security forces in South Waziristan in March-April, 2004, to smoke out the remnants of Al Qaeda, Yuldashev was reported to have been injured, but he managed to escape.
12.Till March, 2007, Mir Ali in North Waziristan used to be the headquarters of the Islamic Jihad Group, also known as the Islamic Jihad Union. It ran a number of training camps there where jihadis from many Western countries, including Germany, China's Xinjiang, and Pakistan itself were trained by Uzbek and Chechen instructors. The IMU's headquarters used to be in the Azam Warsak area of South Waziristan. This area became the scene of violent attacks by sections of the local tribals on the Uzbeks living in the area following the alleged murder of a local tribal personality by an Uzbek resident of the area in the third week of March, 2007. In the ensuing clashes, nearly 100 persons were killed----about 70 Uzbeks and the remaining locals mainly belonging to the Darikhel and the Tojikhel sub-tribes of the Pashtuns. The Yargulkhel sub-tribe led by Noor Islam and his brother Haji Omar, two important pro-Taliban military commanders who had once fought in Afghanistan, supported the Uzbeks in their fight against the Darikhels and the Tojkhels. Some Yargulkhels were also killed. Ultimately, the IMU was forced to evacuate South Waziristan and shift to Mir Ali.
13.Following this, I had reported as follows in my article titled "Mir Ali In North Waziristan- : Under Uzbek Control ", which is available at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers24/paper2317.html : Quote According to well-informed sources in the Police of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan is under the effective control of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) headed by Qari Tohir Yuldashev. Small groups of Chechens and Uighurs are also present in the area. They work under the over-all command of Qari Tohir. They were being helped by Maulana Sadiq Noor, a local tribal leader close to the Neo Taliban. The IMU, with the help of Chechen instructors, has set up training camps in the area for training the recruits of the Neo Taliban, the jihadi terrorist organisations of Pakistan and individual jihadis from abroad-particularly from the Pakistani
diaspora abroad."
14.After the Pakistani commando raid in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad between July 10 and `13, 2007, the Mehsuds of Baitullah joined hands with the IMU and the Islamic Jihad Group and they started instigating suicide terrorist attacks not only in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), but also outside the tribal belt---even in places like Islamabad and Rawalpindi.Coinciding with the commando raid, the Government of Pervez Musharraf sent reinforcements of security forces to North Waziristan. This was interpreted by sections of the local tribals as a violation of the peace agreement signed with them by the Pakistan Army in September,2006, and as a prelude to attacks on the headquarters of the IMU and the Islamic Jihad Group. They kidnapped nearly 300 members of the para-military forces and threatened to kill them at the rate of three a day if their followers in Government custody were not released and the reinforcements were not withdrawn.
15. Following the arrest in Germany in September,2007, of three German Muslims trained in the camps of the Islamic Jihad Group in the Mir Ali area, who were allegedly planning to attack a US military base in Germany, the Musharraf Government came under increased pressure from the US to act against pro-Al Qaeda jihadis in the Mir Ali area. There was similar pressure from the Chinese, who were concerned over the attacks on Chinese nationals working in Pakistan after the Lal Masjid raid. Even apart from these pressures, the worsening security situation in the tribal belt forced the Pakistani Security Forces to act against the Uzbeks, Chechens and Uighurs and their local tribal supporters. Reports from the NATO forces in Afghanistan of the presence of increasing numbers of Uzbeks, Chechens and Uighurs with the
Neo Taliban forces operating in Afghan territory added to the pressure for action. Responding to these pressures, the Pakistani Government started sending further reinforcements to the area. It was a jihadi attack on one of the convoys carrying these reinforcements which triggered off a new round of deadly clashes.
16.About 200 members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) , the Islamic Jihad Group and the Pashtun tribal group led by Baitullah Mehsud and about a hundred members of the Pakistani Security Forces---mostly para-military personnel--- were killed in violent clashes between pro-Al Qaeda jihadis and the security forces in and around the Mir Ali area from October 6, 2007. The clashes started after the
terrorists ambushed a convoy of the security forces in North Waziristan, inflicting an undisclosed number of fatalities and capturing some Pakistani personnel of the security forces.
17. The dead bodies of the some of the security forces personnel were later found abandoned with their throats slit. A Jirga of leading North Waziristan clerics led by former Member of the National Assembly from North Waziristan, Maulana Nek Zaman Haqqani, after daylong negotiations, received 30 bodies of the slain soldiers from the jihadis in Khaisur and handed them over to military officials in Mir Ali. The
"News", a well-informed daily newspaper, quoted an unidentified jirga member as claiming on October 8, 2007, that the jirga members had recovered 73 bodies of soldiers, majority of which were burnt or badly mutilated, from the Mir Ali villages that they had visited. Malik Sher Khan, a local tribal elder, said 45 bodies of soldiers had been handed over to military officials in Mir Ali. Quoting a local Government official,the "News" reported as follows: “Very few of the over 200 soldiers besieged by militants on Sunday (October 7) seem to have survived after
the deadliest ever attack on them.” Following the discovery of over a dozen mutilated dead bodies, either beheaded or with their throats slit,of para-military personnel captured earlier by the men of Baitullah Mehsud, the para-military forces ran amok. Some surrendered to the terrorists, others discarded their uniforms and took shelter in the homes of the residents of the area and some others went on a killing spree, indiscriminately killing the local villagers and the Uzbeks, Chechens and Uighurs..
18.The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) or the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), came into being in Pakistani territory post 9/11 as a result of a split in the IMU following the US military strikes in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. It describes Osama bin Laden, Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Neo Taliban, and Maulana Samiul Haq, the Amir of a faction of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam Pakistan, as its mentors. It
focusses on training volunteers from the Western countries as well as from Uzbekistan.
19. It came to notice for the first time in April 2004 when it claimed the responsibility for a series of suicide bombings around Tashkent and Bukharo in Uzbekistan which killed 47 people. The attacks targeted local government offices, as well as a crowded market. On July 30,2004, it carried out simultaneous bombing attacks on the US Embassy, the Israeli Embassy, and the office of the Uzbek Prosecutor General,killing at least two people and wounding many others.
20. A statement purported to have been disseminated by it said: “A group of young Muslims executed martyrdom operations that put fear in the apostate government and its infidel allies, the Americans and Jews. The mujahidin belonging to Islamic Jihad Group attacked both the American and Israeli embassies as well as the court building where the trials of a large number of the brothers from the Group had begun.
These martyrdom operations that the group is executing will not stop, God willing. It is for the purpose of repelling the injustice of the apostate government and supporting the jihad of our Muslim brothers in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, the Hijaz, and in other Muslim countries ruled by infidels and apostates.”
21. On May 26, 2005, the US State Department issued the following statement: "The Department of State on May 25 announced the designation of the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organisation under Executive Order 13224. This designation blocks all property, and interests in property, of the organization that are in the United States, or come within the United States,
or the control of U. S. persons. The Secretary of State took this action in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Department of Homeland Security. The Islamic Jihad Group, active in Central Asia, broke away from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization that is listed by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee. On
July 30, 2004, the Islamic Jihad Group conducted coordinated bombing attacks in Tashkent against the U.S. and Israeli Embassies, and the office of the Uzbek Prosecutor General, killing at least two people and wounding nine. The Islamic Jihad Group claimed responsibility for these attacks and indicated that future attacks are planned. The Islamic Jihad Group continues to target Americans and U.S. facilities
overseas and is a dangerous threat to U.S. interests. After an explosion at a safehouse in Bukharo, Uzbekistan, IJG suicide bombers attacked a popular bazaar and other locations in Tashkent in March and April 2004, resulting in the deaths of more than a dozen police officers and innocent bystanders and dozens of injuries. The attackers in the March and April 2004 attacks, some of whom were female suicide bombers, targeted the local government offices of the Uzbekistani and Bukharo police, killing approximately 47 people, including 33 terrorists. These attacks marked the first use of female suicide bombers in Central Asia. Those arrested in connection with the attacks in Bukharo have testified to the close ties between the IJG leaders and Usama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. Kazakhstani authorities have
declared that IJG members were taught by al-Qaida instructors to handle explosives and to organize intelligence work and subversive activities. Kazakhstan has arrested several IJG members and put them on trial."
22 In October, 2005, the British Government declared it as a terrorist organisation despite strong opposition from human rights groups,which alleged that the Uzbek Government was projecting political dissidents opposed to it as pro-Al Qaeda terrorists.
23.The IJG, which was formed in 2002 to oppose the co-operation extended by the Government of Islam Karimov to the US in its operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, projects the US and Israel as the main enemies of Islam and all Muslim countries co-operating with the US as apostates, which need to be opposed. The IJG, which also has the over-all objective of a global Islamic Caliphate, projects itself as a global jihadi organisation and not a basically Uzbek organisation. It says that since Islam does not recognise nationalities or ethnicities, any Muslim can become its member irrespective of where he or she lives. Since it describes the US and Israel as its principal enemies, it welcomes volunteers from countries where the US and Israel have a large presence.
24. In an interview on May 31, 2007, Ebu Yahya Muhammed Fatih, who describes himself as the Commander of the Islamic Jihad Union,stated as follows:
"After the fall of the Afganistan Islamic Administration,we who shared the same opinions came together and decided to organize groups which will conduct jihad operations against the infidel constitution of cruel Karimov in Uzbekistan. The sole aim of all the emigrant-mujahedeen brothers was to find war-like solutions against the infidel constitution of cruel Karimov. For this aim our Union was established in 2002.
"Our Union's aim is, under the flag of justice and Islam Dominancy, to save our Müslim brothers who have been suffering from the cruelty of pre-Soviet period and Uzbekistan, and to take them out of the swamp of cruelty and infidelity, as well as to help other Müslim brothers all around the world as per God and his Prophet's orders.
"Members of our Union are not members of a specific tribe or a nation. As there is no nationalism and tribalism in Islam, our Union is formed of the believers from all over the world and multi-national emigrants travelling to praise the religion.
"Today we proceed according to our targeted goals with all our means. Muslim youth in the republics of former Soviet Union who found the path of Allah and are ready to fight for their religion have been trained in various fields in the training facilities of the Union. One of the armed forces of the Union is active in Afghanistan. Besides, we have been in contact and also been working on our common targets together with Caucasian mujahedeens. We have also been working together on plans and aims against the infidel regime of Uzbekistan which is one of our major targets."
25. In April, 2007, the US Embassy in Berlin announced that it was strengthening security at US facilities in Germany in response to what it described as an increased threat of terrorism. Mr. August Hanning, a former head of Germany’s foreign intelligence agency known as the Bundes Nachrichten Dienst (BND), who was the then Deputy Interior Minister, said in an interview that 14 German Islamists had gone to Pakistan for training. He also said that in recent months the Pakistani authorities had detained at least seven German Islamists “who could have been involved in planning attacks”.
26. On September 5, 2007, German Federal Prosecutor Monika Harms announced the arrest of three persons and the recovery from them of 700 kilos of chemicals capable of being converted into explosives. German media reports said that they were planning attacks against a US military base in Ramstein and the Frankfurt airport. Two of the arrested persons were described as white converts to Islam, both German
nationals, and the third as of Turkish origin. The Federal Prosecutor named the three persons aged 22,28 and 29 as belonging to the German cell of the Islamic Jihad Union. It was reported that seven more members of the cell were still at large.
27.There is another Yuldashev in the jihadi world of Uzbekistan ---- by the first name Akram.In 1992, Akram Yuldashev,then a 29-year-old maths teacher of Andijan, published a pamphlet titled "Yimonga Yul" (Path to faith) on what he projected as the superiority of Islamic moral values. This brought him many supporters and his pamphlet was widely read. In 1998, the authorities arrested him on a charge of
possessing narcotics and he was jailed for 30 months. However, he was prematurely released in December 1998.At the time of his arrest, he was working in a furniture company. He was again arrested in February 1999 following explosions in Tashkent, accused of participating in acts of terrorism and sentenced to 17 years in jail. The charge-sheet filed against him described him as the head of a jihadi organisation
called Akramia, named after him, whose objective, it was alleged, was to convert Uzbekistan into an Islamic State ruled according to the Sharia.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retired), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
B.RAMAN
In its relentless strikes with drones (pilotless planes) on suspected terrorist hide-outs in Pakistan's tribal belt, the US intelligence has been scoring two kinds of successes. The first is the kind of success where the US intelligence knows immediately after a strike whom it has targeted and killed. A good example was the drone strike on the house of the father-in-law of Baitullah Mehsud , the then Amir of the Pakistani Taliban known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in South Waziristan on August 5,2009. Immediately after the strike, the US intelligenvce knew and said with an 80 per cent certainty that it had killed Baitullah. The TTP initially denied the US claim, but subsequently had to admit his death.
2. The second is the kind of success of which the US intelligence becomes aware long after a strike. It attacks a place knowing it to be a terrorist hide-out without being aware of the identity of the inmates. After the strike, it realises through source information that one of the persons killed by it was someone important and becomes aware of his identity.
3. The reported death of Tohir Yuldashev, the Amir of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), would come in this category. On August 27,2009, there was a drone strike on a suspected terrorist hide-out at Kanigoram in South Waziristan. At that time, the US intelligence was not aware as to whom it had killed. Much later, on September 29,2009, a man claiming to be Yuldashev's bodyguard reportedly phoned
Radio Liberty in Prague to claim that Yuldashev was among those killed in this attack.This has subsequently been corroborated by tribal and Pakistani official sources cited in the Pakistani media, but not yet confirmed by the US intelligence. That is why I have called it a suspected death.
4. If ultimately confirmed, the death of Yuldashev would be the second instance in which drones have killed the Amirs (heads) of two dreaded terrorist organisations. US drones have killed many middle and even senior level leaders of Al Qaeda and other organisations, but not heads of organisations till their two successes in August----the confirmed death of Baitullah on August 5 and the reported, but not yet
confirmed death of Yuldashev on August 27.
5.The reported elimination of Yuldashev would be greeted with relief not only by the counter-terrorism agencies of Uzbekistan and China, but also by the agencies of the West European countries faced with threats arising from members of their Muslim diaspora trained by the IMU and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), another Uzbek organisation, in their training camps in North Waziristan. Germany, which was recently threatened repeatedly by Al Qaeda and some of its affiliates, would have particular reason to be happy since some of the Germans of Turkish or Moroccan origin , who pose a threat to German security, had been trained in the camps of the two Uzbek organisations in North Waziristan.
6.The first signs of Islamic fundamentalism appeared in Uzbekistan in December 1991, when some unemployed Muslim youth seized the Communist Party headquarters in the eastern city of Namangan, to protest against the refusal of the local Mayor to permit the construction of a mosque. The protest was organised by Tohir Abdouhalilovitch Yuldashev, a 24-year-old college drop-out, who had become a Mulla, and Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev, a former Soviet paratrooper who had served in Afghanistan and returned from there totally converted to Wahabism.
7. Yuldashev and Khojaev, who later adopted the alias Juma Namangani, after his hometown, became members of the Uzbekistan branch of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). Following the IRP's refusal to support their demand for the establishment of an Islamic State in Uzbekistan, they formed their own party called the Adolat (Justice) Party, which was banned by President Islam Karimov. They then fled to
Tajikistan. While Namangani fought in the local civil war, Yuldashev went to Chechnya to participate in the jihad there. In 1995, he went to Pakistan, where the jihadi organisations gave him shelter in Peshawar. From there, he re-named the Adolat Party as the IMU and was allegedly in receipt of funds from the intelligence agencies of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. After Osama bin Laden shifted to Jalalabad from Khartoum in Sudan in 1996, Yuldashev crossed over into Afghanistan.
8. After the end of the civil war in Tajikistan, Namangani settled down for a while as a road transport operator. He was also allegedly involved in heroin smuggling from Afghanistan. Subsequently, he too crossed over into Afghanistan and joined the IMU and became its leader. The IMU allegedly earns a major part of its revenue from heroin smuggling.
9. After the Taliban captured Kabul in September, 1996, Namangani and Yuldashev held a press conference at Kabul at which they announced the formation of the IMU with Namangani as the Amir and Yuldashev as its military commander. In 1998, the IMU joined the International Islamic Front (IIF) of Al Qaeda. bin Laden was reportedly greatly interested in the IMU because he was hoping to use it for getting nuclear material and know-how from Russia and other constituent States of the erstwhile USSR.
10. The IMU's initial goal was described as the overthrow of Uzbek President Islam Karimov and the establishment of an Islamic State in Uzbekistan. It changed its name to the Islamic Party of Turkestan (IPT) in June 2001, and called for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia consisting of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China's Xinjiang province. It has been recruiting members from all these areas, including Uighurs from Xinjiang. Initially, its recruits were trained by the Arab instructors of Al Qaeda in the training camps in Afghan territory and after 9/11 by Chechen and Pashtun instructors of the Taliban in the South Waziristan area of Pakistan. Despite its 2001 change of name as IPT, it continues to be known in Uzbekistan as the IMU. The name IPT is not widely known.
11. After the reported death of Namangani in a US air strike in Afghanistan post-9/11 Yuldashev took over the leadership of the IMU as its Amir and crossed over with the surviving members of the IMU into South Waziristan in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, where he and his Uzbek/Chechen instructors set up a training camp for training jihadi terrorists. In an operation launched by the
Pakistani security forces in South Waziristan in March-April, 2004, to smoke out the remnants of Al Qaeda, Yuldashev was reported to have been injured, but he managed to escape.
12.Till March, 2007, Mir Ali in North Waziristan used to be the headquarters of the Islamic Jihad Group, also known as the Islamic Jihad Union. It ran a number of training camps there where jihadis from many Western countries, including Germany, China's Xinjiang, and Pakistan itself were trained by Uzbek and Chechen instructors. The IMU's headquarters used to be in the Azam Warsak area of South Waziristan. This area became the scene of violent attacks by sections of the local tribals on the Uzbeks living in the area following the alleged murder of a local tribal personality by an Uzbek resident of the area in the third week of March, 2007. In the ensuing clashes, nearly 100 persons were killed----about 70 Uzbeks and the remaining locals mainly belonging to the Darikhel and the Tojikhel sub-tribes of the Pashtuns. The Yargulkhel sub-tribe led by Noor Islam and his brother Haji Omar, two important pro-Taliban military commanders who had once fought in Afghanistan, supported the Uzbeks in their fight against the Darikhels and the Tojkhels. Some Yargulkhels were also killed. Ultimately, the IMU was forced to evacuate South Waziristan and shift to Mir Ali.
13.Following this, I had reported as follows in my article titled "Mir Ali In North Waziristan- : Under Uzbek Control ", which is available at
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers24/paper2317.html : Quote According to well-informed sources in the Police of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan is under the effective control of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) headed by Qari Tohir Yuldashev. Small groups of Chechens and Uighurs are also present in the area. They work under the over-all command of Qari Tohir. They were being helped by Maulana Sadiq Noor, a local tribal leader close to the Neo Taliban. The IMU, with the help of Chechen instructors, has set up training camps in the area for training the recruits of the Neo Taliban, the jihadi terrorist organisations of Pakistan and individual jihadis from abroad-particularly from the Pakistani
diaspora abroad."
14.After the Pakistani commando raid in the Lal Masjid of Islamabad between July 10 and `13, 2007, the Mehsuds of Baitullah joined hands with the IMU and the Islamic Jihad Group and they started instigating suicide terrorist attacks not only in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), but also outside the tribal belt---even in places like Islamabad and Rawalpindi.Coinciding with the commando raid, the Government of Pervez Musharraf sent reinforcements of security forces to North Waziristan. This was interpreted by sections of the local tribals as a violation of the peace agreement signed with them by the Pakistan Army in September,2006, and as a prelude to attacks on the headquarters of the IMU and the Islamic Jihad Group. They kidnapped nearly 300 members of the para-military forces and threatened to kill them at the rate of three a day if their followers in Government custody were not released and the reinforcements were not withdrawn.
15. Following the arrest in Germany in September,2007, of three German Muslims trained in the camps of the Islamic Jihad Group in the Mir Ali area, who were allegedly planning to attack a US military base in Germany, the Musharraf Government came under increased pressure from the US to act against pro-Al Qaeda jihadis in the Mir Ali area. There was similar pressure from the Chinese, who were concerned over the attacks on Chinese nationals working in Pakistan after the Lal Masjid raid. Even apart from these pressures, the worsening security situation in the tribal belt forced the Pakistani Security Forces to act against the Uzbeks, Chechens and Uighurs and their local tribal supporters. Reports from the NATO forces in Afghanistan of the presence of increasing numbers of Uzbeks, Chechens and Uighurs with the
Neo Taliban forces operating in Afghan territory added to the pressure for action. Responding to these pressures, the Pakistani Government started sending further reinforcements to the area. It was a jihadi attack on one of the convoys carrying these reinforcements which triggered off a new round of deadly clashes.
16.About 200 members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) , the Islamic Jihad Group and the Pashtun tribal group led by Baitullah Mehsud and about a hundred members of the Pakistani Security Forces---mostly para-military personnel--- were killed in violent clashes between pro-Al Qaeda jihadis and the security forces in and around the Mir Ali area from October 6, 2007. The clashes started after the
terrorists ambushed a convoy of the security forces in North Waziristan, inflicting an undisclosed number of fatalities and capturing some Pakistani personnel of the security forces.
17. The dead bodies of the some of the security forces personnel were later found abandoned with their throats slit. A Jirga of leading North Waziristan clerics led by former Member of the National Assembly from North Waziristan, Maulana Nek Zaman Haqqani, after daylong negotiations, received 30 bodies of the slain soldiers from the jihadis in Khaisur and handed them over to military officials in Mir Ali. The
"News", a well-informed daily newspaper, quoted an unidentified jirga member as claiming on October 8, 2007, that the jirga members had recovered 73 bodies of soldiers, majority of which were burnt or badly mutilated, from the Mir Ali villages that they had visited. Malik Sher Khan, a local tribal elder, said 45 bodies of soldiers had been handed over to military officials in Mir Ali. Quoting a local Government official,the "News" reported as follows: “Very few of the over 200 soldiers besieged by militants on Sunday (October 7) seem to have survived after
the deadliest ever attack on them.” Following the discovery of over a dozen mutilated dead bodies, either beheaded or with their throats slit,of para-military personnel captured earlier by the men of Baitullah Mehsud, the para-military forces ran amok. Some surrendered to the terrorists, others discarded their uniforms and took shelter in the homes of the residents of the area and some others went on a killing spree, indiscriminately killing the local villagers and the Uzbeks, Chechens and Uighurs..
18.The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) or the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), came into being in Pakistani territory post 9/11 as a result of a split in the IMU following the US military strikes in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. It describes Osama bin Laden, Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Neo Taliban, and Maulana Samiul Haq, the Amir of a faction of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam Pakistan, as its mentors. It
focusses on training volunteers from the Western countries as well as from Uzbekistan.
19. It came to notice for the first time in April 2004 when it claimed the responsibility for a series of suicide bombings around Tashkent and Bukharo in Uzbekistan which killed 47 people. The attacks targeted local government offices, as well as a crowded market. On July 30,2004, it carried out simultaneous bombing attacks on the US Embassy, the Israeli Embassy, and the office of the Uzbek Prosecutor General,killing at least two people and wounding many others.
20. A statement purported to have been disseminated by it said: “A group of young Muslims executed martyrdom operations that put fear in the apostate government and its infidel allies, the Americans and Jews. The mujahidin belonging to Islamic Jihad Group attacked both the American and Israeli embassies as well as the court building where the trials of a large number of the brothers from the Group had begun.
These martyrdom operations that the group is executing will not stop, God willing. It is for the purpose of repelling the injustice of the apostate government and supporting the jihad of our Muslim brothers in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, the Hijaz, and in other Muslim countries ruled by infidels and apostates.”
21. On May 26, 2005, the US State Department issued the following statement: "The Department of State on May 25 announced the designation of the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organisation under Executive Order 13224. This designation blocks all property, and interests in property, of the organization that are in the United States, or come within the United States,
or the control of U. S. persons. The Secretary of State took this action in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Department of Homeland Security. The Islamic Jihad Group, active in Central Asia, broke away from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization that is listed by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee. On
July 30, 2004, the Islamic Jihad Group conducted coordinated bombing attacks in Tashkent against the U.S. and Israeli Embassies, and the office of the Uzbek Prosecutor General, killing at least two people and wounding nine. The Islamic Jihad Group claimed responsibility for these attacks and indicated that future attacks are planned. The Islamic Jihad Group continues to target Americans and U.S. facilities
overseas and is a dangerous threat to U.S. interests. After an explosion at a safehouse in Bukharo, Uzbekistan, IJG suicide bombers attacked a popular bazaar and other locations in Tashkent in March and April 2004, resulting in the deaths of more than a dozen police officers and innocent bystanders and dozens of injuries. The attackers in the March and April 2004 attacks, some of whom were female suicide bombers, targeted the local government offices of the Uzbekistani and Bukharo police, killing approximately 47 people, including 33 terrorists. These attacks marked the first use of female suicide bombers in Central Asia. Those arrested in connection with the attacks in Bukharo have testified to the close ties between the IJG leaders and Usama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. Kazakhstani authorities have
declared that IJG members were taught by al-Qaida instructors to handle explosives and to organize intelligence work and subversive activities. Kazakhstan has arrested several IJG members and put them on trial."
22 In October, 2005, the British Government declared it as a terrorist organisation despite strong opposition from human rights groups,which alleged that the Uzbek Government was projecting political dissidents opposed to it as pro-Al Qaeda terrorists.
23.The IJG, which was formed in 2002 to oppose the co-operation extended by the Government of Islam Karimov to the US in its operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, projects the US and Israel as the main enemies of Islam and all Muslim countries co-operating with the US as apostates, which need to be opposed. The IJG, which also has the over-all objective of a global Islamic Caliphate, projects itself as a global jihadi organisation and not a basically Uzbek organisation. It says that since Islam does not recognise nationalities or ethnicities, any Muslim can become its member irrespective of where he or she lives. Since it describes the US and Israel as its principal enemies, it welcomes volunteers from countries where the US and Israel have a large presence.
24. In an interview on May 31, 2007, Ebu Yahya Muhammed Fatih, who describes himself as the Commander of the Islamic Jihad Union,stated as follows:
"After the fall of the Afganistan Islamic Administration,we who shared the same opinions came together and decided to organize groups which will conduct jihad operations against the infidel constitution of cruel Karimov in Uzbekistan. The sole aim of all the emigrant-mujahedeen brothers was to find war-like solutions against the infidel constitution of cruel Karimov. For this aim our Union was established in 2002.
"Our Union's aim is, under the flag of justice and Islam Dominancy, to save our Müslim brothers who have been suffering from the cruelty of pre-Soviet period and Uzbekistan, and to take them out of the swamp of cruelty and infidelity, as well as to help other Müslim brothers all around the world as per God and his Prophet's orders.
"Members of our Union are not members of a specific tribe or a nation. As there is no nationalism and tribalism in Islam, our Union is formed of the believers from all over the world and multi-national emigrants travelling to praise the religion.
"Today we proceed according to our targeted goals with all our means. Muslim youth in the republics of former Soviet Union who found the path of Allah and are ready to fight for their religion have been trained in various fields in the training facilities of the Union. One of the armed forces of the Union is active in Afghanistan. Besides, we have been in contact and also been working on our common targets together with Caucasian mujahedeens. We have also been working together on plans and aims against the infidel regime of Uzbekistan which is one of our major targets."
25. In April, 2007, the US Embassy in Berlin announced that it was strengthening security at US facilities in Germany in response to what it described as an increased threat of terrorism. Mr. August Hanning, a former head of Germany’s foreign intelligence agency known as the Bundes Nachrichten Dienst (BND), who was the then Deputy Interior Minister, said in an interview that 14 German Islamists had gone to Pakistan for training. He also said that in recent months the Pakistani authorities had detained at least seven German Islamists “who could have been involved in planning attacks”.
26. On September 5, 2007, German Federal Prosecutor Monika Harms announced the arrest of three persons and the recovery from them of 700 kilos of chemicals capable of being converted into explosives. German media reports said that they were planning attacks against a US military base in Ramstein and the Frankfurt airport. Two of the arrested persons were described as white converts to Islam, both German
nationals, and the third as of Turkish origin. The Federal Prosecutor named the three persons aged 22,28 and 29 as belonging to the German cell of the Islamic Jihad Union. It was reported that seven more members of the cell were still at large.
27.There is another Yuldashev in the jihadi world of Uzbekistan ---- by the first name Akram.In 1992, Akram Yuldashev,then a 29-year-old maths teacher of Andijan, published a pamphlet titled "Yimonga Yul" (Path to faith) on what he projected as the superiority of Islamic moral values. This brought him many supporters and his pamphlet was widely read. In 1998, the authorities arrested him on a charge of
possessing narcotics and he was jailed for 30 months. However, he was prematurely released in December 1998.At the time of his arrest, he was working in a furniture company. He was again arrested in February 1999 following explosions in Tashkent, accused of participating in acts of terrorism and sentenced to 17 years in jail. The charge-sheet filed against him described him as the head of a jihadi organisation
called Akramia, named after him, whose objective, it was alleged, was to convert Uzbekistan into an Islamic State ruled according to the Sharia.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retired), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Thursday, October 1, 2009
INDIA SHOULD SUSPEND WORK VISAS FOR CHINESE
B.RAMAN
"The Hindu" has reported on October 1,2009, that the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi has been issuing visas on a separate sheet of paper to Indian citizens born and resident in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). A Chinese Embassy spokesman has been quoted as claiming that this is not a new practice and has been done even in the past.
2.From a perusal of the two reports from its New Delhi-based correspondent carried by the paper, it would seem that one or two Kashmiris,who are citizens of India, with plain paper visas issued by the Chinese Embassy, were not allowed to leave the country by the Indian immigration and they complained to this correspondent.
3. While the Chinese Embassy has tried to make out that this practice is nothing new, it must have been of recent origin. Otherwise, the Indian immigration would have noticed it and drawn the attention of the Ministry of External Affairs. The veracity of the Chinese claim can be easily established by the Indian Embassy in Beijing requesting Kashmiris ftrom India studying in China to produce their Indian passports in order to see whether they had travelled with plain paper visas. If so, there was definitely negligence on the part of the Indian immigration in not noticing this earlier.
4. The Chinese action in issuing such plain-paper visas to Indian citizens born and resident in J&K is a political statement meant to indicate that China does not recognise J&K as an integral part of India and that it agrees with the Pakistani contention that J&K is a disputed territory.
5.Chinese policy on J&K has passed through three stages. In the first stage till 1996 China automatically supported the Pakistani contention that J&K is a disputed territory and that the violence in J&K did not amount to terrorism.Following the visit of the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin to India and Pakistan in 1996, there was a nuanced change in the Chinese policy. They did not recognise J&K as an
integral part of India, but started avoiding words, actions or gestures which could be interpreted as their support to the Pakistani stand.During the Kargil conflict of 1999, the Chinese reportedly supported the US position that Pakistan should withdraw its troops from the Indian territory in the Kargil Heights and that the Line of Control should be respected. It was the Chinese reluctance to support Pakistan at the
time of the Kargil conflict during the visit to Beijing by Nawaz Sharif, the then Pakistani Prime Minister, which made him dash to Washington after returning to Islamabad and seek a US-backed face-saving before ordering the withdrawal of the Pakistani troops ftrom Indian territory.
6.The Chinese position had stood there since then. Their position till recently can be summed up as follows:Avoiding any action or words or gestures which could be interpreted as their support to either the Pakistani stand that J&K is a disputed territory or the Iindian stand that J&K is an integral part of India. At the same time, they have consistently maintained their past policy of refusing to categorise the violence in J&K as terrorism.
7.Their practice of issuing plain paper visas to Indian citizens born and resident in J&K, whenever it started, indicates their sliding back to their pre-1999 position of support to the Pakistani stand that J&K is a disputed territory and rejection of the Indian stand that J&K is an integral part of India.
8.India should not remain content with merely taking up this issue at the diplomatic level with China. There is a need for concrete action to express our displeasure over the insidious Chinese practice. The Indian diplomatic and consular missions in China should be asked not to issue any more work visas to Chinese selected by their companies to work in their projects in India. The visas of the Chinese already
working in India should not be extended when they expire. It should be made clear to the Chinese that the issue of work visas to Chinese nationals will be resumed only when their practice of issue of plain paper visas is discontinued. ( 2-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
"The Hindu" has reported on October 1,2009, that the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi has been issuing visas on a separate sheet of paper to Indian citizens born and resident in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). A Chinese Embassy spokesman has been quoted as claiming that this is not a new practice and has been done even in the past.
2.From a perusal of the two reports from its New Delhi-based correspondent carried by the paper, it would seem that one or two Kashmiris,who are citizens of India, with plain paper visas issued by the Chinese Embassy, were not allowed to leave the country by the Indian immigration and they complained to this correspondent.
3. While the Chinese Embassy has tried to make out that this practice is nothing new, it must have been of recent origin. Otherwise, the Indian immigration would have noticed it and drawn the attention of the Ministry of External Affairs. The veracity of the Chinese claim can be easily established by the Indian Embassy in Beijing requesting Kashmiris ftrom India studying in China to produce their Indian passports in order to see whether they had travelled with plain paper visas. If so, there was definitely negligence on the part of the Indian immigration in not noticing this earlier.
4. The Chinese action in issuing such plain-paper visas to Indian citizens born and resident in J&K is a political statement meant to indicate that China does not recognise J&K as an integral part of India and that it agrees with the Pakistani contention that J&K is a disputed territory.
5.Chinese policy on J&K has passed through three stages. In the first stage till 1996 China automatically supported the Pakistani contention that J&K is a disputed territory and that the violence in J&K did not amount to terrorism.Following the visit of the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin to India and Pakistan in 1996, there was a nuanced change in the Chinese policy. They did not recognise J&K as an
integral part of India, but started avoiding words, actions or gestures which could be interpreted as their support to the Pakistani stand.During the Kargil conflict of 1999, the Chinese reportedly supported the US position that Pakistan should withdraw its troops from the Indian territory in the Kargil Heights and that the Line of Control should be respected. It was the Chinese reluctance to support Pakistan at the
time of the Kargil conflict during the visit to Beijing by Nawaz Sharif, the then Pakistani Prime Minister, which made him dash to Washington after returning to Islamabad and seek a US-backed face-saving before ordering the withdrawal of the Pakistani troops ftrom Indian territory.
6.The Chinese position had stood there since then. Their position till recently can be summed up as follows:Avoiding any action or words or gestures which could be interpreted as their support to either the Pakistani stand that J&K is a disputed territory or the Iindian stand that J&K is an integral part of India. At the same time, they have consistently maintained their past policy of refusing to categorise the violence in J&K as terrorism.
7.Their practice of issuing plain paper visas to Indian citizens born and resident in J&K, whenever it started, indicates their sliding back to their pre-1999 position of support to the Pakistani stand that J&K is a disputed territory and rejection of the Indian stand that J&K is an integral part of India.
8.India should not remain content with merely taking up this issue at the diplomatic level with China. There is a need for concrete action to express our displeasure over the insidious Chinese practice. The Indian diplomatic and consular missions in China should be asked not to issue any more work visas to Chinese selected by their companies to work in their projects in India. The visas of the Chinese already
working in India should not be extended when they expire. It should be made clear to the Chinese that the issue of work visas to Chinese nationals will be resumed only when their practice of issue of plain paper visas is discontinued. ( 2-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
INDIA SHOULD SUSPEND WORK VISAS FOR CHINESE
B.RAMAN
"The Hindu" has reported on October 1,2009, that the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi has been issuing visas on a separate sheet of paper to Indian citizens born and resident in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). A Chinese Embassy spokesman has been quoted as claiming that this is not a new practice and has been done even in the past.
2.From a perusal of the two reports from its New Delhi-based correspondent carried by the paper, it would seem that one or two Kashmiris, who are citizens of India, with plain paper visas issued by the Chinese Embassy, were not allowed to leave the country by the Indian immigration and they complained to this correspondent.
3. While the Chinese Embassy has tried to make out that this practice is nothing new, it must have been of recent origin. Otherwise, the Indian immigration would have noticed it and drawn the attention of the Ministry of External Affairs. The veracity of the Chinese claim can be easily established by the Indian Embassy in Beijing requesting Kashmiris ftrom India studying in China to produce their Indian passports in order to see whether they had travelled with plain paper visas. If so, there was definitely negligence on the part of the Indian immigration in not noticing this earlier.
4. The Chinese action in issuing such plain-paper visas to Indian citizens born and resident in J&K is a political statement meant to indicate that China does not recognise J&K as an integral part of India and that it agrees with the Pakistani contention that J&K is a disputed territory.
5.Chinese policy on J&K has passed through three stages. In the first stage till 1996 China automatically supported the Pakistani contention that J&K is a disputed territory and that the violence in J&K did not amount to terrorism.Following the visit of the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin to India and Pakistan in 1996, there was a nuanced change in the Chinese policy. They did not recognise J&K as an
integral part of India, but started avoiding words, actions or gestures which could be interpreted as their support to the Pakistani stand. During the Kargil conflict of 1999, the Chinese reportedly supported the US position that Pakistan should withdraw its troops from the Indian territory in the Kargil Heights and that the Line of Control should be respected. It was the Chinese reluctance to support Pakistan at the time of the Kargil conflict during the visit to Beijing by Nawaz Sharif, the then Pakistani Prime Minister, which made him dash to Washington
after returning to Islamabad and seek a US-backed face-saving before ordering the withdrawal of the Pakistani troops ftrom Indian territory.
6.The Chinese position had stood there since then. Their position till recently can be summed up as follows:Avoiding any action or words or gestures which could be interpreted as their support to either the Pakistani stand that J&K is a disputed territory or the Iindian stand that J&K is an integral part of India. At the same time, they have consistently maintained their past policy of refusing to categorise the violence in J&K as terrorism.
7.Their practice of issuing plain paper visas to Indian citizens born and resident in J&K, whenever it started, indicates their sliding back to their pre-1999 position of support to the Pakistani stand that J&K is a disputed territory and rejection of the Indian stand that J&K is an integral part of India.
8.India should not remain content with merely taking up this issue at the diplomatic level with China. There is a need for concrete action to express our displeasure over the insidious Chinese practice. The Indian diplomatic and consular missions in China should be asked not to issue any more work visas to Chinese selected by their companies to work in their projects in India. The visas of the Chinese already
working in India should not be extended when they expire. It should be made clear to the Chinese that the issue of work visas to Chinese nationals will be resumed only when their practice of issue of plain paper visas is discontinued. ( 2-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
"The Hindu" has reported on October 1,2009, that the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi has been issuing visas on a separate sheet of paper to Indian citizens born and resident in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). A Chinese Embassy spokesman has been quoted as claiming that this is not a new practice and has been done even in the past.
2.From a perusal of the two reports from its New Delhi-based correspondent carried by the paper, it would seem that one or two Kashmiris, who are citizens of India, with plain paper visas issued by the Chinese Embassy, were not allowed to leave the country by the Indian immigration and they complained to this correspondent.
3. While the Chinese Embassy has tried to make out that this practice is nothing new, it must have been of recent origin. Otherwise, the Indian immigration would have noticed it and drawn the attention of the Ministry of External Affairs. The veracity of the Chinese claim can be easily established by the Indian Embassy in Beijing requesting Kashmiris ftrom India studying in China to produce their Indian passports in order to see whether they had travelled with plain paper visas. If so, there was definitely negligence on the part of the Indian immigration in not noticing this earlier.
4. The Chinese action in issuing such plain-paper visas to Indian citizens born and resident in J&K is a political statement meant to indicate that China does not recognise J&K as an integral part of India and that it agrees with the Pakistani contention that J&K is a disputed territory.
5.Chinese policy on J&K has passed through three stages. In the first stage till 1996 China automatically supported the Pakistani contention that J&K is a disputed territory and that the violence in J&K did not amount to terrorism.Following the visit of the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin to India and Pakistan in 1996, there was a nuanced change in the Chinese policy. They did not recognise J&K as an
integral part of India, but started avoiding words, actions or gestures which could be interpreted as their support to the Pakistani stand. During the Kargil conflict of 1999, the Chinese reportedly supported the US position that Pakistan should withdraw its troops from the Indian territory in the Kargil Heights and that the Line of Control should be respected. It was the Chinese reluctance to support Pakistan at the time of the Kargil conflict during the visit to Beijing by Nawaz Sharif, the then Pakistani Prime Minister, which made him dash to Washington
after returning to Islamabad and seek a US-backed face-saving before ordering the withdrawal of the Pakistani troops ftrom Indian territory.
6.The Chinese position had stood there since then. Their position till recently can be summed up as follows:Avoiding any action or words or gestures which could be interpreted as their support to either the Pakistani stand that J&K is a disputed territory or the Iindian stand that J&K is an integral part of India. At the same time, they have consistently maintained their past policy of refusing to categorise the violence in J&K as terrorism.
7.Their practice of issuing plain paper visas to Indian citizens born and resident in J&K, whenever it started, indicates their sliding back to their pre-1999 position of support to the Pakistani stand that J&K is a disputed territory and rejection of the Indian stand that J&K is an integral part of India.
8.India should not remain content with merely taking up this issue at the diplomatic level with China. There is a need for concrete action to express our displeasure over the insidious Chinese practice. The Indian diplomatic and consular missions in China should be asked not to issue any more work visas to Chinese selected by their companies to work in their projects in India. The visas of the Chinese already
working in India should not be extended when they expire. It should be made clear to the Chinese that the issue of work visas to Chinese nationals will be resumed only when their practice of issue of plain paper visas is discontinued. ( 2-10-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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