B.RAMAN
( To be read in continuation of my article of January 13,2012, titled “ a Counter-Terrorism Czar In Indian Colours” at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.in/2012/01/counter-terrorism-czar-in-indian.html )
There has been an avoidable and unfortunate controversy over the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC), which, according to the media, is to become operational from March 1,2012.
2. Going by the media reports on it, the NCTC, which is meant to co-ordinate intelligence collection, analysis and assessment and follow-up action in matters relating to terrorism, will differ from the NCTC set up in the US after 9/11 in two important respects.
3. In the US, the NCTC is an independent institution functioning under the supervision of the Director, National Intelligence (DNI). It co-ordinates the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of the various agencies of the Intelligence Community. The chiefs of the various intelligence agencies having any role in counter-terrorism do not have any powers of supervision over it. The idea of making it independent was to ensure that it would take an objective view of the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of different agencies and ensure proper-coordination. The expectation was that being an independent agency, its functioning will not be affected by inter-agency clashes and egos.
4. As per the media reports, the NCTC being set up in India will not be an independent institution. It will be part of the IB and Director, IB, will supervise its functioning. This could come in the way of an independent audit and supervision of the functioning of the counter-terrorism division of the IB. Whatever deficiencies are there presently in the exercise of the counter-terrorism functions of the IB will get duplicated and magnified instead of being identified and rectified.
5. The post-9/11 creation of the NCTC in the US was meant to strengthen the preventive capability by improving the collection, analysis and assessment of terrorism-related intelligence and effective follow-up action. The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US were attributed to inadequate intelligence and unsatisfactory follow-up action even on the intelligence that was available. The same was the case in India in respect of 26/11.
6. The NCTC in the US has no powers of arrest, interrogation, investigation and prosecution. The responsibility in these matters continues to be that of the FBI. In India, if media reports are to be believed, the NCTC has been given the powers to arrest and carry out searches under Section 43 (A) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
7.Till now, in India, these powers belong to only the National Investigation Agency (NIC) and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) at the Centre and the Police in the States. By giving these powers to the NCTC too, we are going to create confusion in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases.
8. Moreover, the IB does not have such powers. It is a clandestine organisation for the secret collection of intelligence. In all genuinely democratic countries, intelligence agencies are not given powers of arrest, searches and interrogation due to fears that such powers may be misused under pressure from the political leadership against political opponents. Only in authoritarian countries do intelligence agencies have powers of arrest and searches.
9. In India, the IB informally associates itself with all terrorism-related interrogation, but the arrests and searches are made either by the Police or by the NIA or the CBI. By creating a multiplicity of organisations having such powers and by giving these powers to the NCTC which will work under the DIB, we will be taking an unwise step which could further politicise our handling of counter-terrorism. (17-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, February 17, 2012
Thursday, February 16, 2012
COUNTER-TERRORISM: NEED TO REVISIT SECURITY PROCEDURES
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO.744
B.RAMAN
Since 2007, five Iranian nuclear scientists have been killed in Iranian territory. In some of these instances, the terrorists had attached small magnetic bombs to the exterior of the victims’ cars.
2.The latest attack took place on January 11, 2012, when Mostafa Ahamdi Roshan, described by Western sources as a Deputy Director in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, died in a blast in Tehran shortly after two assailants on a motorcycle placed a small magnetic bomb on his car.
3. It was reported by Iranian sources that the bomb was probably a shaped charge that directed all the explosive power inside the car, killing its occupants without causing any collateral damage to bystanders in the area. The explosive device was meant to kill the occupants without resulting in a blowing up of the car which could have led to a large number of casualties from the splinters of the exploding car.
4. It has been reported that Iranian investigators have been able to collect considerable details regarding this modus operandi, the kind of device used and the organisation behind these attacks from a terrorist who was caught along with the device towards the end of 2010 before he could carry out the attack. On the basis of his interrogation details of which were telecast by the Iranian TV, the Iranian security agencies have alleged that these attacks are being carried out by terrorists of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK), an anti-regime terrorist organisation, motivated, funded, trained and equipped by Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence agency.
5. From the media reports of the February 13,2012, terrorist attack at New Delhi on an Israeli diplomatic vehicle, it is apparent that it had features similar to the attacks on the vehicles of Iranian nuclear scientists--- a shaped uni-directional instantaneous explosive charge meant to kill only the occupants of the car without causing collateral damage and stuck to the rear of the car by a speeding motor-cycle borne terrorist, who managed to get away after his act.
6. This MO, meant to kill targeted individuals with an explosive device by a motor-cycle borne terrorist without killing innocent civilians, would call for a re-visit to our security procedures for the protection of high-value individual targets of terrorists.
7.Access control and prior sanitisation through anti-explosive checks are the two basic procedures followed for protecting high-value targets of terrorists. The use of a speeding motor-cycle borne terrorist to attach an explosive device to a car is meant to circumvent access control and prior sanitisation procedures.
8. The MO of using a motor-cycle borne terrorist to beat access control has been followed by terrorists in many countries, including Pakistan, for the last 30 years. In the past, terrorists using this MO used either a hand-held weapon fired by a terrorist sitting in the rear or a hand-grenade. When a hand-held weapon or a hand-grenade is used chances of success are not always guaranteed unless it was a suicide attack.
9. In the case of magnetic bombs stuck to the metallic portion of a car by a speeding terrorist, chances of success in killing or maiming targeted individuals increase without adding to innocent civilian casualties.
10. The Israeli diplomat attacked was a high-value target of the terrorists, but not a VIP protectee. She, therefore, did not enjoy the benefit of access control through the use of pilot and escort vehicles. It was easy to attack her from a motor-cycle.
11.Is it possible to devise new security procedures by which high-value targets of terrorists, who do not enjoy the benefit of VIP protection procedures, can be better protected? This is a question which needs to be examined by our security experts. ( 17-2-2012)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
B.RAMAN
Since 2007, five Iranian nuclear scientists have been killed in Iranian territory. In some of these instances, the terrorists had attached small magnetic bombs to the exterior of the victims’ cars.
2.The latest attack took place on January 11, 2012, when Mostafa Ahamdi Roshan, described by Western sources as a Deputy Director in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, died in a blast in Tehran shortly after two assailants on a motorcycle placed a small magnetic bomb on his car.
3. It was reported by Iranian sources that the bomb was probably a shaped charge that directed all the explosive power inside the car, killing its occupants without causing any collateral damage to bystanders in the area. The explosive device was meant to kill the occupants without resulting in a blowing up of the car which could have led to a large number of casualties from the splinters of the exploding car.
4. It has been reported that Iranian investigators have been able to collect considerable details regarding this modus operandi, the kind of device used and the organisation behind these attacks from a terrorist who was caught along with the device towards the end of 2010 before he could carry out the attack. On the basis of his interrogation details of which were telecast by the Iranian TV, the Iranian security agencies have alleged that these attacks are being carried out by terrorists of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK), an anti-regime terrorist organisation, motivated, funded, trained and equipped by Mossad, the Israeli external intelligence agency.
5. From the media reports of the February 13,2012, terrorist attack at New Delhi on an Israeli diplomatic vehicle, it is apparent that it had features similar to the attacks on the vehicles of Iranian nuclear scientists--- a shaped uni-directional instantaneous explosive charge meant to kill only the occupants of the car without causing collateral damage and stuck to the rear of the car by a speeding motor-cycle borne terrorist, who managed to get away after his act.
6. This MO, meant to kill targeted individuals with an explosive device by a motor-cycle borne terrorist without killing innocent civilians, would call for a re-visit to our security procedures for the protection of high-value individual targets of terrorists.
7.Access control and prior sanitisation through anti-explosive checks are the two basic procedures followed for protecting high-value targets of terrorists. The use of a speeding motor-cycle borne terrorist to attach an explosive device to a car is meant to circumvent access control and prior sanitisation procedures.
8. The MO of using a motor-cycle borne terrorist to beat access control has been followed by terrorists in many countries, including Pakistan, for the last 30 years. In the past, terrorists using this MO used either a hand-held weapon fired by a terrorist sitting in the rear or a hand-grenade. When a hand-held weapon or a hand-grenade is used chances of success are not always guaranteed unless it was a suicide attack.
9. In the case of magnetic bombs stuck to the metallic portion of a car by a speeding terrorist, chances of success in killing or maiming targeted individuals increase without adding to innocent civilian casualties.
10. The Israeli diplomat attacked was a high-value target of the terrorists, but not a VIP protectee. She, therefore, did not enjoy the benefit of access control through the use of pilot and escort vehicles. It was easy to attack her from a motor-cycle.
11.Is it possible to devise new security procedures by which high-value targets of terrorists, who do not enjoy the benefit of VIP protection procedures, can be better protected? This is a question which needs to be examined by our security experts. ( 17-2-2012)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, February 15, 2012
TERRORISM : IRAN AS A NEW SOURCE OF CONCERN
B.RAMAN
( Written at the request of “The Times of India”---http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Turning-a-conflict-zone/articleshow/11903038.cms )
One has to take seriously the Israeli suspicion that Iran and the Hizbollah terrorist organization supported by it probably had a hand in the terrorist attack with a magnetized improvised explosive device (IED) on an Israeli diplomatic vehicle at New Delhi on February 13. However, it is going to be difficult to establish the veracity of the Israeli suspicion unless the terrorist responsible for the attack or any of his accomplices is arrested and interrogated.There is so far no smoking gun pointing in any definitive direction.
The Israeli suspicion is strengthened by the fact that there was a similar attempt---but unsuccessful--- in Tibilisi in Georgia the same day and other attempts in Bangkok the next day. It is not yet clear whether Israeli nationals were the targets in the Bangkok attacks. Presuming they were,the series of attempted attacks on Israeli targets in three different cities indicate a State-sponsored orchestration of the planning and execution.
Iran has been having a war of nerves with Israel over its nuclear programme and has been the suspected target of Israeli covert action for over a year now to disrupt its nuclear programme.It has the required motive and covert capability to make Israel pay a price for its actions directed against Iran.It would look upon terrorist attacks directed against Israeli nationals and interests as justified acts of reprisal to protect its nuclear programme. As a result,the world is likely to see a covert war with no holds barred between the two countries.
While Israel has been able to wage its covert warfare against Iran in Iranian territory, the effectiveness of Israeli security agencies in their territory will come in way of Iran confining its reprisal attacks to Israeli territory. It will, therefore, try to extend its attacks on Israeli targets to other countries with an Israeli presence. Countries with a weak preventive security set-up will be its battlefields of choice for hitting back at Israel.
If it is established that Iran was behind the New Delhi attack, it would indicate that India has been chosen as a suitable territory for the Iranian reprisal attacks even at the risk of such attacks having an adverse impact on Iran’s hitherto friendly relations with India. In the eventuality of the Iranian hand being proved, a question of serious concern to the Indian counter-terrorism agencies would be whether it would remain a sporadic attack with no follow-up attempts or whether more attacks are likely.
The February 13 attack was well-planned and well-executed.This would have been possible only with painstaking collection of information regarding the movements and activities of Israeli diplomats and a capability for undetected clandestine activity in Indian territory for the procurement of explosive material and the fabrication of the IED.
The fact that all such preparatory activities went unnoticed and undetected by the Indian agencies would indicate that Iran probably already has a strong intelligence presence in the Indian territory in the form of intelligence officers working under cover and sleeper cells in the Indian Shia community as well as in the large number of Iranians studying in India. Detecting and neutralizing the Iranian network in India is going to be a difficult task. Till now, the focus of our agencies has been on detecting and neutralizing the pro-Pakistan networks, which operated mainly through sympathisers in the Sunni community.
The Iranian networks, if they are found to be already operating in Indian territory, would most probably consist of Shias----Indians as well as Iranians.The Indian Shia community has till now been peace-loving and has kept away from jihadi terrorism of Pakistani inspiration. Even if Iran looks upon its recruitment of persons from the Indian Shia community as directed against Israel and not India, the involvement of some Shias in acts of terrorism sponsored by Iran against Israel could sow the seeds of a possible radicalisation of sections of the Shia community.Moreover, the involvement of the Shias recruited by Iran either directly or through the Hizbollah in acts of terrorism against Israel could make expertise in matters such as fabrication of IEDs available in the Shia community.This could add to the problems already faced by our agencies due to the availability of such expertise in the Sunni community.
If Iran continues to use India as a clandestine base for its anti-Israel covert actions, the difficulties faced by our counter-terrorism agencies will acquire a new dimension.There is practically no Pakistani student community in India.Pakistan and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), therefore, have to depend on sympathetic members of the Indian Muslim community and Pakistanis clandestinely infiltrated into India for their acts of terrorism.
Iran will enjoy an advantage over Pakistan due to the presence of a large number of Iranian students in different cities of India.Recuitment from their ranks would enable Iran to operate with ease from Indian territory.
If the Iranian hand is finally established, the Indian intelligence has to pay greater attention and devote greater resources for the coverage of the activities of the Iranian intelligence and its links with the Hizbollah and the Iranian student community in India.
We should make it clear to Iran that its use of Indian territory for terrorism against Israel could affect bilateral relations. Suspicion and distrust do not contaminate our relations.If Iran uses Indian territory for terrorism against Israel, such a contamination could be an unfortunate outcome.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
( Written at the request of “The Times of India”---http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Turning-a-conflict-zone/articleshow/11903038.cms )
One has to take seriously the Israeli suspicion that Iran and the Hizbollah terrorist organization supported by it probably had a hand in the terrorist attack with a magnetized improvised explosive device (IED) on an Israeli diplomatic vehicle at New Delhi on February 13. However, it is going to be difficult to establish the veracity of the Israeli suspicion unless the terrorist responsible for the attack or any of his accomplices is arrested and interrogated.There is so far no smoking gun pointing in any definitive direction.
The Israeli suspicion is strengthened by the fact that there was a similar attempt---but unsuccessful--- in Tibilisi in Georgia the same day and other attempts in Bangkok the next day. It is not yet clear whether Israeli nationals were the targets in the Bangkok attacks. Presuming they were,the series of attempted attacks on Israeli targets in three different cities indicate a State-sponsored orchestration of the planning and execution.
Iran has been having a war of nerves with Israel over its nuclear programme and has been the suspected target of Israeli covert action for over a year now to disrupt its nuclear programme.It has the required motive and covert capability to make Israel pay a price for its actions directed against Iran.It would look upon terrorist attacks directed against Israeli nationals and interests as justified acts of reprisal to protect its nuclear programme. As a result,the world is likely to see a covert war with no holds barred between the two countries.
While Israel has been able to wage its covert warfare against Iran in Iranian territory, the effectiveness of Israeli security agencies in their territory will come in way of Iran confining its reprisal attacks to Israeli territory. It will, therefore, try to extend its attacks on Israeli targets to other countries with an Israeli presence. Countries with a weak preventive security set-up will be its battlefields of choice for hitting back at Israel.
If it is established that Iran was behind the New Delhi attack, it would indicate that India has been chosen as a suitable territory for the Iranian reprisal attacks even at the risk of such attacks having an adverse impact on Iran’s hitherto friendly relations with India. In the eventuality of the Iranian hand being proved, a question of serious concern to the Indian counter-terrorism agencies would be whether it would remain a sporadic attack with no follow-up attempts or whether more attacks are likely.
The February 13 attack was well-planned and well-executed.This would have been possible only with painstaking collection of information regarding the movements and activities of Israeli diplomats and a capability for undetected clandestine activity in Indian territory for the procurement of explosive material and the fabrication of the IED.
The fact that all such preparatory activities went unnoticed and undetected by the Indian agencies would indicate that Iran probably already has a strong intelligence presence in the Indian territory in the form of intelligence officers working under cover and sleeper cells in the Indian Shia community as well as in the large number of Iranians studying in India. Detecting and neutralizing the Iranian network in India is going to be a difficult task. Till now, the focus of our agencies has been on detecting and neutralizing the pro-Pakistan networks, which operated mainly through sympathisers in the Sunni community.
The Iranian networks, if they are found to be already operating in Indian territory, would most probably consist of Shias----Indians as well as Iranians.The Indian Shia community has till now been peace-loving and has kept away from jihadi terrorism of Pakistani inspiration. Even if Iran looks upon its recruitment of persons from the Indian Shia community as directed against Israel and not India, the involvement of some Shias in acts of terrorism sponsored by Iran against Israel could sow the seeds of a possible radicalisation of sections of the Shia community.Moreover, the involvement of the Shias recruited by Iran either directly or through the Hizbollah in acts of terrorism against Israel could make expertise in matters such as fabrication of IEDs available in the Shia community.This could add to the problems already faced by our agencies due to the availability of such expertise in the Sunni community.
If Iran continues to use India as a clandestine base for its anti-Israel covert actions, the difficulties faced by our counter-terrorism agencies will acquire a new dimension.There is practically no Pakistani student community in India.Pakistan and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), therefore, have to depend on sympathetic members of the Indian Muslim community and Pakistanis clandestinely infiltrated into India for their acts of terrorism.
Iran will enjoy an advantage over Pakistan due to the presence of a large number of Iranian students in different cities of India.Recuitment from their ranks would enable Iran to operate with ease from Indian territory.
If the Iranian hand is finally established, the Indian intelligence has to pay greater attention and devote greater resources for the coverage of the activities of the Iranian intelligence and its links with the Hizbollah and the Iranian student community in India.
We should make it clear to Iran that its use of Indian territory for terrorism against Israel could affect bilateral relations. Suspicion and distrust do not contaminate our relations.If Iran uses Indian territory for terrorism against Israel, such a contamination could be an unfortunate outcome.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, February 13, 2012
TERRORIST ATTACK ON ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC VEHICLE IN DELHI: AN ANALYSIS
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR— PAPER NO 743
B.RAMAN
The wife of the Israeli Defence Attache in New Delhi, her Indian driver and two bystanders on the road were injured on February 13,2012, when what was believed to be an explosive-cum-incendiary device attached to the rear of her car as it stopped or slowed down near a petrol service station about a km from the Israeli Embassy exploded. The scene of the blast is located in a high-security area where the tightly-guarded house of the Indian Prime Minister is located. The car---a sports utility vehicle—was engulfed in flames, but did not explode into pieces, thereby indicating that the incendiary effect was more than the explosive effect.
2. Access control in front of the Israeli Embassy is generally very tight. It would, therefore, be very difficult for a terrorist to approach the vicinity of the Embassy and plant a bomb on a vehicle or otherwise cause an explosion. The wife of the Defence Attache is also a diplomatic member of the staff of the Israeli Embassy. She was reportedly going to the American School to pick up their children when the explosion took place.
3. The police believe, on the basis of eye-witness accounts, that a motor-cycle borne terrorist neared the car as it stopped or slowed down, attached the improvised explosive device (IED) to the rear of the car and sped away before the explosion took place. The indications till now are that only one terrorist was involved.
4. Since the blast took place almost instantaneously after the terrorist attached the IED to the rear of the vehicle, the IED would appear to have been triggered off by an instantaneous timer or a mobile phone.
5.The car did not enjoy any protection. Nor was there any Israeli security guard inside the car. Since the driver was an Indian, it is unlikely that he was an Israeli security guard. In view of the tight security outside the Israeli Embassy, it would have been difficult for the terrorist to have waited on his motor-cycle outside the Embassy and then followed the car. He must have waited at a point where he could not be observed by the Israeli security personnel posted outside the Embassy and neared the rear of the car as it approached the scene where the blast took place.
6.The incident had not been planned as a mass fatality attack. It was more a targeted attack to kill an Israeli diplomat. It is not clear whether the terrorist knew that the car belonged to the Israeli Defence Attache. Possibly not. It appears to have been a random attack on a car bearing the CD number plate of the Israeli Embassy.
7. The attack coincided with the fourth anniversary of the assassination of a senior leader of the Hizbollah in Damacus and the first anniversary of the death of two Iranian nuclear scientists in Teheran due to a similar explosion caused by a sticky bomb. Iran had blamed the Israeli intelligence for these incidents and had threatened revenge. A similar explosion due to an IED attached to the car of an employee of the Israeli Embassy in Tibilisi, capital of Georgia, was averted the same day due to the timely detection of the IED and its neutralisation before it could explode.
8. Israeli leaders and officials have blamed the Iranian intelligence and the Hizbollah for the successful attack in New Delhi and the attempted one in Tiblisi. They have claimed that these two incidents came in the wake of two other thwarted attempts a few days earlier in Bangkok and Buenon Aires. They have threatened reprisals against Iran and the Hizbollah.
9. The Hizbollah had operated in the 1990s in Bangkok and Buenos Aires and was known to have a local support base in Tibilisi. But it had neither operated in New Delhi in the past nor was it known to have sleeper cells in India.
10. Unless the terrorist involved is arrested and interrogated, it would be difficult to say whether he had come into India from outside to cause the blast or whether he is an Indian Muslim recruited by the Hizbollah for the attack.
11.In the 1990s, there were instances of Shia terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir, but there had not been an incident of Shia terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K in the past. In the past, there was no evidence of any plans of the Hizbollah to attack Israeli nationals and interests in India, but Al Qaeda was known to have planned to carry out an attack on the Israeli Embassy in New Delhi before 9/11, but it could not carry it out. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), who had orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes for OBL, had reportedly told the US interrogators that before 9/11 he had visited New Delhi to explore the possibility of attacking the Israeli Embassy.
12. The Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba’s attack on the Narriman House in Mumbai, housing an Israeli religious-cum-cultural centre, during its terrorist strikes in Mumbai on 26/11, was the first instance of a terrorist attack on Israeli targets in Indian territory outside J&K. In the early 1990s, there was one attack on Israeli tourists in Srinagar by the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).
13. David Coleman Headley, of the Chicago-based secret cell of the LET, who is a US citizen of Pakistani origin, was reported to have told his US interrogators that at the instance of the LET in Pakistan, he had visited the Narriman House to collect operational intelligence to facilitate an attack. He also reportedly said that during a subsequent visit to India after 26/11, he had recceed other possible Israeli/Jewish targets in India for possible future attacks.
14. All such past evidence was attributable to the interest of Al Qaeda and the LET, both Sunni organisations, to carry out terrorist strikes against Israeli/Jewish targets in India.
15. There had been no evidence in the past of similar interest of Shia elements in India in carrying out attacks on Israeli nationals and interests. There is no Shia terrorist organisation in Indian territory outside J&K. Even the one in J&K has been dormant for some years. It had never come to notice for any contacts with the Hizbollah.
16. While there has been no Shia terrorism in Indian territory in recent years, there is Shia terrorism in Pakistani territory carried out by an organisation called Sipah Mohammad and by another organisation also called the Hizbollah in the Kurram agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Kurram has had a history of violent incidents between Sunni terrorists supported by the Taliban and Shia terrorists allegedly supported by Iran. None of these groups had so far come to notice for any links in the Shia community in India.
17. In June 2010, there were unconfirmed reports attributed to Pakistani security agencies that Mohammadi Ali Hammedei, a Hizbollah terrorist who had spent some years in jail in Germany for his suspected involvement in a hijacking incident before he was released, was killed in a US Drone strike in the FATA. However, the US did not confirm this incident. It was not clear whether he was living in Kurram or elsewhere in the FATA after his release from jail in Germany.
18.If it is finally established that Iran, through the Hizbollah, was involved in the terrorist attack of February 13, it would have two implications for India. Firstly, it would indicate that the Hizbollah probably now has support elements in the Indian Muslim community. Secondly, it would indicate the involvement of the Iranian intelligence in orchestrating terrorist attacks on Israeli targets in India.
19.Till now, the attention of Indian counter-terrorism agencies was mainly focussed on Pakistan-based Sunni terrorist organisations and their supporters in the Indian Muslim community and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which was supporting them. Hereafter, they also have to focus on the Hizbollah and the Shia terrorist organisations of Pakistan and their contacts in the Shia community in India and the Iranian intelligence (mainly of the Revolutionary Guards) which possibly uses them. ( 14-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
B.RAMAN
The wife of the Israeli Defence Attache in New Delhi, her Indian driver and two bystanders on the road were injured on February 13,2012, when what was believed to be an explosive-cum-incendiary device attached to the rear of her car as it stopped or slowed down near a petrol service station about a km from the Israeli Embassy exploded. The scene of the blast is located in a high-security area where the tightly-guarded house of the Indian Prime Minister is located. The car---a sports utility vehicle—was engulfed in flames, but did not explode into pieces, thereby indicating that the incendiary effect was more than the explosive effect.
2. Access control in front of the Israeli Embassy is generally very tight. It would, therefore, be very difficult for a terrorist to approach the vicinity of the Embassy and plant a bomb on a vehicle or otherwise cause an explosion. The wife of the Defence Attache is also a diplomatic member of the staff of the Israeli Embassy. She was reportedly going to the American School to pick up their children when the explosion took place.
3. The police believe, on the basis of eye-witness accounts, that a motor-cycle borne terrorist neared the car as it stopped or slowed down, attached the improvised explosive device (IED) to the rear of the car and sped away before the explosion took place. The indications till now are that only one terrorist was involved.
4. Since the blast took place almost instantaneously after the terrorist attached the IED to the rear of the vehicle, the IED would appear to have been triggered off by an instantaneous timer or a mobile phone.
5.The car did not enjoy any protection. Nor was there any Israeli security guard inside the car. Since the driver was an Indian, it is unlikely that he was an Israeli security guard. In view of the tight security outside the Israeli Embassy, it would have been difficult for the terrorist to have waited on his motor-cycle outside the Embassy and then followed the car. He must have waited at a point where he could not be observed by the Israeli security personnel posted outside the Embassy and neared the rear of the car as it approached the scene where the blast took place.
6.The incident had not been planned as a mass fatality attack. It was more a targeted attack to kill an Israeli diplomat. It is not clear whether the terrorist knew that the car belonged to the Israeli Defence Attache. Possibly not. It appears to have been a random attack on a car bearing the CD number plate of the Israeli Embassy.
7. The attack coincided with the fourth anniversary of the assassination of a senior leader of the Hizbollah in Damacus and the first anniversary of the death of two Iranian nuclear scientists in Teheran due to a similar explosion caused by a sticky bomb. Iran had blamed the Israeli intelligence for these incidents and had threatened revenge. A similar explosion due to an IED attached to the car of an employee of the Israeli Embassy in Tibilisi, capital of Georgia, was averted the same day due to the timely detection of the IED and its neutralisation before it could explode.
8. Israeli leaders and officials have blamed the Iranian intelligence and the Hizbollah for the successful attack in New Delhi and the attempted one in Tiblisi. They have claimed that these two incidents came in the wake of two other thwarted attempts a few days earlier in Bangkok and Buenon Aires. They have threatened reprisals against Iran and the Hizbollah.
9. The Hizbollah had operated in the 1990s in Bangkok and Buenos Aires and was known to have a local support base in Tibilisi. But it had neither operated in New Delhi in the past nor was it known to have sleeper cells in India.
10. Unless the terrorist involved is arrested and interrogated, it would be difficult to say whether he had come into India from outside to cause the blast or whether he is an Indian Muslim recruited by the Hizbollah for the attack.
11.In the 1990s, there were instances of Shia terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir, but there had not been an incident of Shia terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K in the past. In the past, there was no evidence of any plans of the Hizbollah to attack Israeli nationals and interests in India, but Al Qaeda was known to have planned to carry out an attack on the Israeli Embassy in New Delhi before 9/11, but it could not carry it out. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), who had orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes for OBL, had reportedly told the US interrogators that before 9/11 he had visited New Delhi to explore the possibility of attacking the Israeli Embassy.
12. The Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba’s attack on the Narriman House in Mumbai, housing an Israeli religious-cum-cultural centre, during its terrorist strikes in Mumbai on 26/11, was the first instance of a terrorist attack on Israeli targets in Indian territory outside J&K. In the early 1990s, there was one attack on Israeli tourists in Srinagar by the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).
13. David Coleman Headley, of the Chicago-based secret cell of the LET, who is a US citizen of Pakistani origin, was reported to have told his US interrogators that at the instance of the LET in Pakistan, he had visited the Narriman House to collect operational intelligence to facilitate an attack. He also reportedly said that during a subsequent visit to India after 26/11, he had recceed other possible Israeli/Jewish targets in India for possible future attacks.
14. All such past evidence was attributable to the interest of Al Qaeda and the LET, both Sunni organisations, to carry out terrorist strikes against Israeli/Jewish targets in India.
15. There had been no evidence in the past of similar interest of Shia elements in India in carrying out attacks on Israeli nationals and interests. There is no Shia terrorist organisation in Indian territory outside J&K. Even the one in J&K has been dormant for some years. It had never come to notice for any contacts with the Hizbollah.
16. While there has been no Shia terrorism in Indian territory in recent years, there is Shia terrorism in Pakistani territory carried out by an organisation called Sipah Mohammad and by another organisation also called the Hizbollah in the Kurram agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Kurram has had a history of violent incidents between Sunni terrorists supported by the Taliban and Shia terrorists allegedly supported by Iran. None of these groups had so far come to notice for any links in the Shia community in India.
17. In June 2010, there were unconfirmed reports attributed to Pakistani security agencies that Mohammadi Ali Hammedei, a Hizbollah terrorist who had spent some years in jail in Germany for his suspected involvement in a hijacking incident before he was released, was killed in a US Drone strike in the FATA. However, the US did not confirm this incident. It was not clear whether he was living in Kurram or elsewhere in the FATA after his release from jail in Germany.
18.If it is finally established that Iran, through the Hizbollah, was involved in the terrorist attack of February 13, it would have two implications for India. Firstly, it would indicate that the Hizbollah probably now has support elements in the Indian Muslim community. Secondly, it would indicate the involvement of the Iranian intelligence in orchestrating terrorist attacks on Israeli targets in India.
19.Till now, the attention of Indian counter-terrorism agencies was mainly focussed on Pakistan-based Sunni terrorist organisations and their supporters in the Indian Muslim community and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which was supporting them. Hereafter, they also have to focus on the Hizbollah and the Shia terrorist organisations of Pakistan and their contacts in the Shia community in India and the Iranian intelligence (mainly of the Revolutionary Guards) which possibly uses them. ( 14-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, February 12, 2012
THE PAKISTANI CONUNDRUM
B.RAMAN
After having fairly successfully defied the Army over the so-called Memogate affair, the elected Pakistani Executive headed by President Asif Ali Zardari has now chosen to defy the judiciary on the question of its refusal to write to the Swiss Government requesting it to re-open the investigation into some Swiss bank accounts allegedly belonging to Zardari and the late Benazir Bhutto.
2. The directive to write to the Swiss Government came from the Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury. The Executive could have easily written to the Swiss Government and avoided a confrontation with the judiciary. It was very unlikely that the Swiss Government would have re-opened the investigation. Once the Executive wrote this letter, there would have been no more grounds for the court to proceed against Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani on a charge of contempt of court.
3. Instead of choosing this easier option, the Executive has chosen the more difficult and complex option of refusing to write to the Swiss Government on the ground that Zardari as the President enjoyed immunity from investigation and prosecution.
4. Faced with a defiant Executive, a seven-member bench of the court, headed by the Chief Justice, has framed an indictment ( US expression ) or a charge-sheet ( a sub-continental expression inherited from the British) against Gilani on February 13,2012.What this means is that from being a man under investigation as he was till now, he has become an accused in a criminal prosecution, but he is not yet a convict. The question of his resignation from office and arrest would arise only if after the trial, the charge of contempt of court against him is held to have been proved and he is convicted.
5. At the pre-trial stage of framing of the charge-sheet, there was no scope for a compromise or flexibility in the judiciary’s handling of the case. The court had no other alternative but to charge-sheet and Gilani has no other alternative but to stand trial. The question of a possible Presidential pardon would arise only after conviction and not in the pre-conviction stage
6. The intriguing question is what accounts for the apparent confidence of the Executive that it can defy the Judiciary and still escape negative consequences. There are three plus points for the Executive--- firstly, the solidarity between Zardari and Gilani continues; secondly, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and its coalition allies remain united behind the Zardari-Gilani combine; and thirdly, there has been no public reaction against the Executive for defying the judiciary similar to what one saw against Pervez Musharraf when he defied the judiciary and had Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury dismissed.
7. Another important plus point is that Aitzaz Ahsan, the celebrated lawyer belonging to the PPP, who was in the forefront of the “Back Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury” movement formed by the public and the lawyers community, is now supporting the Executive against the judiciary and defending Gilani. He seems to have lost his influence with the Chief Justice, but it is likely that he still has a good equation with some other judges of the bench that would try Gilani.
8.If the trial goes ahead as expected, three alternative scenarios are possible:
(a). Scenario 1: A split develops in the Bench and a majority verdict convicting Gilani eludes it, thereby forcing a compromise.
(b).Scenario 2: The Bench remains united and reaches a majority, if not unanimous, verdict convicting Gilani who is then pardoned by Zardari.
( c ). Scenario 3: Gilani is convicted and chooses to resign and go to jail in order to highlight excessive judicial activism.
9. If Zardari does not exercise the right of presidential pardon and if Gilani chooses to go to jail, there will be a new phase of aggravated political uncertainty in Pakistan. ( 13-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
After having fairly successfully defied the Army over the so-called Memogate affair, the elected Pakistani Executive headed by President Asif Ali Zardari has now chosen to defy the judiciary on the question of its refusal to write to the Swiss Government requesting it to re-open the investigation into some Swiss bank accounts allegedly belonging to Zardari and the late Benazir Bhutto.
2. The directive to write to the Swiss Government came from the Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury. The Executive could have easily written to the Swiss Government and avoided a confrontation with the judiciary. It was very unlikely that the Swiss Government would have re-opened the investigation. Once the Executive wrote this letter, there would have been no more grounds for the court to proceed against Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani on a charge of contempt of court.
3. Instead of choosing this easier option, the Executive has chosen the more difficult and complex option of refusing to write to the Swiss Government on the ground that Zardari as the President enjoyed immunity from investigation and prosecution.
4. Faced with a defiant Executive, a seven-member bench of the court, headed by the Chief Justice, has framed an indictment ( US expression ) or a charge-sheet ( a sub-continental expression inherited from the British) against Gilani on February 13,2012.What this means is that from being a man under investigation as he was till now, he has become an accused in a criminal prosecution, but he is not yet a convict. The question of his resignation from office and arrest would arise only if after the trial, the charge of contempt of court against him is held to have been proved and he is convicted.
5. At the pre-trial stage of framing of the charge-sheet, there was no scope for a compromise or flexibility in the judiciary’s handling of the case. The court had no other alternative but to charge-sheet and Gilani has no other alternative but to stand trial. The question of a possible Presidential pardon would arise only after conviction and not in the pre-conviction stage
6. The intriguing question is what accounts for the apparent confidence of the Executive that it can defy the Judiciary and still escape negative consequences. There are three plus points for the Executive--- firstly, the solidarity between Zardari and Gilani continues; secondly, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and its coalition allies remain united behind the Zardari-Gilani combine; and thirdly, there has been no public reaction against the Executive for defying the judiciary similar to what one saw against Pervez Musharraf when he defied the judiciary and had Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury dismissed.
7. Another important plus point is that Aitzaz Ahsan, the celebrated lawyer belonging to the PPP, who was in the forefront of the “Back Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury” movement formed by the public and the lawyers community, is now supporting the Executive against the judiciary and defending Gilani. He seems to have lost his influence with the Chief Justice, but it is likely that he still has a good equation with some other judges of the bench that would try Gilani.
8.If the trial goes ahead as expected, three alternative scenarios are possible:
(a). Scenario 1: A split develops in the Bench and a majority verdict convicting Gilani eludes it, thereby forcing a compromise.
(b).Scenario 2: The Bench remains united and reaches a majority, if not unanimous, verdict convicting Gilani who is then pardoned by Zardari.
( c ). Scenario 3: Gilani is convicted and chooses to resign and go to jail in order to highlight excessive judicial activism.
9. If Zardari does not exercise the right of presidential pardon and if Gilani chooses to go to jail, there will be a new phase of aggravated political uncertainty in Pakistan. ( 13-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
DEVALUATION OF THE IMAGE OF GEN.V.K.SINGH IN THE EYES OF HIS JAWANS
B.RAMAN
Many TV channels, including the NDTV today, have held Town Hall style debates on the controversy relating to the date of birth of Gen.V.K.Singh, our Chief of the Army Staff (COAS).The facts of the case are well-known. It should not, therefore, be necessary for me to repeat them here. All that I need to underline is that Gen.Singh failed to get a directive from the Supreme Court before which he articulated his grievances through his lawyer because of its reluctance to intervene in the matter,
thereby making him withdraw his petition.
2.Many of us, in retrospect, will question the wisdom of his action in taking up the matter before the court instead of finding a face and honour-saving compromise in-house within the four walls of the Government. Gen.Singh was widely recognised as a General of very high integrity and professionalism who had distinguished himself in battles during his long career in the Army. Nobody---not even his detractors—questioned his fitness to command the Army and lead it in times of peace as well as war.
3. The case had no national security implications. Nor did it show the lack of wisdom of the present policy of choosing the COAS. In the civilian services above the rank of the Joint Secretary and in the Armed Forces above the rank of Majors-Gen and equivalent ranks, promotions are decided by merit and not by seniority. On the basis of the evaluation of the records and achievements a short panel of officers fit to hold the position is prepared and the seniormost in the panel is promoted. The selection passes through two stages. In the first stage, the merit is the sole criterion. In the second and final stage after merit has been evaluated and assessed, the seniority becomes the factor. Thus, Gen.Singh cleared the first hurdle of merit on the basis of his outstanding record and capabilities and the second stage on the basis of his seniority.
4. His wrongly-recorded date of birth became a factor not for judging his suitability for commanding the Army, but for deciding his date of superannuation and the date of completion of his tenure. He should have got the issue regarding his wrongly-recorded date of birth settled before he assumed charge as the COAS. Even if he had not done so, the Government should have done so anticipating an inconvenient and distasteful denouement. Neither he nor the Government did so.
5. When he raised the issue half-way through his tenure, it gave an opportunity to his ill-wishers in the Army and outside to impute motives, thereby giving rise to an avoidable controversy of unfortunate fall-out.
6. The entire case and his failure to make his grievance find endorsement by the Supreme Court must have been followed with great interest by the junior ranks of the armed forces, including thousands of jawans. It would have been the subject-matter of heated discussions right across the barracks, cantonments and stations of the Army. The junior ranks would have been particularly keen to see whether the Supreme Court followed a different yard-stick in the case of a General. From that point of view, the Supreme Court’s decision not to intervene in the matter has to be welcomed because it would convey a clear message to all in the Armed Forces that in the eyes of the Supreme Court in deciding such cases ranks of the petitioners do not matter. All are equal from the jawan up to the General in its eyes.
7. What next? The Supreme Court’s non-intervention in a substantive manner has not cast any blemish on the integrity and professionalism of Gen.Singh. But it does cast a blemish on his image in the eyes of his jawans and junior officers. Whenever he visits the Army establishments, his image before his men would be not only that of a capable and courageous General of great integrity, but also that of a General who failed to maintain his personal and official dignity by agitating his grievance regarding his date of birth before the highest judiciary of the land and failed to have his grievance accepted.
8. This would definitely devalue his image in the eyes of the jawans and junior officers. As a disciplined force they would not show it outside, but in their heart of hearts, Gen Singh would be a leader with diminished dignity of office. It would, therefore, be in the interest of the institution and his own interest that he honourably resigns as the COAS after facilitating the process for the selection of his successor. ( 13-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Many TV channels, including the NDTV today, have held Town Hall style debates on the controversy relating to the date of birth of Gen.V.K.Singh, our Chief of the Army Staff (COAS).The facts of the case are well-known. It should not, therefore, be necessary for me to repeat them here. All that I need to underline is that Gen.Singh failed to get a directive from the Supreme Court before which he articulated his grievances through his lawyer because of its reluctance to intervene in the matter,
thereby making him withdraw his petition.
2.Many of us, in retrospect, will question the wisdom of his action in taking up the matter before the court instead of finding a face and honour-saving compromise in-house within the four walls of the Government. Gen.Singh was widely recognised as a General of very high integrity and professionalism who had distinguished himself in battles during his long career in the Army. Nobody---not even his detractors—questioned his fitness to command the Army and lead it in times of peace as well as war.
3. The case had no national security implications. Nor did it show the lack of wisdom of the present policy of choosing the COAS. In the civilian services above the rank of the Joint Secretary and in the Armed Forces above the rank of Majors-Gen and equivalent ranks, promotions are decided by merit and not by seniority. On the basis of the evaluation of the records and achievements a short panel of officers fit to hold the position is prepared and the seniormost in the panel is promoted. The selection passes through two stages. In the first stage, the merit is the sole criterion. In the second and final stage after merit has been evaluated and assessed, the seniority becomes the factor. Thus, Gen.Singh cleared the first hurdle of merit on the basis of his outstanding record and capabilities and the second stage on the basis of his seniority.
4. His wrongly-recorded date of birth became a factor not for judging his suitability for commanding the Army, but for deciding his date of superannuation and the date of completion of his tenure. He should have got the issue regarding his wrongly-recorded date of birth settled before he assumed charge as the COAS. Even if he had not done so, the Government should have done so anticipating an inconvenient and distasteful denouement. Neither he nor the Government did so.
5. When he raised the issue half-way through his tenure, it gave an opportunity to his ill-wishers in the Army and outside to impute motives, thereby giving rise to an avoidable controversy of unfortunate fall-out.
6. The entire case and his failure to make his grievance find endorsement by the Supreme Court must have been followed with great interest by the junior ranks of the armed forces, including thousands of jawans. It would have been the subject-matter of heated discussions right across the barracks, cantonments and stations of the Army. The junior ranks would have been particularly keen to see whether the Supreme Court followed a different yard-stick in the case of a General. From that point of view, the Supreme Court’s decision not to intervene in the matter has to be welcomed because it would convey a clear message to all in the Armed Forces that in the eyes of the Supreme Court in deciding such cases ranks of the petitioners do not matter. All are equal from the jawan up to the General in its eyes.
7. What next? The Supreme Court’s non-intervention in a substantive manner has not cast any blemish on the integrity and professionalism of Gen.Singh. But it does cast a blemish on his image in the eyes of his jawans and junior officers. Whenever he visits the Army establishments, his image before his men would be not only that of a capable and courageous General of great integrity, but also that of a General who failed to maintain his personal and official dignity by agitating his grievance regarding his date of birth before the highest judiciary of the land and failed to have his grievance accepted.
8. This would definitely devalue his image in the eyes of the jawans and junior officers. As a disciplined force they would not show it outside, but in their heart of hearts, Gen Singh would be a leader with diminished dignity of office. It would, therefore, be in the interest of the institution and his own interest that he honourably resigns as the COAS after facilitating the process for the selection of his successor. ( 13-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
TIME TO STOP DEMONISATION OF NARENDRA MODI
B.RAMAN
The allegations made against Narendra Modi, Chief Minister of Gujarat, in connection with some incidents of violence against Muslims during the communal disturbances of 2002 were quite serious. They amounted to charges of conscious inaction amounting to criminal complicity.
2. These allegations warranted thorough investigation by a body of professional investigators and follow-up action in the form of criminal prosecution if the allegations proved to be correct during the investigation.
3. Such a body was constituted by the judiciary through the setting-up of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) headed by R.K.Raghavan, former Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Raghavan is a highly distinguished officer of the Indian Police Service (IPS) known for his professionalism, integrity, independence and objectivity.
4. He had been associated with many complex criminal investigations when he headed the CBI and continues to be associated with matters relating to the Police even after his retirement.
5. After a thorough and professional investigation lasting about two years, the SIT headed by him has reportedly concluded that its investigation did not unearth any evidence that could warrant the prosecution of Modi under any charge.
6. In other words, the allegations of criminal complicity against Modi stand disproved. The serious allegations against Modi were not pushed under the carpet. He was not exempted from facing the due process of the law in the nature of a criminal investigation. He was treated like any other citizen despite the high office held by him and subjected to a criminal investigation by a team of distinguished professionals.
7. When the SIT has cleared him of the charges levelled against him by some sections of the public---particularly from the Muslim community--- and by some human rights activists, fairness of criminal justice demands that the demonization campaign against him should be discontinued and the sword hanging over his head should be removed. He has been cleared honourably and not conditionally.
8. Instead of doing so, his political and non-Governmental detractors seem determined not to accept the conclusions of the SIT and to keep up the campaign of denigration and demonization against him by recycling the allegations which have already been enquired into and found unproven by the SIT.
9. It is no longer a case of the law taking its own course, but one of malicious witch-hunt against a political leader by his political opponents and by sections of the media and lawyers and others who are not well disposed towards him. Even after having failed to prove the charges before the SIT, they are determined to keep their vicious campaign alive for political reasons and not for reasons of natural justice.
10. Their ill-motivated attempts have to be deplored by all right-thinking persons, who should demand that the campaign of demonization should stop immediately. Modi has so far not allowed this campaign to negatively affect his administration of the State of Gujarat for the last 10 years. The State has made considerable progress under his leadership. This is acknowledged by independent-minded observers and even by persons who are not comfortable with him as an individual.
11. His future should be decided by the people not on the basis of the re-cycled unproven allegations of his demonisers, but on the basis of what he has already achieved as an administrator, his ideas and vision for the future and his capability for achieving them.
12. Those who still have reservations regarding his style of leadership and do not agree with those who praise his governance should confront him politically and establish before the people that his achievements and capabilities are over-rated if that is what they feel.
13. But his detractors and demonisers find themselves on a weak ground in respect of a political campaign against him based on objective factors. They are, therefore, trying to keep alive the demonization in the hope of thereby damaging and destroying his future political career. This has to be strongly deplored and I have no hesitation in doing so.
14. I have never been an uncritical admirer of Modi. Nor am I in the ranks of his perpetual demonisers. I have always sought to judge him as objectively as I can. It is my view that the demonization campaign against him must stop now. ( 12-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The allegations made against Narendra Modi, Chief Minister of Gujarat, in connection with some incidents of violence against Muslims during the communal disturbances of 2002 were quite serious. They amounted to charges of conscious inaction amounting to criminal complicity.
2. These allegations warranted thorough investigation by a body of professional investigators and follow-up action in the form of criminal prosecution if the allegations proved to be correct during the investigation.
3. Such a body was constituted by the judiciary through the setting-up of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) headed by R.K.Raghavan, former Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Raghavan is a highly distinguished officer of the Indian Police Service (IPS) known for his professionalism, integrity, independence and objectivity.
4. He had been associated with many complex criminal investigations when he headed the CBI and continues to be associated with matters relating to the Police even after his retirement.
5. After a thorough and professional investigation lasting about two years, the SIT headed by him has reportedly concluded that its investigation did not unearth any evidence that could warrant the prosecution of Modi under any charge.
6. In other words, the allegations of criminal complicity against Modi stand disproved. The serious allegations against Modi were not pushed under the carpet. He was not exempted from facing the due process of the law in the nature of a criminal investigation. He was treated like any other citizen despite the high office held by him and subjected to a criminal investigation by a team of distinguished professionals.
7. When the SIT has cleared him of the charges levelled against him by some sections of the public---particularly from the Muslim community--- and by some human rights activists, fairness of criminal justice demands that the demonization campaign against him should be discontinued and the sword hanging over his head should be removed. He has been cleared honourably and not conditionally.
8. Instead of doing so, his political and non-Governmental detractors seem determined not to accept the conclusions of the SIT and to keep up the campaign of denigration and demonization against him by recycling the allegations which have already been enquired into and found unproven by the SIT.
9. It is no longer a case of the law taking its own course, but one of malicious witch-hunt against a political leader by his political opponents and by sections of the media and lawyers and others who are not well disposed towards him. Even after having failed to prove the charges before the SIT, they are determined to keep their vicious campaign alive for political reasons and not for reasons of natural justice.
10. Their ill-motivated attempts have to be deplored by all right-thinking persons, who should demand that the campaign of demonization should stop immediately. Modi has so far not allowed this campaign to negatively affect his administration of the State of Gujarat for the last 10 years. The State has made considerable progress under his leadership. This is acknowledged by independent-minded observers and even by persons who are not comfortable with him as an individual.
11. His future should be decided by the people not on the basis of the re-cycled unproven allegations of his demonisers, but on the basis of what he has already achieved as an administrator, his ideas and vision for the future and his capability for achieving them.
12. Those who still have reservations regarding his style of leadership and do not agree with those who praise his governance should confront him politically and establish before the people that his achievements and capabilities are over-rated if that is what they feel.
13. But his detractors and demonisers find themselves on a weak ground in respect of a political campaign against him based on objective factors. They are, therefore, trying to keep alive the demonization in the hope of thereby damaging and destroying his future political career. This has to be strongly deplored and I have no hesitation in doing so.
14. I have never been an uncritical admirer of Modi. Nor am I in the ranks of his perpetual demonisers. I have always sought to judge him as objectively as I can. It is my view that the demonization campaign against him must stop now. ( 12-2-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
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