B.RAMAN
Forty-five days after the Mumbai terrorist strike of November 26 to 29,2008, India has failed to convince large sections of the internationalcommunity that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had orchestrated the terrorist strike in Mumbai by 10 terrorists of theLashkar-e-Toiba (LET). That is my conclusion after interactions with a wide spectrum of foreign counter-terrorism experts----governmental aswell as non-governmental.
2. The experts of the various countries whose nationals died at the hands of the terrorists are convinced on the basis of their ownsubstantial independent technical intelligence that the terrorist attack was carried out by 10 Pakistani nationals belonging to the LET, whocame to Mumbai by boat from Karachi for carrying out the strike. They are also convinced on the basis of the voluminous evidence in theirarchives about the privileged relationship between the ISI and the LET. But they claim not to have seen any conclusive evidence so far toshow that the ISI----or at least its present leadership---- had orchestrated the Mumbai terrorist attack. A question, which they pose, which islogical and compelling, is whether the terrorists would have killed nationals of the US, the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Canada and Australiaif they had been deputed by the ISI to indulge in the carnage.
3. Some of these experts, who were earlier convinced of the ISI hand behind the attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul in the first week ofJuly, 2008, when Lt.Gen.Nadeem Taj, the present Corps Commander at Gujranwala, was the ISI Director-General, are prepared to allow forthe possibility that Lt.Gen.Taj, before he was removed from the ISI on September 30,2008, allegedly under US pressure by Gen.PervezAshfaq Kayani, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), might have also planned the Mumbai attack by the LET and got its cadres chosenfor the attack trained. In this connection, it is significant that Ajmal Amir, the Pakistani in the custody of the Mumbai Police, had reportedlystated during his interrogation that the attack was planned for September 26, but was postponed. These experts point out that Taj was stillthe DG of the ISI on September 26.
4. The Americans had allegedly got Taj removed because of their conviction that his was the brain behind the Kabul attack and that Taj,who has a reputation of being rabidly anti-Indian and anti-US, had leaked out some information shared by the Americans with him to theTaliban. It was generally presumed till now on the basis of some past reports in sections of the Pakistani media about Taj being related toGen.(retd) Pervez Musharraf that he must be a Mohajir, but some Western experts claim that he is actually a Punjabi-speaking Kashmiri. Ifthis is so, in its history the ISI had been headed by Punjabi-speaking Kashmiris twice. The earlier Kashmiri DG of the ISI was Lt.Gen.(retd)Javed Nasir, who headed the ISI during Nawaz Sharif's first tenure as the Prime Minister (1990-93). The Mumbai blasts of March,1993,were orchestrated by him. He was removed by Sharif from the ISI under US pressure because of his perceived non-cooperation in the USattempts to buy back the unused Stinger missiles from the Afghan Mujahideen. It was during his tenure that the Bill Clinton Administrationhad declared Pakistan as a suspected State-sponsor of terrorism. This designation was removed after six months after Sharif had removedfrom the ISI Nasir and some other officers disliked by the US.
5. While thus some American experts have an open mind on the possibility of the involvement of Taj in the Mumbai carnage, they areprepared to give the benefit of doubt to Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who has been the DG of the ISI since September 30,2008. He enjoys agood reputation in the West as a balanced person, who would not indulge in this type of operation, particularly when it is partly directedagainst Western nationals and Jewish civilians.
6. Every country, whose nationals died during the terrorist attack, has been making a detailed analysis of why its nationals were targetedand killed. For example, in addition to the Israelis and the nationals of the countries mentioned above, the terrorists also killed the nationalsof three countries in South-East Asia. One of them was a Chinese woman from Singapore. According to one version that one heard inSingapore, the terrorists forced her to ring up her Foreign Office in Singapore and request it to urge the Government of India not to send thesecurity forces into the hotels. According to the version prevalent in Singapore, when the Singapore Foreign Office refused to intercede inthis matter, the terrorists shot her dead. Why did they do so? What is the reason for their apparent anger against Singapore? This is aquestion, which kept propping up.
7. Apart from the way the attack was planned and executed, the most significant aspect of the attack was the targeting of foreignnationals----particularly the cream of the foreign business community who frequent these hotels. It was because of this that the technicalintelligence agencies of the Western countries diverted all their capabilities to cover the conversations between the terrorists and theirhandlers in Pakistan. It is said that the US moved one of its communication satellites over Mumbai during the 60 hours that the drama lastedin order to cover these conversations.
8. After the drama was over and the National Security Guards (NSGs) had rescued the surviving hostages, the Western countries had alltheir surviving nationals quietly flown to Europe where they were thoroughly debriefed by special teams from their intelligence agencies. Itis said that the French even sent a special plane for evacuating the French and other Western survivors from Mumbai to Paris. Westernexperts are surprised that neither the Mumbai Police nor the central intelligence agencies showed interest in detaining the survivingforeign hostages in India in order to debrief them thoroughly. If they had done so, the details collected by them would have formed animportant part of the dossier prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs and disseminated to foreign Governments. It is said that such details,which could have been obtained by debriefing the foreign survivors, hardly figure in the dossier.
9. According to foreign experts, the Mumbai Police and the central intelligence agencies were so excited by the capture alive of one of thePakistani perpetrators that they seem to have devoted all their attention to interrogating him and getting as many details as possible, whichcould help them to fix Pakistan. They complain that other important aspects which might have helped them in reconstructing the terroristattack, drawing the right lessons from it and preventing a repetition of similar attacks in future have not received much attention.
10. Pakistan's argument that the Government of India has been trying to divert attention from the colossal failure of its counter-terrorismmachinery in Mumbai by focussing on the alleged involvement of the ISI has started having some takers abroad due to the unprofessionalmanner in which the sequel to the terrorist strike has been handled by the Govt.of India. It is important to hold Pakistan accountable for using terrorism against India through concrete evidence. At the same time, it is equally important to identify the deficiencioes in ourcounter-terrorism machinery and act quickly to remove them. This is not being done.
11. The Mumbai carnage has caused great concern in the Western countries for two reasons. Firstly, the jihadi terrorists in India, who had inthe past showed an increasing preference for explosives over hand-held weapons, have gone back to hand-held weapons for attackingprivate establishments such as hotels, which have anti-explosive checks, but no armed guards to foil an attack with hand-held weapons. Ofthe 163 fatalities in Mumbai, only five were reportedly caused by explosives. The remaining 158 were caused by hand-held weapons (assaultrifles and hand-grenades). This trend of the jihadi terrorists going back to hand-held weapons was first noticed in the Anbar province of Iraqafter 1993 when Al Qaeda killed a number of Americans and others with hand-held weapons. It was noticed in Pakistan in 2007. When thejihadis failed to kill Benazir Bhutto with an explosive device at Karachi in October,2007, they used a mix of a hand-held weapon and anexplosive to successfuly kill her at Rawalpindi on December 27,2007. This trend was noticed in Afghanistan in 2008. While there wasreportedly an one-third increase in the use of explosive devices in Afghanistan, there was a simultaneous increase in the use of hand-heldweapons for precision killings. This trend has now spread to the Indian territory outside Jammu & Kashmir.
12. Secondly, many Western experts feel that there was an Al Qaeda hand in the planning and execution of the Mumbai attack and that suchprecision planning and execution would not have been possible without the involvement of some local Muslims. While Indian experts havebeen able to quantify reasonably well the threat which they would continue to face in J&K, they have not been able to quantify in a similar manner the threat from sections of the Indian Muslim youth outside J&K because of a fear in political circles that such an exercise forquantification might have an adverse effect on the Muslim votes in the forthcoming parliamentary elections..
13. US Congressional committees and professional counter-terrorism organisations in the West are already examining the details of theMumbai carnage in order to draw lessons for themselves and to prevent a Mumbai-style attack in their country. Surprisingly, such anexercise is hardly to be seen in India. All the debate till now has been on what are the options against Pakistan. There has hardly been anypublic debate on what are the options against the terrorists in order to prevent another major attack. ( 12-1-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretasry (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.cm )
Sunday, January 11, 2009
Monday, January 5, 2009
CAN INDIA EMULATE ISRAEL'S ACTION IN GAZA?
B.RAMAN
Ever since Israel started its military strikes in Gaza a week ago to put down the acts of terrorism of the Hamas, there have been demands from sections of analysts and the general public in our country that India should emulate Israel and retaliate in a similar manner against Pakistan for its complicity in the terrorist attack by the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Pakistani terrorist organisation, in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008.
2. Nobody can question Israel's exercise of its right of self-defence to protect the lives and property of its citizens from rocket attacks from Gaza by the Hamas for weeks and months now. As the Deputy Permanent Representative of the US to the United Nations said in a press interview after the US had refused to join in the condemnation of Israel's action by the UN Security Council: " Israel, like all other members of the UN, has the right of self-defence. This right is not negotiable."
3. Like Israel and other members of the UN, India too has the right of self-defence against acts of terrorism emanating from Pakistani territory and sponsored by the State of Pakistan and has the right to retaliate against Pakistan and the duty to do so to protect the lives and property of its citizens.
4. The question is not whether we should retaliate. We should if we want Pakistan and the horde of terrorists nursed by it to take us seriously. The question is whether a direct military strike will be the wise and appropriate way of retaliating against Pakistan or should we do it through political and diplomatic measures, followed by deniable covert actions if those measures do not make Pakistan change its ways.
5. For many years, Israel has been the victim of acts of terrorism by organisations such as the Hamas and the Hizbollah sponsored mainly by Syria and Iran. Its retaliation has been directed against these terrorist organisations and not against their State-sponsors. After the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and the Yom Kippur war of 1973 Israel has indulged in military strikes in the territory of a sovereign state and a member of the UN only on two occasions---- against the Osirak nuclear reactor under construction in Iraq in the early 1980s and against the Hizbollah's infrastructure in the Lebanese territory in 2006. In the past,Israeli armed forces had operated in Lebanese territory on other occasions too.
6. Its action against Osirak in Iraq was a success, but its action in the Lebanon in 2006 against the Hizbollah was not. Despite its concerns over the nuclear sites in Iran for the production of enriched uranium, Israel has till now avoided any military strikes on these sites despite public pressure from sections of the Israeli people to do so. It did launch an attack on a suspected nuclear site in Syria last year, but as a deniable covert action and not as an admitted military strike.It has also indulged in covert actions against suspected Hamas operatives based in Syria.
7. It is able to indulge in openly admitted military strikes against the Hamas in Gaza because Gaza is not part of any sovereign State. In the past, Israel's retaliatory military strikes have been against terrorist organisations posing a threat to Israeli citizens and property and not against the States sponsoring them. Its actions against States sponsoring terrorism have been in the form of covert actions and not direct military strikes.
8. Practically all States facing the problem of terrorism have a covert action capability because it gives you a third option if political and diplomatic measures fail. If you don't have this capability, the only option you have if political and diplomatic actions fail is a military retaliation, which could be messy when used against a next door neighbour. If you don't use military strikes and if you don't have a covert action capability, the state-sponsor and the terrorists sponsored by it develop a contempt for you.
9. The US has bombed Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan in retaliation for their perceived anti-US acts, but it never does it against Cuba, its next door neighbour. It has declared Cuba a state-sponsor of terrorism and constantly keeps trying to undermine Cuba's political stability and economy, but avoids direct military action against it despite its being a super power because it knows it could be messy.
10. It is hoped the Government draws the right lessons from its dilemma after Mumbai and tries to revive quikly our covert action capability, which was discarded more than a decade ago as an ill-conceived unilateral gesture to Pakistan.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com ) Reply Reply to all Forward
Ever since Israel started its military strikes in Gaza a week ago to put down the acts of terrorism of the Hamas, there have been demands from sections of analysts and the general public in our country that India should emulate Israel and retaliate in a similar manner against Pakistan for its complicity in the terrorist attack by the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Pakistani terrorist organisation, in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008.
2. Nobody can question Israel's exercise of its right of self-defence to protect the lives and property of its citizens from rocket attacks from Gaza by the Hamas for weeks and months now. As the Deputy Permanent Representative of the US to the United Nations said in a press interview after the US had refused to join in the condemnation of Israel's action by the UN Security Council: " Israel, like all other members of the UN, has the right of self-defence. This right is not negotiable."
3. Like Israel and other members of the UN, India too has the right of self-defence against acts of terrorism emanating from Pakistani territory and sponsored by the State of Pakistan and has the right to retaliate against Pakistan and the duty to do so to protect the lives and property of its citizens.
4. The question is not whether we should retaliate. We should if we want Pakistan and the horde of terrorists nursed by it to take us seriously. The question is whether a direct military strike will be the wise and appropriate way of retaliating against Pakistan or should we do it through political and diplomatic measures, followed by deniable covert actions if those measures do not make Pakistan change its ways.
5. For many years, Israel has been the victim of acts of terrorism by organisations such as the Hamas and the Hizbollah sponsored mainly by Syria and Iran. Its retaliation has been directed against these terrorist organisations and not against their State-sponsors. After the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and the Yom Kippur war of 1973 Israel has indulged in military strikes in the territory of a sovereign state and a member of the UN only on two occasions---- against the Osirak nuclear reactor under construction in Iraq in the early 1980s and against the Hizbollah's infrastructure in the Lebanese territory in 2006. In the past,Israeli armed forces had operated in Lebanese territory on other occasions too.
6. Its action against Osirak in Iraq was a success, but its action in the Lebanon in 2006 against the Hizbollah was not. Despite its concerns over the nuclear sites in Iran for the production of enriched uranium, Israel has till now avoided any military strikes on these sites despite public pressure from sections of the Israeli people to do so. It did launch an attack on a suspected nuclear site in Syria last year, but as a deniable covert action and not as an admitted military strike.It has also indulged in covert actions against suspected Hamas operatives based in Syria.
7. It is able to indulge in openly admitted military strikes against the Hamas in Gaza because Gaza is not part of any sovereign State. In the past, Israel's retaliatory military strikes have been against terrorist organisations posing a threat to Israeli citizens and property and not against the States sponsoring them. Its actions against States sponsoring terrorism have been in the form of covert actions and not direct military strikes.
8. Practically all States facing the problem of terrorism have a covert action capability because it gives you a third option if political and diplomatic measures fail. If you don't have this capability, the only option you have if political and diplomatic actions fail is a military retaliation, which could be messy when used against a next door neighbour. If you don't use military strikes and if you don't have a covert action capability, the state-sponsor and the terrorists sponsored by it develop a contempt for you.
9. The US has bombed Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan in retaliation for their perceived anti-US acts, but it never does it against Cuba, its next door neighbour. It has declared Cuba a state-sponsor of terrorism and constantly keeps trying to undermine Cuba's political stability and economy, but avoids direct military action against it despite its being a super power because it knows it could be messy.
10. It is hoped the Government draws the right lessons from its dilemma after Mumbai and tries to revive quikly our covert action capability, which was discarded more than a decade ago as an ill-conceived unilateral gesture to Pakistan.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com ) Reply Reply to all Forward
Sunday, January 4, 2009
LTTE: ONE MORE Q & A
B.RAMAN
Q.It was really interesting to read your recent article (LTTE after Klinochchi –Q&A) as well as past articles. But I would be happy if you can send me answer for my question. The War will mark major turn if the LTTE air men strike Kamikaze type attack on Colombo or other important places and military bases in Sri Lanka?
A.I am sure the LTTE must be examining the various options available to it. At present, it has very little opportunity for offensive action in the North when it is relentlessly under pressure from the Sri Lankan Army. However, it has the option of unconventional offensive strikes in other fronts far removed from the North. One such front could be Colombo. Another Trincomallee. The third Hambantota where the Chinese are reportedly constructing a modern port for Sri Lanka. Very often, turning points in unconventional warfare come when the terrorists start attacking the economic infrastructure. One saw this in the British fight against the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Mrs.Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister in the 1980s, took a very strong line against the IRA and waged a no-holds-barred campaign against it in Northern Ireland. The IRA managed to carry the fight to London and carried out some explosions in London's finance district where the offices of leading British banks are located. This led to a more nuanced policy towards the IRA instead of relying exclusively on brute force. One of the objectives of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) of Pakistan in attacking Mumbai on November 26-29 was to try to damage India's economic growth. The LTTE must be trying hard for mounting kamikazee type attacks on military---particularly Air Force ---targets in Colombo similar to its raid on the SLAF base in Anuradhapura. The fact that it has not succeeded so far would indicate that the physical security for such establishments is strong and that the LTTE is facing shortages of the required materials for such attacks. One notices that the LTTE has not yet used all the weapons in its arsenal. It has apparently retained for itself an element of ultimate surprise.
Q.It was really interesting to read your recent article (LTTE after Klinochchi –Q&A) as well as past articles. But I would be happy if you can send me answer for my question. The War will mark major turn if the LTTE air men strike Kamikaze type attack on Colombo or other important places and military bases in Sri Lanka?
A.I am sure the LTTE must be examining the various options available to it. At present, it has very little opportunity for offensive action in the North when it is relentlessly under pressure from the Sri Lankan Army. However, it has the option of unconventional offensive strikes in other fronts far removed from the North. One such front could be Colombo. Another Trincomallee. The third Hambantota where the Chinese are reportedly constructing a modern port for Sri Lanka. Very often, turning points in unconventional warfare come when the terrorists start attacking the economic infrastructure. One saw this in the British fight against the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Mrs.Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister in the 1980s, took a very strong line against the IRA and waged a no-holds-barred campaign against it in Northern Ireland. The IRA managed to carry the fight to London and carried out some explosions in London's finance district where the offices of leading British banks are located. This led to a more nuanced policy towards the IRA instead of relying exclusively on brute force. One of the objectives of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) of Pakistan in attacking Mumbai on November 26-29 was to try to damage India's economic growth. The LTTE must be trying hard for mounting kamikazee type attacks on military---particularly Air Force ---targets in Colombo similar to its raid on the SLAF base in Anuradhapura. The fact that it has not succeeded so far would indicate that the physical security for such establishments is strong and that the LTTE is facing shortages of the required materials for such attacks. One notices that the LTTE has not yet used all the weapons in its arsenal. It has apparently retained for itself an element of ultimate surprise.
Saturday, January 3, 2009
LTTE AFTER KILINOCHCHI---Q & A
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.489
B.RAMAN
I have received many questions in response to my article on the capture of Kilinochchi, the so-called administrative capital of the LiberationTigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), by the Sri Lankan Army on January 2,2008. I will attempt to answer some of the questions:
Q.What will be the next move of the Sri Lankan Army (SLA)?
A.One of the reasons for the continuing success of the SLA during the last two years has been its ability to deny to the LTTE an opportunityfor an offensive action. It has consistently forced the LTTE to fight a defensive battle in one piece of territory after another-----whether in theEast or the North. Succession of defensive battles with no opportunity for taking the offensive anywhere saps the morale. That moment hasnot yet come for the LTTE, but it could and it will if the SLA manages to continue to deny to the LTTE an opportunity for an offensive action.From the reports coming out of the North, one gets an impression that the SLA is not giving itself a pause after its success at Kilinochchi. Itis pressing its offensive against the LTTE and has started moving towards Mulaithivu, which has now become the principal target of thebombings by the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF). The objective of the SLA is to keep the LTTE bleeding and not to allow it to re-group itself.
Q.In the past against the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) as well as the SLA subsequently, the LTTE had repeatedly bounced back from seemingly hopeless situations and recovered lost territory. Will it be able to do it again?
A.The LTTE's morale and motivation remain strong, but strong morale and motivation alone cannot win battles in the absence ofresources----human and material resources. In respect of both, the law of diminishing returns has already set in for the LTTE. One cannottotally rule out the kind of spectacular come-backs the LTTE had staged in the 1990s, but the objective conditions in the post-9/11 world aredifferent from those in the pre-9/11 world. There was a certain amount of acceptance of the legitimacy of terrorism/insurgency for achievinga political objective if left with no other option pre-9/11. Hence, the LTTE had a free run of the world collecting funds and clandestinelyprocuring materials. One of the consequences of the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US is the acceptance by the international community thatterrorism is an absolute evil and cannot be accepted whatever be the reason for it. The LTTE today is a terrorist organisation in the eyes ofthe international community. It no longer has a free run. Its source of funds and equipment are being choked off one after the other. Before9/11, another important source of replenishment of arms and ammunition for the LTTE was the capture from the SLA. In defensive battlesthis also dries up. The ground realities today are much more strongly against the LTTE than they were pre-9/11. It will be a miracle if it isable to repeat its pre-/9/11 comebacks, but one should not act on the assumption that it will not be able to stage a come-back.It particularlycan if the SLA, in over-confidence or over-exuberance, creates serious tactical or strategic mistakes.
Q.But even in the post-9/11 world, Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda forces in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan staged a come-back?
A. Yes, they did due to two reasons----- the availability of sanctuaries and assistance for the pro-Al Qaeda forces from Iran and Syria and thesimilar availability for the Taliban from the Pakistani Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The LTTE is a banned terroristorganisation in India and its leader Prabakaran is a wanted assassin in India wanted for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Hence, the LTTEmay not be able to get sanctuaries and assistance from elements in Tamil Nadu. It has to fight with its back to the sea with no possibility ofescape beyond the sea.
Q. But even under the IPKF the LTTE managed to stage a come-back despite being denied sanctuaries and assistance in Indian territory?
A.As I have already mentioned, the pre-9/11 objective conditions were different from the post-9/11. Moreover, the IPKF did not indulge in aruthless application of India's air power against the LTTE. If it had done so, as the SLAF has been doing now, the LTTE might not have beenable to stage a come-back.
Q. Does it mean, the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils has become hopeless?
A. Their cause was not hopeless till 2003. It enjoyed a lot of international support. Prabakaran made it hopeless by a series of errors ofjudgement and tactical and strategic blunders. He continues to live in a make-believe world of his own, nursing an illusion that theinternational opinion might once again change in favour of the Tamils. Yes, it might, but only if Prabakaran is removed from the leadership ofthe LTTE along with his close associates. As I have been saying and writing for the last two years, he has become a liability for the Tamilcause and should be removed by the Tamils themselves or by his associates in the LTTE leadership who realise the damage he has causedto the Tamil cause.
Q. How will the end of Prabakaran come?
A. Either in an air strike by the SLAF or through suicide or through one of his own men turning against him. I would not be surprised if one ofthese days the SLAF manages to kill him as it managed to kill Tamilselvan, his political adviser, in 2006. As I wrote in the past, he has to belucky every time,but the SLAF has to be lucky only once.
Q. What are the chances of he and his cadres taking shelter in India?
A. The Governments of India and Tamil Nadu will not allow it.However, one has to be alert to the possibility that the Maoists (Naxalites) inthe tribal belt of central India who have some territorial control in the jungles might help him and give him shelter in return for theassistance which the LTTE had allegedly given them in the past. If he manages to reach the Maoists controlled territory, the ability of oursecurity forces to get at him may be limited. In the case of the LTTE cadres, some of them might succeed to come over to India as refugees.This would call for stricter vetting of the refugee flow in order to identify and arrest such elements.
Q. What would happen to the arms and ammunition and the planes at the disposal of the LTTE?
A. They might try to cache them in the jungles in the Northern Province or bring some of them to India and give them to the Maoists forpossible use or safe custody. We have to be alert enough to prevent this.
Q.If the SLA ultimately manages to defeat the LTTE, will it be peace in Sri Lanka?
A.Most probably not. It might be the end of classical insurgency, but it will not be the end of terrorism till the aspiratiions of the Tamils areaddressed without weakening the unity of Sri Lanka.
Q. India has been accused of double standards---taking a strong line against terrorism as seen after Mumbai, but at the same time critical ofthe strong measures taken by the SL Government?
A.There are no double standards. We take a strong line against the ISI-sponsored Pakistani terrorists, who have no business to be in ourterritory. We follow a no-holds-barred policy towards them to eradicate them. Our policy towards our own people----separatists, ideologicalterrorists or jihadi terrorists--- is more nuanced. Our policy towards them is graduated with a mix of political and the law and ordercomponents. We have never hesitated to talk to them. We look upon indigenous movements not as a conflict between one community andanother, but as a conflict between the Government and aggrieved elements in a community. Some of the strongest supporters of thehuman rights of the aggrieved communities have come from the majority Hindu community. In Sri Lanka, there are no foreign terroristsoperating. All the insurgents and terrorists are their own people. The counter-terrorism strategy of the Mahinda Rajapakse Governmentlacks the kind of sophistication and nuances we have. It treats the Sri Lankan Tamils as if they are foreigners while paying lip service totheir being citizens with equal rights. This has made the conflict in Sri Lanka not only between the Government and aggrieved sections ofthe Tamils, but also between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamil communities. How many Sinhalese moulders of public opinionhave come forward to support the human rights of the Tamils? How many of them have criticised the use of the Air Force against the civilianTamil population? Even if the SLA is able to defeat the LTTE, it will take years for the SL society to heal the divide between the Sinhaleseand the Tamils caused by the policies of the Rajapakse Government and the intemperate pronouncements of Lt.Gen. Sarath Fonseka, theCommander of the SLA. (4-1-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStrudues, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
I have received many questions in response to my article on the capture of Kilinochchi, the so-called administrative capital of the LiberationTigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), by the Sri Lankan Army on January 2,2008. I will attempt to answer some of the questions:
Q.What will be the next move of the Sri Lankan Army (SLA)?
A.One of the reasons for the continuing success of the SLA during the last two years has been its ability to deny to the LTTE an opportunityfor an offensive action. It has consistently forced the LTTE to fight a defensive battle in one piece of territory after another-----whether in theEast or the North. Succession of defensive battles with no opportunity for taking the offensive anywhere saps the morale. That moment hasnot yet come for the LTTE, but it could and it will if the SLA manages to continue to deny to the LTTE an opportunity for an offensive action.From the reports coming out of the North, one gets an impression that the SLA is not giving itself a pause after its success at Kilinochchi. Itis pressing its offensive against the LTTE and has started moving towards Mulaithivu, which has now become the principal target of thebombings by the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF). The objective of the SLA is to keep the LTTE bleeding and not to allow it to re-group itself.
Q.In the past against the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) as well as the SLA subsequently, the LTTE had repeatedly bounced back from seemingly hopeless situations and recovered lost territory. Will it be able to do it again?
A.The LTTE's morale and motivation remain strong, but strong morale and motivation alone cannot win battles in the absence ofresources----human and material resources. In respect of both, the law of diminishing returns has already set in for the LTTE. One cannottotally rule out the kind of spectacular come-backs the LTTE had staged in the 1990s, but the objective conditions in the post-9/11 world aredifferent from those in the pre-9/11 world. There was a certain amount of acceptance of the legitimacy of terrorism/insurgency for achievinga political objective if left with no other option pre-9/11. Hence, the LTTE had a free run of the world collecting funds and clandestinelyprocuring materials. One of the consequences of the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US is the acceptance by the international community thatterrorism is an absolute evil and cannot be accepted whatever be the reason for it. The LTTE today is a terrorist organisation in the eyes ofthe international community. It no longer has a free run. Its source of funds and equipment are being choked off one after the other. Before9/11, another important source of replenishment of arms and ammunition for the LTTE was the capture from the SLA. In defensive battlesthis also dries up. The ground realities today are much more strongly against the LTTE than they were pre-9/11. It will be a miracle if it isable to repeat its pre-/9/11 comebacks, but one should not act on the assumption that it will not be able to stage a come-back.It particularlycan if the SLA, in over-confidence or over-exuberance, creates serious tactical or strategic mistakes.
Q.But even in the post-9/11 world, Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda forces in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan staged a come-back?
A. Yes, they did due to two reasons----- the availability of sanctuaries and assistance for the pro-Al Qaeda forces from Iran and Syria and thesimilar availability for the Taliban from the Pakistani Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The LTTE is a banned terroristorganisation in India and its leader Prabakaran is a wanted assassin in India wanted for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Hence, the LTTEmay not be able to get sanctuaries and assistance from elements in Tamil Nadu. It has to fight with its back to the sea with no possibility ofescape beyond the sea.
Q. But even under the IPKF the LTTE managed to stage a come-back despite being denied sanctuaries and assistance in Indian territory?
A.As I have already mentioned, the pre-9/11 objective conditions were different from the post-9/11. Moreover, the IPKF did not indulge in aruthless application of India's air power against the LTTE. If it had done so, as the SLAF has been doing now, the LTTE might not have beenable to stage a come-back.
Q. Does it mean, the cause of the Sri Lankan Tamils has become hopeless?
A. Their cause was not hopeless till 2003. It enjoyed a lot of international support. Prabakaran made it hopeless by a series of errors ofjudgement and tactical and strategic blunders. He continues to live in a make-believe world of his own, nursing an illusion that theinternational opinion might once again change in favour of the Tamils. Yes, it might, but only if Prabakaran is removed from the leadership ofthe LTTE along with his close associates. As I have been saying and writing for the last two years, he has become a liability for the Tamilcause and should be removed by the Tamils themselves or by his associates in the LTTE leadership who realise the damage he has causedto the Tamil cause.
Q. How will the end of Prabakaran come?
A. Either in an air strike by the SLAF or through suicide or through one of his own men turning against him. I would not be surprised if one ofthese days the SLAF manages to kill him as it managed to kill Tamilselvan, his political adviser, in 2006. As I wrote in the past, he has to belucky every time,but the SLAF has to be lucky only once.
Q. What are the chances of he and his cadres taking shelter in India?
A. The Governments of India and Tamil Nadu will not allow it.However, one has to be alert to the possibility that the Maoists (Naxalites) inthe tribal belt of central India who have some territorial control in the jungles might help him and give him shelter in return for theassistance which the LTTE had allegedly given them in the past. If he manages to reach the Maoists controlled territory, the ability of oursecurity forces to get at him may be limited. In the case of the LTTE cadres, some of them might succeed to come over to India as refugees.This would call for stricter vetting of the refugee flow in order to identify and arrest such elements.
Q. What would happen to the arms and ammunition and the planes at the disposal of the LTTE?
A. They might try to cache them in the jungles in the Northern Province or bring some of them to India and give them to the Maoists forpossible use or safe custody. We have to be alert enough to prevent this.
Q.If the SLA ultimately manages to defeat the LTTE, will it be peace in Sri Lanka?
A.Most probably not. It might be the end of classical insurgency, but it will not be the end of terrorism till the aspiratiions of the Tamils areaddressed without weakening the unity of Sri Lanka.
Q. India has been accused of double standards---taking a strong line against terrorism as seen after Mumbai, but at the same time critical ofthe strong measures taken by the SL Government?
A.There are no double standards. We take a strong line against the ISI-sponsored Pakistani terrorists, who have no business to be in ourterritory. We follow a no-holds-barred policy towards them to eradicate them. Our policy towards our own people----separatists, ideologicalterrorists or jihadi terrorists--- is more nuanced. Our policy towards them is graduated with a mix of political and the law and ordercomponents. We have never hesitated to talk to them. We look upon indigenous movements not as a conflict between one community andanother, but as a conflict between the Government and aggrieved elements in a community. Some of the strongest supporters of thehuman rights of the aggrieved communities have come from the majority Hindu community. In Sri Lanka, there are no foreign terroristsoperating. All the insurgents and terrorists are their own people. The counter-terrorism strategy of the Mahinda Rajapakse Governmentlacks the kind of sophistication and nuances we have. It treats the Sri Lankan Tamils as if they are foreigners while paying lip service totheir being citizens with equal rights. This has made the conflict in Sri Lanka not only between the Government and aggrieved sections ofthe Tamils, but also between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamil communities. How many Sinhalese moulders of public opinionhave come forward to support the human rights of the Tamils? How many of them have criticised the use of the Air Force against the civilianTamil population? Even if the SLA is able to defeat the LTTE, it will take years for the SL society to heal the divide between the Sinhaleseand the Tamils caused by the policies of the Rajapakse Government and the intemperate pronouncements of Lt.Gen. Sarath Fonseka, theCommander of the SLA. (4-1-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStrudues, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
PAKISTAN BANKS ON PERCEIVED INDIAN AMENABILITY TO US PRESSURE
B.RAMAN
The US pressured India into not retaliating against Pakistan after the attempted attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistani terrorists onDecember 13,2001, and promised that Pakistan would be made to dismantle the anti-Indian terrorist infrastructure in its territory. Inresponse to the US pressure, India exercised moderation and did not exercise its right to retaliate. The promises made to India were neverkept. The anti-Indian terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory continued to grow without the West taking any action against Pakistan.
2. The result: the savage attack of November 26-29,2008, in Mumbai by 10 Pakistani terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). The US and theother Western countries have been conducting themselves in exactly the same way as they did in 2002---- expressions of outrage over theterrorist strike, pretense of solidarity with India, but at the same time ill-concealed attempts to protect Pakistan and its military-intelligencecomplex from the consequences of their continuing to sponsor terrorism against India in Indian territory.
3. Pakistan's behaviour----whether it is ruled by elected political or military rulers---- has not changed one iota since it started using terrorismagainst India in 1981. It would organise an act of terrorism and to pre-empt a possible Indian retaliation would project itself as thevictim-State threatened by India and manipulate Western policy-makers into rationalising its use of terrorism against India and pressuringIndia not to retaliate against Pakistan.
4. One thought and hoped that the West would act more firmly against Pakistan this time than it had done in the past because of the factthat the LET terrorists, who attacked Mumbai, killed nine Israelis and some nationals of the US, the UK, France, Italy,Germany, Canada andAustralia,in addition to killing about 160 India nationals. These hopes are on the way to being belied.
5. Instead of stepping up the pressure on Pakistan to dismantle the LET's terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory and arrest and handover to India those involved in the orchestration of the terrorist strike in Mumbai, pressue is being stepped up on India not to retaliateagainst Pakistan---not even politically. Instead of calling Pakistan to account for the outrage, attempts are being to mollify it by acceptingthe various conditions sought to be imposed by it, one of the conditions being that it would, if India produces evidence, prosecute theterrorists in its own courts and would not hand them over to India.
6. This is the fifth time Pakistan has been defying international pressure to hand over suspects for investigation and prosecution. The firstwas Omar Sheikh, one of the principal accused in the case relating to the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, atKarachi in January-February,2002. It got him tried and sentenced to death by one of its courts. The hearing on his appeal has beenadjourned by the anti-terrorism court over a hundred times. In the meanwhile, reports from Pakistan say that he has been given all thefacilities such as mobile phones etc that he asked for and that with these he is once again active from jail in guiding the pro-Al Qaeda jihaditerrorist organisations like the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM).
7. The second is Dawood Ibrahim, the Indian mafia leader, who is the principal accused in the case relating to the serial explosions inMumbai in March,1993. He was designated by the US Department of Treasury as an international terrorist in October,2003, because of hislinks with Al Qaeda and the LET. Pakistan has avoided handing him over either to India or the US. He continues to live under an assumedname as a Pakistani national at Karachi. Even though sections of the Pakistani media have been periodically reporting about his presenceand activities at Karachi, Pakistan continues to deny his presence in Pakistani territory.
8. The third is A.Q.Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, found guilty of clandestinely transfering military nuclear technology to North Korea,Iran and Libya. Both the previous Government headed by Pervez Musharraf and the present Government headed by Asif Ali Zardari haveconsistently opposed demands that an international team of experts should be allowed to interrogate him outside Pakistan.
9. The fourth is Rashid Rauf, a British citizen of Mirpuri (Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir ) origin, who was arrested by the Pakistani authorities inAugust,2006, on suspicion of his involvement in a plot discovered by the London Police to blow up a number of US-bound planes originatingfrom British airports. He was the brother-in-law of Maulana Masood Azhar, the Amir of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). The Pakistaniauthorities repeatedly evaded action on a British request to hand him over so that they could interrogate him not only in connection with thealleged plot to blow up planes, but also in connection with the alleged murder of one of his relatives in Birmingham before he fled toPakistan. He escaped from police custody under mysterious circumstances in December,2007, and died in a missile strike by a US Predator(pilotless) plane on a suspected Al Qaeda- hide-out in North Waziristan on November 15,2008. The leaders of the LET wanted by India inconnection wit the Mumbai attack constitute the fifth instance .
10. Pakistan's reluctance to hand over Omar Sheikh was due to the long history of contacts between him and the Inter-Services Intelligenceand between him and Osama bin Laden. According to Karachi police sources, he had claimed during his interrogation that during a visit toKandahar to meet Osama bin Laden before 9/11, he had come to know of Al Qaeda's plans for the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homelandand that on his return from Kandahar he had met Lt.Gen.Ehsanul Haq, the then Corps Commander at Peshawar, and told him about AlQaeda's plans. After 9/11, Musharraf, under US pressure, had appointed Ehsanul Haq as the Director-General of the ISI in replacement ofLt.Gen.Mahmodd Ahmed whom the US did not trust. It was believed that Musharraf was worried that if Omar Sheikh was handed over to theUS, he could mention during his interrogation by the FBI about his telling Ehsanul Haq regarding Al Qaeda's plans and the question mightarise as to why Pakistan did not pass on this information to the US, which might have prevented the 9/11 strikes.
11. Fears that Dawood Ibrahim's long history of contacts with the ISI, his contacts with Al Qaeda and the LET and his role in helpingA.Q.Khan in clandestinely transporting nuclear material to North Korea, Iran and Libya and North Korean missiles to Pakistan might cometo the notice of the US during any interrogation have stood in the way of Pakistan handing him over either to India or the US. In the case ofA.Q.Khan, fears that he might reveal the role of the political and military rulers in his clandestine proliferation activities are behindPakistan's refusal to permit any independent interrogation of him. When the restrictions on his house arrest were relaxed after the electionsof March last year, he allegedly told some foreign journalists that Musharraf was totally in the picture about his nuclear and missile dealingswith North Korea. The Government strongly denied these allegations and re-imposed the restrictions on him.
12. In the case of Rashid Rauf, police sources say that he was aware of the contacts of the JEM with the ISI. Moreover, according to thesame sources, he was also aware that the four suicide bombers, who carried out the London blasts of July 2005, had been trained by theJEM in one of its camps in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) at the request of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the NO.2 to bin Laden. TheISI's anxiety to cover up these facts should explain the decision not to hand him over to the British Police.
13.The LET's close links with the ISI on the one side and with Al Qaeda on the other is believed to be behind the present refusal to handover the masterminds behind the Mumbai attack to the Indian authorities.
14. Under these circumstances, the Pakistani leadership----political as well as military--- is determined not to hand over any of the LEToperatives either to India or to the US. If the US, through independent sources, collects more irrefutable evidence and maintains thepressure on Pakistan, the most Pakistan might do is to hold a proforma trial against the LET operatives, get them jailed and allow them toguide the LET activities from jail in the same manner as Omar Sheikh has been guiding the activities of the JEM from jail.
15. If the US is really concerned over the refusal of Pakistan to act against the LET's terrorist infrastructure and operatives, it could declarePakistan as a state-sponsor of terrorism and stop all military and economic assistance to it.However, it is unlikely to take this step due tofears that this might affect even the limited co-operation which Pakistan has been extending to the US in targeting Al Qaeda sanctuaries inNorth Waziristan.
16. India should not, therefore, have any illusions that the US would act decisively against Pakistan. It is our problem and we have to dealwith it on our own through appropriate political, diplomatic and operational means. It is a pity that all the strong statements on the optionsbefore India are coming from Shri Pranab Mukherjee, the Minister For External Affairs, and not from the Prime Minister, Dr.Manmohan Singh.He mostly maintains a discreet silence. Some comments which he did make like ruling out a military option have had the effect of dilutingthe uncertainty and anxiety caused in the minds of the Pakistanis by the strong statements of Shri Mukherjee.
17. This impression of Indian softness, if not removed, would encourage the Pakistani political and military leaders to continue with theirpresent policy of inaction against the LET. (3-1-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The US pressured India into not retaliating against Pakistan after the attempted attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistani terrorists onDecember 13,2001, and promised that Pakistan would be made to dismantle the anti-Indian terrorist infrastructure in its territory. Inresponse to the US pressure, India exercised moderation and did not exercise its right to retaliate. The promises made to India were neverkept. The anti-Indian terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory continued to grow without the West taking any action against Pakistan.
2. The result: the savage attack of November 26-29,2008, in Mumbai by 10 Pakistani terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). The US and theother Western countries have been conducting themselves in exactly the same way as they did in 2002---- expressions of outrage over theterrorist strike, pretense of solidarity with India, but at the same time ill-concealed attempts to protect Pakistan and its military-intelligencecomplex from the consequences of their continuing to sponsor terrorism against India in Indian territory.
3. Pakistan's behaviour----whether it is ruled by elected political or military rulers---- has not changed one iota since it started using terrorismagainst India in 1981. It would organise an act of terrorism and to pre-empt a possible Indian retaliation would project itself as thevictim-State threatened by India and manipulate Western policy-makers into rationalising its use of terrorism against India and pressuringIndia not to retaliate against Pakistan.
4. One thought and hoped that the West would act more firmly against Pakistan this time than it had done in the past because of the factthat the LET terrorists, who attacked Mumbai, killed nine Israelis and some nationals of the US, the UK, France, Italy,Germany, Canada andAustralia,in addition to killing about 160 India nationals. These hopes are on the way to being belied.
5. Instead of stepping up the pressure on Pakistan to dismantle the LET's terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory and arrest and handover to India those involved in the orchestration of the terrorist strike in Mumbai, pressue is being stepped up on India not to retaliateagainst Pakistan---not even politically. Instead of calling Pakistan to account for the outrage, attempts are being to mollify it by acceptingthe various conditions sought to be imposed by it, one of the conditions being that it would, if India produces evidence, prosecute theterrorists in its own courts and would not hand them over to India.
6. This is the fifth time Pakistan has been defying international pressure to hand over suspects for investigation and prosecution. The firstwas Omar Sheikh, one of the principal accused in the case relating to the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, atKarachi in January-February,2002. It got him tried and sentenced to death by one of its courts. The hearing on his appeal has beenadjourned by the anti-terrorism court over a hundred times. In the meanwhile, reports from Pakistan say that he has been given all thefacilities such as mobile phones etc that he asked for and that with these he is once again active from jail in guiding the pro-Al Qaeda jihaditerrorist organisations like the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM).
7. The second is Dawood Ibrahim, the Indian mafia leader, who is the principal accused in the case relating to the serial explosions inMumbai in March,1993. He was designated by the US Department of Treasury as an international terrorist in October,2003, because of hislinks with Al Qaeda and the LET. Pakistan has avoided handing him over either to India or the US. He continues to live under an assumedname as a Pakistani national at Karachi. Even though sections of the Pakistani media have been periodically reporting about his presenceand activities at Karachi, Pakistan continues to deny his presence in Pakistani territory.
8. The third is A.Q.Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, found guilty of clandestinely transfering military nuclear technology to North Korea,Iran and Libya. Both the previous Government headed by Pervez Musharraf and the present Government headed by Asif Ali Zardari haveconsistently opposed demands that an international team of experts should be allowed to interrogate him outside Pakistan.
9. The fourth is Rashid Rauf, a British citizen of Mirpuri (Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir ) origin, who was arrested by the Pakistani authorities inAugust,2006, on suspicion of his involvement in a plot discovered by the London Police to blow up a number of US-bound planes originatingfrom British airports. He was the brother-in-law of Maulana Masood Azhar, the Amir of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). The Pakistaniauthorities repeatedly evaded action on a British request to hand him over so that they could interrogate him not only in connection with thealleged plot to blow up planes, but also in connection with the alleged murder of one of his relatives in Birmingham before he fled toPakistan. He escaped from police custody under mysterious circumstances in December,2007, and died in a missile strike by a US Predator(pilotless) plane on a suspected Al Qaeda- hide-out in North Waziristan on November 15,2008. The leaders of the LET wanted by India inconnection wit the Mumbai attack constitute the fifth instance .
10. Pakistan's reluctance to hand over Omar Sheikh was due to the long history of contacts between him and the Inter-Services Intelligenceand between him and Osama bin Laden. According to Karachi police sources, he had claimed during his interrogation that during a visit toKandahar to meet Osama bin Laden before 9/11, he had come to know of Al Qaeda's plans for the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homelandand that on his return from Kandahar he had met Lt.Gen.Ehsanul Haq, the then Corps Commander at Peshawar, and told him about AlQaeda's plans. After 9/11, Musharraf, under US pressure, had appointed Ehsanul Haq as the Director-General of the ISI in replacement ofLt.Gen.Mahmodd Ahmed whom the US did not trust. It was believed that Musharraf was worried that if Omar Sheikh was handed over to theUS, he could mention during his interrogation by the FBI about his telling Ehsanul Haq regarding Al Qaeda's plans and the question mightarise as to why Pakistan did not pass on this information to the US, which might have prevented the 9/11 strikes.
11. Fears that Dawood Ibrahim's long history of contacts with the ISI, his contacts with Al Qaeda and the LET and his role in helpingA.Q.Khan in clandestinely transporting nuclear material to North Korea, Iran and Libya and North Korean missiles to Pakistan might cometo the notice of the US during any interrogation have stood in the way of Pakistan handing him over either to India or the US. In the case ofA.Q.Khan, fears that he might reveal the role of the political and military rulers in his clandestine proliferation activities are behindPakistan's refusal to permit any independent interrogation of him. When the restrictions on his house arrest were relaxed after the electionsof March last year, he allegedly told some foreign journalists that Musharraf was totally in the picture about his nuclear and missile dealingswith North Korea. The Government strongly denied these allegations and re-imposed the restrictions on him.
12. In the case of Rashid Rauf, police sources say that he was aware of the contacts of the JEM with the ISI. Moreover, according to thesame sources, he was also aware that the four suicide bombers, who carried out the London blasts of July 2005, had been trained by theJEM in one of its camps in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) at the request of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the NO.2 to bin Laden. TheISI's anxiety to cover up these facts should explain the decision not to hand him over to the British Police.
13.The LET's close links with the ISI on the one side and with Al Qaeda on the other is believed to be behind the present refusal to handover the masterminds behind the Mumbai attack to the Indian authorities.
14. Under these circumstances, the Pakistani leadership----political as well as military--- is determined not to hand over any of the LEToperatives either to India or to the US. If the US, through independent sources, collects more irrefutable evidence and maintains thepressure on Pakistan, the most Pakistan might do is to hold a proforma trial against the LET operatives, get them jailed and allow them toguide the LET activities from jail in the same manner as Omar Sheikh has been guiding the activities of the JEM from jail.
15. If the US is really concerned over the refusal of Pakistan to act against the LET's terrorist infrastructure and operatives, it could declarePakistan as a state-sponsor of terrorism and stop all military and economic assistance to it.However, it is unlikely to take this step due tofears that this might affect even the limited co-operation which Pakistan has been extending to the US in targeting Al Qaeda sanctuaries inNorth Waziristan.
16. India should not, therefore, have any illusions that the US would act decisively against Pakistan. It is our problem and we have to dealwith it on our own through appropriate political, diplomatic and operational means. It is a pity that all the strong statements on the optionsbefore India are coming from Shri Pranab Mukherjee, the Minister For External Affairs, and not from the Prime Minister, Dr.Manmohan Singh.He mostly maintains a discreet silence. Some comments which he did make like ruling out a military option have had the effect of dilutingthe uncertainty and anxiety caused in the minds of the Pakistanis by the strong statements of Shri Mukherjee.
17. This impression of Indian softness, if not removed, would encourage the Pakistani political and military leaders to continue with theirpresent policy of inaction against the LET. (3-1-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, January 2, 2009
SRI LANKA: MISSION ACCOMPLISHED?
B.RAMAN
There have been understandable scenes of jubilation in Colombo and other Sinhalese majority areas of Sri Lanka over the occupation of Kilinochchi, which used to be the administrative capital of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), by the Sri Lankan Army on January 2,2008. These scenes bring to one's mind similar scenes one witnessed after the US army moved without resistance into Baghdad vacated by Saddam Hussein's army in 2003 and shortly thereafter President George Bush proclaimed "Mission Accomplished". Almost six years later, the violence still continues in Iraq. His proclamation of "Mission Accomplished" has kept haunting him since then. Shortly after the US troops entered Baghdad, I had pointed out that the US Army's entry into Baghdad marked the end of one phase of the war and the beginning of another.
2. So too in Afghanistan where the Taliban, whose death was proclaimed with fanfare in December 2001, rose from its proclaimed grave and staged a come-back causing much bleeding and destruction. The fighting is still going on in Afghanistan.
3. To mention all this is not to under-estimate the significane of the LTTE's loss of control over Kilinochchi after remaining in occupation of it for 12 years, but to stress the inadvisability of premature claims of victory in unconventional conflicts between a State actor and a non-State actor.
4. The re-occupation of Kilinochchi by the Sri Lankan Army will naturally add to the pride, confidence and morale of the Sri Lankan Army. This does not mean that it will necessarily undermine the motivation and morale of the LTTE. Its motivation and morale would have been undermined if it was an unexpected rout for the LTTE. From all indications, it was not. It was a denouement for which it had prepared itself and the Tamil population of the area on which it depends for support. It has lost territory whose gain was symbolically important to the SL Army. But this does not mean the end of the LTTE's campaign of insurgency-cum-terrorism.
5. The end of the LTTE's campaign will come not when it loses an important piece of territory, but when it loses the support of the Tamil people in the areas still controlled by it and in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora.
6. In an unconventional warfare, there is no victory day when the war definitively ends with the adversary vanquished once and for all. Victory comes invisibly when the insurgent or terrorist organisation either realises that continued fighting or violence is no longer a viable option as it happened in Mizoram or when it totally loses the support of the people on whose behalf it claims to be fighting the State as it happened in the case of Khalistani terrorism in Punjab.
7. We must be proud of our political leaders. They did not indulge in scenes of jubilation when Laldenga, the leader of the Mizo National Front, sought peace talks with the Government of India in 1975 . Nor did they indulge in triumphalism when they realised by the end of the 1990s that the Khalistan movement has withered away without their even realising it due to the aversion of the overwhelming majority of the Sikhs to the movement.
8. Turning points in unconventional warfare are brought about not through the force of arms, but through the force of wisdom. Arms do play an impiortant role if they are wielded with wisdom.One is yet to see such signs of wisdom in Colombo. The turning point in Sri Lanka will come the day the Tamils realise that Prabhakaran has become a liability for their cause and get rid of him. If there is to be real peace in Sri Lanka, the end of Prabhakaran has to be brought about by the Tamils themselves and not by the Sinhalese army. Has that day been brought nearer by the entry of the Sinhalese Army into Kilinochchi? One has to keep one's fingers crossed .(2-1-2009)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
There have been understandable scenes of jubilation in Colombo and other Sinhalese majority areas of Sri Lanka over the occupation of Kilinochchi, which used to be the administrative capital of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), by the Sri Lankan Army on January 2,2008. These scenes bring to one's mind similar scenes one witnessed after the US army moved without resistance into Baghdad vacated by Saddam Hussein's army in 2003 and shortly thereafter President George Bush proclaimed "Mission Accomplished". Almost six years later, the violence still continues in Iraq. His proclamation of "Mission Accomplished" has kept haunting him since then. Shortly after the US troops entered Baghdad, I had pointed out that the US Army's entry into Baghdad marked the end of one phase of the war and the beginning of another.
2. So too in Afghanistan where the Taliban, whose death was proclaimed with fanfare in December 2001, rose from its proclaimed grave and staged a come-back causing much bleeding and destruction. The fighting is still going on in Afghanistan.
3. To mention all this is not to under-estimate the significane of the LTTE's loss of control over Kilinochchi after remaining in occupation of it for 12 years, but to stress the inadvisability of premature claims of victory in unconventional conflicts between a State actor and a non-State actor.
4. The re-occupation of Kilinochchi by the Sri Lankan Army will naturally add to the pride, confidence and morale of the Sri Lankan Army. This does not mean that it will necessarily undermine the motivation and morale of the LTTE. Its motivation and morale would have been undermined if it was an unexpected rout for the LTTE. From all indications, it was not. It was a denouement for which it had prepared itself and the Tamil population of the area on which it depends for support. It has lost territory whose gain was symbolically important to the SL Army. But this does not mean the end of the LTTE's campaign of insurgency-cum-terrorism.
5. The end of the LTTE's campaign will come not when it loses an important piece of territory, but when it loses the support of the Tamil people in the areas still controlled by it and in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora.
6. In an unconventional warfare, there is no victory day when the war definitively ends with the adversary vanquished once and for all. Victory comes invisibly when the insurgent or terrorist organisation either realises that continued fighting or violence is no longer a viable option as it happened in Mizoram or when it totally loses the support of the people on whose behalf it claims to be fighting the State as it happened in the case of Khalistani terrorism in Punjab.
7. We must be proud of our political leaders. They did not indulge in scenes of jubilation when Laldenga, the leader of the Mizo National Front, sought peace talks with the Government of India in 1975 . Nor did they indulge in triumphalism when they realised by the end of the 1990s that the Khalistan movement has withered away without their even realising it due to the aversion of the overwhelming majority of the Sikhs to the movement.
8. Turning points in unconventional warfare are brought about not through the force of arms, but through the force of wisdom. Arms do play an impiortant role if they are wielded with wisdom.One is yet to see such signs of wisdom in Colombo. The turning point in Sri Lanka will come the day the Tamils realise that Prabhakaran has become a liability for their cause and get rid of him. If there is to be real peace in Sri Lanka, the end of Prabhakaran has to be brought about by the Tamils themselves and not by the Sinhalese army. Has that day been brought nearer by the entry of the Sinhalese Army into Kilinochchi? One has to keep one's fingers crossed .(2-1-2009)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, December 29, 2008
PASHTUNS AREN'T IRAQIS: TALIBAN'S MESSAGE TO GEN.PETRAEUS
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.486
B.RAMAN
Gen.David Petraeus, the Commander of the US Central Command, who previously headed the US forces in Iraq, was credited with bringing down the level of violence in Iraq and weakening the capability of Al Qaeda in Iraq by creating a divide between the secular Baathist Arabs of Saddam Hussein's army and local administration and the Wahabi Arabs of Al Qaeda by strengthening various local militias with names such as the Awakening Councils, which had come into existence even before he took over in Iraq.
2. When he was appointed by President George Bush to be the head of the Central Command, which, inter alia, is responsible for the US operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and in the bordering Pashtun areas of Pakistan, he was reported to have set up a brains trust to advise him on a new strategy to be followed against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. While the new strategy is still being worked out, some elements of it are already in the process of being implemented.
3. These include a planned surge in the US forces in Afghanistan in the coming months by inducting another 30,000 troops and the setting up of local militias, which would work on the pattern of the Awakening Councils in Iraq. Many Afghan observers have been expressing doubts whether Petraeus' ideas would work in Afghanistan. The Pashtun society---particularly in Afghanistan--- is different from the Iraqi society. Hatred of non-Muslim foreigners is very strong among the Pashtuns and the hatred of Pashtuns who are perceived as collaborating with non-Muslim foreigners is even stronger. Moreover, the Pashtuns look upon the Arabs of Al Qaeda, now operating from sanctuaries in the North Waziristan area of Pakistan's Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), as their honoured guests and as their co-religionists, who had helped them in driving out the Soviet troops in the 1980s and who are now helping them in their fight to drive out the Americans and other NATO forces.
4. These observers have been saying that the intensifying violence in Afghanistan and the inability of the US-led forces to control it are due to the sanctuaries available to Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban in Pakistani territory and the inability or relcutance of the Pakistan Army to destroy these sanctuaries. While the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda in North Waziristan and of the Taliban in South Waziristan are being repeatedly attacked by the unmanned Predator aircraft of the US intelligence community, those of the Taliban in the Quetta area of Balochistan have largely been left untouched with neither the Pakistan Army nor the American Predator aircraft targeting them. These observers are of the view that unless these sanctuaries are destroyed no amount of surge and local militias will help.
5. The current operations of the Pakistan Army in the Bajaur Agency of the FATA and the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) are mainly targeting the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which poses a threat to Pakistan and not the Afghan Taliban, headed by the Quetta-based Mulla Mohammad Omar, which the Pakistan Army continues to perceive as its strategic ally. While the Pakistan Army has reduced the scale of its operations in the Bajaur Agency and its presence in South Waziristan, where Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the TTP is based, in order to re-deploy the troops thus relieved on the Indian border particularly in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), its operations against the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), headed by Maulana Fazlullah, in the Swat Valley have not so far been reduced.
6. While the Mehsuds and the Ahmedzai Wazirs of South Waziristan, who were in the forefront of the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir in 1947-48 and in 1965, have informally agreed not to take advantage of the thinning out of the Pakistani forces in these areas, the Pakistan Army has not yet been able to reach a similar informal agreement with the TNSM, despite the fact that it is a component of the TTP. Moreover, the Pakistan Army is prepared to face the risk of a temporary dilution of the Pakistani writ in the Bajaur Agency and South Waziristan if the Mehsuds and the Ahmedzai Wazirs do not keep up their informal agreement not to create problems for the Army and the Frontier Corps.
7. It is not prepared to face a similar risk in the Swat Valley, which it sees as important for maintaining its writ in the NWFP. It is concerned over the recent increase in the activities of the Pakistani Taliban in Peshawar and is determined not to allow the TNSM undermine the Government position in the NWFP. The operations against the TNSM in the Swat Valley, which started in November,2007, have been continuing for over a year now without the Army and the Frontier Corps being able to make any headway in neutralising the TNSM. Even long before the Pakistan Army thinned out its presence in the FATA in the wake of the tensions with India after the terrorist attack by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET)----acting alone or in association with Al Qaeda--- in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, it was facing difficulty in reinforcing its presence in the Swat Valley.
8. Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), borrowed some of the Iraqi ideas of Gen.Petraeus even before the latter assumed command of the US Central Command. He set up in some villages of the Swat Valley as well as the FATA people's militias called Lashkars, which were trained and armed to counter the Sunni forces of the TNSM and the Pakistani Taliban. A large number of Shia Pashtuns were recruited by Kayani into these Lashkars and they were given the task of countering the TNSM and the TTP. The Sunnis of the Pakistani Taliban retaliated with vigour against these Lashkars and killed a large number of them.
9.In October, 82 persons were killed and 241 injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up in a grand Jirga held at Khadizai area of the predominantly Shia Alikhel sub-tribe of the Pashtuns. The Jirga was specially convened to form a tribal Lashkar against the Taliban.
10.Thirty-two people were killed and over 120 others injured in a blast just outside a Shia Imambargah called Alamdar in Koocha-e-Risaldar, located behind the historic Qissa Khwani Bazaar, in the Peshawar area on December 5,2008. A vehicle driven by a suicide bomber destroyed a multi-storey hotel, a girls’ school, and dozens of shops selling crockery and plastic-wares.
11.On December 7,2008, the Afghan Islamic Press disseminated a message purported to have been issued by Mulla Omar, which warned the US as follows in response to the reported new strategy of Petraeus without, however, naming him: “Today the world’s economy is facing growing risk from meltdown owing to the belligerent and expansionist policies of US. This has left its negative impact on the globe and it is the collective duty of all to work for a lasting peace in the world. You should understand that no puppet regime will ever stand up to the current resistance movement. Nor you will justify the occupation of the Islamic countries under the so-called slogan of rehabilitation anymore. Deployment of more troops (by the US) would lead to battles everywhere. The current armed clashes will spiral and your current casualties of hundreds will jack up to thousands.The US has imposed the war on the Afghan nation and the followers of the path of Islamic resistance will never abandon their legitimate struggle. The invading forces wrongly contemplate that they will be able to pit the Afghans against the mujahideen under the so-called label of tribal militias. No Afghan will play into the hands of the aliens and fight against his own brothers for worldly pleasure.”
12.On December 13,2008,Pir Samiullah, who had formed one of the Lashkars at the request of the Army, and eight of his followers were killed by the TNSM in Swat . The TNSM members captured over 50 AK-47 rifles with ammunition and two rocket launchers issued to the Lashkar by the Pakistan Army
13.Over 40 persons, many of them Shias, including two policemen and four children, were killed and 20 others injured when a suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden car into a polling station set up in a school in Shalbandai village, located about six kilometres south of the Buner district headquarters, Daggar, on December 28,2008.The Swat chapter of the TTP has claimed responsibility for the attack.Speaking on the group’s illegal FM radio channel, TTP Swat chapter Deputy Head Maulana Shah Dauran said the bombing was in retaliation for the death of six TTP members gunned down in Shalbandai by a local Lashkar set up by the Army.He warned that the revenge wasn’t yet over and that every person in Shalbandai would be eliminated for killing the Taliban members.
14. In addition to stepping up the attacks on the Lashkars, the TTP has also embarked on a programme of disrupting the movement of supplies to the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan from the Karachi port.About 150 containers go to Afghanistan from Karachi every day. A majority of these containers crosses the Torkham border in the NWFP into Afghanistan while others take the Chaman route in Balochistan. In addition to this, about 150 to 200 oil tankers transport fuel from Karachi to Afghanistan via Torkham every day.About 100 tankers carry fuel through the Chaman border post.Around 300 vehicles and containers have been burnt in six attacks since December 1. The TTP has projected these attacks as in retaliation for the Predator strikes on the TTP hide-outs in South Waziristan.
15. Concerned over the attacks, US and other NATO officials have reportedly been negotiating with the authorities of Russia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for alternate routes to reduce their dependence on the Pakistan route. Not only the TTP, even the religious political parties of Pakistan and Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League are opposed to the movement of supplies to the NATO forces in Afghanistan through Pakistani territory.
16. The TTP, which has till now been attacking the trucks and tankers only after they reach Peshawar, has warned that if the Predator strikes do not stop it will start attacking the supplies everywhere in Pakistan. This would include at the Karachi port itself as the supplies are brought by ships. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Group (IMG), a splinter group of the IMU, are also likely to attack the supply convoys in Central Asia when the US starts using the alternate routes. (29-12-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Gen.David Petraeus, the Commander of the US Central Command, who previously headed the US forces in Iraq, was credited with bringing down the level of violence in Iraq and weakening the capability of Al Qaeda in Iraq by creating a divide between the secular Baathist Arabs of Saddam Hussein's army and local administration and the Wahabi Arabs of Al Qaeda by strengthening various local militias with names such as the Awakening Councils, which had come into existence even before he took over in Iraq.
2. When he was appointed by President George Bush to be the head of the Central Command, which, inter alia, is responsible for the US operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and in the bordering Pashtun areas of Pakistan, he was reported to have set up a brains trust to advise him on a new strategy to be followed against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. While the new strategy is still being worked out, some elements of it are already in the process of being implemented.
3. These include a planned surge in the US forces in Afghanistan in the coming months by inducting another 30,000 troops and the setting up of local militias, which would work on the pattern of the Awakening Councils in Iraq. Many Afghan observers have been expressing doubts whether Petraeus' ideas would work in Afghanistan. The Pashtun society---particularly in Afghanistan--- is different from the Iraqi society. Hatred of non-Muslim foreigners is very strong among the Pashtuns and the hatred of Pashtuns who are perceived as collaborating with non-Muslim foreigners is even stronger. Moreover, the Pashtuns look upon the Arabs of Al Qaeda, now operating from sanctuaries in the North Waziristan area of Pakistan's Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), as their honoured guests and as their co-religionists, who had helped them in driving out the Soviet troops in the 1980s and who are now helping them in their fight to drive out the Americans and other NATO forces.
4. These observers have been saying that the intensifying violence in Afghanistan and the inability of the US-led forces to control it are due to the sanctuaries available to Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban in Pakistani territory and the inability or relcutance of the Pakistan Army to destroy these sanctuaries. While the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda in North Waziristan and of the Taliban in South Waziristan are being repeatedly attacked by the unmanned Predator aircraft of the US intelligence community, those of the Taliban in the Quetta area of Balochistan have largely been left untouched with neither the Pakistan Army nor the American Predator aircraft targeting them. These observers are of the view that unless these sanctuaries are destroyed no amount of surge and local militias will help.
5. The current operations of the Pakistan Army in the Bajaur Agency of the FATA and the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) are mainly targeting the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which poses a threat to Pakistan and not the Afghan Taliban, headed by the Quetta-based Mulla Mohammad Omar, which the Pakistan Army continues to perceive as its strategic ally. While the Pakistan Army has reduced the scale of its operations in the Bajaur Agency and its presence in South Waziristan, where Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the TTP is based, in order to re-deploy the troops thus relieved on the Indian border particularly in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), its operations against the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), headed by Maulana Fazlullah, in the Swat Valley have not so far been reduced.
6. While the Mehsuds and the Ahmedzai Wazirs of South Waziristan, who were in the forefront of the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir in 1947-48 and in 1965, have informally agreed not to take advantage of the thinning out of the Pakistani forces in these areas, the Pakistan Army has not yet been able to reach a similar informal agreement with the TNSM, despite the fact that it is a component of the TTP. Moreover, the Pakistan Army is prepared to face the risk of a temporary dilution of the Pakistani writ in the Bajaur Agency and South Waziristan if the Mehsuds and the Ahmedzai Wazirs do not keep up their informal agreement not to create problems for the Army and the Frontier Corps.
7. It is not prepared to face a similar risk in the Swat Valley, which it sees as important for maintaining its writ in the NWFP. It is concerned over the recent increase in the activities of the Pakistani Taliban in Peshawar and is determined not to allow the TNSM undermine the Government position in the NWFP. The operations against the TNSM in the Swat Valley, which started in November,2007, have been continuing for over a year now without the Army and the Frontier Corps being able to make any headway in neutralising the TNSM. Even long before the Pakistan Army thinned out its presence in the FATA in the wake of the tensions with India after the terrorist attack by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET)----acting alone or in association with Al Qaeda--- in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, it was facing difficulty in reinforcing its presence in the Swat Valley.
8. Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), borrowed some of the Iraqi ideas of Gen.Petraeus even before the latter assumed command of the US Central Command. He set up in some villages of the Swat Valley as well as the FATA people's militias called Lashkars, which were trained and armed to counter the Sunni forces of the TNSM and the Pakistani Taliban. A large number of Shia Pashtuns were recruited by Kayani into these Lashkars and they were given the task of countering the TNSM and the TTP. The Sunnis of the Pakistani Taliban retaliated with vigour against these Lashkars and killed a large number of them.
9.In October, 82 persons were killed and 241 injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up in a grand Jirga held at Khadizai area of the predominantly Shia Alikhel sub-tribe of the Pashtuns. The Jirga was specially convened to form a tribal Lashkar against the Taliban.
10.Thirty-two people were killed and over 120 others injured in a blast just outside a Shia Imambargah called Alamdar in Koocha-e-Risaldar, located behind the historic Qissa Khwani Bazaar, in the Peshawar area on December 5,2008. A vehicle driven by a suicide bomber destroyed a multi-storey hotel, a girls’ school, and dozens of shops selling crockery and plastic-wares.
11.On December 7,2008, the Afghan Islamic Press disseminated a message purported to have been issued by Mulla Omar, which warned the US as follows in response to the reported new strategy of Petraeus without, however, naming him: “Today the world’s economy is facing growing risk from meltdown owing to the belligerent and expansionist policies of US. This has left its negative impact on the globe and it is the collective duty of all to work for a lasting peace in the world. You should understand that no puppet regime will ever stand up to the current resistance movement. Nor you will justify the occupation of the Islamic countries under the so-called slogan of rehabilitation anymore. Deployment of more troops (by the US) would lead to battles everywhere. The current armed clashes will spiral and your current casualties of hundreds will jack up to thousands.The US has imposed the war on the Afghan nation and the followers of the path of Islamic resistance will never abandon their legitimate struggle. The invading forces wrongly contemplate that they will be able to pit the Afghans against the mujahideen under the so-called label of tribal militias. No Afghan will play into the hands of the aliens and fight against his own brothers for worldly pleasure.”
12.On December 13,2008,Pir Samiullah, who had formed one of the Lashkars at the request of the Army, and eight of his followers were killed by the TNSM in Swat . The TNSM members captured over 50 AK-47 rifles with ammunition and two rocket launchers issued to the Lashkar by the Pakistan Army
13.Over 40 persons, many of them Shias, including two policemen and four children, were killed and 20 others injured when a suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden car into a polling station set up in a school in Shalbandai village, located about six kilometres south of the Buner district headquarters, Daggar, on December 28,2008.The Swat chapter of the TTP has claimed responsibility for the attack.Speaking on the group’s illegal FM radio channel, TTP Swat chapter Deputy Head Maulana Shah Dauran said the bombing was in retaliation for the death of six TTP members gunned down in Shalbandai by a local Lashkar set up by the Army.He warned that the revenge wasn’t yet over and that every person in Shalbandai would be eliminated for killing the Taliban members.
14. In addition to stepping up the attacks on the Lashkars, the TTP has also embarked on a programme of disrupting the movement of supplies to the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan from the Karachi port.About 150 containers go to Afghanistan from Karachi every day. A majority of these containers crosses the Torkham border in the NWFP into Afghanistan while others take the Chaman route in Balochistan. In addition to this, about 150 to 200 oil tankers transport fuel from Karachi to Afghanistan via Torkham every day.About 100 tankers carry fuel through the Chaman border post.Around 300 vehicles and containers have been burnt in six attacks since December 1. The TTP has projected these attacks as in retaliation for the Predator strikes on the TTP hide-outs in South Waziristan.
15. Concerned over the attacks, US and other NATO officials have reportedly been negotiating with the authorities of Russia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for alternate routes to reduce their dependence on the Pakistan route. Not only the TTP, even the religious political parties of Pakistan and Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League are opposed to the movement of supplies to the NATO forces in Afghanistan through Pakistani territory.
16. The TTP, which has till now been attacking the trucks and tankers only after they reach Peshawar, has warned that if the Predator strikes do not stop it will start attacking the supplies everywhere in Pakistan. This would include at the Karachi port itself as the supplies are brought by ships. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Group (IMG), a splinter group of the IMU, are also likely to attack the supply convoys in Central Asia when the US starts using the alternate routes. (29-12-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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