B.RAMAN
The erosion of decorum and gravitas in parliamentary proceedings is a phenomenon often seen in Parliaments of democracies with a multi-party parliamentary system, with no party strong enough to enforce its political will on the conduct of the parliamentary proceedings.
2.One saw it in the pre-de Gaulle French Parliament and one continues to see it often in the parliaments of democracies such as Italy, Japan, South Korea and some South American countries.
3. de Gaulle did manage to improve the functioning of the French Parliament by having a new Constitution introduced. Despite this, the experience on the whole has been that the erosion cannot be prevented or reversed through rules and regulations alone or through flippant measures such as denying salary to Members of Parliament disrupting parliamentary proceedings. The only way of dealing with this erosion is through the practice of a robust system of parliamentary ethics, the initiative for which has to come from the ruling party.
4. This phenomenon is generally not seen in democracies with a two-party system or with a restricted number of political parties where parliamentary strengths are evenly matched. Two examples are the UK and India before 1970. The predominant presence of the Congress in the Indian Parliament and the parliamentary etiquette of the post-Independence leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru ensured the prevalence of decorum and gravitas even in the most contentious of situations. The self-confidence arising from predominance in numbers ensured a certain dignity and self-restraint in the conduct of the MsP of the ruling party, which was reciprocated by the members of the opposition.
5. The erosion in the decorum and gravitas consequent on the emergence of a multiplicity of political parties initially started in the State legislatures in the 1960s and has subsequently spread to the Parliament, causing frequent spells of paralysis in the functioning of the Parliament, to which the ruling and opposition parties have contributed in varying measures.
6. The initiative for reversing the erosion through better parliamentary etiquette and conduct has to come from the ruling party, but unfortunately there has been a leadership vacuum in the Congress due to the lack of political stature in the party as well as the Government. Neither Mrs.Sonia Gandhi, the leader of the party, nor Dr.Manmohan Singh, the leader of the Government lacking parity of status with the party leader, has been able to give an ethical lead inside the two Houses.
7. The lack of self-confidence of the two leaders arising from their lack of stature has added to their feelings of political insecurity leading to an undesirable abrasive style of politics poisoning the conduct and proceedings inside the two Houses.
8.The political ineptitude of the two leaders was seen in the manner in which they tried to push through the decision on the question of FDI in the retail sector. The parliamentary proceedings have been paralysed by the determination of the ruling party to push through the decision by hook or by crook and the equal determination of the opposition to frustrate the machinations of the ruling party.
9. While the merits of allowing FDI in the retail sector have been adequately discussed, there has not been enough focus on how the Government, which had slept over the issue for many months, has tried to push through the decision in such a peremptory manner in unedifying haste.
10.Some retired senior officials with whom I had discussed this in Delhi last week attributed the haste displayed by the Congress to its urgent need for funds for the UP elections next year. They alleged that some corporate houses, which would be the main beneficiaries of the FDI decision, were expected to be the main contributors to the coffers of the Congress for the UP elections.
11. According to them, the determination of other political parties to prevent the Congress from financially benefiting from the decision before the UP elections accounted for their obduracy in preventing the normal functioning of the two Houses.
12. Even if the Congress had legitimate economic and policy reasons for pushing through the decision, it could have averted the prevailing paralysis either by postponing the decision till the session was over or by seeking to build an all-party consensus on the issue or by accepting the demand of the opposition for an adjournment motion with voting, subject to the proviso that either there will be voice voting or any adverse voting will be deemed to be only a disapproval of the policy initiative and not a lack of confidence in the Government.
13. Instead of discussing the various legitimate options with the opposition, the Government adopted a stone-walling tactics which has led a further erosion of decorum and gravitas. This situation could not have been averted through any number of rules and regulations to govern the functioning of the Parliament.
14. This could have been averted only by a self-confident and enlightened political leadership in the Congress taking the initiative for searching for a way out in consultation with all political parties in a manner that would have preserved decorum and gravitas in the two Houses.
15. By failing to do so, the Congress has contributed to a further erosion of the dignity and stature of the Parliament. While the opposition parties cannot escape their share of the blame for the prevailing state of affairs, one has to admit that the initial provocation came from the Congress.
16. If media reports that the Government has decided to suspend the FDI decision are correct, the present crisis may end, but another crisis will occur in future unless and until there is an ethical introspection by all parties and the Congress leadership takes the initiative for restoring the decorum and gravitas and the ethical dimensions of the parliamentary proceedings. It is in this direction that the public should exercise pressure on the political class. ( 5-12-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, December 4, 2011
Sunday, November 27, 2011
AVOIDABLE UNPLEASANTNESS IN INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS
B.RAMAN
Avoidable unpleasantness has recently crept into India-China relations over issues which should not have been over-dramatised by China thereby injecting a certain distrust into the relations which had been progressing well despite continuing differences over the border dispute between the two countries.
2. China’s unhappiness over the participation of an Indian Government-owned oil company in off-shore oil/gas exploration in three blocks in the South China Sea area belonging to Vietnam sovereignty over which is claimed by China was the starting point of this unpleasantness.
3. Chinese official spokesmen took care to be measured in their comments on the participation of the Indian company so that the issue did not have an uncontrollably adverse effect on the bilateral relations. Similar care not to over-dramatise the Chinese unhappiness was evident in Chinese official comments after the recent meeting on November 18,2011,between Prime Ministers Dr.Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao in the margins of the East Asia summit at Bali in Indonesia.
4. This salutary restraint was unfortunately not evident in two commentaries on Sino-Indian relations disseminated by the party-owned “Global Times” and the Government-owned Xinhua news agency. In view of the Party ownership of the “Global Times” and the State ownership of Xinhua, it is natural that their hard-hitting comments on India were viewed by many in India as the conscious adoption of a two-edged policy by the Chinese authorities on India’s relations with Vietnam and its perceived activism in the South China Sea. This two-edged policy was seen by many in India as marked by seeming official restraint and semi-official anti-Indian virulence.
5. The hiccups over India’s firm, but gentle assertion of its right to help Vietnam in oil/gas exploration without taking a stand on the merits of the dispute between China and Vietnam over the question of sovereignty over the South China Sea islands have been aggravated by another instance of over-dramatisation by the Chinese of their objection to the proposed participation by His Holiness the Dalai Lama in a global Buddhist conference being held by a non-governmental foundation at New Delhi from November 27 to 30 coinciding with the 2600th anniversary of the Enlightenment of Buddha.
6. It is understood that the Chinese initially objected to the participation of His Holiness in the conference and subsequently to the conference itself. It so happened that the dates of the conference coincided with the 15th round of the talks on the pending border issue between the Special Representatives of the Prime Ministers of the two countries which was proposed to be held at New Delhi on November 28 and 29. This round has now been postponed without any fresh dates being fixed because of the reported Chinese unhappiness over the Buddhist conference and the participation of His Holiness in it.
7. While one could argue with some reason that Chinese sensitivities could have been kept in mind while fixing the dates for the two events so that they did not clash, one would have equal reason not to appreciate the avoidable drama created by the Chinese which has not only come in the way of the 15th round of the border talks, but has also cast a shadow over the current state of the Sino-Indian relations.
8. While continuing to be sensitive to Chinese interests and concerns wherever possible and necessary, India has in recent months started slowly asserting its own interests and concerns without surrendering totally to those of China.
9. The increasing assertion of the Indian will to defend and promote its interests without impinging on those of China has been particularly evident in our relations with Vietnam and Myanmar and in our refusal to intervene in matters concerning His Holiness Dalai Lama provided those matters are purely of a religious nature without any political significance.
10. This assertion of the Indian will has had two aspects---in relation to our developing relations with Myanmar and Vietnam, and in developing our co-operation with the US, Japan and Australia in matters relating to maritime security and maritime counter-terrorism.
11. While the Chinese have not so far openly come out with any objection to our developing relations with Myanmar, their officially-controlled media has been increasingly irritable with regard to our developing relations with Vietnam and the US. The Dalai Lama issue is showing signs of becoming an additional source of irritation.
12. If the Chinese really value their relations with India as they claim to be, it is important for them to pay as much attention to India’s interests and concerns as we have always paid to theirs. Mutual respect of each other’s core interests and concerns has to be a two-way traffic. The Chinese, who lose no opportunity of asserting their core interests and concerns, cannot object to India doing likewise.
13. It is hoped that the current unpleasantness in the bilateral relations would be ephemeral and would dissipate in the days to come thereby enabling the two countries to resume their forward movement in their search for a mutually satisfactory solution to the border problem.
14. However, India should be prepared for the possibility that it may not be ephemeral and it may have to live for some years with the shadow cast on the bilateral relations. We should continue to assert our core interests and concerns in a carefully calibrated manner without letting our assertion become disproportionate to our present capacity to counter any adventurist impulses of China directed at us----whether across the border or in the South China Sea. ( 28-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Avoidable unpleasantness has recently crept into India-China relations over issues which should not have been over-dramatised by China thereby injecting a certain distrust into the relations which had been progressing well despite continuing differences over the border dispute between the two countries.
2. China’s unhappiness over the participation of an Indian Government-owned oil company in off-shore oil/gas exploration in three blocks in the South China Sea area belonging to Vietnam sovereignty over which is claimed by China was the starting point of this unpleasantness.
3. Chinese official spokesmen took care to be measured in their comments on the participation of the Indian company so that the issue did not have an uncontrollably adverse effect on the bilateral relations. Similar care not to over-dramatise the Chinese unhappiness was evident in Chinese official comments after the recent meeting on November 18,2011,between Prime Ministers Dr.Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao in the margins of the East Asia summit at Bali in Indonesia.
4. This salutary restraint was unfortunately not evident in two commentaries on Sino-Indian relations disseminated by the party-owned “Global Times” and the Government-owned Xinhua news agency. In view of the Party ownership of the “Global Times” and the State ownership of Xinhua, it is natural that their hard-hitting comments on India were viewed by many in India as the conscious adoption of a two-edged policy by the Chinese authorities on India’s relations with Vietnam and its perceived activism in the South China Sea. This two-edged policy was seen by many in India as marked by seeming official restraint and semi-official anti-Indian virulence.
5. The hiccups over India’s firm, but gentle assertion of its right to help Vietnam in oil/gas exploration without taking a stand on the merits of the dispute between China and Vietnam over the question of sovereignty over the South China Sea islands have been aggravated by another instance of over-dramatisation by the Chinese of their objection to the proposed participation by His Holiness the Dalai Lama in a global Buddhist conference being held by a non-governmental foundation at New Delhi from November 27 to 30 coinciding with the 2600th anniversary of the Enlightenment of Buddha.
6. It is understood that the Chinese initially objected to the participation of His Holiness in the conference and subsequently to the conference itself. It so happened that the dates of the conference coincided with the 15th round of the talks on the pending border issue between the Special Representatives of the Prime Ministers of the two countries which was proposed to be held at New Delhi on November 28 and 29. This round has now been postponed without any fresh dates being fixed because of the reported Chinese unhappiness over the Buddhist conference and the participation of His Holiness in it.
7. While one could argue with some reason that Chinese sensitivities could have been kept in mind while fixing the dates for the two events so that they did not clash, one would have equal reason not to appreciate the avoidable drama created by the Chinese which has not only come in the way of the 15th round of the border talks, but has also cast a shadow over the current state of the Sino-Indian relations.
8. While continuing to be sensitive to Chinese interests and concerns wherever possible and necessary, India has in recent months started slowly asserting its own interests and concerns without surrendering totally to those of China.
9. The increasing assertion of the Indian will to defend and promote its interests without impinging on those of China has been particularly evident in our relations with Vietnam and Myanmar and in our refusal to intervene in matters concerning His Holiness Dalai Lama provided those matters are purely of a religious nature without any political significance.
10. This assertion of the Indian will has had two aspects---in relation to our developing relations with Myanmar and Vietnam, and in developing our co-operation with the US, Japan and Australia in matters relating to maritime security and maritime counter-terrorism.
11. While the Chinese have not so far openly come out with any objection to our developing relations with Myanmar, their officially-controlled media has been increasingly irritable with regard to our developing relations with Vietnam and the US. The Dalai Lama issue is showing signs of becoming an additional source of irritation.
12. If the Chinese really value their relations with India as they claim to be, it is important for them to pay as much attention to India’s interests and concerns as we have always paid to theirs. Mutual respect of each other’s core interests and concerns has to be a two-way traffic. The Chinese, who lose no opportunity of asserting their core interests and concerns, cannot object to India doing likewise.
13. It is hoped that the current unpleasantness in the bilateral relations would be ephemeral and would dissipate in the days to come thereby enabling the two countries to resume their forward movement in their search for a mutually satisfactory solution to the border problem.
14. However, India should be prepared for the possibility that it may not be ephemeral and it may have to live for some years with the shadow cast on the bilateral relations. We should continue to assert our core interests and concerns in a carefully calibrated manner without letting our assertion become disproportionate to our present capacity to counter any adventurist impulses of China directed at us----whether across the border or in the South China Sea. ( 28-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, November 26, 2011
PAKISTAN: DANGERS OF A SUBALTERNS’ COUP
B.RAMAN
Appearing in a talk show hosted by Suhasini Haidar of CNN-IBN on November 26,2011, I said that I never believed a coup was likely in Pakistan as a result of the Army’s anger over the so-called Memogate affair . I added that Pakistan had an independent judiciary today and that, hence, the Army would not have the confidence that it could get a coup validated by the judiciary post-facto.
2.If Suhasini were to ask me the same question today in the light of the outrage in the Pakistan Army over the reported death of 28 Pakistani troops due to a mistaken NATO airstrike on two Pakistani military posts about two kms from the Afghan border in the Mohmand Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on November 26, my reply would be a little more nuanced.
3. I would still rule out a coup by senior officers headed by Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), who are quite capable of rational thinking regarding the legal and other consequences of a coup, but I would not rule out a coup by subalterns and middle level officers enraged over the failure of their senior officers and the political leadership to protect the honour of the Pakistan Army against repeated infringements by the US and other NATO forces.
4. One saw reports of such anger in the barracks over the failure of the senior military leadership to prevent the US Commando raid to kill Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2,2011.Kayani managed to control this anger with great difficulty by undertaking a tour of important military cantonments.
5. Reports received by me from Pakistani sources, who are not known to have misled me in the past, claim that one could see similar anger over the latest incident spreading across the barracks. The anger is against the US as well as against the senior leadership of the Army. The reports indicate that organisations such as the Hizbut Tehrir have been trying to fan this anger.
6.If this anger doesn’t subside, there is a danger of a successful or attempted coup in Pakistan organised by officers at middle level, who would not be bothered about the legal consequences of a coup. The Pakistan Army is a disciplined force. In its history, there has never been a successful coup by junior officers. However, there were two instances of attempted junior officers’ coup, the preparations for which were detected in time by the senior military leadership and crushed.
7. The last of them was in 1995 when Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister and Gen Abdul Wahid Kakkar was the COAS. A group of middle level officers headed by Brig. Zahir-ul-Islam Abbasi, fromer Defence Attache to India, joined hands with the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and planned to capture power after killing Benazir and the COAS. The plans for the coup were accidentally detected and the officers concerned arrested and court-martialled.
8. When Gen.Pervez Musharraf was in power we had seen reports of individual junior officers of the Army and the Air Force, who were angry over Musharraf’s co-operation with the US, joining hands with Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda elements in a conspiracy to have Musharraf assassinated. Their role came to notice during the investigation into the two attempts to kill Musharraf in December,2003, allegedly orchestrated by Abu Faraj at-Libbi of Al Qaeda now in the Guantanamo Bay detention centre of the US.
9. The anti-US anger in the lower and middle ranks of the Pakistan Army after the Abbottabad raid has till now been kept under control by Kayani. If the anger over the killing of 28 troops, including two officers, allegedly by NATO air strikes on Pakistani military posts in the Momand Agency is not carefully and tactfully handled by the US and the Pakistani civilian and military leadership, there is a danger of this anger getting out of control leading to a conspiracy of the junior officers.
10. If such a conspiracy is successful with the co-operation of jihadi elements, there would be a real threat of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal coming under their control. Senior Pakistani Army officers are responsible people who are quite capable of ensuring that there is no misuse of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. I do not have the same confidence about the junior officers.
11. The US-Pakistan relations are going from bad to worse--- particularly the military-military and intelligence-intelligence relationship. There is a lot of glee among many Indian analysts over it. This need not necessarily be a beneficial development for India. It is in our interest that the US retains the ability to influence the behaviour of the Pakistani military leadership.
12. The situation in Pakistan needs very close monitoring. (27-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Appearing in a talk show hosted by Suhasini Haidar of CNN-IBN on November 26,2011, I said that I never believed a coup was likely in Pakistan as a result of the Army’s anger over the so-called Memogate affair . I added that Pakistan had an independent judiciary today and that, hence, the Army would not have the confidence that it could get a coup validated by the judiciary post-facto.
2.If Suhasini were to ask me the same question today in the light of the outrage in the Pakistan Army over the reported death of 28 Pakistani troops due to a mistaken NATO airstrike on two Pakistani military posts about two kms from the Afghan border in the Mohmand Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on November 26, my reply would be a little more nuanced.
3. I would still rule out a coup by senior officers headed by Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), who are quite capable of rational thinking regarding the legal and other consequences of a coup, but I would not rule out a coup by subalterns and middle level officers enraged over the failure of their senior officers and the political leadership to protect the honour of the Pakistan Army against repeated infringements by the US and other NATO forces.
4. One saw reports of such anger in the barracks over the failure of the senior military leadership to prevent the US Commando raid to kill Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad on May 2,2011.Kayani managed to control this anger with great difficulty by undertaking a tour of important military cantonments.
5. Reports received by me from Pakistani sources, who are not known to have misled me in the past, claim that one could see similar anger over the latest incident spreading across the barracks. The anger is against the US as well as against the senior leadership of the Army. The reports indicate that organisations such as the Hizbut Tehrir have been trying to fan this anger.
6.If this anger doesn’t subside, there is a danger of a successful or attempted coup in Pakistan organised by officers at middle level, who would not be bothered about the legal consequences of a coup. The Pakistan Army is a disciplined force. In its history, there has never been a successful coup by junior officers. However, there were two instances of attempted junior officers’ coup, the preparations for which were detected in time by the senior military leadership and crushed.
7. The last of them was in 1995 when Benazir Bhutto was the Prime Minister and Gen Abdul Wahid Kakkar was the COAS. A group of middle level officers headed by Brig. Zahir-ul-Islam Abbasi, fromer Defence Attache to India, joined hands with the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and planned to capture power after killing Benazir and the COAS. The plans for the coup were accidentally detected and the officers concerned arrested and court-martialled.
8. When Gen.Pervez Musharraf was in power we had seen reports of individual junior officers of the Army and the Air Force, who were angry over Musharraf’s co-operation with the US, joining hands with Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda elements in a conspiracy to have Musharraf assassinated. Their role came to notice during the investigation into the two attempts to kill Musharraf in December,2003, allegedly orchestrated by Abu Faraj at-Libbi of Al Qaeda now in the Guantanamo Bay detention centre of the US.
9. The anti-US anger in the lower and middle ranks of the Pakistan Army after the Abbottabad raid has till now been kept under control by Kayani. If the anger over the killing of 28 troops, including two officers, allegedly by NATO air strikes on Pakistani military posts in the Momand Agency is not carefully and tactfully handled by the US and the Pakistani civilian and military leadership, there is a danger of this anger getting out of control leading to a conspiracy of the junior officers.
10. If such a conspiracy is successful with the co-operation of jihadi elements, there would be a real threat of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal coming under their control. Senior Pakistani Army officers are responsible people who are quite capable of ensuring that there is no misuse of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. I do not have the same confidence about the junior officers.
11. The US-Pakistan relations are going from bad to worse--- particularly the military-military and intelligence-intelligence relationship. There is a lot of glee among many Indian analysts over it. This need not necessarily be a beneficial development for India. It is in our interest that the US retains the ability to influence the behaviour of the Pakistani military leadership.
12. The situation in Pakistan needs very close monitoring. (27-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, November 25, 2011
THREE YEARS AFTER 26/11
B.RAMAN
The 26/11 terrorist strikes led to five important decisions by the Government of India--- to decentralise the deployment of the National Security Guards (NSG) by setting up regional hubs, to set up the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to investigate terrorist incidents of a pan-Indian nature, to strengthen coastal security, to create a national intelligence grid to serve as a data-base accessible to all agencies---- at the central and State levels--- dealing with counter-terrorism, and to set up a National Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC), to take co-ordinated follow-up action on all terrorism-related inputs flowing from the intelligence agencies and the police.
2. The NSG has already been decentralised and regional hubs have come into existence. This has been done because of the delayed deployment of the NSG during the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The then totally Delhi-based NSG was slow to move and equally slow to react and its ability to co-ordinate with the local police and other security agencies in Mumbai was found wanting.
3. With the deployment of units of the NSG in big metro centres now, there is an expectation that the deficiencies witnessed on 26/11 will not recur now. If this is really so will become evident only when there is another act of mass fatality terrorism. Fortunately, we have not had one since 26/11. As a result, the proclaimed ability of the NSG to move faster and with greater effectiveness now is yet to be tested. It is important that the NSG’s training pays attention to the need to sharpen its institutional reflexes and that it keeps constantly interacting and rehearsing with the local police and other security agencies.
4. The NIA, which is already functioning, has had a lethargic and confused start. It is not clear to objective counter-terrorism analysts as to when and how it will be called into action. One has reasons to suspect and fear that like the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) the NIA is tending to become a partly professional and partly politicised agency, which is sought to be used by the Government of India as a stick to beat the opponents with. It has shown greater alacrity and enthusiasm in looking into terrorist incidents in which some Hindus were suspected than in investigating cases where jihadi terrorists---indigenous or externally-sponsored---were suspected. Its record till now in successful investigation has been disappointing due to excessive political control over its functioning. It was expected to be an independent agency which will move on its own after a major terrorist strike. The expectation has been belied so far.
5. The steps already taken to strengthen coastal security have not yet contributed to an increase of our alertness to possible sea-borne threats. The shocking lack of reflexes on the part of the Navy, the Coast Guard, the intelligence agencies and the Police during a recent incident when an abandoned foreign ship managed to drift into our coastal waters without being noticed by any of these agencies speaks disturbingly of the continuing poor state of our coastal defence. Our capabilities for maritime counter-terrorism---whether by way of improved intelligence collection or physical security or alert mechanism---- seem to be as poor as they were before 26/11.
6. The decisions to set up a National Intelligence Grid and the NCTC have not yet been implemented---reportedly due to a lack of convergence of views among the various agencies and Ministries that would be involved in the implementation of these decisions as to how to go about it. The implementation process has been lethargic and glacial.
7. Fortunately, we have not had any major act of mass fatality terrorism ( with fatalities of more than 100) since 26/11. However, despite the proclaimed strengthening of our preventive and investigative capabilities since 26/11, we have had five acts of low or medium fatality terrorism after 26/11 in Pune, Mumbai, Delhi and Varanasi. Despite the proclaimed strengthening of our preventive capability, none of them could be prevented and despite the proclaimed strengthening of our investigative capabilities none of them could be successfully detected.
8. We are clueless as to who committed them, how many undetected cells are operating, are they indigenous or Pakistani, wherefrom are they getting their explosives, detonators and triggering mechanism etc. While our preventive capability has generally been below par, our investigative capability used to be good. This too seems to have deteriorated now due to politicisation and communalisation of the investigation process.
9. An equally worrisome aspect is the seeming deterioration in our TECHINT capability. While our HUMINT capability was not satisfactory, our good TECHINT capability made up for our HUMINT deficiencies------ contributing to successful neutralisation of new cells and successful investigation of terrorist strikes. The detection of the electronic chatter of terrorist suspects has become weaker after 26/11. As a result, good TECHINT is no longer compensating for the poor HUMINT. My assessment is that our terrorism-related intelligence collection capability today is weaker than it was before 26/11.
10. A reason given for our failures to detect the electronic chatter of terrorist suspects after 26/11 is that the terrorists now have access to better communication technology and gadgets and have better evasive capability and that, consequently, they have become smarter. I do not buy this explanation. I have not seen any evidence to support this. Our poor performance after 26/11 is not because the terrorists have become smarter, but it is because our agencies have become less smart than the terrorists.
11. We are yet to find an effective way of dealing with the sanctuaries of the terrorists in Pakistan. While our peace initiatives are welcome, they are not going to induce Pakistan to act against these sanctuaries. The peace process has to go hand in hand with a counter sanctuary process through deniable covert actions. Peace does not mean surrender or resignation. Peace means willingness to talk without letting it dent our courage and readiness to act against the sanctuaries. Action to create a counter-sanctuary capability continues to be totally neglected.
12. The continuing deficiencies in our counter-terrorism thinking and reflexes is due to a disinterested approach on the part of the Congress as well as the BJP. Both are equally guilty of politicising and communalising counter-terrorism. Both are equally guilty of failures to build up our counter-terrorism capabilities. The public is equally disinterested. There is hardly any meaningful debate on the issue either in the parliament or in our media or in public fora. The beneficiaries are the terrorists.
13. The public has to sit up and exercise pressure on the political class. The voters have to make it clear to the political class that their counter-terrorism record will be an important factor in influencing voter preference. Unless the public stirs itself up and moves, the political class is not going to move. (26-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The 26/11 terrorist strikes led to five important decisions by the Government of India--- to decentralise the deployment of the National Security Guards (NSG) by setting up regional hubs, to set up the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to investigate terrorist incidents of a pan-Indian nature, to strengthen coastal security, to create a national intelligence grid to serve as a data-base accessible to all agencies---- at the central and State levels--- dealing with counter-terrorism, and to set up a National Counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC), to take co-ordinated follow-up action on all terrorism-related inputs flowing from the intelligence agencies and the police.
2. The NSG has already been decentralised and regional hubs have come into existence. This has been done because of the delayed deployment of the NSG during the 26/11 terrorist strikes. The then totally Delhi-based NSG was slow to move and equally slow to react and its ability to co-ordinate with the local police and other security agencies in Mumbai was found wanting.
3. With the deployment of units of the NSG in big metro centres now, there is an expectation that the deficiencies witnessed on 26/11 will not recur now. If this is really so will become evident only when there is another act of mass fatality terrorism. Fortunately, we have not had one since 26/11. As a result, the proclaimed ability of the NSG to move faster and with greater effectiveness now is yet to be tested. It is important that the NSG’s training pays attention to the need to sharpen its institutional reflexes and that it keeps constantly interacting and rehearsing with the local police and other security agencies.
4. The NIA, which is already functioning, has had a lethargic and confused start. It is not clear to objective counter-terrorism analysts as to when and how it will be called into action. One has reasons to suspect and fear that like the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) the NIA is tending to become a partly professional and partly politicised agency, which is sought to be used by the Government of India as a stick to beat the opponents with. It has shown greater alacrity and enthusiasm in looking into terrorist incidents in which some Hindus were suspected than in investigating cases where jihadi terrorists---indigenous or externally-sponsored---were suspected. Its record till now in successful investigation has been disappointing due to excessive political control over its functioning. It was expected to be an independent agency which will move on its own after a major terrorist strike. The expectation has been belied so far.
5. The steps already taken to strengthen coastal security have not yet contributed to an increase of our alertness to possible sea-borne threats. The shocking lack of reflexes on the part of the Navy, the Coast Guard, the intelligence agencies and the Police during a recent incident when an abandoned foreign ship managed to drift into our coastal waters without being noticed by any of these agencies speaks disturbingly of the continuing poor state of our coastal defence. Our capabilities for maritime counter-terrorism---whether by way of improved intelligence collection or physical security or alert mechanism---- seem to be as poor as they were before 26/11.
6. The decisions to set up a National Intelligence Grid and the NCTC have not yet been implemented---reportedly due to a lack of convergence of views among the various agencies and Ministries that would be involved in the implementation of these decisions as to how to go about it. The implementation process has been lethargic and glacial.
7. Fortunately, we have not had any major act of mass fatality terrorism ( with fatalities of more than 100) since 26/11. However, despite the proclaimed strengthening of our preventive and investigative capabilities since 26/11, we have had five acts of low or medium fatality terrorism after 26/11 in Pune, Mumbai, Delhi and Varanasi. Despite the proclaimed strengthening of our preventive capability, none of them could be prevented and despite the proclaimed strengthening of our investigative capabilities none of them could be successfully detected.
8. We are clueless as to who committed them, how many undetected cells are operating, are they indigenous or Pakistani, wherefrom are they getting their explosives, detonators and triggering mechanism etc. While our preventive capability has generally been below par, our investigative capability used to be good. This too seems to have deteriorated now due to politicisation and communalisation of the investigation process.
9. An equally worrisome aspect is the seeming deterioration in our TECHINT capability. While our HUMINT capability was not satisfactory, our good TECHINT capability made up for our HUMINT deficiencies------ contributing to successful neutralisation of new cells and successful investigation of terrorist strikes. The detection of the electronic chatter of terrorist suspects has become weaker after 26/11. As a result, good TECHINT is no longer compensating for the poor HUMINT. My assessment is that our terrorism-related intelligence collection capability today is weaker than it was before 26/11.
10. A reason given for our failures to detect the electronic chatter of terrorist suspects after 26/11 is that the terrorists now have access to better communication technology and gadgets and have better evasive capability and that, consequently, they have become smarter. I do not buy this explanation. I have not seen any evidence to support this. Our poor performance after 26/11 is not because the terrorists have become smarter, but it is because our agencies have become less smart than the terrorists.
11. We are yet to find an effective way of dealing with the sanctuaries of the terrorists in Pakistan. While our peace initiatives are welcome, they are not going to induce Pakistan to act against these sanctuaries. The peace process has to go hand in hand with a counter sanctuary process through deniable covert actions. Peace does not mean surrender or resignation. Peace means willingness to talk without letting it dent our courage and readiness to act against the sanctuaries. Action to create a counter-sanctuary capability continues to be totally neglected.
12. The continuing deficiencies in our counter-terrorism thinking and reflexes is due to a disinterested approach on the part of the Congress as well as the BJP. Both are equally guilty of politicising and communalising counter-terrorism. Both are equally guilty of failures to build up our counter-terrorism capabilities. The public is equally disinterested. There is hardly any meaningful debate on the issue either in the parliament or in our media or in public fora. The beneficiaries are the terrorists.
13. The public has to sit up and exercise pressure on the political class. The voters have to make it clear to the political class that their counter-terrorism record will be an important factor in influencing voter preference. Unless the public stirs itself up and moves, the political class is not going to move. (26-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Tuesday, November 22, 2011
GUJARAT POLICE: TAKING LIBERTIES WITH LEGALITY
B.RAMAN
A three-member Special Investigation Team (SIT) headed by Rajiv Ranjan Verma, a senior officer of the Bihar IPS cadre, has concluded that Ishrat Jahan, a 19-year-old girl from Maharashtra, and three others, who had been projected by some officers of the Ahmedabad Police as belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), killed by the Police during an encounter on June 15,2004, were in fact the victims of a case fabricated against them by the Ahmedabad Police. According to the original version of the Ahmedabad police, which now stands discredited by the SIT , the four were planning to kill Chief Minister Narendra Modi, when they were intercepted resulting in the alleged encounter.
2.The SIT has concluded that they were killed in cold blood and subsequently shown as having died during an encounter with the Police. Since the text of the SIT report has not yet been released, one does not know under what circumstances they were taken into custody by the Police and why they were killed. It would appear that they did not belong to the LET and that the police version of their being LET members conspiring to kill Modi might have been cooked up to justify their killing.
3. The Gujarat High Court has ordered the registration of a fresh FIR on the basis of the finding of the SIT and a fresh investigation. The court is yet to decide who will investigate the case---the Gujarat Police itself or the SIT or a central investigation agency. Sections of the media have reported that 21 policemen, four of them IPS officers, may face investigation as suspects in the alleged murder of these innocent persons.
4. While the legal aspects of the case will be taken care of by the agency which would be doing the fresh investigation, the administrative and professional aspects have to be dealt with separately. These relate to setting right the rot that seems to have set in in sections of the Gujarat Police that has led to as many as 21 officers, four of them from the IPS, conspiring to project the deaths of four apparently innocent persons in police custody as deaths of terrorists in an encounter.
5.Rogue actions by individual police officers,including from the IPS, are not unknown in the history of the Indian Police, but as many as 21 officers conspiring together to commit an illegal act of a heinous nature which led to the death of four innocent persons at the hands of the Police should disturb all right-thinking police officers who value the reputation of the force. The Ishrat Jahan case is not one of individual aberration, but of collective aberration by a large section of the force without any qualms of conscience. They let themselves become a law unto themselves.
6. The fact that the enormity of their misconduct in deliberate violation of the law and the code of police conduct had not been brought to light till the SIT investigation by the senior police officers and the political leadership of Gujarat would indicate that an unethically permissive atmosphere has been prevailing in sections of the police force under the pretext of counter-terrorism.
7. Serious wrong-doings by sections of the police officers in the name of counter-terrorism have remained unchecked,unrebuked and unpunished. Terrorism, whether indigenous or externally-sponsored, needs firm handling, including the use of force legally permitted, but the firmness has to be tempered with a strict adherence to legality in criminal administration and justice. There are grounds to suspect that adherence to legality may not be the rule in dealing with terrorism in Gujarat.
8. It is important for the National Human Rights Commission to go into this and lay down a special code of conduct by the police while dealing with counter-terrorism to prevent a recurrence of such serious incidents. Such a code of conduct in counter-terrorism could be drafted in such a manner as to have pan-Indian applicability. (22-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
A three-member Special Investigation Team (SIT) headed by Rajiv Ranjan Verma, a senior officer of the Bihar IPS cadre, has concluded that Ishrat Jahan, a 19-year-old girl from Maharashtra, and three others, who had been projected by some officers of the Ahmedabad Police as belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), killed by the Police during an encounter on June 15,2004, were in fact the victims of a case fabricated against them by the Ahmedabad Police. According to the original version of the Ahmedabad police, which now stands discredited by the SIT , the four were planning to kill Chief Minister Narendra Modi, when they were intercepted resulting in the alleged encounter.
2.The SIT has concluded that they were killed in cold blood and subsequently shown as having died during an encounter with the Police. Since the text of the SIT report has not yet been released, one does not know under what circumstances they were taken into custody by the Police and why they were killed. It would appear that they did not belong to the LET and that the police version of their being LET members conspiring to kill Modi might have been cooked up to justify their killing.
3. The Gujarat High Court has ordered the registration of a fresh FIR on the basis of the finding of the SIT and a fresh investigation. The court is yet to decide who will investigate the case---the Gujarat Police itself or the SIT or a central investigation agency. Sections of the media have reported that 21 policemen, four of them IPS officers, may face investigation as suspects in the alleged murder of these innocent persons.
4. While the legal aspects of the case will be taken care of by the agency which would be doing the fresh investigation, the administrative and professional aspects have to be dealt with separately. These relate to setting right the rot that seems to have set in in sections of the Gujarat Police that has led to as many as 21 officers, four of them from the IPS, conspiring to project the deaths of four apparently innocent persons in police custody as deaths of terrorists in an encounter.
5.Rogue actions by individual police officers,including from the IPS, are not unknown in the history of the Indian Police, but as many as 21 officers conspiring together to commit an illegal act of a heinous nature which led to the death of four innocent persons at the hands of the Police should disturb all right-thinking police officers who value the reputation of the force. The Ishrat Jahan case is not one of individual aberration, but of collective aberration by a large section of the force without any qualms of conscience. They let themselves become a law unto themselves.
6. The fact that the enormity of their misconduct in deliberate violation of the law and the code of police conduct had not been brought to light till the SIT investigation by the senior police officers and the political leadership of Gujarat would indicate that an unethically permissive atmosphere has been prevailing in sections of the police force under the pretext of counter-terrorism.
7. Serious wrong-doings by sections of the police officers in the name of counter-terrorism have remained unchecked,unrebuked and unpunished. Terrorism, whether indigenous or externally-sponsored, needs firm handling, including the use of force legally permitted, but the firmness has to be tempered with a strict adherence to legality in criminal administration and justice. There are grounds to suspect that adherence to legality may not be the rule in dealing with terrorism in Gujarat.
8. It is important for the National Human Rights Commission to go into this and lay down a special code of conduct by the police while dealing with counter-terrorism to prevent a recurrence of such serious incidents. Such a code of conduct in counter-terrorism could be drafted in such a manner as to have pan-Indian applicability. (22-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, November 20, 2011
INDIA &PAKISTAN’S L’AFFAIRE IJAZ
B.RAMAN
In the wake of the allegations levelled by Mansoor Ijaz, the controversial US businessman of Pakistani origin, against Hussain Haqqani, the Pakistani Ambassador to the US, two separate bouts of boxing are going on simultaneously in Pakistan---- Ijaz vs Haqqani and President Asif Ali Zardari vs Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS).
2.As I had mentioned in my previous article on this subject, there has so far been no smoking gun on the basis of which anyone can be hung. Ijaz, who has made a series of claims regarding his contacts with Haqqani on May 9,2011, in a London Hotel and subsequently, has carefully built up an electronic trail that could support his claims and allegations and handed it over to Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), during a meeting in London on October 22,2011.
3. The electronic trail would have been in the Blackberry (BB) of both Haqqani and Ijaz. Whereas Ijaz would seem to have saved the trail and given it to the ISI, it is not clear whether Haqqani has saved or erased it. He has offered to hand over his BB for forensic examination to any enquiry committee set up by the Government or the National Assembly. If it turns out during the forensic examination that there is no electronic trail in Haqqani’s BB, he would have difficulty in explaining it and the Army’s suspicion against him would be further strengthened.
4. If the National Assembly decides to hold an enquiry, it will have to depend on the Ministry of the Interior headed by Rehman Malik for a forensic examination of Haqqani’s BB. Thus, there could be two forensic examinations---one by the ISI of the material handed over by Ijaz, which must have been already done, and another by the Ministry of the Interior of the material handed over by Haqqani. Reconciling any contradictions between the two forensic examinations of materials of different origin could further exacerbate the suspicions of the Army against Haqqani and even Zardari himself.
5. There is a third possibility. Sections of the Pakistani media have reported that a public interest petition has been filed before Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhamed Chaudhury of the Pakistan Supreme Court, requesting that he should monitor the investigation into the case. He has not so far reacted to it. If he decides to do so, the ISI may have to suspend its enquiry and the National Assembly may not order its own enquiry.
6. The matter could get prolonged and the question would arise as to what to do with Haqqani in the meanwhile--- replace him honourably without waiting for the results of the enquiries or allow him to continue in office and fight it out. Will the Army agree to his continuing in office?
7.The boxing bout between Zardari and Kayani is unlikely to lead to any military coup against him. The Army may not be able to get any coup validated by the judiciary. Moreover, when the enquiries are still on, the Army would have no grounds for intervening. The Army would most probably wait and watch while keeping up the pressure for removing Haqqani from office. To build up the pressure, Kayani might refer the matter to his Corps Commanders and get their support for removing Haqqani.
8.So long as L’Affaire Ijaz is not settled in a manner mutually satisfactory to the civilian and Army leaderships, the uneasy vibrations between the elected civilian leadership and the Army would add to the already existing suspicions between Zardari and Kayani. The civilian leadership might find itself reduced to a lame-duck administration till the next elections due in the beginning of 2013.
9. L’Affaire Ijaz is Pakistan’s internal affair. However, the re-surfacing of Ijaz from oblivion could uncomfortably remind us of the naivete of the NDA Government which lionised him in 2000-01 and amazingly without verification accepted his claims that he could help in bringing peace to Jammu & Kashmir. The then NDA Government headed by Atal Behari Vajpayee extended to him extraordinary courtesies to facilitate his visits to Srinagar without any paper trail as an interlocutor supposedly blessed by the US. The details of what happened are too well known to need any recapitulation.
10. Since the middle 1990s, Ijaz has repeatedly taken many personalities in the US, India and Pakistan for a ride by projecting himself as a man of iconic influence and web of contacts in the corridors of power in Washington DC, Islamabad and New Delhi. Despite this, eminent sub-continental personalities have been walking into his parlour again and again. This shows that naivete is perennial.
11. India has put its peace eggs in the basket of the elected Pakistani civilian leadership. It was already weak, but, despite this, had been able to carry the Army’s GHQ along with it in some of its peace initiatives. It is likely to be further weakened now if it doesn’t handle intelligently the sequel to L’Affaire Ijaz. What could be the impact of the civilian-military boxing bout on Indo-Pakistan relations and the peace process? This question would attract the attention of our policy-makers. Discreet silence combined with a discreet watch on the goings-on in Islamabad and Rawalpindi should be our policy till the dust settles down. ( 21-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
In the wake of the allegations levelled by Mansoor Ijaz, the controversial US businessman of Pakistani origin, against Hussain Haqqani, the Pakistani Ambassador to the US, two separate bouts of boxing are going on simultaneously in Pakistan---- Ijaz vs Haqqani and President Asif Ali Zardari vs Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS).
2.As I had mentioned in my previous article on this subject, there has so far been no smoking gun on the basis of which anyone can be hung. Ijaz, who has made a series of claims regarding his contacts with Haqqani on May 9,2011, in a London Hotel and subsequently, has carefully built up an electronic trail that could support his claims and allegations and handed it over to Lt.Gen.Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Director-General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), during a meeting in London on October 22,2011.
3. The electronic trail would have been in the Blackberry (BB) of both Haqqani and Ijaz. Whereas Ijaz would seem to have saved the trail and given it to the ISI, it is not clear whether Haqqani has saved or erased it. He has offered to hand over his BB for forensic examination to any enquiry committee set up by the Government or the National Assembly. If it turns out during the forensic examination that there is no electronic trail in Haqqani’s BB, he would have difficulty in explaining it and the Army’s suspicion against him would be further strengthened.
4. If the National Assembly decides to hold an enquiry, it will have to depend on the Ministry of the Interior headed by Rehman Malik for a forensic examination of Haqqani’s BB. Thus, there could be two forensic examinations---one by the ISI of the material handed over by Ijaz, which must have been already done, and another by the Ministry of the Interior of the material handed over by Haqqani. Reconciling any contradictions between the two forensic examinations of materials of different origin could further exacerbate the suspicions of the Army against Haqqani and even Zardari himself.
5. There is a third possibility. Sections of the Pakistani media have reported that a public interest petition has been filed before Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhamed Chaudhury of the Pakistan Supreme Court, requesting that he should monitor the investigation into the case. He has not so far reacted to it. If he decides to do so, the ISI may have to suspend its enquiry and the National Assembly may not order its own enquiry.
6. The matter could get prolonged and the question would arise as to what to do with Haqqani in the meanwhile--- replace him honourably without waiting for the results of the enquiries or allow him to continue in office and fight it out. Will the Army agree to his continuing in office?
7.The boxing bout between Zardari and Kayani is unlikely to lead to any military coup against him. The Army may not be able to get any coup validated by the judiciary. Moreover, when the enquiries are still on, the Army would have no grounds for intervening. The Army would most probably wait and watch while keeping up the pressure for removing Haqqani from office. To build up the pressure, Kayani might refer the matter to his Corps Commanders and get their support for removing Haqqani.
8.So long as L’Affaire Ijaz is not settled in a manner mutually satisfactory to the civilian and Army leaderships, the uneasy vibrations between the elected civilian leadership and the Army would add to the already existing suspicions between Zardari and Kayani. The civilian leadership might find itself reduced to a lame-duck administration till the next elections due in the beginning of 2013.
9. L’Affaire Ijaz is Pakistan’s internal affair. However, the re-surfacing of Ijaz from oblivion could uncomfortably remind us of the naivete of the NDA Government which lionised him in 2000-01 and amazingly without verification accepted his claims that he could help in bringing peace to Jammu & Kashmir. The then NDA Government headed by Atal Behari Vajpayee extended to him extraordinary courtesies to facilitate his visits to Srinagar without any paper trail as an interlocutor supposedly blessed by the US. The details of what happened are too well known to need any recapitulation.
10. Since the middle 1990s, Ijaz has repeatedly taken many personalities in the US, India and Pakistan for a ride by projecting himself as a man of iconic influence and web of contacts in the corridors of power in Washington DC, Islamabad and New Delhi. Despite this, eminent sub-continental personalities have been walking into his parlour again and again. This shows that naivete is perennial.
11. India has put its peace eggs in the basket of the elected Pakistani civilian leadership. It was already weak, but, despite this, had been able to carry the Army’s GHQ along with it in some of its peace initiatives. It is likely to be further weakened now if it doesn’t handle intelligently the sequel to L’Affaire Ijaz. What could be the impact of the civilian-military boxing bout on Indo-Pakistan relations and the peace process? This question would attract the attention of our policy-makers. Discreet silence combined with a discreet watch on the goings-on in Islamabad and Rawalpindi should be our policy till the dust settles down. ( 21-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, November 19, 2011
ZARDARI SHOULD JETTISON HUSSAIN HAQQANI
B.RAMAN
If Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari is intelligent, he would realise the damage that has been caused to the credibility of the state of Pakistan by Mr.Hussain Haqqani, the Pakistani Ambassador to the US, by his naivete in trying to use the services of Mansoor Ijaz, a controversial US businessman of Pakistani origin, for conveying to Admiral Mike Mullen, then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, a request to rein in Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff, in return for some quid pro quos promised by Haqqani on behalf of “his boss”.
2. In this highly murky case, we have only claims and denials----with most of the claims coming from Ijaz and most of the denials coming from the Pakistani side. Apart from a belated admission that the Admiral did receive a memo relating to Pakistan, US Government sources have refrained from any comments in the matter.
3. There is as yet no smoking gun on the basis of which anyone can be hung ----not even Ambassador Haqqani--- but there are enough indicators regarding the utter naivete of the Ambassador which could ultimately burn the credibility of Zardari himself and drive a further wedge between him and the Army.
4. The entire L’Affaire Ijaz originated in the days after the US commando raid in Abbottabad on May 2,2011, that led to the death of Osama bin Laden. There was apparent nervousness among those close to Zardari that an Army humiliated and enraged by the success of the US raid, might turn its wrath against Zardari, who was generally perceived to be soft and sympathetic to the US interests in matters relating to the campaign against Al Qaeda.
5. Rightly or wrongly, there was an apprehension that Kayani might try to have Zardari removed. It was against this background that the Ambassador, who was then ( May 9,2011) on a visit to London, contacted Ijaz, who was then on a visit to Monaco, and sought a meeting with him in London. The rest of the sordid affair followed from there.
6.Ijaz prepared the memo or non-paper in his hand-writing on the basis of what Haqqani dictated to him and had it delivered to Mullen through an American intermediary. In his statements and interviews, Ijaz has clearly admitted that he never knew or had never met Mullen, that he had used an American intermediary to have the memo reached to him, that the memo is in his (Ijaz’s) handwriting and that the contents were dictated by Haqqani.
7. Ijaz has not said anywhere that he knew that the contents had the approval of Zardari. He only says that Haqqani gave him to understand that the contents had the approval of “his boss”.
8. One could understand the fears in the Pakistani civilian leadership--- particularly at the level of Zardari--- regarding a possible threat from Kayani in the wake of the Abbottabad raid. One could also understand their anxiety to seek the intervention of Admiral Mullen to have any threat from Kayani neutralised before it materialised.
9. There were various diplomatic and tactful ways of doing this----by directly taking up the matter secretly and informally with their contacts in the US Administration. It was amazing that instead of doing so, the matter was taken up through the intermediary of a Pakistani origin businessman with dubious credentials without paying any attention to the need for deniability. When you put down anything in writing---whether it is signed or not---you damage the deniability.
10. The only saving grace in the entire episode is that there is no evidence to implicate Zardari himself, but there is enough evidence to implicate the Ambassador. After carefully reading all the available evidence in the matter, my own conclusion is that it was a rogue initiative by an over-anxious or over-enthusiastic Haqqani, which has gone horribly wrong.
11. The Pakistani Army would be justified in feeling enraged against the Ambassador and in expecting that action would be taken against him. By failing to act against him and by trying to cover up the matter, Zardari would be further damaging his credibility in the eyes of not only his Army, but also large sections of the Pakistani public. It would create serious suspicions about the soundness of Zardari’s judgement in sensitive matters such as this.
12. Could there be a coup staged against Zardari by Kayani on this issue? Pakistan of today is not the Pakistan of 1999 when a small group of Amy officers loyal to Pervez Musharraf then out of the country staged a coup against Nawaz Sharif. They were confident that the judiciary would validate their coup. Today’s judiciary in Pakistan is more independent than that of 1999. Kayani can’t be confident that it would support him.
13. Moreover, Kayani would know that a coup or even an attempted one would create instability and damage his reputation as a General who wants to avoid politicisation of the Army. He will exercise pressure on Zardari to get rid of the Ambassador, but would not go beyond that.
14. Even the Americans would be embarrassed by the present controversy which shows the civilian political leadership and bureaucracy and its judgement in poor light. (20-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75)
If Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari is intelligent, he would realise the damage that has been caused to the credibility of the state of Pakistan by Mr.Hussain Haqqani, the Pakistani Ambassador to the US, by his naivete in trying to use the services of Mansoor Ijaz, a controversial US businessman of Pakistani origin, for conveying to Admiral Mike Mullen, then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, a request to rein in Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Chief of the Army Staff, in return for some quid pro quos promised by Haqqani on behalf of “his boss”.
2. In this highly murky case, we have only claims and denials----with most of the claims coming from Ijaz and most of the denials coming from the Pakistani side. Apart from a belated admission that the Admiral did receive a memo relating to Pakistan, US Government sources have refrained from any comments in the matter.
3. There is as yet no smoking gun on the basis of which anyone can be hung ----not even Ambassador Haqqani--- but there are enough indicators regarding the utter naivete of the Ambassador which could ultimately burn the credibility of Zardari himself and drive a further wedge between him and the Army.
4. The entire L’Affaire Ijaz originated in the days after the US commando raid in Abbottabad on May 2,2011, that led to the death of Osama bin Laden. There was apparent nervousness among those close to Zardari that an Army humiliated and enraged by the success of the US raid, might turn its wrath against Zardari, who was generally perceived to be soft and sympathetic to the US interests in matters relating to the campaign against Al Qaeda.
5. Rightly or wrongly, there was an apprehension that Kayani might try to have Zardari removed. It was against this background that the Ambassador, who was then ( May 9,2011) on a visit to London, contacted Ijaz, who was then on a visit to Monaco, and sought a meeting with him in London. The rest of the sordid affair followed from there.
6.Ijaz prepared the memo or non-paper in his hand-writing on the basis of what Haqqani dictated to him and had it delivered to Mullen through an American intermediary. In his statements and interviews, Ijaz has clearly admitted that he never knew or had never met Mullen, that he had used an American intermediary to have the memo reached to him, that the memo is in his (Ijaz’s) handwriting and that the contents were dictated by Haqqani.
7. Ijaz has not said anywhere that he knew that the contents had the approval of Zardari. He only says that Haqqani gave him to understand that the contents had the approval of “his boss”.
8. One could understand the fears in the Pakistani civilian leadership--- particularly at the level of Zardari--- regarding a possible threat from Kayani in the wake of the Abbottabad raid. One could also understand their anxiety to seek the intervention of Admiral Mullen to have any threat from Kayani neutralised before it materialised.
9. There were various diplomatic and tactful ways of doing this----by directly taking up the matter secretly and informally with their contacts in the US Administration. It was amazing that instead of doing so, the matter was taken up through the intermediary of a Pakistani origin businessman with dubious credentials without paying any attention to the need for deniability. When you put down anything in writing---whether it is signed or not---you damage the deniability.
10. The only saving grace in the entire episode is that there is no evidence to implicate Zardari himself, but there is enough evidence to implicate the Ambassador. After carefully reading all the available evidence in the matter, my own conclusion is that it was a rogue initiative by an over-anxious or over-enthusiastic Haqqani, which has gone horribly wrong.
11. The Pakistani Army would be justified in feeling enraged against the Ambassador and in expecting that action would be taken against him. By failing to act against him and by trying to cover up the matter, Zardari would be further damaging his credibility in the eyes of not only his Army, but also large sections of the Pakistani public. It would create serious suspicions about the soundness of Zardari’s judgement in sensitive matters such as this.
12. Could there be a coup staged against Zardari by Kayani on this issue? Pakistan of today is not the Pakistan of 1999 when a small group of Amy officers loyal to Pervez Musharraf then out of the country staged a coup against Nawaz Sharif. They were confident that the judiciary would validate their coup. Today’s judiciary in Pakistan is more independent than that of 1999. Kayani can’t be confident that it would support him.
13. Moreover, Kayani would know that a coup or even an attempted one would create instability and damage his reputation as a General who wants to avoid politicisation of the Army. He will exercise pressure on Zardari to get rid of the Ambassador, but would not go beyond that.
14. Even the Americans would be embarrassed by the present controversy which shows the civilian political leadership and bureaucracy and its judgement in poor light. (20-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75)
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