B.RAMAN
SYNOPSIS OF A PAPER FOR PRESENTATION AT A SEMINAR ON “STRATEGIC CONTOURS OF INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS” AT THE EASTERN NAVAL COMMAND,VIZAG, ON JULY 14-15,2011
China is not a South Asian power, but it has acquired an important South Asian presence by taking advantage of certain factors which work in its favour and to India’s detriment:
(a). Firstly, no contentious issues bedevil its relations with any of the South Asian nations. It has not allowed the absence of an agreement with Bhutan on the border issue and its concerns over the activities of Tibetan refugees from Nepalese territory to come in the way of its strengthening its bilateral relations with the countries of the South Asian region. As against this, persisting problems in India’s bilateral relations with these countries work to India’s detriment. These countries have a higher comfort level in their relations with China than in their relations with India.
(b).Secondly, there is a huge hunger for the development of infrastructure in the South Asian counties in the form of ports, railways, roads etc. China, which has built up a huge cash reserve from its surplus external trade balances, has been able to meet their requirements of funds for infrastructure projects. Indian ability in this regard is severely limited. China has built up a large reserve of construction engineers of world class with experience in developing the infrastructure under difficult conditions in China. It has been able to utilise them for its construction projects in these countries. India’s over-focus on the IT sector and under-focus on the engineering sector have come in the way of building a similar pool of construction engineers. As a result, China has been better able to meet the infrastructure requirements of the South Asian countries than India.
( c ) Thirdly,China has been aggressive in meeting the requirements of these countries for arms and ammunition. It has also been actively helping Pakistan in developing a civil and military nuclear capability. There have been reports that it might help Bangladesh in developing a civil nuclear capability.
2.It is important for India to challenge China’s monopoly in the infrastructure development sector. Presence in the infrastructure sector has a strategic importance. We must be able to find the funds and the required number of construction engineers for this. India has three advantages over China which it must exploit vigorously to increase its strategic presence in the region and to counter the Chinese presence.
(a).Firstly, India provides a huge market next door for the products of these countries. Their traders value the Indian market more than the Chinese market. We should be generous in our trade concessions in order to keep them attracted to India and prevent them from drifting towards China.
(b).Secondly, India could play an important role in helping these countries develop their educational facilities such as institutions for technology studies.
(c).Thirdly, culturally, the people of these countries still look up to India and not to China. India’s soft power has to be effectively utilised for strengthening our presence and influence in these countries. China is not in a position to compete with us in soft power.
3.Whether India should compete with China in selling arms and ammunition and nuclear technology to these countries has to be carefully considered keeping in view the implications of the likely use of Indian arms and ammunition by these countries against their dissident elements, which often look up to India for moral support. As regards the supply of nuclear technology, India may not be in a position to providee the kind of financial back-up that China provides.
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, July 8, 2011
Thursday, July 7, 2011
JIANG ZEMIN'S HEALTH: CURIOUSER & CURIOUSER
B.RAMAN
At a time when the Communist Party of China (CPC) was directing all discussions in the print,TV and new media towards its achievements during the 90 years of its existence, a section of determined netizens of the country operating clandestinely with the help of microblogs has managed to hijack the discussion and divert it away from a debate on the achievements of the party.
2. Instead, they have succeeded in drawing attention to the nervousness of the CPC over its future and over the effectiveness of its political control. They have done this by the simple act of spreading through microblogs rumours that Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of President Hu Jintao, as the President, the CPC General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, had passed away in a Beijing military hospital after suffering a massive heart attack when he had come to Beijing from Shanghai to attend a gala function held by the CPC on July 1,2011, chaired by Hu, to mark the 90th anniversary of the party.
3.Of the leadership triumvirate of the pre-Hu and post-Deng Xiaoping era, only former Prime Ministers Li Peng and Zhu Rongji attended the function. Jiang was conspicuous by his absence.
4. This set off rumours regarding the reasons for his absence. It has been known in China that Jiang, who is 84, has been in indifferent health for some months and was undergoing treatment in a Shanghai military hospital. Some months ago there were similar rumours of his death, which subsequently proved to be false.
5.At that time, one did not witness on the net the kind of frenzied speculation and rumour-mongering as one witnessed this time since the night of July 5 after a Hong Kong newspaper, one of whose share-holders is reportedly related to Jiang, carried the first report of the possible death of Jiang.
6. The Chinese authorities were taken aback when discussions on the achievements of the CPC disappeared from many microblogs, which started feverishly spreading rumours about the death of Jiang and searching for more information on the subject.
7. The microblogs have become the most important barometer of the state of the Chinese nation. They have also become the most disconcerting whistle-blower in modern China which manage to disseminate politically inconvenient and militarily sensitive news circumventing the firewalls erected by the Ministry of Public Security and other measures taken by it to prevent the spread of potentially destabilising news through the net.
8.One had repeatedly seen the new power of the new media during sessions of the National People’s Congress and the party committees. More significant details of the deliberations came from the microblogs than from the party and government controlled publicity organs.
9. In the past, the Chinese authorities had dealt with this phenomenon in a mature way. They had sought to strengthen their control over the new media through appropriate technologies instead of arresting and harassing the people behind this phenomenon. But their nervousness over their inability to control this phenomenon remains.
10. When the Net rumours about the death of Jiang started spreading like wild fire, their first reaction to the rumour spread was to try to suppress it through technical means. The much simpler way of countering the rumours by telling the truth to the people or through an official denial of the rumours occurred to them only on the morning of July 7 when the Government-controlled Xinhua news agency disseminated a report denying the rumours. This was followed by a report carried by the HK newspaper marking its distance from its initial story.
11. These denials have not ended the prairie fire of rumours across the Net. The previous speculation was whether Jiang was really dead, and, if so, when, where and why he died. The latest speculation after Xinhua came out with the official denial is why the Chinese authorities behaved in such a bizarre manner for nearly 48 hours before putting out an official denial. What explains their nervousness over the initial speculation regarding Jiang’s death?
12. Information about the health of ruling political leaders is always treated as a state secret in China. Mao Dze Dong and Deng died as leaders still wielding influence and authority at the time of their death. One could understand the nervousness that prevailed in the CPC as their death approached due to fears that their death could lead to a political turmoil inside the party as well as the country. This danger almost materialised after Mao’s death, but not after Deng’s.
13. Jiang is not a serving political leader. He is a retired leader, who has been ailing for some time and whose last public appearance was in 2009.There has been unverified speculation about his still retaining some influence in the CPC and hence being in a position to influence the post-Hu leadership even from his death bed.However, it is doubtful what kind of influence an ex-leader spending more time in hospital than outside could wield.
14. Still, sections of the CPC leadership were apparently worried over the possibility of a turmoil in the public or the party or both after his death and wanted to make sure that this would not happen before letting him die. There is a paucity of correct information regarding what has been happening in China.
15. Sometimes even a State-organised paucity of information could be the basis of a political assessment. One assessment that one could make is that whatever the rest of the world might say, sections of the CPC leadership are not certain in their mind that they are presiding over a politically stable country free of any potential surprises. That is the assessment that comes out loud and clear from the extreme nervousness of the CPC leadership over the Net speculation regarding Jiang’s health. (8-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
At a time when the Communist Party of China (CPC) was directing all discussions in the print,TV and new media towards its achievements during the 90 years of its existence, a section of determined netizens of the country operating clandestinely with the help of microblogs has managed to hijack the discussion and divert it away from a debate on the achievements of the party.
2. Instead, they have succeeded in drawing attention to the nervousness of the CPC over its future and over the effectiveness of its political control. They have done this by the simple act of spreading through microblogs rumours that Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of President Hu Jintao, as the President, the CPC General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, had passed away in a Beijing military hospital after suffering a massive heart attack when he had come to Beijing from Shanghai to attend a gala function held by the CPC on July 1,2011, chaired by Hu, to mark the 90th anniversary of the party.
3.Of the leadership triumvirate of the pre-Hu and post-Deng Xiaoping era, only former Prime Ministers Li Peng and Zhu Rongji attended the function. Jiang was conspicuous by his absence.
4. This set off rumours regarding the reasons for his absence. It has been known in China that Jiang, who is 84, has been in indifferent health for some months and was undergoing treatment in a Shanghai military hospital. Some months ago there were similar rumours of his death, which subsequently proved to be false.
5.At that time, one did not witness on the net the kind of frenzied speculation and rumour-mongering as one witnessed this time since the night of July 5 after a Hong Kong newspaper, one of whose share-holders is reportedly related to Jiang, carried the first report of the possible death of Jiang.
6. The Chinese authorities were taken aback when discussions on the achievements of the CPC disappeared from many microblogs, which started feverishly spreading rumours about the death of Jiang and searching for more information on the subject.
7. The microblogs have become the most important barometer of the state of the Chinese nation. They have also become the most disconcerting whistle-blower in modern China which manage to disseminate politically inconvenient and militarily sensitive news circumventing the firewalls erected by the Ministry of Public Security and other measures taken by it to prevent the spread of potentially destabilising news through the net.
8.One had repeatedly seen the new power of the new media during sessions of the National People’s Congress and the party committees. More significant details of the deliberations came from the microblogs than from the party and government controlled publicity organs.
9. In the past, the Chinese authorities had dealt with this phenomenon in a mature way. They had sought to strengthen their control over the new media through appropriate technologies instead of arresting and harassing the people behind this phenomenon. But their nervousness over their inability to control this phenomenon remains.
10. When the Net rumours about the death of Jiang started spreading like wild fire, their first reaction to the rumour spread was to try to suppress it through technical means. The much simpler way of countering the rumours by telling the truth to the people or through an official denial of the rumours occurred to them only on the morning of July 7 when the Government-controlled Xinhua news agency disseminated a report denying the rumours. This was followed by a report carried by the HK newspaper marking its distance from its initial story.
11. These denials have not ended the prairie fire of rumours across the Net. The previous speculation was whether Jiang was really dead, and, if so, when, where and why he died. The latest speculation after Xinhua came out with the official denial is why the Chinese authorities behaved in such a bizarre manner for nearly 48 hours before putting out an official denial. What explains their nervousness over the initial speculation regarding Jiang’s death?
12. Information about the health of ruling political leaders is always treated as a state secret in China. Mao Dze Dong and Deng died as leaders still wielding influence and authority at the time of their death. One could understand the nervousness that prevailed in the CPC as their death approached due to fears that their death could lead to a political turmoil inside the party as well as the country. This danger almost materialised after Mao’s death, but not after Deng’s.
13. Jiang is not a serving political leader. He is a retired leader, who has been ailing for some time and whose last public appearance was in 2009.There has been unverified speculation about his still retaining some influence in the CPC and hence being in a position to influence the post-Hu leadership even from his death bed.However, it is doubtful what kind of influence an ex-leader spending more time in hospital than outside could wield.
14. Still, sections of the CPC leadership were apparently worried over the possibility of a turmoil in the public or the party or both after his death and wanted to make sure that this would not happen before letting him die. There is a paucity of correct information regarding what has been happening in China.
15. Sometimes even a State-organised paucity of information could be the basis of a political assessment. One assessment that one could make is that whatever the rest of the world might say, sections of the CPC leadership are not certain in their mind that they are presiding over a politically stable country free of any potential surprises. That is the assessment that comes out loud and clear from the extreme nervousness of the CPC leadership over the Net speculation regarding Jiang’s health. (8-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, July 6, 2011
THE CBI & THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT : Q & A
B.RAMAN
I have received a number of questions from readers regarding the recent decision of the Government to totally exempt the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) from the operation of the Right To Information Act. Previously, for four years, the CBI did not enjoy such exemption. This sudden decision of the Government to grant a total exemption to the CBI has been sought to be justified on grounds of national security. There has been criticism of the Government action from advocates of greater transparency in the functioning of our intelligence and investigation agencies. I have tried to answer the questions to the extent possible:
Question: Is the CBI a national security organisation such as the Intelligence Bureau and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) are?
A. It is not, but it does have a national security role to a limited extent. It is essentially an agency for the investigation of criminal cases entrusted to it. These cases fall into two categories---- cases of corruption and other common law crimes of a serious nature and cases of terrorism and related offences such as the counterfeiting of currency notes. After the National Investigation Agency (NIA) came into existence in 2009, the responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases of a specified nature was transferred to it from the CBI. Despite this, the CBI continues to have a responsibility for follow-up action on cases registered before the NIA came into existence. The CBI played an important role in the investigation of the March 1993 blasts in Mumbai and other important terrorist attacks. It continues to have responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of important cases involving mafia groups and their nexus with terrorist groups. When the NIA gets going completely, the CBI’s responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of cases relating to terrorism and mafia activities will be considerably reduced and it will focus almost entirely on the investigation of corruption cases and other common law crimes not necessarily having an impact on national security. However, the CBI cannot be treated on par with the IB and the R&AW because it is not a clandestine organisation operating covertly. Whereas the IB and the R&AW are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny, some aspects of the CBI’s work such as its budget are subject to scrutiny by relevant committees of the Parliament such as the Estimates Committee. Thus, to treat the CBI on par with the IB and the R&AW for giving it the benefit of total exemption was unwarranted.
Q. What must have made the Government bring the CBI under the totally exempted category after having kept it out of this category for four years?
A. It is difficult to answer this question categorically in the absence of details. Advocates of Right to Information should examine whether there is scope for forcing the Government to disclose these details which made it reverse its earlier decision not to exempt the CBI. Vague answers such as “national security grounds” should not be accepted. The apparent suddenness and abruptness with which the Government took this decision would indicate that the CBI was probably in receipt of a request under the Right to Information Act for some information which it was not in a position to legitimately deny. The Government, therefore, decided that instead of denying the specific information requested for which could have put the Government in an embarrassing position, it would totally exempt the CBI. One example of such information that I could think of could be relating to the past investigation in the Bofors case. There could have been other similar cases.
Q. Why is the BJP supporting the Government’s decision to grant total exemption to the CBI?
A. One possibility is that the BJP genuinely feels that since the CBI had in the past investigated terrorism-related cases and now continues to investigate mafia-related cases, it should have the benefit of total exemption.
Q. Is granting total exemption to the CBI the only way of preventing disclosure of information relating to cases with national security implications such as terrorism, mafia activities, counterfeiting etc?
A. No. Without including the CBI in the list of totally exempted organisations, the Government could have suggested to the CBI to take advantage of those provisions in the Act for denying information in cases having a bearing on national security on a case by case basis. The public has a right to a lot of information relating to the CBI such as its administration, methods of recruitment and training, budgetary control etc. At the same time, it should not have the right to seek information relating to investigation of on-going cases---- whether of corruption or of other common law crime or terrorism-related. These two requirements could have been easily met by continuing to keep the CBI in the not-exempted category. ( 6-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
I have received a number of questions from readers regarding the recent decision of the Government to totally exempt the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) from the operation of the Right To Information Act. Previously, for four years, the CBI did not enjoy such exemption. This sudden decision of the Government to grant a total exemption to the CBI has been sought to be justified on grounds of national security. There has been criticism of the Government action from advocates of greater transparency in the functioning of our intelligence and investigation agencies. I have tried to answer the questions to the extent possible:
Question: Is the CBI a national security organisation such as the Intelligence Bureau and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) are?
A. It is not, but it does have a national security role to a limited extent. It is essentially an agency for the investigation of criminal cases entrusted to it. These cases fall into two categories---- cases of corruption and other common law crimes of a serious nature and cases of terrorism and related offences such as the counterfeiting of currency notes. After the National Investigation Agency (NIA) came into existence in 2009, the responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases of a specified nature was transferred to it from the CBI. Despite this, the CBI continues to have a responsibility for follow-up action on cases registered before the NIA came into existence. The CBI played an important role in the investigation of the March 1993 blasts in Mumbai and other important terrorist attacks. It continues to have responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of important cases involving mafia groups and their nexus with terrorist groups. When the NIA gets going completely, the CBI’s responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of cases relating to terrorism and mafia activities will be considerably reduced and it will focus almost entirely on the investigation of corruption cases and other common law crimes not necessarily having an impact on national security. However, the CBI cannot be treated on par with the IB and the R&AW because it is not a clandestine organisation operating covertly. Whereas the IB and the R&AW are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny, some aspects of the CBI’s work such as its budget are subject to scrutiny by relevant committees of the Parliament such as the Estimates Committee. Thus, to treat the CBI on par with the IB and the R&AW for giving it the benefit of total exemption was unwarranted.
Q. What must have made the Government bring the CBI under the totally exempted category after having kept it out of this category for four years?
A. It is difficult to answer this question categorically in the absence of details. Advocates of Right to Information should examine whether there is scope for forcing the Government to disclose these details which made it reverse its earlier decision not to exempt the CBI. Vague answers such as “national security grounds” should not be accepted. The apparent suddenness and abruptness with which the Government took this decision would indicate that the CBI was probably in receipt of a request under the Right to Information Act for some information which it was not in a position to legitimately deny. The Government, therefore, decided that instead of denying the specific information requested for which could have put the Government in an embarrassing position, it would totally exempt the CBI. One example of such information that I could think of could be relating to the past investigation in the Bofors case. There could have been other similar cases.
Q. Why is the BJP supporting the Government’s decision to grant total exemption to the CBI?
A. One possibility is that the BJP genuinely feels that since the CBI had in the past investigated terrorism-related cases and now continues to investigate mafia-related cases, it should have the benefit of total exemption.
Q. Is granting total exemption to the CBI the only way of preventing disclosure of information relating to cases with national security implications such as terrorism, mafia activities, counterfeiting etc?
A. No. Without including the CBI in the list of totally exempted organisations, the Government could have suggested to the CBI to take advantage of those provisions in the Act for denying information in cases having a bearing on national security on a case by case basis. The public has a right to a lot of information relating to the CBI such as its administration, methods of recruitment and training, budgetary control etc. At the same time, it should not have the right to seek information relating to investigation of on-going cases---- whether of corruption or of other common law crime or terrorism-related. These two requirements could have been easily met by continuing to keep the CBI in the not-exempted category. ( 6-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
HIS HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA IS 76
B.RAMAN
His Holiness the Dalai Lama is 76 today. Happy returns of the day Your Holiness.
2. The day passed off without any incident in the so-called Tibet autonomous region of China, in the Sichuan province and other Tibetan-inhabited areas.
3. In the past, the Tibetan followers of the Dalai Lama used to close their shops and other establishments on his birthday as a mark of respect to him. The Chinese did not interfere with this.
4. However, for the last few years, they have made it illegal for anyone to observe the birthday of His Holiness. As a result, people are forced to observe it in the privacy of their homes. Reports received from the Tibetan areas of China indicate that they did so this year too. In addition, Tibetan monks in monasteries held special prayers on the occasion.
5. The Dalai Lama’s 76th birthday was preceded by anti-China protests in the Kardze and Ngaba prefectures in recent weeks. The local official newspaper “Ganzi Daily” reported on July 5 that Liu Daoping, the party chief in Kardze, had called for harsh measures against any “secessionist activities.”
6. On July 5, the Government-controlled Xinhua news agency disseminated extracts of a special commentary carried by the Party-controlled “People’s Daily” on His Holiness. The Xinhua despatch said:
“The People's Daily, flagship newspaper of the Communist Party of China (CPC), ran a commentary on Tuesday, saying the retirement of Dalai Lama will not save the Dalai "clique" from failure.
“The commentary said that no matter what objectives the Dalai Lama pursues, whether "Tibetan Independence" or the "Middle Way Approach," and no matter how he acts on stage or controls his puppets from backstage, he will fail.
"No matter who heads the 'exiled Tibetan government,'" its illegal nature will not be altered," according to the commentary.
“For the future of Dalai Lama himself, there is no other option for him than to abandon all secessionist acts and speeches and meet the central government's demands, added the commentary.
"The past 60 years since the peaceful liberation of Tibet witnessed serfdom being replaced by a socialist system, the rapid development of Tibet, a remarkable improvement of the Tibetan people's lives, and closer inter-connections between Tibet and other parts of China, and people of all ethnic groups have developed a deeper understanding of the reactionary nature of the 'clique'," said the commentary.
“The Dalai Lama announced his plan to step down as the political head of the "exiled Tibetan government" on March 10.
“The year 2011 marks the 60th anniversary of the peaceful liberation of Tibet.”
6-7-11
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
His Holiness the Dalai Lama is 76 today. Happy returns of the day Your Holiness.
2. The day passed off without any incident in the so-called Tibet autonomous region of China, in the Sichuan province and other Tibetan-inhabited areas.
3. In the past, the Tibetan followers of the Dalai Lama used to close their shops and other establishments on his birthday as a mark of respect to him. The Chinese did not interfere with this.
4. However, for the last few years, they have made it illegal for anyone to observe the birthday of His Holiness. As a result, people are forced to observe it in the privacy of their homes. Reports received from the Tibetan areas of China indicate that they did so this year too. In addition, Tibetan monks in monasteries held special prayers on the occasion.
5. The Dalai Lama’s 76th birthday was preceded by anti-China protests in the Kardze and Ngaba prefectures in recent weeks. The local official newspaper “Ganzi Daily” reported on July 5 that Liu Daoping, the party chief in Kardze, had called for harsh measures against any “secessionist activities.”
6. On July 5, the Government-controlled Xinhua news agency disseminated extracts of a special commentary carried by the Party-controlled “People’s Daily” on His Holiness. The Xinhua despatch said:
“The People's Daily, flagship newspaper of the Communist Party of China (CPC), ran a commentary on Tuesday, saying the retirement of Dalai Lama will not save the Dalai "clique" from failure.
“The commentary said that no matter what objectives the Dalai Lama pursues, whether "Tibetan Independence" or the "Middle Way Approach," and no matter how he acts on stage or controls his puppets from backstage, he will fail.
"No matter who heads the 'exiled Tibetan government,'" its illegal nature will not be altered," according to the commentary.
“For the future of Dalai Lama himself, there is no other option for him than to abandon all secessionist acts and speeches and meet the central government's demands, added the commentary.
"The past 60 years since the peaceful liberation of Tibet witnessed serfdom being replaced by a socialist system, the rapid development of Tibet, a remarkable improvement of the Tibetan people's lives, and closer inter-connections between Tibet and other parts of China, and people of all ethnic groups have developed a deeper understanding of the reactionary nature of the 'clique'," said the commentary.
“The Dalai Lama announced his plan to step down as the political head of the "exiled Tibetan government" on March 10.
“The year 2011 marks the 60th anniversary of the peaceful liberation of Tibet.”
6-7-11
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
IMPROVING MEDIA LITERACY IN CHINA: ATTENTION DR.MANMOHAN SINGH
B.RAMAN
At a time when the office of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh is confused and hesitant in its response to the opportunities and challenges relating to the use of the Internet for improving communications with the citizens and for improving governance, it would be useful to study how China is responding to the new media. In this connection, a study published by the “People’s Daily” of the Communist Party of China on July 1,2011, under the title “How microblogging power shakes reality in China” is annexed.
ANNEXURE
( Text of the Article)
As more and more people are turning to microblogging as a means to participate in public affairs and to express their personal opinions, it has become particularly important for government officials to improve their media literacy.
Microblogging was introduced in China in 2009 and has quickly developed into a major channel of public opinions within less than three years. Many hot incidents were first exposed through microblog posts, including the accidentally exposed affair between a bureau director in Liyang, Jiangsu province and a local married woman, the Guo Meimei incident and a badly photo-shopped picture of Huili County government officials. There are more than 640,000 microblog posts concerning the Guo Meimei incident alone.
This has shown the great power of microblogging and made government officials realize that the Internet and reality are becoming increasingly intertwined, and so are public opinion platforms and social administration. Apparently unaware that his microblog posts could be seen by other users, the bureau director paid a heavy price for detailing his affair with a married woman via microblogging. After the badly photo-shopped picture was exposed, the Huili County government issued a quick apology using a newly registered Sina microblog account, successfully preventing the incident from escalating as the "fake South China tiger photos" incident did.
Sina Weibo, a popular Chinese microblogging site operated by Sina Corporation, has attracted more than 1.4 million users alone. Objectively speaking, the fast rise of microblogging has enhanced the ability of local governments and leading cadres to communicate with the public and to respond appropriately to unexpected incidents.
Local governments, which were formerly unfamiliar and resistant, have now begun to actively utilize microblogs. Seeking advice from netizens via microblogs has become a popular practice among many local governments. Certain government officials in Guangdong, Zhejiang and other provinces recently attended special seminars on microblogging, and the Nanjing municipal government issued a directive requiring any emergency event in the city to be posted on microblogs within one hour. It is gratifying to see government officials using microblogs to improve governance.
However, according to the "Research Report on Microblogs for Chinese Political Affairs," only 1,700 government agencies and 720 government officials have verified microblog accounts as of March this year, which reflects that most officials are unfamiliar with microblogging, the new battlefield of public opinion.
Although some officials and cadres still cannot adapt to the new public opinion pattern of the microblogging era, it has already become an inevitable phenomenon that the people will participate in public affairs and express their opinions by microblogging. Topics regarding government policies, public administration, and cadres' words and deeds usually turn into hot topics very quickly.
In fact, most microbloggers' behaviors of "surrounding to watch" and "participating in" are ultimately out of their goodwill of caring about the work of local governments and their sincere desire to help local governments overcome shortcomings. The thing that makes microblogging a perfect platform for responding to concerns is goodwill and sincerity.
If governments can correctly and properly guide public opinions, use microblogging as a good platform to learn about public opinions and the wisdom of the people, and find and solve problems as soon as possible, forming a widely-participated, orderly and interactive microblogging public opinion environment is completely possible. Microblogging will also become a "release valve" of social emotions and the "lubricant" of government-public relations.
From the forum to microblogging, the people's enthusiasm and ability to participate in public affairs has greatly risen along with the Internet, which is developing at an unbelievable speed. After rumors frequently appeared on microblogs, some special anti-rumor plates, such as Rumor Grinder and Rumor-Refuting League, have also appeared. It reflects that microblogging is maturating and people's participation on the Internet has increased. However, some negative problems, such as privacy violations, radical emotions and rumor starting and spreading, still exist to some extent.
Under this condition, social administrators should especially adhere to the principle of "treating, using and managing properly" to improve the attainment of the media, pay attention to the public opinion platform of microblogging, respond to social concerns and guide the people's participation.
The innovation of social administration cannot go without the innovation of "virtual community" administration. If the governments realize it earlier, their work will become easy earlier.
By Shan Xuegang from People's Daily Online and the article is translated by People's Daily Online.
At a time when the office of Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh is confused and hesitant in its response to the opportunities and challenges relating to the use of the Internet for improving communications with the citizens and for improving governance, it would be useful to study how China is responding to the new media. In this connection, a study published by the “People’s Daily” of the Communist Party of China on July 1,2011, under the title “How microblogging power shakes reality in China” is annexed.
ANNEXURE
( Text of the Article)
As more and more people are turning to microblogging as a means to participate in public affairs and to express their personal opinions, it has become particularly important for government officials to improve their media literacy.
Microblogging was introduced in China in 2009 and has quickly developed into a major channel of public opinions within less than three years. Many hot incidents were first exposed through microblog posts, including the accidentally exposed affair between a bureau director in Liyang, Jiangsu province and a local married woman, the Guo Meimei incident and a badly photo-shopped picture of Huili County government officials. There are more than 640,000 microblog posts concerning the Guo Meimei incident alone.
This has shown the great power of microblogging and made government officials realize that the Internet and reality are becoming increasingly intertwined, and so are public opinion platforms and social administration. Apparently unaware that his microblog posts could be seen by other users, the bureau director paid a heavy price for detailing his affair with a married woman via microblogging. After the badly photo-shopped picture was exposed, the Huili County government issued a quick apology using a newly registered Sina microblog account, successfully preventing the incident from escalating as the "fake South China tiger photos" incident did.
Sina Weibo, a popular Chinese microblogging site operated by Sina Corporation, has attracted more than 1.4 million users alone. Objectively speaking, the fast rise of microblogging has enhanced the ability of local governments and leading cadres to communicate with the public and to respond appropriately to unexpected incidents.
Local governments, which were formerly unfamiliar and resistant, have now begun to actively utilize microblogs. Seeking advice from netizens via microblogs has become a popular practice among many local governments. Certain government officials in Guangdong, Zhejiang and other provinces recently attended special seminars on microblogging, and the Nanjing municipal government issued a directive requiring any emergency event in the city to be posted on microblogs within one hour. It is gratifying to see government officials using microblogs to improve governance.
However, according to the "Research Report on Microblogs for Chinese Political Affairs," only 1,700 government agencies and 720 government officials have verified microblog accounts as of March this year, which reflects that most officials are unfamiliar with microblogging, the new battlefield of public opinion.
Although some officials and cadres still cannot adapt to the new public opinion pattern of the microblogging era, it has already become an inevitable phenomenon that the people will participate in public affairs and express their opinions by microblogging. Topics regarding government policies, public administration, and cadres' words and deeds usually turn into hot topics very quickly.
In fact, most microbloggers' behaviors of "surrounding to watch" and "participating in" are ultimately out of their goodwill of caring about the work of local governments and their sincere desire to help local governments overcome shortcomings. The thing that makes microblogging a perfect platform for responding to concerns is goodwill and sincerity.
If governments can correctly and properly guide public opinions, use microblogging as a good platform to learn about public opinions and the wisdom of the people, and find and solve problems as soon as possible, forming a widely-participated, orderly and interactive microblogging public opinion environment is completely possible. Microblogging will also become a "release valve" of social emotions and the "lubricant" of government-public relations.
From the forum to microblogging, the people's enthusiasm and ability to participate in public affairs has greatly risen along with the Internet, which is developing at an unbelievable speed. After rumors frequently appeared on microblogs, some special anti-rumor plates, such as Rumor Grinder and Rumor-Refuting League, have also appeared. It reflects that microblogging is maturating and people's participation on the Internet has increased. However, some negative problems, such as privacy violations, radical emotions and rumor starting and spreading, still exist to some extent.
Under this condition, social administrators should especially adhere to the principle of "treating, using and managing properly" to improve the attainment of the media, pay attention to the public opinion platform of microblogging, respond to social concerns and guide the people's participation.
The innovation of social administration cannot go without the innovation of "virtual community" administration. If the governments realize it earlier, their work will become easy earlier.
By Shan Xuegang from People's Daily Online and the article is translated by People's Daily Online.
Tuesday, July 5, 2011
LACK OF COMMAND & CONTROL
B.RAMAN
Institutions and states tend to decay when there is a weakening of the command and control at the top.
2.Many institutions and States do pass through such spells due to the failure of the human element, but they manage to correct themselves in time and prevent the decay from setting in.
3.That is where the quality of the command and control comes in. The command and control can’t be brilliant all the time. There will be lapses from time to time, but a good leadership exercising the command and control notices and corrects them in time.
4.The citizens of our country---whatever be their political persuasion and whatever be their ideological leanings--- have reasons to be concerned over the continuing signs of a lack of command and control in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Cabinet Secretariat that have been coming in for nearly two years now.
5.Among such signs, one could draw attention to the following:
(a). The failure to act in time in dealing with the cascading indicators of corruption in different Ministries of the Government and in the committee set up to organise the Commonwealth Games. The indictors were deafening and yet were ignored till the judiciary stepped in.
(b).The failure to understand and appreciate the growing public concern over what was perceived as the studied inaction of the Government on these corruption indicators and to address those concerns to the satisfaction of the people.
( c).The failure to take seriously the allegations of large amounts held by Indian nationals in foreign bank deposits and act to establish the truth and bring back the money, if the allegations were correct. In the face of the perceived unsatisfactory action of the Government, the judiciary has been forced to step in by bringing the investigation under its control.
(d). The mishandling of public demands for setting up an independent and effective machinery for dealing with future complaints of corruption, which has resulted in the mushrooming of public agitations on this issue and in the emergence of a new breed of non-State actors, who have managed to project themselves as the genuine upholders of public morality and as the genuine voices of the people despite their never having participated in the political processes of the country such as the elections. The mishandling has created a new centre of unelected authority called the civil society in addition to the Executive, the legislature and the judiciary.
( e ). The mishandling of appointments to certain posts such as that of the Central Vigilance Commissioner, which carry a certain moral authority and hence require incumbents with unimpeachable moral credentials.
( f ). A reluctance to communicate with the people on the issues of concern to them directly or through the media.
( g ). A failure to understand the immense potential and soft power of the media of today and benefit from its capabilities, strength and reach to establish an equation with the people.
( h). A penchant for letting sleeping dogs lie instead of boldly confronting issues.
6.One can go on and on and on. A disturbing instance of the shockingly casual manner in which the PMO and the Cabinet Secretariat have been functioning was seen in the messy sequel to the Prime Minister’s recent long-delayed interaction with a small and pampered group of senior editors. The exercise was meant to provide the Prime Minister with an opportunity to convey a clear message to the people that he was in effective command and control.
7.Instead, the result achieved was quite the opposite. The PM was apparently not briefed by his officials in the PMO and the Cabinet Secretariat that the transcript of the discussions would be released to the public and hence he should be careful while talking about State-to-State relations with other countries. As a result, some of his remarks have caused serious embarrassment.
8.The PM apparently did not also get himself properly briefed about the corruption cases in various stages of investigation and prosecution. This has resulted in the PM making statements in matters relating to the Commonwealth Games that are not factually correct.
9.The PMO and the Cabinet Secretariat are the nerve-centres of the Government of India. The PMO acts as the personal nerve-centre of the PM. The Cabinet Secretariat acts as the nerve-centre of the Council of Ministers. If the PMO functions unsatisfactorily it reflects poorly on the leadership of the Prime Minister as the head of the Executive. If the Cabinet Secretariat , which also comes under the PM, functions inadequately it reflects poorly on the functioning of the Council of Ministers and the Government as a whole.
10.How effective is the command and control in the Government of India can be seen from the effective manner in which the PMO and the Cabinet Secretariat function. How effective are the PMO and the Cabinet Secretariat is dependent on how effective is the assertion of the executive authority by the PM.
11.Just by the Prime Minister asserting before a small group of pampered Editors that “I am in charge” doesn’t necessarily prove that he is in charge. If he is effectively in charge, he does not have to proclaim it from the roof-top. The people will notice it from the way the Government functions.
12.Past Prime Ministers never had to proclaim from the roof-top that they were in charge. The people knew that they were in charge. It is unfortunate that Dr.Manmohan Singh finds himself constrained to say and prove in vain that he is in charge because large sections of the people and opinion-makers of this country do not believe he is in charge.
13.It is time for the Prime Minister to do an introspection and give a real shake-up to the way the Government has been functioning.
14.I hold Dr.Manmohan Singh in great esteem. The country ought to be proud of his contribution as an academic, as the No.2 in the South-South Commission, as a bureaucrat and as the Finance Minister. But his contribution as the Prime Minister of this country---particularly post-2009--- has left much to be desired.
15.I had written about this earlier. I hate myself for writing about this again. But still I do because I feel I will be doing a disservice to the country if I do not do so. I will not be worth my salt as an ex- senior bureaucrat if I did not do so. ( 6-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Institutions and states tend to decay when there is a weakening of the command and control at the top.
2.Many institutions and States do pass through such spells due to the failure of the human element, but they manage to correct themselves in time and prevent the decay from setting in.
3.That is where the quality of the command and control comes in. The command and control can’t be brilliant all the time. There will be lapses from time to time, but a good leadership exercising the command and control notices and corrects them in time.
4.The citizens of our country---whatever be their political persuasion and whatever be their ideological leanings--- have reasons to be concerned over the continuing signs of a lack of command and control in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Cabinet Secretariat that have been coming in for nearly two years now.
5.Among such signs, one could draw attention to the following:
(a). The failure to act in time in dealing with the cascading indicators of corruption in different Ministries of the Government and in the committee set up to organise the Commonwealth Games. The indictors were deafening and yet were ignored till the judiciary stepped in.
(b).The failure to understand and appreciate the growing public concern over what was perceived as the studied inaction of the Government on these corruption indicators and to address those concerns to the satisfaction of the people.
( c).The failure to take seriously the allegations of large amounts held by Indian nationals in foreign bank deposits and act to establish the truth and bring back the money, if the allegations were correct. In the face of the perceived unsatisfactory action of the Government, the judiciary has been forced to step in by bringing the investigation under its control.
(d). The mishandling of public demands for setting up an independent and effective machinery for dealing with future complaints of corruption, which has resulted in the mushrooming of public agitations on this issue and in the emergence of a new breed of non-State actors, who have managed to project themselves as the genuine upholders of public morality and as the genuine voices of the people despite their never having participated in the political processes of the country such as the elections. The mishandling has created a new centre of unelected authority called the civil society in addition to the Executive, the legislature and the judiciary.
( e ). The mishandling of appointments to certain posts such as that of the Central Vigilance Commissioner, which carry a certain moral authority and hence require incumbents with unimpeachable moral credentials.
( f ). A reluctance to communicate with the people on the issues of concern to them directly or through the media.
( g ). A failure to understand the immense potential and soft power of the media of today and benefit from its capabilities, strength and reach to establish an equation with the people.
( h). A penchant for letting sleeping dogs lie instead of boldly confronting issues.
6.One can go on and on and on. A disturbing instance of the shockingly casual manner in which the PMO and the Cabinet Secretariat have been functioning was seen in the messy sequel to the Prime Minister’s recent long-delayed interaction with a small and pampered group of senior editors. The exercise was meant to provide the Prime Minister with an opportunity to convey a clear message to the people that he was in effective command and control.
7.Instead, the result achieved was quite the opposite. The PM was apparently not briefed by his officials in the PMO and the Cabinet Secretariat that the transcript of the discussions would be released to the public and hence he should be careful while talking about State-to-State relations with other countries. As a result, some of his remarks have caused serious embarrassment.
8.The PM apparently did not also get himself properly briefed about the corruption cases in various stages of investigation and prosecution. This has resulted in the PM making statements in matters relating to the Commonwealth Games that are not factually correct.
9.The PMO and the Cabinet Secretariat are the nerve-centres of the Government of India. The PMO acts as the personal nerve-centre of the PM. The Cabinet Secretariat acts as the nerve-centre of the Council of Ministers. If the PMO functions unsatisfactorily it reflects poorly on the leadership of the Prime Minister as the head of the Executive. If the Cabinet Secretariat , which also comes under the PM, functions inadequately it reflects poorly on the functioning of the Council of Ministers and the Government as a whole.
10.How effective is the command and control in the Government of India can be seen from the effective manner in which the PMO and the Cabinet Secretariat function. How effective are the PMO and the Cabinet Secretariat is dependent on how effective is the assertion of the executive authority by the PM.
11.Just by the Prime Minister asserting before a small group of pampered Editors that “I am in charge” doesn’t necessarily prove that he is in charge. If he is effectively in charge, he does not have to proclaim it from the roof-top. The people will notice it from the way the Government functions.
12.Past Prime Ministers never had to proclaim from the roof-top that they were in charge. The people knew that they were in charge. It is unfortunate that Dr.Manmohan Singh finds himself constrained to say and prove in vain that he is in charge because large sections of the people and opinion-makers of this country do not believe he is in charge.
13.It is time for the Prime Minister to do an introspection and give a real shake-up to the way the Government has been functioning.
14.I hold Dr.Manmohan Singh in great esteem. The country ought to be proud of his contribution as an academic, as the No.2 in the South-South Commission, as a bureaucrat and as the Finance Minister. But his contribution as the Prime Minister of this country---particularly post-2009--- has left much to be desired.
15.I had written about this earlier. I hate myself for writing about this again. But still I do because I feel I will be doing a disservice to the country if I do not do so. I will not be worth my salt as an ex- senior bureaucrat if I did not do so. ( 6-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, July 4, 2011
RURAL THAILAND STRIKES BACK
B.RAMAN
Rural Thailand has struck back in the general elections held on July,3,2011. And with what vehemence!
2.Since 2006, it was deprived of the leadership of its favourite son Thaksin Shinawatra, a Thai of Chinese origin, whose family belonged to Chiangmai in Northern Thailand. A cop turned businessman turned politician, he sought to change the face of Bangkok and Thailand after his election victory in 2001, which brought him to power as the Prime Minister. He was his own man and not the creation of Bangkok.
3. He sought to root out the bad reputation of Bangkok as the sex capital of Asia. On his orders, the unauthorised night clubs which had mushroomed all over Bangkok were demolished by the municipal authorities. They drove the prostitutes and sex girls away from the lanes and bye-lanes of Bangkok.
4. He reduced bureaucracy and red-tapism and made the Government friendly to the man in the street and to the rural poor. No Thai leader had ever paid more attention to the problems of the rural poor than Thaksin. He was easily accessible to them.
5. Despite being the son of the rural soil, he realised that Thai prosperity depended on the prosperity of Bangkok. He gave Bangkok a modern international airport and a rapid transit system of which it can be proud.
6. Having been a telecommunication tycoon who had earned his billions in the telecommunications industry, he improved communications and connectivity.
7. But also, unfortunately, he broke rules with abandon ---not only in national interest , but also in the interest of his own business and that of his family and cronies. Being from the rural areas, he was seen as irreverent to the royal family and the ruling aristocracy.
8. All those in Bangkok--- the privy councillors, senior officers of the Armed Forces and the civilian bureaucracy, the businessmen, the sex traders and others---- who felt spurned, scorned, ignored and deprived of their illegal sources of income by him---- joined hands together under the leadership of the Army and had him overthrown in a military coup in September 2006 when he was away to New York to attend a session of the UN General Assembly.
9. Since then, he has been in political wilderness flying from country to country seeking political asylum--- living mostly in Dubai, but keeping in touch with his family, party colleagues and the leaders and people of rural Thailand and guiding them politically.
10. His rural support base remained intact. It was not affected by the harassment of his family members by those who had overthrown him. Nor was it affected by the corruption cases instituted against him by his successors. They could drive him out of Thailand, but they could not drive him out of the hearts of the rural people for whom he cared. His party survived repeated attempts to ban it by changing its name after each ban.
11.As the general elections approached on July 3, it became apparent that his supporters now operating under the name Pheu Thai meaning For Thai, could not be kept out of power. Their victory ---now under the leadership of Thaksin’s dynamic businesswoman younger sister Yingluck Shinawatra, who is 44 years old--- was widely anticipated by the local political analysts. Even Thaksin’s political opponents ---- the leaders of the Democrats Party headed by the outgoing Prime Minister Mr. Abhisit Vejjajiva--- were reconciled to Thaksin’s supporters staging a come-back in the elections --- but as the leader of a coalition with the largest number of seats in the Parliament without an absolute majority of its own.
12. Their calculations have proved wrong. The Pheu Thai has emerged with an absolute majority of its own---winning 265 of the total of 500 seats. Its spectacular victory has been grudgingly accepted by the Bangkok elite. It had no other option. Even the Army has assured that there will be no more coups and that it will not again intervene in the politics of the country.
13. It will be churlish to deny Yingluck the credit for the spectacular victory. She and her advisers in the Party ----many of them hand-picked and remote-controlled by her brother from Dubai--- fought a vigorous campaign. The organisational skills, which have brought them back to power, were theirs, but the populist ideas --- such as the promise to supply free Tablet PCs to about one million new school children and to raise the minimum wage by 40 per cent to 300 bahts ($9.70) per day -- which motivated their election campaign were Thaksin’s. Yingluck, a post-graduate from the Kentucky State University of the US, and her party could not have won in the manner they did but for the love and affection still enjoyed by her brother among the rural people.
14. She will be the de jure Prime Minister of Thailand. She has already announced that she will head a coalition with the support of four other smaller parties, which had remained loyal to her party.
15. But will she be the de facto Prime Minister? If so, for how long? Will she be driven from the back-seat by her brother? Will he make her withdraw the corruption proceedings against him to enable him to return to power? If he did and if he returned to the country to exercise his political influence de facto once again without any de jure role, will the Bangkok elite, the military leadership, the civilian bureaucracy and the Privy Councillors accept it? Or will they join hands once again and have another coup staged?
16. Yingluck has promised a Government of reconciliation. She has indicated that there will be no political or legal reprisals against the supporters of the outgoing Government for the way they repeatedly and violently suppressed the supporters of Thaksin who took to street agitation to demand his return to power.
17. She probably means to adhere to her promise to let bygones be bygones, but will Thaksin and his advisers allow her to do so? Or will they pressure her to go back on her pre-election promises?
18. Thaksin has always been a man who never says die. By nature, he cannot play second fiddle to anybody---not even to his sister when she is sitting in the chair of the Prime Minister. He will try to assert himself more and more. He will try to teach a lesson or two to the supporters of the outgoing Government. He will try to have the corruption proceedings against him reversed sooner or later. It is doubtful whether his sister will be able to resist the increasing assertion of his influence.
19. If and when that happens, his opponents will be back in the streets of Bangkok agitating. The continued support of the military leadership, the civilian bureaucracy and the privy councillors could become problematic. One could see a new spell of political instability in Thailand, which would come in the way of its playing its due role in the ASEAN and in it economic growth.
20. Foreign policy has never been a major issue in the contentious politics of Thailand. It never was when Thaksin was the Prime Minister. There were suspicions about the Chinese origin of his family and about the perceived closeness of Thaksin to China and Singapore. Such suspicions could be revived, but they are unlikely to play any significant role in influencing the future course of internal political events.
21. Thaksin came to power in 2001 as a politician well-disposed towards India with personal business interests in India, but his attitude started changing when Mr.Shaukat Aziz, Pakistan’s Finance Minister, became the Prime Minister under then President Gen.Pervez Musharraf. The common business background of Thaksin and Shaukat brought the two together. Thaksin became an advocate of a more important role for Pakistan in the ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
22. The outgoing Government had shed Thaksin’s enthusiasm for Pakistan. One has to watch for any signs of revival of the affinity for Pakistan. Along with China and Singapore, Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos will continue to be the main foreign policy preoccupations of the new Government.
23. Thailand’s relations with the US will continue to be close. It had played an important role in helping the US in its rendition operations involving Al Qaeda suspects. It had been sympathetic to continued US naval presence and interests in the ASEAN region. These close relations will continue.( 5-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Rural Thailand has struck back in the general elections held on July,3,2011. And with what vehemence!
2.Since 2006, it was deprived of the leadership of its favourite son Thaksin Shinawatra, a Thai of Chinese origin, whose family belonged to Chiangmai in Northern Thailand. A cop turned businessman turned politician, he sought to change the face of Bangkok and Thailand after his election victory in 2001, which brought him to power as the Prime Minister. He was his own man and not the creation of Bangkok.
3. He sought to root out the bad reputation of Bangkok as the sex capital of Asia. On his orders, the unauthorised night clubs which had mushroomed all over Bangkok were demolished by the municipal authorities. They drove the prostitutes and sex girls away from the lanes and bye-lanes of Bangkok.
4. He reduced bureaucracy and red-tapism and made the Government friendly to the man in the street and to the rural poor. No Thai leader had ever paid more attention to the problems of the rural poor than Thaksin. He was easily accessible to them.
5. Despite being the son of the rural soil, he realised that Thai prosperity depended on the prosperity of Bangkok. He gave Bangkok a modern international airport and a rapid transit system of which it can be proud.
6. Having been a telecommunication tycoon who had earned his billions in the telecommunications industry, he improved communications and connectivity.
7. But also, unfortunately, he broke rules with abandon ---not only in national interest , but also in the interest of his own business and that of his family and cronies. Being from the rural areas, he was seen as irreverent to the royal family and the ruling aristocracy.
8. All those in Bangkok--- the privy councillors, senior officers of the Armed Forces and the civilian bureaucracy, the businessmen, the sex traders and others---- who felt spurned, scorned, ignored and deprived of their illegal sources of income by him---- joined hands together under the leadership of the Army and had him overthrown in a military coup in September 2006 when he was away to New York to attend a session of the UN General Assembly.
9. Since then, he has been in political wilderness flying from country to country seeking political asylum--- living mostly in Dubai, but keeping in touch with his family, party colleagues and the leaders and people of rural Thailand and guiding them politically.
10. His rural support base remained intact. It was not affected by the harassment of his family members by those who had overthrown him. Nor was it affected by the corruption cases instituted against him by his successors. They could drive him out of Thailand, but they could not drive him out of the hearts of the rural people for whom he cared. His party survived repeated attempts to ban it by changing its name after each ban.
11.As the general elections approached on July 3, it became apparent that his supporters now operating under the name Pheu Thai meaning For Thai, could not be kept out of power. Their victory ---now under the leadership of Thaksin’s dynamic businesswoman younger sister Yingluck Shinawatra, who is 44 years old--- was widely anticipated by the local political analysts. Even Thaksin’s political opponents ---- the leaders of the Democrats Party headed by the outgoing Prime Minister Mr. Abhisit Vejjajiva--- were reconciled to Thaksin’s supporters staging a come-back in the elections --- but as the leader of a coalition with the largest number of seats in the Parliament without an absolute majority of its own.
12. Their calculations have proved wrong. The Pheu Thai has emerged with an absolute majority of its own---winning 265 of the total of 500 seats. Its spectacular victory has been grudgingly accepted by the Bangkok elite. It had no other option. Even the Army has assured that there will be no more coups and that it will not again intervene in the politics of the country.
13. It will be churlish to deny Yingluck the credit for the spectacular victory. She and her advisers in the Party ----many of them hand-picked and remote-controlled by her brother from Dubai--- fought a vigorous campaign. The organisational skills, which have brought them back to power, were theirs, but the populist ideas --- such as the promise to supply free Tablet PCs to about one million new school children and to raise the minimum wage by 40 per cent to 300 bahts ($9.70) per day -- which motivated their election campaign were Thaksin’s. Yingluck, a post-graduate from the Kentucky State University of the US, and her party could not have won in the manner they did but for the love and affection still enjoyed by her brother among the rural people.
14. She will be the de jure Prime Minister of Thailand. She has already announced that she will head a coalition with the support of four other smaller parties, which had remained loyal to her party.
15. But will she be the de facto Prime Minister? If so, for how long? Will she be driven from the back-seat by her brother? Will he make her withdraw the corruption proceedings against him to enable him to return to power? If he did and if he returned to the country to exercise his political influence de facto once again without any de jure role, will the Bangkok elite, the military leadership, the civilian bureaucracy and the Privy Councillors accept it? Or will they join hands once again and have another coup staged?
16. Yingluck has promised a Government of reconciliation. She has indicated that there will be no political or legal reprisals against the supporters of the outgoing Government for the way they repeatedly and violently suppressed the supporters of Thaksin who took to street agitation to demand his return to power.
17. She probably means to adhere to her promise to let bygones be bygones, but will Thaksin and his advisers allow her to do so? Or will they pressure her to go back on her pre-election promises?
18. Thaksin has always been a man who never says die. By nature, he cannot play second fiddle to anybody---not even to his sister when she is sitting in the chair of the Prime Minister. He will try to assert himself more and more. He will try to teach a lesson or two to the supporters of the outgoing Government. He will try to have the corruption proceedings against him reversed sooner or later. It is doubtful whether his sister will be able to resist the increasing assertion of his influence.
19. If and when that happens, his opponents will be back in the streets of Bangkok agitating. The continued support of the military leadership, the civilian bureaucracy and the privy councillors could become problematic. One could see a new spell of political instability in Thailand, which would come in the way of its playing its due role in the ASEAN and in it economic growth.
20. Foreign policy has never been a major issue in the contentious politics of Thailand. It never was when Thaksin was the Prime Minister. There were suspicions about the Chinese origin of his family and about the perceived closeness of Thaksin to China and Singapore. Such suspicions could be revived, but they are unlikely to play any significant role in influencing the future course of internal political events.
21. Thaksin came to power in 2001 as a politician well-disposed towards India with personal business interests in India, but his attitude started changing when Mr.Shaukat Aziz, Pakistan’s Finance Minister, became the Prime Minister under then President Gen.Pervez Musharraf. The common business background of Thaksin and Shaukat brought the two together. Thaksin became an advocate of a more important role for Pakistan in the ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
22. The outgoing Government had shed Thaksin’s enthusiasm for Pakistan. One has to watch for any signs of revival of the affinity for Pakistan. Along with China and Singapore, Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos will continue to be the main foreign policy preoccupations of the new Government.
23. Thailand’s relations with the US will continue to be close. It had played an important role in helping the US in its rendition operations involving Al Qaeda suspects. It had been sympathetic to continued US naval presence and interests in the ASEAN region. These close relations will continue.( 5-7-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com. Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
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