B.RAMAN
During the entire three-day visit of President Barack Obama to India from November 6 to 8,2010, the Indian public focus remained disproportionately on what he had to say on Pakistan’s continued use of terrorism against India. The Indian public opinion expected him to condemn Pakistan in public if he was sincere in his professions of friendship for India.
2.It was, therefore, disappointed when he said nothing about Pakistan’s role in the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai in his address to the relatives of the victims of the terrorist attacks at the Taj Mahal Hotel immediately after his arrival on November 6,2010.
3. This disappointment turned to indignation the next morning when he projected Pakistan in what the Indian public opinion regarded as positive terms while answering a question from a student at a Town Hall meeting in Mumbai, who asked him why the US is not declaring Pakistan a terrorist state. In his reply, Obama described Pakistan as an enormous State with enormous potential and as a State which is strategically important not only for the US, but for the world. He expressed his view that a stable Pakistan would be in the interest of India. Indian public opinion was shocked when he described extremism as not uniquely confined to Pakistan, highlighted the casualties being suffered by Pakistan itself at the hands of extremists and explained the difficulties being faced by Pakistan in dealing with the extremists. His reply created an impression that he did not believe that the Pakistani State had any role in the activities of the terrorists.
4.The widespread indignation over his reply apparently caused concern in Government of India circles that the visit may end on a negative note if corrective pronouncements, which would reassure the Indian public, were not made. These circles started leaking to the media that the Joint Statement to be issued at the end of the visit would contain strong references against the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). They also suggested that one should not prematurely judge Obama and that one should wait to hear his address to the Parliament and read the Joint Statement before coming to any conclusions.
5.The Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh was apparently concerned over the negative public reactions to Obama’s observations at the Town Hall meeting. His concern was reflected in his unusually strong observations while replying to a question at a joint press conference with Obama at New Delhi on November 8 on the conclusion of the formal talks. He said: “You cannot simultaneously be talking and at the same time the terror machine is as active as ever before. Once Pakistan moves away from this terror-induced coercion, we will be very happy to engage productively with Pakistan to resolve all outstanding issues.” By emphasizing the role of the “terror-induced coercion” of the terror machine, he made it clear that in India’s view the Pakistani State was responsible for the acts of terrorism in Indian territory. His observations were intended to reassure the Indian public opinion and make it clear to Obama that the Government of India did not agree with the manner in which Obama projected the problem at the Town Hall meeting.
6. One could sense the happiness among the public over the Prime Minister’s firm observations. Even then, Obama refrained from any criticism of Pakistan at the press conference. His observations on terrorism were of a general nature and related to Indo-US co-operation in counter-terrorism. He said at the press conference: “ To ensure the safety of our citizens, we’re deepening our efforts to prevent terrorism. Cooperation between our countries’ intelligence and law enforcement communities has already reached unprecedented levels. And today, we’re taking another step -- a new effort between our Department of Homeland Security and the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs to improve security at our ports, our airports, and our borders.”
7. Apparently, Obama and his aides realized that his ambiguous references to Pakistan’s role in terrorism directed against India had given a bad start to the visit. In his address to the Parliament on the evening of November 8, Obama sought to correct the wrong impression that he was evasive on the role of Pakistan. He said: “America's fight against al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates is why we persevere in Afghanistan, where major development assistance from India has improved the lives of the Afghan people. We're making progress in our mission to break the Taliban's momentum and to train Afghan forces so they can take the lead for their security. And while I have made it clear that American forces will begin the transition to Afghan responsibility next summer, I have also made it clear that America's commitment to the Afghan people will endure. The United States will not abandon the people of Afghanistan—or the region—to the violent extremists who threaten us all. Our strategy to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates has to succeed on both sides of the border. That is why we have worked with the Pakistani government to address the threat of terrorist networks in the border region. The Pakistani government increasingly recognizes that these networks are not just a threat outside of Pakistan—they are a threat to the Pakistani people, who have suffered greatly at the hands of violent extremists. And we will continue to insist to Pakistan's leaders that terrorist safe-havens within their borders are unacceptable, and that the terrorists behind the Mumbai attacks be brought to justice. We must also recognize that all of us have and interest in both an Afghanistan and a Pakistan that is stable, prosperous and democratic—and none more so than India.”
8. These observations were widely greeted in India and succeeded to a considerable extent in diluting the indignation initially caused by his observations in Mumbai and by his seeming reluctance to talk negatively of Pakistan while in Indian territory. The references to the issue in the Joint Statement went even further in erasing the indignation. By the evening of November 8, Obama was the toast of India---partly due to his naming Pakistan unambiguously and partly due to his supporting ---though in guarded language--- India’s case for permanent membership of the UN Security Council.
9. The Joint Statement said as follows on terrorism : “ They (the two leaders) reiterated that success in Afghanistan and regional and global security require elimination of safe havens and infrastructure for terrorism and violent extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Condemning terrorism in all its forms, the two sides agreed that all terrorist networks, including Lashkar e-Tayiba, must be defeated and called for Pakistan to bring to justice the perpetrators of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. Building upon the Counter Terrorism Initiative signed in July 2010, the two leaders announced a new Homeland Security Dialogue between the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Department of Homeland Security and agreed to further deepen operational cooperation, counter-terrorism technology transfers and capacity building. The two leaders also emphasized the importance of close cooperation in combating terrorist financing and in protecting the international financial system.”
10. The word safehaven generally used by the Americans is seen in India as referring to the sanctuaries in Pakistani territory of foreign terrorists belonging to Al Qaeda and its foreign affiliates. The Indians do not look upon it as a reference to the terrorist camps of the Pakistani jihadi organizations which pose a threat to India. Obama’s anti-safehaven policy is viewed in India as directed against Al Qaeda and its affiliates through intensified drone (pilotless plane) strikes and other means and not as directed against the terrorist camps of the anti-India Pakistani jihadi organizations which act as surrogates of the Pakistani intelligence. The specific reference in the Joint Statement to the need to “eliminate safehavens and infrastructure for terrorism” and defeat “all terrorist networks including LET” is meant to reassure Indian public opinion that the anti-safehaven policy of the US has no double standards.
11. Indian public opinion is satisfied for the moment that the US has corrected the ambiguities in its position. How long the satisfaction will endure will depend upon how effectively the US is able to make Pakistan act against the “terrorist infrastructure” in Pakistani territory directed against India. One had seen in the past that US assurances to India on this subject remained unfulfilled due to the clout enjoyed by the Pakistan Army in the Pentagon and by its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the Central Intelligence Agency. Will India’s past experience of broken promises by the US be repeated in future? If that happens, the gains made during Obama’s visit will be neutralized. ( 10-11-10)---To be continued
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, November 9, 2010
Monday, November 8, 2010
COMMENTS ON OBAMA'S VISIT---PART I:INDIA-US ROADMAP FOR STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
B.RAMAN
A comprehensive roadmap for giving shape to the Indo-US strategic partnership has been the most important outcome of the very successful visit of President Barack Obama to India from November 6 to 8,2010. The details of this roadmap are to be found in the joint statement issued by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Obama on the conclusion of his visit. The basic foundation of this strategic partnership will be "the shared values and increasing convergence of interests" between the two countries. This convergence of interests relates to shared security as well as shared prosperity.
2. The joint statement said: "The two leaders reaffirmed that India-US strategic partnership is indispensable not only for their two countries but also for global stability and prosperity in the 21st century. To that end, President Obama welcomed India's emergence as a major regional and global power and affirmed his country's interest in India's rise, its economic prosperity, and its security." The joint statement and the President's well-drafted address to a joint session of the Parliament on November 8 sought to remove Indian misgivings that he had diluted the importance given by his predecessor George Bush to the Indo-US Strategic Partnership.The partnership as projected by the Bush Administration was vague in concepts and weak in details. Manmohan Singh and Obama have sought to strengthen the conceptual framework of the partnership and lay down a comprehensive architecture for the partnership.
3. The framework and architecture envisaged by them will have regional, global and bilateral dimensions. The regional dimensions will be :
* Deepening existing regular strategic consultations on developments in East Asia, and expanding and intensifying their strategic consultations to cover regional and global issues of mutual interest, including Central and West Asia.
* Intensifying consultation, cooperation and coordination to promote a stable, democratic, prosperous, and independent Afghanistan and pursuing joint development projects with the Afghan Government in capacity building, agriculture and women's empowerment. These joint projects will suplplement the individual projects of the two countries.
* In an indirect reference to regional concerns over the Chinese assertiveness in the South and East China Seas and the perceived lack of transparency in Chinese policies, the statement said: "In an increasingly inter-dependent world, the stability of, and access to, the air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains is vital for the security and economic prosperity of nations. Acknowledging their commitment to openness and responsible international conduct, and on the basis of their shared values, India and the United States have launched a dialogue to explore ways to work together, as well as with other countries, to develop a shared vision for these critical domains to promote peace, security and development. The leaders reaffirmed the importance of maritime security, unimpeded commerce, and freedom of navigation, in accordance with relevant universally agreed principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. "
4. Thus, the partnership will seek to promote peace and security across Asia in general and in East and Central Asia in particular, strengthen maritime security and work for a peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. Though China has not been named, Beijing will have reasons to be concerned over the implications of this formulation.
5. The global dimensions seek to provide an enhanced role for India as a global power. Obama emphsasised on more than one occasion that India can no longer be charactertised as an emerging power as the Bush Administration used to do, but is already a global power. India's enhanced role as a global power will be assured through the following actions with the support of the US:
* India's eventual permanent membership of the UN Security Council as part of the reforms in the UN structure. This amounts to the US agreeing in principle to India's permanent membership, but no time-line has been indicated. There is also a lack of clarity on the issue as to whether the US wants India to be a permant member with full veto rights on par with China and the other four permanent members.
* "The United States intends to support India's full membership in the four multilateral export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement) in a phased manner, and to consult with regime members to encourage the evolution of regime membership criteria, consistent with maintaining the core principles of these regimes, as the Government of India takes steps towards the full adoption of the regimes' export control requirements to reflect its prospective membership, with both processes moving forward together. In the view of the United States, India should qualify for membership in the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement according to existing requirements once it imposes export controls over all items on these regimes' control lists."
* "They agreed to work together in the G-20 to make progress on the broad range of issues on its agenda, including by encouraging actions consistent with achieving strong, balanced, and sustainable growth, strengthening financial system regulation, reforming the international financial institutions, enhancing energy security, resisting protectionism in all its forms, reducing barriers to trade and investment, and implementing the development action plans."
* "The leaders launched a US-India Open Government Dialogue that will, through public-private partnerships and use of new technologies and innovations, promote their shared goal of democratizing access to information and energizing civic engagement, support global initiatives in this area and share their expertise with other interested countries. This will build on India's impressive achievements in this area in recent years and the commitments that the President made to advance an open government agenda at the United Nations General Assembly. The President and Prime Minister also pledged to explore cooperation in support of efforts to strengthen elections organization and management in other interested countries, including through sharing their expertise in this area. Taking advantage of the global nature of their relationship, and recognizing India's vast development experience and historical research strengths, the two leaders pledged to work together, in addition to their independent programmes, to adapt shared innovations and technologies and use their expertise in capacity building to extend food security to interested countries, including in Africa, in consultation with host governments."
6. The concretisation of the first two actions relating to the UN Security Council and multilateral export control regimes is likely to take time because of the possibility of Chinese opposition, partly for their own reasons and partly at the instigation of Pakistan.The idea of joint Indo-US projects in Africa will also cause concern in China which has been very active in Africa.
7. The Joint Statement sums up the bilateral dimension as follows: "Recognizing that India and the United States should play a leadership role in promoting global nonproliferation objectives and their desire to expand high technology cooperation and trade, Prime Minister Singh and President Obama committed to work together to strengthen the global export control framework and further transform bilateral export control regulations and policies to realize the full potential of the strategic partnership between the two countries.Accordingly, the two leaders decided to take mutual steps to expand U.S.-India cooperation in civil space, defense, and other high-technology sectors. Commensurate with India's nonproliferation record and commitment to abide by multilateral export control standards, these steps include the United States removing Indian entities from the U.S. Department of Commerce's "Entity List" and realignment of India in U.S. export control regulations." There is also a counter-terrorism dimension to the joint partnership. This will be covered in the next article.
8. My over-all expectation is that while the regional and bilateral dimensions, which depend only on the two countries, can be concretised in the short and medium terms, the global dimensions will face likely hurdles from China before their concretisation. ( 9-11-10) ---To be continued)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
A comprehensive roadmap for giving shape to the Indo-US strategic partnership has been the most important outcome of the very successful visit of President Barack Obama to India from November 6 to 8,2010. The details of this roadmap are to be found in the joint statement issued by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Obama on the conclusion of his visit. The basic foundation of this strategic partnership will be "the shared values and increasing convergence of interests" between the two countries. This convergence of interests relates to shared security as well as shared prosperity.
2. The joint statement said: "The two leaders reaffirmed that India-US strategic partnership is indispensable not only for their two countries but also for global stability and prosperity in the 21st century. To that end, President Obama welcomed India's emergence as a major regional and global power and affirmed his country's interest in India's rise, its economic prosperity, and its security." The joint statement and the President's well-drafted address to a joint session of the Parliament on November 8 sought to remove Indian misgivings that he had diluted the importance given by his predecessor George Bush to the Indo-US Strategic Partnership.The partnership as projected by the Bush Administration was vague in concepts and weak in details. Manmohan Singh and Obama have sought to strengthen the conceptual framework of the partnership and lay down a comprehensive architecture for the partnership.
3. The framework and architecture envisaged by them will have regional, global and bilateral dimensions. The regional dimensions will be :
* Deepening existing regular strategic consultations on developments in East Asia, and expanding and intensifying their strategic consultations to cover regional and global issues of mutual interest, including Central and West Asia.
* Intensifying consultation, cooperation and coordination to promote a stable, democratic, prosperous, and independent Afghanistan and pursuing joint development projects with the Afghan Government in capacity building, agriculture and women's empowerment. These joint projects will suplplement the individual projects of the two countries.
* In an indirect reference to regional concerns over the Chinese assertiveness in the South and East China Seas and the perceived lack of transparency in Chinese policies, the statement said: "In an increasingly inter-dependent world, the stability of, and access to, the air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains is vital for the security and economic prosperity of nations. Acknowledging their commitment to openness and responsible international conduct, and on the basis of their shared values, India and the United States have launched a dialogue to explore ways to work together, as well as with other countries, to develop a shared vision for these critical domains to promote peace, security and development. The leaders reaffirmed the importance of maritime security, unimpeded commerce, and freedom of navigation, in accordance with relevant universally agreed principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. "
4. Thus, the partnership will seek to promote peace and security across Asia in general and in East and Central Asia in particular, strengthen maritime security and work for a peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. Though China has not been named, Beijing will have reasons to be concerned over the implications of this formulation.
5. The global dimensions seek to provide an enhanced role for India as a global power. Obama emphsasised on more than one occasion that India can no longer be charactertised as an emerging power as the Bush Administration used to do, but is already a global power. India's enhanced role as a global power will be assured through the following actions with the support of the US:
* India's eventual permanent membership of the UN Security Council as part of the reforms in the UN structure. This amounts to the US agreeing in principle to India's permanent membership, but no time-line has been indicated. There is also a lack of clarity on the issue as to whether the US wants India to be a permant member with full veto rights on par with China and the other four permanent members.
* "The United States intends to support India's full membership in the four multilateral export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement) in a phased manner, and to consult with regime members to encourage the evolution of regime membership criteria, consistent with maintaining the core principles of these regimes, as the Government of India takes steps towards the full adoption of the regimes' export control requirements to reflect its prospective membership, with both processes moving forward together. In the view of the United States, India should qualify for membership in the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement according to existing requirements once it imposes export controls over all items on these regimes' control lists."
* "They agreed to work together in the G-20 to make progress on the broad range of issues on its agenda, including by encouraging actions consistent with achieving strong, balanced, and sustainable growth, strengthening financial system regulation, reforming the international financial institutions, enhancing energy security, resisting protectionism in all its forms, reducing barriers to trade and investment, and implementing the development action plans."
* "The leaders launched a US-India Open Government Dialogue that will, through public-private partnerships and use of new technologies and innovations, promote their shared goal of democratizing access to information and energizing civic engagement, support global initiatives in this area and share their expertise with other interested countries. This will build on India's impressive achievements in this area in recent years and the commitments that the President made to advance an open government agenda at the United Nations General Assembly. The President and Prime Minister also pledged to explore cooperation in support of efforts to strengthen elections organization and management in other interested countries, including through sharing their expertise in this area. Taking advantage of the global nature of their relationship, and recognizing India's vast development experience and historical research strengths, the two leaders pledged to work together, in addition to their independent programmes, to adapt shared innovations and technologies and use their expertise in capacity building to extend food security to interested countries, including in Africa, in consultation with host governments."
6. The concretisation of the first two actions relating to the UN Security Council and multilateral export control regimes is likely to take time because of the possibility of Chinese opposition, partly for their own reasons and partly at the instigation of Pakistan.The idea of joint Indo-US projects in Africa will also cause concern in China which has been very active in Africa.
7. The Joint Statement sums up the bilateral dimension as follows: "Recognizing that India and the United States should play a leadership role in promoting global nonproliferation objectives and their desire to expand high technology cooperation and trade, Prime Minister Singh and President Obama committed to work together to strengthen the global export control framework and further transform bilateral export control regulations and policies to realize the full potential of the strategic partnership between the two countries.Accordingly, the two leaders decided to take mutual steps to expand U.S.-India cooperation in civil space, defense, and other high-technology sectors. Commensurate with India's nonproliferation record and commitment to abide by multilateral export control standards, these steps include the United States removing Indian entities from the U.S. Department of Commerce's "Entity List" and realignment of India in U.S. export control regulations." There is also a counter-terrorism dimension to the joint partnership. This will be covered in the next article.
8. My over-all expectation is that while the regional and bilateral dimensions, which depend only on the two countries, can be concretised in the short and medium terms, the global dimensions will face likely hurdles from China before their concretisation. ( 9-11-10) ---To be continued)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Sunday, November 7, 2010
WHAT R.N.KAO THOUGHT OF THE US, CHINA & PAKISTAN
B.RAMAN
With President Barack Obama in our midst, I thought it would be interesting to recall what R.N.Kao, the founding father of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), thought of the US, China and Pakistan in his retirement before he died in January 2002. Extracts from some of his letters to me are given below:
THE USA
'Many years ago, after meeting some of the top functionaries in the USA, I formed the opinion that they are not necessarily anti-Indian. Their priorities are different and are determined by their perception of national interests. They follow their chosen line of action with a stubborn determination. If, in the process, we get hurt, it is just too bad.' (7-10-97)
AMERICAN CULTURAL INFLUENCE ON THE INDIAN ELITE
'Pan-American culture is making our so-called elite rootless. Indeed, it is very true that in the southern hemisphere, the young upwardly mobile affluent people find themselves more at ease with West Europeans and Americans than with their own poorer nationals. For a country like India, this could lead to dangerous tensions..' (23-1-98)
INFORMATION REVOLUTION
'The question in my mind is whether, with the fast developing information technology, it would at all be feasible for any government agency to filter the avalanche of information, which is beamed towards us from different angles of the azimuth.' (4-8-97)
' The recent advances in information technology are quite dazzling, but one doubts whether an overwhelming data bank is synonymous with wisdom. Indeed, I have always felt a little uneasy at the thought that the world would become a mirror image of the US. What a dull prospect it would be, and how disastrous for the natural resources of this planet.! It has been truly said that man is the only creature of this earth who destroys the environment in which it survives.' (12-1- 98)
SINO-US RELATIONS
'China and USA have some kind of a love-hate relationship. The Chinese will feel they have arrived only if they can show to the world that they are in the same league as the USA. The latter, on their part, have, to my mind, a long-standing guilt complex so far as China is concerned. Perhaps, it flows from the long history of American Methodist missionary activity in China.' (25-11-97)
CHINA
'As a people,we sometimes get carried away by euphoria or sink into gloom. It is quite clear that, so far as China is concerned, it would be a long haul for us. I remember that, in the mid fifties, while addressing an annual conference of the intelligence chiefs of the States, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had said that while our problems with Pakistan were acute and demanded urgent solution, our problems with China would prove more intractable and continue for a long long time.' (14-12-96)
'The Chinese, too, are busy playing games, as every one else does. In 1984, when I was leaving for Beijing, my then boss (My comment: Mrs Indira Gandhi) asked me what I hoped to achieve. In reply, I had said I expected very little, but that I saw no reason why we should leave the field to Pakistan unchallenged and not make even an effort.' (23-12-96)
'I think that with economic prosperity being more evenly spread out in China, the liberalisation of the political system would be inevitable. Once the people have enough to eat and a roof over their head, all kinds of explosive ideas of individual liberties, human rights and freedom of expression begin to take shape. One only hopes that the Chinese would be able to manage this better than, apparently, the Russians have been able to handle the economic problems following their attempts at political liberalisation.' (30-1-97)
'This morning, over the AIR there was a brief commentary about the increase in China's armed might and its modernisation over the last few years. One cannot but view this with some uneasiness.' (3-3-97)
'In spite of the publicity, a large part of the functioning of the Chinese apparatus remains opaque. Therefore, one has to be very cautious in making any forecasts about that country.' (12-5-98)
PAKISTAN
'Pakistan deserves to be declared a rogue state. How I wish that geography could be changed and we should leave Pakistan alone to stew in her own juice!' (9-8-96)
'My gnawing fear is that, so long as there is an oligarchy in Pakistan of the armed forces and the senior bureaucrats, the government there would continue to maintain a posture of some hostility to us. Perhaps, they need it for their survival.' (23-5-97)
'It may sound somewhat impulsive, but I do often feel that we should leave Pakistan alone to stew in its own juice. The only thing we need to make certain is that if they start any adventurist course of action, we are able to give them a bloody nose.' (7-10-97)
''There is little doubt that China and North Korea have helped Pakistan in developing her missile capability, even if they have not handed over to them finished products. It is of extreme importance that we should know what Pakistan is doing so that we are able to maintain a posture of strength, based on our defensive and offensive capacities.' (25-4-98)
"We should not allow ourselves to be driven into a position where we have to fight simultaneously on two fronts.' (19-5-98)
THE INDIAN SCENE
'Irrespective of whatever else happens, there is no doubt that now the so-called backward and Dalit classes will wield a great deal of influence by virtue of their numbers, and it is significant that they are now acutely conscious of their strength. Therefore, one should expect major changes in politics, economics and social equity. It is a fascinating prospect.' (8-5-96)
'I suspect that though we are catching up on globalisation, the bulk of our industrialists and business tycoons are still out of date in their thinking.' (2-8-97)
'Unfortunately, the political scene in our country is presently so confused that it is difficult to say in which direction we are going. Of course, every one avows that the process of liberalisation of government controls would continue. One, however, wonders whether with megascams discovered every other day, how long we would be able to go on like this.' (12-1-98)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India,New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
With President Barack Obama in our midst, I thought it would be interesting to recall what R.N.Kao, the founding father of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), thought of the US, China and Pakistan in his retirement before he died in January 2002. Extracts from some of his letters to me are given below:
THE USA
'Many years ago, after meeting some of the top functionaries in the USA, I formed the opinion that they are not necessarily anti-Indian. Their priorities are different and are determined by their perception of national interests. They follow their chosen line of action with a stubborn determination. If, in the process, we get hurt, it is just too bad.' (7-10-97)
AMERICAN CULTURAL INFLUENCE ON THE INDIAN ELITE
'Pan-American culture is making our so-called elite rootless. Indeed, it is very true that in the southern hemisphere, the young upwardly mobile affluent people find themselves more at ease with West Europeans and Americans than with their own poorer nationals. For a country like India, this could lead to dangerous tensions..' (23-1-98)
INFORMATION REVOLUTION
'The question in my mind is whether, with the fast developing information technology, it would at all be feasible for any government agency to filter the avalanche of information, which is beamed towards us from different angles of the azimuth.' (4-8-97)
' The recent advances in information technology are quite dazzling, but one doubts whether an overwhelming data bank is synonymous with wisdom. Indeed, I have always felt a little uneasy at the thought that the world would become a mirror image of the US. What a dull prospect it would be, and how disastrous for the natural resources of this planet.! It has been truly said that man is the only creature of this earth who destroys the environment in which it survives.' (12-1- 98)
SINO-US RELATIONS
'China and USA have some kind of a love-hate relationship. The Chinese will feel they have arrived only if they can show to the world that they are in the same league as the USA. The latter, on their part, have, to my mind, a long-standing guilt complex so far as China is concerned. Perhaps, it flows from the long history of American Methodist missionary activity in China.' (25-11-97)
CHINA
'As a people,we sometimes get carried away by euphoria or sink into gloom. It is quite clear that, so far as China is concerned, it would be a long haul for us. I remember that, in the mid fifties, while addressing an annual conference of the intelligence chiefs of the States, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had said that while our problems with Pakistan were acute and demanded urgent solution, our problems with China would prove more intractable and continue for a long long time.' (14-12-96)
'The Chinese, too, are busy playing games, as every one else does. In 1984, when I was leaving for Beijing, my then boss (My comment: Mrs Indira Gandhi) asked me what I hoped to achieve. In reply, I had said I expected very little, but that I saw no reason why we should leave the field to Pakistan unchallenged and not make even an effort.' (23-12-96)
'I think that with economic prosperity being more evenly spread out in China, the liberalisation of the political system would be inevitable. Once the people have enough to eat and a roof over their head, all kinds of explosive ideas of individual liberties, human rights and freedom of expression begin to take shape. One only hopes that the Chinese would be able to manage this better than, apparently, the Russians have been able to handle the economic problems following their attempts at political liberalisation.' (30-1-97)
'This morning, over the AIR there was a brief commentary about the increase in China's armed might and its modernisation over the last few years. One cannot but view this with some uneasiness.' (3-3-97)
'In spite of the publicity, a large part of the functioning of the Chinese apparatus remains opaque. Therefore, one has to be very cautious in making any forecasts about that country.' (12-5-98)
PAKISTAN
'Pakistan deserves to be declared a rogue state. How I wish that geography could be changed and we should leave Pakistan alone to stew in her own juice!' (9-8-96)
'My gnawing fear is that, so long as there is an oligarchy in Pakistan of the armed forces and the senior bureaucrats, the government there would continue to maintain a posture of some hostility to us. Perhaps, they need it for their survival.' (23-5-97)
'It may sound somewhat impulsive, but I do often feel that we should leave Pakistan alone to stew in its own juice. The only thing we need to make certain is that if they start any adventurist course of action, we are able to give them a bloody nose.' (7-10-97)
''There is little doubt that China and North Korea have helped Pakistan in developing her missile capability, even if they have not handed over to them finished products. It is of extreme importance that we should know what Pakistan is doing so that we are able to maintain a posture of strength, based on our defensive and offensive capacities.' (25-4-98)
"We should not allow ourselves to be driven into a position where we have to fight simultaneously on two fronts.' (19-5-98)
THE INDIAN SCENE
'Irrespective of whatever else happens, there is no doubt that now the so-called backward and Dalit classes will wield a great deal of influence by virtue of their numbers, and it is significant that they are now acutely conscious of their strength. Therefore, one should expect major changes in politics, economics and social equity. It is a fascinating prospect.' (8-5-96)
'I suspect that though we are catching up on globalisation, the bulk of our industrialists and business tycoons are still out of date in their thinking.' (2-8-97)
'Unfortunately, the political scene in our country is presently so confused that it is difficult to say in which direction we are going. Of course, every one avows that the process of liberalisation of government controls would continue. One, however, wonders whether with megascams discovered every other day, how long we would be able to go on like this.' (12-1-98)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India,New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, November 6, 2010
MICHELLE OBAMA: AS SEEN BY THE CHINESE
B.RAMAN
If you ask me what stands out on the first day of President Barack Obama's stay in India, which he spent in Mumbai, I would say without hesitation, the spontaneity, grace and natural ( not cultivated) charm of his wife Michelle.
2. Pics of her visiting university students and chatting, smiling, laughing, singing and dancing with the them have captivated Indian audiencces right across the country. Wherever she went----whether with the President or on her own ---- she imparted a charm of her own to the event, thereby making the visit memorable.
3. We should thank Obama for bringing her to India. None of his five predecessors who visited India brought their wives.
4. I was curious. Did he take her to China last year? How did the Chinese react to her? How did she react to the Chinese? Did she feel as comfortable with the Chinese as she has been with Indians?
5. She didn't accompany her husband to China. I did a Google search to find out why she didn't go to China and what the Chinese thought of her. I found in an NBC blog an interesting article written on November 17,2009, by Adrienne Mong, the NBC's news correspondent. I am annexing it below. ( http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2009/11/17/4376056-michelle-obama-frenzy-hasnt-hit-china-yet ) ( 7-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
Michelle Obama frenzy hasn't hit China, yet
By Adrienne Mong, NBC News Correspondent
BEIJING – OK, I confess. If a Web site features a photo gallery of Michelle Obama's latest fashions, I click on it.
Like many other American women, I have a certain fascination with our first lady.
So there was a frisson of anticipation when we learned President Barack Obama would travel to China. Would Michelle come with him? What would she wear? Not red, surely? What about when she met Chinese leaders? Or when she met Chinese people? (Had anyone here noticed the fact that she chose a dress by Jason Wu, an ethnic Chinese designer for the inauguration? Even though he was born in that renegade province, Taiwan?)
As it turns out, Michelle Obama isn't visiting China.
It also turns out the Chinese public doesn't have quite the same fascination with her as many others around the world.
Absence of media coverage
"I don't really pay attention to her," was the common reply when, in an unscientific survey, we asked people on the streets of downtown Beijing what they thought of her.
When we tried searching for "Michelle Obama" on people.com.cn, a popular chat room in China, we turned up no results.
And the absence of coverage of Michelle Obama in the Chinese media is noticeable compared to how much attention she receives from the Western press.
"She has been overshadowed by Obama," said Li Xin, a former international editor of a Chinese financial magazine which has profiled Hillary Clinton but not Michelle Obama. "Chinese media coverage will pay more attention to substance – what will make a difference to policy toward China rather than who [the Obamas are as people]."
Media observers say President Obama's star power overshadows that of his wife. By Adrienne Mong/ NBC News
The Chinese media, according to Li, doesn't have the same propensity to humanize politicians or to try to put a human face on them. "And to some extent, Chinese media are not allowed to probe too much into political leaders' lives," she said.
Moreover, Michelle Obama has no counterpart in the Chinese realm. "The wife is usually backstage and doesn't come out and send a message by [herself]," said Li.
So while the Obamas may be viewed as something of a rock star couple on multiple continents, in China they're "just the couple who occupy the White House," said Hung Huang, a publisher and television talk show host in Beijing.
And it's the ease with which Michelle Obama became first lady that may be why she doesn't get too much media coverage in China. "Her lack of controversy probably is the primary reason there is a lack of interest," said Hung. "Everyone just says she's a nice person, she's beautiful, she's powerful, she's married to one of the most popular presidents in U.S. history…OK, that's it!"
Michelle Obama: 'Too strong'
But there's also another reason some people were willing to comment only anonymously. "I think Chinese people find her a little scary," said one 30-year-old female Beijing resident. "She's not that attractive to us."
Li put it more diplomatically. "Michelle Obama is seen as feminine in the U.S., but in China the perception of beauty is very different," she explained. "The Chinese standard would maybe prefer someone softer, more petite. She's so strong and independent and tough. [I've heard] from some co-workers and friends, they don't see her as pretty and don't understand why she was on the cover of Vogue U.S."
"In Chinese culture, the Chinese don't actually appreciate a woman like her," said Qu Wei. The 43-year-old freelance consultant is a self-professed fan of the first lady. She said Michelle Obama represents a new refreshing female ideal who telegraphs the message: "When you're getting older, when you're ageing, you can still be attractive."
The Chinese aesthetic, says some Chinese media pundits, is "skinny" – as seen on the covers of these magazines.
Qu reflects a narrow demographic which does find resonance with Michelle Obama: urbane, middle class Chinese women who are professionals tend to think highly of her skills and values as a mother, a strong partner, and an independent woman.
"This is really the opposite of Chinese culture where men only appreciate young girls and don't really know how to appreciate women," said Qu.
And while Vogue China may not have put Obama on their cover yet, editor-in-chief Angelica Cheung said, "She represents the new woman and the new Vogue woman, which is what I'm trying to promote here, too. A new woman looks good and has great taste, but also has a great career …and has a very rich life."
All of which makes it all the more of a let-down for her fans in China that Michelle Obama didn't accompany her husband on his state visit.
"Yeah, I'm very, very disappointed that she's not coming to China," said Qu. "I would like the Chinese to start knowing something about women like Michelle Obama, not only in that narrowly-defined [traditional] way."
If you ask me what stands out on the first day of President Barack Obama's stay in India, which he spent in Mumbai, I would say without hesitation, the spontaneity, grace and natural ( not cultivated) charm of his wife Michelle.
2. Pics of her visiting university students and chatting, smiling, laughing, singing and dancing with the them have captivated Indian audiencces right across the country. Wherever she went----whether with the President or on her own ---- she imparted a charm of her own to the event, thereby making the visit memorable.
3. We should thank Obama for bringing her to India. None of his five predecessors who visited India brought their wives.
4. I was curious. Did he take her to China last year? How did the Chinese react to her? How did she react to the Chinese? Did she feel as comfortable with the Chinese as she has been with Indians?
5. She didn't accompany her husband to China. I did a Google search to find out why she didn't go to China and what the Chinese thought of her. I found in an NBC blog an interesting article written on November 17,2009, by Adrienne Mong, the NBC's news correspondent. I am annexing it below. ( http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2009/11/17/4376056-michelle-obama-frenzy-hasnt-hit-china-yet ) ( 7-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
Michelle Obama frenzy hasn't hit China, yet
By Adrienne Mong, NBC News Correspondent
BEIJING – OK, I confess. If a Web site features a photo gallery of Michelle Obama's latest fashions, I click on it.
Like many other American women, I have a certain fascination with our first lady.
So there was a frisson of anticipation when we learned President Barack Obama would travel to China. Would Michelle come with him? What would she wear? Not red, surely? What about when she met Chinese leaders? Or when she met Chinese people? (Had anyone here noticed the fact that she chose a dress by Jason Wu, an ethnic Chinese designer for the inauguration? Even though he was born in that renegade province, Taiwan?)
As it turns out, Michelle Obama isn't visiting China.
It also turns out the Chinese public doesn't have quite the same fascination with her as many others around the world.
Absence of media coverage
"I don't really pay attention to her," was the common reply when, in an unscientific survey, we asked people on the streets of downtown Beijing what they thought of her.
When we tried searching for "Michelle Obama" on people.com.cn, a popular chat room in China, we turned up no results.
And the absence of coverage of Michelle Obama in the Chinese media is noticeable compared to how much attention she receives from the Western press.
"She has been overshadowed by Obama," said Li Xin, a former international editor of a Chinese financial magazine which has profiled Hillary Clinton but not Michelle Obama. "Chinese media coverage will pay more attention to substance – what will make a difference to policy toward China rather than who [the Obamas are as people]."
Media observers say President Obama's star power overshadows that of his wife. By Adrienne Mong/ NBC News
The Chinese media, according to Li, doesn't have the same propensity to humanize politicians or to try to put a human face on them. "And to some extent, Chinese media are not allowed to probe too much into political leaders' lives," she said.
Moreover, Michelle Obama has no counterpart in the Chinese realm. "The wife is usually backstage and doesn't come out and send a message by [herself]," said Li.
So while the Obamas may be viewed as something of a rock star couple on multiple continents, in China they're "just the couple who occupy the White House," said Hung Huang, a publisher and television talk show host in Beijing.
And it's the ease with which Michelle Obama became first lady that may be why she doesn't get too much media coverage in China. "Her lack of controversy probably is the primary reason there is a lack of interest," said Hung. "Everyone just says she's a nice person, she's beautiful, she's powerful, she's married to one of the most popular presidents in U.S. history…OK, that's it!"
Michelle Obama: 'Too strong'
But there's also another reason some people were willing to comment only anonymously. "I think Chinese people find her a little scary," said one 30-year-old female Beijing resident. "She's not that attractive to us."
Li put it more diplomatically. "Michelle Obama is seen as feminine in the U.S., but in China the perception of beauty is very different," she explained. "The Chinese standard would maybe prefer someone softer, more petite. She's so strong and independent and tough. [I've heard] from some co-workers and friends, they don't see her as pretty and don't understand why she was on the cover of Vogue U.S."
"In Chinese culture, the Chinese don't actually appreciate a woman like her," said Qu Wei. The 43-year-old freelance consultant is a self-professed fan of the first lady. She said Michelle Obama represents a new refreshing female ideal who telegraphs the message: "When you're getting older, when you're ageing, you can still be attractive."
The Chinese aesthetic, says some Chinese media pundits, is "skinny" – as seen on the covers of these magazines.
Qu reflects a narrow demographic which does find resonance with Michelle Obama: urbane, middle class Chinese women who are professionals tend to think highly of her skills and values as a mother, a strong partner, and an independent woman.
"This is really the opposite of Chinese culture where men only appreciate young girls and don't really know how to appreciate women," said Qu.
And while Vogue China may not have put Obama on their cover yet, editor-in-chief Angelica Cheung said, "She represents the new woman and the new Vogue woman, which is what I'm trying to promote here, too. A new woman looks good and has great taste, but also has a great career …and has a very rich life."
All of which makes it all the more of a let-down for her fans in China that Michelle Obama didn't accompany her husband on his state visit.
"Yeah, I'm very, very disappointed that she's not coming to China," said Qu. "I would like the Chinese to start knowing something about women like Michelle Obama, not only in that narrowly-defined [traditional] way."
Friday, November 5, 2010
INDIA’S SOFT RESPONSE TO CHINESE ASSERTIVENESS
B.RAMAN
The Government of India has sought to play down the worrisome implications of China’s new policy on Kashmir favouring Pakistan, its growing strategic presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-Occupies Kashmir (POK), its disinclination to give up its claims to the Indian territory of Arunachal Pradesh and its strengthening of its military-related capabilities in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).
2. The strengthening of its military-related capabilities in the TAR has been in the form of a further upgradation of its highway network, the construction of more airports ostensibly to meet civilian needs, the extension of the railway line from Lhasa towards the border with Nepal and Arunachal Pradesh with plans for the ultimate construction of a railway link-up with Nepal and military exercises involving various units of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including the Air Force and strategic artillery units. Among the objectives of these exercises are to fine-tune their capability to fight jointly against an adversary at high altitudes, strategic operations of the Air Force involving long-distance flights with mid-air refueling and the reliability of its strategic missiles at high altitudes.
3. The PLA has been handling the implementation of the projects and exercises for strengthening the military-related capabilities in the TAR and the strategic presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area by taking advantage of Pakistani needs in the wake of landslides and severe floods in the region twice this year. These projects and exercises will enable the PLA to pose a threat to the Indian Armed Forces from two directions----from the North and the West.
4. Even while thus enhancing the PLA’s military capabilities, the Chinese political leadership has sought to maintain a reassuring profile during its interactions with its Indian counterpart. This reassuring profile was evident in the recent cordial meeting on October 30,2010,between Dr.Manmohan Singh and Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in the margins of the ASEAN-sponsored East Asia summit at Hanoi, the announcement made after the meeting of the plans of Wen to visit New Delhi in December as part of the year-long celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the visit this week to New Delhi by Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Secretary of the CPC Central Commission for Political and Legal Affairs, to attend a seminar on Sino-Indian relations, co-organized by the CPC and the ruling Indian National Congress as part of the 60th anniversary celebrations.
5. Commenting on the visit of Zhou, the “Global Times”, the daily of the CPC, wrote on November 1,2010, as follows: “China-India relations have maintained good momentum recently, despite some heated discussions on their relations as rivals. "The argument of the two countries' rivalry is inappropriate," said Miao Hongni, a professor from the International Relations Institute at Communication University of China. "Beijing and New Delhi are in the process of learning from each other. India excels at IT and outsourcing areas, while China is better at the manufacturing industry.As two responsible countries, they will cooperate to improve the development of Asia,"
6.It quoted Dr.Manmohan Singh as saying that India and China would look for "practical and pragmatic" measures to solve border issues, calling on the two sides to ensure "peace and tranquillity" in the region.
7. The impression sought to be created by the political leaderships of the two countries is that the bilateral relations are developing satisfactorily and that there is nothing to worry about. The reality is otherwise. India has many reasons to worry about the Chinese policies and capabilities, but by playing them down and avoiding highlighting them the Government of Dr. Manmohan Singh is repeating the mistake of Jawaharlal Nehru in the 1950s when he tried to play down Chinese intrusions into Indian territory in the Ladakh sector and their construction of the Aksai Chin Road. By the time he realized the seriousness of the Chinese activities and sought to draw international attention to the malign intention and activities of the Chinese, it was too late. When the Sino-Indian military conflict of 1962 broke out, we were caught unprepared and without the support----not even the moral support---- of the international community.
8.The Chinese leaders are quite happy with the reluctance shown by the Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh to inform the Indian public opinion and the international community about the nature of the activities of the PLA under the cover of friendship. It suits their designs that the international community is given the impression that everything is normal in Sino-Indian relations and that the Government of India is not unduly worried over the Chinese activities.
9. The Chinese assertiveness across the Sino-Indian border and their determination to enforce their territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh have been evident for about two years now. Their virtual military alliance with Pakistan has been a new worrisome factor. It was during the same period that similar Chinese assertiveness was directed against some ASEAN countries with which China has disputes over island territories in the South China Sea and against Japan with which China has disputes in the East China Sea. Instead of playing down their concerns over the Chinese assertiveness, those countries made their concerns evident to the international community thereby inviting statements of support for them from the US. The Chinese are particularly angry with the present Government in Japan because it actively highlighted the Chinese activities which threatened peace and security in the East China Sea area and invoked the support of the US under its security commitments to Japan.
10. As against its anger against Japan and irritation against Vietnam, the Chinese leadership is happy with the lack of an energetic response from the Government of India. This has enabled the Chinese to go ahead with their activities detrimental to India without having to face adverse attention from the international community.
11. While the keenness of the Manmohan Singh Government to maintain the seeming cordiality and momentum in the relations with China is understandable, its soft response to Chinese activities which could prove detrimental to Indian interests and security could prove counter-productive and could ultimately lead us to a military confrontation, however much we may want to avoid it. Softness in response has been the defining characteristic of our policies towards Pakistan and China. They are both taking advantage of our reluctance to respond energetically to undermine our security. An energetic response need not necessarily be in the form of a slanging match with Beijing. It ought to be in the form of a crash programme to strengthen our defence capabilities against China and building up a network of strategic relationships with countries such as Japan and Vietnam. The hopes entertained by many of us that Dr.Manmohan Singh would avail of his recent visits to Japan and Vietnam for this purpose in a manner that would convey an unmistakable message to Beijing have been belied. ( 5-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The Government of India has sought to play down the worrisome implications of China’s new policy on Kashmir favouring Pakistan, its growing strategic presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-Occupies Kashmir (POK), its disinclination to give up its claims to the Indian territory of Arunachal Pradesh and its strengthening of its military-related capabilities in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).
2. The strengthening of its military-related capabilities in the TAR has been in the form of a further upgradation of its highway network, the construction of more airports ostensibly to meet civilian needs, the extension of the railway line from Lhasa towards the border with Nepal and Arunachal Pradesh with plans for the ultimate construction of a railway link-up with Nepal and military exercises involving various units of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including the Air Force and strategic artillery units. Among the objectives of these exercises are to fine-tune their capability to fight jointly against an adversary at high altitudes, strategic operations of the Air Force involving long-distance flights with mid-air refueling and the reliability of its strategic missiles at high altitudes.
3. The PLA has been handling the implementation of the projects and exercises for strengthening the military-related capabilities in the TAR and the strategic presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area by taking advantage of Pakistani needs in the wake of landslides and severe floods in the region twice this year. These projects and exercises will enable the PLA to pose a threat to the Indian Armed Forces from two directions----from the North and the West.
4. Even while thus enhancing the PLA’s military capabilities, the Chinese political leadership has sought to maintain a reassuring profile during its interactions with its Indian counterpart. This reassuring profile was evident in the recent cordial meeting on October 30,2010,between Dr.Manmohan Singh and Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in the margins of the ASEAN-sponsored East Asia summit at Hanoi, the announcement made after the meeting of the plans of Wen to visit New Delhi in December as part of the year-long celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the visit this week to New Delhi by Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Secretary of the CPC Central Commission for Political and Legal Affairs, to attend a seminar on Sino-Indian relations, co-organized by the CPC and the ruling Indian National Congress as part of the 60th anniversary celebrations.
5. Commenting on the visit of Zhou, the “Global Times”, the daily of the CPC, wrote on November 1,2010, as follows: “China-India relations have maintained good momentum recently, despite some heated discussions on their relations as rivals. "The argument of the two countries' rivalry is inappropriate," said Miao Hongni, a professor from the International Relations Institute at Communication University of China. "Beijing and New Delhi are in the process of learning from each other. India excels at IT and outsourcing areas, while China is better at the manufacturing industry.As two responsible countries, they will cooperate to improve the development of Asia,"
6.It quoted Dr.Manmohan Singh as saying that India and China would look for "practical and pragmatic" measures to solve border issues, calling on the two sides to ensure "peace and tranquillity" in the region.
7. The impression sought to be created by the political leaderships of the two countries is that the bilateral relations are developing satisfactorily and that there is nothing to worry about. The reality is otherwise. India has many reasons to worry about the Chinese policies and capabilities, but by playing them down and avoiding highlighting them the Government of Dr. Manmohan Singh is repeating the mistake of Jawaharlal Nehru in the 1950s when he tried to play down Chinese intrusions into Indian territory in the Ladakh sector and their construction of the Aksai Chin Road. By the time he realized the seriousness of the Chinese activities and sought to draw international attention to the malign intention and activities of the Chinese, it was too late. When the Sino-Indian military conflict of 1962 broke out, we were caught unprepared and without the support----not even the moral support---- of the international community.
8.The Chinese leaders are quite happy with the reluctance shown by the Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh to inform the Indian public opinion and the international community about the nature of the activities of the PLA under the cover of friendship. It suits their designs that the international community is given the impression that everything is normal in Sino-Indian relations and that the Government of India is not unduly worried over the Chinese activities.
9. The Chinese assertiveness across the Sino-Indian border and their determination to enforce their territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh have been evident for about two years now. Their virtual military alliance with Pakistan has been a new worrisome factor. It was during the same period that similar Chinese assertiveness was directed against some ASEAN countries with which China has disputes over island territories in the South China Sea and against Japan with which China has disputes in the East China Sea. Instead of playing down their concerns over the Chinese assertiveness, those countries made their concerns evident to the international community thereby inviting statements of support for them from the US. The Chinese are particularly angry with the present Government in Japan because it actively highlighted the Chinese activities which threatened peace and security in the East China Sea area and invoked the support of the US under its security commitments to Japan.
10. As against its anger against Japan and irritation against Vietnam, the Chinese leadership is happy with the lack of an energetic response from the Government of India. This has enabled the Chinese to go ahead with their activities detrimental to India without having to face adverse attention from the international community.
11. While the keenness of the Manmohan Singh Government to maintain the seeming cordiality and momentum in the relations with China is understandable, its soft response to Chinese activities which could prove detrimental to Indian interests and security could prove counter-productive and could ultimately lead us to a military confrontation, however much we may want to avoid it. Softness in response has been the defining characteristic of our policies towards Pakistan and China. They are both taking advantage of our reluctance to respond energetically to undermine our security. An energetic response need not necessarily be in the form of a slanging match with Beijing. It ought to be in the form of a crash programme to strengthen our defence capabilities against China and building up a network of strategic relationships with countries such as Japan and Vietnam. The hopes entertained by many of us that Dr.Manmohan Singh would avail of his recent visits to Japan and Vietnam for this purpose in a manner that would convey an unmistakable message to Beijing have been belied. ( 5-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
OBAMA MINUS THE HALO
B.RAMAN
President Bill Clinton and President George Bush had suffered electoral set-backs in the mid-term elections to the US Congress before they visited India. But, they came a few months after their electoral set-back. By the time they came, public opinion in India had forgotten their set-back, which did not have any impact on their visits.
2. President Barack Obama will be reaching India two days after the elections in which his party has lost control of the House of Representatives and managed to retain control of the Senate by only a narrow margin. This has become an important subject of discussion everywhere. As much time is spent in discussing his electoral set-back as in discussing his policies towards India. Would the set-back weaken him politically? Would it come in the way of substantial changes in Indo-US relations, which would be to the benefit of the two countries?
3. It must be remembered that the elections were fought largely on domestic issues. Foreign policy hardly figured during the election campaign. The election results represented a rejection of his domestic agenda.His powers to make and implement foreign policy will remain undiminished.That is the conventional wisdom. But one has to remember that the Congress controls the federal funds. A hostile Congress can make his foreign policy initiatives non-starters by denying funds for implementing them.
4. This is not a rosy picture for Obama, but the return of the Republicans to the Congress could still have some bright spots for India. India can hopefully expect the Republican members of the Congress to insist on a strict implementation by Pakistan of the conditionalities imposed under the Kerry-Lugar Act of 2009 laying down the conditions under which the economic aid of US $ 7.5 billion over a five-year period voted last year will be disbursed. It can also hopefully expect that the Republican-controlled House of Representatives will subject to intense scrutiny the President's proposal for a new allocation of US $ 2.29 billion towards military assistance for Pakistan. India should lose no time in briefing the elected Republican members about its serious objections to these allocations.
5. Obama's Af-Pak strategy relating to Afghanistan cannot hope to get easy approval from the House. Questions will be asked about his exit strategy and about the talk of a dialogue with the so-called good Taliban in the hope of bringing them into the political mainstream. The House of Representatives is likely at act as a speed-breaker on his so-called Afghan exit strategy. This ought to suit India.
6. Even in the case of China, Obama has been avoiding declaring it a currency manipulator and diluting the focus on human rights issues. The newly-elected House is likely to step up pressure for the declaratiion of China as a currency manipulator and highlight the violation of human rights in China. Concerns arising from China's newly-acquired cyber warfare capability are likely to be taken up with a greater vigour by the new House. These are issues which enjoy considerable public support in the US. Obama will no longer be able to push them under the carpet.
7. There are interesting opportunities for India as a result of the thinking of the Republicans on these issues.It should not fail to take advantage of these opportunities to have the foreign policy distortions of the Obama administration corrected in a manner that could be beneficial to India. (5-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
President Bill Clinton and President George Bush had suffered electoral set-backs in the mid-term elections to the US Congress before they visited India. But, they came a few months after their electoral set-back. By the time they came, public opinion in India had forgotten their set-back, which did not have any impact on their visits.
2. President Barack Obama will be reaching India two days after the elections in which his party has lost control of the House of Representatives and managed to retain control of the Senate by only a narrow margin. This has become an important subject of discussion everywhere. As much time is spent in discussing his electoral set-back as in discussing his policies towards India. Would the set-back weaken him politically? Would it come in the way of substantial changes in Indo-US relations, which would be to the benefit of the two countries?
3. It must be remembered that the elections were fought largely on domestic issues. Foreign policy hardly figured during the election campaign. The election results represented a rejection of his domestic agenda.His powers to make and implement foreign policy will remain undiminished.That is the conventional wisdom. But one has to remember that the Congress controls the federal funds. A hostile Congress can make his foreign policy initiatives non-starters by denying funds for implementing them.
4. This is not a rosy picture for Obama, but the return of the Republicans to the Congress could still have some bright spots for India. India can hopefully expect the Republican members of the Congress to insist on a strict implementation by Pakistan of the conditionalities imposed under the Kerry-Lugar Act of 2009 laying down the conditions under which the economic aid of US $ 7.5 billion over a five-year period voted last year will be disbursed. It can also hopefully expect that the Republican-controlled House of Representatives will subject to intense scrutiny the President's proposal for a new allocation of US $ 2.29 billion towards military assistance for Pakistan. India should lose no time in briefing the elected Republican members about its serious objections to these allocations.
5. Obama's Af-Pak strategy relating to Afghanistan cannot hope to get easy approval from the House. Questions will be asked about his exit strategy and about the talk of a dialogue with the so-called good Taliban in the hope of bringing them into the political mainstream. The House of Representatives is likely at act as a speed-breaker on his so-called Afghan exit strategy. This ought to suit India.
6. Even in the case of China, Obama has been avoiding declaring it a currency manipulator and diluting the focus on human rights issues. The newly-elected House is likely to step up pressure for the declaratiion of China as a currency manipulator and highlight the violation of human rights in China. Concerns arising from China's newly-acquired cyber warfare capability are likely to be taken up with a greater vigour by the new House. These are issues which enjoy considerable public support in the US. Obama will no longer be able to push them under the carpet.
7. There are interesting opportunities for India as a result of the thinking of the Republicans on these issues.It should not fail to take advantage of these opportunities to have the foreign policy distortions of the Obama administration corrected in a manner that could be beneficial to India. (5-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, November 3, 2010
Intelligence: Need for Enhanced Focus on China
B.RAMAN
( Article written for the November,2010, issue of “AGNI”, the journal of the Forum For Strategic and Security Studies of New Delhi )
Since 1947, India has had four reviews of its intelligence capabilities.
2.The first was after the Sino-Indian military conflict of 1962 in which the Indian Army did badly. The review led to two conclusions. Firstly, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which was then responsible for the collection of internal and external intelligence, had serious deficiencies in its capabilities for the collection, analysis and assessment of intelligence regarding China in general and Chinese-occupied Tibet in particular. Secondly, its capabilities in this regard had to be strengthened quickly and this would not be possible without the assistance of the intelligence agencies of the US and the UK.
3. Among the follow-up measures taken were building a cadre of Chinese linguists on a crash basis in order to be able to collect, collate, analyse and assess open source intelligence, expanding the IB’s network of Forward Intelligence Posts (FIPs) on the Tibetan order and Foreign Intelligence Posts in South-East and East Asia for collecting human intelligence and strengthening the IB’s capability for the collection of technical intelligence through ground stations for the interception of messages and air platforms for the collection of signals of various kinds and aerial photography.
4. The reservoir of linguists was built up without the need for any foreign assistance. Many young graduates and post-graduates were recruited and got trained in the foreign language schools of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and in a special school for teaching the Chinese language which had been set up after 1962. Those who did well in their language training were sent to places like Hong Kong for further improvement of their language skills.
5. Despite this, the IB was not in a position to provide a 100 per cent coverage of open source intelligence. This would have involved huge investments. In view of the limited resources available to the IB, it was decided to benefit from the open source intelligence collection capabilities of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the UK’s external intelligence agency called the Secret Intelligence Service or the MI 6. The CIA and the MI 6 readily agreed to share with the IB the produce of their open source intelligence monitoring stations located in South-East and East Asia and Australia.
6. The strengthening of the FIPs on the Tibetan border and the Foreign Intelligence Posts was also done by the IB through its own limited human and financial resources without any external assistance. There was an increased intake of officers at the junior, middle and senior levels and they were got trained in the Central Police Training College at Mount Abu in Rajasthan followed by specialised training in the intelligence tradecraft in the IB’s own training school.
7. Foreign assistance was obtained from the intelligence agencies of the US and the UK for strengthening the IB’s capability for the collection of technical intelligence relating to China. It was felt that from the counter-intelligence point of view --- that is, to prevent a possible penetration of the counter-intelligence set-up of the IB by the US and British agencies--- it would not be advisable for the new technical intelligence capabilities created with US and British assistance to be located in the IB. These capabilities consisted essentially of ground-based monitoring stations for the collection of signal intelligence and air–based platforms for the collection of signals of various kinds and for aerial photography.
8. It was decided to locate the new Techint capabilities acquired from the US and the UK in a new organization called the Directorate-General of Security (DGS), which would come under the over-all supervision of the Director of the IB, but would be administratively independent of the IB, with its own cadre of staff and its own budget. While the DGS exercised the responsibility for the collection of intelligence through ground stations, the responsibility for operating air platforms was given to an organization called the Aviation Research Centre (ARC), which was part of the DGS, but had a different administrative set-up.
9.This re-organised set-up, which came into being as a result of the post-1962 review, started functioning well. The post-1962 review paid no attention to the IB’s capabilities for the collection of intelligence about Pakistan. It was an ad hoc re-organisation carried out with American and British assistance following the disastrous 1962 military conflict with China. The review and the re-organisation were not holistic covering the entire gamut of the intelligence collection capabilities of the IB. There was considerable extra attention to China, but inadequate attention to Pakistan. The IB was not in a position to use the additional capabilities acquired after 1962 for the collection of intelligence about Pakistan because the US and British agencies had insisted that the assistance given by them could be used only for strengthening the intelligence-collection capabilities relating to China and not for the coverage of Pakistan.
10. The second and third reviews were undertaken after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and the revolt by the Mizo National Front (MNF) in 1966. Both these reviews brought out that the intelligence deficiencies noticed in 1965 and 1966 were due to the fact that the main focus of the IB’s attention was on internal intelligence and that, as result, external intelligence----whether relating to Pakistan or China--- did not receive the attention it deserved.
11. These two reviews led to the decision of the Government of India in 1968 to divest the IB of the responsibility for the collection of external intelligence. It was decided that thereafter the IB should be responsible for the collection of internal intelligence only. A separate organization for the collection of external intelligence----human as well as technical --- under the name of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) was created on September 21,1968. The DGS, which was responsible for the collection of intelligence about China with technical capabilities acquired from the US and British agencies, was transferred from the control of the IB to that of the R&AW. Secretary (R ), as the head of the R&AW is known, was given two hats to wear---as the head of the R&AW and as the concurrent head of the DGS.
12. The post-1968 re-organisation paid more attention to strengthening the capability of the R&AW for the collection of intelligence about Pakistan and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. However, R.N.Kao, the first head of the R&AW from 1968 to 1977, who had spent his years in the IB in the China and international communism wings of the IB, and his No.2, K.Sankaran Nair, who had spent most of his years in the IB in the Division dealing with Pakistan and the Islamic world, saw to it that the increased focus on China after 1962 did not get diluted as a result of the increased focus on Pakistan post-1968. Under Kao, the co-operation of the US and British agencies with the DGS continued to function well.
13. Between 1977 and 1991 --- a period of 14 years--- the R&AW and the DGS were headed by officers who were essentially experts on Pakistan and other countries. They did take interest in improving the coverage of China, but their focus tended to be on Pakistan. Between 1991 and 1993, the R&AW and the DGS were again headed by an officer who was an acknowledged expert on China. He had served for some years in the DGS set-up and hence was able to see that the co-operation between the DGS and the American agencies on China remained strong. Since 1993----for 17 years now--- the R&AW and the DGS have again been headed by officers who were more experts on Pakistan and other countries and internal security than on China. During this period, there has been a dilution of the focus on China. The result---- a weakening of the Chinese language skills and a decrease in the number of officers with expertise on China. The present focus has been on Pakistan and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, which are important and should receive priority, but this should not be to the detriment of the China-related capabilities.
14. In the early 1980s, the Government constituted a separate cadre of the R&AW called the Research & Analysis Service (RAS). It consisted of officers directly recruited to the R&AW and got trained by it and officers of the Indian Police Service (IPS) and the armed forces, who had come to the R&AW on deputation from the IB and the States as well as from the armed forces and who were found good in intelligence work. For the directly-recruited officers of the RAS, acquisition of foreign language skills was obligatory before they could be confirmed and promoted. It was not necessary for the deputationists from the IPS and the Armed Forces who were taken into the RAS.
15. Most of the deputationists were experts on Pakistan or terrorism and insurgency. Hardly any expert on China came on deputation. The IPS officers of the IB and the State Police do not have much expertise on China. The Armed Forces do have officers with Chinese language skills and China expertise. In the 1960s and the 1970s, some of these officers came on deputation, but since the 1980s, the flow of military officers with China expertise decreased. As a result, the dwindling Chinese language skills and China expertise remained confined to the small number of direct recruits to the RAS. When the turn of these direct recruits for appointment as Secretary (R) came, they were overlooked and IPS officers were inducted from the States or the IB to take over as the chief. The result has been a declining incentive among young officers for acquiring Chinese language skills and China expertise. The number of young officers who want to specialize on China has been coming down. Practically everybody wants to specialize on Pakistan or internal security related subjects so that their chances of rising to the top will be strengthened.
16. Since 1962, we have not had a military conflict with China. As a result, we have not had a comprehensive review of our capabilities for the collection, analysis and assessment of intelligence about China. The fourth review, which was undertaken in 2000 after the Kargil military conflict with Pakistan through a task force headed by G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW between 1983 and 1986 and then Governor of J&K, again focused largely on examining our capabilities relating to Pakistan, terrorism, insurgency and other aspects of internal security. It paid only limited attention to China, but it did examine in detail the working of the DGS set-up and our capabilities for the collection of Techint----whether relating to Pakistan or China.
17. Its report led to the creation of two new agencies in the intelligence community---- the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) to analyse and assess military intelligence of a strategic nature and the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) to deal exclusively with the collection of Techint through ground stations as well as air platforms. While the creation of the DIA did not weaken any of the existing military intelligence agencies, the manner in which the NTRO was created weakened the capabilities of the DGS. The Task Force wanted that the NTRO should handle all capabilities to be newly-created and that the then existing capabilities in different organizations like the R&AW, the DGS and the IB should not be disturbed. This recommendation was not fully implemented. One understands that some of the existing capabilities of the DGS were transferred to the NTRO much to the opposition of the then head of the R&AW and the DGS. The China-centric capability of the R&AW and the DGS, which had already been weakened, was further weakened by the manner in which the NTRO was set up.
18.Thus, at a time when our major concerns relating to China have been increasing we find the adequacy and effectiveness of our China-centric capabilities in an unsatisfactory state. Our major concerns relating to China arise from the continuing border dispute with China, its determination to acquire at least part of Arunachal Pradesh if not the whole of it one day, its virtual military alliance with Pakistan, its favouring Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, its increasing presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, its growing strategic presence in South Asia and Myanmar, its space-related military capabilities, its sophisticated capabilities for a cyber warfare, the modernization of its armed forces, the upgradation of its infrastructure in Tibet, the assertiveness of its Navy etc.
19. India is now faced with strategic concerns on many fronts---- all of them arising from Pakistan or China acting individually or jointly. It has been reported that our Army is increasingly concerned over the possibility of a two-front war that one day may be imposed on us by Pakistan and China and has been trying to revamp its strategic doctrines and capabilities to meet such a threat should it arise.
20. The intelligence community should also have a corresponding two-front capability for the collection of intelligence in equal measure about Pakistan and China. Pakistan is important and should continue to have high priority. But China has become equally important and its importance as a priority has been increasing.
21. Since 1962, we have not had a detailed review of our intelligence capabilities relating to China. It is urgent to undertake such a review to identify our deficiencies and take action to remove them. There are two ways of doing this. Either have a holistic review of our entire intelligence capabilities instead of focusing only on China or have a review of only our capabilities relating to China. A holistic review would be more advisable. We have not had such a holistic review since we became independent in 1947.
22. Other countries such as the US have two kinds of reviews. The first is a review undertaken whenever there is a national security set-back or failure. This is similar to the four reviews which we have had. They focus only on identifying the reasons for the set-back or failure and suggesting corrective actions. The second is a holistic review undertaken periodically to determine whether the intelligence agencies are keeping pace with the evolving threats to national security and taking continuous corrective action. Such a holistic review is urgently called for in the light of the growing alliance between China and Pakistan. (28-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
( Article written for the November,2010, issue of “AGNI”, the journal of the Forum For Strategic and Security Studies of New Delhi )
Since 1947, India has had four reviews of its intelligence capabilities.
2.The first was after the Sino-Indian military conflict of 1962 in which the Indian Army did badly. The review led to two conclusions. Firstly, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which was then responsible for the collection of internal and external intelligence, had serious deficiencies in its capabilities for the collection, analysis and assessment of intelligence regarding China in general and Chinese-occupied Tibet in particular. Secondly, its capabilities in this regard had to be strengthened quickly and this would not be possible without the assistance of the intelligence agencies of the US and the UK.
3. Among the follow-up measures taken were building a cadre of Chinese linguists on a crash basis in order to be able to collect, collate, analyse and assess open source intelligence, expanding the IB’s network of Forward Intelligence Posts (FIPs) on the Tibetan order and Foreign Intelligence Posts in South-East and East Asia for collecting human intelligence and strengthening the IB’s capability for the collection of technical intelligence through ground stations for the interception of messages and air platforms for the collection of signals of various kinds and aerial photography.
4. The reservoir of linguists was built up without the need for any foreign assistance. Many young graduates and post-graduates were recruited and got trained in the foreign language schools of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and in a special school for teaching the Chinese language which had been set up after 1962. Those who did well in their language training were sent to places like Hong Kong for further improvement of their language skills.
5. Despite this, the IB was not in a position to provide a 100 per cent coverage of open source intelligence. This would have involved huge investments. In view of the limited resources available to the IB, it was decided to benefit from the open source intelligence collection capabilities of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the UK’s external intelligence agency called the Secret Intelligence Service or the MI 6. The CIA and the MI 6 readily agreed to share with the IB the produce of their open source intelligence monitoring stations located in South-East and East Asia and Australia.
6. The strengthening of the FIPs on the Tibetan border and the Foreign Intelligence Posts was also done by the IB through its own limited human and financial resources without any external assistance. There was an increased intake of officers at the junior, middle and senior levels and they were got trained in the Central Police Training College at Mount Abu in Rajasthan followed by specialised training in the intelligence tradecraft in the IB’s own training school.
7. Foreign assistance was obtained from the intelligence agencies of the US and the UK for strengthening the IB’s capability for the collection of technical intelligence relating to China. It was felt that from the counter-intelligence point of view --- that is, to prevent a possible penetration of the counter-intelligence set-up of the IB by the US and British agencies--- it would not be advisable for the new technical intelligence capabilities created with US and British assistance to be located in the IB. These capabilities consisted essentially of ground-based monitoring stations for the collection of signal intelligence and air–based platforms for the collection of signals of various kinds and for aerial photography.
8. It was decided to locate the new Techint capabilities acquired from the US and the UK in a new organization called the Directorate-General of Security (DGS), which would come under the over-all supervision of the Director of the IB, but would be administratively independent of the IB, with its own cadre of staff and its own budget. While the DGS exercised the responsibility for the collection of intelligence through ground stations, the responsibility for operating air platforms was given to an organization called the Aviation Research Centre (ARC), which was part of the DGS, but had a different administrative set-up.
9.This re-organised set-up, which came into being as a result of the post-1962 review, started functioning well. The post-1962 review paid no attention to the IB’s capabilities for the collection of intelligence about Pakistan. It was an ad hoc re-organisation carried out with American and British assistance following the disastrous 1962 military conflict with China. The review and the re-organisation were not holistic covering the entire gamut of the intelligence collection capabilities of the IB. There was considerable extra attention to China, but inadequate attention to Pakistan. The IB was not in a position to use the additional capabilities acquired after 1962 for the collection of intelligence about Pakistan because the US and British agencies had insisted that the assistance given by them could be used only for strengthening the intelligence-collection capabilities relating to China and not for the coverage of Pakistan.
10. The second and third reviews were undertaken after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and the revolt by the Mizo National Front (MNF) in 1966. Both these reviews brought out that the intelligence deficiencies noticed in 1965 and 1966 were due to the fact that the main focus of the IB’s attention was on internal intelligence and that, as result, external intelligence----whether relating to Pakistan or China--- did not receive the attention it deserved.
11. These two reviews led to the decision of the Government of India in 1968 to divest the IB of the responsibility for the collection of external intelligence. It was decided that thereafter the IB should be responsible for the collection of internal intelligence only. A separate organization for the collection of external intelligence----human as well as technical --- under the name of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) was created on September 21,1968. The DGS, which was responsible for the collection of intelligence about China with technical capabilities acquired from the US and British agencies, was transferred from the control of the IB to that of the R&AW. Secretary (R ), as the head of the R&AW is known, was given two hats to wear---as the head of the R&AW and as the concurrent head of the DGS.
12. The post-1968 re-organisation paid more attention to strengthening the capability of the R&AW for the collection of intelligence about Pakistan and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. However, R.N.Kao, the first head of the R&AW from 1968 to 1977, who had spent his years in the IB in the China and international communism wings of the IB, and his No.2, K.Sankaran Nair, who had spent most of his years in the IB in the Division dealing with Pakistan and the Islamic world, saw to it that the increased focus on China after 1962 did not get diluted as a result of the increased focus on Pakistan post-1968. Under Kao, the co-operation of the US and British agencies with the DGS continued to function well.
13. Between 1977 and 1991 --- a period of 14 years--- the R&AW and the DGS were headed by officers who were essentially experts on Pakistan and other countries. They did take interest in improving the coverage of China, but their focus tended to be on Pakistan. Between 1991 and 1993, the R&AW and the DGS were again headed by an officer who was an acknowledged expert on China. He had served for some years in the DGS set-up and hence was able to see that the co-operation between the DGS and the American agencies on China remained strong. Since 1993----for 17 years now--- the R&AW and the DGS have again been headed by officers who were more experts on Pakistan and other countries and internal security than on China. During this period, there has been a dilution of the focus on China. The result---- a weakening of the Chinese language skills and a decrease in the number of officers with expertise on China. The present focus has been on Pakistan and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, which are important and should receive priority, but this should not be to the detriment of the China-related capabilities.
14. In the early 1980s, the Government constituted a separate cadre of the R&AW called the Research & Analysis Service (RAS). It consisted of officers directly recruited to the R&AW and got trained by it and officers of the Indian Police Service (IPS) and the armed forces, who had come to the R&AW on deputation from the IB and the States as well as from the armed forces and who were found good in intelligence work. For the directly-recruited officers of the RAS, acquisition of foreign language skills was obligatory before they could be confirmed and promoted. It was not necessary for the deputationists from the IPS and the Armed Forces who were taken into the RAS.
15. Most of the deputationists were experts on Pakistan or terrorism and insurgency. Hardly any expert on China came on deputation. The IPS officers of the IB and the State Police do not have much expertise on China. The Armed Forces do have officers with Chinese language skills and China expertise. In the 1960s and the 1970s, some of these officers came on deputation, but since the 1980s, the flow of military officers with China expertise decreased. As a result, the dwindling Chinese language skills and China expertise remained confined to the small number of direct recruits to the RAS. When the turn of these direct recruits for appointment as Secretary (R) came, they were overlooked and IPS officers were inducted from the States or the IB to take over as the chief. The result has been a declining incentive among young officers for acquiring Chinese language skills and China expertise. The number of young officers who want to specialize on China has been coming down. Practically everybody wants to specialize on Pakistan or internal security related subjects so that their chances of rising to the top will be strengthened.
16. Since 1962, we have not had a military conflict with China. As a result, we have not had a comprehensive review of our capabilities for the collection, analysis and assessment of intelligence about China. The fourth review, which was undertaken in 2000 after the Kargil military conflict with Pakistan through a task force headed by G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW between 1983 and 1986 and then Governor of J&K, again focused largely on examining our capabilities relating to Pakistan, terrorism, insurgency and other aspects of internal security. It paid only limited attention to China, but it did examine in detail the working of the DGS set-up and our capabilities for the collection of Techint----whether relating to Pakistan or China.
17. Its report led to the creation of two new agencies in the intelligence community---- the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) to analyse and assess military intelligence of a strategic nature and the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) to deal exclusively with the collection of Techint through ground stations as well as air platforms. While the creation of the DIA did not weaken any of the existing military intelligence agencies, the manner in which the NTRO was created weakened the capabilities of the DGS. The Task Force wanted that the NTRO should handle all capabilities to be newly-created and that the then existing capabilities in different organizations like the R&AW, the DGS and the IB should not be disturbed. This recommendation was not fully implemented. One understands that some of the existing capabilities of the DGS were transferred to the NTRO much to the opposition of the then head of the R&AW and the DGS. The China-centric capability of the R&AW and the DGS, which had already been weakened, was further weakened by the manner in which the NTRO was set up.
18.Thus, at a time when our major concerns relating to China have been increasing we find the adequacy and effectiveness of our China-centric capabilities in an unsatisfactory state. Our major concerns relating to China arise from the continuing border dispute with China, its determination to acquire at least part of Arunachal Pradesh if not the whole of it one day, its virtual military alliance with Pakistan, its favouring Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, its increasing presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, its growing strategic presence in South Asia and Myanmar, its space-related military capabilities, its sophisticated capabilities for a cyber warfare, the modernization of its armed forces, the upgradation of its infrastructure in Tibet, the assertiveness of its Navy etc.
19. India is now faced with strategic concerns on many fronts---- all of them arising from Pakistan or China acting individually or jointly. It has been reported that our Army is increasingly concerned over the possibility of a two-front war that one day may be imposed on us by Pakistan and China and has been trying to revamp its strategic doctrines and capabilities to meet such a threat should it arise.
20. The intelligence community should also have a corresponding two-front capability for the collection of intelligence in equal measure about Pakistan and China. Pakistan is important and should continue to have high priority. But China has become equally important and its importance as a priority has been increasing.
21. Since 1962, we have not had a detailed review of our intelligence capabilities relating to China. It is urgent to undertake such a review to identify our deficiencies and take action to remove them. There are two ways of doing this. Either have a holistic review of our entire intelligence capabilities instead of focusing only on China or have a review of only our capabilities relating to China. A holistic review would be more advisable. We have not had such a holistic review since we became independent in 1947.
22. Other countries such as the US have two kinds of reviews. The first is a review undertaken whenever there is a national security set-back or failure. This is similar to the four reviews which we have had. They focus only on identifying the reasons for the set-back or failure and suggesting corrective actions. The second is a holistic review undertaken periodically to determine whether the intelligence agencies are keeping pace with the evolving threats to national security and taking continuous corrective action. Such a holistic review is urgently called for in the light of the growing alliance between China and Pakistan. (28-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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