B.RAMAN
Q: What is the likelihood of Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), staging a coup, seizing political power and imposing the rule of the Army till fresh elections are held?
A: Little likely. The present tussle of the Pakistan Army over the so-called Memogate scandal is against Asif Ali Zardari, who is the elected Head of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The Army has no grievance against Yousef Raza Gilani, the elected Head of Government. If Gen.Kayani wants to seize power, he has to overthrow the Head of State who is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Acting against the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces would be an act of treason. In the history of Pakistan, there has been only one coup against the Head of State---- by Gen.Ayub Khan, the then COAS, against the then President Iskander Mirza. On October 7,1958, Mirza suspended the Constitution on the ground it was proving to be unworkable, imposed a martial law and appointed Ayub Khan as the Martial Law Administrator. On October 27,1958, Ayub Khan, who did not get along well with Mirza, forced him to go into exile in London and declared himself the President of Pakistan and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The coups of Zia ul-Haq in 1977 and of Gen.Pervez Musharraf in 1999 were against the elected Head of Government who was not the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Zia and Musharraf had no difficulty in getting their coup validated ex-post facto either by a compliant President or judiciary or both under the so-called doctrine of necessity.
Gen.Kayani would not like to place himself in a position where he has to overthrow the elected Head of State of Pakistan and the constitutionally designated Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury, the Chief Justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court, has made it clear on many occasions that there is no question of the judiciary validating a coup ex post facto under the doctrine of necessity.
If Kayani stages a coup against Zardari and fails to get it validated by the judiciary he would have committed an act of treason on two counts---for overthrowing his Head of State and for acting against his Supreme Commander. All the other senior officers, who go along with a possible coup plot by Kayani, would be liable to be tried for conspiring and acting against their Supreme Commander. Many of them may not want to find themselves in such a situation.
Q. Does that totally rule out the possibility of an anti-Zardari coup?
A. Not necessarily. If there is a serious law and order situation in Pakistan, the Army under Kayani may still stage a coup unmindful of the post facto legal consequences. One does not presently see the possibility of such a situation arising.
Q. If an outright coup is ruled out, what is the fall-back position available to Kayani to save his face?
A.The fall-back option available to the Army is to manipulate the situation in such a manner so as to make it untenable for Zardari to continue as the Head of State and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The Army could achieve this by driving a wedge between Zardari and Gilani or by undermining Zardari’s political base in the Pakistan People’s Party. Such a contingency is unlikely. Both Gilani and the PPP have remained steadfast in their loyalty to Zardari so far.
A second option available to the Army is by having the COAS declared as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. This would make it easier for Kayani to act against Zardari. In May last year, after the USA’s Abbottabad raid, a private person filed a petition before the Lahore High Court to have the COAS declared as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Such a change could be brought in only by a Constitutional amendment. With the PPP and its Allies having the majority in the National Assembly and in the provincial Assemblies of Sindh and Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa such an amendment is unlikely.
The other option available to the Army is to work and hope for an adverse ruling by the Supreme Court against Zardari in the Memogate case.The possibility of the Supreme Court giving a direct finding against Zardari is weak now. Even Manzoor Ijaz blames only Hussain Haqqani, former Pakistani Ambassador to the US, for the contents of the Memo seeking US assistance to prevent a coup after the Abbottabad raid of May 2 last year against Osama bin Laden. He has not definitively blamed Zardari for the contents of the Memo.
The best the Army can hope for from the Supreme Court is for an adverse ruling against Haqqani holding him guilty of an act of treason for having sought the assistance of a foreign Govt for acting against the Pakistan Army. If the court gives such a ruling, Zardari could become an accomplice of Haqqani’s act of treason by virtue of sheltering him initially in his house and subsequently in Gilani’s house after Haqqani returned from Washington DC to resign.
Even in such an eventuality, the Supreme Court cannot act against Zardari unless the National Assembly in which the PPP and its allies have a majority lifts Zardari’s immunity against prosecution.
Q.Is there any political and honourable way out available?
A.The only honourable way out is by dissolving the National Assembly before its term expires in March next year and calling for fresh elections later this year. However, if the PPP and Zardari return to power in that election, it will pose an embarrassing situation for Kayani as well as the Chief Justice.
Pakistan is in for a long period of an excruciating war of nerves in which there will be neither honour nor victory for any of the dramatis personae (9-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, January 9, 2012
Sunday, January 8, 2012
MAIN ELEMENTS OF US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS ASIA
B.RAMAN
( Salient points of a presentation that I will be making at a seminar on Re-evaluating US Foreign Policy Towards Asia being jointly organised at the University of Madras on January 9,2012, by the Chennai Centre For China Studies, the Centre For Asia Studies, Chennai, and the Department of Politics and Public Administration of the University of Madras )
As President Obama nears the end of his first term and gets ready to seek a second term, he has sought to give a new focus to the US foreign policy towards Asia.
2.This new focus is marked by two characteristics.Firstly, an open and uninhibited expression of US concerns over China’s ever-increasing economic and military capabilities and its far from transparent intentions. Secondly, an open expression of the US determination to maintain and strengthen its capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region in order to safeguard the strategic interests of not only the US, but also other like-minded countries which share the US concerns over China’s capabilities and intentions. Prominent among such like-minded countries are Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam and India.
3. While the first three years of Obama’s first term were marked by preoccupation with the threats emanating to the security of the US Homeland from the Af-Pak region and from the global terrorists operating from that region, the coming years of the Obama Presidency will be marked by a new preoccupation with likely threats to the US economic, commercial and other strategic interests from the increasing capabilities and intentions of China and to the critical infrastructure ---civilian as well as military-- in the US Homeland from the well-concealed Chinese cyber war capabilities.
4.The US does not anticipate a conventional war with China, but it does fear a major threat from China to its naval primacy in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions and to its commercial interests in the region marked by the passage of nearly US $ 1.2 trillion of its foreign trade every year through the South China Sea. The US also fears a major threat to its critical infrastructure in the US Homeland as well as overseas from the Chinese cyber war capabilities.
5. The US nervousness is increased by the fact that while considerable information is available on China’s modernisation and expansion of its conventional, nuclear and space-related capabilities, very little information is available on China’s cyber war capabilities. Till recently, fears over likely threats to US nationals and interests from the attempts of Al Qaeda-led global terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction capabilities remained an important driving force of the US strategic doctrine. Since the beginning of last year, there are indications that fears over likely threats to the US critical infrastructure, in times of peace and war, from China’s cyber war capabilities have become an important driving force of the US strategic doctrine relating to the Asia-Pacific region.
6. Since May last year, there have been reliable reports in sections of the US media about the examination of the outlines of a cyber war doctrine to meet the new needs of the expanding threat scenario. A significant element of the cyber war doctrine reportedly under contemplation is making explicit the US determination to use its military forces in response to a cyber attack if the gravity of the attack crosses a certain threshold. These reports of a cyber war doctrine under evolution and the recent decisions of the Obama Administration to maintain and strengthen its military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region are meant to convey a carefully-disguised cautionary to China to behave itself not only in the high seas, but also in the cyber space. The US is determined to prevent China from acquiring an asymmetric advantage in cyber space by threatening China with a military response against targets in its territory to neutralise its cyber war capabilities should it become necessary.
7. The Pentagon’s strategic defence guidance document titled "Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense" released at a press conference attended by Obama on January 5,2012, says as follows: “Over the long term, China’'s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. However, the growth of China’'s military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region. The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty obligations and with international law.␣ ␣ Working closely with our network of allies and partners, we will continue to promote a rules-based international order that ensures underlying stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation.”
8. The focus in the Pentagon document released to the media is on China’s non-cyber capabilities, but there are reports that the US is equally concerned---if not more---over China’s cyber warfare capabilities and intentions.
9. The US is still keen on strengthening a co-operative convergence with China to restore the health of the global economy, to deal with problems relating to climate and environment and to de-nuclearise Iran and North Korea. Nuclear non- proliferation will continue to be an important US foreign policy objective. For this, it needs the co-operation of China. At the same time, there are growing concerns in Washington DC that the USA’s benign strategic intentions and objectives might not be matched by equally benign Chinese intentions and objectives. It would, therefore, be necessary to reinforce the US presence and capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region.
10. This objective is sought to be achieved by a unilateral revamp of the US presence and capabilities and through co-operation with other like-minded and equally concerned countries without giving an impression of an attempt to promote a new alliance to contain China. What the new Pentagon document talks of is not a new alliance, but a network of US allies and partners. Though not explicitly stated, the US obviously views Japan, South Korea and Australia as allies in this network and India, Vietnam, the Philippines and possibly other ASEAN countries as partners. These unilateral and multilateral efforts will be projected in the months to come not as an attempt to contain China, but as an exercise to bring China into the mainstream of Asian peace and security.
11. The US is interested in India playing an activist role in this new exercise for a network of allies and partners, but does India reciprocate this interest? The answer to this is not clear. India has already been playing an activist role in relation to its strategic co-operation with Myanmar, Vietnam , Japan and South Korea. It has also been increasing its strategic co-operation with Singapore and Australia. Its relations with the US have improved in the fields of counter-terrorism and maritime security. But India is still inclined to view these relationships as without any linkages or networking which could trigger off alarm in Beijing.
12.India and the other Asian countries with which India has established a one-to-one strategic partnership share the openly expressed US concerns over China’s capabilities, intentions and objectives, but they are not prepared to say so openly. They would want to promote a policy of mutual consultations and assistance in security matters, but not in a manner that could alarm China.
13.India has its own unique concerns relating to China arising from the failure of the India-China border talks to make any progress and the growing strategic co-operation between China and Pakistan. It has to evolve its own strategy for dealing with China in a manner that would not make these two issues more complex and complicated than they are now. What would be in India’s interest is not a networked relationship, but a mutually assisted and reinforced relationship on a one-to-one basis with a gradually expanding basket of issues that could promote a strategic convergence.
14.Two such issues in the Indo-US strategic basket relate to counter-terrorism and maritime security. The time has come to add cyber security not only against non-State actors, but also against common States of concern to this basket. China’s undetermined cyber warfare capabilities could pose as much of a threat to India as they do to the US. The time has also come for the US and Indian Navies to think of a graduated surge in their navy-to-navy co-operation by way of training, joint exercises, exchanges of visits, intelligence liaison etc. ( 8-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
( Salient points of a presentation that I will be making at a seminar on Re-evaluating US Foreign Policy Towards Asia being jointly organised at the University of Madras on January 9,2012, by the Chennai Centre For China Studies, the Centre For Asia Studies, Chennai, and the Department of Politics and Public Administration of the University of Madras )
As President Obama nears the end of his first term and gets ready to seek a second term, he has sought to give a new focus to the US foreign policy towards Asia.
2.This new focus is marked by two characteristics.Firstly, an open and uninhibited expression of US concerns over China’s ever-increasing economic and military capabilities and its far from transparent intentions. Secondly, an open expression of the US determination to maintain and strengthen its capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region in order to safeguard the strategic interests of not only the US, but also other like-minded countries which share the US concerns over China’s capabilities and intentions. Prominent among such like-minded countries are Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam and India.
3. While the first three years of Obama’s first term were marked by preoccupation with the threats emanating to the security of the US Homeland from the Af-Pak region and from the global terrorists operating from that region, the coming years of the Obama Presidency will be marked by a new preoccupation with likely threats to the US economic, commercial and other strategic interests from the increasing capabilities and intentions of China and to the critical infrastructure ---civilian as well as military-- in the US Homeland from the well-concealed Chinese cyber war capabilities.
4.The US does not anticipate a conventional war with China, but it does fear a major threat from China to its naval primacy in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions and to its commercial interests in the region marked by the passage of nearly US $ 1.2 trillion of its foreign trade every year through the South China Sea. The US also fears a major threat to its critical infrastructure in the US Homeland as well as overseas from the Chinese cyber war capabilities.
5. The US nervousness is increased by the fact that while considerable information is available on China’s modernisation and expansion of its conventional, nuclear and space-related capabilities, very little information is available on China’s cyber war capabilities. Till recently, fears over likely threats to US nationals and interests from the attempts of Al Qaeda-led global terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction capabilities remained an important driving force of the US strategic doctrine. Since the beginning of last year, there are indications that fears over likely threats to the US critical infrastructure, in times of peace and war, from China’s cyber war capabilities have become an important driving force of the US strategic doctrine relating to the Asia-Pacific region.
6. Since May last year, there have been reliable reports in sections of the US media about the examination of the outlines of a cyber war doctrine to meet the new needs of the expanding threat scenario. A significant element of the cyber war doctrine reportedly under contemplation is making explicit the US determination to use its military forces in response to a cyber attack if the gravity of the attack crosses a certain threshold. These reports of a cyber war doctrine under evolution and the recent decisions of the Obama Administration to maintain and strengthen its military capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region are meant to convey a carefully-disguised cautionary to China to behave itself not only in the high seas, but also in the cyber space. The US is determined to prevent China from acquiring an asymmetric advantage in cyber space by threatening China with a military response against targets in its territory to neutralise its cyber war capabilities should it become necessary.
7. The Pentagon’s strategic defence guidance document titled "Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense" released at a press conference attended by Obama on January 5,2012, says as follows: “Over the long term, China’'s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. However, the growth of China’'s military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region. The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty obligations and with international law.␣ ␣ Working closely with our network of allies and partners, we will continue to promote a rules-based international order that ensures underlying stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation.”
8. The focus in the Pentagon document released to the media is on China’s non-cyber capabilities, but there are reports that the US is equally concerned---if not more---over China’s cyber warfare capabilities and intentions.
9. The US is still keen on strengthening a co-operative convergence with China to restore the health of the global economy, to deal with problems relating to climate and environment and to de-nuclearise Iran and North Korea. Nuclear non- proliferation will continue to be an important US foreign policy objective. For this, it needs the co-operation of China. At the same time, there are growing concerns in Washington DC that the USA’s benign strategic intentions and objectives might not be matched by equally benign Chinese intentions and objectives. It would, therefore, be necessary to reinforce the US presence and capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region.
10. This objective is sought to be achieved by a unilateral revamp of the US presence and capabilities and through co-operation with other like-minded and equally concerned countries without giving an impression of an attempt to promote a new alliance to contain China. What the new Pentagon document talks of is not a new alliance, but a network of US allies and partners. Though not explicitly stated, the US obviously views Japan, South Korea and Australia as allies in this network and India, Vietnam, the Philippines and possibly other ASEAN countries as partners. These unilateral and multilateral efforts will be projected in the months to come not as an attempt to contain China, but as an exercise to bring China into the mainstream of Asian peace and security.
11. The US is interested in India playing an activist role in this new exercise for a network of allies and partners, but does India reciprocate this interest? The answer to this is not clear. India has already been playing an activist role in relation to its strategic co-operation with Myanmar, Vietnam , Japan and South Korea. It has also been increasing its strategic co-operation with Singapore and Australia. Its relations with the US have improved in the fields of counter-terrorism and maritime security. But India is still inclined to view these relationships as without any linkages or networking which could trigger off alarm in Beijing.
12.India and the other Asian countries with which India has established a one-to-one strategic partnership share the openly expressed US concerns over China’s capabilities, intentions and objectives, but they are not prepared to say so openly. They would want to promote a policy of mutual consultations and assistance in security matters, but not in a manner that could alarm China.
13.India has its own unique concerns relating to China arising from the failure of the India-China border talks to make any progress and the growing strategic co-operation between China and Pakistan. It has to evolve its own strategy for dealing with China in a manner that would not make these two issues more complex and complicated than they are now. What would be in India’s interest is not a networked relationship, but a mutually assisted and reinforced relationship on a one-to-one basis with a gradually expanding basket of issues that could promote a strategic convergence.
14.Two such issues in the Indo-US strategic basket relate to counter-terrorism and maritime security. The time has come to add cyber security not only against non-State actors, but also against common States of concern to this basket. China’s undetermined cyber warfare capabilities could pose as much of a threat to India as they do to the US. The time has also come for the US and Indian Navies to think of a graduated surge in their navy-to-navy co-operation by way of training, joint exercises, exchanges of visits, intelligence liaison etc. ( 8-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Thursday, January 5, 2012
CHINA BOLSTERS PAK ARMY’S IMAGE AS IT CONFRONTS THE US & THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP
B.RAMAN
As the Pakistan Army confronts the US on the one hand and the civilian leadership headed by President Asif Ali Zardari on the other in a triangular re-assertion of its primacy in strategic matters, China’s political and military leadership has carefully chosen to bolster the image of the Pakistan Army as the driving force of the all-weather strategic relationship between the two countries.
2. This carefully modulated exercise is evident from the reports emanating from Beijing on the current six-day visit of Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), to China, which started on January 4,2012.
3. Gen.Kayani has already had some high-profile engagements in Beijing---including a well-publicised 75-minute meeting with Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, another meeting with General Liang Guanglie, China’s Defense Minister, and discussions with senior officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
4. Attempts have been made by Chinese and Pakistani sources to underline the fact that this is Gen.Kayani’s third visit to China as the COAS in an apparent bid to discourage speculation connecting the visit with the Army’s confrontation with the US on the one hand and the elected Pakistani civilian leadership on the other.
5.Despite this, it is significant that the reported remarks of Wen in his discussions with Kayani as disseminated by the official Xinhua news agency highlighted the role of the Pakistan Army in strengthening the strategic relationship between the two countries.
6. The Xinhua despatches as carried by the Party-run People’s Daily and the PLA Daily quoted Wen as having stated as follows: “The premier said Pakistani armed forces have made important contributions toward maintaining bilateral relations and boosting the Pakistan-China strategic cooperative partnership. He pledged to support stronger military exchanges and cooperation between both countries.”
7. In the past, Zardari had been making frequent visits to China ostensibly for studying the Chinese model of development. These visits and his interactions with Chinese leaders and officials had created an impression that the Chinese felt comfortable with his leadership in Pakistan and would not like this to be disturbed.
8. The reports emanating from Beijing so far on the visit of Kayani and his interactions with Chinese leaders and PLA officers clearly indicate an attempt by the Chinese, to the satisfaction of Kayani, to underline the continued importance attached by them to the role of the Pakistan Army in strategic matters.
9.While the Chinese have avoided saying anything that might be construed as marking a distance from Zardari, who is perceived by the Pakistan Army as soft to the US, it is clear that the Chinese feel that it would be in their interest that the Pakistan Army maintains its primacy in strategic and national security matters.
10. The Xinhua despatches have also reported as follows: “Kayani, who is currently on a six-day visit to China, expressed gratitude for China’s efforts to aid Pakistan’s economic growth and social stability, as well as China’s support for Pakistan’s efforts to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Developing the Pakistan-China strategic cooperative partnership is a cornerstone of the foreign strategies of both countries, Kayani said.”
11.There is a significant difference in the report on Kayani’s talks with Wen as put out by the Government-run Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) and the Xinhua. The APP report said: “Premier Wen said that China and Pakistan support safeguarding of each other’s core interests and thanked Pakistan for its people’s consistent stand on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang.”
12. There is no reference in the Xinhua despatches put out so far to the Chinese support to Pakistan’s core interests as claimed by the APP. While there have been no references to Pakistan’s relations with India and the US in the reports on the visit emanating from Pakistan as well as China, it is to be noted that the burden of Kayani’s remarks in Beijing as reported by the Pakistani media has been on Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan.
13. The APP has reported as follows: “Pakistan is pursuing a holistic concept of internal and external security. Pakistan’s objective is to see a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. If Afghanistan is peaceful and stable, Pakistan will be the biggest beneficiary, Kayani said.”
14.The Xinhua despatches do not refer to Kayani’s reported remarks on Afghanistan. From a study of the reports on the visit emanating so far, two conclusions emerge regarding the objectives of Kayani’s visit: Firstly, to seek a reiteration of Chinese support for the primacy of the Pakistani military leadership in strategic matters and secondly, to seek a recognition of Afghanistan as a core interest of Pakistan as a quid pro quo to Pakistan’s recognition of Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan as the core interests of China.
15. While going half way to meet the expectations of the Pakistan Army, the Chinese have taken care to avoid any misperception of their taking sides in Pakistan’s differences with the US and India and in the internal confrontation between the Pakistani Army and the civilian leadership, particularly Zardari. ( 6-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
As the Pakistan Army confronts the US on the one hand and the civilian leadership headed by President Asif Ali Zardari on the other in a triangular re-assertion of its primacy in strategic matters, China’s political and military leadership has carefully chosen to bolster the image of the Pakistan Army as the driving force of the all-weather strategic relationship between the two countries.
2. This carefully modulated exercise is evident from the reports emanating from Beijing on the current six-day visit of Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), to China, which started on January 4,2012.
3. Gen.Kayani has already had some high-profile engagements in Beijing---including a well-publicised 75-minute meeting with Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, another meeting with General Liang Guanglie, China’s Defense Minister, and discussions with senior officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
4. Attempts have been made by Chinese and Pakistani sources to underline the fact that this is Gen.Kayani’s third visit to China as the COAS in an apparent bid to discourage speculation connecting the visit with the Army’s confrontation with the US on the one hand and the elected Pakistani civilian leadership on the other.
5.Despite this, it is significant that the reported remarks of Wen in his discussions with Kayani as disseminated by the official Xinhua news agency highlighted the role of the Pakistan Army in strengthening the strategic relationship between the two countries.
6. The Xinhua despatches as carried by the Party-run People’s Daily and the PLA Daily quoted Wen as having stated as follows: “The premier said Pakistani armed forces have made important contributions toward maintaining bilateral relations and boosting the Pakistan-China strategic cooperative partnership. He pledged to support stronger military exchanges and cooperation between both countries.”
7. In the past, Zardari had been making frequent visits to China ostensibly for studying the Chinese model of development. These visits and his interactions with Chinese leaders and officials had created an impression that the Chinese felt comfortable with his leadership in Pakistan and would not like this to be disturbed.
8. The reports emanating from Beijing so far on the visit of Kayani and his interactions with Chinese leaders and PLA officers clearly indicate an attempt by the Chinese, to the satisfaction of Kayani, to underline the continued importance attached by them to the role of the Pakistan Army in strategic matters.
9.While the Chinese have avoided saying anything that might be construed as marking a distance from Zardari, who is perceived by the Pakistan Army as soft to the US, it is clear that the Chinese feel that it would be in their interest that the Pakistan Army maintains its primacy in strategic and national security matters.
10. The Xinhua despatches have also reported as follows: “Kayani, who is currently on a six-day visit to China, expressed gratitude for China’s efforts to aid Pakistan’s economic growth and social stability, as well as China’s support for Pakistan’s efforts to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Developing the Pakistan-China strategic cooperative partnership is a cornerstone of the foreign strategies of both countries, Kayani said.”
11.There is a significant difference in the report on Kayani’s talks with Wen as put out by the Government-run Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) and the Xinhua. The APP report said: “Premier Wen said that China and Pakistan support safeguarding of each other’s core interests and thanked Pakistan for its people’s consistent stand on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang.”
12. There is no reference in the Xinhua despatches put out so far to the Chinese support to Pakistan’s core interests as claimed by the APP. While there have been no references to Pakistan’s relations with India and the US in the reports on the visit emanating from Pakistan as well as China, it is to be noted that the burden of Kayani’s remarks in Beijing as reported by the Pakistani media has been on Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan.
13. The APP has reported as follows: “Pakistan is pursuing a holistic concept of internal and external security. Pakistan’s objective is to see a peaceful and stable Afghanistan. If Afghanistan is peaceful and stable, Pakistan will be the biggest beneficiary, Kayani said.”
14.The Xinhua despatches do not refer to Kayani’s reported remarks on Afghanistan. From a study of the reports on the visit emanating so far, two conclusions emerge regarding the objectives of Kayani’s visit: Firstly, to seek a reiteration of Chinese support for the primacy of the Pakistani military leadership in strategic matters and secondly, to seek a recognition of Afghanistan as a core interest of Pakistan as a quid pro quo to Pakistan’s recognition of Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan as the core interests of China.
15. While going half way to meet the expectations of the Pakistan Army, the Chinese have taken care to avoid any misperception of their taking sides in Pakistan’s differences with the US and India and in the internal confrontation between the Pakistani Army and the civilian leadership, particularly Zardari. ( 6-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
REMINISCENCES OF LATE H.S.CHITTARANJAN IPS, FORMER DGP OF ASSAM & MEGHALAYA
REMINISCENCES OF THE LATE H.S. CHITTARANJAN, MY 1961 BATCHBATE IN THE INDIAN POLICE SERVICE, AS RECORDED BY KALPANA, HIS DAUGHTER, IN DECEMBER 2009, JUST AFTER HE WAS DIAGNOSED WITH CANCER. HE PASSED AWAY IN OCTOBER 2010.
http://youtu.be/0vwOer6vvxs
My tributes to him may be seen at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.com/2010/10/hs-chittaranjan-indian-police-service.html
B.Raman, 6-1-12
http://youtu.be/0vwOer6vvxs
My tributes to him may be seen at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.com/2010/10/hs-chittaranjan-indian-police-service.html
B.Raman, 6-1-12
MY GOOD LUCK CHARM IS GONE
B.RAMAN
S.P.Chibber, who retired as a Director in the West Asia Division of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), on August 31,1994, passed away at his home near Gurgaon in Haryana on the morning of December 31, 2011. Chibber, who had been under treatment for cancer for some years, died in his sleep. He was 75.
2.Chibber joined the intelligence profession in a junior executive cadre and rose to the rank of Director by sheer hard work and excellent performance as a linguist, field operative and analyst in headquarters. He acquired excellent proficiency in Arabic and French and had served with distinction in West Asia and West Europe.
3. He used to assist the staff officers to the head of the R&AW and in that capacity was associated with me in some difficult and sensitive operations. We shared sharp operational instincts and a sixth or seventh sense which alerted us to operational dangers and traps.
4. He was a devoted colleague and a steadfast friend and we shared happy and gratifying memories of some difficult operations in which we were jointly involved. In the years of our retirement, we were both diagnosed with cancer---he three years before me. In our common fight against cancer ---as in our joint operations against Pakistan and terrorism---we held each other’s hand and sustained each other’s courage and morale. We were each other’s good luck charm.
5. My good luck charm is gone ( 5-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
S.P.Chibber, who retired as a Director in the West Asia Division of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), on August 31,1994, passed away at his home near Gurgaon in Haryana on the morning of December 31, 2011. Chibber, who had been under treatment for cancer for some years, died in his sleep. He was 75.
2.Chibber joined the intelligence profession in a junior executive cadre and rose to the rank of Director by sheer hard work and excellent performance as a linguist, field operative and analyst in headquarters. He acquired excellent proficiency in Arabic and French and had served with distinction in West Asia and West Europe.
3. He used to assist the staff officers to the head of the R&AW and in that capacity was associated with me in some difficult and sensitive operations. We shared sharp operational instincts and a sixth or seventh sense which alerted us to operational dangers and traps.
4. He was a devoted colleague and a steadfast friend and we shared happy and gratifying memories of some difficult operations in which we were jointly involved. In the years of our retirement, we were both diagnosed with cancer---he three years before me. In our common fight against cancer ---as in our joint operations against Pakistan and terrorism---we held each other’s hand and sustained each other’s courage and morale. We were each other’s good luck charm.
5. My good luck charm is gone ( 5-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, January 2, 2012
CHINA: A BAD TASTE IN INDIA’S MOUTH
B.RAMAN
The alleged ill-treatment of S.Balachandran, an Indian diplomat posted in the Consulate in Shanghai, and two Indian employees of an Yemeni firm by local Chinese authorities in the city of Yiwu , about 300 kms from Shanghai, has led to a strong protest by the Government of India to the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi on January 2,2012.
2.The incident started with the illegal detention and ill-treatment of the two Indian employees of the Yemeni firm by local Chinese traders and authorities who allegedly held them accountable for the failure of the Yemeni firm to pay its dues to local Chinese traders. It has been further alleged that the China-based Yemeni head of the company disappeared making the Indian employees face the wrath of the Chinese traders and authorities.
3.When Balachandran went to the city to provide consular assistance to the two Indians and get them released, he himself became the victim of ill-treatment by the authorities and the court which was dealing with the case against the Indians. It has been reported that Balachandran, who is a severe diabetic, was denied access to food for nearly six hours during which period he had to remain in court. He reportedly collapsed as a result.
4.There is so far no reason to believe that any official of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was involved in the incident. The ill-treatment allegedly meted out to Balachandran and the two Indian employees of the Yemeni firm was apparently by the local authorities who seem to have been acting at the behest of the Chinese to whom the Yemeni company owed money.
5. The incident illustrates the dangers of foreigners doing business in some small towns of China where the local authorities often collude with the local Chinese businessmen in harassing foreign businessmen and traders.
6. At the same time, this incident has come in the wake of the detention of a number of Indian diamond merchants by the Chinese authorities for months following allegations of illegal trading practices by them. Collusion of local Chinese authorities with Chinese businessmen and traders having unresolved disputes with foreigners is often seen and the Chinese authorities in their Ministry of Foreign Affairs have generally not been known for their vigorous intervention in such matters. They tend to treat casually complaints of misbehaviour and ill-treatment against their local authorities and businessmen.
7. The Government of India should insist on strong action against those responsible in the instant case while discouraging our media from blowing the incident out of proportion. At a time when there is still considerable prejudice against the Chinese in sections of the Indian civil society, such incidents would create a bad taste in our mouth and tend to strengthen the anti-Chinese prejudices. (3-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The alleged ill-treatment of S.Balachandran, an Indian diplomat posted in the Consulate in Shanghai, and two Indian employees of an Yemeni firm by local Chinese authorities in the city of Yiwu , about 300 kms from Shanghai, has led to a strong protest by the Government of India to the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi on January 2,2012.
2.The incident started with the illegal detention and ill-treatment of the two Indian employees of the Yemeni firm by local Chinese traders and authorities who allegedly held them accountable for the failure of the Yemeni firm to pay its dues to local Chinese traders. It has been further alleged that the China-based Yemeni head of the company disappeared making the Indian employees face the wrath of the Chinese traders and authorities.
3.When Balachandran went to the city to provide consular assistance to the two Indians and get them released, he himself became the victim of ill-treatment by the authorities and the court which was dealing with the case against the Indians. It has been reported that Balachandran, who is a severe diabetic, was denied access to food for nearly six hours during which period he had to remain in court. He reportedly collapsed as a result.
4.There is so far no reason to believe that any official of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was involved in the incident. The ill-treatment allegedly meted out to Balachandran and the two Indian employees of the Yemeni firm was apparently by the local authorities who seem to have been acting at the behest of the Chinese to whom the Yemeni company owed money.
5. The incident illustrates the dangers of foreigners doing business in some small towns of China where the local authorities often collude with the local Chinese businessmen in harassing foreign businessmen and traders.
6. At the same time, this incident has come in the wake of the detention of a number of Indian diamond merchants by the Chinese authorities for months following allegations of illegal trading practices by them. Collusion of local Chinese authorities with Chinese businessmen and traders having unresolved disputes with foreigners is often seen and the Chinese authorities in their Ministry of Foreign Affairs have generally not been known for their vigorous intervention in such matters. They tend to treat casually complaints of misbehaviour and ill-treatment against their local authorities and businessmen.
7. The Government of India should insist on strong action against those responsible in the instant case while discouraging our media from blowing the incident out of proportion. At a time when there is still considerable prejudice against the Chinese in sections of the Indian civil society, such incidents would create a bad taste in our mouth and tend to strengthen the anti-Chinese prejudices. (3-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
NEED TO PRE-EMPT POLITICISATION OF THE URI TRAGEDY THROUGH PROMPT FOLLOW-UP ACTION
B.RAMAN
The police of Jammu and Kashmir need to be complimented for promptly arresting five members of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), who had allegedly opened fire on a crowd of an estimated 500 protesters who were protesting over power shortages in the Boniyar area of the Baramulla District in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). The firing allegedly resulted in the death of a 25-year-old person and injuries to two others. The incident has reportedly led to resentment and protests against the CISF by the local residents.
2. The CISF personnel who opened fire reportedly belonged to a unit posted in that area for providing physical security to the Uri power project. It is not yet clear whether the demonstrators were protesting in the residential township or in the vicinity of the plant.
3.The CISF is a physical security force specially raised and trained for guarding vital installations such as thermal, hydel and nuclear power stations, oil and gas infrastructure, airports etc. It is not a law and order or counter-insurgency force. Its personnel do receive basic training in crowd control, but they are not equipped for crowd control. Since their primary purpose is to prevent infiltrations and attacks on vital installations, they are issued with live ammunition.
4.The Uri incident has arisen probably because the CISF personnel were used for crowd control for which they are not specially equipped.Normally, the local police or other para-military forces such as the Central Reserve Police Force should have been used for maintaining law and order and for preventing acts of violence when the crowd was demonstrating. It is not clear how the CISF personnel got involved in crowd control duties for which they should have sought the help of the local police.
5.Two things need to be enquired into: Why the assistance of the local police or the CRPF was not sought? What were the circumstances under which the CISF personnel opened fire? If the protesters were marching to the gates of the power project, there might have been some justification for the action taken by the CISF personnel. Not otherwise.
6.CISF personnel deployed on duties for guarding vital installations in insurgency-affected areas need to be specially trained on dealing with situations such as the one that was witnessed in the Uri area and on the need for co-ordination with the local police, who should be entrusted with the responsibility for dealing with crowds which do not pose a direct threat to the plant.
7.To prevent a spiralling and creeping spread of the protests in anger over the death of a local resident, there is a need for a prompt enquiry into the incident and follow-up action against those found responsible for the mishandling of the demonstration. Any public perception that the Governments of India and J & K are attempting to cover up the incident might prove counter-productive and might be exploited for political purposes by local elements. The incident must be handled from the legal and humanitarian angles without any attempts at politicisation of this tragedy. ( 1-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The police of Jammu and Kashmir need to be complimented for promptly arresting five members of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), who had allegedly opened fire on a crowd of an estimated 500 protesters who were protesting over power shortages in the Boniyar area of the Baramulla District in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). The firing allegedly resulted in the death of a 25-year-old person and injuries to two others. The incident has reportedly led to resentment and protests against the CISF by the local residents.
2. The CISF personnel who opened fire reportedly belonged to a unit posted in that area for providing physical security to the Uri power project. It is not yet clear whether the demonstrators were protesting in the residential township or in the vicinity of the plant.
3.The CISF is a physical security force specially raised and trained for guarding vital installations such as thermal, hydel and nuclear power stations, oil and gas infrastructure, airports etc. It is not a law and order or counter-insurgency force. Its personnel do receive basic training in crowd control, but they are not equipped for crowd control. Since their primary purpose is to prevent infiltrations and attacks on vital installations, they are issued with live ammunition.
4.The Uri incident has arisen probably because the CISF personnel were used for crowd control for which they are not specially equipped.Normally, the local police or other para-military forces such as the Central Reserve Police Force should have been used for maintaining law and order and for preventing acts of violence when the crowd was demonstrating. It is not clear how the CISF personnel got involved in crowd control duties for which they should have sought the help of the local police.
5.Two things need to be enquired into: Why the assistance of the local police or the CRPF was not sought? What were the circumstances under which the CISF personnel opened fire? If the protesters were marching to the gates of the power project, there might have been some justification for the action taken by the CISF personnel. Not otherwise.
6.CISF personnel deployed on duties for guarding vital installations in insurgency-affected areas need to be specially trained on dealing with situations such as the one that was witnessed in the Uri area and on the need for co-ordination with the local police, who should be entrusted with the responsibility for dealing with crowds which do not pose a direct threat to the plant.
7.To prevent a spiralling and creeping spread of the protests in anger over the death of a local resident, there is a need for a prompt enquiry into the incident and follow-up action against those found responsible for the mishandling of the demonstration. Any public perception that the Governments of India and J & K are attempting to cover up the incident might prove counter-productive and might be exploited for political purposes by local elements. The incident must be handled from the legal and humanitarian angles without any attempts at politicisation of this tragedy. ( 1-1-12)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)