INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO. 732
B.RAMAN
According to the British Broadcasting Corporation, a large bomb blast has hit near government headquarters in the Norwegian capital Oslo, killing at least one person. The offices of Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg were damaged extensively, but he was described by a government spokeswoman as safe.
2.Police said a number of people were injured in the city centre explosion. Television footage from the scene showed rubble and glass from shattered windows in the streets - smoke was rising from some buildings. The wreckage of at least one car was on one street.
3.All roads into the city centre have been closed, said national broadcaster NRK, and security officials evacuated people from the area, fearing another blast. "Police can confirm there were deaths and injuries following the explosion in the government quarter this afternoon," the police said in a statement.
4.Oistein Mjarum, head of communications for the Norwegian Red Cross, said fires were burning in the 17-storey building housing the Prime Minister’s office. An NRK journalist, Ingunn Andersen, said the headquarters of tabloid newspaper VG had also been damaged.
5.A message of Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's then No. 2, who has taken over as the head of Al Qaeda after OBL’s death on May 2,2011, in a US Commando attack at Abbottabad in Pakistan, broadcast by Al Jazeera on May 21, 2003, had called for reprisal attacks against the US and some of its allies for occupying Iraq.
6. The message, inter alia, said: "O Muslims, take matters firmly against the embassies of America, England, Australia, and Norway and their interests, companies, and employees. Burn the ground under their feet, as they should not enjoy your protection, safety, or security. Expel those criminals out of your countries. Do not allow the Americans, the British, the Australians, the Norwegians, and the other crusaders who killed your brothers in Iraq to live in your countries. Wreak havoc on them."
7. While the calls for attacks on the US, the UK and Australia were not a surprise, the call for reprisals against Norway was, since Norway was not one of the allies of the US in Iraq. It was not clear why Zawahiri included Norway in the list.
8.The Norwegian police announced on July 8,2010, the arrest of three men suspected of having ties to Al Qaeda on charges of preparing terrorist attacks. One of them was a Norwegian citizen of Uighur origin. The other two were permanent residents in Norway of Uzbek and Iraqi-Kurdish origin. Two of them (the Uzbek and the Uighur) were reported to have been arrested in Norway and the third (Iraqi-Kurd with a permanent residence permit of Norway) in Germany. The Norwegian police had been keeping them under surveillance for investigation for about a year. The arrests appeared to have been made even though the investigation had not yet been completed because of the leakage of the news about the investigation against them to the media. They apparently decided to arrest them before the media came out with the news.
9. Media reports indicated that the arrested persons were suspected of involvement in plots for terrorist strikes in Norway and of having links with some terrorist suspects under investigation in the US and the UK. It was not clear whether the arrested belonged to Al Qaeda or its ally the Islamic Jihad Union , which has many Uzbek and Uighur members.
10.It is not clear whether the targeting of Norway has anything to do with its role in Afghanistan as a member of the NATO forces fighting against the Taliban.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75)
Friday, July 22, 2011
Thursday, July 21, 2011
L'AFFAIRE FAI : THE INDIAN ANGLE
B.RAMAN
There are two aspects to L’Affaire Fai, the case relating to the arrest earlier this week and the proposed prosecution of Ghulam Nabi Fai, the head of the Washington DC based Kashmiri American Council (KAC) on a charge of working as an agent of influence of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
2. It has been alleged that his organisation was in receipt of large funds over the years from the ISI for making contributions to the electoral funds of some US politicians and for holding international seminars on the Kashmir issue some of which were attended by journalists and other opinion-makers from India. It has also been alleged that their travel and stay expenses were met by his organisation out of the funds received by him from the ISI.
3. The first aspect relates to the US angle---why did the USA’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Justice Department choose to act against him now after having closed their eyes to his apparently illegal activities for many years? Does the US have an agenda in proceeding against him now? I have covered these questions in my earlier article on this subject. (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers47/paper4610.html )
4. The second aspect relates to the Indian angle. Many questions arise here. The first is, have the Indian participants in Fai’s ISI-funded seminars violated any Indian law calling for any legal action against them. No, they have not. Their claim that they were not aware of his ISI background can’t be just dismissed as an after-thought.
5.The second is, was it wrong or unwise on their part to have participated in the ISI-funded seminars organised by him? Yes, their actions do show a lack of wisdom. While his ISI background may not have been known to them, his reputation as a person of dubious credentials with a Pakistani agenda was widely known for years.
6.There have been detailed reports on him carried by the Indian print media itself over the last 20 years. Their own journalist colleagues based in Washington DC had been reporting about Fai from time to time. Here is a man promoting the agenda of Pakistan, India’s adversary with which we have fought three wars and which has been sponsoring terrorism against Indian citizens, inviting Indian opinion-makers to his seminars in an ill-concealed attempt to use them to earn respectability for himself and his organisation.
7. Was it wise on their part to have let themselves be thus used by him? It was definitely not. Any right-thinking person should have no difficulty in admitting this. The third question arises from this. Do the Indian participants owe an explanation to the public of this country regarding their actions? The word explanation is strong and inappropriate, but they definitely have an obligation as Indian citizens to welcome and facilitate a detailed enquiry into the matter in order to see whether their unwise actions have in any way compromised national interests.
8. The last question that arises is, whether the fact that they are journalists gives them any protection from public and legal scrutiny of their actions. It does not and should not. They did not attend the seminars at the instance of their media houses to cover them as an event for their media houses. They went there as individual Indian citizens and hence their actions should be subject to the same public and legal scrutiny as those of any other Indian citizen. They cannot claim and should not be allowed to claim any special protection from such public and legal scrutiny by virtue of the fact that they are journalists.
9. The arrest of Fai and the filing of an affidavit against him by the FBI is only the beginning of L’Affaire Fai. More details regarding his and the ISI’s methods of operation could come up during the trial if he does not make a plea bargain with the FBI. The Indian participants in his seminars should seek to avoid any future embarrassment by taking the initiative in informing the public and the Government about the details of their participation. Such actions are normally not required in respect of participation in foreign seminars. But once it turns out that a seminar was funded by the ISI and organised at the instance of the ISI by one of its agents of influence, prudence demands that one takes the initiative in informing the public and the Government of the details.
10. Times Now and the CNN-IBN news channels need to be complimented for throwing the spotlight on this important development. Times Now had a detailed debate on this anchored by Arnab Goswami and the CNN-IBN by Suhasini Haidar.It is time for NDTV to follow their example. (22-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
There are two aspects to L’Affaire Fai, the case relating to the arrest earlier this week and the proposed prosecution of Ghulam Nabi Fai, the head of the Washington DC based Kashmiri American Council (KAC) on a charge of working as an agent of influence of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
2. It has been alleged that his organisation was in receipt of large funds over the years from the ISI for making contributions to the electoral funds of some US politicians and for holding international seminars on the Kashmir issue some of which were attended by journalists and other opinion-makers from India. It has also been alleged that their travel and stay expenses were met by his organisation out of the funds received by him from the ISI.
3. The first aspect relates to the US angle---why did the USA’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Justice Department choose to act against him now after having closed their eyes to his apparently illegal activities for many years? Does the US have an agenda in proceeding against him now? I have covered these questions in my earlier article on this subject. (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers47/paper4610.html )
4. The second aspect relates to the Indian angle. Many questions arise here. The first is, have the Indian participants in Fai’s ISI-funded seminars violated any Indian law calling for any legal action against them. No, they have not. Their claim that they were not aware of his ISI background can’t be just dismissed as an after-thought.
5.The second is, was it wrong or unwise on their part to have participated in the ISI-funded seminars organised by him? Yes, their actions do show a lack of wisdom. While his ISI background may not have been known to them, his reputation as a person of dubious credentials with a Pakistani agenda was widely known for years.
6.There have been detailed reports on him carried by the Indian print media itself over the last 20 years. Their own journalist colleagues based in Washington DC had been reporting about Fai from time to time. Here is a man promoting the agenda of Pakistan, India’s adversary with which we have fought three wars and which has been sponsoring terrorism against Indian citizens, inviting Indian opinion-makers to his seminars in an ill-concealed attempt to use them to earn respectability for himself and his organisation.
7. Was it wise on their part to have let themselves be thus used by him? It was definitely not. Any right-thinking person should have no difficulty in admitting this. The third question arises from this. Do the Indian participants owe an explanation to the public of this country regarding their actions? The word explanation is strong and inappropriate, but they definitely have an obligation as Indian citizens to welcome and facilitate a detailed enquiry into the matter in order to see whether their unwise actions have in any way compromised national interests.
8. The last question that arises is, whether the fact that they are journalists gives them any protection from public and legal scrutiny of their actions. It does not and should not. They did not attend the seminars at the instance of their media houses to cover them as an event for their media houses. They went there as individual Indian citizens and hence their actions should be subject to the same public and legal scrutiny as those of any other Indian citizen. They cannot claim and should not be allowed to claim any special protection from such public and legal scrutiny by virtue of the fact that they are journalists.
9. The arrest of Fai and the filing of an affidavit against him by the FBI is only the beginning of L’Affaire Fai. More details regarding his and the ISI’s methods of operation could come up during the trial if he does not make a plea bargain with the FBI. The Indian participants in his seminars should seek to avoid any future embarrassment by taking the initiative in informing the public and the Government about the details of their participation. Such actions are normally not required in respect of participation in foreign seminars. But once it turns out that a seminar was funded by the ISI and organised at the instance of the ISI by one of its agents of influence, prudence demands that one takes the initiative in informing the public and the Government of the details.
10. Times Now and the CNN-IBN news channels need to be complimented for throwing the spotlight on this important development. Times Now had a detailed debate on this anchored by Arnab Goswami and the CNN-IBN by Suhasini Haidar.It is time for NDTV to follow their example. (22-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, July 20, 2011
L'AFFAIRE FAI IN PERSPECTIVE
B.RAMAN
The practice of intelligence agencies floating and funding non-Governmental organisations and even publishing houses for using them for PSYWAR purposes was born during the Second World War and extensively used during the subsequent cold war against the USSR and its communist allies.
2. In the 1960s and the 1970s, the US media highlighted this practice and revealed the links of many supposedly prestigious US non-Governmental organisations to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).One of these organisations used to fund the visits of many senior Indian Government servants to the US for some purpose or the other.
3. A senior official of our Ministry of Home Affairs, who was on a Congressional fellowship in the US at the invitation of a highly prestigious non-Governmental organisation, was embarrassed when the US media identified it as funded and used by the CIA for softening public opinion moulders in other countries.
4. He immediately drew the attention of the Government of India to this report and asked for instructions whether he should terminate his fellowship and return to India. The Government of India advised him not to do so. It felt that he had not done anything wrong since he had no way of knowing that the CIA was behind that organisation.
5.This practice was also followed by the MI-6, the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service, its external intelligence agency. In fact some years ago, in reply to a question in the House of Commons, the British Government admitted that some of the anti-communist best-sellers were sponsored and funded by the MI-6.
6.After the end of the cold war, this practice has come down but has not been abandoned. Intelligence agencies continue to float and fund non-governmental organisations, seminars etc for PSYWAR purposes. In addition, they also seek to soften political leaders by making contributions to their election funds.
7.In the 1980s, during the jihad against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, considerable money was spent by the CIA and the Saudi intelligence for carrying on a PSYWAR against the Soviet troops through non-governmental organisations. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which played a role in assisting in these PSYWAR activities, which were often in the Pashtun language, acquired considerable expertise in this field.
8. It has since been using this expertise for achieving its-Kashmir-related objectives. Since 1989, the ISI has either floated a number of non-Governmental organisations or has been funding organisations which already existed in order to use them against the Government of India. There are many such organisations in the West floated and/or funded by the ISI.
9. The more active amongst them is the Kashmiri American Council (KAC) of Washington DC headed by Ghulam Nabi Fai , a US resident of Kashmiri origin. For nearly two decades, the KAC has been organising activities such as printing and disseminating propaganda pamphlets and other literature on alleged human rights violations in Jammu & Kashmir, holding national seminars in the US to which only residents in the US are invited, holding international seminars to which the participants are invited from many countries including India, lobbying against the Government of India in the US Congress and in the margins of international human rights conferences and softening US politicians by contributing to their election funds.
10. There were strong indications for many years that Fai and his organisation were promoting such activities at the instance of the ISI with funds provided by it. His activities were against US laws, but the US agencies chose to close their eyes to them and refrained from taking any criminal action against him because of what the US perceived as the useful role played by Pakistan as a frontline ally in the war against terrorism.
11.There are two kinds of activities which intelligence agencies indulge in foreign territory--- secret, but declared and secret and undeclared. The liaison relationships for intelligence co-operation would come under the secret, but declared category. Unilateral HUMINT operations such as the one which ultimately led to the killing of Osama bin Laden and other clandestine activities, which are kept deniable, would come under the secret and undeclared category.
12. Since the beginning of this year, there have been complaints in Pakistan that since 9/11 there has been a mushrooming of the US intelligence presence in Pakistan due to an increase in secret and undeclared activities of the US agencies. After the Raymond Davis affair of January last, the Pakistan Government has been trying to keep a greater check on such activities through measures such as asking the US to reduce its intelligence presence and tightening the procedure for the issue of visas to suspected, but undeclared intelligence personnel.
13. The activities of Fai and his organisation came under the category of secret and undeclared activities of the ISI in US territory. In return for the Pakistan Government closing its eyes to the secret and undeclared activities of the US intelligence in Pakistani territory, the US closed its eyes to the secret and undeclared activities of the ISI in US territory so long as those activities were directed against India and were not considered detrimental to the national security of the US.
14. Now that there has been a change in Pakistan’s policy and it has abandoned its hitherto permissive attitude to the secret and undeclared activities of the US intelligence in Pakistani territory, the US has decided to retaliate by giving up its permissive attitude and putting an end to the secret and undeclared activities of the ISI in US territory. That is the message from the arrest on July 19,2011, of Fai and another person for indulging in illegal activities as undeclared foreign agents and the decision to prosecute them.
15. While we should be gratified over the US action, we should avoid over-assessing its significance as an indicator of US solidarity with India or as a precursor to a possible change in the US attitude to Pakistani claims and designs relating to J&K. It is an opportunistic and tactical action to exercise pressure on Pakistan and its ISI to do the US bidding and nothing more. ( 21-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The practice of intelligence agencies floating and funding non-Governmental organisations and even publishing houses for using them for PSYWAR purposes was born during the Second World War and extensively used during the subsequent cold war against the USSR and its communist allies.
2. In the 1960s and the 1970s, the US media highlighted this practice and revealed the links of many supposedly prestigious US non-Governmental organisations to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).One of these organisations used to fund the visits of many senior Indian Government servants to the US for some purpose or the other.
3. A senior official of our Ministry of Home Affairs, who was on a Congressional fellowship in the US at the invitation of a highly prestigious non-Governmental organisation, was embarrassed when the US media identified it as funded and used by the CIA for softening public opinion moulders in other countries.
4. He immediately drew the attention of the Government of India to this report and asked for instructions whether he should terminate his fellowship and return to India. The Government of India advised him not to do so. It felt that he had not done anything wrong since he had no way of knowing that the CIA was behind that organisation.
5.This practice was also followed by the MI-6, the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service, its external intelligence agency. In fact some years ago, in reply to a question in the House of Commons, the British Government admitted that some of the anti-communist best-sellers were sponsored and funded by the MI-6.
6.After the end of the cold war, this practice has come down but has not been abandoned. Intelligence agencies continue to float and fund non-governmental organisations, seminars etc for PSYWAR purposes. In addition, they also seek to soften political leaders by making contributions to their election funds.
7.In the 1980s, during the jihad against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, considerable money was spent by the CIA and the Saudi intelligence for carrying on a PSYWAR against the Soviet troops through non-governmental organisations. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which played a role in assisting in these PSYWAR activities, which were often in the Pashtun language, acquired considerable expertise in this field.
8. It has since been using this expertise for achieving its-Kashmir-related objectives. Since 1989, the ISI has either floated a number of non-Governmental organisations or has been funding organisations which already existed in order to use them against the Government of India. There are many such organisations in the West floated and/or funded by the ISI.
9. The more active amongst them is the Kashmiri American Council (KAC) of Washington DC headed by Ghulam Nabi Fai , a US resident of Kashmiri origin. For nearly two decades, the KAC has been organising activities such as printing and disseminating propaganda pamphlets and other literature on alleged human rights violations in Jammu & Kashmir, holding national seminars in the US to which only residents in the US are invited, holding international seminars to which the participants are invited from many countries including India, lobbying against the Government of India in the US Congress and in the margins of international human rights conferences and softening US politicians by contributing to their election funds.
10. There were strong indications for many years that Fai and his organisation were promoting such activities at the instance of the ISI with funds provided by it. His activities were against US laws, but the US agencies chose to close their eyes to them and refrained from taking any criminal action against him because of what the US perceived as the useful role played by Pakistan as a frontline ally in the war against terrorism.
11.There are two kinds of activities which intelligence agencies indulge in foreign territory--- secret, but declared and secret and undeclared. The liaison relationships for intelligence co-operation would come under the secret, but declared category. Unilateral HUMINT operations such as the one which ultimately led to the killing of Osama bin Laden and other clandestine activities, which are kept deniable, would come under the secret and undeclared category.
12. Since the beginning of this year, there have been complaints in Pakistan that since 9/11 there has been a mushrooming of the US intelligence presence in Pakistan due to an increase in secret and undeclared activities of the US agencies. After the Raymond Davis affair of January last, the Pakistan Government has been trying to keep a greater check on such activities through measures such as asking the US to reduce its intelligence presence and tightening the procedure for the issue of visas to suspected, but undeclared intelligence personnel.
13. The activities of Fai and his organisation came under the category of secret and undeclared activities of the ISI in US territory. In return for the Pakistan Government closing its eyes to the secret and undeclared activities of the US intelligence in Pakistani territory, the US closed its eyes to the secret and undeclared activities of the ISI in US territory so long as those activities were directed against India and were not considered detrimental to the national security of the US.
14. Now that there has been a change in Pakistan’s policy and it has abandoned its hitherto permissive attitude to the secret and undeclared activities of the US intelligence in Pakistani territory, the US has decided to retaliate by giving up its permissive attitude and putting an end to the secret and undeclared activities of the ISI in US territory. That is the message from the arrest on July 19,2011, of Fai and another person for indulging in illegal activities as undeclared foreign agents and the decision to prosecute them.
15. While we should be gratified over the US action, we should avoid over-assessing its significance as an indicator of US solidarity with India or as a precursor to a possible change in the US attitude to Pakistani claims and designs relating to J&K. It is an opportunistic and tactical action to exercise pressure on Pakistan and its ISI to do the US bidding and nothing more. ( 21-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Tuesday, July 19, 2011
XINJIANG, TIBET CONTINUE TO HAUNT CPC/PLA LEADERSHIP
B.RAMAN
The situation in the Chinese-controlled Xinjiang region of China and in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region continues to haunt the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which has been observing the 90th anniversary of its formation this month, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which has been observing the 60th anniversary of its occupation of Tibet.
2. For the last four weeks the Chinese authorities have considerably stepped up security in Xinjiang and Tibet to prevent any mass protests. July is a sensitive month for both regions---- for Xinjiang because it marks the first anniversary of the violent incidents of last year and for Tibet because it marks the 60th anniversary of the occupation of Tibet by the PLA. The reluctance of the Uighurs and the Tibetans to join in the celebrations of the 90th anniversary of the CPC has been an added cause for tension.
3. More by unintended coincidence than by design, the visit of Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, to India from July 19,2011, fell on the 60th anniversary of the occupation of Tibet by the PLA. Before her departure from Washington for New Delhi, two worrisome developments for the Chinese relating to Tibet had taken place in Washington DC. Firstly, despite Chinese objections, President Barack Obama received His Holiness the Dalai Lama, who happened to be on a visit to the US on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the PLA’s occupation of Tibet, in the Map Room of the White House for a discussion to underline continuing US interest in the human rights of the Tibetan people.
4. Secondly, of equal concern to the Chinese was the reported visit of His Holiness to the Washington Headquarters of the US State Department funded Radio Free Asia (RFA), which was started under the Bill Clinton Administration to make broadcasts ,inter alia, to the people of Tibet and Xinjiang.
5. The Chinese remember the role played by the US-funded Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in encouraging political dissidence in the erstwhile USSR and other communist countries in East Europe. Radio Free Asia has been allegedly broadcasting to the people of Xinjiang and Tibet not only the latest news about developments in their region to which they are denied access by the Chinese censors, but also instructions on how to circumvent the various curbs imposed by the Chinese authorities on microblogging and other social media networks to prevent a copy-cat emulation of the Jasmine Revolution of Tunisia and Egypt by the people of not only Xinjiang and Tibet, but also other parts of China.
6.The Chinese authorities, who view the recent mass demonstrations in support of electoral reforms in Kuala Lumpur as inspired by the Jasmine Revolution, take seriously the danger of the Jasmine effect creating political dissidence in China during the year of its celebration of the 90th anniversary of the CPC.
7. In view of these factors, there has been palpable nervousness in both Xinjiang and Tibet resulting in many preventive arrests and seizure of the belongings of many suspected political dissidents. While these measures have not so far led to the outbreak of any violence in the Tibetan areas, protests staged by the Uighurs against the preventive arrests, which have been taking place for the last two weeks, led to a major clash between the protesting Uighurs and the Chinese security forces on July 18 resulting in the death of over 20 persons---the majority of them Uighurs plus at least two members of the security forces.
8. According to reports from reliable Uighur sources, the trouble started in the central bazaar of the Hotan town in the Xinjiang province when the Chinese security forces opened fire on a group of Uighurs demanding the release of arrested relatives. Enraged by this, the protesters attacked a nearby police station and took some policemen hostage. The Chinese security forces used more force to drive the protesters out of the police station and rescue the hostages taken by them.
9. The Chinese authorities have depicted the incident as a terrorist attack on the police station without giving details of the initial incidents in the central bazaar. The situation is tense all over Xinjiang, but there have been no reports of violence from other parts of the Chinese-controlled province.
10. The Chinese authorities have noted with concern an interview given by His Holiness in the US in which he was quoted as saying that it was he and not the CPC who would determine the selection process for choosing his successor after his death. They view this as a pre-emptive attempt by His Holiness to deny legitimacy to any selection process initiated by the CPC and to prepare the ground for a protest by his followers against any selection process imposed on the Tibetan people by the Han-controlled CPC.
11. The Chinese have sought to counter the attempts of His Holiness to influence his succession in two ways. Firstly, they have sought to discredit His Holiness by projecting him as an old man, who does not know what he is talking about. Secondly, the “People’s Daily”, the newspaper of the CPC, has come out with a detailed article on July 20 on how the successor of a Dalai Lama has to be chosen according to Tibetan Buddhist traditions.
12. The “People’s Daily” article said: “The Dalai Lama recently showed special attention to his reincarnation, which is understandable as he is already an old man. The problem is that the more he talks, the crazier he looks, and the further away he is from his religion. He is like an actor or a politician, often leaving people wondering about the credibility of his words.”
13. Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping, who is expected to succeed President Hu Jintao, visited Lhasa on July 19 to participate in celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the “liberation” of Tibet by the PLA. Speaking at a public function on that occasion, he said: “Tibet serves as an important national security screen for the country. It also constitutes an important ecological security screen, a major base of strategic resources reserve and a major production area of special highland agro-produce. It is home for the preservation of a unique culture of the Chinese nation and a major international tourism destination.” (20-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The situation in the Chinese-controlled Xinjiang region of China and in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region continues to haunt the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which has been observing the 90th anniversary of its formation this month, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which has been observing the 60th anniversary of its occupation of Tibet.
2. For the last four weeks the Chinese authorities have considerably stepped up security in Xinjiang and Tibet to prevent any mass protests. July is a sensitive month for both regions---- for Xinjiang because it marks the first anniversary of the violent incidents of last year and for Tibet because it marks the 60th anniversary of the occupation of Tibet by the PLA. The reluctance of the Uighurs and the Tibetans to join in the celebrations of the 90th anniversary of the CPC has been an added cause for tension.
3. More by unintended coincidence than by design, the visit of Mrs.Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, to India from July 19,2011, fell on the 60th anniversary of the occupation of Tibet by the PLA. Before her departure from Washington for New Delhi, two worrisome developments for the Chinese relating to Tibet had taken place in Washington DC. Firstly, despite Chinese objections, President Barack Obama received His Holiness the Dalai Lama, who happened to be on a visit to the US on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the PLA’s occupation of Tibet, in the Map Room of the White House for a discussion to underline continuing US interest in the human rights of the Tibetan people.
4. Secondly, of equal concern to the Chinese was the reported visit of His Holiness to the Washington Headquarters of the US State Department funded Radio Free Asia (RFA), which was started under the Bill Clinton Administration to make broadcasts ,inter alia, to the people of Tibet and Xinjiang.
5. The Chinese remember the role played by the US-funded Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in encouraging political dissidence in the erstwhile USSR and other communist countries in East Europe. Radio Free Asia has been allegedly broadcasting to the people of Xinjiang and Tibet not only the latest news about developments in their region to which they are denied access by the Chinese censors, but also instructions on how to circumvent the various curbs imposed by the Chinese authorities on microblogging and other social media networks to prevent a copy-cat emulation of the Jasmine Revolution of Tunisia and Egypt by the people of not only Xinjiang and Tibet, but also other parts of China.
6.The Chinese authorities, who view the recent mass demonstrations in support of electoral reforms in Kuala Lumpur as inspired by the Jasmine Revolution, take seriously the danger of the Jasmine effect creating political dissidence in China during the year of its celebration of the 90th anniversary of the CPC.
7. In view of these factors, there has been palpable nervousness in both Xinjiang and Tibet resulting in many preventive arrests and seizure of the belongings of many suspected political dissidents. While these measures have not so far led to the outbreak of any violence in the Tibetan areas, protests staged by the Uighurs against the preventive arrests, which have been taking place for the last two weeks, led to a major clash between the protesting Uighurs and the Chinese security forces on July 18 resulting in the death of over 20 persons---the majority of them Uighurs plus at least two members of the security forces.
8. According to reports from reliable Uighur sources, the trouble started in the central bazaar of the Hotan town in the Xinjiang province when the Chinese security forces opened fire on a group of Uighurs demanding the release of arrested relatives. Enraged by this, the protesters attacked a nearby police station and took some policemen hostage. The Chinese security forces used more force to drive the protesters out of the police station and rescue the hostages taken by them.
9. The Chinese authorities have depicted the incident as a terrorist attack on the police station without giving details of the initial incidents in the central bazaar. The situation is tense all over Xinjiang, but there have been no reports of violence from other parts of the Chinese-controlled province.
10. The Chinese authorities have noted with concern an interview given by His Holiness in the US in which he was quoted as saying that it was he and not the CPC who would determine the selection process for choosing his successor after his death. They view this as a pre-emptive attempt by His Holiness to deny legitimacy to any selection process initiated by the CPC and to prepare the ground for a protest by his followers against any selection process imposed on the Tibetan people by the Han-controlled CPC.
11. The Chinese have sought to counter the attempts of His Holiness to influence his succession in two ways. Firstly, they have sought to discredit His Holiness by projecting him as an old man, who does not know what he is talking about. Secondly, the “People’s Daily”, the newspaper of the CPC, has come out with a detailed article on July 20 on how the successor of a Dalai Lama has to be chosen according to Tibetan Buddhist traditions.
12. The “People’s Daily” article said: “The Dalai Lama recently showed special attention to his reincarnation, which is understandable as he is already an old man. The problem is that the more he talks, the crazier he looks, and the further away he is from his religion. He is like an actor or a politician, often leaving people wondering about the credibility of his words.”
13. Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping, who is expected to succeed President Hu Jintao, visited Lhasa on July 19 to participate in celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the “liberation” of Tibet by the PLA. Speaking at a public function on that occasion, he said: “Tibet serves as an important national security screen for the country. It also constitutes an important ecological security screen, a major base of strategic resources reserve and a major production area of special highland agro-produce. It is home for the preservation of a unique culture of the Chinese nation and a major international tourism destination.” (20-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, July 18, 2011
EVOLUTION OF MILITANCY IN INDIAN MUSLIM COMMUNITY
B.RAMAN
The following three events have contributed to the growth of militancy, often amounting to terrorism, in the Indian Muslim community, particularly among its young members:
(a).The demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, by some Hindus in December,1992.
(b).The incidents of violence thereafter in Mumbai in which many Muslims were allegedly involved and Muslim complaints of disproportionate use of force by the Mumbai Police for suppressing the acts of violence.
( c ). The anti-Muslim massacres in Gujarat in 2002 in the wake of the alleged massacre of some Hindu pilgrims travelling by train at the Godhra railway station by some local Muslims.
2. These events contributed to the radicalisation of two Muslim organisations which had existed before the demolition of the Babri Masjid and to the birth of a new organisation after the anti-Muslim massacres in Gujarat. The two old organisations were the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), which is a pan-Indian organisation, and Al Umma, which is an organisation with its following confined to South India---particularly Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
3. The SIMI and Al Umma took to organised, pre-meditated violence with the use of improvised explosive devices (IED) after the demolition of the Babri Masjid. There were a number of explosions in trains in North India allegedly organised by the SIMI. There were a series of terrorist strikes in Tamil Nadu starting from 1993.The most serious of these were the serial explosions in Coimbatore in February,1998, coinciding with the visit of Shri L.K.Advani, the leader of the BJP, to Coimbatore in connection with the election campaign. Neither the SIMI nor Al Umma claimed responsibility for the terrorist strikes organised by them due to a fear that this could lead to a harassment of innocent members of the Muslim community by the police.
4. The investigation of these incidents did not bring in any evidence of any contacts between Al Umma and Pakistan. Al Umma was a purely indigenous movement of Muslim anger with no Pakistani influence or inspiration or instigation. It had organised the explosions with IEDs fabricated out of material allegedly stolen from granite quarries. In the case of the SIMI, there was evidence of contacts with Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) and Inter-Services Intelligence even before the demolition of the Babri Masjid during the Afghan jihad of the 1980s against the Soviet troops
5. Tamil Nadu was the epi-centre of Al Umma terrorism. The Tamil Nadu Government handled it in two ways. The Tamil Nadu Police identified all those involved in terrorism and arrested and prosecuted them. The Government paid attention to the general grievances of the Muslim community and ensured that there were no instances of excesses by the Police against the Muslim community. As a result, acts of terrorism emanating from some angry elements in the Muslim community have been controlled in Tamil Nadu. The subsiding of the anger over the demolition of the Babri Masjid also helped in controlling terrorism.
6. While anger over the demolition of the Babri Masjid has generally subsided in the Muslim community, grievances or even anger arising from the perceived non-implementation of the Sri Krishna Commission report on the excesses allegedly committed by the Mumbai police against the Muslims and the anti-Muslim massacres in Gujarat and the alleged inaction of the Gujarat Government in the initial stages of the massacres persist in some younger elements of the Indian Muslim community all over India, including among some highly educated elements in the community.
7.Their main cause of anger is no longer the demolition of the Babri Masjid. Nor is it due to social or economic factors. Their anger is due to their perception that the Indian criminal justice system is anti-Muslim. When they talk of the Indian criminal justice system, they essentially mean the police and the judiciary.
8. This anger in sections of the Indian Muslim community over the alleged non-implementation of the Sri Krishna Commission report and the anti-Muslim massacres in Gujarat gave birth to the Indian Mujahideen (IM) by some members of the SIMI and others not associated with the SIMI in the past. In its propaganda, the IM projects the suburban train blasts in Mumbai in July,2006, as its first act of reprisal and has claimed responsibility for many other acts of terrorism that followed.
9.The IM projects itself as a movement of reprisal terrorism to protest against alleged injustices and excesses against the members of the Muslim community. It denies any links with Pakistani jihadi organisations or the ISI. Despite its denials, Indian intelligence and investigating agencies believe that the SIMI and the IM have clandestine contacts with the Pakistani jihadi organisations and the ISI and have had the benefit of some training assistance from them. There is some evidence of their links with Pakistan and the ISI. There is no doubt about it.
10. It is a fact that the ISI----directly as well as through the Pakistani jihadi organisations--- has been trying to take advantage of the continuing anger amongst some Indian Muslim youth to create indigenous groups in the rest of India outside Jammu & Kashmir to wage a militant struggle against the Government of India without implicating Pakistani organisations.
11. In dealing with the phenomenon of reprisal terrorism by some members of the Muslim community, we should adopt a five-pronged approach as indicated below:
(a). Avoid demonising the Muslim community.
(b).Avoid dismissing and demonising the Muslim youth who have taken to terrorism as the proxies of Pakistan. If you do it, your mind gets closed to their legitimate grievances.
( c ). Identify and address the legitimate grievances of the Muslim community and stress upon the police the need for greater sensitivity in dealing with our Muslim co-citizens.
( d). Act firmly in accordance with the law against Indian Muslims indulging in terrorism.
( e ). Be ruthless in dealing with Pakistani elements trying to exploit these indigenous elements for promoting the Pakistani agenda.
12.No organisation has claimed responsibility for the three explosions in Mumbai on July 13,2011.Till the police is able to identify the perpetrators, arrest and interrogate them, we should avoid speculating. When evidence is poor, speculation is rich. The flow of evidence in this case has been poor. This has given rise to all sorts of speculation. Let us keep our mind open and wait till the police are able to make a break-through in their investigation.( 18-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The following three events have contributed to the growth of militancy, often amounting to terrorism, in the Indian Muslim community, particularly among its young members:
(a).The demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, by some Hindus in December,1992.
(b).The incidents of violence thereafter in Mumbai in which many Muslims were allegedly involved and Muslim complaints of disproportionate use of force by the Mumbai Police for suppressing the acts of violence.
( c ). The anti-Muslim massacres in Gujarat in 2002 in the wake of the alleged massacre of some Hindu pilgrims travelling by train at the Godhra railway station by some local Muslims.
2. These events contributed to the radicalisation of two Muslim organisations which had existed before the demolition of the Babri Masjid and to the birth of a new organisation after the anti-Muslim massacres in Gujarat. The two old organisations were the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), which is a pan-Indian organisation, and Al Umma, which is an organisation with its following confined to South India---particularly Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
3. The SIMI and Al Umma took to organised, pre-meditated violence with the use of improvised explosive devices (IED) after the demolition of the Babri Masjid. There were a number of explosions in trains in North India allegedly organised by the SIMI. There were a series of terrorist strikes in Tamil Nadu starting from 1993.The most serious of these were the serial explosions in Coimbatore in February,1998, coinciding with the visit of Shri L.K.Advani, the leader of the BJP, to Coimbatore in connection with the election campaign. Neither the SIMI nor Al Umma claimed responsibility for the terrorist strikes organised by them due to a fear that this could lead to a harassment of innocent members of the Muslim community by the police.
4. The investigation of these incidents did not bring in any evidence of any contacts between Al Umma and Pakistan. Al Umma was a purely indigenous movement of Muslim anger with no Pakistani influence or inspiration or instigation. It had organised the explosions with IEDs fabricated out of material allegedly stolen from granite quarries. In the case of the SIMI, there was evidence of contacts with Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) and Inter-Services Intelligence even before the demolition of the Babri Masjid during the Afghan jihad of the 1980s against the Soviet troops
5. Tamil Nadu was the epi-centre of Al Umma terrorism. The Tamil Nadu Government handled it in two ways. The Tamil Nadu Police identified all those involved in terrorism and arrested and prosecuted them. The Government paid attention to the general grievances of the Muslim community and ensured that there were no instances of excesses by the Police against the Muslim community. As a result, acts of terrorism emanating from some angry elements in the Muslim community have been controlled in Tamil Nadu. The subsiding of the anger over the demolition of the Babri Masjid also helped in controlling terrorism.
6. While anger over the demolition of the Babri Masjid has generally subsided in the Muslim community, grievances or even anger arising from the perceived non-implementation of the Sri Krishna Commission report on the excesses allegedly committed by the Mumbai police against the Muslims and the anti-Muslim massacres in Gujarat and the alleged inaction of the Gujarat Government in the initial stages of the massacres persist in some younger elements of the Indian Muslim community all over India, including among some highly educated elements in the community.
7.Their main cause of anger is no longer the demolition of the Babri Masjid. Nor is it due to social or economic factors. Their anger is due to their perception that the Indian criminal justice system is anti-Muslim. When they talk of the Indian criminal justice system, they essentially mean the police and the judiciary.
8. This anger in sections of the Indian Muslim community over the alleged non-implementation of the Sri Krishna Commission report and the anti-Muslim massacres in Gujarat gave birth to the Indian Mujahideen (IM) by some members of the SIMI and others not associated with the SIMI in the past. In its propaganda, the IM projects the suburban train blasts in Mumbai in July,2006, as its first act of reprisal and has claimed responsibility for many other acts of terrorism that followed.
9.The IM projects itself as a movement of reprisal terrorism to protest against alleged injustices and excesses against the members of the Muslim community. It denies any links with Pakistani jihadi organisations or the ISI. Despite its denials, Indian intelligence and investigating agencies believe that the SIMI and the IM have clandestine contacts with the Pakistani jihadi organisations and the ISI and have had the benefit of some training assistance from them. There is some evidence of their links with Pakistan and the ISI. There is no doubt about it.
10. It is a fact that the ISI----directly as well as through the Pakistani jihadi organisations--- has been trying to take advantage of the continuing anger amongst some Indian Muslim youth to create indigenous groups in the rest of India outside Jammu & Kashmir to wage a militant struggle against the Government of India without implicating Pakistani organisations.
11. In dealing with the phenomenon of reprisal terrorism by some members of the Muslim community, we should adopt a five-pronged approach as indicated below:
(a). Avoid demonising the Muslim community.
(b).Avoid dismissing and demonising the Muslim youth who have taken to terrorism as the proxies of Pakistan. If you do it, your mind gets closed to their legitimate grievances.
( c ). Identify and address the legitimate grievances of the Muslim community and stress upon the police the need for greater sensitivity in dealing with our Muslim co-citizens.
( d). Act firmly in accordance with the law against Indian Muslims indulging in terrorism.
( e ). Be ruthless in dealing with Pakistani elements trying to exploit these indigenous elements for promoting the Pakistani agenda.
12.No organisation has claimed responsibility for the three explosions in Mumbai on July 13,2011.Till the police is able to identify the perpetrators, arrest and interrogate them, we should avoid speculating. When evidence is poor, speculation is rich. The flow of evidence in this case has been poor. This has given rise to all sorts of speculation. Let us keep our mind open and wait till the police are able to make a break-through in their investigation.( 18-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Saturday, July 16, 2011
ZHAVERI BAZAAR FIRST:AN OPEN LETTER TO SHRI PRITHVIRAJ CHAVAN, CM OF MAHARASHTRA
Sir,
Permit me to compliment you on your interview to Ms.Barkha Dutt, Group Editor, ND TV, telecast on July 15,2011, on the terrorist attacks in Mumbai on July 13. Like me, thousands of viewers of the interview would have been impressed by the frankness and clarity with which you spoke and by your determination to see that the right lessons are drawn and implemented to prevent a repeat of similar attacks.
2.After the Mumbai blasts of 26/11, I wrote as follows on the London blasts of July 2005: “ 243 posts of Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers have been created since July 2005 and it has been reported that each important police station in London has at least two advisers attached to it. The London Police have established a programme called “London First” in which the Police and the private sector co-operate closely to ensure better security in London. The principle underlying it is that it is the joint responsibility of every one in London to ensure its security from terrorist attacks. Let us have our own Delhi First, Mumbai First, Chennai First, Kolkata First, Bangalore First and Hyderabad First partnerships to ensure that November 26 will not be repeated again.”
3. Before the London blasts, the conventional wisdom was that an effective way of dealing with terrorism was through a good beat system. Our success in dealing with Khalistani terrorism in Punjab was due to the commendable role of the Punjab Police, ably headed by Shri K.P.S.Gill, the then Directror-General of the Punjab Police. He believed that the police should be the weapon of first resort against terrorism. He made it clear to his Station House Officers that he would hold them responsible for the successful prevention and investigation of terrorism.
4. On August 17,2006,, Mr.Gill had an interaction with a group of retired police officers living in Chennai. I happened to be present. He expressed his disquiet over the mushrooming of specialised counter-terrorism organisations which could create a wrong impression in the minds of the police officers that counter-terrorism is not their primary responsibility. A note recorded by me on the interaction is available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers20%5Cpaper1919.html
5. After the London blasts of July 2005, there has been fresh thinking on the role of the police. While its role is still considered important and primary and there is still emphasis on the need for revamping the beat system, it is now admitted that the police alone will not be able to deal effectively with modern terrorism sponsored by another state and with international links unless it has the benefit of expertise from specialists and assistance from specialised units. Moreover, the security forces alone will not be able to deal with terrorism unless they receive the co-operation of the general public and the private sector, which is increasingly concerned over the spread of terrorism to urban centres of economic power. It was to meet these additional requirements that the London Police created the posts of Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers attached to police stations in vulnerable areas.
6. I was given to understand that a scheme for ensuring better security for Mumbai through the co-operation of the police and the private sector was started after 26/11, but I do not know how well it has been working. A special task force on counter-terrorism set up by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) of New Delhi---of which Shri Ved Marwah, former Commissioner of Police, Delhi, Shri A.K.Doval, former Director, Intelligence Bureau, Lt.Gen.Satish Nambiar, who was a member of the high-power panel on terrorism set up by Mr. Kofi Annan, the then UN Secretary-General, and I were amongst the members--- came out with a comprehensive set of recommendations in November 2009, which were presented to Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister. One of the objectives of this Task Force was to examine how to prevent another 26/11 and better ensure the security of the metro cities.
7. The serial blasts of July 13,2011, in three sensitive areas of Mumbai would indicate that despite the measures taken by the Government after 26/11 to strengthen the security of Mumbai on its own as well as on the recommendations of others such as the Task Force set up by the FICCI, the terrorists continue to locate loopholes in the security structure of Mumbai and take advantage of them to carry out terrorist attacks.
8.The 13/7 attacks show that either the pre-26/11 cells of terrorist organisations, which had remained dormant, had been re-activated or new organisations or groups have come up with their own cells without being detected by the Intelligence Agencies and the State Police. We are not yet in a position to provide effective security to the people of Mumbai who have been attacked five times ---in 1993, 2003,2006,2008 and 2011. The people living or working in the Zhaveri Bazaar area, an important jewellery and diamond business area, have been targeted thrice---in 1993, 2003 and 2011.
9. None of the intelligence collection and physical security measures taken by us after every major terrorist strike in Mumbai since 1993 has been able to provide effective security to the people of Mumbai in general and of Zhaveri Bazaar in particular. Every successful terrorist strike speaks of loopholes in the intelligence and security cover provided to Mumbai. Otherwise, the terrorists would not have succeeded.
10. Unless we are able to identify and plug these loopholes after a comprehensive enquiry, the terrorists will continue to take advantage of them. There is a need for a comprehensive look at the intelligence and security cover provided to Mumbai in general and to some of its highly vulnerable areas such as Zhaveri Bazaar in particular. We will be badly letting down the people of the Zhaveri Bazaar area if we let them be targeted for a fourth time by the terrorists.
11. It is important to undertake urgently a vulnerability assessment of Mumbai and its sensitive areas in order to provide a scheme for a vulnerability-specific intelligent-cum-security cover. Let us make Zhaveri Bazaar the epi-centre of our counter-terrorism efforts. Let us work out, in co-operation with the public and the private business sector, a Mumbai First and Zhaveri Bazaar First intelligence-cum-security cover and implement it vigorously.
12. The plan should look at the adequacy of the existing police stations for a counter-terrorism role, the effectiveness of the existing beat and patrolling systems, the adequacy of the existing communication network, the need for counter-terrorism expertise to assist the police, the role of the public and the private sector and other related subjects.
13. We should start this exercise today. Tomorrow may be late.
With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
B.Raman, Chennai.17-7-11
Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi
SHRI PRITHVIRAJ CHAVAN, CHIEF MINISTER, MAHARASHTRA
Permit me to compliment you on your interview to Ms.Barkha Dutt, Group Editor, ND TV, telecast on July 15,2011, on the terrorist attacks in Mumbai on July 13. Like me, thousands of viewers of the interview would have been impressed by the frankness and clarity with which you spoke and by your determination to see that the right lessons are drawn and implemented to prevent a repeat of similar attacks.
2.After the Mumbai blasts of 26/11, I wrote as follows on the London blasts of July 2005: “ 243 posts of Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers have been created since July 2005 and it has been reported that each important police station in London has at least two advisers attached to it. The London Police have established a programme called “London First” in which the Police and the private sector co-operate closely to ensure better security in London. The principle underlying it is that it is the joint responsibility of every one in London to ensure its security from terrorist attacks. Let us have our own Delhi First, Mumbai First, Chennai First, Kolkata First, Bangalore First and Hyderabad First partnerships to ensure that November 26 will not be repeated again.”
3. Before the London blasts, the conventional wisdom was that an effective way of dealing with terrorism was through a good beat system. Our success in dealing with Khalistani terrorism in Punjab was due to the commendable role of the Punjab Police, ably headed by Shri K.P.S.Gill, the then Directror-General of the Punjab Police. He believed that the police should be the weapon of first resort against terrorism. He made it clear to his Station House Officers that he would hold them responsible for the successful prevention and investigation of terrorism.
4. On August 17,2006,, Mr.Gill had an interaction with a group of retired police officers living in Chennai. I happened to be present. He expressed his disquiet over the mushrooming of specialised counter-terrorism organisations which could create a wrong impression in the minds of the police officers that counter-terrorism is not their primary responsibility. A note recorded by me on the interaction is available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers20%5Cpaper1919.html
5. After the London blasts of July 2005, there has been fresh thinking on the role of the police. While its role is still considered important and primary and there is still emphasis on the need for revamping the beat system, it is now admitted that the police alone will not be able to deal effectively with modern terrorism sponsored by another state and with international links unless it has the benefit of expertise from specialists and assistance from specialised units. Moreover, the security forces alone will not be able to deal with terrorism unless they receive the co-operation of the general public and the private sector, which is increasingly concerned over the spread of terrorism to urban centres of economic power. It was to meet these additional requirements that the London Police created the posts of Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers attached to police stations in vulnerable areas.
6. I was given to understand that a scheme for ensuring better security for Mumbai through the co-operation of the police and the private sector was started after 26/11, but I do not know how well it has been working. A special task force on counter-terrorism set up by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) of New Delhi---of which Shri Ved Marwah, former Commissioner of Police, Delhi, Shri A.K.Doval, former Director, Intelligence Bureau, Lt.Gen.Satish Nambiar, who was a member of the high-power panel on terrorism set up by Mr. Kofi Annan, the then UN Secretary-General, and I were amongst the members--- came out with a comprehensive set of recommendations in November 2009, which were presented to Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister. One of the objectives of this Task Force was to examine how to prevent another 26/11 and better ensure the security of the metro cities.
7. The serial blasts of July 13,2011, in three sensitive areas of Mumbai would indicate that despite the measures taken by the Government after 26/11 to strengthen the security of Mumbai on its own as well as on the recommendations of others such as the Task Force set up by the FICCI, the terrorists continue to locate loopholes in the security structure of Mumbai and take advantage of them to carry out terrorist attacks.
8.The 13/7 attacks show that either the pre-26/11 cells of terrorist organisations, which had remained dormant, had been re-activated or new organisations or groups have come up with their own cells without being detected by the Intelligence Agencies and the State Police. We are not yet in a position to provide effective security to the people of Mumbai who have been attacked five times ---in 1993, 2003,2006,2008 and 2011. The people living or working in the Zhaveri Bazaar area, an important jewellery and diamond business area, have been targeted thrice---in 1993, 2003 and 2011.
9. None of the intelligence collection and physical security measures taken by us after every major terrorist strike in Mumbai since 1993 has been able to provide effective security to the people of Mumbai in general and of Zhaveri Bazaar in particular. Every successful terrorist strike speaks of loopholes in the intelligence and security cover provided to Mumbai. Otherwise, the terrorists would not have succeeded.
10. Unless we are able to identify and plug these loopholes after a comprehensive enquiry, the terrorists will continue to take advantage of them. There is a need for a comprehensive look at the intelligence and security cover provided to Mumbai in general and to some of its highly vulnerable areas such as Zhaveri Bazaar in particular. We will be badly letting down the people of the Zhaveri Bazaar area if we let them be targeted for a fourth time by the terrorists.
11. It is important to undertake urgently a vulnerability assessment of Mumbai and its sensitive areas in order to provide a scheme for a vulnerability-specific intelligent-cum-security cover. Let us make Zhaveri Bazaar the epi-centre of our counter-terrorism efforts. Let us work out, in co-operation with the public and the private business sector, a Mumbai First and Zhaveri Bazaar First intelligence-cum-security cover and implement it vigorously.
12. The plan should look at the adequacy of the existing police stations for a counter-terrorism role, the effectiveness of the existing beat and patrolling systems, the adequacy of the existing communication network, the need for counter-terrorism expertise to assist the police, the role of the public and the private sector and other related subjects.
13. We should start this exercise today. Tomorrow may be late.
With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
B.Raman, Chennai.17-7-11
Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi
SHRI PRITHVIRAJ CHAVAN, CHIEF MINISTER, MAHARASHTRA
Friday, July 15, 2011
MUMBAI BLASTS 13/7 : Q & A
B.RAMAN
Q.Can the three blasts in Mumbai on July 13,2011, be attributed to an intelligence failure?
A.Yes. I have always held that every successful terrorist strike is due to either an intelligence or a security failure or both.
Q.But the Home Minister Shri P.Chidambaram has said that despite there being no flow of intelligence, there was no intelligence failure. What did he mean by it?
A.Many, including some foreign analysts, have been mystified by his remarks. Most of the queries that I received from abroad sought my explanation of his remarks. I replied that what he probably meant was that while there was no intelligence indicating the possibility of the blasts, he would not attribute the paucity of intelligence to any failure on the part of the agencies. They tried their best to collect intelligence, but this particular intelligence did not come their way. That is what he appears to have meant.
Q. Would you accept his explanation?
A. There was definitely a failure of intelligence. Whether this was due to any institutional failure on the part of the intelligence agencies or not could be established only by an enquiry into how the terrorists managed to carry out the successful strikes. Unfortunately, after each terrorist strike, our Government has avoided holding a detailed enquiry as to how the terrorists succeeded. The enquiry ordered by the Maharashtra State Govt after the 26/11 terrorist strikes only went into the deficiencies of the police. The deficiencies of the central agencies were not enquired into by the Government of India. The result: We have not learnt the right lessons. That is why most of our discourse on dealing with terrorism is on general terms and not in specific terms as a result of lessons drawn from each strike. In other countries, each strike involving large casualties or damage is followed by a detailed enquiry to draw the right lessons.
Q.Presuming there was an intelligence failure, where and how did it occur?
A. As of now there are four possibilities. Either the terrorist strike was carried out by a reactivated old cell of an existing indigenous organisation which had been lying dormant because of the stepped up security measures after 26/11 or it was carried out by a new cell of a new indigenous organisation or by one or more angry indigenous individuals with no organisational affiliation. If it was the first possibility, the surveillance of the old cells was apparently unsatisfactory. If it was the second or third, apparently their coming into being had escaped the attention of the agencies and the police. If these three possibilities involving indigenous elements are ruled out, there is a fourth possibility of the commission of the attack by external elements which had managed to sneak into India despite the stepped up immigration controls introduced after the 26/11 strikes.
Q.What could this be due to?
A. Poor penetration of terrorist organisations---old or new. Timely human intelligence comes through successful penetration. Good penetration comes through good contacts in the community from which the terrorist organisation or individual terrorists have arisen. There is always a reluctance on the part of the community to co-operate with the police against its members suspected of involvement in terrorism. The available means of overcoming this resistance have to be examined.
Q. How about technical intelligence (TECHINT)?
A. There does not appear to have been any TECHINT in the form of electronic chatter through telephones or the Internet. This could be due to gaps in the TECHINT capability of the agencies or the successful adoption of evasive techniques by the terrorists or their not adopting any of the technical means for communication among themselves. What exactly was the reason for the non-flow of TECHINT could be established only if and when one or more of the perpetrators are arrested and interrogated.
Q.Any other point that needs to be considered?
A. There was possibly a certain complacency on the part of the intelligence agencies since there had been no major terrorist strike for some months. The terrorists probably noticed the slackening of vigilance and struck.
Q. Could there have been a security failure that was behind the successful terrorist strike?
A. One security dimension comes into the picture in respect of the procurement of the materials required for the improvisation of an explosive device. Three kinds of materials are required for an IED--- the explosive itself, the detonator and the timer or a remote control device. The final results of the forensic examination are not yet available. The present indicators are that the terrorists had used ammonium nitrate possibly with a booster and made more lethal than normal by mixing it with projectiles and furnace oil, and a timer, possibly the alarm mechanism of a mobile telephone. The ammonium nitrate which is the ingredient of nitrogenous fertilisers is easily available for procurement in India. After the use of the ammonium nitrate in large quantities in the attempt to blow up the New York World trade Centre in February,1993, by Ramzi Yousef and its subsequent use in other terrorist strikes many Western countries are reported to have issued instructions to all wholesale and retail dealers in fertilisers that they should alert the police if any suspicious-looking person, who is not a genuine farmer, seeks to procure nitrogenous fertilisers. A terrorist cell was disrupted in Canada when one of its members tried to procure a large quantity of fertilisers and the dealer, who became suspicious, alerted the police. In India, it is difficult to impose such curbs since terrorists can easily procure the ammonium nitrate from friends in the farmer community instead of from a dealer. The alarm mechanism of a mobile telephone can also be easily procured without attracting suspicion. Procurement of detonators can cause suspicion, but here too one can easily procure from friends in the community of industrial users of detonators such as granite quarry owners. Al Umma of Tamil Nadu reportedly stole detonators from quarry owners. It, therefore, becomes difficult to detect the preparations for an act of terrorism at the stage of procurement of the IED components unless the terrorists use military-grade explosives procured either locally or from other countries.
Another security dimension arises in respect of the planting of the IEDs after they have been assembled clandestinely. The planting could be prevented in places where there is an access control. In public places, where there is no access control, it becomes very difficult to prevent the planting of an IED unless it is detected accidentally as it was in respect of the jihadi bomber who sought to plant an IED in the Times Square of New York last year. His IED, at the time of planting, reportedly started emitting smoke. An alert member of the public noticed it and he was caught and the IED neutralised. It was more luck than physical security which prevented this attempted strike.
The third dimension is about the utility of Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) cameras. The CCTV can help prevent the planting of an IED in an infrastructure building where there is a central control room constantly monitoring the happenings with the help of CCTV images. CCTV cameras have a very limited preventive role in public places such as crowded streets. They are helpful in investigation after the blasts had taken place, but not in detecting the planting of the IEDs. The CCTV cameras in the London tube stations helped in identifying the perpetrators after they had carried out the terrorist strikes in July,2005. They could not help in prevention.
It has been reported that CCTV footages are available in respect of the Opera House scene in Mumbai where one of the IEDs was planted. Their examination could help the investigators if heavy rain during the planting had not affected the quality of the images.
The only way of detecting an IED in a public place with no access control is through the alertness of the public. They have to be constantly briefed by the police as to what to look for.
Q.It has been reported that there were heavy rains before, during and after the blasts. Any comments on that?
A. It is remarkable that despite the rains all the three IEDs detonated at the fixed time without any malfunctioning. This would indicate that the perpetrators had taken the required precautions to ensure that the rains would not affect the detonation of the IEDs at the fixed time. This speaks well of the quality of expertise of the perpetrators. They were not novices.
It has been reported that the police were facing difficulty in determining where exactly the IEDs were planted. This could have been due to the rains. After a blast, two kinds of examinations are done---the visual and the forensic. During the visual examination, one looks for indicators like craters caused by the detonation, the kind of debris at the scene including the remnants of the detonator and the timer etc. The rains would have definitely created difficulties in the visual and forensic examination. It is ironic, but normal that while the rains seem to have created difficulties for the investigators, they do not seem to have created difficulties for the perpetrators.
“The Hindu” (July 16) has reported that the police have since established that one of the IEDs was kept in a scooter.
Q. There has been talk of a wired body being found near the scene in the Zaveri Bazaar area. Could this indicate that one of the blasts might have been caused by a suicide bomber?
A. If a suicide bomber was involved his body would not have been found intact. If the IED was fixed to the upper part of the body his head would have been severed by the force of the blast and thrown far away. If the IED was fixed in the lower part of the body, the legs would have been severed. If the dead body was intact, the possibility of a suicide explosion becomes less. But, how to explain the wires around the body? The answer to this could be found only by the investigators.
Suicide terrorism is a common feature in Pakistan since 2007. In India, we have had instances of suicidal terrorism (fedayeen attacks) against heavily protected targets, but not suicide terrorism except by the LTTE when it killed Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. If it is established that one of the blasts was caused by a suicide terrorist, this would indicate the definitive involvement of jihadi terrorists.
“The Hindu” (July 16) has reported that the Mumbai Police have identified the dead body and ruled out a suicide bomber. There was no wire on his body, but only an electronic chip inside one of his injuries. This might have got embedded due to the force of the blast. However, there has been no official statement from the Police so far.
Q. Who might have been responsible for the explosions?
A. So far, there are no clear indicators. There has been no claim of responsibility. If Indigenous elements were involved there was a possibility that claims of responsibility would have been made. The Indian Mujahideen (IM) had in the past claimed responsibility for the terrorist attacks carried out by it. Pakistani organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) claim responsibility when they carry out a strike in Jammu & Kashmir. When they carry out a strike outside J&K, they either do not claim responsibility or do so in the name of a fictitious organisation of India. After 26/11, the LET claimed responsibility in the name of a fictitious organisation called the Deccan Mujahideen. If individual jihadis, without organisational affiliation, who are called Jundullas (Soldiers of Allah) are involved, no claim of responsibility is made. There is no evidence so far on the basis of which a reasonable surmise could be made as to who might have been responsible.
Q. Shri Prithviraj Chavan, the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, has said that mobile phone services literally collapsed for 15 minutes after the blasts making it difficult for him to communicate with the police.
A. Nothing surprising. This happened in London immediately after the blasts of July 2005. Thousands and thousands of anxious persons were trying to contact their relatives. The mobile services got jammed preventing the Police Commissioner from contacting his men in the field. The police thought of advising mobile companies to suspend their services, but did not do so due to a fear that this might add to the panic. Corrective measures were reportedly taken subsequently. I was under the impression that corrective measures had been taken in India too, because one had not heard of such collapse of the mobile services after the explosions of 2008 by the IM in Delhi, Jaipur, Ahmedabad and Bengaluru or during the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Why this happened this time? This needs to be examined. ( 16-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: SORBONNE75 )
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)