Friday, October 14, 2011
WHAT DOES RECOVERY OF EXPLOSIVES IN AMBALA PORTEND?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO 740
B.RAMAN
Acting on an alert from the Delhi Police, the Haryana Police are reported to have seized a car containing concealed explosives ( about 5 KGs), five detonators and two timers which had been parked in a parking lot of the Ambala Railway Station on October 13,2011.
2. The owners of the car and those responsible for keeping the explosive, detonators and timers in the car have not yet been found. The source information of the Delhi Police is that the car had probably come to Ambala from the Jammu area and that the improvised explosive device materials found in the car were meant to be used for causing an explosion in Delhi around Diwali (October 25-26). The Delhi Police’s source information is that the explosive materials were intended to be used in a joint operation of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI).
3. Of the various Khalistani terrorist organisations, the BKI, after the Dal Khalsa, has had the longest history of contacts with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).Talwinder Singh Parmar of the BKI, Vancouver, who had masterminded the blowing-up of the Kanishka aircraft of Air India in June,1985, had been given shelter in Palistan by the ISI after the terrorist attack on the plane.
4. In 1992, one of the Western intelligence agencies established his presence in Pakistan. The ISI asked him to leave Pakistan. He crossed over into Indian Punjab where he was killed in an encounter by the Punjab Police. Since then other BKI leaders such as Wadhwa Singh had been living in Pakistan.
5.The ISI started helping the various Khalistani organisations such as the Dal Khalsa, the BKI and the International Sikh Youth Federation in the 1970s with a view to using them to destabilise Punjab. They were given training assistance and supplied with arms and ammunition and explosives.
6. The ISI believed that the destabilisation of Punjab would weaken the ability of the Indian security forces to deal with terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir and thereby facilitate a change of the status quo in J&K.
7. The ISI was helping the Khalistani terrorists directly as well as through the Jamaat-e-Islami. In addition, when Nawaz Sharif was the Chief Minister of Punjab after the death of Zia-ul-Haq in 1988, the Khalistani terrorists were also in receipt of assistance from the Special Branch of the Punjab Police.
8. The ISI had code-named the operation for using the Khalistani terrorists to destabilise Punjab and weaken the capability of the Indian security forces in J&K as the K-2 project---meaning the Kashmir-Khalistan project. The JEI and jihadi terrorist organisations under the control of the ISI such as the LET were also sought to be used for the execution of the K-2 project.
9. The recovery of the explosive-laden car and the source information of the Delhi Police indicate an attempt by the ISI to revive the K-2 project . ( 14-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com. Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
B.RAMAN
Acting on an alert from the Delhi Police, the Haryana Police are reported to have seized a car containing concealed explosives ( about 5 KGs), five detonators and two timers which had been parked in a parking lot of the Ambala Railway Station on October 13,2011.
2. The owners of the car and those responsible for keeping the explosive, detonators and timers in the car have not yet been found. The source information of the Delhi Police is that the car had probably come to Ambala from the Jammu area and that the improvised explosive device materials found in the car were meant to be used for causing an explosion in Delhi around Diwali (October 25-26). The Delhi Police’s source information is that the explosive materials were intended to be used in a joint operation of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI).
3. Of the various Khalistani terrorist organisations, the BKI, after the Dal Khalsa, has had the longest history of contacts with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).Talwinder Singh Parmar of the BKI, Vancouver, who had masterminded the blowing-up of the Kanishka aircraft of Air India in June,1985, had been given shelter in Palistan by the ISI after the terrorist attack on the plane.
4. In 1992, one of the Western intelligence agencies established his presence in Pakistan. The ISI asked him to leave Pakistan. He crossed over into Indian Punjab where he was killed in an encounter by the Punjab Police. Since then other BKI leaders such as Wadhwa Singh had been living in Pakistan.
5.The ISI started helping the various Khalistani organisations such as the Dal Khalsa, the BKI and the International Sikh Youth Federation in the 1970s with a view to using them to destabilise Punjab. They were given training assistance and supplied with arms and ammunition and explosives.
6. The ISI believed that the destabilisation of Punjab would weaken the ability of the Indian security forces to deal with terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir and thereby facilitate a change of the status quo in J&K.
7. The ISI was helping the Khalistani terrorists directly as well as through the Jamaat-e-Islami. In addition, when Nawaz Sharif was the Chief Minister of Punjab after the death of Zia-ul-Haq in 1988, the Khalistani terrorists were also in receipt of assistance from the Special Branch of the Punjab Police.
8. The ISI had code-named the operation for using the Khalistani terrorists to destabilise Punjab and weaken the capability of the Indian security forces in J&K as the K-2 project---meaning the Kashmir-Khalistan project. The JEI and jihadi terrorist organisations under the control of the ISI such as the LET were also sought to be used for the execution of the K-2 project.
9. The recovery of the explosive-laden car and the source information of the Delhi Police indicate an attempt by the ISI to revive the K-2 project . ( 14-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com. Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, October 12, 2011
RECTIFICATION OF PAST: MYANMAR GOVT TAKES FIRST HESITANT STEPS
B.RAMAN
In an attempt to rectify the anti-democratic policies and human rights violations of the past by the military junta that ruled the country for 23 years till a few months ago, the Government of President Thein Sein, a military strongman-turned civilian to head an ostensibly civilian Government, has started releasing from October 12,2011, political prisoners who were languishing in jail under the military dictatorship for many years.
2. The decision to release the prisoners under a general amnesty came in the wake of talks held by the Government –including the President-- with Ms.Aung San Sui Kyi, the leader of the pro-democracy movement, who was released earlier this year.
3. The decision to grant an amnesty was a sequel not only to the talks between her and the Government, but also to stepped-up interactions between the Government and US interlocutors, including Mr.Kurt Campbell, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, who has been monitoring developments in Myanmar on behalf of President Barack Obama in order to nudge the Government to make a break with the authoritarian past .
4. In recent weeks---particularly after the dialogue between Suu Kyi and the Government started--- there were signs of excitement in the international community over what seemed to be the beginning of the blowing of winds of change in Myanmar. International observers noted that their fears that the Government of Thein Sein, which came to office after an election manipulated to keep Suu Kyi and her associates out of power, might turn out to be nothing but the old military wine in a new civilian bottle had not proved correct.
5.The seemingly civilian Government, which consists of many military members of the previous junta who had discarded their uniforms and projected themselves as civilian political leaders, started giving indications of new thinking on the road ahead for Myanmar.
6. Two indicators of the new thinking were reports that the Government seemed keen to find ways of associating Suu Kyi with the new dispensation without letting her get into the driving seat of power and the decision to suspend the construction of a huge hydel project by a Chinese company in the Northern Kachin State because of strong opposition to the project on environmental and other grounds by Suu Kyi and her party, by Kachin leaders and non-governmental environment protection groups.
7. The significant decision to suspend the Chinese-driven project, which would have benefited the Yunan province of China more than the Kachin State of Myanmar, gave cause for hope that Chinese interests, which played an important role in influencing the decisions and policies of the military junta, may no longer play the same role under the new Government.
8. Will the winds of change affect positively not only the political and economic landscape of Myanmar, but also its future diplomacy? That was a question that increasingly excited analysts.
9. In the context of these developments, it was, therefore, no wonder that in remarks made in Bangkok on October 10, Campbell hailed the recent developments in Myanmar, including what he described as "very consequential dialogue" between Suu Kyi and the leadership. Campbell, one of many US officials to hold rare talks with Myanmar Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin in Washington recently, added that while concerns remained, "it is also undeniably the case that there are dramatic developments under way".
10. Against this background, the release of the first batch of political prisoners by the Government on October 12 was less daring and more hesitant. The first batch consisted largely of those arrested in recent years, including some activists of the monks’ unrest of 2007, but did not include any of the founding fathers of the pro-democracy movement who took to the streets in 1988, thereby triggering off a ruthless retaliation by the Army.
11. No exact figures of those released on October 12 are available. The Government itself has put the number at about 300 out of a total of about 2000 political prisoners. Non-Governmental organisations such as the Human Rights Watch of the US say that the number involved is less, including 28 monks. Among the prominent persons released were comedian Zarganar, who was arrested in June 2008 and sentenced to 59 years imprisonment for criticising the military junta’s poor and inhuman response to a cyclone disaster that allegedly killed 140,000 people, Sai Say Htan, an ethnic Shan leader sentenced to 104 years in 2005 for refusing to help draft a new constitution, and Su Su Nway, who was serving a 12-year jail term since 2008. Among the more prominent persons not released so far are the then student leaders of the 1988 movement, including Min Ko Naing. Some of them have been in jail for over two decades.
12. While the evidently hesitant first steps have been welcomed by Myanmar political activists, there are concerns that a group of pro-Chinese hardliners from the Army who had served in the junta in the past might be exercising pressure on Thein Sein to go slow and even reverse his policies. In this context, the visit of the Foreign Minister to Beijing reportedly for talks with the Chinese authorities on the decision to suspend the construction of the Chinese-driven hydel project has been noted with concern.
13. According to China’s State-owned Xinhua news agency, talks were held in Beijing on October 10 between Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and his Myanmar counterpart U Wunna Maung Lwin, who was visiting China as a special envoy of President Thein Sein. A press release issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry after the talks said that the two sides conducted a thorough consultation over the Myitsone hydel project, which was ordered to be suspended by Myanmar's President. The two Foreign Ministers also exchanged views on bilateral relations and other issues of common concern, with both voicing commitments to push forward the bilateral comprehensive and strategic partnership in a bid to achieve joint development, the press release said. The visiting Myanmar Foreign Minister was also received by Vice President Xi Jinping.
14. It is not known whether the Myanmar Foreign Minister’s visit had been previously scheduled before the suspension of the hydel project or was triggered off by expressions of Chinese unhappiness over the suspension.
15. Suu Kyi has said she believes Thein Sein genuinely wants to push through reforms, but cautioned it was too soon to say whether he would succeed. The release of the first batch of prisoners came shortly before the departure of President Thein Sein, who has already visited China after assuming office, on his first visit to India.
16. While India has reasons to be gratified over the rectification of the past---even if it be hesitant---- it should avoid any expressions or actions that could create an impression of a policy convergence on Myanmar between India and the US. The situation in Myanmar is still delicate.India should carefully watch its steps and control its mouth. ( 13-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
In an attempt to rectify the anti-democratic policies and human rights violations of the past by the military junta that ruled the country for 23 years till a few months ago, the Government of President Thein Sein, a military strongman-turned civilian to head an ostensibly civilian Government, has started releasing from October 12,2011, political prisoners who were languishing in jail under the military dictatorship for many years.
2. The decision to release the prisoners under a general amnesty came in the wake of talks held by the Government –including the President-- with Ms.Aung San Sui Kyi, the leader of the pro-democracy movement, who was released earlier this year.
3. The decision to grant an amnesty was a sequel not only to the talks between her and the Government, but also to stepped-up interactions between the Government and US interlocutors, including Mr.Kurt Campbell, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, who has been monitoring developments in Myanmar on behalf of President Barack Obama in order to nudge the Government to make a break with the authoritarian past .
4. In recent weeks---particularly after the dialogue between Suu Kyi and the Government started--- there were signs of excitement in the international community over what seemed to be the beginning of the blowing of winds of change in Myanmar. International observers noted that their fears that the Government of Thein Sein, which came to office after an election manipulated to keep Suu Kyi and her associates out of power, might turn out to be nothing but the old military wine in a new civilian bottle had not proved correct.
5.The seemingly civilian Government, which consists of many military members of the previous junta who had discarded their uniforms and projected themselves as civilian political leaders, started giving indications of new thinking on the road ahead for Myanmar.
6. Two indicators of the new thinking were reports that the Government seemed keen to find ways of associating Suu Kyi with the new dispensation without letting her get into the driving seat of power and the decision to suspend the construction of a huge hydel project by a Chinese company in the Northern Kachin State because of strong opposition to the project on environmental and other grounds by Suu Kyi and her party, by Kachin leaders and non-governmental environment protection groups.
7. The significant decision to suspend the Chinese-driven project, which would have benefited the Yunan province of China more than the Kachin State of Myanmar, gave cause for hope that Chinese interests, which played an important role in influencing the decisions and policies of the military junta, may no longer play the same role under the new Government.
8. Will the winds of change affect positively not only the political and economic landscape of Myanmar, but also its future diplomacy? That was a question that increasingly excited analysts.
9. In the context of these developments, it was, therefore, no wonder that in remarks made in Bangkok on October 10, Campbell hailed the recent developments in Myanmar, including what he described as "very consequential dialogue" between Suu Kyi and the leadership. Campbell, one of many US officials to hold rare talks with Myanmar Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin in Washington recently, added that while concerns remained, "it is also undeniably the case that there are dramatic developments under way".
10. Against this background, the release of the first batch of political prisoners by the Government on October 12 was less daring and more hesitant. The first batch consisted largely of those arrested in recent years, including some activists of the monks’ unrest of 2007, but did not include any of the founding fathers of the pro-democracy movement who took to the streets in 1988, thereby triggering off a ruthless retaliation by the Army.
11. No exact figures of those released on October 12 are available. The Government itself has put the number at about 300 out of a total of about 2000 political prisoners. Non-Governmental organisations such as the Human Rights Watch of the US say that the number involved is less, including 28 monks. Among the prominent persons released were comedian Zarganar, who was arrested in June 2008 and sentenced to 59 years imprisonment for criticising the military junta’s poor and inhuman response to a cyclone disaster that allegedly killed 140,000 people, Sai Say Htan, an ethnic Shan leader sentenced to 104 years in 2005 for refusing to help draft a new constitution, and Su Su Nway, who was serving a 12-year jail term since 2008. Among the more prominent persons not released so far are the then student leaders of the 1988 movement, including Min Ko Naing. Some of them have been in jail for over two decades.
12. While the evidently hesitant first steps have been welcomed by Myanmar political activists, there are concerns that a group of pro-Chinese hardliners from the Army who had served in the junta in the past might be exercising pressure on Thein Sein to go slow and even reverse his policies. In this context, the visit of the Foreign Minister to Beijing reportedly for talks with the Chinese authorities on the decision to suspend the construction of the Chinese-driven hydel project has been noted with concern.
13. According to China’s State-owned Xinhua news agency, talks were held in Beijing on October 10 between Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and his Myanmar counterpart U Wunna Maung Lwin, who was visiting China as a special envoy of President Thein Sein. A press release issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry after the talks said that the two sides conducted a thorough consultation over the Myitsone hydel project, which was ordered to be suspended by Myanmar's President. The two Foreign Ministers also exchanged views on bilateral relations and other issues of common concern, with both voicing commitments to push forward the bilateral comprehensive and strategic partnership in a bid to achieve joint development, the press release said. The visiting Myanmar Foreign Minister was also received by Vice President Xi Jinping.
14. It is not known whether the Myanmar Foreign Minister’s visit had been previously scheduled before the suspension of the hydel project or was triggered off by expressions of Chinese unhappiness over the suspension.
15. Suu Kyi has said she believes Thein Sein genuinely wants to push through reforms, but cautioned it was too soon to say whether he would succeed. The release of the first batch of prisoners came shortly before the departure of President Thein Sein, who has already visited China after assuming office, on his first visit to India.
16. While India has reasons to be gratified over the rectification of the past---even if it be hesitant---- it should avoid any expressions or actions that could create an impression of a policy convergence on Myanmar between India and the US. The situation in Myanmar is still delicate.India should carefully watch its steps and control its mouth. ( 13-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, October 10, 2011
CHINESE LEADERS LESS NERVOUS OF THE PAST
B.RAMAN
The Communist Party of China (CPC) and its leaders headed by President Hu Jintao are less nervous about the likely impact of memories of past events on China’s Generation Next.
2 This has become evident from the observance of two important anniversaries in Beijing. The first was the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, which overthrew one of the longest spells of autocratic rule in the world by the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and ushered in a republican Government, which gave way 38 years later to the one-party rule of the CPC.
3.It was a genuine democratic revolution which began with an armed uprising on October 10,1911 in the central city of Wuchang, part of present-day Wuhan, resulting in the fall of the Qing dynasty the next year. Since the CPC came to power in 1949, there has been less and less recall of the democratic revolution by the CPC and Governmental leadership lest the autocratic rule of the CPC be challenged by the people by taking inspiration from the struggle against the autocratic rule of the Qing dynasty.
4. In the light of the concerns of the leadership over the dangers of commemorating an event that led to the end of a long spell of autocratic rule of one kind, different from the autocratic rule of the CPC, many analysts were closely watching to see whether the present leadership would have the political courage and confidence to commemorate the event.
5.The priority given by the leadership to the observance in June last of the 90th anniversary of the founding of the CPC and the silence on the approaching 100th anniversary of the 1911 revolution made it appear that the CPC leadership still did not have the courage and confidence to celebrate an event that might remind China’s GenNext that it has had other political role models in past history different from the models of the CPC.
6. It, therefore, came as a refreshing surprise that the CPC observed in public the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution at a function in Beijing on October 9 chaired by President Hu Jintao and attended, among others, by some of the past leaders of the CPC, including former President Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of Hu, who had disappeared from the public view ( but not from the social media networks) since his participation in the function held in June to mark the 90th anniversary of the CPC. His absence since then had given rise to feverish Net speculation that he was seriously ill or even dead.
7. In his keynote address as reported by the State-controlled Xinhua news agency, President Hu Jintao described the 1911 Revolution as "a thoroughly modern, national and democratic revolution" which shook the world and ushered in unprecedented social changes in China. He praised Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the 1911 revolution, as "a great national hero, a great patriot and a great leader of the Chinese democratic revolution". Hu added that the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation must be achieved by adhering to socialism with Chinese characteristics, with patriotism, and by upholding peace, development and cooperation. Hu said that the mainland and Taiwan should work together for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and called for the peaceful reunification of China.
8. While celebrating the event and recalling the role of Sun Yat-sen in seeking to usher in democracy in China, the CPC leadership has sought to emphasise the continuity of the CPC rule by projecting the emergence of the CPC as a natural outcome of the 1911 Revolution and not a distortion of it.
9.Beijing-based dissident historian Shi Binhai has been quoted by Radio Free Asia, sponsored by the US State Department, as saying that Jiang's appearance at the function served as a reminder that the Communist Party's line on historical events, and on Taiwan, would remain unchanged.
10. Chinese political dissidents and human rights activists have alleged that while holding a strictly-controlled and CPC-sponsored celebration of the 1911 Revolution, the Chinese security agencies stepped up surveillance on suspected dissidents in the main cities of the country---particularly in Wuhan. They also closely monitored the Net due to apparent concerns that the GenNext might exploit the even to revive its attempts for a Jasmine Revolution in China for the restoration of the long-lost democracy.
11. Radio Free Asia has quoted veteran pro-democracy activist He Depu as saying as follows in Beijing: “It has been 100 years since the 1911 revolution, when they overthrew the Qing dynasty to build a democratic China. We have struggled all these years and we still haven't made that happen." Despite the strict surveillance of micro-blogs, some of them managed to post calls for a new democratic revolution in China.
12. The second important anniversary that has been observed not by the CPC or the Government, but by a group of non-Governmental and non-party activists is the 35th anniversary of the fall of the Gang of Four headed by the wife of Mao Zedong, which led to the rise of Deng Xiaoping with his policy of economic reforms.
13.The event held in Beijing on October 5,2011, was titled "Remembering the smashing of the Gang of Four, 35 Years On". It was reportedly organised by Hu Deping, son of late disgraced former Premier Hu Yaobang, whose funeral sparked the 1989 student movement. Participants included the son of Hua Guofeng, Mao's short-tenured designated successor, and the daughter of Li Xiannian, Hua's chief economic adviser.
14.Some of the participants allegedly called for a new Cultural Revolution to put an end to corruption and moral decay, but their call did not find majority support among the about 200 participants from the past. The majority view was that genuine democracy and the rule of law were the only ways of achieving these laudable objectives.
15. The observance of these two anniversaries---one on the initiative of the CPC itself and the other on that of some political remnants of the past without much political influence---- indicates a continuing confidence in the present leadership that it has the on-going debate on the need for political reforms to buttress the economic reforms firmly under control and that revival of memories of certain past events would not divert the debate in a direction not desired by the Party.
16. It also reflects the assessment of the present leadership that China’s GenNext, while increasingly articulate and active in the Net in discussing new political ideas and models, would not create instability. China’s GenNext has benefited from China’s economic progress and would not like this to be jeopardised by destabilising political ideas and movements. ( 11-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and , presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Asssociate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The Communist Party of China (CPC) and its leaders headed by President Hu Jintao are less nervous about the likely impact of memories of past events on China’s Generation Next.
2 This has become evident from the observance of two important anniversaries in Beijing. The first was the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, which overthrew one of the longest spells of autocratic rule in the world by the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and ushered in a republican Government, which gave way 38 years later to the one-party rule of the CPC.
3.It was a genuine democratic revolution which began with an armed uprising on October 10,1911 in the central city of Wuchang, part of present-day Wuhan, resulting in the fall of the Qing dynasty the next year. Since the CPC came to power in 1949, there has been less and less recall of the democratic revolution by the CPC and Governmental leadership lest the autocratic rule of the CPC be challenged by the people by taking inspiration from the struggle against the autocratic rule of the Qing dynasty.
4. In the light of the concerns of the leadership over the dangers of commemorating an event that led to the end of a long spell of autocratic rule of one kind, different from the autocratic rule of the CPC, many analysts were closely watching to see whether the present leadership would have the political courage and confidence to commemorate the event.
5.The priority given by the leadership to the observance in June last of the 90th anniversary of the founding of the CPC and the silence on the approaching 100th anniversary of the 1911 revolution made it appear that the CPC leadership still did not have the courage and confidence to celebrate an event that might remind China’s GenNext that it has had other political role models in past history different from the models of the CPC.
6. It, therefore, came as a refreshing surprise that the CPC observed in public the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution at a function in Beijing on October 9 chaired by President Hu Jintao and attended, among others, by some of the past leaders of the CPC, including former President Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of Hu, who had disappeared from the public view ( but not from the social media networks) since his participation in the function held in June to mark the 90th anniversary of the CPC. His absence since then had given rise to feverish Net speculation that he was seriously ill or even dead.
7. In his keynote address as reported by the State-controlled Xinhua news agency, President Hu Jintao described the 1911 Revolution as "a thoroughly modern, national and democratic revolution" which shook the world and ushered in unprecedented social changes in China. He praised Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the 1911 revolution, as "a great national hero, a great patriot and a great leader of the Chinese democratic revolution". Hu added that the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation must be achieved by adhering to socialism with Chinese characteristics, with patriotism, and by upholding peace, development and cooperation. Hu said that the mainland and Taiwan should work together for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and called for the peaceful reunification of China.
8. While celebrating the event and recalling the role of Sun Yat-sen in seeking to usher in democracy in China, the CPC leadership has sought to emphasise the continuity of the CPC rule by projecting the emergence of the CPC as a natural outcome of the 1911 Revolution and not a distortion of it.
9.Beijing-based dissident historian Shi Binhai has been quoted by Radio Free Asia, sponsored by the US State Department, as saying that Jiang's appearance at the function served as a reminder that the Communist Party's line on historical events, and on Taiwan, would remain unchanged.
10. Chinese political dissidents and human rights activists have alleged that while holding a strictly-controlled and CPC-sponsored celebration of the 1911 Revolution, the Chinese security agencies stepped up surveillance on suspected dissidents in the main cities of the country---particularly in Wuhan. They also closely monitored the Net due to apparent concerns that the GenNext might exploit the even to revive its attempts for a Jasmine Revolution in China for the restoration of the long-lost democracy.
11. Radio Free Asia has quoted veteran pro-democracy activist He Depu as saying as follows in Beijing: “It has been 100 years since the 1911 revolution, when they overthrew the Qing dynasty to build a democratic China. We have struggled all these years and we still haven't made that happen." Despite the strict surveillance of micro-blogs, some of them managed to post calls for a new democratic revolution in China.
12. The second important anniversary that has been observed not by the CPC or the Government, but by a group of non-Governmental and non-party activists is the 35th anniversary of the fall of the Gang of Four headed by the wife of Mao Zedong, which led to the rise of Deng Xiaoping with his policy of economic reforms.
13.The event held in Beijing on October 5,2011, was titled "Remembering the smashing of the Gang of Four, 35 Years On". It was reportedly organised by Hu Deping, son of late disgraced former Premier Hu Yaobang, whose funeral sparked the 1989 student movement. Participants included the son of Hua Guofeng, Mao's short-tenured designated successor, and the daughter of Li Xiannian, Hua's chief economic adviser.
14.Some of the participants allegedly called for a new Cultural Revolution to put an end to corruption and moral decay, but their call did not find majority support among the about 200 participants from the past. The majority view was that genuine democracy and the rule of law were the only ways of achieving these laudable objectives.
15. The observance of these two anniversaries---one on the initiative of the CPC itself and the other on that of some political remnants of the past without much political influence---- indicates a continuing confidence in the present leadership that it has the on-going debate on the need for political reforms to buttress the economic reforms firmly under control and that revival of memories of certain past events would not divert the debate in a direction not desired by the Party.
16. It also reflects the assessment of the present leadership that China’s GenNext, while increasingly articulate and active in the Net in discussing new political ideas and models, would not create instability. China’s GenNext has benefited from China’s economic progress and would not like this to be jeopardised by destabilising political ideas and movements. ( 11-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and , presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Asssociate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Sunday, October 9, 2011
INDIA EXPANDS ITS STRATEGIC PRESENCE
B.RAMAN
Slowly, but steadily and unrelentingly, India has been expanding its strategic presence.
2. One dimension of this became evident during the recent visit of President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan to New Delhi on October 4 and 5,2011. The visit saw the signing of a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between India and Afghanistan covering military as well as non-military aspects of the relationship.
3. The non-military aspects were open and well known to the international community even earlier. These included, inter alia, Indian assistance to Afghanistan in the development of its strategic infrastructure and in strengthening its democratic and non-radical foundation. A democratic and non-radical Afghanistan is in India’s strategic interest as it is in the strategic interest of many other countries.
4. Pakistan views a genuinely democratic and non-radical Afghanistan as not conducive to its interests. Hence, its strong opposition even to India’s non-military assistance to Afghanistan. It made out even India’s political and economic links with Afghanistan as designed to trap Pakistan in an India-Afghanistan nutcracker.
5.The staged Pakistani hysteria on this subject initially met with a sympathetic and understanding response from the West, but as the West’s understanding of the real nature of Pakistan and its role as a catalyst of radicalism increased---particularly in the wake of the Abbottabad raid of May 2 by the US Navy SEALS to kill Osama bin Laden--- the West has come to realise that a robust Indian presence in Afghanistan after the West thins out its presence is desirable and necessary. One hears less and less from the West past articulations of concerns regarding the impact of the Indian presence on the psyche of Pakistan.
6. The SPA seeks to expand the Indian role from the non-military to the military sphere with an active Indian involvement in the training of the Afghan National Security Forces. The details of this training----what will be the magnitude of it, where will it be carried out, in Indian or Afghan territory---- are still to be worked out, but a decision in principle has been taken to make firm commitments to Afghanistan in the military field too, just as India has made in the economic field in the past.
7.The second dimension of this became evident coincidentally in the recent decisions of the Government of India not to let itself be inhibited in expanding its strategic ties with Vietnam by fears of Chinese concerns over it. In the past, India’s strategic ties with Vietnam were restricted to expanding the political and economic presence in Vietnam’s land territory and laying the foundation for a strong military-military relationship without rubbing China on the wrong side in relation to the South China Sea and the island territories in it under Vietnam’s control and sovereignty, which are challenged by Beijing.
8. The recently reported decision of the Government of India to permit a Government-connected oil company to accept from Vietnam oil and gas exploration rights from Vietnam in respect of two blocks belonging to Vietnam, which are claimed by China as its territory, is an indication of a decision in New Delhi not to let itself be inhibited any longer in expanding the strategic relationship with Vietnam by staged Chinese dramatics over the South China Sea and the island territories.
9. These are very important decisions indicative of a well thought-out Indian strategy for an incremental increase in Indian activism in areas which are of interest and concern not only to India, but also to the US. Whether India has kept the US informed of its moves and sought its blessings or not, its moves will ultimately redound to helping the strategic interests of the US too in Afghanistan as well as in the South China Sea area. The open signs of Indian activism should also be welcome to the ASEAN countries, Japan and South Korea .
10. India has proclaimed subtly, but firmly that its continuing desire for friendly relations with Pakistan and China would not come in the way of its promoting its legitimate strategic role and interests in the Af-Pak and Sino-Vietnamese regions.
11. To embark on a policy of activism is easier than to keep the activism sustained. Sustaining it would require better intelligence and military capabilities. There is bound to be resistance from Pakistan and China to the Indian strategic activism and to the expansion of the Indian strategic presence to areas which they consider as coming under their sphere of influence. Do we have the required national capabilities to counter their resistance separately and jointly? If not, how to strengthen them quickly and what role the US can and should play in this regard are important questions, which should be addressed by the Task Force on National Security headed by Shri Naresh Chandra. ( 10-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and , presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Slowly, but steadily and unrelentingly, India has been expanding its strategic presence.
2. One dimension of this became evident during the recent visit of President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan to New Delhi on October 4 and 5,2011. The visit saw the signing of a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) between India and Afghanistan covering military as well as non-military aspects of the relationship.
3. The non-military aspects were open and well known to the international community even earlier. These included, inter alia, Indian assistance to Afghanistan in the development of its strategic infrastructure and in strengthening its democratic and non-radical foundation. A democratic and non-radical Afghanistan is in India’s strategic interest as it is in the strategic interest of many other countries.
4. Pakistan views a genuinely democratic and non-radical Afghanistan as not conducive to its interests. Hence, its strong opposition even to India’s non-military assistance to Afghanistan. It made out even India’s political and economic links with Afghanistan as designed to trap Pakistan in an India-Afghanistan nutcracker.
5.The staged Pakistani hysteria on this subject initially met with a sympathetic and understanding response from the West, but as the West’s understanding of the real nature of Pakistan and its role as a catalyst of radicalism increased---particularly in the wake of the Abbottabad raid of May 2 by the US Navy SEALS to kill Osama bin Laden--- the West has come to realise that a robust Indian presence in Afghanistan after the West thins out its presence is desirable and necessary. One hears less and less from the West past articulations of concerns regarding the impact of the Indian presence on the psyche of Pakistan.
6. The SPA seeks to expand the Indian role from the non-military to the military sphere with an active Indian involvement in the training of the Afghan National Security Forces. The details of this training----what will be the magnitude of it, where will it be carried out, in Indian or Afghan territory---- are still to be worked out, but a decision in principle has been taken to make firm commitments to Afghanistan in the military field too, just as India has made in the economic field in the past.
7.The second dimension of this became evident coincidentally in the recent decisions of the Government of India not to let itself be inhibited in expanding its strategic ties with Vietnam by fears of Chinese concerns over it. In the past, India’s strategic ties with Vietnam were restricted to expanding the political and economic presence in Vietnam’s land territory and laying the foundation for a strong military-military relationship without rubbing China on the wrong side in relation to the South China Sea and the island territories in it under Vietnam’s control and sovereignty, which are challenged by Beijing.
8. The recently reported decision of the Government of India to permit a Government-connected oil company to accept from Vietnam oil and gas exploration rights from Vietnam in respect of two blocks belonging to Vietnam, which are claimed by China as its territory, is an indication of a decision in New Delhi not to let itself be inhibited any longer in expanding the strategic relationship with Vietnam by staged Chinese dramatics over the South China Sea and the island territories.
9. These are very important decisions indicative of a well thought-out Indian strategy for an incremental increase in Indian activism in areas which are of interest and concern not only to India, but also to the US. Whether India has kept the US informed of its moves and sought its blessings or not, its moves will ultimately redound to helping the strategic interests of the US too in Afghanistan as well as in the South China Sea area. The open signs of Indian activism should also be welcome to the ASEAN countries, Japan and South Korea .
10. India has proclaimed subtly, but firmly that its continuing desire for friendly relations with Pakistan and China would not come in the way of its promoting its legitimate strategic role and interests in the Af-Pak and Sino-Vietnamese regions.
11. To embark on a policy of activism is easier than to keep the activism sustained. Sustaining it would require better intelligence and military capabilities. There is bound to be resistance from Pakistan and China to the Indian strategic activism and to the expansion of the Indian strategic presence to areas which they consider as coming under their sphere of influence. Do we have the required national capabilities to counter their resistance separately and jointly? If not, how to strengthen them quickly and what role the US can and should play in this regard are important questions, which should be addressed by the Task Force on National Security headed by Shri Naresh Chandra. ( 10-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and , presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, October 8, 2011
INDIA-PAKISTAN-UK
B.RAMAN
The following are my answers yo E-mailed questions on the above-mentioned subject received from a UK-based analyst:
1) In your view, what is Pakistan's goal in Afghanistan? Do they want their interests to be respected in any peace settlement or do they want their interests to be the settlement? What is the view of the Indian government, officially and unofficially?
PAKISTAN'S GOAL IN AFGHANISTAN IS A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD NOT CREATE PROBLEMS FOR ISLAMABAD IN THE PASHTUN BELT, WHICH WOULD NOT TAKE SIDES WITH INDIA IN ANY INDO-PAKISTAN MILITARY CONFLICT, WHICH WOULD PROTECT PAKISTAN'S ECONOMIC LINKS WITH THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AND WHICH WOULD KEEP INDIA AT A DISTANCE.PAKISTAN REGARDS AFGHANISTAN AS WITHIN ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE AND WANTS A GOVERNMENT IN KABUL WHICH WOULD KEEP AFGHANISTAN THAT WAY.
2) In your view, what are India's strategic objectives in Afghanistan? How does it differ from its stated policy, if at all?
INDIA'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN ARE A MULTI-ETHNIC,PLURALISTIC,MODERN,DEMOCRATIC AFGHANISTAN WHICH WOULD PLAY ITS DUE ROLE IN THE SOUTH ASIAN REGION WITHOUT COMING UNDER THE MALIGN INFLUENCE OF THE PAKISTANI ARMY AND ITS ISI AND WHICH WOULD REMAIN IMMUNISED FROM PAKISTAN'S JIHADI VIRUS.INDIA WOULD ALSO HAVE A KEY INTEREST IN CONTRIBUTING TO A PREVENTION OF A RE-TALIBANISATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE RETURN OF AL QAEDA TO ITS OLD SANCTUARIES IN THE AFGHAN TERRITORY.THE STATED POLICY AND THE GENUINE OBJECTIVES ARE IDENTICAL.
3) How do you rate the MI6-ISI intelligence relationship? What is the view of the Indian government? Is there a similarly strong relationship with RAW?
I DON'T KNOW THE VIEWS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT.BASED ON OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION, MY ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE ISI'S CO-OPERATION WITH THE MI-5 AND THE MI-6 HAS BEEN AS UNSATISFACTORY AS ITS CO-OPERATION WITH THE CIA AND THE FBI. WE SAW A GOOD EXAMPLE OF ISI FOOT-DRAGGING IN THE CASE OF RASHID RAUF, A MIRPURI FROM BIRMINGHAM WHO WAS WANTED IN A CRIMINAL CASE IN THE UK AND WHO HAD LINKS WITH THE JAISH-E-MOHAMMAD AND SUSPECTED LINKS WITH AL QAEDA.
4) Given David Cameron wants to build a "special relationship" with India, what would the UK need to do vis-a-vis Afghanistan and Pakistan to help build such a relationship?
BOTH INDIA AND THE UK HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT PAKISTAN WINDS UP THE JIHADI TERRORIST INFRASTRUCTURE IN ITS TERRITORY AND ACTS AGAINST THE LEADERS OF THE TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS SUCH AS THE LASHKAR-E-TOIBA AND THE JEM WHICH POSE A THREAT TO THE NATIONALS AND INTERESTS OF INDIA AND THE UK. IN AFGHANISTAN, THEY HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN PREVENTING THE RETURN OF THE TALIBAN TO POWER IN KABUL AND OF AL QAEDA TO ITS SANCTUARIES IN AFGHAN TERRITORY. INDIA AND THE UK SHOULD WORK JOINTLY FOR PROMOTING THESE COMMON INTERESTS.
5) What could India offer the UK to make such a relationship reciprocal? Could RAW fill the vacuum of an ISI break from MI6?
THE RELATIONSHIP IS PROGRESSING. THERE IS NOW A GREATER APPRECIATION IN LONDON OF THE ROLE OF PAKISTAN IN FOMENTING TERRORISM IN INDIAN TERRITORY. SIMILARLY, THERE IS A GREATER APPRECIATION IN LONDON OF INDIA'S LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN. BUT THE PROGRESS HAS NOT BEEN AS SATISFACTORY AS INDIA WOULD HAVE WISHED BECAUSE THE UK IS NOT PREPARED TO USE THE STICK AGAINST PAKISTAN DESPITE ITS UNHAPPINESS OVER PAKISTAN'S FOOT-DRAGGING AGAINST TERRORISM ORIGINATING FROM ITS TERRITORY. THE CONVERGENCE OF INDIAN AND BRITISH INTERESTS IN RELATION TO PAKISTAN CONTINUES TO HAVE LIMITS. THIS COMES IN THE WAY OF A STRONGER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UK AND INDIA ON STRATEGIC ISSUES.
6) What is your view of Cameron's remarks last year about Pakistan "exporting terror"?
TOTALLY JUSTIFIED AND FACTUALLY CORRECT.
7) How do you rate the idea of a UK-India "special relationship"?
THE IDEA IS GOOD, BUT THE PROBLEM IS IN IMPLEMENTATION. ANY SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP, TO BE WORTHWHILE, HAS TO BE BASED ON A QUID PRO QUO. THERE IS NO QUID PRO QUO IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIA AND THE UK.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
The following are my answers yo E-mailed questions on the above-mentioned subject received from a UK-based analyst:
1) In your view, what is Pakistan's goal in Afghanistan? Do they want their interests to be respected in any peace settlement or do they want their interests to be the settlement? What is the view of the Indian government, officially and unofficially?
PAKISTAN'S GOAL IN AFGHANISTAN IS A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD NOT CREATE PROBLEMS FOR ISLAMABAD IN THE PASHTUN BELT, WHICH WOULD NOT TAKE SIDES WITH INDIA IN ANY INDO-PAKISTAN MILITARY CONFLICT, WHICH WOULD PROTECT PAKISTAN'S ECONOMIC LINKS WITH THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS AND WHICH WOULD KEEP INDIA AT A DISTANCE.PAKISTAN REGARDS AFGHANISTAN AS WITHIN ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE AND WANTS A GOVERNMENT IN KABUL WHICH WOULD KEEP AFGHANISTAN THAT WAY.
2) In your view, what are India's strategic objectives in Afghanistan? How does it differ from its stated policy, if at all?
INDIA'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN ARE A MULTI-ETHNIC,PLURALISTIC,MODERN,DEMOCRATIC AFGHANISTAN WHICH WOULD PLAY ITS DUE ROLE IN THE SOUTH ASIAN REGION WITHOUT COMING UNDER THE MALIGN INFLUENCE OF THE PAKISTANI ARMY AND ITS ISI AND WHICH WOULD REMAIN IMMUNISED FROM PAKISTAN'S JIHADI VIRUS.INDIA WOULD ALSO HAVE A KEY INTEREST IN CONTRIBUTING TO A PREVENTION OF A RE-TALIBANISATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE RETURN OF AL QAEDA TO ITS OLD SANCTUARIES IN THE AFGHAN TERRITORY.THE STATED POLICY AND THE GENUINE OBJECTIVES ARE IDENTICAL.
3) How do you rate the MI6-ISI intelligence relationship? What is the view of the Indian government? Is there a similarly strong relationship with RAW?
I DON'T KNOW THE VIEWS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT.BASED ON OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION, MY ASSESSMENT IS THAT THE ISI'S CO-OPERATION WITH THE MI-5 AND THE MI-6 HAS BEEN AS UNSATISFACTORY AS ITS CO-OPERATION WITH THE CIA AND THE FBI. WE SAW A GOOD EXAMPLE OF ISI FOOT-DRAGGING IN THE CASE OF RASHID RAUF, A MIRPURI FROM BIRMINGHAM WHO WAS WANTED IN A CRIMINAL CASE IN THE UK AND WHO HAD LINKS WITH THE JAISH-E-MOHAMMAD AND SUSPECTED LINKS WITH AL QAEDA.
4) Given David Cameron wants to build a "special relationship" with India, what would the UK need to do vis-a-vis Afghanistan and Pakistan to help build such a relationship?
BOTH INDIA AND THE UK HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT PAKISTAN WINDS UP THE JIHADI TERRORIST INFRASTRUCTURE IN ITS TERRITORY AND ACTS AGAINST THE LEADERS OF THE TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS SUCH AS THE LASHKAR-E-TOIBA AND THE JEM WHICH POSE A THREAT TO THE NATIONALS AND INTERESTS OF INDIA AND THE UK. IN AFGHANISTAN, THEY HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN PREVENTING THE RETURN OF THE TALIBAN TO POWER IN KABUL AND OF AL QAEDA TO ITS SANCTUARIES IN AFGHAN TERRITORY. INDIA AND THE UK SHOULD WORK JOINTLY FOR PROMOTING THESE COMMON INTERESTS.
5) What could India offer the UK to make such a relationship reciprocal? Could RAW fill the vacuum of an ISI break from MI6?
THE RELATIONSHIP IS PROGRESSING. THERE IS NOW A GREATER APPRECIATION IN LONDON OF THE ROLE OF PAKISTAN IN FOMENTING TERRORISM IN INDIAN TERRITORY. SIMILARLY, THERE IS A GREATER APPRECIATION IN LONDON OF INDIA'S LEGITIMATE INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN. BUT THE PROGRESS HAS NOT BEEN AS SATISFACTORY AS INDIA WOULD HAVE WISHED BECAUSE THE UK IS NOT PREPARED TO USE THE STICK AGAINST PAKISTAN DESPITE ITS UNHAPPINESS OVER PAKISTAN'S FOOT-DRAGGING AGAINST TERRORISM ORIGINATING FROM ITS TERRITORY. THE CONVERGENCE OF INDIAN AND BRITISH INTERESTS IN RELATION TO PAKISTAN CONTINUES TO HAVE LIMITS. THIS COMES IN THE WAY OF A STRONGER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UK AND INDIA ON STRATEGIC ISSUES.
6) What is your view of Cameron's remarks last year about Pakistan "exporting terror"?
TOTALLY JUSTIFIED AND FACTUALLY CORRECT.
7) How do you rate the idea of a UK-India "special relationship"?
THE IDEA IS GOOD, BUT THE PROBLEM IS IN IMPLEMENTATION. ANY SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP, TO BE WORTHWHILE, HAS TO BE BASED ON A QUID PRO QUO. THERE IS NO QUID PRO QUO IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIA AND THE UK.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, October 7, 2011
INDIA-PAKISTAN-US
These are my answers in reply to E-mailed questions received from the Islamabad correspondent of a well-known US weekly:
What is India's role in the war on terror?
Exchange of intelligence, knowledge,experience and capabilities and mutual assistance in legal matters with interested countries, including the US..
- India has been the victim of several terror attacks recently. What is your opinion on New Delhi's approach to combating terrorist attacks? Do you think there is untapped potential for exchanging information between India and Pakistan on how to deal with terrorist actions?
Since much of the jihadi threat in India is from Pakistan-based organisations working under the control of the ISI, there is no scope for exchange of intelligence or mutual legal assistance between India and Pakistan.Terrorism is one of the weapons in Pakistan's anti-India arsenal. It is not going to help India in blunting that weapon. Having said this, I have been arguing in my interviews and writings that there must be some kind of institutional interface between the ISI and the R&AW to reduce the present high level of distrust between the two. This could come about only over a longer period and not in the short-term, but this should be an important objective of both.
-
With an increasing presence in Afghanistan, what role do you think India could play in Kabul following the U.S. withdrawal?
By helping in the economic development and in the spread of modern education in Afghanistan and by assisting Afghanistan in strengthening the capabilities of its armed forces, India could contribute to preventing the re-Talibanisation of the Afghan State and society and the return of Al Qaeda to its sanctuaries in Afghan territory after the US and other NATO forces thin out.
-
Do you believe the Haqqani network is still based in Pakistan or have they moved to Afghanistan, as claimed in recent interviews with Sirajuddin Haqqani?
My assessment is that the Haqqani network no longer operates from North Waziristan. It now operates from the Kurram agency of Pakistan.The cadres and the training camps are in the Kurram Agency, but the leaders, who are high-value targets for US Drones, are spread out across Pakistan in order to escape Drone attacks.The cadres carry out hit and withdraw raids into Afghanistan.
-
What role could India play if conditions between Pakistan and the U.S. continue to deteriorate?
The US will never strategically co-operate with India against Pakistan. While the CIA and the Pentagon are not averse to ideas of limited Indo-US co-operation in dealing with threats originating from Pakistan, the State Department has always been cautious in endorsing such ideas. I had seen this vividly while I was in service and I continue to see this in my retirement.The only role India can play is to keep nudging the US to act more strongly against Pakistan without unrealistic hopes that the US wil,in fact, do so.When the US talks of strategic co-operation with India, it has China in mind and not Pakistan.
-
In interviews, Pakistan Army leaders have said they still consider India to be their biggest threat. Do you think India feels the same about Pakistan?
India can any day deal with Pakistan and put it in its place.What India is worried is the increasing strategic threat from the developing Sino-Pakistani axis.Unfortunately, Washington does not seem to view this axis with the same concern as India does.The developing China-Pakistan axis is the real axis of evil.
- Despite its efforts in the war on terror, Pakistan still has a substantial terrorist problem. Can peace be achieved between India and Pakistan while suspected terrorists still reside here?
There is unlikely to be a normal good-neighbours relationship between India and Pakistan in the short and medium terms.Pakistani complexes relating to India will come in the way. That doesn't mean the two countries should not try for a more benign and less malign relationship. There is a need for a common vision.The leaders of the two countries should meet more frequently to get to know and like each other and work painstakingly and without undue illusions towards such a common vision.
-
Following Al Qaeda, what terrorist group is the biggest threat to stability in South Asia, in your opinion.
The Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the two Talibans in that order.I do not consider the Haqqani network as a separate terrorist organisation. It is a wing of the Afghan Taliban, but with some autonomy in its operations.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75)
What is India's role in the war on terror?
Exchange of intelligence, knowledge,experience and capabilities and mutual assistance in legal matters with interested countries, including the US..
- India has been the victim of several terror attacks recently. What is your opinion on New Delhi's approach to combating terrorist attacks? Do you think there is untapped potential for exchanging information between India and Pakistan on how to deal with terrorist actions?
Since much of the jihadi threat in India is from Pakistan-based organisations working under the control of the ISI, there is no scope for exchange of intelligence or mutual legal assistance between India and Pakistan.Terrorism is one of the weapons in Pakistan's anti-India arsenal. It is not going to help India in blunting that weapon. Having said this, I have been arguing in my interviews and writings that there must be some kind of institutional interface between the ISI and the R&AW to reduce the present high level of distrust between the two. This could come about only over a longer period and not in the short-term, but this should be an important objective of both.
-
With an increasing presence in Afghanistan, what role do you think India could play in Kabul following the U.S. withdrawal?
By helping in the economic development and in the spread of modern education in Afghanistan and by assisting Afghanistan in strengthening the capabilities of its armed forces, India could contribute to preventing the re-Talibanisation of the Afghan State and society and the return of Al Qaeda to its sanctuaries in Afghan territory after the US and other NATO forces thin out.
-
Do you believe the Haqqani network is still based in Pakistan or have they moved to Afghanistan, as claimed in recent interviews with Sirajuddin Haqqani?
My assessment is that the Haqqani network no longer operates from North Waziristan. It now operates from the Kurram agency of Pakistan.The cadres and the training camps are in the Kurram Agency, but the leaders, who are high-value targets for US Drones, are spread out across Pakistan in order to escape Drone attacks.The cadres carry out hit and withdraw raids into Afghanistan.
-
What role could India play if conditions between Pakistan and the U.S. continue to deteriorate?
The US will never strategically co-operate with India against Pakistan. While the CIA and the Pentagon are not averse to ideas of limited Indo-US co-operation in dealing with threats originating from Pakistan, the State Department has always been cautious in endorsing such ideas. I had seen this vividly while I was in service and I continue to see this in my retirement.The only role India can play is to keep nudging the US to act more strongly against Pakistan without unrealistic hopes that the US wil,in fact, do so.When the US talks of strategic co-operation with India, it has China in mind and not Pakistan.
-
In interviews, Pakistan Army leaders have said they still consider India to be their biggest threat. Do you think India feels the same about Pakistan?
India can any day deal with Pakistan and put it in its place.What India is worried is the increasing strategic threat from the developing Sino-Pakistani axis.Unfortunately, Washington does not seem to view this axis with the same concern as India does.The developing China-Pakistan axis is the real axis of evil.
- Despite its efforts in the war on terror, Pakistan still has a substantial terrorist problem. Can peace be achieved between India and Pakistan while suspected terrorists still reside here?
There is unlikely to be a normal good-neighbours relationship between India and Pakistan in the short and medium terms.Pakistani complexes relating to India will come in the way. That doesn't mean the two countries should not try for a more benign and less malign relationship. There is a need for a common vision.The leaders of the two countries should meet more frequently to get to know and like each other and work painstakingly and without undue illusions towards such a common vision.
-
Following Al Qaeda, what terrorist group is the biggest threat to stability in South Asia, in your opinion.
The Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the two Talibans in that order.I do not consider the Haqqani network as a separate terrorist organisation. It is a wing of the Afghan Taliban, but with some autonomy in its operations.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75)
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