B.RAMAN
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China, who had cancelled a scheduled visit to Nepal in December for unexplained reasons, halted in Kathmandu for a little more than four hours on January 14,2012, while on his way from Beijing to Saudi Arabia for an official visit.
2. This is the first time a Chinese Prime Minister had visited Nepal since the visit of the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji in 2001. There have been a number of high-level visits of political and military figures from Nepal to China since the Nepalese Maoists came overground, suspended their insurgency and joined the power structure in Nepal, but reciprocal visits from the Chinese side to Nepal were very few.
3.However, the Chinese have considerably stepped up assistance to the Nepalese since the end of the monarchy in 2008 and established a "comprehensive and cooperative partnership" with Nepal in 2009.
4. China has strong security concerns in Nepal due to the presence of about 20,000 Tibetan refugees in Nepalese territory and their support to His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the radical Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC).
5. These concerns have been magnified by fresh indicators of unrest in the Tibetan community of China---particularly in Western Sichuan, Gansu and Qinghai regions. There have been 16 self-immolation attempts since the beginning of last year by pro-Dalai Lama monks and others. Twelve of them were reported last year and four in the first 15 days of this year. Fourteen of these attempts were in Western Sichuan and one each in Tibet and Qinghai.
6. The large-scale round-up and detention in a special military camp of suspected pro-Dalai Lama monks of the Kirti monastery in Sichuan last year have aggravated the situation leading to frequent public demonstrations in support of those attempting self-immolation. The public demonstrations remained largely non-violent last year, but since the beginning of this year there have been two violent attacks by enraged Tibetans on Police Stations.
7. In the latest violent attack reported on January 14, a crowd of about 1000 Tibetans demanding the body of a Tibetan who committed self-immolation the same day attacked a police station where, they suspected, the body was kept. The Police reportedly opened fire to disperse the protesters killing two of them---one of them a woman.
8. The affected areas have been far away from the Nepal border. The fact that Tibet itself has remained relatively calm with only one incident last year would indicate that these self-immolations and the subsequent protest demonstrations were largely spontaneous due to local anger against the Chinese security forces and not inspired or instigated by the Tibetan refugees in Nepal.
9. The Chinese are worried over the danger of a recrudescence of unrest and violence in Tibet, particularly Lhasa, similar to the violent outbreak of 2008 and have stepped up pressure on the Nepalese authorities to tighten controls over the refugees and to allow the Chinese Ministries of Public and State Security to post more intelligence officers in the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu.
10.During his brief visit to Kathmandu, Wen met, among others, Nepalese President Ram Baran Yadav and Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai.
11.Wen was quoted by the local media as saying as follows: “My trip is aimed at consolidating good-neighbourly friendship, deepening cooperation and boosting the joint development of China and Nepal.”
12. A joint statement issued at the end of his visit said: "As a close neighbour of Nepal, the Chinese side is pleased to see the progress in the peace process in Nepal and sincerely hopes that Nepal will realize peace, stability and prosperity, including the drafting of a new constitution in the near future. Nepal firmly supports the efforts of the Chinese side to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity and will not allow any force to engage in anti-China activities by using Nepali territory,"
13.Wen was further quoted as saying: “China and Nepal are good neighbours, good friends and good partners. China supports Nepal's peace and constitutional process, and its efforts to safeguard independence, sovereignty, territorial integration and national unification. China is ready to provide, within its capacity, assistance to Nepal for economic and social development and believes that Nepal can overcome difficulties to realize the goal of building a new Nepal.”.
14.Wen reportedly pledged $140 million in aid to Nepal of which US $ 20 million would be spent on consolidating the peace process and US $ two million for strengthening the police. Nepal has reportedly sought Chinese assistance for a modern airport at Pokhra, for the development of its railway network and for the construction of three hydel power stations. ( 15-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, January 14, 2012
Friday, January 13, 2012
A COUNTER-TERRORISM CZAR IN INDIAN COLOURS
B.RAMAN
Before 9/11, there was a counter-terrorism centre ( CTC ) in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US, which had officers from various agencies, that formed part of the counter-terrorism community of the US. It worked under a CIA Officer. Its task was co-ordination of the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of various agencies to facilitate the analysis, assessment and fusion of the intelligence relating to terrorism flowing from different agencies and ensure effective follow-up action. Its main role was in prevention. It had no role in investigation and prosecution.
2. When it was created, this Centre was placed under the CIA for the following reasons:
(a).Before 9/11, the conventional wisdom in the US was that threats from terrorists would be mainly to US nationals and interests abroad. Since the CIA was an external intelligence agency, it was felt that the nodal set-up for the co-ordination of follow-up action should function under the supervision of the CIA.
(b). Till 2004, Director,CIA, wore two hats. He was the head of the CIA. He was also designated as Director, Central Intelligence. In the second capacity, he was responsible for the co-ordination of the functioning of all agencies of the US intelligence community. Since the Counter-Terrorism Centre was to co-ordinate follow-up action on all terrorism-related intelligence, it was felt that the responsibility for c-ordination should vest in the Director, CIA, in his second capacity as the Director, Central Intelligence.
3. The enquiry by the National Commission appointed by President George Bush into the 9/11 terrorist strikes brought home to the US the dangers posed to US Homeland security from home-grown terrorists as well as terrorists based abroad. It also revealed deficiencies in the co-ordinating roles of the Director, Central Intelligence, and of the CTC of the CIA. It was felt that there was no effective analysis, assessment and fusion of the intelligence flowing from the counter-terrorism divisions of the various agencies and no effective and co-ordinated follow-up to neutralise the threats revealed by the flowing intelligence.
4. The National Commission enquiry led to the following decisions:
(a). To create an NCTC to co-ordinate the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of all agencies which form part of the counter-terrorism community and to co-ordinate follow-up action to prevent acts of terrorism.
( b ).To divest the Director,CIA, of his responsibilities as the Director, Central Intelligence, and to create a post of Director, National Intelligence, (DNI) directly under the President to co-ordinate the functioning of various intelligence agencies.
( c ). To place the NCTC under the supervision of the DNI and not under the heads of any of the intelligence agencies which will continue to have the responsibility for the collection of terrorism-related intelligence.
5. Since 2005, the US Counter-Terrorism architecture is as follows:
(a) Each agency has its own counter-terrorism division for the collection, analysis, assessment and fusion of intelligence and follow-up action.
(b) The NCTC co-ordinates the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of all agencies and ensures co-ordinated follow-up action. Its role is preventive and not in investigation and prosecution.
(c) The NCTC functions under the DNI. The heads of the agencies have no control over its functioning.
6.The GC Saxena Task Force on intelligence revamp, set up by the Government in 2000, studied the working of the CTC of the CIA and recommended the creation of a similar counter-terrorism centre to be placed in the IB consisting of officers of various agencies and headed by an IB officer. The Government created it in the IB, but for reasons not clear to me, called it a Multi-Agency Centre and not a counter-terrorism centre. It did not get going for a long time because of the reported reluctance of the R&AW and MI to depute their officers to work in the MAC under an IB officer.
7.The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US Homeland exposed deficiencies in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA. Normally, the recommendation of the Saxena Task Force for the creation of a CTC in the IB should have been re-examined in the light of the 9/11 strikes in the US and the exposed deficiencies in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA, which led to the decision to create the NCTC under the DNI. This was not done till the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai.
8. The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai revealed more or less the same deficiencies in our counter-terrorism architecture as the deficiencies in the counter-terrorism architecture of the US revealed by the 9/11 terrorist strikes. Namely, inadequate intelligence and lack of co-ordinated follow-up action even on the intelligence that was available. In his first statement to the Lok Sabha on the 26/11 terrorist strikes after taking over as the Home Minister, Shri P.Chidambaram said that the responsibility for follow-up action on available intelligence was found to be diffused.
9. Shortly thereafter, he had visited the US to study the working of the Department of Homeland Security and the NCTC, both of which came into being after 9/11. He came back a strong votary of two ideas: For the creation of a separate Ministry of Internal Security patterned after the Department of Homeland Security of the US and for the creation of an NCTC patterned after its US counterpart.
10. Shri Chidambaram’s ideas differed in one important respect from the Counter-terrorism architecture created in the US. In the US, the newly set up DNI oversees the functioning of the NCTC. Shri Chidambaram reportedly wanted that the entire counter-terrorism architecture, including the proposed NCTC, should function under the Minister for Home Affairs till his idea of a Ministry of Internal Security was accepted and implemented. That is, he wanted the National Security Adviser to be divested of all counter-terrorism responsibilities and the Home Minister to be made the counter-terrorism Czar of the Government of India.
11. There was speculation ( seemed well-informed) in the media at that time that Shri M.K. Narayanan, the then National Security Adviser, viewed this as a negative reflection of his handling of the 26/11 terrorist strikes and strongly opposed the ideas of Shri Chidambaram. There was a long examination of Shri Chidambaram’s ideas. What has come out on January 12,2012, as a result of this examination is neither an ass nor a mule, but something in between and not recognisable.
12. There will be an emaciated-at-birth NCTC which will not be independent , but will form part of the IB. Thus, there will be no independent supervision over the performance of the follow-up action role. The NSA will have no responsibility for counter-terrorism. As desired by him, Shri Chidambaram will be the Czar for counter-terrorism, but he will be a Czar in Indian colours, not given the necessary tools for being an effective Czar.
13. In the US too, the NSA has no responsibility for counter-terrorism. This role is performed by an Adviser on Homeland Security to the President who is commonly referred to as the Adviser on Counter-Terrorism.
14. In my view, the proposed NCTC is unlikely to improve our capability for preventive action through effective follow-up action on the intelligence collected. ( 14-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Before 9/11, there was a counter-terrorism centre ( CTC ) in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US, which had officers from various agencies, that formed part of the counter-terrorism community of the US. It worked under a CIA Officer. Its task was co-ordination of the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of various agencies to facilitate the analysis, assessment and fusion of the intelligence relating to terrorism flowing from different agencies and ensure effective follow-up action. Its main role was in prevention. It had no role in investigation and prosecution.
2. When it was created, this Centre was placed under the CIA for the following reasons:
(a).Before 9/11, the conventional wisdom in the US was that threats from terrorists would be mainly to US nationals and interests abroad. Since the CIA was an external intelligence agency, it was felt that the nodal set-up for the co-ordination of follow-up action should function under the supervision of the CIA.
(b). Till 2004, Director,CIA, wore two hats. He was the head of the CIA. He was also designated as Director, Central Intelligence. In the second capacity, he was responsible for the co-ordination of the functioning of all agencies of the US intelligence community. Since the Counter-Terrorism Centre was to co-ordinate follow-up action on all terrorism-related intelligence, it was felt that the responsibility for c-ordination should vest in the Director, CIA, in his second capacity as the Director, Central Intelligence.
3. The enquiry by the National Commission appointed by President George Bush into the 9/11 terrorist strikes brought home to the US the dangers posed to US Homeland security from home-grown terrorists as well as terrorists based abroad. It also revealed deficiencies in the co-ordinating roles of the Director, Central Intelligence, and of the CTC of the CIA. It was felt that there was no effective analysis, assessment and fusion of the intelligence flowing from the counter-terrorism divisions of the various agencies and no effective and co-ordinated follow-up to neutralise the threats revealed by the flowing intelligence.
4. The National Commission enquiry led to the following decisions:
(a). To create an NCTC to co-ordinate the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of all agencies which form part of the counter-terrorism community and to co-ordinate follow-up action to prevent acts of terrorism.
( b ).To divest the Director,CIA, of his responsibilities as the Director, Central Intelligence, and to create a post of Director, National Intelligence, (DNI) directly under the President to co-ordinate the functioning of various intelligence agencies.
( c ). To place the NCTC under the supervision of the DNI and not under the heads of any of the intelligence agencies which will continue to have the responsibility for the collection of terrorism-related intelligence.
5. Since 2005, the US Counter-Terrorism architecture is as follows:
(a) Each agency has its own counter-terrorism division for the collection, analysis, assessment and fusion of intelligence and follow-up action.
(b) The NCTC co-ordinates the functioning of the counter-terrorism divisions of all agencies and ensures co-ordinated follow-up action. Its role is preventive and not in investigation and prosecution.
(c) The NCTC functions under the DNI. The heads of the agencies have no control over its functioning.
6.The GC Saxena Task Force on intelligence revamp, set up by the Government in 2000, studied the working of the CTC of the CIA and recommended the creation of a similar counter-terrorism centre to be placed in the IB consisting of officers of various agencies and headed by an IB officer. The Government created it in the IB, but for reasons not clear to me, called it a Multi-Agency Centre and not a counter-terrorism centre. It did not get going for a long time because of the reported reluctance of the R&AW and MI to depute their officers to work in the MAC under an IB officer.
7.The 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US Homeland exposed deficiencies in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA. Normally, the recommendation of the Saxena Task Force for the creation of a CTC in the IB should have been re-examined in the light of the 9/11 strikes in the US and the exposed deficiencies in the functioning of the CTC of the CIA, which led to the decision to create the NCTC under the DNI. This was not done till the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai.
8. The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai revealed more or less the same deficiencies in our counter-terrorism architecture as the deficiencies in the counter-terrorism architecture of the US revealed by the 9/11 terrorist strikes. Namely, inadequate intelligence and lack of co-ordinated follow-up action even on the intelligence that was available. In his first statement to the Lok Sabha on the 26/11 terrorist strikes after taking over as the Home Minister, Shri P.Chidambaram said that the responsibility for follow-up action on available intelligence was found to be diffused.
9. Shortly thereafter, he had visited the US to study the working of the Department of Homeland Security and the NCTC, both of which came into being after 9/11. He came back a strong votary of two ideas: For the creation of a separate Ministry of Internal Security patterned after the Department of Homeland Security of the US and for the creation of an NCTC patterned after its US counterpart.
10. Shri Chidambaram’s ideas differed in one important respect from the Counter-terrorism architecture created in the US. In the US, the newly set up DNI oversees the functioning of the NCTC. Shri Chidambaram reportedly wanted that the entire counter-terrorism architecture, including the proposed NCTC, should function under the Minister for Home Affairs till his idea of a Ministry of Internal Security was accepted and implemented. That is, he wanted the National Security Adviser to be divested of all counter-terrorism responsibilities and the Home Minister to be made the counter-terrorism Czar of the Government of India.
11. There was speculation ( seemed well-informed) in the media at that time that Shri M.K. Narayanan, the then National Security Adviser, viewed this as a negative reflection of his handling of the 26/11 terrorist strikes and strongly opposed the ideas of Shri Chidambaram. There was a long examination of Shri Chidambaram’s ideas. What has come out on January 12,2012, as a result of this examination is neither an ass nor a mule, but something in between and not recognisable.
12. There will be an emaciated-at-birth NCTC which will not be independent , but will form part of the IB. Thus, there will be no independent supervision over the performance of the follow-up action role. The NSA will have no responsibility for counter-terrorism. As desired by him, Shri Chidambaram will be the Czar for counter-terrorism, but he will be a Czar in Indian colours, not given the necessary tools for being an effective Czar.
13. In the US too, the NSA has no responsibility for counter-terrorism. This role is performed by an Adviser on Homeland Security to the President who is commonly referred to as the Adviser on Counter-Terrorism.
14. In my view, the proposed NCTC is unlikely to improve our capability for preventive action through effective follow-up action on the intelligence collected. ( 14-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Thursday, January 12, 2012
PAKISTAN: STILL ON THE BRINK
B.RAMAN
The War of Nerves in Pakistan, which has degenerated into a War of the Institutions of the State, shows no signs of ending.
2. The lack of self-restraint on the part of the three institutions involved in the war---the elected executive, the Army and the judiciary--- has kept the country on the brink. The inflexible stand taken by the three institutions has created the danger of a possible institutional collapse, the main beneficiaries of which could be neither the elected executive, nor the army nor the judiciary, but the jihadi elements opposed to a liberal democracy who are waiting in the wings for the collapse of the State.
3.The jihadi elements, who had always advocated the end of the liberal democracy on the ground that it gives greater importance to the will of the people than to the will of Allah, are hoping that the present civil war of the institutions, might pave the way for the replacement of a liberal democratic State by a jihadi State. If this happens, the implications will be serious not only for the people of Pakistan, but for the international community as a whole.
4. There is a real danger of Pakistan becoming a failed State not as a result of a collapse of its economy and/or system of governance, but as a result of the civil war being waged by the institutions of the State.
5. The Army has united behind Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). According to reliable sources, the Corps Commanders and the Principal Staff Officers, who held a strategy session at the GHQ in Rawalpindi on January 12,2012, threw their weight behind Kayani and Lt.General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence, and decided that the ISI should provide security to Mansoor Ijaz, the US citizen of Pakistani origin, who unwittingly or deliberately triggered off the present confrontation, to enable him to testify before the Judicial Enquiry Commission appointed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury to enquire into the allegations made by Ijaz against Hussain Haqqani, former Pakistani Ambassador to US, in connection with the so-called Memogate.
6.The same sources say that the Army is firm that Hussain Haqqani must be punished for what it looks upon as an act of treason in complaining to the US Government against the Pakistan Army and seeking Washington’s intervention in the matter. Punishment of Haqqani is the minimum that the Army demands as a price for relenting in its fight against the elected executive.
7. The seeming support of President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani to Haqqani even before the serious allegations made by Ijaz against him had been formally enquired into and their action in providing security to Haqqani while dragging their feet on the question of security to Ijaz have added to the anger of the Army.
8.The judiciary’s determination to go ahead with its enquiry into the allegations of Ijaz despite the non-cooperation of the executive has encouraged the inflexible stand of the Army.
9. Despite whatever one might say about the domination of the Army in the Pakistani State, the anger of the military class against the political class in general and Haqqani in particular for allegedly seeking the intervention of the US against the Pakistan Army has to be understood instead of being ridiculed. The credibility of Kayani as the leader of the military class---in the eyes of his senior officers as well as the rank and file--- could suffer if he is seen as taking a soft line on this issue.
10. To save Pakistan from a looming institutional collapse, three steps are necessary:
(a). A statement by the Government that the law will be allowed to take its course against Haqqani and that the Government will not stand in the way of the judicial enquiry into the matter.
(b).A public assurance by Kayani that all the Army wants is action against Haqqani and that it has no intention of staging a coup to overthrow the elected Government.
( c ). A reiteration by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the judiciary’s determination not to provide ex-post facto validation to any coup staged by the Army.
11. At a time when there is a crying need for wisdom, discretion and self-imposed restraint on the part of the political class as a whole, the opportunistic attempts of Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan to exploit the situation for their partisan purposes could push Pakistan down the precipice.
12.US policy-makers, who have nothing to learn and nothing to forget from their experiences in Pakistan, are adding to the complexities of the situation by coming out with statements and remarks which are seen by the military class as sympathetic to Haqqani. The US has to realise that it no longer has the same influence over the Pakistan Army as it used to have before May 2 last when its special forces unilaterally raided Abbottabad and killed Osama bin Laden. (13-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The War of Nerves in Pakistan, which has degenerated into a War of the Institutions of the State, shows no signs of ending.
2. The lack of self-restraint on the part of the three institutions involved in the war---the elected executive, the Army and the judiciary--- has kept the country on the brink. The inflexible stand taken by the three institutions has created the danger of a possible institutional collapse, the main beneficiaries of which could be neither the elected executive, nor the army nor the judiciary, but the jihadi elements opposed to a liberal democracy who are waiting in the wings for the collapse of the State.
3.The jihadi elements, who had always advocated the end of the liberal democracy on the ground that it gives greater importance to the will of the people than to the will of Allah, are hoping that the present civil war of the institutions, might pave the way for the replacement of a liberal democratic State by a jihadi State. If this happens, the implications will be serious not only for the people of Pakistan, but for the international community as a whole.
4. There is a real danger of Pakistan becoming a failed State not as a result of a collapse of its economy and/or system of governance, but as a result of the civil war being waged by the institutions of the State.
5. The Army has united behind Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). According to reliable sources, the Corps Commanders and the Principal Staff Officers, who held a strategy session at the GHQ in Rawalpindi on January 12,2012, threw their weight behind Kayani and Lt.General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence, and decided that the ISI should provide security to Mansoor Ijaz, the US citizen of Pakistani origin, who unwittingly or deliberately triggered off the present confrontation, to enable him to testify before the Judicial Enquiry Commission appointed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury to enquire into the allegations made by Ijaz against Hussain Haqqani, former Pakistani Ambassador to US, in connection with the so-called Memogate.
6.The same sources say that the Army is firm that Hussain Haqqani must be punished for what it looks upon as an act of treason in complaining to the US Government against the Pakistan Army and seeking Washington’s intervention in the matter. Punishment of Haqqani is the minimum that the Army demands as a price for relenting in its fight against the elected executive.
7. The seeming support of President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani to Haqqani even before the serious allegations made by Ijaz against him had been formally enquired into and their action in providing security to Haqqani while dragging their feet on the question of security to Ijaz have added to the anger of the Army.
8.The judiciary’s determination to go ahead with its enquiry into the allegations of Ijaz despite the non-cooperation of the executive has encouraged the inflexible stand of the Army.
9. Despite whatever one might say about the domination of the Army in the Pakistani State, the anger of the military class against the political class in general and Haqqani in particular for allegedly seeking the intervention of the US against the Pakistan Army has to be understood instead of being ridiculed. The credibility of Kayani as the leader of the military class---in the eyes of his senior officers as well as the rank and file--- could suffer if he is seen as taking a soft line on this issue.
10. To save Pakistan from a looming institutional collapse, three steps are necessary:
(a). A statement by the Government that the law will be allowed to take its course against Haqqani and that the Government will not stand in the way of the judicial enquiry into the matter.
(b).A public assurance by Kayani that all the Army wants is action against Haqqani and that it has no intention of staging a coup to overthrow the elected Government.
( c ). A reiteration by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the judiciary’s determination not to provide ex-post facto validation to any coup staged by the Army.
11. At a time when there is a crying need for wisdom, discretion and self-imposed restraint on the part of the political class as a whole, the opportunistic attempts of Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan to exploit the situation for their partisan purposes could push Pakistan down the precipice.
12.US policy-makers, who have nothing to learn and nothing to forget from their experiences in Pakistan, are adding to the complexities of the situation by coming out with statements and remarks which are seen by the military class as sympathetic to Haqqani. The US has to realise that it no longer has the same influence over the Pakistan Army as it used to have before May 2 last when its special forces unilaterally raided Abbottabad and killed Osama bin Laden. (13-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, January 11, 2012
PAKISTAN:MAKING SENSE OUT OF WAR OF NERVES & WAR OF TWEETS
B.RAMAN
There are four factors in the current War of Nerves in Pakistan which centres around mutually contradictory perceptions of the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of the actions taken by different institutions of the state in relation to the hearing in the Pakistan Supreme Court on the veracity of the so-called Memogate.
2. To recall, the Memogate scandal refers to the allegations made by Mansoor Ijaz, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, that the civilian leadership in Pakistan apprehended a coup by the Army after the US raid in Abbottabad on May 2 last which led to the death of Osama bin Laden. Ijaz had further alleged that in the wake of these fears the civilian Government used his contacts in the US administration through Hussain Haqqani, the then Pakistani Ambassador in Washington DC, for having a memo reached to Admiral Mike Mullen, the then Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, seeking US intervention to prevent a coup.
3. The allegations of Ijaz triggered off three parallel enquiries---- by the Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), by the committee on national security of the National Assembly assisted by the Ministry of the Interior and the Supreme Court.
4. The Army was the first to move in the matter. Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), despatched Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the ISI, to question Ijaz in Europe and take over from him his phone records pertaining to his telephone conversations with Haqqani in this matter. Kayani did not keep the Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani informed of his action in this matter.
5. While it would be difficult to characterise the Army’s action as unconstitutional or illegal, it was definitely incorrect. Kayani should have taken the prior clearance of Gilani before despatching Pasha to Europe for questioning Ijaz.
6. The Govt of Gilani was the second to move in the matter. It moved for an enquiry by the Committee on National Security of the National Assembly into the allegations of Ijaz, which were denied by Haqqani, who returned to Islamabad to face the enquiry and resigned. The Govt. ordered the Ministry of the Interior, which controls the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Police, to assist the enquiry by the National Assembly committee. It did not seek the assistance of the ISI in the enquiry.
7.Up to this point, the action of Gilani was constitutional, legal and correct. But after moving for an enquiry by the National Assembly committee, Gilani took another action which was incorrect and which could turn out post facto to be illegal if Haqqani is found guilty of treason for seeking the intervention of a foreign power against the Pakistan Army. Gilani took Haqqani under his physical protection instead of ordering the Police to strengthen his physical security. Initially, Haqqani allegedly lived in the house of Zardari and then moved into a building controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office and its security set-up. This was totally unwise on the part of Gilani.
8. The Supreme Court was the third to move in to add to the confusion. It received a number of private interest petitions seeking a judicial enquiry into the allegations made by Ijaz against Haqqani. One of the petitions was from Nawaz Sharif, former Prime Minister and the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz faction ). The main intention of Nawaz in moving his petition was to exploit Ijaz’s allegations in his campaign against President Asif Ali Zardari and to teach a lesson to Haqqani, who in the 1990s had betrayed Nawaz by defecting from the PML to Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).
9. Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury issued notices to the various dramatis personae calling for their comments on the sustainability of Nawaz’s petition and the follow-up action to be taken by the Supreme Court on it. The Govt. of Gilani held that Nawaz’s petition for a judicial enquiry was unsustainable and that only the National Assembly Committee was competent to enquire into it. The Army took up a position which indirectly endorsed the demand for a judicial enquiry on the ground that the allegations made by Ijaz, if true, had national security implications. The Defence Secretary, in his reply to the Supreme Court, took up a position which sought to endorse the position of Kayani and not Gilani.
10. Kayani and Pasha had submitted their proposed replies to the Supreme Court to the Defence Secretary Lt.Gen. (retd) Khalid Naeem Lodhi for vetting before forwarding them to the Supreme Court. The Defence Secretary allegedly forwarded their replies in toto to the Supreme Court without telling Gilani about it and without the approval of the Cabinet as required under the rules of procedure relating to Govt. business..
11. There was a furore in the PPP and the ruling coalition over the actions of the Defence Secretary who has been removed from his post by Gilani after an enquiry into his unauthorised actions.
12. After considering the replies received from the dramatis personae, the Chief Justice rejected the opposition of the Gilani Government to a judicial enquiry and ordered a judicial enquiry by a commission headed by the Chief Justice of the Balochistan High Court and consisting, among others, of one more provincial Chief Justice. Hussain Haqqani has challenged the constitutionality of the action of the Chief Justice in appointing an enquiry commission consisting, among others, of judges of provincial courts. While the Chief Justice plays a role in the appointment of the judges of the provincial courts, under the Pakistan Constitution, according to Haqqani’s petition, the provincial High Courts are not subordinate to the Supreme Court. While the Chief Justice can appoint an enquiry commission consisting of judges of the Supreme Court, he cannot include provincial judges in it. In such matters, the power to appoint an enquiry commission with judges of provincial courts is with the Government and not with the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice has admitted Haqqani’s petition and ordered a hearing into it. But he has not accepted Haqqani’s request for a stay of the proceedings of the judicial commission till the hearing is completed and a ruling is given.
13. In the meanwhile, knowingly or unwittingly, China became a factor in the internal controversy between the Government of Gilani and Kayani. The COAS went on a five-day visit to China on January 4. During his talks in Beijing, Chinese leaders, including Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, highlighted the role of the Pakistan Army in the strengthening of the strategic partnership between the two countries. Before Kayani left for Beijing, the party-controlled People’s Daily sought an interview with Gilani on the on-going controversy. In his replies to questions from the People’s Daily, Gilani reportedly described the actions of Kayani and Pasha in submitting their replies to the Supreme Court directly without getting them vetted and approved by the Government as unconstitutional and illegal.
14. So far, my google searches have not yielded an authentic version of Gilani’s interview to the People’s Daily. The only version that is available is the one disseminated by the Pakistani media. Since Gilani has not denied Pakistani media reports of his interview to the People’s Daily, the Pakistani media reports in this regard must be taken as correct.
15.The most significant part of this injected China factor is that Beijing has praised the Army during Kayani’s visit without referring to his tussle with the Government and at the same time used the party journal for disseminating Gilani’s version of the tussle. Thus, it has sought to remove any impression that its sympathies were with the Army.
16.Kayani has reacted promptly to Gilani’s allegations made in his reported interview to the People’s Daily. In a statement issued through the media cell of the GHQ, the Army said: “There can be no allegation more serious than what the honourable prime minister has levelled against COAS and DG ISI and has unfortunately charged the officers for violation of the constitution. This has very serious ramifications with potentially grievous consequences for the country”. The statement has underlined the fact that the replies of Kayani and Pasha were forwarded to the court through the Defence Secretary and not directly and hence there is no unconstitutionality or illegality by the Army and the ISI.
17. The statement significantly added: “. Allegiance to state and the constitution is and will always remain prime consideration for the respondent, who in this case has followed the book.”
18. What are the implications? The Defence Secretary, Kayani and Pasha were enjoying an extended tenure granted by the Government. The post-retirement contract of the Defence Secretary has been terminated by the Government due to his role in the controversy. The Army and the ISI apprehend that the Government might be contemplating a similar reversal of the extended tenure granted to Kayani and Pasha.
19. The Army has conveyed a message to the civilian leadership that while it has no intention of acting against the Government at present, it may not hesitate to act if the Government humiliates Kayani and Pasha by having them removed from office by cancelling their extended tenure. ( 12-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
There are four factors in the current War of Nerves in Pakistan which centres around mutually contradictory perceptions of the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of the actions taken by different institutions of the state in relation to the hearing in the Pakistan Supreme Court on the veracity of the so-called Memogate.
2. To recall, the Memogate scandal refers to the allegations made by Mansoor Ijaz, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, that the civilian leadership in Pakistan apprehended a coup by the Army after the US raid in Abbottabad on May 2 last which led to the death of Osama bin Laden. Ijaz had further alleged that in the wake of these fears the civilian Government used his contacts in the US administration through Hussain Haqqani, the then Pakistani Ambassador in Washington DC, for having a memo reached to Admiral Mike Mullen, the then Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, seeking US intervention to prevent a coup.
3. The allegations of Ijaz triggered off three parallel enquiries---- by the Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), by the committee on national security of the National Assembly assisted by the Ministry of the Interior and the Supreme Court.
4. The Army was the first to move in the matter. Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), despatched Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the ISI, to question Ijaz in Europe and take over from him his phone records pertaining to his telephone conversations with Haqqani in this matter. Kayani did not keep the Government of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani informed of his action in this matter.
5. While it would be difficult to characterise the Army’s action as unconstitutional or illegal, it was definitely incorrect. Kayani should have taken the prior clearance of Gilani before despatching Pasha to Europe for questioning Ijaz.
6. The Govt of Gilani was the second to move in the matter. It moved for an enquiry by the Committee on National Security of the National Assembly into the allegations of Ijaz, which were denied by Haqqani, who returned to Islamabad to face the enquiry and resigned. The Govt. ordered the Ministry of the Interior, which controls the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Police, to assist the enquiry by the National Assembly committee. It did not seek the assistance of the ISI in the enquiry.
7.Up to this point, the action of Gilani was constitutional, legal and correct. But after moving for an enquiry by the National Assembly committee, Gilani took another action which was incorrect and which could turn out post facto to be illegal if Haqqani is found guilty of treason for seeking the intervention of a foreign power against the Pakistan Army. Gilani took Haqqani under his physical protection instead of ordering the Police to strengthen his physical security. Initially, Haqqani allegedly lived in the house of Zardari and then moved into a building controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office and its security set-up. This was totally unwise on the part of Gilani.
8. The Supreme Court was the third to move in to add to the confusion. It received a number of private interest petitions seeking a judicial enquiry into the allegations made by Ijaz against Haqqani. One of the petitions was from Nawaz Sharif, former Prime Minister and the leader of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz faction ). The main intention of Nawaz in moving his petition was to exploit Ijaz’s allegations in his campaign against President Asif Ali Zardari and to teach a lesson to Haqqani, who in the 1990s had betrayed Nawaz by defecting from the PML to Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).
9. Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury issued notices to the various dramatis personae calling for their comments on the sustainability of Nawaz’s petition and the follow-up action to be taken by the Supreme Court on it. The Govt. of Gilani held that Nawaz’s petition for a judicial enquiry was unsustainable and that only the National Assembly Committee was competent to enquire into it. The Army took up a position which indirectly endorsed the demand for a judicial enquiry on the ground that the allegations made by Ijaz, if true, had national security implications. The Defence Secretary, in his reply to the Supreme Court, took up a position which sought to endorse the position of Kayani and not Gilani.
10. Kayani and Pasha had submitted their proposed replies to the Supreme Court to the Defence Secretary Lt.Gen. (retd) Khalid Naeem Lodhi for vetting before forwarding them to the Supreme Court. The Defence Secretary allegedly forwarded their replies in toto to the Supreme Court without telling Gilani about it and without the approval of the Cabinet as required under the rules of procedure relating to Govt. business..
11. There was a furore in the PPP and the ruling coalition over the actions of the Defence Secretary who has been removed from his post by Gilani after an enquiry into his unauthorised actions.
12. After considering the replies received from the dramatis personae, the Chief Justice rejected the opposition of the Gilani Government to a judicial enquiry and ordered a judicial enquiry by a commission headed by the Chief Justice of the Balochistan High Court and consisting, among others, of one more provincial Chief Justice. Hussain Haqqani has challenged the constitutionality of the action of the Chief Justice in appointing an enquiry commission consisting, among others, of judges of provincial courts. While the Chief Justice plays a role in the appointment of the judges of the provincial courts, under the Pakistan Constitution, according to Haqqani’s petition, the provincial High Courts are not subordinate to the Supreme Court. While the Chief Justice can appoint an enquiry commission consisting of judges of the Supreme Court, he cannot include provincial judges in it. In such matters, the power to appoint an enquiry commission with judges of provincial courts is with the Government and not with the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice has admitted Haqqani’s petition and ordered a hearing into it. But he has not accepted Haqqani’s request for a stay of the proceedings of the judicial commission till the hearing is completed and a ruling is given.
13. In the meanwhile, knowingly or unwittingly, China became a factor in the internal controversy between the Government of Gilani and Kayani. The COAS went on a five-day visit to China on January 4. During his talks in Beijing, Chinese leaders, including Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, highlighted the role of the Pakistan Army in the strengthening of the strategic partnership between the two countries. Before Kayani left for Beijing, the party-controlled People’s Daily sought an interview with Gilani on the on-going controversy. In his replies to questions from the People’s Daily, Gilani reportedly described the actions of Kayani and Pasha in submitting their replies to the Supreme Court directly without getting them vetted and approved by the Government as unconstitutional and illegal.
14. So far, my google searches have not yielded an authentic version of Gilani’s interview to the People’s Daily. The only version that is available is the one disseminated by the Pakistani media. Since Gilani has not denied Pakistani media reports of his interview to the People’s Daily, the Pakistani media reports in this regard must be taken as correct.
15.The most significant part of this injected China factor is that Beijing has praised the Army during Kayani’s visit without referring to his tussle with the Government and at the same time used the party journal for disseminating Gilani’s version of the tussle. Thus, it has sought to remove any impression that its sympathies were with the Army.
16.Kayani has reacted promptly to Gilani’s allegations made in his reported interview to the People’s Daily. In a statement issued through the media cell of the GHQ, the Army said: “There can be no allegation more serious than what the honourable prime minister has levelled against COAS and DG ISI and has unfortunately charged the officers for violation of the constitution. This has very serious ramifications with potentially grievous consequences for the country”. The statement has underlined the fact that the replies of Kayani and Pasha were forwarded to the court through the Defence Secretary and not directly and hence there is no unconstitutionality or illegality by the Army and the ISI.
17. The statement significantly added: “. Allegiance to state and the constitution is and will always remain prime consideration for the respondent, who in this case has followed the book.”
18. What are the implications? The Defence Secretary, Kayani and Pasha were enjoying an extended tenure granted by the Government. The post-retirement contract of the Defence Secretary has been terminated by the Government due to his role in the controversy. The Army and the ISI apprehend that the Government might be contemplating a similar reversal of the extended tenure granted to Kayani and Pasha.
19. The Army has conveyed a message to the civilian leadership that while it has no intention of acting against the Government at present, it may not hesitate to act if the Government humiliates Kayani and Pasha by having them removed from office by cancelling their extended tenure. ( 12-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Tuesday, January 10, 2012
AN EXTRAORDINARY HUMAN BEING FROM TIBET
B.RAMAN
All those who have faith in the future of humanity and of the long suffering people of Tibet should not fail to watch and further disseminate an extraordinary interview with an extraordinary human being, namely His Holiness the Dalai Lama, by Barkha Dutt, Group Editor of NDTV. The interview was carried out by her at Bodhgaya in India’s Bihar before the conclusion on January 10,2012, of the Kalachakra, a Tibetan Buddhist religious observance during which His Holiness conducts special teachings on Buddhism for 10 days and provides spiritual guidance to his followers.
2.Thousands of Buddhists from all over the world including the Tibetan areas and mainland China attended the Kalachakra and benefited from the teachings and guidance of His Holiness.
3.For those who were not able to watch the fascinating interview on NDTV, it is available on the web at http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/the-buck-stops-here/just-a-human-being-the-dalai-lama-in-bodh-gaya/220748?pfrom=home-lateststories.
4. The extraordinary human qualities of His Holiness as brought out in the interview were already well known. What is so gratifying in the interview is the infectious optimism of His Holiness regarding the future of the cause of his people. Ever since His Holiness transferred all his powers as the de jure head of the Tibetan-Government-in-exile to a successor elected by the Tibetan diaspora last year, a question repeatedly posed all over the world is : Is it the beginning of the end of the Tibetan cause?
5. The interview brings out very clearly the Dalai Lama’s confidence in the ultimate triumph of the cause of the Tibetan people and Tibetan Buddhism despite the continuing sufferings of his people in the Tibetan areas of China. The Dalai Lama rightly interprets the continuing instances of self-immolation in the Tibetan areas, particularly in Western Sichuan province---however regrettable for the loss of precious human lives--- as an indicator that the self-motivation of the Tibetan people ---monks as well as others--- and their determination to safeguard their religious, cultural and ethnic rights remain as strong as ever.
6.Neither His Holiness nor his senior advisers are happy over the loss of lives due to the self-immolations, but when people have no other way of expressing their protest and giving vent to their desperation, how can we blame them for taking this extreme step?
7. Despite the severe repressive measures of the Chinese, the attempts at self-immolation continue. There have been three more reports since the beginning of this year---two from Sichuan and one from the Qinghai province. The self-immolation of a 42-year-old monk---the oldest so far--- in the Qinghai province reportedly brought out thousands of Tibetans into the streets to express their solidarity with him.
8. However much one might regret these self-immolations, stopping them is in the hands of the Chinese rulers. Unless they stop their repression of the Tibetan people, restore their religious, cultural and ethnic rights and resume talks with officials of His Holiness for finding a mutually acceptable solution to the problems and aspirations of the Tibetans, this tragedy is likely to continue.
9.2012 is going to be a year of transition in China---with new leaderships taking over in the Communist Party of China and in the Government. This is the time for introspection by the Chinese leaders on a new and more humane way of dealing with the grievances and aspirations of the Tibetan people.
10. It is hoped that His Holiness’ interview would be seen by Chinese leaders and policy-makers and pave the way for such an introspection as a prelude to new policies meant to safeguard the dignity and culture of the Tibetan people instead of crushing them as Beijing has been doing till now. ( 10-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
All those who have faith in the future of humanity and of the long suffering people of Tibet should not fail to watch and further disseminate an extraordinary interview with an extraordinary human being, namely His Holiness the Dalai Lama, by Barkha Dutt, Group Editor of NDTV. The interview was carried out by her at Bodhgaya in India’s Bihar before the conclusion on January 10,2012, of the Kalachakra, a Tibetan Buddhist religious observance during which His Holiness conducts special teachings on Buddhism for 10 days and provides spiritual guidance to his followers.
2.Thousands of Buddhists from all over the world including the Tibetan areas and mainland China attended the Kalachakra and benefited from the teachings and guidance of His Holiness.
3.For those who were not able to watch the fascinating interview on NDTV, it is available on the web at http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/the-buck-stops-here/just-a-human-being-the-dalai-lama-in-bodh-gaya/220748?pfrom=home-lateststories.
4. The extraordinary human qualities of His Holiness as brought out in the interview were already well known. What is so gratifying in the interview is the infectious optimism of His Holiness regarding the future of the cause of his people. Ever since His Holiness transferred all his powers as the de jure head of the Tibetan-Government-in-exile to a successor elected by the Tibetan diaspora last year, a question repeatedly posed all over the world is : Is it the beginning of the end of the Tibetan cause?
5. The interview brings out very clearly the Dalai Lama’s confidence in the ultimate triumph of the cause of the Tibetan people and Tibetan Buddhism despite the continuing sufferings of his people in the Tibetan areas of China. The Dalai Lama rightly interprets the continuing instances of self-immolation in the Tibetan areas, particularly in Western Sichuan province---however regrettable for the loss of precious human lives--- as an indicator that the self-motivation of the Tibetan people ---monks as well as others--- and their determination to safeguard their religious, cultural and ethnic rights remain as strong as ever.
6.Neither His Holiness nor his senior advisers are happy over the loss of lives due to the self-immolations, but when people have no other way of expressing their protest and giving vent to their desperation, how can we blame them for taking this extreme step?
7. Despite the severe repressive measures of the Chinese, the attempts at self-immolation continue. There have been three more reports since the beginning of this year---two from Sichuan and one from the Qinghai province. The self-immolation of a 42-year-old monk---the oldest so far--- in the Qinghai province reportedly brought out thousands of Tibetans into the streets to express their solidarity with him.
8. However much one might regret these self-immolations, stopping them is in the hands of the Chinese rulers. Unless they stop their repression of the Tibetan people, restore their religious, cultural and ethnic rights and resume talks with officials of His Holiness for finding a mutually acceptable solution to the problems and aspirations of the Tibetans, this tragedy is likely to continue.
9.2012 is going to be a year of transition in China---with new leaderships taking over in the Communist Party of China and in the Government. This is the time for introspection by the Chinese leaders on a new and more humane way of dealing with the grievances and aspirations of the Tibetan people.
10. It is hoped that His Holiness’ interview would be seen by Chinese leaders and policy-makers and pave the way for such an introspection as a prelude to new policies meant to safeguard the dignity and culture of the Tibetan people instead of crushing them as Beijing has been doing till now. ( 10-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, January 9, 2012
THE LASHKAR-E-TOIBA ( LET ) AND AL QAEDA
B.RAMAN
( Replies sent by me on January 10,2012, in response to E-mailed questions from a Japanese journalist in Tokyo working for "Newsweek")
1.The LET is very active even now in Pakistan in ideological propaganda, running of training camps and charity work. It continues to be protected by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). However, it has not carried out any act of mass fatality terrorism in the Indian territory after the 26/11 terrorist strikes of 2008 in Mumbai.In view of the adverse publicity against the ISI after 26/11, the ISI has not used it for any act in Indian territory after 26/11.
2.The LET's first target is India and Indian nationals and interests in Afghanistan and other countries. Its next target is Israel and Israeli nationals and interests wherever they are. Its third target is US nationals and interests. It has the same capability and ideological motivation as Al Qaeda, but it is not trying to replace Al Qaeda, which continues to be a largely Arab organisation. The LET is largely a Pakistani organisation.Al Qaeda and the LET help each other and co-ordinate their operations, but they maintain their respective independent existence.
3.Hafiz Mohammed Sayeed and bin Laden strongly shared the Wahabi-Deobandi ideology.They supported the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Muslims to protect their religion.Both called for the destruction of Israel.Both called for a jihad against India and the US.But bin Laden was strongly anti-Shia and anti-Iran, but Sayeed is not.bin Laden was strongly against the Saudi monarchy and sought to organise a jihad in Saudi Arabia to overthrow the monarchy.Sayeed is supportive of the Saudi monarchy.The LET has a base in Saudi territory which has been allowed to function by the Saudi intelligence.Its operations in India are carried out some times from Pakistan and sometimes from Saudi Arabia. Its base in Saudi Arabia is used fror recruiting Indian Muslims from the large number of Indian Muslims going to Saudi Arabia for Haj/Umra pilgrimage.
( Replies sent by me on January 10,2012, in response to E-mailed questions from a Japanese journalist in Tokyo working for "Newsweek")
1.The LET is very active even now in Pakistan in ideological propaganda, running of training camps and charity work. It continues to be protected by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). However, it has not carried out any act of mass fatality terrorism in the Indian territory after the 26/11 terrorist strikes of 2008 in Mumbai.In view of the adverse publicity against the ISI after 26/11, the ISI has not used it for any act in Indian territory after 26/11.
2.The LET's first target is India and Indian nationals and interests in Afghanistan and other countries. Its next target is Israel and Israeli nationals and interests wherever they are. Its third target is US nationals and interests. It has the same capability and ideological motivation as Al Qaeda, but it is not trying to replace Al Qaeda, which continues to be a largely Arab organisation. The LET is largely a Pakistani organisation.Al Qaeda and the LET help each other and co-ordinate their operations, but they maintain their respective independent existence.
3.Hafiz Mohammed Sayeed and bin Laden strongly shared the Wahabi-Deobandi ideology.They supported the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Muslims to protect their religion.Both called for the destruction of Israel.Both called for a jihad against India and the US.But bin Laden was strongly anti-Shia and anti-Iran, but Sayeed is not.bin Laden was strongly against the Saudi monarchy and sought to organise a jihad in Saudi Arabia to overthrow the monarchy.Sayeed is supportive of the Saudi monarchy.The LET has a base in Saudi territory which has been allowed to function by the Saudi intelligence.Its operations in India are carried out some times from Pakistan and sometimes from Saudi Arabia. Its base in Saudi Arabia is used fror recruiting Indian Muslims from the large number of Indian Muslims going to Saudi Arabia for Haj/Umra pilgrimage.
THE WAR OF NERVES IN PAKISTAN: Q & A
B.RAMAN
Q: What is the likelihood of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), staging a coup, seizing political power and imposing the rule of the Army till fresh elections are held?
A: Little likely. The present tussle of the Pakistan Army over the so-called Memogate scandal is against Asif Ali Zardari, who is the elected Head of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The Army has no grievance against Yousef Raza Gilani, the elected Head of Government. If Gen.Kayani wants to seize power, he has to overthrow the Head of State who is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Acting against the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces would be an act of treason. In the history of Pakistan, there has been only one coup against the Head of State---- by Gen.Ayub Khan, the then COAS, against the then President Iskander Mirza. On October 7,1958, Mirza suspended the Constitution on the ground it was proving to be unworkable, imposed a martial law and appointed Ayub Khan as the Martial Law Administrator. On October 27,1958, Ayub Khan, who did not get along well with Mirza, forced him to go into exile in London and declared himself the President of Pakistan and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The coups of Zia ul-Haq in 1977 and of Gen.Pervez Musharraf in 1999 were against the elected Head of Government who was not the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Zia and Musharraf had no difficulty in getting their coup validated ex-post facto either by a compliant President or judiciary or both under the so-called doctrine of necessity.
Gen.Kayani would not like to place himself in a position where he has to overthrow the elected Head of State of Pakistan and the constitutionally designated Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury, the Chief Justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court, has made it clear on many occasions that there is no question of the judiciary validating a coup ex post facto under the doctrine of necessity.
If Kayani stages a coup against Zardari and fails to get it validated by the judiciary he would have committed an act of treason on two counts---for overthrowing his Head of State and for acting against his Supreme Commander. All the other senior officers, who go along with a possible coup plot by Kayani, would be liable to be tried for conspiring and acting against their Supreme Commander. Many of them may not want to find themselves in such a situation.
Q. Does that totally rule out the possibility of an anti-Zardari coup?
A. Not necessarily. If there is a serious law and order situation in Pakistan, the Army under Kayani may still stage a coup unmindful of the post facto legal consequences. One does not presently see the possibility of such a situation arising.
Q. If an outright coup is ruled out, what is the fall-back position available to Kayani to save his face?
A.The fall-back option available to the Army is to manipulate the situation in such a manner so as to make it untenable for Zardari to continue as the Head of State and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The Army could achieve this by driving a wedge between Zardari and Gilani or by undermining Zardari’s political base in the Pakistan People’s Party. Such a contingency is unlikely. Both Gilani and the PPP have remained steadfast in their loyalty to Zardari so far.
A second option available to the Army is by having the COAS declared as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This would make it easier for Kayani to act against Zardari. In May last year, after the USA’s Abbottabad raid, a private person filed a petition before the Lahore High Court to have the COAS declared as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Such a change could be brought in only by a Constitutional amendment. With the PPP and its Allies having the majority in the National Assembly and in the provincial Assemblies of Sindh and Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa such an amendment is unlikely.
The other option available to the Army is to work and hope for an adverse ruling by the Supreme Court against Zardari in the Memogate case.The possibility of the Supreme Court giving a direct finding against Zardari is weak now. Even Manzoor Ijaz blames only Hussain Haqqani, former Pakistani Ambassador to the US, for the contents of the Memo seeking US assistance to prevent a coup after the Abbottabad raid of May 2 last year against Osama bin Laden. He has not definitively blamed Zardari for the contents of the Memo.
The best the Army can hope for from the Supreme Court is for an adverse ruling against Haqqani holding him guilty of an act of treason for having sought the assistance of a foreign Govt for acting against the Pakistan Army. If the court gives such a ruling, Zardari could become an accomplice of Haqqani’s act of treason by virtue of sheltering him initially in his house and subsequently in Gilani’s house after Haqqani returned from Washington DC to resign.
Even in such an eventuality, the Supreme Court cannot act against Zardari unless the National Assembly in which the PPP and its allies have a majority lifts Zardari’s immunity against prosecution.
Q.Is there any political and honourable way out available?
A.The only honourable way out is by dissolving the National Assembly before its term expires in March next year and calling for fresh elections later this year. However, if the PPP and Zardari return to power in that election, it will pose an embarrassing situation for Kayani as well as the Chief Justice.
Pakistan is in for a long period of an excruciating war of nerves in which there will be neither honour nor victory for any of the dramatis personae (9-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Q: What is the likelihood of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), staging a coup, seizing political power and imposing the rule of the Army till fresh elections are held?
A: Little likely. The present tussle of the Pakistan Army over the so-called Memogate scandal is against Asif Ali Zardari, who is the elected Head of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The Army has no grievance against Yousef Raza Gilani, the elected Head of Government. If Gen.Kayani wants to seize power, he has to overthrow the Head of State who is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Acting against the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces would be an act of treason. In the history of Pakistan, there has been only one coup against the Head of State---- by Gen.Ayub Khan, the then COAS, against the then President Iskander Mirza. On October 7,1958, Mirza suspended the Constitution on the ground it was proving to be unworkable, imposed a martial law and appointed Ayub Khan as the Martial Law Administrator. On October 27,1958, Ayub Khan, who did not get along well with Mirza, forced him to go into exile in London and declared himself the President of Pakistan and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The coups of Zia ul-Haq in 1977 and of Gen.Pervez Musharraf in 1999 were against the elected Head of Government who was not the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Zia and Musharraf had no difficulty in getting their coup validated ex-post facto either by a compliant President or judiciary or both under the so-called doctrine of necessity.
Gen.Kayani would not like to place himself in a position where he has to overthrow the elected Head of State of Pakistan and the constitutionally designated Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury, the Chief Justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court, has made it clear on many occasions that there is no question of the judiciary validating a coup ex post facto under the doctrine of necessity.
If Kayani stages a coup against Zardari and fails to get it validated by the judiciary he would have committed an act of treason on two counts---for overthrowing his Head of State and for acting against his Supreme Commander. All the other senior officers, who go along with a possible coup plot by Kayani, would be liable to be tried for conspiring and acting against their Supreme Commander. Many of them may not want to find themselves in such a situation.
Q. Does that totally rule out the possibility of an anti-Zardari coup?
A. Not necessarily. If there is a serious law and order situation in Pakistan, the Army under Kayani may still stage a coup unmindful of the post facto legal consequences. One does not presently see the possibility of such a situation arising.
Q. If an outright coup is ruled out, what is the fall-back position available to Kayani to save his face?
A.The fall-back option available to the Army is to manipulate the situation in such a manner so as to make it untenable for Zardari to continue as the Head of State and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The Army could achieve this by driving a wedge between Zardari and Gilani or by undermining Zardari’s political base in the Pakistan People’s Party. Such a contingency is unlikely. Both Gilani and the PPP have remained steadfast in their loyalty to Zardari so far.
A second option available to the Army is by having the COAS declared as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This would make it easier for Kayani to act against Zardari. In May last year, after the USA’s Abbottabad raid, a private person filed a petition before the Lahore High Court to have the COAS declared as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Such a change could be brought in only by a Constitutional amendment. With the PPP and its Allies having the majority in the National Assembly and in the provincial Assemblies of Sindh and Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa such an amendment is unlikely.
The other option available to the Army is to work and hope for an adverse ruling by the Supreme Court against Zardari in the Memogate case.The possibility of the Supreme Court giving a direct finding against Zardari is weak now. Even Manzoor Ijaz blames only Hussain Haqqani, former Pakistani Ambassador to the US, for the contents of the Memo seeking US assistance to prevent a coup after the Abbottabad raid of May 2 last year against Osama bin Laden. He has not definitively blamed Zardari for the contents of the Memo.
The best the Army can hope for from the Supreme Court is for an adverse ruling against Haqqani holding him guilty of an act of treason for having sought the assistance of a foreign Govt for acting against the Pakistan Army. If the court gives such a ruling, Zardari could become an accomplice of Haqqani’s act of treason by virtue of sheltering him initially in his house and subsequently in Gilani’s house after Haqqani returned from Washington DC to resign.
Even in such an eventuality, the Supreme Court cannot act against Zardari unless the National Assembly in which the PPP and its allies have a majority lifts Zardari’s immunity against prosecution.
Q.Is there any political and honourable way out available?
A.The only honourable way out is by dissolving the National Assembly before its term expires in March next year and calling for fresh elections later this year. However, if the PPP and Zardari return to power in that election, it will pose an embarrassing situation for Kayani as well as the Chief Justice.
Pakistan is in for a long period of an excruciating war of nerves in which there will be neither honour nor victory for any of the dramatis personae (9-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
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