B.RAMAN
The continuing unrest among Tibetan students in the Qinghai province over the introduction of Mandarin as the medium of instruction shows no signs of subsiding, though it has not taken a violent form and the number of those involved in different protest demonstrations is less than 10,000. As a precautionary measure, to prevent any outbreak of violence, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security, which is responsible for internal security, has moved police reinforcements from the adjoining provinces to the Qinghai province.
2. There were reports of two demonstrations on October 22. About 1000 Tibetan students took out an early morning procession in the Gepasumdo (in Chinese, Tongde) county of the Qinghai province. There was also a peaceful demonstration by about 400 Tibetan students studying in the National Minorities' University in Beijing.
3.The Uighur students in Chinese-controlled Xinjiang have not joined the demonstrations so far even though the order introducing Mandarin as the medium of instruction applies to Uighur schools also. However, there have been reports of protests in the local mosques over orders issued by the Ministry of Public Security recently banning the sporting of beards by men and the wearing of veils by women. The local authorities have allegedly threatened to withdraw the licences of shops and other small and medium business establishments if their Uighur owners and staff do not comply with their instructions in this regard. All Uighur Government servants have also been told to comply with this ban.
4. In the meanwhile, there is a cause for worry to the Ministry of Public Security even from the majority Han community. The advocates of genuine political reforms to dilute the dominating role of the Communist Party and ensure respect for freedom of speech have been circulating through the Internet texts of the recent interview of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, when he was in New York in September, to the CNN emphasising the importance of respecting the freedom of speech. This interview has been blacked out in China by the Ministry of Public Security---an amazing instance of a Department of the Government blacking out an interview of its own Prime Minister.
5. It has been reported that some dissident elements are trying to start a Chinese version of Wikileaks to upload secret government and party documents. A report on this subject carried by the "South China Morning Post" of October 22 is attached. ( 23-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
( Report dated October 22,2010, of the "South China Morning Post " )
Chinese dissidents plan their own WikiLeaks
By Choi Chi-yuk
A group of Chinese dissidents plan to launch their own version of whistle-blowing website WikiLeaks to expose central government secrets and promote democracy.
The organisers have signalled their intentions through social networking sites such as Twitter. They aim to launch "Government Leaks" on June 1 next year and they are calling on people to upload confidential government information to their database.
"I think by making government secrets open we can promote democracy in China. This is a fight against the dictatorship, and to return the right to information to the people. I believe it will advance China's political reform," said the founder of the website, who identified himself as "Deep Throat" when talking to the South China Morning Post (SEHK: 0583, announcements, news) .
Deep Throat said a team of professionals had been aseembled to run the site, including journalists, editors, lawyers and hackers - who would help defend against possible cyberattacks.
The founder said he was inspired by Watergate, the US scandal of the 1970s, and the success of WikiLeaks, which gained worldwide recognition after it published a massive trove of US intelligence documents relating to the war in Afghanistan, a move that infuriated the Pentagon and energised opponents of the war.
Ironically, the founders of WikiLeaks include some Chinese dissidents, according to its website, and it has recently launched a Chinese language version. The Chinese WikiLeaks has not so far published any sensitive information on the Beijing government though.
Deep Throat said at first he tried to form a partnership with WikiLeaks. "I sent them a letter on October 1, to all three e-mail accounts listed by WikiLeaks. I told them that I wanted to co-operate with them. But the e-mails never went through as their system was always down. I ended up with three undelivered e-mails in my box," he said.
"Government Leaks has no relations with WikiLeaks, but you can call us the copycat version of WikiLeaks in China," he said.
Unlike WikiLeaks, which is based in Europe where the freedom of speech and rights to information are guaranteed by the European Union's constitution, Government Leaks would inevitably anger the central government.
Many technology-savvy net activists on the mainland feel Government Leaks is too open in its approach. They say the idea is naive and dangerous. Some fear it could become a trap for the authorities to round-up whistle-blowers.
John Kennedy, the Chinese language editor of Global Voices Online, who is more widely known in China by his pseudonym Feng 37, described it as "a blind man riding a blind horse" - a Chinese idiom of things doomed to fail.
Kennedy, a Canadian national, said five out of the seven e-mail service providers of Government Leaks are based on the mainland - meaning they would be subject to severe surveillance by the authorities. "No one would send them anything, except those stupid guys," he said. He also criticised the website for lacking encrypted links to protect informers.
Another mainland net activist, calling himself Zola, also questioned if the security technology of Government Leaks could provide enough protection to whistle-blowers. "In the worst case, the informer could be prosecuted for illegally possessing state secrets," he warned.
He cited the example of mainland journalist Shi Tao, who was sentenced to 10 years in jail in 2005 for leaking state secrets. Shi was incriminated by the central government after the authorities obtained a secret document he sent to an overseas website through a mainland-based Yahoo China server.
Deep Throat said informers' safety would be treated as the most important issue. Government Leaks would not use normal e-mail accounts to communicate with informers. It is also studying encrypted technologies to receive reports. "We will also keep contacting WikiLeaks and see if they can help," he said.
Another challenge for the website is verifying information and fact checking. Deep Throat said he would invite well-known public figures to help authenticate documents.
"We are not formally launched yet. But once the site is up, we will definitely run things through them before publishing them."
Since making the open call for information a few months ago, Deep Throat said Government Leaks was receiving four or five documents on average each week.
But he said most of the information would hardly be considered classified. "Some are out-dated. Some is actual information that is available on the internet. So far we have got only one document that really fits the bill."
Zola said he would not send any sensitive information to Government Leaks unless he was 100 per cent certain about safety.
He does not suspect Deep Throat's motives and background, but he is sceptical over Government Leaks' ability to overcome the daunting technological and legal challenges it faces.
"They have got to have the right mentality in terms of the seriousness of security in the first place. Then they have a chance of being in full command of the network technology. Only then, can privacy and, hence, the safety of both the website operators and potential informers be secured."
Friday, October 22, 2010
Thursday, October 21, 2010
WHY PAK ARMY REACTED STRONGLY TO COPTER STRIKE IN KURRAM?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO. 686
B.RAMAN
( To be read in continuation of my article of September 18,2010 titled “HAQQANI NETWORK IN PARACHINAR” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4047.html )
“The US, while targeting the Haqqanis, is pursuing the ‘hammer and anvil approach’. Alongside the spike in the drone attacks, US Special Forces have launched an intense operation against the group in eastern Afghanistan, killing a number of its ‘commanders’. The Haqqani network has been the focus of US action for the past two years. However, after the Dec 2009 suicide attack on the Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost, a key facility of the CIA, the network again came under renewed focus. In this unprecedented intense bombardment by drones, military officials see a shift in US policy in Afghanistan from counter-insurgency to counter-terrorism.” ---“Dawn” of Karachi of September 16,2010
----------------------------------------------------
The US has been carrying on Drone (pilotless plane) strikes against suspected members of Al Qaeda and its associate jihadi organizations in North and South Waziristan for nearly four years. These strikes have been stepped up since President Barack Obama assumed office in January last year. There has been a further escalation of the strikes since the beginning of September following reports of an Al Qaeda-inspired plot to carry out Mumbai—26/11 style terrorist strikes in the UK, France and Germany.
2. These strikes have killed many known and identified senior cadres of Al Qaeda, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other associate organizations of Al Qaeda. They have also killed some European recruits to Al Qaeda such as Rashid Rauf of the Jaish-e-Mohammad, who was a British citizen of Mirpuri origin, and German recruits to the Islamic Jihad Union. However, they have not had any success in locating and neutralizing Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, his No.2, Jalalludin Haqqani and his son Serajuddin. The US information seems to be that they are probably in North Waziristan. Hence, the largest number of Drone strikes in that area. The US suspicion has also been strengthened by the reluctance of the Pakistan Army to undertake operations in the North Waziristan area.
3. If it is true that these prized assets of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) are in North Waziristan, the Pakistan Army must have been highly concerned over the stepped-up Drone strikes in that area and reacted strongly against them. But it did not show signs of any such concern. It did protest pro forma against the Drone strikes, calling them a violation of Pakistani sovereignty and calling upon the US periodically to stop them. Beyond that, it did nothing. The presumption in Pakistan is that these strikes are being carried out with the nod of the Pakistani Army.
4. The same Army, which has avoided any retaliatory action against the US for the Drone strikes, reacted vehemently against a helicopter strike by a NATO helicopter on a ground position in the area of the Kurram Agency, in which two soldiers of a para-military unit of the Army were reportedly killed. The Pakistan Army not only protested strongly against the attack, but even retaliated on the ground by stopping the flow of logistic supplies to the NATO forces in Afghanistan through the Torkham area. The US was so concerned by the impact of this on the logistics position in Afghanistan that it asked its then Ambassador in Pakistan, Anne Patterson, to publicly apologise to the Pakistani authorities for this incident. Other apologies from the Pentagon followed. Only then, did the Pakistani Army relent and allow the resumption of logistic supplies.
5. Why did the Pakistan Army retaliate so vehemently against one copter strike in the Kurram area, whereas it had closed its eyes to dozens of Drone strikes in the two Waziristans? According to well-informed Pakistani police sources, this was because the NATO helicopter, which bombed a position in the Kurram Agency, had unwittingly gone very close to the area where the prized assets of the ISI are sheltered. Fears that the US intelligence might have come to know of the presence of these elements in the Kurram area created panic in the GHQ of the Army. It decided to retaliate by stopping the flow of logistics in order to prevent any more strikes by the NATO copters in the area.
6. The “Dawn” Karachi of October 21 has come out with a report on the ground situation in the Kurram area, which explains the importance of Kurram for the Haqqani network and others in the following words: “The most important among all the agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Kurram borders Afghanistan’s Khost province in the south, Paktia in the southwest and Nangarhar in the north, while Kabul is 90 kilometres west of Parachinar. In fact, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, all the major groups of ‘Mujahideen’ had bases in the area. The Haqqani group is active in Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Ghazni and Wardak, which is close to Kabul. And especially as Waziristan has become vulnerable for the network in the wake of frequent US drone attacks, the Haqqanis are desperate to find safe locations outside the agency. Kurram would prove ideal for them and this is why they are trying to reconcile with the tribes in its lower and upper parts. They are not the first to find Kurram’s proximity to Afghanistan attractive. In fact, Taliban first came there in 2006 when they moved to Orakzai Agency and some parts of Kurram from Waziristan after signing peace deals with the government. Baitullah Mehsud, the late chief of the banned Tehrik-i-Taliban, Pakistan had deputed Hakimullah Mehsud to oversee Kurram, Khyber and Orakzai. Another reason the Taliban shifted activities to Orakzai and Kurram was that North and South Waziristan were being closely watched by the International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan and they were facing difficulties crossing the border from there. “
7. The text of the “Dawn” report is annexed.( 22-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE ( Report carried by “Dawn of October 21,2010)
Haqqani’s two sons mediating in Kurram
By Our Correspondent
Thursday, 21 Oct, 2010
ISLAMABAD: The three-year fragile and ineffective efforts for peace between warring sectarian tribes in Kurram Agency have received an unexpected boost in the shape of the controversial Haqqani network which is now trying to play peace broker.
This has been confirmed by more than one source from among the key players involved in the peace process.
The entry of the Haqqanis in the Kurram peace talks, which date back to 2007, has surprised many. After all, the network is usually mentioned in terms of its war theatre in Afghanistan and its base in North Waziristan. The US has been pressurising the government for months to dislodge the Haqqanis from North Waziristan.
Khalil and Ibrahim, sons of the network’s founder Jalaluddin Haqqani, have reportedly been meeting tribal elders from the Kurram in Peshawar and Islamabad to end the hostilities between the local tribes and bring peace to the area which has witnessed some of the worst clashes in its history over the past three years.
The last round of talks was held in Islamabad on Oct 10. “They first turned up at a meeting held in Peshawar in the first week of September,” a tribal elder told Dawn.
This account is corroborated by another elder who adds that the two brothers were also present at the second meeting in the provincial capital on Sept 16 and then at a subsequent one in Islamabad.
It is expected that elders and mediators will put their heads together in the next few days yet again to ensure sustainable peace in the area.
Although the ongoing spate of violence dates back to 2007 and the peace efforts to 2008, the Haqqanis have been in contact with the rival tribes since early last year.
In the early phase, Haqqani’s senior ‘commanders’ negotiated with all the groups in Kurram on his behalf. But the talks remained inconclusive.
Now he has nominated his two younger sons which shows how important the region has become for the group.
However, the people of the violence-wracked Kurram are apprehensive of the aims of the mediators.
Not only are they wary of those involved in fighting in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also because they think that the involvement of the Haqqanis may not be possible without the tacit approval of the military which is reported to enjoy links with this group of Afghan militants.
Such suspicions gain credence against the backdrop of reports that members of the Haqqani clan visited Peshawar and Islamabad for the talks.
Some reports suggest that the Haqqanis have sought full authority and ‘machlaka’ (bond) from rival factions before unveiling a new peace agreement. The proposed deal will be binding on all parties.
However some groups are reluctant to give full authority and machlaka to the ‘mediators’.
Instead, they are stressing that the Murree/Islamabad agreement signed by all tribes be implemented.The government had brokered the agreement in Murree that was signed on Oct 16, 2008.
Under the agreement, the rival tribes deposited Rs20 million to the local authorities as guarantee that they would refrain from fighting in the future.
But the five-point agreement which covers all major issues could not be implemented.
Tribesmen blame a lack of interest on the part of the state organs for this.
According to some reports, the tribesmen have sought the release of the people kidnapped during an attack on a convoy on the Thall-Parachinar road in July.
The Haqqanis’ interest is not linked to the welfare of the residents of Kurram but to the tribal agency’s strategic position. The most important among all the agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Kurram borders Afghanistan’s Khost province in the south, Paktia in the southwest and Nangarhar in the north, while Kabul is 90 kilometres west of Parachinar.
In fact, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, all the major groups of ‘Mujahideen’ had bases in the area.
The Haqqani group is active in Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Ghazni and Wardak, which is close to Kabul. And especially as Waziristan has become vulnerable for the network in the wake of frequent US drone attacks, the Haqqanis are desperate to find safe locations outside the agency. Kurram would prove ideal for them and this is why they are trying to reconcile with the tribes in its lower and upper parts.
They are not the first to find Kurram’s proximity to Afghanistan attractive. In fact, Taliban first came there in 2006 when they moved to Orakzai Agency and some parts of Kurram from Waziristan after signing peace deals with the government.
Baitullah Mehsud, the late chief of the banned Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan had deputed Hakimullah Mehsud to oversee Kurram, Khyber and Orakzai.
Another reason the Taliban shifted activities to Orakzai and Kurram was that North and South Waziristan were being closely watched by the International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan and they were facing difficulties crossing the border from there.
However, the militant groups’ move to Kurram was opposed locally. The residents of the upper parts of Kurram opposed the movement of armed men through the agency. Eventually the agency plunged into bloody clashes in April 2007, leaving over 3,000 people dead, according to unofficial estimates, while hundreds of families were displaced.
Property worth millions of rupees was destroyed in clashes and the people suffered immensely because of prolonged closure of the Thall-Parachinar road.
Unfortunately, scrappy media coverage of the clashes gave them a sectarian colour and the involvement of the Taliban was ignored, although the government did acknowledge on some occasions the involvement of a third party.
For a number of reasons, the Taliban since then have not been able to enforce their writ in Kurram. And this is why they have been forced to negotiate peace, a process which the Haqqanis have joined. Meanwhile, the residents of Kurram remain sceptical about the new initiative. DAWN 21-10-10
B.RAMAN
( To be read in continuation of my article of September 18,2010 titled “HAQQANI NETWORK IN PARACHINAR” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4047.html )
“The US, while targeting the Haqqanis, is pursuing the ‘hammer and anvil approach’. Alongside the spike in the drone attacks, US Special Forces have launched an intense operation against the group in eastern Afghanistan, killing a number of its ‘commanders’. The Haqqani network has been the focus of US action for the past two years. However, after the Dec 2009 suicide attack on the Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost, a key facility of the CIA, the network again came under renewed focus. In this unprecedented intense bombardment by drones, military officials see a shift in US policy in Afghanistan from counter-insurgency to counter-terrorism.” ---“Dawn” of Karachi of September 16,2010
----------------------------------------------------
The US has been carrying on Drone (pilotless plane) strikes against suspected members of Al Qaeda and its associate jihadi organizations in North and South Waziristan for nearly four years. These strikes have been stepped up since President Barack Obama assumed office in January last year. There has been a further escalation of the strikes since the beginning of September following reports of an Al Qaeda-inspired plot to carry out Mumbai—26/11 style terrorist strikes in the UK, France and Germany.
2. These strikes have killed many known and identified senior cadres of Al Qaeda, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other associate organizations of Al Qaeda. They have also killed some European recruits to Al Qaeda such as Rashid Rauf of the Jaish-e-Mohammad, who was a British citizen of Mirpuri origin, and German recruits to the Islamic Jihad Union. However, they have not had any success in locating and neutralizing Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, his No.2, Jalalludin Haqqani and his son Serajuddin. The US information seems to be that they are probably in North Waziristan. Hence, the largest number of Drone strikes in that area. The US suspicion has also been strengthened by the reluctance of the Pakistan Army to undertake operations in the North Waziristan area.
3. If it is true that these prized assets of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) are in North Waziristan, the Pakistan Army must have been highly concerned over the stepped-up Drone strikes in that area and reacted strongly against them. But it did not show signs of any such concern. It did protest pro forma against the Drone strikes, calling them a violation of Pakistani sovereignty and calling upon the US periodically to stop them. Beyond that, it did nothing. The presumption in Pakistan is that these strikes are being carried out with the nod of the Pakistani Army.
4. The same Army, which has avoided any retaliatory action against the US for the Drone strikes, reacted vehemently against a helicopter strike by a NATO helicopter on a ground position in the area of the Kurram Agency, in which two soldiers of a para-military unit of the Army were reportedly killed. The Pakistan Army not only protested strongly against the attack, but even retaliated on the ground by stopping the flow of logistic supplies to the NATO forces in Afghanistan through the Torkham area. The US was so concerned by the impact of this on the logistics position in Afghanistan that it asked its then Ambassador in Pakistan, Anne Patterson, to publicly apologise to the Pakistani authorities for this incident. Other apologies from the Pentagon followed. Only then, did the Pakistani Army relent and allow the resumption of logistic supplies.
5. Why did the Pakistan Army retaliate so vehemently against one copter strike in the Kurram area, whereas it had closed its eyes to dozens of Drone strikes in the two Waziristans? According to well-informed Pakistani police sources, this was because the NATO helicopter, which bombed a position in the Kurram Agency, had unwittingly gone very close to the area where the prized assets of the ISI are sheltered. Fears that the US intelligence might have come to know of the presence of these elements in the Kurram area created panic in the GHQ of the Army. It decided to retaliate by stopping the flow of logistics in order to prevent any more strikes by the NATO copters in the area.
6. The “Dawn” Karachi of October 21 has come out with a report on the ground situation in the Kurram area, which explains the importance of Kurram for the Haqqani network and others in the following words: “The most important among all the agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Kurram borders Afghanistan’s Khost province in the south, Paktia in the southwest and Nangarhar in the north, while Kabul is 90 kilometres west of Parachinar. In fact, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, all the major groups of ‘Mujahideen’ had bases in the area. The Haqqani group is active in Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Ghazni and Wardak, which is close to Kabul. And especially as Waziristan has become vulnerable for the network in the wake of frequent US drone attacks, the Haqqanis are desperate to find safe locations outside the agency. Kurram would prove ideal for them and this is why they are trying to reconcile with the tribes in its lower and upper parts. They are not the first to find Kurram’s proximity to Afghanistan attractive. In fact, Taliban first came there in 2006 when they moved to Orakzai Agency and some parts of Kurram from Waziristan after signing peace deals with the government. Baitullah Mehsud, the late chief of the banned Tehrik-i-Taliban, Pakistan had deputed Hakimullah Mehsud to oversee Kurram, Khyber and Orakzai. Another reason the Taliban shifted activities to Orakzai and Kurram was that North and South Waziristan were being closely watched by the International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan and they were facing difficulties crossing the border from there. “
7. The text of the “Dawn” report is annexed.( 22-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE ( Report carried by “Dawn of October 21,2010)
Haqqani’s two sons mediating in Kurram
By Our Correspondent
Thursday, 21 Oct, 2010
ISLAMABAD: The three-year fragile and ineffective efforts for peace between warring sectarian tribes in Kurram Agency have received an unexpected boost in the shape of the controversial Haqqani network which is now trying to play peace broker.
This has been confirmed by more than one source from among the key players involved in the peace process.
The entry of the Haqqanis in the Kurram peace talks, which date back to 2007, has surprised many. After all, the network is usually mentioned in terms of its war theatre in Afghanistan and its base in North Waziristan. The US has been pressurising the government for months to dislodge the Haqqanis from North Waziristan.
Khalil and Ibrahim, sons of the network’s founder Jalaluddin Haqqani, have reportedly been meeting tribal elders from the Kurram in Peshawar and Islamabad to end the hostilities between the local tribes and bring peace to the area which has witnessed some of the worst clashes in its history over the past three years.
The last round of talks was held in Islamabad on Oct 10. “They first turned up at a meeting held in Peshawar in the first week of September,” a tribal elder told Dawn.
This account is corroborated by another elder who adds that the two brothers were also present at the second meeting in the provincial capital on Sept 16 and then at a subsequent one in Islamabad.
It is expected that elders and mediators will put their heads together in the next few days yet again to ensure sustainable peace in the area.
Although the ongoing spate of violence dates back to 2007 and the peace efforts to 2008, the Haqqanis have been in contact with the rival tribes since early last year.
In the early phase, Haqqani’s senior ‘commanders’ negotiated with all the groups in Kurram on his behalf. But the talks remained inconclusive.
Now he has nominated his two younger sons which shows how important the region has become for the group.
However, the people of the violence-wracked Kurram are apprehensive of the aims of the mediators.
Not only are they wary of those involved in fighting in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also because they think that the involvement of the Haqqanis may not be possible without the tacit approval of the military which is reported to enjoy links with this group of Afghan militants.
Such suspicions gain credence against the backdrop of reports that members of the Haqqani clan visited Peshawar and Islamabad for the talks.
Some reports suggest that the Haqqanis have sought full authority and ‘machlaka’ (bond) from rival factions before unveiling a new peace agreement. The proposed deal will be binding on all parties.
However some groups are reluctant to give full authority and machlaka to the ‘mediators’.
Instead, they are stressing that the Murree/Islamabad agreement signed by all tribes be implemented.The government had brokered the agreement in Murree that was signed on Oct 16, 2008.
Under the agreement, the rival tribes deposited Rs20 million to the local authorities as guarantee that they would refrain from fighting in the future.
But the five-point agreement which covers all major issues could not be implemented.
Tribesmen blame a lack of interest on the part of the state organs for this.
According to some reports, the tribesmen have sought the release of the people kidnapped during an attack on a convoy on the Thall-Parachinar road in July.
The Haqqanis’ interest is not linked to the welfare of the residents of Kurram but to the tribal agency’s strategic position. The most important among all the agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Kurram borders Afghanistan’s Khost province in the south, Paktia in the southwest and Nangarhar in the north, while Kabul is 90 kilometres west of Parachinar.
In fact, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, all the major groups of ‘Mujahideen’ had bases in the area.
The Haqqani group is active in Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Ghazni and Wardak, which is close to Kabul. And especially as Waziristan has become vulnerable for the network in the wake of frequent US drone attacks, the Haqqanis are desperate to find safe locations outside the agency. Kurram would prove ideal for them and this is why they are trying to reconcile with the tribes in its lower and upper parts.
They are not the first to find Kurram’s proximity to Afghanistan attractive. In fact, Taliban first came there in 2006 when they moved to Orakzai Agency and some parts of Kurram from Waziristan after signing peace deals with the government.
Baitullah Mehsud, the late chief of the banned Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan had deputed Hakimullah Mehsud to oversee Kurram, Khyber and Orakzai.
Another reason the Taliban shifted activities to Orakzai and Kurram was that North and South Waziristan were being closely watched by the International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan and they were facing difficulties crossing the border from there.
However, the militant groups’ move to Kurram was opposed locally. The residents of the upper parts of Kurram opposed the movement of armed men through the agency. Eventually the agency plunged into bloody clashes in April 2007, leaving over 3,000 people dead, according to unofficial estimates, while hundreds of families were displaced.
Property worth millions of rupees was destroyed in clashes and the people suffered immensely because of prolonged closure of the Thall-Parachinar road.
Unfortunately, scrappy media coverage of the clashes gave them a sectarian colour and the involvement of the Taliban was ignored, although the government did acknowledge on some occasions the involvement of a third party.
For a number of reasons, the Taliban since then have not been able to enforce their writ in Kurram. And this is why they have been forced to negotiate peace, a process which the Haqqanis have joined. Meanwhile, the residents of Kurram remain sceptical about the new initiative. DAWN 21-10-10
TIBETAN STUDENT PROTESTS SPREAD
B.RAMAN
Protests by Tibetan students against the introduction of Mandarin as a medium of instruction in Tibetan schools spread to new areas on October 20,2010. However, the protests have remained peaceful.
2. In an attempt to pacify the protesting students, Party and Government officials have been meeting the students to explain the new language policy. At different places, different explanations have been given by the officials. At some places, the students have been assured that the introduction of Mandarin as the medium of instruction would not mean the downgrading of the importance attached to the study of the Tibetan language. At some other places, the students have been told that they will have the option of choosing either Tibetan or Mandarin as the medium of instruction, but those choosing Mandarin will get a higher credit. The students have not been satisfied by these explanations.
3. About 8,000 students held protest demonstrations on October 20 at various towns in the Tsolho (in Chinese, Hainan) Tibet Autonomous Prefecture in the western Qinghai province. (21-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Protests by Tibetan students against the introduction of Mandarin as a medium of instruction in Tibetan schools spread to new areas on October 20,2010. However, the protests have remained peaceful.
2. In an attempt to pacify the protesting students, Party and Government officials have been meeting the students to explain the new language policy. At different places, different explanations have been given by the officials. At some places, the students have been assured that the introduction of Mandarin as the medium of instruction would not mean the downgrading of the importance attached to the study of the Tibetan language. At some other places, the students have been told that they will have the option of choosing either Tibetan or Mandarin as the medium of instruction, but those choosing Mandarin will get a higher credit. The students have not been satisfied by these explanations.
3. About 8,000 students held protest demonstrations on October 20 at various towns in the Tsolho (in Chinese, Hainan) Tibet Autonomous Prefecture in the western Qinghai province. (21-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, October 20, 2010
WANTED: A HANOI COOPERATION ORGANISATION A LA THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANISATION
B.RAMAN
Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh will be visiting Japan, Vietnam and Malaysia for six days from October 24,2010.He has to attend the ASEAN summit at Hanoi. He is combining it with bilateral visits to the three countries.
2. China is not expected to be a major issue during his discussions with the Malaysian leaders.Though Malaysia is one of the parties to the dispute with China over the question of sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea, it has been favouring a non-confrontational approach to solving the differences among the countries involved without encouraging the interests or involvement of outside powers such as the US.
3. China would be an important issue during the discussions of Dr.Manmohan Singh with the Vietnamese and Japanese leaders. The leaders of all the three countries have valid reasons to be concerned over the increasing assertiveness of the Chinese Navy in projecting its territorial claims in the South China and East China Seas and the Army against India in India's Arunachal Pradesh area, which the Chinese call southern Tibet.In the territorial disputes, the status quo favours India (in Arunachal Pradesh), Japan and Vietnam. The Chinese have been wanting to change it by strengthening their Navy and their military capability in Tibet.They have started extending their railway line in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region towards the border with Nepal and Arunachal Pradesh and have plans for railway link-ups with Kathmandu and Chittagong. They have launched new projects for upgrading and expanding the highway networks in Tibet and are giving their Air Force, which till now enjoyed less attention than their Navy, a strategic reach beyond their borders as seen during the recent joint exercises of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) and their bilateral joint exercises with the Turkish Air Force in Turkish air space with refueling facilities provided by Pakistan and Iran.
4. The Chinese have also been increasing their strategic presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) in order to strengthen their hold in the Chinese-controlled Xinjiang province and to confront India with a new strategic front with China. They seem determined to go ahead with their plans to supply at least two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan disregarding the opposition from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
5. The over-active Chinese Navy has been harassing Vietnamese fishing and oil/gas exploration vessels in the areas of the South China Sea legitimately belonging to Vietnam and the continuing dispute with Japan over the ownership of the Senkaku group of islands in the East China Sea highlights their determination to challenge the status quo by using their growing naval power. Following Japanese action in capturing a Chinese fishing trawler which trespassed into Japanese territorial waters, they have launched a war of nerves against Japan, started sending military vessels to escort their trespassing fishing trawlers and stopped the export of rare earths to Japan on which Japanese electronic industries are vitally dependent.
6.These are not sporadic developments of a tactical nature. These are evidence of a calculated Chinese strategy to enforce their territorial claims and expand their strategic presence and influence. The port construction projects undertaken by them in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar and proposals for a similar project in Chittagong in Bangladesh are part of the same long-term strategy to expand their strategic frontier. A wake-up call about the Chinese attempts to expand their strategic frontier was recently sounded by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during a talk in Washington DC.
7. As the countries most threatened by the Chinese strategy, India, Japan and Vietnam should put their heads together as to how to deal with it without unnecessarily creating a confrontational situation. This subject should be discussed by Dr.Manmohan Singh during his forthcoming visit to Japan and Vietnam. Among the options that could be considered are forming a Hanoi Co-operation Organisation (HCO) similar to the Shanghani Cooperation Organisation (SCO) floated by China and Russia with some Central Asian countries some years ago. The main objective of the SCO was defined as protecting the member-countries from the three evils of terrorism, extremism and splittism. The main objective of the proposed HCO could be promoting co-operative ways of monitoring and assessing threats to regional security from state and non-state actors and helping each other in strengthening their respective capacities.
8. The US, as the major naval power of the region with concerns over the Chinese naval assertiveness and the increase in its activities in the Indian Ocean region, should be an additional member of this organisation along with South Korea which has similar concerns. Initially, the founding membership of the organisation should be confined to these five countries----India, Vietnam. Japan, South Koprea and the US. After it gets going satisfactorily, proposals for its expansion could be considered.
9. India should take advantage of the forthcoming visit of President Barack Obama to New Delhi to discuss this with him in the light of the Prime Minister's discussions in Hanoi and Tokyo. ( 20-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
.
Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh will be visiting Japan, Vietnam and Malaysia for six days from October 24,2010.He has to attend the ASEAN summit at Hanoi. He is combining it with bilateral visits to the three countries.
2. China is not expected to be a major issue during his discussions with the Malaysian leaders.Though Malaysia is one of the parties to the dispute with China over the question of sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea, it has been favouring a non-confrontational approach to solving the differences among the countries involved without encouraging the interests or involvement of outside powers such as the US.
3. China would be an important issue during the discussions of Dr.Manmohan Singh with the Vietnamese and Japanese leaders. The leaders of all the three countries have valid reasons to be concerned over the increasing assertiveness of the Chinese Navy in projecting its territorial claims in the South China and East China Seas and the Army against India in India's Arunachal Pradesh area, which the Chinese call southern Tibet.In the territorial disputes, the status quo favours India (in Arunachal Pradesh), Japan and Vietnam. The Chinese have been wanting to change it by strengthening their Navy and their military capability in Tibet.They have started extending their railway line in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region towards the border with Nepal and Arunachal Pradesh and have plans for railway link-ups with Kathmandu and Chittagong. They have launched new projects for upgrading and expanding the highway networks in Tibet and are giving their Air Force, which till now enjoyed less attention than their Navy, a strategic reach beyond their borders as seen during the recent joint exercises of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO) and their bilateral joint exercises with the Turkish Air Force in Turkish air space with refueling facilities provided by Pakistan and Iran.
4. The Chinese have also been increasing their strategic presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) in order to strengthen their hold in the Chinese-controlled Xinjiang province and to confront India with a new strategic front with China. They seem determined to go ahead with their plans to supply at least two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan disregarding the opposition from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
5. The over-active Chinese Navy has been harassing Vietnamese fishing and oil/gas exploration vessels in the areas of the South China Sea legitimately belonging to Vietnam and the continuing dispute with Japan over the ownership of the Senkaku group of islands in the East China Sea highlights their determination to challenge the status quo by using their growing naval power. Following Japanese action in capturing a Chinese fishing trawler which trespassed into Japanese territorial waters, they have launched a war of nerves against Japan, started sending military vessels to escort their trespassing fishing trawlers and stopped the export of rare earths to Japan on which Japanese electronic industries are vitally dependent.
6.These are not sporadic developments of a tactical nature. These are evidence of a calculated Chinese strategy to enforce their territorial claims and expand their strategic presence and influence. The port construction projects undertaken by them in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar and proposals for a similar project in Chittagong in Bangladesh are part of the same long-term strategy to expand their strategic frontier. A wake-up call about the Chinese attempts to expand their strategic frontier was recently sounded by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during a talk in Washington DC.
7. As the countries most threatened by the Chinese strategy, India, Japan and Vietnam should put their heads together as to how to deal with it without unnecessarily creating a confrontational situation. This subject should be discussed by Dr.Manmohan Singh during his forthcoming visit to Japan and Vietnam. Among the options that could be considered are forming a Hanoi Co-operation Organisation (HCO) similar to the Shanghani Cooperation Organisation (SCO) floated by China and Russia with some Central Asian countries some years ago. The main objective of the SCO was defined as protecting the member-countries from the three evils of terrorism, extremism and splittism. The main objective of the proposed HCO could be promoting co-operative ways of monitoring and assessing threats to regional security from state and non-state actors and helping each other in strengthening their respective capacities.
8. The US, as the major naval power of the region with concerns over the Chinese naval assertiveness and the increase in its activities in the Indian Ocean region, should be an additional member of this organisation along with South Korea which has similar concerns. Initially, the founding membership of the organisation should be confined to these five countries----India, Vietnam. Japan, South Koprea and the US. After it gets going satisfactorily, proposals for its expansion could be considered.
9. India should take advantage of the forthcoming visit of President Barack Obama to New Delhi to discuss this with him in the light of the Prime Minister's discussions in Hanoi and Tokyo. ( 20-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
.
CHINESE SUPPRESSION OF TIBETAN LANGUAGE LEADS TO PROTESTS
B.RAMAN
In the wake of the first Xinjiang Work Conference held at Beijing from May 17 to 19, 2010, to draft a blueprint for the Chinese-controlled province's economic development until 2020, the Chinese authorities had embarked on a campaign in Xinjiang, which de-emphasised the Uighur ethnic identity of the province and highlighted the Government's plans for its rapid economic development in order to bring it on par with other Chinese provinces. Following the conference, the "China Daily" of June 4, 2010, quoted Prof. Qiang Shigong, Director of the Research Centre on the Rule of Law at Peking University, as calling for measures to weaken the identity of ethnic groups in policy-making, such as closing ethnic schools to promote more communication between different ethnic groups. He also said the promotion of Mandarin in ethnic regions could benefit local people in the current market economy environment. Following this, the Chinese authorities have initiated a policy of introducing Mandarin as the medium of instruction in the Uighur schools of the province. Under this policy, while Uighur is taught as a second language in the Uighur schools, all teaching in other subjects has to be in Mandarin. This has added to the anti-Han resentment in the Uighur community, which looks upon the new policy as meant to destroy the ethnic identity of the Uighurs and integrate them with the Hans.
2. A similar policy has now been extended to the schools in the so-called Tibetan Autonomous Region and other Tibetan-inhabited areas. While Tibetan continues to be taught as a second language, Mandarin is being made the medium of instruction in other subjects. As in the case of the Uighurs, the objective is to destroy the ethnic identity of the Tibetans and integrate them with the Hans. This has caused considerable resentment in the Tibetan student community. This resentment led to a spontaneous demonstration by about 7,000 Tibetan students in Rebkong [in Chinese, Tongren] in the Malho [in Chinese, Huangnan] prefecture in the Chinese-controlled Qinghai province on October 19,2010. The demonstrations remained peaceful and there are no reports of any violent incidents.
3.The student demonstrators, who belonged to six schools in the area, carried banners, written in both Tibetan and Chinese, which said “Equality Among Nationalities” and “Expand the Use of the Tibetan Language.” Monks from the nearby Rebkong Rongpo monastery joined in the demonstration. The demonstrators said that at a recent meeting convened by the Education Department of Qinghai province, the local Communist Party Secretary and Chairman ordered that the language used in textbooks should be changed to Chinese.Similar protest demonstrations were earlier reported from the Tibetan schools in the Chinese-controlled Gansu province. According to Tibetan exiles, many Tibetan teachers who cannot teach in Mandarin have been sacked and replaced by Han teachers.
4.This may please be read in continuation of my article of June 3,2010, titled "China to De-Emphasise Uighur Identity of Xinjiang" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3886.html .
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
In the wake of the first Xinjiang Work Conference held at Beijing from May 17 to 19, 2010, to draft a blueprint for the Chinese-controlled province's economic development until 2020, the Chinese authorities had embarked on a campaign in Xinjiang, which de-emphasised the Uighur ethnic identity of the province and highlighted the Government's plans for its rapid economic development in order to bring it on par with other Chinese provinces. Following the conference, the "China Daily" of June 4, 2010, quoted Prof. Qiang Shigong, Director of the Research Centre on the Rule of Law at Peking University, as calling for measures to weaken the identity of ethnic groups in policy-making, such as closing ethnic schools to promote more communication between different ethnic groups. He also said the promotion of Mandarin in ethnic regions could benefit local people in the current market economy environment. Following this, the Chinese authorities have initiated a policy of introducing Mandarin as the medium of instruction in the Uighur schools of the province. Under this policy, while Uighur is taught as a second language in the Uighur schools, all teaching in other subjects has to be in Mandarin. This has added to the anti-Han resentment in the Uighur community, which looks upon the new policy as meant to destroy the ethnic identity of the Uighurs and integrate them with the Hans.
2. A similar policy has now been extended to the schools in the so-called Tibetan Autonomous Region and other Tibetan-inhabited areas. While Tibetan continues to be taught as a second language, Mandarin is being made the medium of instruction in other subjects. As in the case of the Uighurs, the objective is to destroy the ethnic identity of the Tibetans and integrate them with the Hans. This has caused considerable resentment in the Tibetan student community. This resentment led to a spontaneous demonstration by about 7,000 Tibetan students in Rebkong [in Chinese, Tongren] in the Malho [in Chinese, Huangnan] prefecture in the Chinese-controlled Qinghai province on October 19,2010. The demonstrations remained peaceful and there are no reports of any violent incidents.
3.The student demonstrators, who belonged to six schools in the area, carried banners, written in both Tibetan and Chinese, which said “Equality Among Nationalities” and “Expand the Use of the Tibetan Language.” Monks from the nearby Rebkong Rongpo monastery joined in the demonstration. The demonstrators said that at a recent meeting convened by the Education Department of Qinghai province, the local Communist Party Secretary and Chairman ordered that the language used in textbooks should be changed to Chinese.Similar protest demonstrations were earlier reported from the Tibetan schools in the Chinese-controlled Gansu province. According to Tibetan exiles, many Tibetan teachers who cannot teach in Mandarin have been sacked and replaced by Han teachers.
4.This may please be read in continuation of my article of June 3,2010, titled "China to De-Emphasise Uighur Identity of Xinjiang" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3886.html .
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Tuesday, October 19, 2010
AGENDA FOR OBAMA'S VISIT: COUNTER-TERRORISM
B.RAMAN
Indo-US co-operation in counter-terrorism has the following components:
* Assistance in capacity building in traditional counter-terrorism: Started in the early 1980s during the administration of Ronald Reagan when some officers of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) were sent initially to the UK and then to the US for training in matters like dealing with hostage situations. Aviation security to prevent and deal with hijacking was an important initial area of US assistance in capacity-building. This has since expanded to cover other areas such as forensic examination of explosive devices.
* Assistance in capacity-building in non-traditional areas: Started in 2001 during the administration of George Bush at the initiative of Richard Armitage, the then US Deputy Secretary of State. Cyber security was the initial area of US assistance. This was extended to other areas such as maritime security in ports and container vessels, prevention of catastrophic acts of terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass destruction material etc.
* Assistance in strengthening the physical security of vulnerable establishments and sectors such as urban transport: Started during the administration of George Bush after the explosions in some Mumbai suburban trains in July,2006.
* Mutual legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases: Started during the second term of Ronald Reagan when the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was sought by India for the investigation of the assassination of Gen.A.S.Vaidya, retired Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), by some Khalistani terrorists in Pune in 1985. The co-operation declined during the administration of Bill Clinton. The US agencies were only partly helpful when their assistance was sought in the investigation and prosecution of the Mumbai blasts of March,1993. The co-operation has improved under the George Bush and Barack Obama Administrations. Under the Obama Administration, the FBI was helpful in the forensic examination of the intercepts during the 26/11 terrorist strikes. For the first time, FBI officers testified before the trial court through video-conferencing. In the past, the FBI's policy was not to allow its officers to testify before an Indian court.
* Intelligence-sharing: This is the most unsatisfactory aspect of Indo-US counter-terrorism co-operation. Before 26/11, the US had hardly ever shared with India any worthwhile preventive intelligence. However, in 2008, during the Bush Administration, the FBI was reported to have passed on to Indian agencies three fairly specific bits of information about the plans of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) to launch a sea-borne attack on some seafront establishments in Mumbai including the Taj Mahal hotel. This information cannot by any means be described as vague or non-specific. If the Indian agencies had promptly acted in strengthening physical security as a follow-up to this, 26/11 might have been prevented. Despite this instance, intelligence-sharing from the US has generally been unsatisfactory due to the following reasons. Firstly, the large, prosperous and politically active Sikh community in the US prevented their Governments from co-operating fully with the Government of India in dealing with Khalistani terrorism. Secondly, all US administrations have as a matter of policy refrained from sharing with India intelligence relating to terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir. Thirdly, the US agencies are allowed to share with India only preventive intelligence relating to planned acts of terrorism by jihadi organisations in Indian territory outside J&K. Here too, the agencies are required to share the intelligence in such a manner as not to implicate Pakistan and not to add substance to India's case against Pakistan for the sponsorship of terrorism in Indian territory. There have been exceptions to this such as the reported US warning to India about a planned terrorist strike against the Indian Embassy in Kabul by terrorist elements instigated by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). So long as the US continues to attach importance to counter-terrorism co-operation from Pakistan for dealing with the situation in Afghanistan, its intelligence-sharing with India and co-operation with India against Pakistan will be half-hearted.
* Mutual assistance in the interrogation of arrested terrorist suspects, sharing of the produce of the interrogation and opportunities for the examination of captured documents: Another highly-unsatisfactory area of co-operation due to the US keenness to protect Pakistan from the consequences of its using terrorism against India. It was reported that after the US troops entered Kabul in 2001, the US response to Indian requests for the interrogation of some suspects and for the examination of some documents relating to the Kandahar hijacking of 1999 was unsatisfactory. So was its much-delayed response to Indian requests for the prompt interrogation of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the LET who had visited India five times for collecting targeting information for the LET. While the FBI did share with India information relating to the planned terrorist strikes in Mumbai (the dates were not known), it did not share with India collateral information which might have enabled India to unearth the LET network in India. Fears that if it shared the collateral information with India, its agencies might arrest and interrogate Headley thereby exposing his links with the US agencies seem to have stood in the way of this sharing. The recently reported disclosures of two ex-wives of Headley----one living in the US and the other in Pakistan---about their alerting an FBI Task Force in New York and the US Embassy in Islamabad regarding Headley’s terrorist links with the LET could have embarrassing legal consequences for the US Government. The LET was designated by the US State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) under US laws in 2000. It is criminal for any US national to maintain contacts with an FTO or to assist it in any way. The alerts of the two ex-wives showed that Headley had violated US laws relating to contacts with an FTO. He should have been immediately detained, investigated and prosecuted. The FBI did not do so. He continued to maintain his contacts with the LET and we have an instance of an American national helping an FTO in killing some US nationals in Mumbai without the FBI taking any action to stop this. If the relatives of the Americans killed in Mumbai take the State Department, the US Embassy in Islamabad and the FBI to court for this, they could face difficulty in defending themselves.
2. Before 2000, there was no institutional mechanism for facilitating and co-ordinating Indo-US co-operation. The co-operation was handled informally at the level of the intelligence and investigative agencies of the two countries. During their meeting in London in January 2000, Jaswant Singh, the then Indian Foreign Minister, and Strobe Talbot, the then US Deputy Secretary of State, agreed to set up an institutional mechanism in the form of the Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism. This was followed by the setting up of an Indo-US Cyber Security Forum as suggested by Armitage in 2002. The Forum ran into controversy following Indian suspicions that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had misused it for penetrating the National Security Council Secretariat. During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Washington DC in November last year, the two countries launched what was described as a Joint Counter-Terrorism Initiative to strengthen counter-terrorism co-operation in different fields such as forensics, megacity policing etc. This was formalized into a Memo of Understanding in July,2010. It is not clear which institution co-ordinates and monitors its implementation. The Headley case illustrates deficiencies in its implementation.
3. After the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984, India and the UK set up what was called Indo-UK Back Channel For Counter-Terrorism Co-operation, which at that time was mainly directed against Khalistani terrorists. This consisted of hot lines connecting the chiefs of the intelligence agencies of the two countries and periodic co-ordination meetings between the counter-terrorism experts of the countries. It worked very well because the trust level between the Indian and British agencies was high.
4. The trust level between the Indian and US agencies leaves much to be desired. The US anxiety to protect Pakistan adds to the distrust. How to improve the trust level and what should be the institutional mechanism for improving co-operation are important questions which should be discussed by our Prime Minister and President Obama during their forthcoming meeting in New Delhi next month. ( 20-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Indo-US co-operation in counter-terrorism has the following components:
* Assistance in capacity building in traditional counter-terrorism: Started in the early 1980s during the administration of Ronald Reagan when some officers of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) were sent initially to the UK and then to the US for training in matters like dealing with hostage situations. Aviation security to prevent and deal with hijacking was an important initial area of US assistance in capacity-building. This has since expanded to cover other areas such as forensic examination of explosive devices.
* Assistance in capacity-building in non-traditional areas: Started in 2001 during the administration of George Bush at the initiative of Richard Armitage, the then US Deputy Secretary of State. Cyber security was the initial area of US assistance. This was extended to other areas such as maritime security in ports and container vessels, prevention of catastrophic acts of terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass destruction material etc.
* Assistance in strengthening the physical security of vulnerable establishments and sectors such as urban transport: Started during the administration of George Bush after the explosions in some Mumbai suburban trains in July,2006.
* Mutual legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases: Started during the second term of Ronald Reagan when the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was sought by India for the investigation of the assassination of Gen.A.S.Vaidya, retired Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), by some Khalistani terrorists in Pune in 1985. The co-operation declined during the administration of Bill Clinton. The US agencies were only partly helpful when their assistance was sought in the investigation and prosecution of the Mumbai blasts of March,1993. The co-operation has improved under the George Bush and Barack Obama Administrations. Under the Obama Administration, the FBI was helpful in the forensic examination of the intercepts during the 26/11 terrorist strikes. For the first time, FBI officers testified before the trial court through video-conferencing. In the past, the FBI's policy was not to allow its officers to testify before an Indian court.
* Intelligence-sharing: This is the most unsatisfactory aspect of Indo-US counter-terrorism co-operation. Before 26/11, the US had hardly ever shared with India any worthwhile preventive intelligence. However, in 2008, during the Bush Administration, the FBI was reported to have passed on to Indian agencies three fairly specific bits of information about the plans of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) to launch a sea-borne attack on some seafront establishments in Mumbai including the Taj Mahal hotel. This information cannot by any means be described as vague or non-specific. If the Indian agencies had promptly acted in strengthening physical security as a follow-up to this, 26/11 might have been prevented. Despite this instance, intelligence-sharing from the US has generally been unsatisfactory due to the following reasons. Firstly, the large, prosperous and politically active Sikh community in the US prevented their Governments from co-operating fully with the Government of India in dealing with Khalistani terrorism. Secondly, all US administrations have as a matter of policy refrained from sharing with India intelligence relating to terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir. Thirdly, the US agencies are allowed to share with India only preventive intelligence relating to planned acts of terrorism by jihadi organisations in Indian territory outside J&K. Here too, the agencies are required to share the intelligence in such a manner as not to implicate Pakistan and not to add substance to India's case against Pakistan for the sponsorship of terrorism in Indian territory. There have been exceptions to this such as the reported US warning to India about a planned terrorist strike against the Indian Embassy in Kabul by terrorist elements instigated by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). So long as the US continues to attach importance to counter-terrorism co-operation from Pakistan for dealing with the situation in Afghanistan, its intelligence-sharing with India and co-operation with India against Pakistan will be half-hearted.
* Mutual assistance in the interrogation of arrested terrorist suspects, sharing of the produce of the interrogation and opportunities for the examination of captured documents: Another highly-unsatisfactory area of co-operation due to the US keenness to protect Pakistan from the consequences of its using terrorism against India. It was reported that after the US troops entered Kabul in 2001, the US response to Indian requests for the interrogation of some suspects and for the examination of some documents relating to the Kandahar hijacking of 1999 was unsatisfactory. So was its much-delayed response to Indian requests for the prompt interrogation of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the LET who had visited India five times for collecting targeting information for the LET. While the FBI did share with India information relating to the planned terrorist strikes in Mumbai (the dates were not known), it did not share with India collateral information which might have enabled India to unearth the LET network in India. Fears that if it shared the collateral information with India, its agencies might arrest and interrogate Headley thereby exposing his links with the US agencies seem to have stood in the way of this sharing. The recently reported disclosures of two ex-wives of Headley----one living in the US and the other in Pakistan---about their alerting an FBI Task Force in New York and the US Embassy in Islamabad regarding Headley’s terrorist links with the LET could have embarrassing legal consequences for the US Government. The LET was designated by the US State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) under US laws in 2000. It is criminal for any US national to maintain contacts with an FTO or to assist it in any way. The alerts of the two ex-wives showed that Headley had violated US laws relating to contacts with an FTO. He should have been immediately detained, investigated and prosecuted. The FBI did not do so. He continued to maintain his contacts with the LET and we have an instance of an American national helping an FTO in killing some US nationals in Mumbai without the FBI taking any action to stop this. If the relatives of the Americans killed in Mumbai take the State Department, the US Embassy in Islamabad and the FBI to court for this, they could face difficulty in defending themselves.
2. Before 2000, there was no institutional mechanism for facilitating and co-ordinating Indo-US co-operation. The co-operation was handled informally at the level of the intelligence and investigative agencies of the two countries. During their meeting in London in January 2000, Jaswant Singh, the then Indian Foreign Minister, and Strobe Talbot, the then US Deputy Secretary of State, agreed to set up an institutional mechanism in the form of the Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism. This was followed by the setting up of an Indo-US Cyber Security Forum as suggested by Armitage in 2002. The Forum ran into controversy following Indian suspicions that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had misused it for penetrating the National Security Council Secretariat. During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Washington DC in November last year, the two countries launched what was described as a Joint Counter-Terrorism Initiative to strengthen counter-terrorism co-operation in different fields such as forensics, megacity policing etc. This was formalized into a Memo of Understanding in July,2010. It is not clear which institution co-ordinates and monitors its implementation. The Headley case illustrates deficiencies in its implementation.
3. After the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984, India and the UK set up what was called Indo-UK Back Channel For Counter-Terrorism Co-operation, which at that time was mainly directed against Khalistani terrorists. This consisted of hot lines connecting the chiefs of the intelligence agencies of the two countries and periodic co-ordination meetings between the counter-terrorism experts of the countries. It worked very well because the trust level between the Indian and British agencies was high.
4. The trust level between the Indian and US agencies leaves much to be desired. The US anxiety to protect Pakistan adds to the distrust. How to improve the trust level and what should be the institutional mechanism for improving co-operation are important questions which should be discussed by our Prime Minister and President Obama during their forthcoming meeting in New Delhi next month. ( 20-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, October 18, 2010
WHO IS USING THE JAPAN CARD IN CHINA?
B.RAMAN
Someone is using the Japan Card in China to keep up the tensions between the two countries over the recent incident in the East China Sea involving the capture and subsequent release of the crew of a Chinese fishing trawler by the Japanese Coast Guard. The trawler was intercepted by the Japanese Coast Guard because it had allegedly intruded into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku group of Islands. The Chinese reject Japanese claims of sovereignty over the group and claim it as their own. They have been demanding an official apology by Japan and payment of compensation for the allegedly wrongful action of the Japanese Coast Guard. Tokyo has fIrmly rejected this demand.
2. Despite the continuing differences over the legality of the action of the Japanese Coast Guard and over Tokyo's refusal to apologise and pay compensation, there were indications of an attempt to cool the tensions while maintaining their respective stand on the islands. Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, who reportedly refused to meet his Japanese counterpart Naoto Kan in September when the two were in New York to attend the UN General Assembly session, subsequently met him briefly in the margins of the Asia-Europe summit in Brussels in the first week of October. This was followed by a meeting between the Japanese Defence Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and his Chinese counterpart Liang Guanglie on October 11 in Hanoi where they had gone to attend a meeting of the Defence Ministers of ASEAN Plus Dialogue Partners hosted by Vietnam.It was reported by the media after the meeting that the two had agreed to set up a liaison system to try to avert future maritime confrontations.
3. There was a positive assessment of the meeting from Tokyo. Yoshito Sengoku, a Japanese Government spokesman, said in Tokyo on October 12: "Continued positive developments are creating an environment to pave the way for a bilateral summit.Prime Minister Naoto Kan and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, who met informally in Brussels last week, could hold an official summit at a meeting with Southeast Asian leaders this month." It was reported subsequently that a team of Japanese officials would be going to Beijing to prepare the ground for the summit.
4. When the tensions thus started showing signs of beginning to subside, there was a sudden flare-up of orchestrated (through the Internet and the People's Forum of the People's Daily) anti-Japanese emotions in some cities of China in the form of public demonstrations against Japan and the Japanese. These demonstrations followed an anti-China demonstration in Tokyo on October 16 believed to have been organised by conservative militarists.
5. Following the anti-China demonstrations in Tokyo, SMS and Internet messages flashed across China calling for demonstrations against the Japanese. Anti-Japanese demonstrations during which there were attacks on the properties of Japanese companies have been reported so far from Chengdu, Xian, Zhengzhou and Wuhan. The fresh tensions have been exacerbated by Chinese perceptions of a new anti-China assertiveness in Japan. In this connection, Chinese analysts have drawn attention to what they regard as the anti-China statements of the Japanese Foreign Minister, Seiji Maehara, who has been projected in the People's Forum columns of the "People's Daily " as a China hawk, "who has been known to warn against China's increased military presence in the region, saying in a 2005 speech to fellow members of parliament that "We can control (China's) expansion in its force only if we act firmly and resolutely." He has called China "a threat," saying that the country has developed missiles capable of reaching Japan and conducted maritime surveys around the Japanese waters. He has also said that deciding whether to establish friendly relations with China would be "Japan's major diplomatic test."
6. The Chinese have also been angered by a reported speech of Japan's conservative former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at Washington DC last week in which he accused China of following a modern-day policy of "lebensraum" with its growing assertiveness over disputed territories. He accused China of trying to expand its strategic frontier.He has been quoted by the media as having stated as follows in Washington DC: "This very dangerous idea ( Lebensraum) posits that borders and exclusive economic zones are determined by national power, and that as long as China's economy continues to grow, its sphere of influence will continue to expand. Some might associate this with the German concept of 'lebensraum.'
7. Intriguingly, the demonstrations and the orchestrated campaign against Japan have coincided with the plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, which was held in Beijing from October15 to 18. The Chinese authorities themselves seem to have been taken by surprise by the virulence of the anti-Japan campaign and demonstrations.
8. Were the campaign and demonstrations provoked by the anti-reformists to oppose demands for a faster pace of reforms by pointing out that at a time when the Japanese ill-will and threat to China seems to be increasing it will be unwise to loosen political controls? A search for an answer to this question needs attention. ( 19-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cebinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Someone is using the Japan Card in China to keep up the tensions between the two countries over the recent incident in the East China Sea involving the capture and subsequent release of the crew of a Chinese fishing trawler by the Japanese Coast Guard. The trawler was intercepted by the Japanese Coast Guard because it had allegedly intruded into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku group of Islands. The Chinese reject Japanese claims of sovereignty over the group and claim it as their own. They have been demanding an official apology by Japan and payment of compensation for the allegedly wrongful action of the Japanese Coast Guard. Tokyo has fIrmly rejected this demand.
2. Despite the continuing differences over the legality of the action of the Japanese Coast Guard and over Tokyo's refusal to apologise and pay compensation, there were indications of an attempt to cool the tensions while maintaining their respective stand on the islands. Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, who reportedly refused to meet his Japanese counterpart Naoto Kan in September when the two were in New York to attend the UN General Assembly session, subsequently met him briefly in the margins of the Asia-Europe summit in Brussels in the first week of October. This was followed by a meeting between the Japanese Defence Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and his Chinese counterpart Liang Guanglie on October 11 in Hanoi where they had gone to attend a meeting of the Defence Ministers of ASEAN Plus Dialogue Partners hosted by Vietnam.It was reported by the media after the meeting that the two had agreed to set up a liaison system to try to avert future maritime confrontations.
3. There was a positive assessment of the meeting from Tokyo. Yoshito Sengoku, a Japanese Government spokesman, said in Tokyo on October 12: "Continued positive developments are creating an environment to pave the way for a bilateral summit.Prime Minister Naoto Kan and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, who met informally in Brussels last week, could hold an official summit at a meeting with Southeast Asian leaders this month." It was reported subsequently that a team of Japanese officials would be going to Beijing to prepare the ground for the summit.
4. When the tensions thus started showing signs of beginning to subside, there was a sudden flare-up of orchestrated (through the Internet and the People's Forum of the People's Daily) anti-Japanese emotions in some cities of China in the form of public demonstrations against Japan and the Japanese. These demonstrations followed an anti-China demonstration in Tokyo on October 16 believed to have been organised by conservative militarists.
5. Following the anti-China demonstrations in Tokyo, SMS and Internet messages flashed across China calling for demonstrations against the Japanese. Anti-Japanese demonstrations during which there were attacks on the properties of Japanese companies have been reported so far from Chengdu, Xian, Zhengzhou and Wuhan. The fresh tensions have been exacerbated by Chinese perceptions of a new anti-China assertiveness in Japan. In this connection, Chinese analysts have drawn attention to what they regard as the anti-China statements of the Japanese Foreign Minister, Seiji Maehara, who has been projected in the People's Forum columns of the "People's Daily " as a China hawk, "who has been known to warn against China's increased military presence in the region, saying in a 2005 speech to fellow members of parliament that "We can control (China's) expansion in its force only if we act firmly and resolutely." He has called China "a threat," saying that the country has developed missiles capable of reaching Japan and conducted maritime surveys around the Japanese waters. He has also said that deciding whether to establish friendly relations with China would be "Japan's major diplomatic test."
6. The Chinese have also been angered by a reported speech of Japan's conservative former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at Washington DC last week in which he accused China of following a modern-day policy of "lebensraum" with its growing assertiveness over disputed territories. He accused China of trying to expand its strategic frontier.He has been quoted by the media as having stated as follows in Washington DC: "This very dangerous idea ( Lebensraum) posits that borders and exclusive economic zones are determined by national power, and that as long as China's economy continues to grow, its sphere of influence will continue to expand. Some might associate this with the German concept of 'lebensraum.'
7. Intriguingly, the demonstrations and the orchestrated campaign against Japan have coincided with the plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, which was held in Beijing from October15 to 18. The Chinese authorities themselves seem to have been taken by surprise by the virulence of the anti-Japan campaign and demonstrations.
8. Were the campaign and demonstrations provoked by the anti-reformists to oppose demands for a faster pace of reforms by pointing out that at a time when the Japanese ill-will and threat to China seems to be increasing it will be unwise to loosen political controls? A search for an answer to this question needs attention. ( 19-10-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cebinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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