B.RAMAN
The Government of India has sought to play down the worrisome implications of China’s new policy on Kashmir favouring Pakistan, its growing strategic presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-Occupies Kashmir (POK), its disinclination to give up its claims to the Indian territory of Arunachal Pradesh and its strengthening of its military-related capabilities in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).
2. The strengthening of its military-related capabilities in the TAR has been in the form of a further upgradation of its highway network, the construction of more airports ostensibly to meet civilian needs, the extension of the railway line from Lhasa towards the border with Nepal and Arunachal Pradesh with plans for the ultimate construction of a railway link-up with Nepal and military exercises involving various units of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including the Air Force and strategic artillery units. Among the objectives of these exercises are to fine-tune their capability to fight jointly against an adversary at high altitudes, strategic operations of the Air Force involving long-distance flights with mid-air refueling and the reliability of its strategic missiles at high altitudes.
3. The PLA has been handling the implementation of the projects and exercises for strengthening the military-related capabilities in the TAR and the strategic presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area by taking advantage of Pakistani needs in the wake of landslides and severe floods in the region twice this year. These projects and exercises will enable the PLA to pose a threat to the Indian Armed Forces from two directions----from the North and the West.
4. Even while thus enhancing the PLA’s military capabilities, the Chinese political leadership has sought to maintain a reassuring profile during its interactions with its Indian counterpart. This reassuring profile was evident in the recent cordial meeting on October 30,2010,between Dr.Manmohan Singh and Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in the margins of the ASEAN-sponsored East Asia summit at Hanoi, the announcement made after the meeting of the plans of Wen to visit New Delhi in December as part of the year-long celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the visit this week to New Delhi by Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Secretary of the CPC Central Commission for Political and Legal Affairs, to attend a seminar on Sino-Indian relations, co-organized by the CPC and the ruling Indian National Congress as part of the 60th anniversary celebrations.
5. Commenting on the visit of Zhou, the “Global Times”, the daily of the CPC, wrote on November 1,2010, as follows: “China-India relations have maintained good momentum recently, despite some heated discussions on their relations as rivals. "The argument of the two countries' rivalry is inappropriate," said Miao Hongni, a professor from the International Relations Institute at Communication University of China. "Beijing and New Delhi are in the process of learning from each other. India excels at IT and outsourcing areas, while China is better at the manufacturing industry.As two responsible countries, they will cooperate to improve the development of Asia,"
6.It quoted Dr.Manmohan Singh as saying that India and China would look for "practical and pragmatic" measures to solve border issues, calling on the two sides to ensure "peace and tranquillity" in the region.
7. The impression sought to be created by the political leaderships of the two countries is that the bilateral relations are developing satisfactorily and that there is nothing to worry about. The reality is otherwise. India has many reasons to worry about the Chinese policies and capabilities, but by playing them down and avoiding highlighting them the Government of Dr. Manmohan Singh is repeating the mistake of Jawaharlal Nehru in the 1950s when he tried to play down Chinese intrusions into Indian territory in the Ladakh sector and their construction of the Aksai Chin Road. By the time he realized the seriousness of the Chinese activities and sought to draw international attention to the malign intention and activities of the Chinese, it was too late. When the Sino-Indian military conflict of 1962 broke out, we were caught unprepared and without the support----not even the moral support---- of the international community.
8.The Chinese leaders are quite happy with the reluctance shown by the Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh to inform the Indian public opinion and the international community about the nature of the activities of the PLA under the cover of friendship. It suits their designs that the international community is given the impression that everything is normal in Sino-Indian relations and that the Government of India is not unduly worried over the Chinese activities.
9. The Chinese assertiveness across the Sino-Indian border and their determination to enforce their territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh have been evident for about two years now. Their virtual military alliance with Pakistan has been a new worrisome factor. It was during the same period that similar Chinese assertiveness was directed against some ASEAN countries with which China has disputes over island territories in the South China Sea and against Japan with which China has disputes in the East China Sea. Instead of playing down their concerns over the Chinese assertiveness, those countries made their concerns evident to the international community thereby inviting statements of support for them from the US. The Chinese are particularly angry with the present Government in Japan because it actively highlighted the Chinese activities which threatened peace and security in the East China Sea area and invoked the support of the US under its security commitments to Japan.
10. As against its anger against Japan and irritation against Vietnam, the Chinese leadership is happy with the lack of an energetic response from the Government of India. This has enabled the Chinese to go ahead with their activities detrimental to India without having to face adverse attention from the international community.
11. While the keenness of the Manmohan Singh Government to maintain the seeming cordiality and momentum in the relations with China is understandable, its soft response to Chinese activities which could prove detrimental to Indian interests and security could prove counter-productive and could ultimately lead us to a military confrontation, however much we may want to avoid it. Softness in response has been the defining characteristic of our policies towards Pakistan and China. They are both taking advantage of our reluctance to respond energetically to undermine our security. An energetic response need not necessarily be in the form of a slanging match with Beijing. It ought to be in the form of a crash programme to strengthen our defence capabilities against China and building up a network of strategic relationships with countries such as Japan and Vietnam. The hopes entertained by many of us that Dr.Manmohan Singh would avail of his recent visits to Japan and Vietnam for this purpose in a manner that would convey an unmistakable message to Beijing have been belied. ( 5-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, November 5, 2010
OBAMA MINUS THE HALO
B.RAMAN
President Bill Clinton and President George Bush had suffered electoral set-backs in the mid-term elections to the US Congress before they visited India. But, they came a few months after their electoral set-back. By the time they came, public opinion in India had forgotten their set-back, which did not have any impact on their visits.
2. President Barack Obama will be reaching India two days after the elections in which his party has lost control of the House of Representatives and managed to retain control of the Senate by only a narrow margin. This has become an important subject of discussion everywhere. As much time is spent in discussing his electoral set-back as in discussing his policies towards India. Would the set-back weaken him politically? Would it come in the way of substantial changes in Indo-US relations, which would be to the benefit of the two countries?
3. It must be remembered that the elections were fought largely on domestic issues. Foreign policy hardly figured during the election campaign. The election results represented a rejection of his domestic agenda.His powers to make and implement foreign policy will remain undiminished.That is the conventional wisdom. But one has to remember that the Congress controls the federal funds. A hostile Congress can make his foreign policy initiatives non-starters by denying funds for implementing them.
4. This is not a rosy picture for Obama, but the return of the Republicans to the Congress could still have some bright spots for India. India can hopefully expect the Republican members of the Congress to insist on a strict implementation by Pakistan of the conditionalities imposed under the Kerry-Lugar Act of 2009 laying down the conditions under which the economic aid of US $ 7.5 billion over a five-year period voted last year will be disbursed. It can also hopefully expect that the Republican-controlled House of Representatives will subject to intense scrutiny the President's proposal for a new allocation of US $ 2.29 billion towards military assistance for Pakistan. India should lose no time in briefing the elected Republican members about its serious objections to these allocations.
5. Obama's Af-Pak strategy relating to Afghanistan cannot hope to get easy approval from the House. Questions will be asked about his exit strategy and about the talk of a dialogue with the so-called good Taliban in the hope of bringing them into the political mainstream. The House of Representatives is likely at act as a speed-breaker on his so-called Afghan exit strategy. This ought to suit India.
6. Even in the case of China, Obama has been avoiding declaring it a currency manipulator and diluting the focus on human rights issues. The newly-elected House is likely to step up pressure for the declaratiion of China as a currency manipulator and highlight the violation of human rights in China. Concerns arising from China's newly-acquired cyber warfare capability are likely to be taken up with a greater vigour by the new House. These are issues which enjoy considerable public support in the US. Obama will no longer be able to push them under the carpet.
7. There are interesting opportunities for India as a result of the thinking of the Republicans on these issues.It should not fail to take advantage of these opportunities to have the foreign policy distortions of the Obama administration corrected in a manner that could be beneficial to India. (5-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
President Bill Clinton and President George Bush had suffered electoral set-backs in the mid-term elections to the US Congress before they visited India. But, they came a few months after their electoral set-back. By the time they came, public opinion in India had forgotten their set-back, which did not have any impact on their visits.
2. President Barack Obama will be reaching India two days after the elections in which his party has lost control of the House of Representatives and managed to retain control of the Senate by only a narrow margin. This has become an important subject of discussion everywhere. As much time is spent in discussing his electoral set-back as in discussing his policies towards India. Would the set-back weaken him politically? Would it come in the way of substantial changes in Indo-US relations, which would be to the benefit of the two countries?
3. It must be remembered that the elections were fought largely on domestic issues. Foreign policy hardly figured during the election campaign. The election results represented a rejection of his domestic agenda.His powers to make and implement foreign policy will remain undiminished.That is the conventional wisdom. But one has to remember that the Congress controls the federal funds. A hostile Congress can make his foreign policy initiatives non-starters by denying funds for implementing them.
4. This is not a rosy picture for Obama, but the return of the Republicans to the Congress could still have some bright spots for India. India can hopefully expect the Republican members of the Congress to insist on a strict implementation by Pakistan of the conditionalities imposed under the Kerry-Lugar Act of 2009 laying down the conditions under which the economic aid of US $ 7.5 billion over a five-year period voted last year will be disbursed. It can also hopefully expect that the Republican-controlled House of Representatives will subject to intense scrutiny the President's proposal for a new allocation of US $ 2.29 billion towards military assistance for Pakistan. India should lose no time in briefing the elected Republican members about its serious objections to these allocations.
5. Obama's Af-Pak strategy relating to Afghanistan cannot hope to get easy approval from the House. Questions will be asked about his exit strategy and about the talk of a dialogue with the so-called good Taliban in the hope of bringing them into the political mainstream. The House of Representatives is likely at act as a speed-breaker on his so-called Afghan exit strategy. This ought to suit India.
6. Even in the case of China, Obama has been avoiding declaring it a currency manipulator and diluting the focus on human rights issues. The newly-elected House is likely to step up pressure for the declaratiion of China as a currency manipulator and highlight the violation of human rights in China. Concerns arising from China's newly-acquired cyber warfare capability are likely to be taken up with a greater vigour by the new House. These are issues which enjoy considerable public support in the US. Obama will no longer be able to push them under the carpet.
7. There are interesting opportunities for India as a result of the thinking of the Republicans on these issues.It should not fail to take advantage of these opportunities to have the foreign policy distortions of the Obama administration corrected in a manner that could be beneficial to India. (5-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, November 3, 2010
Intelligence: Need for Enhanced Focus on China
B.RAMAN
( Article written for the November,2010, issue of “AGNI”, the journal of the Forum For Strategic and Security Studies of New Delhi )
Since 1947, India has had four reviews of its intelligence capabilities.
2.The first was after the Sino-Indian military conflict of 1962 in which the Indian Army did badly. The review led to two conclusions. Firstly, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which was then responsible for the collection of internal and external intelligence, had serious deficiencies in its capabilities for the collection, analysis and assessment of intelligence regarding China in general and Chinese-occupied Tibet in particular. Secondly, its capabilities in this regard had to be strengthened quickly and this would not be possible without the assistance of the intelligence agencies of the US and the UK.
3. Among the follow-up measures taken were building a cadre of Chinese linguists on a crash basis in order to be able to collect, collate, analyse and assess open source intelligence, expanding the IB’s network of Forward Intelligence Posts (FIPs) on the Tibetan order and Foreign Intelligence Posts in South-East and East Asia for collecting human intelligence and strengthening the IB’s capability for the collection of technical intelligence through ground stations for the interception of messages and air platforms for the collection of signals of various kinds and aerial photography.
4. The reservoir of linguists was built up without the need for any foreign assistance. Many young graduates and post-graduates were recruited and got trained in the foreign language schools of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and in a special school for teaching the Chinese language which had been set up after 1962. Those who did well in their language training were sent to places like Hong Kong for further improvement of their language skills.
5. Despite this, the IB was not in a position to provide a 100 per cent coverage of open source intelligence. This would have involved huge investments. In view of the limited resources available to the IB, it was decided to benefit from the open source intelligence collection capabilities of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the UK’s external intelligence agency called the Secret Intelligence Service or the MI 6. The CIA and the MI 6 readily agreed to share with the IB the produce of their open source intelligence monitoring stations located in South-East and East Asia and Australia.
6. The strengthening of the FIPs on the Tibetan border and the Foreign Intelligence Posts was also done by the IB through its own limited human and financial resources without any external assistance. There was an increased intake of officers at the junior, middle and senior levels and they were got trained in the Central Police Training College at Mount Abu in Rajasthan followed by specialised training in the intelligence tradecraft in the IB’s own training school.
7. Foreign assistance was obtained from the intelligence agencies of the US and the UK for strengthening the IB’s capability for the collection of technical intelligence relating to China. It was felt that from the counter-intelligence point of view --- that is, to prevent a possible penetration of the counter-intelligence set-up of the IB by the US and British agencies--- it would not be advisable for the new technical intelligence capabilities created with US and British assistance to be located in the IB. These capabilities consisted essentially of ground-based monitoring stations for the collection of signal intelligence and air–based platforms for the collection of signals of various kinds and for aerial photography.
8. It was decided to locate the new Techint capabilities acquired from the US and the UK in a new organization called the Directorate-General of Security (DGS), which would come under the over-all supervision of the Director of the IB, but would be administratively independent of the IB, with its own cadre of staff and its own budget. While the DGS exercised the responsibility for the collection of intelligence through ground stations, the responsibility for operating air platforms was given to an organization called the Aviation Research Centre (ARC), which was part of the DGS, but had a different administrative set-up.
9.This re-organised set-up, which came into being as a result of the post-1962 review, started functioning well. The post-1962 review paid no attention to the IB’s capabilities for the collection of intelligence about Pakistan. It was an ad hoc re-organisation carried out with American and British assistance following the disastrous 1962 military conflict with China. The review and the re-organisation were not holistic covering the entire gamut of the intelligence collection capabilities of the IB. There was considerable extra attention to China, but inadequate attention to Pakistan. The IB was not in a position to use the additional capabilities acquired after 1962 for the collection of intelligence about Pakistan because the US and British agencies had insisted that the assistance given by them could be used only for strengthening the intelligence-collection capabilities relating to China and not for the coverage of Pakistan.
10. The second and third reviews were undertaken after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and the revolt by the Mizo National Front (MNF) in 1966. Both these reviews brought out that the intelligence deficiencies noticed in 1965 and 1966 were due to the fact that the main focus of the IB’s attention was on internal intelligence and that, as result, external intelligence----whether relating to Pakistan or China--- did not receive the attention it deserved.
11. These two reviews led to the decision of the Government of India in 1968 to divest the IB of the responsibility for the collection of external intelligence. It was decided that thereafter the IB should be responsible for the collection of internal intelligence only. A separate organization for the collection of external intelligence----human as well as technical --- under the name of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) was created on September 21,1968. The DGS, which was responsible for the collection of intelligence about China with technical capabilities acquired from the US and British agencies, was transferred from the control of the IB to that of the R&AW. Secretary (R ), as the head of the R&AW is known, was given two hats to wear---as the head of the R&AW and as the concurrent head of the DGS.
12. The post-1968 re-organisation paid more attention to strengthening the capability of the R&AW for the collection of intelligence about Pakistan and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. However, R.N.Kao, the first head of the R&AW from 1968 to 1977, who had spent his years in the IB in the China and international communism wings of the IB, and his No.2, K.Sankaran Nair, who had spent most of his years in the IB in the Division dealing with Pakistan and the Islamic world, saw to it that the increased focus on China after 1962 did not get diluted as a result of the increased focus on Pakistan post-1968. Under Kao, the co-operation of the US and British agencies with the DGS continued to function well.
13. Between 1977 and 1991 --- a period of 14 years--- the R&AW and the DGS were headed by officers who were essentially experts on Pakistan and other countries. They did take interest in improving the coverage of China, but their focus tended to be on Pakistan. Between 1991 and 1993, the R&AW and the DGS were again headed by an officer who was an acknowledged expert on China. He had served for some years in the DGS set-up and hence was able to see that the co-operation between the DGS and the American agencies on China remained strong. Since 1993----for 17 years now--- the R&AW and the DGS have again been headed by officers who were more experts on Pakistan and other countries and internal security than on China. During this period, there has been a dilution of the focus on China. The result---- a weakening of the Chinese language skills and a decrease in the number of officers with expertise on China. The present focus has been on Pakistan and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, which are important and should receive priority, but this should not be to the detriment of the China-related capabilities.
14. In the early 1980s, the Government constituted a separate cadre of the R&AW called the Research & Analysis Service (RAS). It consisted of officers directly recruited to the R&AW and got trained by it and officers of the Indian Police Service (IPS) and the armed forces, who had come to the R&AW on deputation from the IB and the States as well as from the armed forces and who were found good in intelligence work. For the directly-recruited officers of the RAS, acquisition of foreign language skills was obligatory before they could be confirmed and promoted. It was not necessary for the deputationists from the IPS and the Armed Forces who were taken into the RAS.
15. Most of the deputationists were experts on Pakistan or terrorism and insurgency. Hardly any expert on China came on deputation. The IPS officers of the IB and the State Police do not have much expertise on China. The Armed Forces do have officers with Chinese language skills and China expertise. In the 1960s and the 1970s, some of these officers came on deputation, but since the 1980s, the flow of military officers with China expertise decreased. As a result, the dwindling Chinese language skills and China expertise remained confined to the small number of direct recruits to the RAS. When the turn of these direct recruits for appointment as Secretary (R) came, they were overlooked and IPS officers were inducted from the States or the IB to take over as the chief. The result has been a declining incentive among young officers for acquiring Chinese language skills and China expertise. The number of young officers who want to specialize on China has been coming down. Practically everybody wants to specialize on Pakistan or internal security related subjects so that their chances of rising to the top will be strengthened.
16. Since 1962, we have not had a military conflict with China. As a result, we have not had a comprehensive review of our capabilities for the collection, analysis and assessment of intelligence about China. The fourth review, which was undertaken in 2000 after the Kargil military conflict with Pakistan through a task force headed by G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW between 1983 and 1986 and then Governor of J&K, again focused largely on examining our capabilities relating to Pakistan, terrorism, insurgency and other aspects of internal security. It paid only limited attention to China, but it did examine in detail the working of the DGS set-up and our capabilities for the collection of Techint----whether relating to Pakistan or China.
17. Its report led to the creation of two new agencies in the intelligence community---- the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) to analyse and assess military intelligence of a strategic nature and the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) to deal exclusively with the collection of Techint through ground stations as well as air platforms. While the creation of the DIA did not weaken any of the existing military intelligence agencies, the manner in which the NTRO was created weakened the capabilities of the DGS. The Task Force wanted that the NTRO should handle all capabilities to be newly-created and that the then existing capabilities in different organizations like the R&AW, the DGS and the IB should not be disturbed. This recommendation was not fully implemented. One understands that some of the existing capabilities of the DGS were transferred to the NTRO much to the opposition of the then head of the R&AW and the DGS. The China-centric capability of the R&AW and the DGS, which had already been weakened, was further weakened by the manner in which the NTRO was set up.
18.Thus, at a time when our major concerns relating to China have been increasing we find the adequacy and effectiveness of our China-centric capabilities in an unsatisfactory state. Our major concerns relating to China arise from the continuing border dispute with China, its determination to acquire at least part of Arunachal Pradesh if not the whole of it one day, its virtual military alliance with Pakistan, its favouring Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, its increasing presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, its growing strategic presence in South Asia and Myanmar, its space-related military capabilities, its sophisticated capabilities for a cyber warfare, the modernization of its armed forces, the upgradation of its infrastructure in Tibet, the assertiveness of its Navy etc.
19. India is now faced with strategic concerns on many fronts---- all of them arising from Pakistan or China acting individually or jointly. It has been reported that our Army is increasingly concerned over the possibility of a two-front war that one day may be imposed on us by Pakistan and China and has been trying to revamp its strategic doctrines and capabilities to meet such a threat should it arise.
20. The intelligence community should also have a corresponding two-front capability for the collection of intelligence in equal measure about Pakistan and China. Pakistan is important and should continue to have high priority. But China has become equally important and its importance as a priority has been increasing.
21. Since 1962, we have not had a detailed review of our intelligence capabilities relating to China. It is urgent to undertake such a review to identify our deficiencies and take action to remove them. There are two ways of doing this. Either have a holistic review of our entire intelligence capabilities instead of focusing only on China or have a review of only our capabilities relating to China. A holistic review would be more advisable. We have not had such a holistic review since we became independent in 1947.
22. Other countries such as the US have two kinds of reviews. The first is a review undertaken whenever there is a national security set-back or failure. This is similar to the four reviews which we have had. They focus only on identifying the reasons for the set-back or failure and suggesting corrective actions. The second is a holistic review undertaken periodically to determine whether the intelligence agencies are keeping pace with the evolving threats to national security and taking continuous corrective action. Such a holistic review is urgently called for in the light of the growing alliance between China and Pakistan. (28-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
( Article written for the November,2010, issue of “AGNI”, the journal of the Forum For Strategic and Security Studies of New Delhi )
Since 1947, India has had four reviews of its intelligence capabilities.
2.The first was after the Sino-Indian military conflict of 1962 in which the Indian Army did badly. The review led to two conclusions. Firstly, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which was then responsible for the collection of internal and external intelligence, had serious deficiencies in its capabilities for the collection, analysis and assessment of intelligence regarding China in general and Chinese-occupied Tibet in particular. Secondly, its capabilities in this regard had to be strengthened quickly and this would not be possible without the assistance of the intelligence agencies of the US and the UK.
3. Among the follow-up measures taken were building a cadre of Chinese linguists on a crash basis in order to be able to collect, collate, analyse and assess open source intelligence, expanding the IB’s network of Forward Intelligence Posts (FIPs) on the Tibetan order and Foreign Intelligence Posts in South-East and East Asia for collecting human intelligence and strengthening the IB’s capability for the collection of technical intelligence through ground stations for the interception of messages and air platforms for the collection of signals of various kinds and aerial photography.
4. The reservoir of linguists was built up without the need for any foreign assistance. Many young graduates and post-graduates were recruited and got trained in the foreign language schools of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and in a special school for teaching the Chinese language which had been set up after 1962. Those who did well in their language training were sent to places like Hong Kong for further improvement of their language skills.
5. Despite this, the IB was not in a position to provide a 100 per cent coverage of open source intelligence. This would have involved huge investments. In view of the limited resources available to the IB, it was decided to benefit from the open source intelligence collection capabilities of the USA’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the UK’s external intelligence agency called the Secret Intelligence Service or the MI 6. The CIA and the MI 6 readily agreed to share with the IB the produce of their open source intelligence monitoring stations located in South-East and East Asia and Australia.
6. The strengthening of the FIPs on the Tibetan border and the Foreign Intelligence Posts was also done by the IB through its own limited human and financial resources without any external assistance. There was an increased intake of officers at the junior, middle and senior levels and they were got trained in the Central Police Training College at Mount Abu in Rajasthan followed by specialised training in the intelligence tradecraft in the IB’s own training school.
7. Foreign assistance was obtained from the intelligence agencies of the US and the UK for strengthening the IB’s capability for the collection of technical intelligence relating to China. It was felt that from the counter-intelligence point of view --- that is, to prevent a possible penetration of the counter-intelligence set-up of the IB by the US and British agencies--- it would not be advisable for the new technical intelligence capabilities created with US and British assistance to be located in the IB. These capabilities consisted essentially of ground-based monitoring stations for the collection of signal intelligence and air–based platforms for the collection of signals of various kinds and for aerial photography.
8. It was decided to locate the new Techint capabilities acquired from the US and the UK in a new organization called the Directorate-General of Security (DGS), which would come under the over-all supervision of the Director of the IB, but would be administratively independent of the IB, with its own cadre of staff and its own budget. While the DGS exercised the responsibility for the collection of intelligence through ground stations, the responsibility for operating air platforms was given to an organization called the Aviation Research Centre (ARC), which was part of the DGS, but had a different administrative set-up.
9.This re-organised set-up, which came into being as a result of the post-1962 review, started functioning well. The post-1962 review paid no attention to the IB’s capabilities for the collection of intelligence about Pakistan. It was an ad hoc re-organisation carried out with American and British assistance following the disastrous 1962 military conflict with China. The review and the re-organisation were not holistic covering the entire gamut of the intelligence collection capabilities of the IB. There was considerable extra attention to China, but inadequate attention to Pakistan. The IB was not in a position to use the additional capabilities acquired after 1962 for the collection of intelligence about Pakistan because the US and British agencies had insisted that the assistance given by them could be used only for strengthening the intelligence-collection capabilities relating to China and not for the coverage of Pakistan.
10. The second and third reviews were undertaken after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and the revolt by the Mizo National Front (MNF) in 1966. Both these reviews brought out that the intelligence deficiencies noticed in 1965 and 1966 were due to the fact that the main focus of the IB’s attention was on internal intelligence and that, as result, external intelligence----whether relating to Pakistan or China--- did not receive the attention it deserved.
11. These two reviews led to the decision of the Government of India in 1968 to divest the IB of the responsibility for the collection of external intelligence. It was decided that thereafter the IB should be responsible for the collection of internal intelligence only. A separate organization for the collection of external intelligence----human as well as technical --- under the name of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) was created on September 21,1968. The DGS, which was responsible for the collection of intelligence about China with technical capabilities acquired from the US and British agencies, was transferred from the control of the IB to that of the R&AW. Secretary (R ), as the head of the R&AW is known, was given two hats to wear---as the head of the R&AW and as the concurrent head of the DGS.
12. The post-1968 re-organisation paid more attention to strengthening the capability of the R&AW for the collection of intelligence about Pakistan and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. However, R.N.Kao, the first head of the R&AW from 1968 to 1977, who had spent his years in the IB in the China and international communism wings of the IB, and his No.2, K.Sankaran Nair, who had spent most of his years in the IB in the Division dealing with Pakistan and the Islamic world, saw to it that the increased focus on China after 1962 did not get diluted as a result of the increased focus on Pakistan post-1968. Under Kao, the co-operation of the US and British agencies with the DGS continued to function well.
13. Between 1977 and 1991 --- a period of 14 years--- the R&AW and the DGS were headed by officers who were essentially experts on Pakistan and other countries. They did take interest in improving the coverage of China, but their focus tended to be on Pakistan. Between 1991 and 1993, the R&AW and the DGS were again headed by an officer who was an acknowledged expert on China. He had served for some years in the DGS set-up and hence was able to see that the co-operation between the DGS and the American agencies on China remained strong. Since 1993----for 17 years now--- the R&AW and the DGS have again been headed by officers who were more experts on Pakistan and other countries and internal security than on China. During this period, there has been a dilution of the focus on China. The result---- a weakening of the Chinese language skills and a decrease in the number of officers with expertise on China. The present focus has been on Pakistan and Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, which are important and should receive priority, but this should not be to the detriment of the China-related capabilities.
14. In the early 1980s, the Government constituted a separate cadre of the R&AW called the Research & Analysis Service (RAS). It consisted of officers directly recruited to the R&AW and got trained by it and officers of the Indian Police Service (IPS) and the armed forces, who had come to the R&AW on deputation from the IB and the States as well as from the armed forces and who were found good in intelligence work. For the directly-recruited officers of the RAS, acquisition of foreign language skills was obligatory before they could be confirmed and promoted. It was not necessary for the deputationists from the IPS and the Armed Forces who were taken into the RAS.
15. Most of the deputationists were experts on Pakistan or terrorism and insurgency. Hardly any expert on China came on deputation. The IPS officers of the IB and the State Police do not have much expertise on China. The Armed Forces do have officers with Chinese language skills and China expertise. In the 1960s and the 1970s, some of these officers came on deputation, but since the 1980s, the flow of military officers with China expertise decreased. As a result, the dwindling Chinese language skills and China expertise remained confined to the small number of direct recruits to the RAS. When the turn of these direct recruits for appointment as Secretary (R) came, they were overlooked and IPS officers were inducted from the States or the IB to take over as the chief. The result has been a declining incentive among young officers for acquiring Chinese language skills and China expertise. The number of young officers who want to specialize on China has been coming down. Practically everybody wants to specialize on Pakistan or internal security related subjects so that their chances of rising to the top will be strengthened.
16. Since 1962, we have not had a military conflict with China. As a result, we have not had a comprehensive review of our capabilities for the collection, analysis and assessment of intelligence about China. The fourth review, which was undertaken in 2000 after the Kargil military conflict with Pakistan through a task force headed by G.C.Saxena, former head of the R&AW between 1983 and 1986 and then Governor of J&K, again focused largely on examining our capabilities relating to Pakistan, terrorism, insurgency and other aspects of internal security. It paid only limited attention to China, but it did examine in detail the working of the DGS set-up and our capabilities for the collection of Techint----whether relating to Pakistan or China.
17. Its report led to the creation of two new agencies in the intelligence community---- the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) to analyse and assess military intelligence of a strategic nature and the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) to deal exclusively with the collection of Techint through ground stations as well as air platforms. While the creation of the DIA did not weaken any of the existing military intelligence agencies, the manner in which the NTRO was created weakened the capabilities of the DGS. The Task Force wanted that the NTRO should handle all capabilities to be newly-created and that the then existing capabilities in different organizations like the R&AW, the DGS and the IB should not be disturbed. This recommendation was not fully implemented. One understands that some of the existing capabilities of the DGS were transferred to the NTRO much to the opposition of the then head of the R&AW and the DGS. The China-centric capability of the R&AW and the DGS, which had already been weakened, was further weakened by the manner in which the NTRO was set up.
18.Thus, at a time when our major concerns relating to China have been increasing we find the adequacy and effectiveness of our China-centric capabilities in an unsatisfactory state. Our major concerns relating to China arise from the continuing border dispute with China, its determination to acquire at least part of Arunachal Pradesh if not the whole of it one day, its virtual military alliance with Pakistan, its favouring Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, its increasing presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, its growing strategic presence in South Asia and Myanmar, its space-related military capabilities, its sophisticated capabilities for a cyber warfare, the modernization of its armed forces, the upgradation of its infrastructure in Tibet, the assertiveness of its Navy etc.
19. India is now faced with strategic concerns on many fronts---- all of them arising from Pakistan or China acting individually or jointly. It has been reported that our Army is increasingly concerned over the possibility of a two-front war that one day may be imposed on us by Pakistan and China and has been trying to revamp its strategic doctrines and capabilities to meet such a threat should it arise.
20. The intelligence community should also have a corresponding two-front capability for the collection of intelligence in equal measure about Pakistan and China. Pakistan is important and should continue to have high priority. But China has become equally important and its importance as a priority has been increasing.
21. Since 1962, we have not had a detailed review of our intelligence capabilities relating to China. It is urgent to undertake such a review to identify our deficiencies and take action to remove them. There are two ways of doing this. Either have a holistic review of our entire intelligence capabilities instead of focusing only on China or have a review of only our capabilities relating to China. A holistic review would be more advisable. We have not had such a holistic review since we became independent in 1947.
22. Other countries such as the US have two kinds of reviews. The first is a review undertaken whenever there is a national security set-back or failure. This is similar to the four reviews which we have had. They focus only on identifying the reasons for the set-back or failure and suggesting corrective actions. The second is a holistic review undertaken periodically to determine whether the intelligence agencies are keeping pace with the evolving threats to national security and taking continuous corrective action. Such a holistic review is urgently called for in the light of the growing alliance between China and Pakistan. (28-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, November 2, 2010
THE RETURN OF THE US TO ASIA: CORE INTERESTS VS MUTUAL INTERESTS
B.RAMAN
The forthcoming visit of President Barack Obama to India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea will be as important as his earlier swing through the Asia-Pacific region after assuming office in January 2009. His first swing was in November last year when he visited Japan, Singapore, China and South Korea.
2.Japan and South Korea are figuring in both these swings, indicating the importance attached by him to the USA's relations with its two military allies in Asia. Highlighting the USA's solidarity with these two countries and its security commitments to them have been an important hallmark of his Asia-Pacific policy. One has again seen this recently in the joint exercises held by the US Navy with the South Korean Navy despite Chinese concerns in the wake of the alleged sinking of a South Korean naval ship by North Korea and in the reiteration by Mrs.Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, during her current swing across the Asia-Pacific region that the US security commitments to Japan covered the Senkaku group of islands in the East China Sea too. While the US wished for a peaceful resolution of the dispute between Japan and China, its security commitments to Japan will continue to cover these islands too so long as there is no definitive settlement between Japan and China on the question of sovereignty over the islands.
3. In addition to Japan and South Korea, his Asia-Pacific focus has been on China, India and Indonesia in that order. The reasons for the priority given to China in his Asia-Pacific policy have been economic as well as military------ the impact of China's rise as an economic power on the US economy and the impact of China's rise as a military power on peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and on the freedom of navigation in the waters of the area. Economic issues such as the alleged Chinese manipulation of the value of its currency in order to maintain its exports to the US to the detriment of the US manufacturing sector and the alleged Chinese use of its monopoly in the production of rare earths as a political weapon against countries such as Japan are increasingly figuring in the diplomatic discourse between the US and China.
4.China-related issues with military implications such as the increasing assertiveness of the Chinese Navy, the modernisation of its armed forces and Beijing's repeated emphasis on its "core interests" even if they are at the expense of the "mutual interests" of the countries of the region have led to two consequences. Firstly,a US determination to maintain the primacy of its Navy in the Asia-Pacific region and secondly, its increasing interest in bilateral issues involving China and the countries of the region such as China's disputes with Japan and some ASEAN countries, particularly Vietnam, on the question of sovereignty over the islands in the East and South China Sea.
5. Obama's enhanced interest in India has economic as well as military origin. Economically, while the Indian manufacturing sector poses no threat to the US manufacturing sector similar to the threat posed by the Chinese manufacturing sector, India's services sector, particularly its lead in the information technology sector, is casting, in his view, a lengthening shadow on the US job market. Hence, his unyielding pressure against outsourcing to India to the detriment of the unemployed in the US. Obama's inability to deal effectively with the US economy has been an important contributing factor to the decline in his popularity and to the set-back expected to be suffered by his party in the current mid-term elections to the US Congress. It could come in the way of his own chances of re-election as the President. Obama's economic pressure against both China---on the question of its manipulated currency--- and India on the issue of outsourcing would continue at least till the next Presidential elections. Neither China nor India can expect any gestures from him on economic issues.
6. The military origin of his enhanced interest in India arises from the huge Indian market for military equipment. An increase in the US sales of military equipment to India will have three benefits for the US: an increase in jobs in the US, enhanced US political influence on Indian policy-making and a check on China's power aspirations in the region. The pressure on India to buy more military equipment from the US will continue to be an important component of the US policy towards India. Continuing restrictions on the sale of military-related equipment to China and a gradual relaxation of the existing curbs in relation to India are to be expected in the months to come.
7. A major enunciation of the US policy towards the Asia-Pacific region came in one of Obama's speeches in Japan during his first swing in November,2009. He said: "There must be no doubt.As America’s first Pacific President, I promise you that this Pacific nation will strengthen and sustain our leadership in this vitally important part of the world." He described himself as the USA's first Pacific President because of his birth in Hawaii, his living in Indonesia as a boy and his mother spending nearly a decade working in the villages of Southeast Asia. He added:“The Pacific rim has helped shape my view of the world."
8. In his enunciation of what will be his policy in the Asia-Pacific region, he said:"Since taking office, I have worked to renew American leadership and pursue a new era of engagement with the world based on mutual interests and mutual respect.And our efforts in the Asia Pacific will be rooted, in no small measure, through an enduring and revitalized alliance between the United States and Japan."
9. Explaining why he decided to start his first swing from Japan, he said that he was beginning his journey there in part because of "our common values — a belief in the democratic right of free people to choose their own leaders and realize their own dreams; a belief that made possible the election of both Prime Minister Hatoyama and myself on the promise of change."
10. He had a message for China too. "The United States does not seek to contain China, nor does a deeper relationship with China mean a weakening of our bilateral alliances.On the contrary, the rise of a strong, prosperous China can be a source of strength for the community of nations.And so in Beijing and beyond, we will work to deepen our Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and improve communication between our militaries.We will not agree on every issue, and the United States will never waver in speaking up for the fundamental values that we hold dear – and that includes respect for the religion and cultures of all people. Because support for human rights and human dignity is ingrained in America. But we can move these discussions forward in a spirit of partnership rather than rancor."
11.Chinese analysts looked upon his first swing across the region, the subsequent swings of Mrs.Clinton and other US policy-makers and the increasing US interest in its relations with the ASEAN and its member-countries as "the return of the US to Asia" ---- to underline that it was determined to maintain its political and military primacy in this region and not to concede it to China. While the Chinese have the confidence that China can compete against the US economically, they do not have the confidence that it can compete against it ideologically, politically and militarily.
12. After having seen the increased articulation of the US interests in this region after his first swing, they are watching nervously what the second swing will portend for China and its big power ambitions. It is significant that just as Obama chose Japan, a democracy, for the start of his first swing, he has chosen India, another democracy, for the start of his second swing. Just as he emphasised the USA's ideological compatibility with Japan in his address in Tokyo, the spotlight during his visit to India will be on the USA's ideological compatibility with India.
13. What would this mean in terms of the USA's relations with India and China? That is the question to which Chinese analysts are trying to find an answer. They are still confused. ( 3-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studuies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The forthcoming visit of President Barack Obama to India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea will be as important as his earlier swing through the Asia-Pacific region after assuming office in January 2009. His first swing was in November last year when he visited Japan, Singapore, China and South Korea.
2.Japan and South Korea are figuring in both these swings, indicating the importance attached by him to the USA's relations with its two military allies in Asia. Highlighting the USA's solidarity with these two countries and its security commitments to them have been an important hallmark of his Asia-Pacific policy. One has again seen this recently in the joint exercises held by the US Navy with the South Korean Navy despite Chinese concerns in the wake of the alleged sinking of a South Korean naval ship by North Korea and in the reiteration by Mrs.Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, during her current swing across the Asia-Pacific region that the US security commitments to Japan covered the Senkaku group of islands in the East China Sea too. While the US wished for a peaceful resolution of the dispute between Japan and China, its security commitments to Japan will continue to cover these islands too so long as there is no definitive settlement between Japan and China on the question of sovereignty over the islands.
3. In addition to Japan and South Korea, his Asia-Pacific focus has been on China, India and Indonesia in that order. The reasons for the priority given to China in his Asia-Pacific policy have been economic as well as military------ the impact of China's rise as an economic power on the US economy and the impact of China's rise as a military power on peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and on the freedom of navigation in the waters of the area. Economic issues such as the alleged Chinese manipulation of the value of its currency in order to maintain its exports to the US to the detriment of the US manufacturing sector and the alleged Chinese use of its monopoly in the production of rare earths as a political weapon against countries such as Japan are increasingly figuring in the diplomatic discourse between the US and China.
4.China-related issues with military implications such as the increasing assertiveness of the Chinese Navy, the modernisation of its armed forces and Beijing's repeated emphasis on its "core interests" even if they are at the expense of the "mutual interests" of the countries of the region have led to two consequences. Firstly,a US determination to maintain the primacy of its Navy in the Asia-Pacific region and secondly, its increasing interest in bilateral issues involving China and the countries of the region such as China's disputes with Japan and some ASEAN countries, particularly Vietnam, on the question of sovereignty over the islands in the East and South China Sea.
5. Obama's enhanced interest in India has economic as well as military origin. Economically, while the Indian manufacturing sector poses no threat to the US manufacturing sector similar to the threat posed by the Chinese manufacturing sector, India's services sector, particularly its lead in the information technology sector, is casting, in his view, a lengthening shadow on the US job market. Hence, his unyielding pressure against outsourcing to India to the detriment of the unemployed in the US. Obama's inability to deal effectively with the US economy has been an important contributing factor to the decline in his popularity and to the set-back expected to be suffered by his party in the current mid-term elections to the US Congress. It could come in the way of his own chances of re-election as the President. Obama's economic pressure against both China---on the question of its manipulated currency--- and India on the issue of outsourcing would continue at least till the next Presidential elections. Neither China nor India can expect any gestures from him on economic issues.
6. The military origin of his enhanced interest in India arises from the huge Indian market for military equipment. An increase in the US sales of military equipment to India will have three benefits for the US: an increase in jobs in the US, enhanced US political influence on Indian policy-making and a check on China's power aspirations in the region. The pressure on India to buy more military equipment from the US will continue to be an important component of the US policy towards India. Continuing restrictions on the sale of military-related equipment to China and a gradual relaxation of the existing curbs in relation to India are to be expected in the months to come.
7. A major enunciation of the US policy towards the Asia-Pacific region came in one of Obama's speeches in Japan during his first swing in November,2009. He said: "There must be no doubt.As America’s first Pacific President, I promise you that this Pacific nation will strengthen and sustain our leadership in this vitally important part of the world." He described himself as the USA's first Pacific President because of his birth in Hawaii, his living in Indonesia as a boy and his mother spending nearly a decade working in the villages of Southeast Asia. He added:“The Pacific rim has helped shape my view of the world."
8. In his enunciation of what will be his policy in the Asia-Pacific region, he said:"Since taking office, I have worked to renew American leadership and pursue a new era of engagement with the world based on mutual interests and mutual respect.And our efforts in the Asia Pacific will be rooted, in no small measure, through an enduring and revitalized alliance between the United States and Japan."
9. Explaining why he decided to start his first swing from Japan, he said that he was beginning his journey there in part because of "our common values — a belief in the democratic right of free people to choose their own leaders and realize their own dreams; a belief that made possible the election of both Prime Minister Hatoyama and myself on the promise of change."
10. He had a message for China too. "The United States does not seek to contain China, nor does a deeper relationship with China mean a weakening of our bilateral alliances.On the contrary, the rise of a strong, prosperous China can be a source of strength for the community of nations.And so in Beijing and beyond, we will work to deepen our Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and improve communication between our militaries.We will not agree on every issue, and the United States will never waver in speaking up for the fundamental values that we hold dear – and that includes respect for the religion and cultures of all people. Because support for human rights and human dignity is ingrained in America. But we can move these discussions forward in a spirit of partnership rather than rancor."
11.Chinese analysts looked upon his first swing across the region, the subsequent swings of Mrs.Clinton and other US policy-makers and the increasing US interest in its relations with the ASEAN and its member-countries as "the return of the US to Asia" ---- to underline that it was determined to maintain its political and military primacy in this region and not to concede it to China. While the Chinese have the confidence that China can compete against the US economically, they do not have the confidence that it can compete against it ideologically, politically and militarily.
12. After having seen the increased articulation of the US interests in this region after his first swing, they are watching nervously what the second swing will portend for China and its big power ambitions. It is significant that just as Obama chose Japan, a democracy, for the start of his first swing, he has chosen India, another democracy, for the start of his second swing. Just as he emphasised the USA's ideological compatibility with Japan in his address in Tokyo, the spotlight during his visit to India will be on the USA's ideological compatibility with India.
13. What would this mean in terms of the USA's relations with India and China? That is the question to which Chinese analysts are trying to find an answer. They are still confused. ( 3-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studuies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, November 1, 2010
WEAKNESSES IN CARGO SECURITY
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 689
B.RAMAN
Continuing weaknesses in aviation security despite the strengthening of physical security measures since 9/11 have been noticed and sought (unsuccessfully) to be exploited by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) since December last year.
2. On December 25,2009, a Nigerian student trained by it in Yemen and provided with an improvised explosive device (IED) reportedly concealed inside his underwear managed to go through the security at Amsterdam airport and get on to a flight of the North-West Airlines bound for Detroit undetected. It was reported that the AQAP targeted this particular US-bound flight because it used to take off from a departure gate which did not have a full body scanner. His attempt to blow up the aircraft in an act of suicide terrorism failed because an alert passenger noticed him trying to activate the IED and overcame him in the nick of time before a tragedy could take place.
3.On October 29,2010, it managed to have two printers with cartridges modified to contain an IED with a mobile phone trigger booked by freight aircraft of the FedExpress and UPS companies to two synagogues of Chicago. The modified cartridges were not detected either by the courier companies at the time they were booked or by the airport security at the Sanaa airport through which the packagers had passed and by the airport security at Cologne through which one of the packages booked through the East Midlands airport in the UK had reportedly passed. A reason given for the failure to detect the packages is that generally security checking for IEDs is done at the airport of origin and not at the intermediate transit airports through which the packages pass while on their way to the destination. Thus, once the packages had left the airport of origin at Sanaa undetected, they were able to travel up to Dubai and East Midlands undetected. They were luckily detected at the Dubai and East Midlands airports because of a tip-off received by the Saudi authorities.
4. The ease with which the AQAP managed to circumvent the security procedures regarding the booking of cargo by air shows that it could be equally easy for terrorists to circumvent security measures relating to cargo booked by ship. If they could with ease get packages containing conventional explosives booked, it should be equally easy for them to book by air or by sea packages containing weapons of mass destruction material such as material for a dirty bomb or substances such as anthrax.
5. Security procedures relating to the booking and movement of cargo by air or by sea need to be thoroughly examined in order to identify gaps in security which have been exploited by AQAP and have them removed. Why did the AQAP choose the two synagogues in Chicago? Were they known to it? Or did they place a mail order for the printers----that too from Yemen known as the base of AQAP? Answers to these questions are not available.
6. Reports that an AQAP defector had alerted the Saudi security agencies are not very convincing. He seems to have surrendered to the Saudi authorities days before the packages left on their journey to Chicago from Sanaa. He might have known of the AQAP’s plans to use printer cartridges for sending the IEDs, but how did he know by which company they would be booked and by which flights the cargo companies would send them.
7.An Yemeni student arrested by the local authorities because her telephone number had figured in the papers relating to the booking including the cargo manifest is since reported to have been released. It has been reported that someone else had used her identity and telephone number for booking the packages without her being aware of it.
8. The US authorities seem to suspect that the IED must have been assembled by Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, a 28-year-old Yemen-based son of a retired soldier of Saudi Arabia. They believe he is the chief bomb-maker of the AQAP. John Brennan, Adviser on Counter-terrorism to President Barack Obama, has been quoted by the media as saying that evidence suggested the same person built the intercepted parcel bombs and the device worn by the "underwear" bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab who unsuccessfully tried to blow up the flight to Detroit on Christmas Day last year.
9. Earlier in August 2009, Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri reportedly concealed a PETN-based bomb in the rectum of his younger brother, Abdullah, who pretended to be surrendering to Mohammed bin Nayef, Saudi Deputy Interior Minister. The bomb killed his brother, but the Saudi Deputy Minister escaped because the bomb was activated before Abdullah came within killing range of the Deputy Minister. It was not clear who activated the IED----Abdullah himself or someone else with a mobile phone.
10. In all the four attempts, al-Asiri had used PETN, which is stated to be a stable white powder, similar to salt or sugar, which does not disintegrate and is not easily detectable. In the four attempts, he had used different ways of concealing the IED---- in the rectum, inside the underwear and inside printer cartridges. His concealments were successful in all the four instances and the IEDs could not be detected by the physical security measures now in force in different countries of the world. His high success rate in concealments speak of a thorough knowledge of the security measures now in force and the gaps in them.
11. Of the four attempts attributed to him, one was directed at a Saudi Deputy Minister in Saudi Arabia, one was directed at a US-bound passenger plane when it was approaching the Detroit airport and the latest two were designed to explode either mid-air or at their destination in Chicago.
12. Anwar al-Awlaki, a US-born Yemeni cleric, who now lives in Yemen, is generally believed to be the source of inspiration and motivation for the AQAD. His propaganda and motivational talks are addressed to the English-speaking sections of the Islamic world. While the intelligence agencies of the US and the UK have been keeping the AQAP under watch for over a year now, equal attention has not been paid to its activities by the intelligence agencies of South and South-East Asia, where a large number of English-proficient Muslims live.
13. The AQAP has been coming up as an autonomous organization ideologically aligned with Al Qaeda of North Waziristan in Pakistan headed by Osama bin Laden, but operationally independent of it. Its volunteers/recruits have till now come mainly from amongst Saudis and Yemenis and Muslims of different ethnic origin living in the US. One has not come across instances of Muslims of Pakistani or Indian origin serving in the AQAP. As the case of the Nigerian student recruited for the attempted Christmas Day attack showed, it has been looking around for persons with valid US visas for its operations in the US. There has so far been no evidence of AQAP’s links with the Talibans of Pakistan and organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Lack of evidence should not be interpreted to mean that there are no links between Pakistani jihadis and AQAP. ( 2-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt.of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Continuing weaknesses in aviation security despite the strengthening of physical security measures since 9/11 have been noticed and sought (unsuccessfully) to be exploited by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) since December last year.
2. On December 25,2009, a Nigerian student trained by it in Yemen and provided with an improvised explosive device (IED) reportedly concealed inside his underwear managed to go through the security at Amsterdam airport and get on to a flight of the North-West Airlines bound for Detroit undetected. It was reported that the AQAP targeted this particular US-bound flight because it used to take off from a departure gate which did not have a full body scanner. His attempt to blow up the aircraft in an act of suicide terrorism failed because an alert passenger noticed him trying to activate the IED and overcame him in the nick of time before a tragedy could take place.
3.On October 29,2010, it managed to have two printers with cartridges modified to contain an IED with a mobile phone trigger booked by freight aircraft of the FedExpress and UPS companies to two synagogues of Chicago. The modified cartridges were not detected either by the courier companies at the time they were booked or by the airport security at the Sanaa airport through which the packagers had passed and by the airport security at Cologne through which one of the packages booked through the East Midlands airport in the UK had reportedly passed. A reason given for the failure to detect the packages is that generally security checking for IEDs is done at the airport of origin and not at the intermediate transit airports through which the packages pass while on their way to the destination. Thus, once the packages had left the airport of origin at Sanaa undetected, they were able to travel up to Dubai and East Midlands undetected. They were luckily detected at the Dubai and East Midlands airports because of a tip-off received by the Saudi authorities.
4. The ease with which the AQAP managed to circumvent the security procedures regarding the booking of cargo by air shows that it could be equally easy for terrorists to circumvent security measures relating to cargo booked by ship. If they could with ease get packages containing conventional explosives booked, it should be equally easy for them to book by air or by sea packages containing weapons of mass destruction material such as material for a dirty bomb or substances such as anthrax.
5. Security procedures relating to the booking and movement of cargo by air or by sea need to be thoroughly examined in order to identify gaps in security which have been exploited by AQAP and have them removed. Why did the AQAP choose the two synagogues in Chicago? Were they known to it? Or did they place a mail order for the printers----that too from Yemen known as the base of AQAP? Answers to these questions are not available.
6. Reports that an AQAP defector had alerted the Saudi security agencies are not very convincing. He seems to have surrendered to the Saudi authorities days before the packages left on their journey to Chicago from Sanaa. He might have known of the AQAP’s plans to use printer cartridges for sending the IEDs, but how did he know by which company they would be booked and by which flights the cargo companies would send them.
7.An Yemeni student arrested by the local authorities because her telephone number had figured in the papers relating to the booking including the cargo manifest is since reported to have been released. It has been reported that someone else had used her identity and telephone number for booking the packages without her being aware of it.
8. The US authorities seem to suspect that the IED must have been assembled by Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, a 28-year-old Yemen-based son of a retired soldier of Saudi Arabia. They believe he is the chief bomb-maker of the AQAP. John Brennan, Adviser on Counter-terrorism to President Barack Obama, has been quoted by the media as saying that evidence suggested the same person built the intercepted parcel bombs and the device worn by the "underwear" bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab who unsuccessfully tried to blow up the flight to Detroit on Christmas Day last year.
9. Earlier in August 2009, Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri reportedly concealed a PETN-based bomb in the rectum of his younger brother, Abdullah, who pretended to be surrendering to Mohammed bin Nayef, Saudi Deputy Interior Minister. The bomb killed his brother, but the Saudi Deputy Minister escaped because the bomb was activated before Abdullah came within killing range of the Deputy Minister. It was not clear who activated the IED----Abdullah himself or someone else with a mobile phone.
10. In all the four attempts, al-Asiri had used PETN, which is stated to be a stable white powder, similar to salt or sugar, which does not disintegrate and is not easily detectable. In the four attempts, he had used different ways of concealing the IED---- in the rectum, inside the underwear and inside printer cartridges. His concealments were successful in all the four instances and the IEDs could not be detected by the physical security measures now in force in different countries of the world. His high success rate in concealments speak of a thorough knowledge of the security measures now in force and the gaps in them.
11. Of the four attempts attributed to him, one was directed at a Saudi Deputy Minister in Saudi Arabia, one was directed at a US-bound passenger plane when it was approaching the Detroit airport and the latest two were designed to explode either mid-air or at their destination in Chicago.
12. Anwar al-Awlaki, a US-born Yemeni cleric, who now lives in Yemen, is generally believed to be the source of inspiration and motivation for the AQAD. His propaganda and motivational talks are addressed to the English-speaking sections of the Islamic world. While the intelligence agencies of the US and the UK have been keeping the AQAP under watch for over a year now, equal attention has not been paid to its activities by the intelligence agencies of South and South-East Asia, where a large number of English-proficient Muslims live.
13. The AQAP has been coming up as an autonomous organization ideologically aligned with Al Qaeda of North Waziristan in Pakistan headed by Osama bin Laden, but operationally independent of it. Its volunteers/recruits have till now come mainly from amongst Saudis and Yemenis and Muslims of different ethnic origin living in the US. One has not come across instances of Muslims of Pakistani or Indian origin serving in the AQAP. As the case of the Nigerian student recruited for the attempted Christmas Day attack showed, it has been looking around for persons with valid US visas for its operations in the US. There has so far been no evidence of AQAP’s links with the Talibans of Pakistan and organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Lack of evidence should not be interpreted to mean that there are no links between Pakistani jihadis and AQAP. ( 2-11-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt.of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Xigaze Airport Begins Operations
( From the "People's Daily" of November 1,2010)
In the morning of Oct. 30, an Airbus A319 smoothly landed, marking the opening of Xigaze Airport, Tibet's fifth civil airport.
It is understood that the Xigaze airport is Tibet's key construction project of the 11th Five-Year Plan. Its preliminary design and budget was approved at 532 million yuan.
The airport is located in Jiangdang village, Xigaze City, which is 43 kilometers away from the city, at an altitude 3,782 meters. It has a terminal area of 4,502 square meters. It is designed to meet the demand of a passenger throughput of 230,000 by 2020 as well as a cargo and mail throughput of 1,150 tons. In addition, 2,580 aircraft can take off and land there.
In the morning of Oct. 30, an Airbus A319 smoothly landed, marking the opening of Xigaze Airport, Tibet's fifth civil airport.
It is understood that the Xigaze airport is Tibet's key construction project of the 11th Five-Year Plan. Its preliminary design and budget was approved at 532 million yuan.
The airport is located in Jiangdang village, Xigaze City, which is 43 kilometers away from the city, at an altitude 3,782 meters. It has a terminal area of 4,502 square meters. It is designed to meet the demand of a passenger throughput of 230,000 by 2020 as well as a cargo and mail throughput of 1,150 tons. In addition, 2,580 aircraft can take off and land there.
13,000 Chinese Muslims expected to make pilgrimage to Mecca
(Xinhua)
( From "China Daily" of November 1,2010)
BEIJING - A total of 11,200 Chinese Muslims have already left China on chartered flights for the annual pilgrimage to the Muslim holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, figures released Monday by China's State Administration for Religious Affairs indicated.
About 13,000 Chinese are expected to take part in this year's Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) on 41 chartered flights leaving from Beijing, Lanzhou, Urumqi, Yinchuan and Kunming cities, according to Yang Shuli, assistant president of China Islamic Institute.
Imams, doctors and government officials are accompanying each group of pilgrims.
The first plane took off from Zhongchuan Airport in Lanzhou, capital of northwest China's Gansu Province, on October 18. The last plane is scheduled to leave on November 4.
China has around 23 million Muslims in more than 20 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, according to official statistics.
A pilgrimage to Mecca, the birthplace of the Prophet Mohammed and a shrine for Muslims across the world, is a religious duty that must be carried out at least once in lifetime by every able-bodied Muslim who can afford to do so.
( From "China Daily" of November 1,2010)
BEIJING - A total of 11,200 Chinese Muslims have already left China on chartered flights for the annual pilgrimage to the Muslim holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, figures released Monday by China's State Administration for Religious Affairs indicated.
About 13,000 Chinese are expected to take part in this year's Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) on 41 chartered flights leaving from Beijing, Lanzhou, Urumqi, Yinchuan and Kunming cities, according to Yang Shuli, assistant president of China Islamic Institute.
Imams, doctors and government officials are accompanying each group of pilgrims.
The first plane took off from Zhongchuan Airport in Lanzhou, capital of northwest China's Gansu Province, on October 18. The last plane is scheduled to leave on November 4.
China has around 23 million Muslims in more than 20 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, according to official statistics.
A pilgrimage to Mecca, the birthplace of the Prophet Mohammed and a shrine for Muslims across the world, is a religious duty that must be carried out at least once in lifetime by every able-bodied Muslim who can afford to do so.
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