B.RAMAN
The “Dawn News” of Karachi has reported as follows:
“President Asif Ali Zardari on Tuesday (December 6,2011) arrived in Dubai for a medical check-up. According to presidential spokesperson Farhatullah Babar, the President has traveled to Dubai along with his team of doctors for an extensive medical examination. He added that before his departure, President Zardari had separate meetings with Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, Chairman Senate Farooq H Naik, and Interior Minister Rehman Malik. The President was accompanied not only by his personal doctor Colonel Salman and his medical team, but also by some members of the Assembly, said Mr Babar.”
2. A subsequent report claims that Zardari has entered a Dubai hospital for a medical examination. Babar has been quoted as having denied that Zardari had undergone a medical examination in Pakistan before he was flown to Dubai.
3. Zardari frequently visits Dubai where he has considerable property and investments and where his daughters live. Rarely announcements are made about such private visits. This time, though, his spokesman has taken care to announce his departure for Dubai and to specify that it was for a medical check-up.
4. While no one has questioned that the visit could have been for genuine medical reasons, there has been some speculation as to whether Zardari’s medical condition requiring an urgent check-up might have been triggered by the considerable political pressure faced by him in relation to two current political controversies.
5. The first controversy relates to the so-called Memogate affair. It is about the claims made by Manzoor Ijaz, an American businessman of Pakistani origin, that his services as an intermediary were used by Hussain Haqqani, the then Pakistani Ambassador to the US, in May to pass on a memo to Admiral Mike Mullen, the then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, allegedly seeking the good offices of Mullen for exercising pressure on Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff, not to stage a coup against Zardari in the wake of the US commando raid in Abbottabad on the night of May 2 to kill Osama bin Laden.
6. Neither Ijaz’s version of the Memogate affair nor Hussain Haqqani’s denial of Ijaz’s claims has carried conviction so far. The matter is under enquiry by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Pakistan Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif has sought a judicial enquiry into the claims of Ijaz by the Supreme court. If the Supreme Court agrees to it and initiates an enquiry, it could have the effect of suspending the ISI enquiry into the matter.
7. Zardari himself, who will be as uncomfortable with the prospects of an enquiry by the Supreme Court as with the ISI enquiry, had indicated that he would be addressing a joint session of the two Houses of the Parliament on the controversy after the Muharrum observance was over on December 6. It is not clear whether he would still go ahead with his proposed address or whether would use his medical condition as an excuse for postponing it indefinitely.
8. The resignation of Hussain Haqqani and his replacement by Ms.Sherry Rehman, who enjoys the confidence of Zardari and is not distrusted by Kayani, as the Pakistani Ambassador to Washington DC has not ended the controversy. The Army as well as the PML of Nawaz Sharif are insisting for a thorough enquiry----each for its own reason. The PML wants to exploit it politically for further weakening Zardari and the Army wants to ensure that Zardari, whom it suspects of being soft to the US, will no longer indulge in such alleged conspiracies against the Army with the complicity of anti-Army and anti-ISI elements in US policy-making circles.
9.The second controversy relates to the recent death of 24 Pakistani military personnel in US air strikes on Pakistani military posts in the Mohmand agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The air strikes have caused considerable anger in the barracks which has been sought to be exploited by the Hizbut Tehrir, which has some following at the lower and middle levels of the Army, for creating disaffection not only against the US, but also against the senior leadership of the Pakistan Army.
10. Considerations of pride and reports of anti-US anger in the public and the subordinate ranks of the Army have made the Army and its senior officers take a seemingly inflexible anti-US stand . There has been suspicion that Zardari does not share the depth of the anti-US sentiments and might be prepared to let bygones be bygones and to let the matter rest after the condolences personally conveyed by President Barack Obama.
11. As a result of these developments, the political situation has become increasingly uncomfortable for Zardari giving rise to speculation that the Army might not be satisfied with the head of Hussain Haqqani and might want in addition that of Zardari whose credibility is low in the eyes of the Army. Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani still enjoys the confidence of Gen.Kayani, but he has very little following in the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in which support for Zardari and his son Bilawal Bhutto, who is head of the party, remains strong.
12. The situation has reached a stage where a full-fledged coup might not be validated post facto by the judiciary and the strong backing still enjoyed by Zardari in the PPP would make his being eased out a difficult option. It is generally believed that Zardari’s visit to Dubai at this stage ostensibly for medical reasons might have the additional purpose of seeking the continued support of the ruling families of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to enable him overcome the difficult political situation back home.
13. It is interesting to note that Zardari has left behind in Pakistan Bilawal Bhutto and Rehman Malik, his trusted Interior Minister--- apparently to keep a watch on the goings-on in the PPP and to ensure that no attempt is made to further undermine his position
14. Will Zardari manage to salvage his position and continue in power or will he quit on medical grounds after having inducted his son as the President? This is a million dollar question to which no answers are available. Bilawal is only 23 years old. Inducting him is going to be difficult. If Zardari decides to quit under the increasing pressure caused by the two controversies, the support presently enjoyed by Zardari and Bilawal in PPP---particularly in Punjab---might evaporate, thereby strengthening the position of Gilani.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75
Tuesday, December 6, 2011
Monday, December 5, 2011
OPENING-UP OF MYANMAR
B.RAMAN
The three-day (Nov.30—Dec 2,2011) visit of Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State, to Myanmar--- the first by a US Secretary of State since the visit of Johan Foster Dulles in 1955--- indicated the growing self-confidence of President Thein Sein that the cautious policy of domestic reforms and external opening-up initiated by him had the support of the serving military officers.
2.This self-confidence came out clearly in the assurances reportedly conveyed by his Government to Mrs.Clinton that the reforms and opening-up are real and will be irreversible. The only threat to the new policy could have come from the serving military officers. The slow pace of the promised release of the political prisoners ---200 plus released and about 1600 still in detention--- had given rise to speculation regarding possible resistance from serving military officers to the proposed release of all the political prisoners. This speculation still persists since there have been no more releases for some weeks now.
3. However, the Government has been going ahead with its policy of political reconciliation with the pro-democracy forces led by Aung San Suu Kyi. Her National League for Democracy (NLD) has already decided to register itself as a political party to enable it to contest the bye-elections due in the coming months Suu Kyi is widely expected to contest one of them.
4. The policy of gradual opening-up initiated by the Government has three components--- release of all political prisoners and relaxation of oppressive laws relating to media freedom and the right to hold public meetings and take out processions, facilitating the de jure induction of Suu Kyi and her NLD into the political process and mending relations with the West to pave the way for the removal of the economic sanctions imposed by them and the resumption of the flow of economic assistance from the West and international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
5.The visit of Mrs.Clinton so soon after the East Asia summit at Bali in Indonesia last month at which Myanmar and Cambodia were reportedly the only countries to have supported the Chinese stand on the South China Sea issue clearly indicated the keenness of the Myanmar Government to give a new orientation to its foreign policy despite its anxiety not to tread on the toes of China while so doing.
6. China will continue to be an important factor in Myanmar for some years to come because of the economic dependence on Beijing and the close links between the armies of the two countries. A peeved China can play a spoiler by instigating the pro-China military officers trained by the People’s Liberation Artmy (PLA) to resist any aspect of the new policy that may not be palatable to China.
7. Till the Western countries remove the economic sanctions and aid from the West and the international institutions starts flowing in again thereby enabling the Government to dilute its dependence on China, the Government cannot afford to ignore the likely concerns of China.
8. Beijing’s concerns relate not so much to the domestic political reforms as to the decisions of a strategic nature that may be taken by the Government under prodding from the US that could dilute the strategic primacy enjoyed by China in Myanmar. Vietnam and Myanmar are two countries of major concern to China from the point of view of its national security and Beijing will be closely monitoring the developments relating to the relations of the two countries with the US and India.
9. China has already made no secret of its concerns over the decision of the Myanmar Government to suspend the construction of a big hydel power project by a Chinese company in the Kachin State to supply electricity to Yunnan. The Thein Sein Government has taken care to reassure Beijing that there will be no more reversals of past economic decisions of which China was the main beneficiary and that the closer relations with the US will not be at the expense of the primacy enjoyed by China in the Government’s strategic calculation. How to gradually reduce the dependence on China without seeming to do so is a question which would be constantly engaging the attention of the Thein Sein Government. Unless and until substantial economic assistance starts flowing in quickly, the Government will not be in a position to even contemplate any major change in its policies towards China.
10. The lifting of economic sanctions and the flow of substantial economic assistance are not for tomorrow. This became clear during the visit of Mrs.Clinton. Two concrete indicators of forward movement were the decision to re-establish full-fledged diplomatic relations at the Ambassadorial level and a token grant of US $
1.2 million for health care and micro-credit projects.
11. Mrs.Clinton reportedly made the lifting of economic sanctions and the flow of economic assistance conditional on four steps being taken by the Thein Sein Government---the release of the remaining political prisoners, improvement in human rights, a peace process with the ethnic minorities and breaking-off of Myanmar’s relations with North Korea with a full accounting of the alleged assistance from North Korea in the nuclear field.
12. While the first three conditions should not cause any major problem to the Thein Sein Government, the last one relating to North Korea could. Would it cause concern in Beijing? What would be the reaction of the serving military officers to this condition? Would the US insist on the immediate implementation of this condition or would it be prepared to go slow on this keeping in view the sensitivity of this condition? These are questions to which clear-cut answers are not available.
13. On the whole, the US has reasons to be gratified with the visit which went off without any friction and with signs of considerable mutual goodwill. Initially, Mrs.Clinton visited Naypyidaw, the State capital, for meetings with President Thein Sein and the Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw (Burma’s lower legislative house) Thura Shwe Mann. She then went to Yangon for two meetings with Suu Kyi.
14. While not many details were forthcoming of Mrs.Clinton’s 45-minutes talks with President Thein Sein, more details were available of her meeting with the Speaker, who seems to be playing an important role in the opening-up process. He was quoted by one of his colleagues as having told Mrs.Clinton that there would be no military coup or military government in the future and that there would be no reversal of the policy of democratic reforms.
15. Suu Kyi said after her meeting with Mrs.Clinton:"We are happy with the way in which the United States is engaging with us. It is through engagement that we hope to promote the process of democratization. Because of this engagement, I think our way ahead will be clearer and we will be able to trust that the process of democratization will go forward. We are prepared to go further if reforms maintain momentum. But history teaches us to be cautious. We know that there have been serious setbacks and grave disappointments over the past decades." (6-12-11)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The three-day (Nov.30—Dec 2,2011) visit of Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State, to Myanmar--- the first by a US Secretary of State since the visit of Johan Foster Dulles in 1955--- indicated the growing self-confidence of President Thein Sein that the cautious policy of domestic reforms and external opening-up initiated by him had the support of the serving military officers.
2.This self-confidence came out clearly in the assurances reportedly conveyed by his Government to Mrs.Clinton that the reforms and opening-up are real and will be irreversible. The only threat to the new policy could have come from the serving military officers. The slow pace of the promised release of the political prisoners ---200 plus released and about 1600 still in detention--- had given rise to speculation regarding possible resistance from serving military officers to the proposed release of all the political prisoners. This speculation still persists since there have been no more releases for some weeks now.
3. However, the Government has been going ahead with its policy of political reconciliation with the pro-democracy forces led by Aung San Suu Kyi. Her National League for Democracy (NLD) has already decided to register itself as a political party to enable it to contest the bye-elections due in the coming months Suu Kyi is widely expected to contest one of them.
4. The policy of gradual opening-up initiated by the Government has three components--- release of all political prisoners and relaxation of oppressive laws relating to media freedom and the right to hold public meetings and take out processions, facilitating the de jure induction of Suu Kyi and her NLD into the political process and mending relations with the West to pave the way for the removal of the economic sanctions imposed by them and the resumption of the flow of economic assistance from the West and international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
5.The visit of Mrs.Clinton so soon after the East Asia summit at Bali in Indonesia last month at which Myanmar and Cambodia were reportedly the only countries to have supported the Chinese stand on the South China Sea issue clearly indicated the keenness of the Myanmar Government to give a new orientation to its foreign policy despite its anxiety not to tread on the toes of China while so doing.
6. China will continue to be an important factor in Myanmar for some years to come because of the economic dependence on Beijing and the close links between the armies of the two countries. A peeved China can play a spoiler by instigating the pro-China military officers trained by the People’s Liberation Artmy (PLA) to resist any aspect of the new policy that may not be palatable to China.
7. Till the Western countries remove the economic sanctions and aid from the West and the international institutions starts flowing in again thereby enabling the Government to dilute its dependence on China, the Government cannot afford to ignore the likely concerns of China.
8. Beijing’s concerns relate not so much to the domestic political reforms as to the decisions of a strategic nature that may be taken by the Government under prodding from the US that could dilute the strategic primacy enjoyed by China in Myanmar. Vietnam and Myanmar are two countries of major concern to China from the point of view of its national security and Beijing will be closely monitoring the developments relating to the relations of the two countries with the US and India.
9. China has already made no secret of its concerns over the decision of the Myanmar Government to suspend the construction of a big hydel power project by a Chinese company in the Kachin State to supply electricity to Yunnan. The Thein Sein Government has taken care to reassure Beijing that there will be no more reversals of past economic decisions of which China was the main beneficiary and that the closer relations with the US will not be at the expense of the primacy enjoyed by China in the Government’s strategic calculation. How to gradually reduce the dependence on China without seeming to do so is a question which would be constantly engaging the attention of the Thein Sein Government. Unless and until substantial economic assistance starts flowing in quickly, the Government will not be in a position to even contemplate any major change in its policies towards China.
10. The lifting of economic sanctions and the flow of substantial economic assistance are not for tomorrow. This became clear during the visit of Mrs.Clinton. Two concrete indicators of forward movement were the decision to re-establish full-fledged diplomatic relations at the Ambassadorial level and a token grant of US $
1.2 million for health care and micro-credit projects.
11. Mrs.Clinton reportedly made the lifting of economic sanctions and the flow of economic assistance conditional on four steps being taken by the Thein Sein Government---the release of the remaining political prisoners, improvement in human rights, a peace process with the ethnic minorities and breaking-off of Myanmar’s relations with North Korea with a full accounting of the alleged assistance from North Korea in the nuclear field.
12. While the first three conditions should not cause any major problem to the Thein Sein Government, the last one relating to North Korea could. Would it cause concern in Beijing? What would be the reaction of the serving military officers to this condition? Would the US insist on the immediate implementation of this condition or would it be prepared to go slow on this keeping in view the sensitivity of this condition? These are questions to which clear-cut answers are not available.
13. On the whole, the US has reasons to be gratified with the visit which went off without any friction and with signs of considerable mutual goodwill. Initially, Mrs.Clinton visited Naypyidaw, the State capital, for meetings with President Thein Sein and the Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw (Burma’s lower legislative house) Thura Shwe Mann. She then went to Yangon for two meetings with Suu Kyi.
14. While not many details were forthcoming of Mrs.Clinton’s 45-minutes talks with President Thein Sein, more details were available of her meeting with the Speaker, who seems to be playing an important role in the opening-up process. He was quoted by one of his colleagues as having told Mrs.Clinton that there would be no military coup or military government in the future and that there would be no reversal of the policy of democratic reforms.
15. Suu Kyi said after her meeting with Mrs.Clinton:"We are happy with the way in which the United States is engaging with us. It is through engagement that we hope to promote the process of democratization. Because of this engagement, I think our way ahead will be clearer and we will be able to trust that the process of democratization will go forward. We are prepared to go further if reforms maintain momentum. But history teaches us to be cautious. We know that there have been serious setbacks and grave disappointments over the past decades." (6-12-11)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, December 4, 2011
POSSIBLE MISUSE OF NEW TECHINT CAPABILITIES
B.RAMAN
Since the Indo-Pakistan conflict in the Kargil heights in 1999, there has been a major increase in the Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) capabilities of the Indian security community, which comprises the intelligence agencies of the Government of India and the intelligence divisions of the State Police.
2. A new organization---initially called the National Technical Facilities Organisation (NTFO) and subsequently renamed the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) – has come up to focus exclusively on the collection of TECHINT. It is somewhat---but not totally-- similar to the National Security Agency (NSA) of the USA.
3. However, whereas the NSA comes under the control of the US Defence Secretary and is headed by a serving military officer of the rank of Lt.Gen, whose appointment by the President is subject to confirmation by the Senate Intelligence Committee, the head of the NTRO, called Chairman, is taken on rotation from the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
4.Whereas the head of the NSA is a serving officer, the Chairmen of the NTRO have come from a hotch-potch background --- not found fit to head the organization to which they originally belonged, but sought to be placated by being made the chief of the NTRO with a fixed tenure. The selection process is not subject to review or scrutiny by any external mechanism---either of the Parliament or outside it.
5. There is a greater possibility of the political misuse of a technical intelligence organization than of a human intelligence organization. They ,therefore, have to be subject to even more strict external controls than HUMINT organizations. The dangers of misuse have increased due to the easy availability of modern snooper technology and gadgets. When one was totally dependent on landline telephones for internal communications, the scope for misuse was limited, but mobile technology has placed in the hands of not only the State, but also non-state actors---terrorists, insurgents, organized crime groups, narcotics smugglers, corporate and political rivals--- immense possibilities of snooping on the State, on each other and among themselves.
6. The creation of the NTRO has been accompanied by the strengthening of the TECHINT capabilities of not only the IB, the R&AW and the military intelligence agencies, but also of the police and a number of other departments of the Government of India which have no business to indulge in their own snooping for their own purpose. The Radia Tapes affair brought out that the Income Tax Department has probably acquired its own snooping capability which was sought to be misused by unidentified elements----either in the Department itself or outside--- to besmirch the personal reputation and damage the professional career of innocent personalities like Barkha Dutt, the well-known TV journo, and Ratan Tata, the highly reputed corporate leader.
7. Action to prevent the misuse of the vastly expanding TECHINT capabilities now available at the Centre and in the States demands a centralized and strictly implemented control over the entire snooping process----starting from the procurement of equipment, the recruitment and training of snoopers, the utilization of the funds placed at their disposal, the procedure followed for snooping to ensure that snooping is done strictly in accordance with law for meeting clearly-defined national security objectives etc.
8. In the US, the NSA provides such a centralized set-up. It does the snooping on behalf of all Government Departments after they have obtained the required authorization for the snooping from the competent authority. In India, internal snooping used to be the responsibility of the IB, which had the required technical capability and human and financial resources and which used to do it in accordance with an authorized procedure.
9.The Radia Tapes affair showed that there has probably been a total dilution of the procedure and controls with the result that anybody who wants to snoop has been doing so in reckless disregard of the requirements of the need and obligation to protect the privacy of the citizens and to observe the requirements of the law. Snooping has become the name of the game in many Government departments and State Police.
10. Another worrisome development has been the evident resort to random snooping. There are two kinds of snooping ----targeted snooping of suspects against whom there is suspicion of wrong-doing and random snooping in order to monitor what has been going on in cyber space and mobile frequencies. In the US, whereas targeted snooping is allowed subject to certain conditions and procedures, random snooping, which is a violation of the privacy and human rights of citizens, is totally forbidden. The Clinton and Bush Administrations tried hard to give limited powers of random snooping to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the NSA for counter-terrorism purposes, but the Congress disallowed it. Barkha, Vir Sanghvi and Tata were apparently the victims of illegal random snooping by the Income Tax Department. Had a similar incident happened in the US, not only would there have been a detailed Congressional enquiry into it, but the judiciary would have also awarded heavy damages to the victims.
11. In India, the absence of effective external controls over organizations having the capability for snooping facilitates the misuse of the capabilities for purposes not connected with national security and for besmirching the well-earned reputation of innocent citizens, who find themselves without any defence because they do not know and understand what the hell has been going on.
12. It is important for the Government to go into this matter and establish an architecture of legal and procedural safeguards to ensure that our TECHINT capabilities are used only against suspected wrong-doers and not against innocent citizens---either consciously or unconsciously.
13.Ideally, as in many democracies such as the US and even highly security-conscious Israel, a parliamentary oversight committee for intelligence should be on top of the safeguards architecture. There has been strong resistance from the Indian intelligence community to giving Parliament any oversight role in such matters relating to the intelligence agencies. The political leadership hasn’t had the courage to overrule the nay-sayers in the intelligence community and set up a parliamentary oversights mechanism.
14. While trying to overcome the resistance from the intelligence community, the Government should set up a Cabinet Committee on Intelligence----separate from the Cabinet Committee on Security--- to go into such matters in a regular and systematic manner. It should be chaired by the Prime Minister with the National Security Adviser as the member-secretary and should consist of the Home Minister and the Defence Minister. The very fact that such a high-level committee has been monitoring the use of the TECHINT capabilities to prevent misuse would act as a deterrent against tempted misuse. (5-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75)
Since the Indo-Pakistan conflict in the Kargil heights in 1999, there has been a major increase in the Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) capabilities of the Indian security community, which comprises the intelligence agencies of the Government of India and the intelligence divisions of the State Police.
2. A new organization---initially called the National Technical Facilities Organisation (NTFO) and subsequently renamed the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) – has come up to focus exclusively on the collection of TECHINT. It is somewhat---but not totally-- similar to the National Security Agency (NSA) of the USA.
3. However, whereas the NSA comes under the control of the US Defence Secretary and is headed by a serving military officer of the rank of Lt.Gen, whose appointment by the President is subject to confirmation by the Senate Intelligence Committee, the head of the NTRO, called Chairman, is taken on rotation from the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
4.Whereas the head of the NSA is a serving officer, the Chairmen of the NTRO have come from a hotch-potch background --- not found fit to head the organization to which they originally belonged, but sought to be placated by being made the chief of the NTRO with a fixed tenure. The selection process is not subject to review or scrutiny by any external mechanism---either of the Parliament or outside it.
5. There is a greater possibility of the political misuse of a technical intelligence organization than of a human intelligence organization. They ,therefore, have to be subject to even more strict external controls than HUMINT organizations. The dangers of misuse have increased due to the easy availability of modern snooper technology and gadgets. When one was totally dependent on landline telephones for internal communications, the scope for misuse was limited, but mobile technology has placed in the hands of not only the State, but also non-state actors---terrorists, insurgents, organized crime groups, narcotics smugglers, corporate and political rivals--- immense possibilities of snooping on the State, on each other and among themselves.
6. The creation of the NTRO has been accompanied by the strengthening of the TECHINT capabilities of not only the IB, the R&AW and the military intelligence agencies, but also of the police and a number of other departments of the Government of India which have no business to indulge in their own snooping for their own purpose. The Radia Tapes affair brought out that the Income Tax Department has probably acquired its own snooping capability which was sought to be misused by unidentified elements----either in the Department itself or outside--- to besmirch the personal reputation and damage the professional career of innocent personalities like Barkha Dutt, the well-known TV journo, and Ratan Tata, the highly reputed corporate leader.
7. Action to prevent the misuse of the vastly expanding TECHINT capabilities now available at the Centre and in the States demands a centralized and strictly implemented control over the entire snooping process----starting from the procurement of equipment, the recruitment and training of snoopers, the utilization of the funds placed at their disposal, the procedure followed for snooping to ensure that snooping is done strictly in accordance with law for meeting clearly-defined national security objectives etc.
8. In the US, the NSA provides such a centralized set-up. It does the snooping on behalf of all Government Departments after they have obtained the required authorization for the snooping from the competent authority. In India, internal snooping used to be the responsibility of the IB, which had the required technical capability and human and financial resources and which used to do it in accordance with an authorized procedure.
9.The Radia Tapes affair showed that there has probably been a total dilution of the procedure and controls with the result that anybody who wants to snoop has been doing so in reckless disregard of the requirements of the need and obligation to protect the privacy of the citizens and to observe the requirements of the law. Snooping has become the name of the game in many Government departments and State Police.
10. Another worrisome development has been the evident resort to random snooping. There are two kinds of snooping ----targeted snooping of suspects against whom there is suspicion of wrong-doing and random snooping in order to monitor what has been going on in cyber space and mobile frequencies. In the US, whereas targeted snooping is allowed subject to certain conditions and procedures, random snooping, which is a violation of the privacy and human rights of citizens, is totally forbidden. The Clinton and Bush Administrations tried hard to give limited powers of random snooping to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the NSA for counter-terrorism purposes, but the Congress disallowed it. Barkha, Vir Sanghvi and Tata were apparently the victims of illegal random snooping by the Income Tax Department. Had a similar incident happened in the US, not only would there have been a detailed Congressional enquiry into it, but the judiciary would have also awarded heavy damages to the victims.
11. In India, the absence of effective external controls over organizations having the capability for snooping facilitates the misuse of the capabilities for purposes not connected with national security and for besmirching the well-earned reputation of innocent citizens, who find themselves without any defence because they do not know and understand what the hell has been going on.
12. It is important for the Government to go into this matter and establish an architecture of legal and procedural safeguards to ensure that our TECHINT capabilities are used only against suspected wrong-doers and not against innocent citizens---either consciously or unconsciously.
13.Ideally, as in many democracies such as the US and even highly security-conscious Israel, a parliamentary oversight committee for intelligence should be on top of the safeguards architecture. There has been strong resistance from the Indian intelligence community to giving Parliament any oversight role in such matters relating to the intelligence agencies. The political leadership hasn’t had the courage to overrule the nay-sayers in the intelligence community and set up a parliamentary oversights mechanism.
14. While trying to overcome the resistance from the intelligence community, the Government should set up a Cabinet Committee on Intelligence----separate from the Cabinet Committee on Security--- to go into such matters in a regular and systematic manner. It should be chaired by the Prime Minister with the National Security Adviser as the member-secretary and should consist of the Home Minister and the Defence Minister. The very fact that such a high-level committee has been monitoring the use of the TECHINT capabilities to prevent misuse would act as a deterrent against tempted misuse. (5-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75)
HOW TO RESTORE DECORUM & GRAVITAS IN OUR PARLIAMENT?
B.RAMAN
The erosion of decorum and gravitas in parliamentary proceedings is a phenomenon often seen in Parliaments of democracies with a multi-party parliamentary system, with no party strong enough to enforce its political will on the conduct of the parliamentary proceedings.
2.One saw it in the pre-de Gaulle French Parliament and one continues to see it often in the parliaments of democracies such as Italy, Japan, South Korea and some South American countries.
3. de Gaulle did manage to improve the functioning of the French Parliament by having a new Constitution introduced. Despite this, the experience on the whole has been that the erosion cannot be prevented or reversed through rules and regulations alone or through flippant measures such as denying salary to Members of Parliament disrupting parliamentary proceedings. The only way of dealing with this erosion is through the practice of a robust system of parliamentary ethics, the initiative for which has to come from the ruling party.
4. This phenomenon is generally not seen in democracies with a two-party system or with a restricted number of political parties where parliamentary strengths are evenly matched. Two examples are the UK and India before 1970. The predominant presence of the Congress in the Indian Parliament and the parliamentary etiquette of the post-Independence leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru ensured the prevalence of decorum and gravitas even in the most contentious of situations. The self-confidence arising from predominance in numbers ensured a certain dignity and self-restraint in the conduct of the MsP of the ruling party, which was reciprocated by the members of the opposition.
5. The erosion in the decorum and gravitas consequent on the emergence of a multiplicity of political parties initially started in the State legislatures in the 1960s and has subsequently spread to the Parliament, causing frequent spells of paralysis in the functioning of the Parliament, to which the ruling and opposition parties have contributed in varying measures.
6. The initiative for reversing the erosion through better parliamentary etiquette and conduct has to come from the ruling party, but unfortunately there has been a leadership vacuum in the Congress due to the lack of political stature in the party as well as the Government. Neither Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, the leader of the party, nor Dr.Manmohan Singh, the leader of the Government lacking parity of status with the party leader, has been able to give an ethical lead inside the two Houses.
7. The lack of self-confidence of the two leaders arising from their lack of stature has added to their feelings of political insecurity leading to an undesirable abrasive style of politics poisoning the conduct and proceedings inside the two Houses.
8.The political ineptitude of the two leaders was seen in the manner in which they tried to push through the decision on the question of FDI in the retail sector. The parliamentary proceedings have been paralysed by the determination of the ruling party to push through the decision by hook or by crook and the equal determination of the opposition to frustrate the machinations of the ruling party.
9. While the merits of allowing FDI in the retail sector have been adequately discussed, there has not been enough focus on how the Government, which had slept over the issue for many months, has tried to push through the decision in such a peremptory manner in unedifying haste.
10.Some retired senior officials with whom I had discussed this in Delhi last week attributed the haste displayed by the Congress to its urgent need for funds for the UP elections next year. They alleged that some corporate houses, which would be the main beneficiaries of the FDI decision, were expected to be the main contributors to the coffers of the Congress for the UP elections.
11. According to them, the determination of other political parties to prevent the Congress from financially benefiting from the decision before the UP elections accounted for their obduracy in preventing the normal functioning of the two Houses.
12. Even if the Congress had legitimate economic and policy reasons for pushing through the decision, it could have averted the prevailing paralysis either by postponing the decision till the session was over or by seeking to build an all-party consensus on the issue or by accepting the demand of the opposition for an adjournment motion with voting, subject to the proviso that either there will be voice voting or any adverse voting will be deemed to be only a disapproval of the policy initiative and not a lack of confidence in the Government.
13. Instead of discussing the various legitimate options with the opposition, the Government adopted a stone-walling tactics which has led a further erosion of decorum and gravitas. This situation could not have been averted through any number of rules and regulations to govern the functioning of the Parliament.
14. This could have been averted only by a self-confident and enlightened political leadership in the Congress taking the initiative for searching for a way out in consultation with all political parties in a manner that would have preserved decorum and gravitas in the two Houses.
15. By failing to do so, the Congress has contributed to a further erosion of the dignity and stature of the Parliament. While the opposition parties cannot escape their share of the blame for the prevailing state of affairs, one has to admit that the initial provocation came from the Congress.
16. If media reports that the Government has decided to suspend the FDI decision are correct, the present crisis may end, but another crisis will occur in future unless and until there is an ethical introspection by all parties and the Congress leadership takes the initiative for restoring the decorum and gravitas and the ethical dimensions of the parliamentary proceedings. It is in this direction that the public should exercise pressure on the political class. ( 5-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The erosion of decorum and gravitas in parliamentary proceedings is a phenomenon often seen in Parliaments of democracies with a multi-party parliamentary system, with no party strong enough to enforce its political will on the conduct of the parliamentary proceedings.
2.One saw it in the pre-de Gaulle French Parliament and one continues to see it often in the parliaments of democracies such as Italy, Japan, South Korea and some South American countries.
3. de Gaulle did manage to improve the functioning of the French Parliament by having a new Constitution introduced. Despite this, the experience on the whole has been that the erosion cannot be prevented or reversed through rules and regulations alone or through flippant measures such as denying salary to Members of Parliament disrupting parliamentary proceedings. The only way of dealing with this erosion is through the practice of a robust system of parliamentary ethics, the initiative for which has to come from the ruling party.
4. This phenomenon is generally not seen in democracies with a two-party system or with a restricted number of political parties where parliamentary strengths are evenly matched. Two examples are the UK and India before 1970. The predominant presence of the Congress in the Indian Parliament and the parliamentary etiquette of the post-Independence leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru ensured the prevalence of decorum and gravitas even in the most contentious of situations. The self-confidence arising from predominance in numbers ensured a certain dignity and self-restraint in the conduct of the MsP of the ruling party, which was reciprocated by the members of the opposition.
5. The erosion in the decorum and gravitas consequent on the emergence of a multiplicity of political parties initially started in the State legislatures in the 1960s and has subsequently spread to the Parliament, causing frequent spells of paralysis in the functioning of the Parliament, to which the ruling and opposition parties have contributed in varying measures.
6. The initiative for reversing the erosion through better parliamentary etiquette and conduct has to come from the ruling party, but unfortunately there has been a leadership vacuum in the Congress due to the lack of political stature in the party as well as the Government. Neither Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, the leader of the party, nor Dr.Manmohan Singh, the leader of the Government lacking parity of status with the party leader, has been able to give an ethical lead inside the two Houses.
7. The lack of self-confidence of the two leaders arising from their lack of stature has added to their feelings of political insecurity leading to an undesirable abrasive style of politics poisoning the conduct and proceedings inside the two Houses.
8.The political ineptitude of the two leaders was seen in the manner in which they tried to push through the decision on the question of FDI in the retail sector. The parliamentary proceedings have been paralysed by the determination of the ruling party to push through the decision by hook or by crook and the equal determination of the opposition to frustrate the machinations of the ruling party.
9. While the merits of allowing FDI in the retail sector have been adequately discussed, there has not been enough focus on how the Government, which had slept over the issue for many months, has tried to push through the decision in such a peremptory manner in unedifying haste.
10.Some retired senior officials with whom I had discussed this in Delhi last week attributed the haste displayed by the Congress to its urgent need for funds for the UP elections next year. They alleged that some corporate houses, which would be the main beneficiaries of the FDI decision, were expected to be the main contributors to the coffers of the Congress for the UP elections.
11. According to them, the determination of other political parties to prevent the Congress from financially benefiting from the decision before the UP elections accounted for their obduracy in preventing the normal functioning of the two Houses.
12. Even if the Congress had legitimate economic and policy reasons for pushing through the decision, it could have averted the prevailing paralysis either by postponing the decision till the session was over or by seeking to build an all-party consensus on the issue or by accepting the demand of the opposition for an adjournment motion with voting, subject to the proviso that either there will be voice voting or any adverse voting will be deemed to be only a disapproval of the policy initiative and not a lack of confidence in the Government.
13. Instead of discussing the various legitimate options with the opposition, the Government adopted a stone-walling tactics which has led a further erosion of decorum and gravitas. This situation could not have been averted through any number of rules and regulations to govern the functioning of the Parliament.
14. This could have been averted only by a self-confident and enlightened political leadership in the Congress taking the initiative for searching for a way out in consultation with all political parties in a manner that would have preserved decorum and gravitas in the two Houses.
15. By failing to do so, the Congress has contributed to a further erosion of the dignity and stature of the Parliament. While the opposition parties cannot escape their share of the blame for the prevailing state of affairs, one has to admit that the initial provocation came from the Congress.
16. If media reports that the Government has decided to suspend the FDI decision are correct, the present crisis may end, but another crisis will occur in future unless and until there is an ethical introspection by all parties and the Congress leadership takes the initiative for restoring the decorum and gravitas and the ethical dimensions of the parliamentary proceedings. It is in this direction that the public should exercise pressure on the political class. ( 5-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, November 27, 2011
AVOIDABLE UNPLEASANTNESS IN INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS
B.RAMAN
Avoidable unpleasantness has recently crept into India-China relations over issues which should not have been over-dramatised by China thereby injecting a certain distrust into the relations which had been progressing well despite continuing differences over the border dispute between the two countries.
2. China’s unhappiness over the participation of an Indian Government-owned oil company in off-shore oil/gas exploration in three blocks in the South China Sea area belonging to Vietnam sovereignty over which is claimed by China was the starting point of this unpleasantness.
3. Chinese official spokesmen took care to be measured in their comments on the participation of the Indian company so that the issue did not have an uncontrollably adverse effect on the bilateral relations. Similar care not to over-dramatise the Chinese unhappiness was evident in Chinese official comments after the recent meeting on November 18,2011,between Prime Ministers Dr.Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao in the margins of the East Asia summit at Bali in Indonesia.
4. This salutary restraint was unfortunately not evident in two commentaries on Sino-Indian relations disseminated by the party-owned “Global Times” and the Government-owned Xinhua news agency. In view of the Party ownership of the “Global Times” and the State ownership of Xinhua, it is natural that their hard-hitting comments on India were viewed by many in India as the conscious adoption of a two-edged policy by the Chinese authorities on India’s relations with Vietnam and its perceived activism in the South China Sea. This two-edged policy was seen by many in India as marked by seeming official restraint and semi-official anti-Indian virulence.
5. The hiccups over India’s firm, but gentle assertion of its right to help Vietnam in oil/gas exploration without taking a stand on the merits of the dispute between China and Vietnam over the question of sovereignty over the South China Sea islands have been aggravated by another instance of over-dramatisation by the Chinese of their objection to the proposed participation by His Holiness the Dalai Lama in a global Buddhist conference being held by a non-governmental foundation at New Delhi from November 27 to 30 coinciding with the 2600th anniversary of the Enlightenment of Buddha.
6. It is understood that the Chinese initially objected to the participation of His Holiness in the conference and subsequently to the conference itself. It so happened that the dates of the conference coincided with the 15th round of the talks on the pending border issue between the Special Representatives of the Prime Ministers of the two countries which was proposed to be held at New Delhi on November 28 and 29. This round has now been postponed without any fresh dates being fixed because of the reported Chinese unhappiness over the Buddhist conference and the participation of His Holiness in it.
7. While one could argue with some reason that Chinese sensitivities could have been kept in mind while fixing the dates for the two events so that they did not clash, one would have equal reason not to appreciate the avoidable drama created by the Chinese which has not only come in the way of the 15th round of the border talks, but has also cast a shadow over the current state of the Sino-Indian relations.
8. While continuing to be sensitive to Chinese interests and concerns wherever possible and necessary, India has in recent months started slowly asserting its own interests and concerns without surrendering totally to those of China.
9. The increasing assertion of the Indian will to defend and promote its interests without impinging on those of China has been particularly evident in our relations with Vietnam and Myanmar and in our refusal to intervene in matters concerning His Holiness Dalai Lama provided those matters are purely of a religious nature without any political significance.
10. This assertion of the Indian will has had two aspects---in relation to our developing relations with Myanmar and Vietnam, and in developing our co-operation with the US, Japan and Australia in matters relating to maritime security and maritime counter-terrorism.
11. While the Chinese have not so far openly come out with any objection to our developing relations with Myanmar, their officially-controlled media has been increasingly irritable with regard to our developing relations with Vietnam and the US. The Dalai Lama issue is showing signs of becoming an additional source of irritation.
12. If the Chinese really value their relations with India as they claim to be, it is important for them to pay as much attention to India’s interests and concerns as we have always paid to theirs. Mutual respect of each other’s core interests and concerns has to be a two-way traffic. The Chinese, who lose no opportunity of asserting their core interests and concerns, cannot object to India doing likewise.
13. It is hoped that the current unpleasantness in the bilateral relations would be ephemeral and would dissipate in the days to come thereby enabling the two countries to resume their forward movement in their search for a mutually satisfactory solution to the border problem.
14. However, India should be prepared for the possibility that it may not be ephemeral and it may have to live for some years with the shadow cast on the bilateral relations. We should continue to assert our core interests and concerns in a carefully calibrated manner without letting our assertion become disproportionate to our present capacity to counter any adventurist impulses of China directed at us----whether across the border or in the South China Sea. ( 28-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Avoidable unpleasantness has recently crept into India-China relations over issues which should not have been over-dramatised by China thereby injecting a certain distrust into the relations which had been progressing well despite continuing differences over the border dispute between the two countries.
2. China’s unhappiness over the participation of an Indian Government-owned oil company in off-shore oil/gas exploration in three blocks in the South China Sea area belonging to Vietnam sovereignty over which is claimed by China was the starting point of this unpleasantness.
3. Chinese official spokesmen took care to be measured in their comments on the participation of the Indian company so that the issue did not have an uncontrollably adverse effect on the bilateral relations. Similar care not to over-dramatise the Chinese unhappiness was evident in Chinese official comments after the recent meeting on November 18,2011,between Prime Ministers Dr.Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao in the margins of the East Asia summit at Bali in Indonesia.
4. This salutary restraint was unfortunately not evident in two commentaries on Sino-Indian relations disseminated by the party-owned “Global Times” and the Government-owned Xinhua news agency. In view of the Party ownership of the “Global Times” and the State ownership of Xinhua, it is natural that their hard-hitting comments on India were viewed by many in India as the conscious adoption of a two-edged policy by the Chinese authorities on India’s relations with Vietnam and its perceived activism in the South China Sea. This two-edged policy was seen by many in India as marked by seeming official restraint and semi-official anti-Indian virulence.
5. The hiccups over India’s firm, but gentle assertion of its right to help Vietnam in oil/gas exploration without taking a stand on the merits of the dispute between China and Vietnam over the question of sovereignty over the South China Sea islands have been aggravated by another instance of over-dramatisation by the Chinese of their objection to the proposed participation by His Holiness the Dalai Lama in a global Buddhist conference being held by a non-governmental foundation at New Delhi from November 27 to 30 coinciding with the 2600th anniversary of the Enlightenment of Buddha.
6. It is understood that the Chinese initially objected to the participation of His Holiness in the conference and subsequently to the conference itself. It so happened that the dates of the conference coincided with the 15th round of the talks on the pending border issue between the Special Representatives of the Prime Ministers of the two countries which was proposed to be held at New Delhi on November 28 and 29. This round has now been postponed without any fresh dates being fixed because of the reported Chinese unhappiness over the Buddhist conference and the participation of His Holiness in it.
7. While one could argue with some reason that Chinese sensitivities could have been kept in mind while fixing the dates for the two events so that they did not clash, one would have equal reason not to appreciate the avoidable drama created by the Chinese which has not only come in the way of the 15th round of the border talks, but has also cast a shadow over the current state of the Sino-Indian relations.
8. While continuing to be sensitive to Chinese interests and concerns wherever possible and necessary, India has in recent months started slowly asserting its own interests and concerns without surrendering totally to those of China.
9. The increasing assertion of the Indian will to defend and promote its interests without impinging on those of China has been particularly evident in our relations with Vietnam and Myanmar and in our refusal to intervene in matters concerning His Holiness Dalai Lama provided those matters are purely of a religious nature without any political significance.
10. This assertion of the Indian will has had two aspects---in relation to our developing relations with Myanmar and Vietnam, and in developing our co-operation with the US, Japan and Australia in matters relating to maritime security and maritime counter-terrorism.
11. While the Chinese have not so far openly come out with any objection to our developing relations with Myanmar, their officially-controlled media has been increasingly irritable with regard to our developing relations with Vietnam and the US. The Dalai Lama issue is showing signs of becoming an additional source of irritation.
12. If the Chinese really value their relations with India as they claim to be, it is important for them to pay as much attention to India’s interests and concerns as we have always paid to theirs. Mutual respect of each other’s core interests and concerns has to be a two-way traffic. The Chinese, who lose no opportunity of asserting their core interests and concerns, cannot object to India doing likewise.
13. It is hoped that the current unpleasantness in the bilateral relations would be ephemeral and would dissipate in the days to come thereby enabling the two countries to resume their forward movement in their search for a mutually satisfactory solution to the border problem.
14. However, India should be prepared for the possibility that it may not be ephemeral and it may have to live for some years with the shadow cast on the bilateral relations. We should continue to assert our core interests and concerns in a carefully calibrated manner without letting our assertion become disproportionate to our present capacity to counter any adventurist impulses of China directed at us----whether across the border or in the South China Sea. ( 28-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, November 26, 2011
PAKISTAN: DANGERS OF A SUBALTERNS’ COUP
B.RAMAN
Appearing in a talk show hosted by Suhasini Haidar of CNN-IBN on November 26,2011, I said that I never believed a coup was likely in Pakistan as a result of the Army’s anger over the so-called Memogate affair . I added that Pakistan had an independent judiciary today and that, hence, the Army would not have the confidence that it could get a coup validated by the judiciary post-facto.
2.If Suhasini were to ask me the same question today in the light of the outrage in the Pakistan Army over the reported death of 28 Pakistani troops due to a mistaken NATO airstrike on two Pakistani military posts about two kms from the Afghan border in the Mohmand Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on November 26, my reply would be a little more nuanced.
3. I would still rule out a coup by senior officers headed by Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), who are quite capable of rational thinking regarding the legal and other consequences of a coup, but I would not rule out a coup by subalterns and middle level officers enraged over the failure of their senior officers and the political leadership to protect the honour of the Pakistan Army against repeated infringements by the US and other NATO forces.
4. One saw reports of such anger in the barracks over the failure of the senior military leadership to prevent the US Commando raid to kill Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2,2011.Kayani managed to control this anger with great difficulty by undertaking a tour of important military cantonments.
5. Reports received by me from Pakistani sources, who are not known to have misled me in the past, claim that one could see similar anger over the latest incident spreading across the barracks. The anger is against the US as well as against the senior leadership of the Army. The reports indicate that organisations such as the Hizbut Tehrir have been trying to fan this anger.
6.If this anger doesn’t subside, there is a danger of a successful or attempted coup in Pakistan organised by officers at middle level, who would not be bothered about the legal consequences of a coup. The Pakistan Army is a disciplined force. In its history, there has never been a successful coup by junior officers. However, there were two instances of attempted junior officers’ coup, the preparations for which were detected in time by the senior military leadership and crushed.
7. The last of them was in 1995 when Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister and Gen Abdul Wahid Kakkar was the COAS. A group of middle level officers headed by Brig. Zahir-ul-Islam Abbasi, fromer Defence Attache to India, joined hands with the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and planned to capture power after killing Benazir and the COAS. The plans for the coup were accidentally detected and the officers concerned arrested and court-martialled.
8. When Gen.Pervez Musharraf was in power we had seen reports of individual junior officers of the Army and the Air Force, who were angry over Musharraf’s co-operation with the US, joining hands with Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda elements in a conspiracy to have Musharraf assassinated. Their role came to notice during the investigation into the two attempts to kill Musharraf in December,2003, allegedly orchestrated by Abu Faraj at-Libbi of Al Qaeda now in the Guantanamo Bay detention centre of the US.
9. The anti-US anger in the lower and middle ranks of the Pakistan Army after the Abbottabad raid has till now been kept under control by Kayani. If the anger over the killing of 28 troops, including two officers, allegedly by NATO air strikes on Pakistani military posts in the Momand Agency is not carefully and tactfully handled by the US and the Pakistani civilian and military leadership, there is a danger of this anger getting out of control leading to a conspiracy of the junior officers.
10. If such a conspiracy is successful with the co-operation of jihadi elements, there would be a real threat of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal coming under their control. Senior Pakistani Army officers are responsible people who are quite capable of ensuring that there is no misuse of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. I do not have the same confidence about the junior officers.
11. The US-Pakistan relations are going from bad to worse--- particularly the military-military and intelligence-intelligence relationship. There is a lot of glee among many Indian analysts over it. This need not necessarily be a beneficial development for India. It is in our interest that the US retains the ability to influence the behaviour of the Pakistani military leadership.
12. The situation in Pakistan needs very close monitoring. (27-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Appearing in a talk show hosted by Suhasini Haidar of CNN-IBN on November 26,2011, I said that I never believed a coup was likely in Pakistan as a result of the Army’s anger over the so-called Memogate affair . I added that Pakistan had an independent judiciary today and that, hence, the Army would not have the confidence that it could get a coup validated by the judiciary post-facto.
2.If Suhasini were to ask me the same question today in the light of the outrage in the Pakistan Army over the reported death of 28 Pakistani troops due to a mistaken NATO airstrike on two Pakistani military posts about two kms from the Afghan border in the Mohmand Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on November 26, my reply would be a little more nuanced.
3. I would still rule out a coup by senior officers headed by Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), who are quite capable of rational thinking regarding the legal and other consequences of a coup, but I would not rule out a coup by subalterns and middle level officers enraged over the failure of their senior officers and the political leadership to protect the honour of the Pakistan Army against repeated infringements by the US and other NATO forces.
4. One saw reports of such anger in the barracks over the failure of the senior military leadership to prevent the US Commando raid to kill Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2,2011.Kayani managed to control this anger with great difficulty by undertaking a tour of important military cantonments.
5. Reports received by me from Pakistani sources, who are not known to have misled me in the past, claim that one could see similar anger over the latest incident spreading across the barracks. The anger is against the US as well as against the senior leadership of the Army. The reports indicate that organisations such as the Hizbut Tehrir have been trying to fan this anger.
6.If this anger doesn’t subside, there is a danger of a successful or attempted coup in Pakistan organised by officers at middle level, who would not be bothered about the legal consequences of a coup. The Pakistan Army is a disciplined force. In its history, there has never been a successful coup by junior officers. However, there were two instances of attempted junior officers’ coup, the preparations for which were detected in time by the senior military leadership and crushed.
7. The last of them was in 1995 when Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister and Gen Abdul Wahid Kakkar was the COAS. A group of middle level officers headed by Brig. Zahir-ul-Islam Abbasi, fromer Defence Attache to India, joined hands with the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and planned to capture power after killing Benazir and the COAS. The plans for the coup were accidentally detected and the officers concerned arrested and court-martialled.
8. When Gen.Pervez Musharraf was in power we had seen reports of individual junior officers of the Army and the Air Force, who were angry over Musharraf’s co-operation with the US, joining hands with Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda elements in a conspiracy to have Musharraf assassinated. Their role came to notice during the investigation into the two attempts to kill Musharraf in December,2003, allegedly orchestrated by Abu Faraj at-Libbi of Al Qaeda now in the Guantanamo Bay detention centre of the US.
9. The anti-US anger in the lower and middle ranks of the Pakistan Army after the Abbottabad raid has till now been kept under control by Kayani. If the anger over the killing of 28 troops, including two officers, allegedly by NATO air strikes on Pakistani military posts in the Momand Agency is not carefully and tactfully handled by the US and the Pakistani civilian and military leadership, there is a danger of this anger getting out of control leading to a conspiracy of the junior officers.
10. If such a conspiracy is successful with the co-operation of jihadi elements, there would be a real threat of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal coming under their control. Senior Pakistani Army officers are responsible people who are quite capable of ensuring that there is no misuse of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. I do not have the same confidence about the junior officers.
11. The US-Pakistan relations are going from bad to worse--- particularly the military-military and intelligence-intelligence relationship. There is a lot of glee among many Indian analysts over it. This need not necessarily be a beneficial development for India. It is in our interest that the US retains the ability to influence the behaviour of the Pakistani military leadership.
12. The situation in Pakistan needs very close monitoring. (27-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, November 25, 2011
THREE YEARS AFTER 26/11
B.RAMAN
The 26/11 terrorist strikes led to five important decisions by the Government of India--- to decentralise the deployment of the National Security Guards (NSG) by setting up regional hubs, to set up the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to investigate terrorist incidents of a pan-Indian nature, to strengthen coastal security, to create a national intelligence grid to serve as a data-base accessible to all agencies---- at the central and State levels--- dealing with counter-terrorism, and to set up a National Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC), to take co-ordinated follow-up action on all terrorism-related inputs flowing from the intelligence agencies and the police.
2. The NSG has already been decentralised and regional hubs have come into existence. This has been done because of the delayed deployment of the NSG during the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The then totally Delhi-based NSG was slow to move and equally slow to react and its ability to co-ordinate with the local police and other security agencies in Mumbai was found wanting.
3. With the deployment of units of the NSG in big metro centres now, there is an expectation that the deficiencies witnessed on 26/11 will not recur now. If this is really so will become evident only when there is another act of mass fatality terrorism. Fortunately, we have not had one since 26/11. As a result, the proclaimed ability of the NSG to move faster and with greater effectiveness now is yet to be tested. It is important that the NSG’s training pays attention to the need to sharpen its institutional reflexes and that it keeps constantly interacting and rehearsing with the local police and other security agencies.
4. The NIA, which is already functioning, has had a lethargic and confused start. It is not clear to objective counter-terrorism analysts as to when and how it will be called into action. One has reasons to suspect and fear that like the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) the NIA is tending to become a partly professional and partly politicised agency, which is sought to be used by the Government of India as a stick to beat the opponents with. It has shown greater alacrity and enthusiasm in looking into terrorist incidents in which some Hindus were suspected than in investigating cases where jihadi terrorists---indigenous or externally-sponsored---were suspected. Its record till now in successful investigation has been disappointing due to excessive political control over its functioning. It was expected to be an independent agency which will move on its own after a major terrorist strike. The expectation has been belied so far.
5. The steps already taken to strengthen coastal security have not yet contributed to an increase of our alertness to possible sea-borne threats. The shocking lack of reflexes on the part of the Navy, the Coast Guard, the intelligence agencies and the Police during a recent incident when an abandoned foreign ship managed to drift into our coastal waters without being noticed by any of these agencies speaks disturbingly of the continuing poor state of our coastal defence. Our capabilities for maritime counter-terrorism---whether by way of improved intelligence collection or physical security or alert mechanism---- seem to be as poor as they were before 26/11.
6. The decisions to set up a National Intelligence Grid and the NCTC have not yet been implemented---reportedly due to a lack of convergence of views among the various agencies and Ministries that would be involved in the implementation of these decisions as to how to go about it. The implementation process has been lethargic and glacial.
7. Fortunately, we have not had any major act of mass fatality terrorism ( with fatalities of more than 100) since 26/11. However, despite the proclaimed strengthening of our preventive and investigative capabilities since 26/11, we have had five acts of low or medium fatality terrorism after 26/11 in Pune, Mumbai, Delhi and Varanasi. Despite the proclaimed strengthening of our preventive capability, none of them could be prevented and despite the proclaimed strengthening of our investigative capabilities none of them could be successfully detected.
8. We are clueless as to who committed them, how many undetected cells are operating, are they indigenous or Pakistani, wherefrom are they getting their explosives, detonators and triggering mechanism etc. While our preventive capability has generally been below par, our investigative capability used to be good. This too seems to have deteriorated now due to politicisation and communalisation of the investigation process.
9. An equally worrisome aspect is the seeming deterioration in our TECHINT capability. While our HUMINT capability was not satisfactory, our good TECHINT capability made up for our HUMINT deficiencies------ contributing to successful neutralisation of new cells and successful investigation of terrorist strikes. The detection of the electronic chatter of terrorist suspects has become weaker after 26/11. As a result, good TECHINT is no longer compensating for the poor HUMINT. My assessment is that our terrorism-related intelligence collection capability today is weaker than it was before 26/11.
10. A reason given for our failures to detect the electronic chatter of terrorist suspects after 26/11 is that the terrorists now have access to better communication technology and gadgets and have better evasive capability and that, consequently, they have become smarter. I do not buy this explanation. I have not seen any evidence to support this. Our poor performance after 26/11 is not because the terrorists have become smarter, but it is because our agencies have become less smart than the terrorists.
11. We are yet to find an effective way of dealing with the sanctuaries of the terrorists in Pakistan. While our peace initiatives are welcome, they are not going to induce Pakistan to act against these sanctuaries. The peace process has to go hand in hand with a counter sanctuary process through deniable covert actions. Peace does not mean surrender or resignation. Peace means willingness to talk without letting it dent our courage and readiness to act against the sanctuaries. Action to create a counter-sanctuary capability continues to be totally neglected.
12. The continuing deficiencies in our counter-terrorism thinking and reflexes is due to a disinterested approach on the part of the Congress as well as the BJP. Both are equally guilty of politicising and communalising counter-terrorism. Both are equally guilty of failures to build up our counter-terrorism capabilities. The public is equally disinterested. There is hardly any meaningful debate on the issue either in the parliament or in our media or in public fora. The beneficiaries are the terrorists.
13. The public has to sit up and exercise pressure on the political class. The voters have to make it clear to the political class that their counter-terrorism record will be an important factor in influencing voter preference. Unless the public stirs itself up and moves, the political class is not going to move. (26-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The 26/11 terrorist strikes led to five important decisions by the Government of India--- to decentralise the deployment of the National Security Guards (NSG) by setting up regional hubs, to set up the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to investigate terrorist incidents of a pan-Indian nature, to strengthen coastal security, to create a national intelligence grid to serve as a data-base accessible to all agencies---- at the central and State levels--- dealing with counter-terrorism, and to set up a National Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC), to take co-ordinated follow-up action on all terrorism-related inputs flowing from the intelligence agencies and the police.
2. The NSG has already been decentralised and regional hubs have come into existence. This has been done because of the delayed deployment of the NSG during the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The then totally Delhi-based NSG was slow to move and equally slow to react and its ability to co-ordinate with the local police and other security agencies in Mumbai was found wanting.
3. With the deployment of units of the NSG in big metro centres now, there is an expectation that the deficiencies witnessed on 26/11 will not recur now. If this is really so will become evident only when there is another act of mass fatality terrorism. Fortunately, we have not had one since 26/11. As a result, the proclaimed ability of the NSG to move faster and with greater effectiveness now is yet to be tested. It is important that the NSG’s training pays attention to the need to sharpen its institutional reflexes and that it keeps constantly interacting and rehearsing with the local police and other security agencies.
4. The NIA, which is already functioning, has had a lethargic and confused start. It is not clear to objective counter-terrorism analysts as to when and how it will be called into action. One has reasons to suspect and fear that like the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) the NIA is tending to become a partly professional and partly politicised agency, which is sought to be used by the Government of India as a stick to beat the opponents with. It has shown greater alacrity and enthusiasm in looking into terrorist incidents in which some Hindus were suspected than in investigating cases where jihadi terrorists---indigenous or externally-sponsored---were suspected. Its record till now in successful investigation has been disappointing due to excessive political control over its functioning. It was expected to be an independent agency which will move on its own after a major terrorist strike. The expectation has been belied so far.
5. The steps already taken to strengthen coastal security have not yet contributed to an increase of our alertness to possible sea-borne threats. The shocking lack of reflexes on the part of the Navy, the Coast Guard, the intelligence agencies and the Police during a recent incident when an abandoned foreign ship managed to drift into our coastal waters without being noticed by any of these agencies speaks disturbingly of the continuing poor state of our coastal defence. Our capabilities for maritime counter-terrorism---whether by way of improved intelligence collection or physical security or alert mechanism---- seem to be as poor as they were before 26/11.
6. The decisions to set up a National Intelligence Grid and the NCTC have not yet been implemented---reportedly due to a lack of convergence of views among the various agencies and Ministries that would be involved in the implementation of these decisions as to how to go about it. The implementation process has been lethargic and glacial.
7. Fortunately, we have not had any major act of mass fatality terrorism ( with fatalities of more than 100) since 26/11. However, despite the proclaimed strengthening of our preventive and investigative capabilities since 26/11, we have had five acts of low or medium fatality terrorism after 26/11 in Pune, Mumbai, Delhi and Varanasi. Despite the proclaimed strengthening of our preventive capability, none of them could be prevented and despite the proclaimed strengthening of our investigative capabilities none of them could be successfully detected.
8. We are clueless as to who committed them, how many undetected cells are operating, are they indigenous or Pakistani, wherefrom are they getting their explosives, detonators and triggering mechanism etc. While our preventive capability has generally been below par, our investigative capability used to be good. This too seems to have deteriorated now due to politicisation and communalisation of the investigation process.
9. An equally worrisome aspect is the seeming deterioration in our TECHINT capability. While our HUMINT capability was not satisfactory, our good TECHINT capability made up for our HUMINT deficiencies------ contributing to successful neutralisation of new cells and successful investigation of terrorist strikes. The detection of the electronic chatter of terrorist suspects has become weaker after 26/11. As a result, good TECHINT is no longer compensating for the poor HUMINT. My assessment is that our terrorism-related intelligence collection capability today is weaker than it was before 26/11.
10. A reason given for our failures to detect the electronic chatter of terrorist suspects after 26/11 is that the terrorists now have access to better communication technology and gadgets and have better evasive capability and that, consequently, they have become smarter. I do not buy this explanation. I have not seen any evidence to support this. Our poor performance after 26/11 is not because the terrorists have become smarter, but it is because our agencies have become less smart than the terrorists.
11. We are yet to find an effective way of dealing with the sanctuaries of the terrorists in Pakistan. While our peace initiatives are welcome, they are not going to induce Pakistan to act against these sanctuaries. The peace process has to go hand in hand with a counter sanctuary process through deniable covert actions. Peace does not mean surrender or resignation. Peace means willingness to talk without letting it dent our courage and readiness to act against the sanctuaries. Action to create a counter-sanctuary capability continues to be totally neglected.
12. The continuing deficiencies in our counter-terrorism thinking and reflexes is due to a disinterested approach on the part of the Congress as well as the BJP. Both are equally guilty of politicising and communalising counter-terrorism. Both are equally guilty of failures to build up our counter-terrorism capabilities. The public is equally disinterested. There is hardly any meaningful debate on the issue either in the parliament or in our media or in public fora. The beneficiaries are the terrorists.
13. The public has to sit up and exercise pressure on the political class. The voters have to make it clear to the political class that their counter-terrorism record will be an important factor in influencing voter preference. Unless the public stirs itself up and moves, the political class is not going to move. (26-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
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