INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.745
B.RAMAN
The second Nuclear Security Summit currently being held in Seoul, South Korea, would make a fresh evaluation , inter alia, of the security of nuclear materials in the possession of many countries.
2. Threats to nuclear security arise from two factors--- accidents in nuclear establishments arising from natural or man-made causes and illegal acquisitions of nuclear materials and technology by State as well as non-State actors.
3. While there is a laid down and frequently tested drill for coping with nuclear accidents, preventive and protective measures to prevent the illegal acquisition of nuclear materials and know-how by State and non-State actors have not been satisfactory.
4.While Pakistan and North Korea are two instances of State actors illegally acquiring nuclear capability, Iran is threatening to join their ranks as a result of past complicity of Pakistan and North Korea.
5. Fears of non-State actors clandestinely acquiring nuclear materials and technology acquired a new dimension in the late 1990s after the famous interviews given by Osama bin Laden to US journalists from Kandahar, where he was then based, justifying the right of Muslims to acquire a nuclear weapon and to use it, if necessary, to protect Islam.
6. Since then fears of Pakistan‘s Islamic bomb, as it is referred to by Pakistani Islamic fundamentalist organisations, being transformed into a jihadi bomb in the hands of Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been preoccupying the minds of nuclear security experts. These fears were aggravated after the US troops which defeated the Taliban after 9/11 unearthed evidence to show that Sultan Bashiruddin and Abdul Majid, two retired nuclear scientists of Pakistan, were in touch with OBL and had visited him in Kandahar. The two were arrested by the Pakistanis and interrogated by the Americans.
7. The interrogation did not unearth any incriminating evidence against them. Despite this, the fact that two Pakistani nuclear scientists, who had occupied important positions in its nuclear establishments, were in contact with OBL, showed that jihadi and other terrorist organisations might be able acquire a nuclear capability not only through theft or other illegal means, but also by the complicity of the personnel of Pakistan’s nuclear establishments. This fear would now extend to the personnel of Iran’s nuclear establishments. In the case of North Korea, the dangers of non-State actors getting hold of its capability are not rated high.
8.The death of OBL on May 2 last year has not removed or diluted the threat of jihadi terrorist organisations acquiring a nuclear capability. True, there has been no statement from Al Qaeda or its associates or their leaders after the initial statements of OBL in the 1990s, about the right of the Muslims to acquire a nuclear capability.
9. The absence of statements on this subject by jihadi leaders and their organisations cannot and should not be interpreted as indicating that these organisations and their present leaders did not attach the same priority to this jihadi task as OBL did.
10. Al Qaeda has definitely suffered a set-back as a result of the death of OBL and other leaders in the Af-Pak region and Yemen due to special operations undertaken by the US. Despite the decimation of its leadership, its GenNext continues to show a high level of motivation as was seen by the recent terrorist incidents in France. There has been a geographic spread of its activities.
11. The threat from Al Qaeda and its affiliates and the dangers of their acquiring a nuclear capability have to be factored into in any security planning for nuclear establishments and personnel. The discussions in conferences such as the first Nuclear Security Summit in Washington and the present one in Seoul focus on physical security measures to prevent acquisitions through thefts and other illegal means.
12. With countries such as Pakistan participating in their deliberations, it would not be possible for them to have any meaningful discussions to prevent acquisition of nuclear capability by terrorist organisations through the complicity of personnel in nuclear establishments. This is a matter that has to be discussed in more restricted meetings of experts of intelligence agencies from India, the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Russia and the EU countries. This would require a high level of HUMINT and TECHINT capability, joint operations to collect intelligence and arrangements for sharing and analysing the collected intelligence. India should take the leadership in working for such a mechanism if it has not already done so. (27-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Tuesday, March 27, 2012
Monday, March 26, 2012
A CASUAL, NON-SERIOUS HANDLING OF A CASE OF ATTEMPTED BRIBERY OF COAS
B.RAMAN
The disclosure made by Gen.V.K.Singh, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), in an interview to “The Hindu” ( March 26,2012) that he had refused an offer of a bribe of Rs.14 crores in connection with a commercial transaction relating to the purchase of vehicles for the Army some months ago and that he had reported it to Shri A.K.Antony, the Defence Minister, if correct, raises serious questions regarding the way corruption allegations are handled in the Government of India. Subsequent reports have alleged that the bribe was offered by a senior retired officer of the Army.
2. As per the normal procedures, the COAS should have immediately taken the following action:
( a ). Report the matter to the Minister.
( b ). Address a formal Demi-official letter to the Minister in confirmation of what he had reported orally and requesting for an enquiry.
( c ).Call from his office the file relating to this transaction and record a note that he (the COAS) was offered a bribe by a retired Army officer which he refused and that he had reported it to the Defence Minister orally and in writing and asked for an enquiry.
( d ). Address a note to his office that the retired Army officer who offered the bribe should not be issued a security pass in future to visit Army offices and that action should be initiated for suspending his pension payments till the final outcome of the enquiry.
3. Apart from orally reporting to the Defence Minister, the COAS does not appear to have taken any other action as expected under the normal office procedures when there is an attempted bribery. His disclosing the incident now in a media interview would naturally give rise to a strong suspicion that his belated disclosure two months before the end of the controversial final months of his career because of his differences with the MOD regarding his date of birth must have been motivated with a personal agenda.
4. When the COAS orally reported the matter to him, the Defence Minister should have immediately taken the following action:
( a ). Record a formal note in the relevant file of his office regarding the disclosure of the COAS and stating that he was ordering the Defence Secretary to refer the matter to the Director, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), for a Preliminary Enquiry ( PE) to be followed by a formal investigation if found correct.
( b ) Address a formal DO letter to the Defence Secretary with copies to the Cabinet Secretary and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister to refer the matter to the CBI for a PE.
5. The Defence Minister does not appear to have taken any of these actions. This related to a case of attempted bribery in an office of the Government of India. It did not require the concurrence of any State Government or any other authority for ordering a PE by the CBI. The Minister was competent to do so and should have done so.
6. There have been serious acts of omission by the COAS as well as by the Defence Minister and these amount to a serious case of dereliction of duty. Before the controversy gets dirtier due to allegations and counter-allegations and suspicions and counter-suspicions, the Prime Minister should ask the Cabinet Secretary to take over the responsibility for further enquiries to establish the truth. (27-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The disclosure made by Gen.V.K.Singh, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), in an interview to “The Hindu” ( March 26,2012) that he had refused an offer of a bribe of Rs.14 crores in connection with a commercial transaction relating to the purchase of vehicles for the Army some months ago and that he had reported it to Shri A.K.Antony, the Defence Minister, if correct, raises serious questions regarding the way corruption allegations are handled in the Government of India. Subsequent reports have alleged that the bribe was offered by a senior retired officer of the Army.
2. As per the normal procedures, the COAS should have immediately taken the following action:
( a ). Report the matter to the Minister.
( b ). Address a formal Demi-official letter to the Minister in confirmation of what he had reported orally and requesting for an enquiry.
( c ).Call from his office the file relating to this transaction and record a note that he (the COAS) was offered a bribe by a retired Army officer which he refused and that he had reported it to the Defence Minister orally and in writing and asked for an enquiry.
( d ). Address a note to his office that the retired Army officer who offered the bribe should not be issued a security pass in future to visit Army offices and that action should be initiated for suspending his pension payments till the final outcome of the enquiry.
3. Apart from orally reporting to the Defence Minister, the COAS does not appear to have taken any other action as expected under the normal office procedures when there is an attempted bribery. His disclosing the incident now in a media interview would naturally give rise to a strong suspicion that his belated disclosure two months before the end of the controversial final months of his career because of his differences with the MOD regarding his date of birth must have been motivated with a personal agenda.
4. When the COAS orally reported the matter to him, the Defence Minister should have immediately taken the following action:
( a ). Record a formal note in the relevant file of his office regarding the disclosure of the COAS and stating that he was ordering the Defence Secretary to refer the matter to the Director, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), for a Preliminary Enquiry ( PE) to be followed by a formal investigation if found correct.
( b ) Address a formal DO letter to the Defence Secretary with copies to the Cabinet Secretary and the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister to refer the matter to the CBI for a PE.
5. The Defence Minister does not appear to have taken any of these actions. This related to a case of attempted bribery in an office of the Government of India. It did not require the concurrence of any State Government or any other authority for ordering a PE by the CBI. The Minister was competent to do so and should have done so.
6. There have been serious acts of omission by the COAS as well as by the Defence Minister and these amount to a serious case of dereliction of duty. Before the controversy gets dirtier due to allegations and counter-allegations and suspicions and counter-suspicions, the Prime Minister should ask the Cabinet Secretary to take over the responsibility for further enquiries to establish the truth. (27-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, March 25, 2012
CHINA: REAL WORLD VS VIRTUAL WORLD
B.RAMAN
Beijing seems as normal as ever. Widespread rumours disseminated by Chinese microblogs about a tussle for power and even an attempted coup after the March 15,2012, sacking of Bo Xilai , an informal, easily accessible and populist party functionary from his post of Party chief of Southwest China's Chongqing Municipality, have proved false.
2. According to some of these rumours, Bo enjoyed the support of Zhou Yongkang, the ninth-ranking member of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau of the Communist Party of China, who has been the head of the Party's powerful Political and Legal Affairs Committee, which oversees police and judicial matters, since 2007.
3.These rumours even alleged that there was an attempted coup by elements in the Ministry of Public Security associated with Zhou Yongkang and speculated that Zhou might also be on the way out.
4.These rumours spread by China’s 300 million strong Netizen community have proved false. Things have been normal in Beijing. President Hu Jintao arrived in Seoul on the afternoon of March 25 to attend the nuclear security summit and he is going ahead with his plans to visit New Delhi the coming week to attend the BRIC summit and to pay a bilateral visit to Cambodia. The Chinese have not suggested any changes in the programmes of foreign visitors to Beijing. Vice President Xi Jinping, who is expected to take over from Hu later this year, met former Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio in Beijing, on March 23.
5. Even Zhou, who has been in the centre of these rumours, has been visible and functioning normally. The State-owned Xinhua news agency disseminated on March 22, a letter reported to have been written by Zhou to a conference of police and public security officials stressing the importance of better interactions between law enforcement officials and the public in order to improve their public image.
6. In the meanwhile, Radio Free Asia, funded by the US State Department, has disseminated a report that over 3000 police and public security officials from the provinces have been called to Beijing to attend a re-training programme starting on March 26. The significance of this retraining programme is not clear. Is this connected to the removal of Bo, whose No 2 and police chief, had allegedly made an unsuccessful attempt to seek asylum in the US Consulate in Chengdu?
7. While the rumours have proved to be false, the fact that the rumours spread so fast and so widely should be a matter of concern to the Chinese leaders. This shows that anti-State and anti-Government elements have a capability for causing instability through orchestrated disinformation through the Net.
8. China’s real world seems to be normal, but not its virtual world which is being skilfully used by anti-State elements to create confusion. ( 25-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Beijing seems as normal as ever. Widespread rumours disseminated by Chinese microblogs about a tussle for power and even an attempted coup after the March 15,2012, sacking of Bo Xilai , an informal, easily accessible and populist party functionary from his post of Party chief of Southwest China's Chongqing Municipality, have proved false.
2. According to some of these rumours, Bo enjoyed the support of Zhou Yongkang, the ninth-ranking member of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau of the Communist Party of China, who has been the head of the Party's powerful Political and Legal Affairs Committee, which oversees police and judicial matters, since 2007.
3.These rumours even alleged that there was an attempted coup by elements in the Ministry of Public Security associated with Zhou Yongkang and speculated that Zhou might also be on the way out.
4.These rumours spread by China’s 300 million strong Netizen community have proved false. Things have been normal in Beijing. President Hu Jintao arrived in Seoul on the afternoon of March 25 to attend the nuclear security summit and he is going ahead with his plans to visit New Delhi the coming week to attend the BRIC summit and to pay a bilateral visit to Cambodia. The Chinese have not suggested any changes in the programmes of foreign visitors to Beijing. Vice President Xi Jinping, who is expected to take over from Hu later this year, met former Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio in Beijing, on March 23.
5. Even Zhou, who has been in the centre of these rumours, has been visible and functioning normally. The State-owned Xinhua news agency disseminated on March 22, a letter reported to have been written by Zhou to a conference of police and public security officials stressing the importance of better interactions between law enforcement officials and the public in order to improve their public image.
6. In the meanwhile, Radio Free Asia, funded by the US State Department, has disseminated a report that over 3000 police and public security officials from the provinces have been called to Beijing to attend a re-training programme starting on March 26. The significance of this retraining programme is not clear. Is this connected to the removal of Bo, whose No 2 and police chief, had allegedly made an unsuccessful attempt to seek asylum in the US Consulate in Chengdu?
7. While the rumours have proved to be false, the fact that the rumours spread so fast and so widely should be a matter of concern to the Chinese leaders. This shows that anti-State and anti-Government elements have a capability for causing instability through orchestrated disinformation through the Net.
8. China’s real world seems to be normal, but not its virtual world which is being skilfully used by anti-State elements to create confusion. ( 25-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, March 24, 2012
A CHINESE COMMENT
I have received the following comment from a Chinese analyst:
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About your " India’s Evolving China Policy "
Crossed to your article from internet and wanted to say something to share with you.
First of all, your view is fairly in a matter-of-fact way, which opens up the door for others to comment and discuss further. Not like you, I don't have much influence in China policy making process. But many of common Chinese have similar thinking as mine in that India and China have a lot in common. Only the border dispute has been causing two counties some troubles and such tension will not to go away any time soon, look like. But this shouldn't stop the two countries from keeping a close relation and work together rather than seeing each other as the main threat and enemy. Like I and many of my India friends, if we don't touch such sensitive topic, we can stay together and work together fine. Then what's the solution for this sensitive border dispute? Both India and China are stakeholders who have interests in this field. This should be treated in a business-like manor and both parties share the ownership, invest to it and share
the profit out of this investment. Thinking about eliminating the heavy arm buildup in this region, the cost saving from this along will be very significant to both parties. Hope the policy makers from both India and China have the same view.
I'd like to ready your new articles on such topic in the future. Send me a copy if you have a new one next time. Thank you very much.
----------------------------------
About your " India’s Evolving China Policy "
Crossed to your article from internet and wanted to say something to share with you.
First of all, your view is fairly in a matter-of-fact way, which opens up the door for others to comment and discuss further. Not like you, I don't have much influence in China policy making process. But many of common Chinese have similar thinking as mine in that India and China have a lot in common. Only the border dispute has been causing two counties some troubles and such tension will not to go away any time soon, look like. But this shouldn't stop the two countries from keeping a close relation and work together rather than seeing each other as the main threat and enemy. Like I and many of my India friends, if we don't touch such sensitive topic, we can stay together and work together fine. Then what's the solution for this sensitive border dispute? Both India and China are stakeholders who have interests in this field. This should be treated in a business-like manor and both parties share the ownership, invest to it and share
the profit out of this investment. Thinking about eliminating the heavy arm buildup in this region, the cost saving from this along will be very significant to both parties. Hope the policy makers from both India and China have the same view.
I'd like to ready your new articles on such topic in the future. Send me a copy if you have a new one next time. Thank you very much.
SRI LANKA: MOVING FORWARD
B.RAMAN
The unhappiness in Sri Lanka over the Indian vote in favour of the resolution in the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on the question of the human rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils ---action in respect of past violations during the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations against the LTTE and to safeguard their human rights in future in the form of a political solution to the grievances and aspirations of the Tamils--- is understandable.
2. This unhappiness is unlikely to turn into bitterness. Even in the past, the Sinhalese were unhappy over what they perceived as the Indian support to the LTTE in the years before its assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991. This unhappiness never turned into bitterness and hatred for India.
3. Anyone who knows Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese well would be aware of their genuine goodwill for India. There were instances in the past when Sri Lankan Governments had taken steps which were detrimental to Indian interests. A typical example was before the 1971 India-Pakistan war when they allowed Pakistani Air Force planes carrying men and supplies to East Pakistan to refuel in Sri Lankan airports. When Indira Gandhi strongly objected to this, they discontinued it.
4. Their anger and unhappiness against India tend to remain ephemeral. Despite their best or worst efforts, neither China nor Pakistan has ever been able to create a permanent estrangement between India and Sri Lanka. There are historic, cultural and religious bonds between the Indians and the Sri Lankans. These are natural and evolved over hundreds of years. No synthetic bonds of Sri Lanka with China or Pakistan, created during moments of unhappiness and opportunism, can replace the natural bonds between India and Sri Lanka.
5. I do not rate highly the dangers of Sri Lanka throwing itself into the arms of China or Pakistan to spite India for its vote against it in Geneva. When the unhappiness subsides---as it is likely to--- Sri Lanka will realise that the Indian role in Geneva was more nuanced with considerable empathy for it. India stood in the way of the undoubted Human Rights violations being equated with war crimes. We equally stood in the way of a Human Rights Diktat to Sri Lanka by the US and other Western powers.
6. The resolution was neither a reprimand nor a rebuke. It was an expression of concern over the evasive attitude of the Government of Mahinda Rajapaksa on the question of action against those who committed serious Human Rights violations in the final stages of the anti-LTTE operations. India was as much concerned over this evasion as the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Western powers. India chose to give expression to these concerns bilaterally during political and diplomatic interactions with the Sri Lankan leaders and officials. Since the Rajapaksa Government chose to literally ignore the bilateral expression of these concerns, the Government of India found itself with no other option but to join in a multilateral expression of concern in Geneva.
7.Initially, I was not in favour of India joining the US-led exercise in Geneva to take a more assertive position against the evasive attitude of the Rajapaksa Government. But, after seeing the way the Government of India played a moderating role in Geneva in making the resolution a reasonable and not authoritarian expression of concerns, I do praise the delicate Indian diplomacy.
8. We do not have to be worried about the Chinese grand-standing at Geneva. The vigorous Chinese opposition was dictated not by a profusion of grief and tears for Sri Lanka, but by fears of what could happen if the international focus turns to the continued Chinese violations of the Human Rights of the Tibetans and the Uighurs. It goes to our credit that we did not allow fears of similar allegations against our counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations to restrain the expression of our concerns over the violations of the Human Rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils. There was less political hypocrisy in our stand as compared to that of China.
9. India too has reasons to be unhappy with the Rajapaksa Government for trying to wriggle out of its commitments to the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Government of India to find a political solution to the grievances and aspirations of the Tamils. After having prevailed against the LTTE with considerable Indian help, it has deplorably gone back on its commitments. If it continues to follow on the path of evasion and tries to impose a dictated solution on the Tamils, India has to act tough. I said so recently before the Geneva vote and I say so again. ( 25-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The unhappiness in Sri Lanka over the Indian vote in favour of the resolution in the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on the question of the human rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils ---action in respect of past violations during the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations against the LTTE and to safeguard their human rights in future in the form of a political solution to the grievances and aspirations of the Tamils--- is understandable.
2. This unhappiness is unlikely to turn into bitterness. Even in the past, the Sinhalese were unhappy over what they perceived as the Indian support to the LTTE in the years before its assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991. This unhappiness never turned into bitterness and hatred for India.
3. Anyone who knows Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese well would be aware of their genuine goodwill for India. There were instances in the past when Sri Lankan Governments had taken steps which were detrimental to Indian interests. A typical example was before the 1971 India-Pakistan war when they allowed Pakistani Air Force planes carrying men and supplies to East Pakistan to refuel in Sri Lankan airports. When Indira Gandhi strongly objected to this, they discontinued it.
4. Their anger and unhappiness against India tend to remain ephemeral. Despite their best or worst efforts, neither China nor Pakistan has ever been able to create a permanent estrangement between India and Sri Lanka. There are historic, cultural and religious bonds between the Indians and the Sri Lankans. These are natural and evolved over hundreds of years. No synthetic bonds of Sri Lanka with China or Pakistan, created during moments of unhappiness and opportunism, can replace the natural bonds between India and Sri Lanka.
5. I do not rate highly the dangers of Sri Lanka throwing itself into the arms of China or Pakistan to spite India for its vote against it in Geneva. When the unhappiness subsides---as it is likely to--- Sri Lanka will realise that the Indian role in Geneva was more nuanced with considerable empathy for it. India stood in the way of the undoubted Human Rights violations being equated with war crimes. We equally stood in the way of a Human Rights Diktat to Sri Lanka by the US and other Western powers.
6. The resolution was neither a reprimand nor a rebuke. It was an expression of concern over the evasive attitude of the Government of Mahinda Rajapaksa on the question of action against those who committed serious Human Rights violations in the final stages of the anti-LTTE operations. India was as much concerned over this evasion as the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Western powers. India chose to give expression to these concerns bilaterally during political and diplomatic interactions with the Sri Lankan leaders and officials. Since the Rajapaksa Government chose to literally ignore the bilateral expression of these concerns, the Government of India found itself with no other option but to join in a multilateral expression of concern in Geneva.
7.Initially, I was not in favour of India joining the US-led exercise in Geneva to take a more assertive position against the evasive attitude of the Rajapaksa Government. But, after seeing the way the Government of India played a moderating role in Geneva in making the resolution a reasonable and not authoritarian expression of concerns, I do praise the delicate Indian diplomacy.
8. We do not have to be worried about the Chinese grand-standing at Geneva. The vigorous Chinese opposition was dictated not by a profusion of grief and tears for Sri Lanka, but by fears of what could happen if the international focus turns to the continued Chinese violations of the Human Rights of the Tibetans and the Uighurs. It goes to our credit that we did not allow fears of similar allegations against our counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations to restrain the expression of our concerns over the violations of the Human Rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils. There was less political hypocrisy in our stand as compared to that of China.
9. India too has reasons to be unhappy with the Rajapaksa Government for trying to wriggle out of its commitments to the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Government of India to find a political solution to the grievances and aspirations of the Tamils. After having prevailed against the LTTE with considerable Indian help, it has deplorably gone back on its commitments. If it continues to follow on the path of evasion and tries to impose a dictated solution on the Tamils, India has to act tough. I said so recently before the Geneva vote and I say so again. ( 25-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, March 17, 2012
MY ARTICLE ON BO XINLAI: A DIFFERENT VIEW
i HAVE BEEN IN RECEIPT OF THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FROM AN AUSTRALIAN ANALYST ON MY ARTICLE ON THE FALL OF BO XINLAI
"Your portrait of Bo is the one-sided flattering version cultivated by him and which is swallowed by the netizen community. Bo was a charismatic but ruthless politician whose pursuit of "mafia" figures was carried out with considerable excesses. Some would argue that Bo sought, in doing so, to entrench himself as the paramount leader in Chongqing. His assiduous courting of the digital media and his public warfare against the mafia made his Party colleagues uneasy. Bo's family however brazenly wore the trappings of power - his son drove a Ferrari - suggesting that Bo himself was not the uncompromising moral crusader he made himself out to be.
"The Party leadership has never been comfortable with those who aspired to high office through high profile, public campaigns as these risked the collective, consensus-moded and cautious Party approach they favoured. The abortive attempt by the Police Chief to seek asylum at the US consulate was seen by Beijing as symptomatic of Bo's inability to manage the situation - regardless of the circumstances, this was a highly public and humiliating outcome. Whilst Bo was busily mounting his anti-corruption rhetoric, the detained Chief made a series of allegations (unfounded or not) against Bo that provided his Party detractors with the weapon to remove a person whose pathway to the highest Party positions was increasingly perceived as being based on building public opinion rather than on the Party's favoured internal consultative mechanisms."
"Your portrait of Bo is the one-sided flattering version cultivated by him and which is swallowed by the netizen community. Bo was a charismatic but ruthless politician whose pursuit of "mafia" figures was carried out with considerable excesses. Some would argue that Bo sought, in doing so, to entrench himself as the paramount leader in Chongqing. His assiduous courting of the digital media and his public warfare against the mafia made his Party colleagues uneasy. Bo's family however brazenly wore the trappings of power - his son drove a Ferrari - suggesting that Bo himself was not the uncompromising moral crusader he made himself out to be.
"The Party leadership has never been comfortable with those who aspired to high office through high profile, public campaigns as these risked the collective, consensus-moded and cautious Party approach they favoured. The abortive attempt by the Police Chief to seek asylum at the US consulate was seen by Beijing as symptomatic of Bo's inability to manage the situation - regardless of the circumstances, this was a highly public and humiliating outcome. Whilst Bo was busily mounting his anti-corruption rhetoric, the detained Chief made a series of allegations (unfounded or not) against Bo that provided his Party detractors with the weapon to remove a person whose pathway to the highest Party positions was increasingly perceived as being based on building public opinion rather than on the Party's favoured internal consultative mechanisms."
BO XILAI: FALL OF AN AMBITIOUS REGIONAL PARTY FUNCTIONARY
B.RAMAN
The state-owned Xinhua News Agency of China announced on March 15,2012, shortly after the end of the annual session of the National People’s Congress, China’s Parliament, that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) has decided to remove Bo Xilai , an informal, easily accessible and populist party functionary from his post of Party chief of Southwest China's Chongqing Municipality. He continues to be in the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee.
2.Bo, born in July 1949, had earlier served as the Mayor of Dalian in the Liaoning province, and then as the Governor of Liaoning and Minister of Commerce before being appointed as the Party chief of Chongqing in 2007.
3.He has been replaced by Zhang Dejiang a native of Tai'an in the Liaoning province. Zhang has been a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee since 2002 and a Vice- premier in the State Council since 2008.
4.Between 1995 and 2007,Zhang had served as Party chief in Jilin, Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces. Both Zhang and Bo were considered protégés of Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of Hu Jintao as the President and Party General Secretary.
5.Bo Xilai is the son of Bo Yibo, one of the Eight Elders of the CCP, and was considered a steadily rising member of the CCP’s new leadership. Because of his easy accessibility and informal and relaxed style of interaction with the people, he was a popular figure in the world of China’s GenNext and particularly among the rapidly growing community of China’s Netizens. He had more admirers and followers in the virtual world than in the real world.
6.What added to his popularity was his campaign against corruption and organised crime wherever he was posted and his image of being a people-friendly party functionary, who believed that the Cultural Revolution of Mao Zedong had its positive aspect in its caring for the ordinary people, which should not be discarded. While pursuing a policy of double-digit economic growth, he attached importance to welfare schemes for the less-privileged people. He was perceived as a votary of a New Left movement in the party and as a Maoist without the embarrassing evils of Maoism which made the Cultural Revolution a hated phenomenon.
7. He did not pose a threat to the present party leadership consisting of President Hu and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Nor was he perceived as likely to pose a threat to the new leadership consisting of Vice-President Xi Jinping, who is expected to take over from President Hu later this year and Vice-Premier Li Keqiang who is tipped to take over from Prime Minister Wen before the next NPC session in March next year.
8. But, Bo was a source of increasing unease and embarrassment because of his popularity in the large community of netizens, his advocacy of people-friendly economic policies, his transparent and charismatic style of leadership which was in refreshing contrast to the old style of leadership which kept a distance from the people (barring Wen) and his praise for some aspects of Mao’s policies.
9. Easing him out could have proved counter-productive, but the embarrassing action of Bo’s No2 Wang Lijun, the police chief, in visiting the US Consulate in Chengdu allegedly in an unsuccessful attempt to seek political asylum in the US, provided the leadership with an opportunity to tar Bo and have him eased out.
10. The party has taken care not to cite the action of Wang as the immediate cause of Bo’s removal. His policy mistakes have been cited as the cause for his removal. At the same time, the Party leadership is keen that Bo’s removal is not viewed by the netizens as an attempt by the leadership to prevent political reforms. In his briefing of the media on the NPC proceedings a day before the decision to sack Bo, Wen underlined the importance of political reforms without specifying what kind of reforms he had in mind and stressed the importance of preventing another Cultural Revolution.
11. In a speech to party cadre trainees delivered on March 1 and published in the Party media on March 16,Xi, who will also be taking over as the Party Secretary from Hu, has stressed the importance of purity of thought and party unity. It was a hint to the party cadres that Bo’s (whose name was not mentioned by Xi) policies and actions threatened to distort the party’s ideology and create disunity. "To maintain the party's ideological purity is to guarantee the unity of the party," said Xi, accusing some members of "a lack or principles and corrupt behaviour which is not conducive to the purity of the party".
12. Bo did not have much of a following outside the areas where he had served. He was a competent and popular regional leader who looked upon himself as having a national stature. He was politically ambitious. His undoubted following in the community of Netizens would not have been sufficient to propel him forward on his ambitious path. By cutting his wings in time, the party leadership has sought to ensure that he will not be able to take off. ( 17-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The state-owned Xinhua News Agency of China announced on March 15,2012, shortly after the end of the annual session of the National People’s Congress, China’s Parliament, that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) has decided to remove Bo Xilai , an informal, easily accessible and populist party functionary from his post of Party chief of Southwest China's Chongqing Municipality. He continues to be in the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee.
2.Bo, born in July 1949, had earlier served as the Mayor of Dalian in the Liaoning province, and then as the Governor of Liaoning and Minister of Commerce before being appointed as the Party chief of Chongqing in 2007.
3.He has been replaced by Zhang Dejiang a native of Tai'an in the Liaoning province. Zhang has been a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee since 2002 and a Vice- premier in the State Council since 2008.
4.Between 1995 and 2007,Zhang had served as Party chief in Jilin, Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces. Both Zhang and Bo were considered protégés of Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of Hu Jintao as the President and Party General Secretary.
5.Bo Xilai is the son of Bo Yibo, one of the Eight Elders of the CCP, and was considered a steadily rising member of the CCP’s new leadership. Because of his easy accessibility and informal and relaxed style of interaction with the people, he was a popular figure in the world of China’s GenNext and particularly among the rapidly growing community of China’s Netizens. He had more admirers and followers in the virtual world than in the real world.
6.What added to his popularity was his campaign against corruption and organised crime wherever he was posted and his image of being a people-friendly party functionary, who believed that the Cultural Revolution of Mao Zedong had its positive aspect in its caring for the ordinary people, which should not be discarded. While pursuing a policy of double-digit economic growth, he attached importance to welfare schemes for the less-privileged people. He was perceived as a votary of a New Left movement in the party and as a Maoist without the embarrassing evils of Maoism which made the Cultural Revolution a hated phenomenon.
7. He did not pose a threat to the present party leadership consisting of President Hu and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao. Nor was he perceived as likely to pose a threat to the new leadership consisting of Vice-President Xi Jinping, who is expected to take over from President Hu later this year and Vice-Premier Li Keqiang who is tipped to take over from Prime Minister Wen before the next NPC session in March next year.
8. But, Bo was a source of increasing unease and embarrassment because of his popularity in the large community of netizens, his advocacy of people-friendly economic policies, his transparent and charismatic style of leadership which was in refreshing contrast to the old style of leadership which kept a distance from the people (barring Wen) and his praise for some aspects of Mao’s policies.
9. Easing him out could have proved counter-productive, but the embarrassing action of Bo’s No2 Wang Lijun, the police chief, in visiting the US Consulate in Chengdu allegedly in an unsuccessful attempt to seek political asylum in the US, provided the leadership with an opportunity to tar Bo and have him eased out.
10. The party has taken care not to cite the action of Wang as the immediate cause of Bo’s removal. His policy mistakes have been cited as the cause for his removal. At the same time, the Party leadership is keen that Bo’s removal is not viewed by the netizens as an attempt by the leadership to prevent political reforms. In his briefing of the media on the NPC proceedings a day before the decision to sack Bo, Wen underlined the importance of political reforms without specifying what kind of reforms he had in mind and stressed the importance of preventing another Cultural Revolution.
11. In a speech to party cadre trainees delivered on March 1 and published in the Party media on March 16,Xi, who will also be taking over as the Party Secretary from Hu, has stressed the importance of purity of thought and party unity. It was a hint to the party cadres that Bo’s (whose name was not mentioned by Xi) policies and actions threatened to distort the party’s ideology and create disunity. "To maintain the party's ideological purity is to guarantee the unity of the party," said Xi, accusing some members of "a lack or principles and corrupt behaviour which is not conducive to the purity of the party".
12. Bo did not have much of a following outside the areas where he had served. He was a competent and popular regional leader who looked upon himself as having a national stature. He was politically ambitious. His undoubted following in the community of Netizens would not have been sufficient to propel him forward on his ambitious path. By cutting his wings in time, the party leadership has sought to ensure that he will not be able to take off. ( 17-3-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
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