B.RAMAN
A commentary published by the "News" of Pakistan on September 15,2010, says as follows: "The news that Gwadar port is all set to be taken away from the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) and is likely to be given to the Chinese may have repercussions that go much beyond its white sand shores. Official sources confirm that “an understanding to that effect has already developed at the highest levels but it will take a while before the legal and administrative constraints are removed.” The biggest constraint remains the agreement with the PSA, which was given the right to run the port for 40 years. However, official sources are confident that the PSA had given them sufficient grounds to revoke the agreement. Apart from its failure to bring a single commercial ship to the Gwadar docks, the PSA has not invested even a fraction of the $525 million it had committed to spend in five years. .......The move to hand over Gwadar to China, among other things, may just be the first step to replace the erstwhile IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline) into a new reality - Iran-Pakistan-China (IPC). The acronym already stood dissolved after India backed out of the Iran-Pakistan gas deal.....It will mean much more than the transfer of power at the Gwadar port. The Chinese will build Gwadar as tax-free industrial hub which may include oil and gas refineries and a network of roads and railways from Gwadar to China through the ancient silk route. An ambitious deal to build railways along the Khunjrab pass has already been signed between Pakistan and China. The Chinese are more suited to develop the Gwadar port and the network of rail and roads in Balochistan as they have experience and the muscle to work in the troublesome part of Pakistan. ....The Chinese have the capacity to not only make Gwadar port viable but can complete the expansion plan, which includes increasing the existing three berths to 18 by 2014. The volume of the Chinese trade is so much that Gwadar can beat regional giants like Dubai hands down if China could divert only a fraction of its trade to pass to its burgeoning western regions through the mighty Karakorams......The project is bound to arch lots of eyebrows in India on our east and NATO forces, read the US, sitting on our right flank. China has capitalised on India’s loss. Beijing and Islamabad had set up an agreement whereby China would import most of this Iranian gas left by India. Islamabad hopes to make a billion dollar a year just from transit fee. "
2.While there is likely to be some exaggeration in the report, some recent developments tend to lend some credence to it. Among them is the unhappiness of the Pakistani authorities with the way the PSA has managed the port, which has failed to come up to expectations even more than three years after it was commissioned. The port has failed to attract international shipping partly due to the security situation in Balochistan and partly due to the failure of the Pakistani authorities to develop road and rail infrastructure in the area. Instead of admitting their own failures, they have been blaming the PSA for the poor management of the port, which is now being used only to meet part of the requirements of Pakistan's external trade by providing incentives to Pakistani companies which use Gwadar for their exports and imports.
3.A report prepared last year by a Task Force of the Pakistan Government's Planning Commission on the working of the Gwadar port stated inter alia as follows: "Both the Government and the PSA are in default.No commercial vessel has arrived at the Gwadar Port in the last three years and there is no possibility of the arrival of any commercial vessel for many years to come. The Gwadar Port was supposed to be connected by construction of road links. It is also to be connected through the establishment of a rail network with the rest of the country as well as with neighboring countries especially Afghanistan, and through Afghanistan to the Central Asian Republics (CARs) as well as China. The rail connectivity would take some 10-15 years to complete. Till date, some 72 ships brought government cargo via Gwadar Port and the Federal Government had to subsidise such imports by giving subsidy to the tune of Rs 2,000 per tonne. Apart from subsidising cargo imports, the Government has also paid PSA Rs 220 million as subsidy. Under the Gwadar Port operation agreement, the Federal Government is required to purchase 2281 acres of land on water front and transfer this land free of cost to PSA for 40 years. There is no possibility of land purchase in the near future and the cost of land that the Federal Government would be required to pay is estimated at Rs 15 billion. On the other hand, without getting free of cost land the PSA is unwilling to make further investment in Gwadar Port.The PSA had earlier committed to making investment to the tune of $525 million in five years. It has not invested during the first three years, and it is not likely to spend any during the next two years.The Government will have to subsidise the GPA (Gwadar Port Authority) for many years to come. On the political side, the Balochistan Government has strongly opposed the present Gwadar Port Concession Agreement with the PSA as the Baloch people are not gaining anything from it. The Gwadar Port will not be viable for transshipment and transit until the political and law and order situation in Afghanistan stabilises and Western China is connected by road and rail with Gwadar."
4.It has been apparent for over a year now that though the PSA was originally recommended to Gen.Pervez Musharraf by Beijing. the Government of President Asif Ali Zardari has been disenchanted with it and has been considering other options.No company---either in Pakistan or abroad--- is prepared to take over the responsibility for the management of the port. It is in this context that the Pakistani authorities have been pressing the Chinese to take over the responsibility for the management of the port through one of their companies---- private or State-owned. This issue figured in the talks during the visit of Mr.Zardari to China in July last.
5.Mr.Zardari once again took up with the Chinese the pending Pakistani proposals for the upgradation of the Gwadar port, the construction of an oil refinery and an airport in Gwadar and the construction of oil/gas pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang. While the Chinese have readily responded in a positive manner to various proposals for projects in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they are still hesitant regarding new projects in the Balochistan area. While they do not anticipate any security problems in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they are still worried about the security situation in Balochistan.
6. Mr.Zardari’s disappointment over the Chinese hesitation in the Balochistan area became evident in his reported remarks to Prime Minister Wen Jiabao that Pakistan desired that “China should take maximum benefits from the Gwadar Port.” From this it was evident that while Pakistan is keen for the quick implementation of the Gwadar-related projects, security considerations still inhibited the Chinese response.
7. Pakistan has reached a deal with Iran in respect of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. While Iran will finance and construct the pipeline on its side, Pakistan has agreed to do so on its side, but it does not have the money. Will the Chinese give the money and help in the pipeline construction in return for a supply of part of the gas from Iran? This is a question which Pakistan has repeatedly raised with Beijing. China has been reluctant so far. According to reliable sources, Mr. Zardari raised this issue once again in Beijing, but there was no positive response from the Chinese. ( Please refer to my article of July 11,2010, titled "PAKISTAN AS CHINA’S FORCE-MULTIPLIER AGAINST INDIA" available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3918.html )
8.in an interview over the State radio on December 28, 2009,on the need for a naval base in the Indian Ocean region, Rear Admiral Yin Zhou, an expert of the Chinese Navy, said: “I believe that a relatively stable, relatively solid base for resupply and repair would be appropriate. Such a base would provide a steady source of fresh food, along with facilities for communications, ship repair and recreation. Any definite decision to establish such a base would have to be taken by the Communist Party. Supplying and maintaining the ( Chinese) fleet off Somalia was challenging without such a base. Other nations were unlikely to object.”
9.Subsequently, the Chinese authorities denied any interest in acquiring a naval base in the Indian Ocean region. Despite this, the debate continues in academic circles in China about the ultimate need for a base to make the anti-piracy patrols of the Chinese Navy effective. It is in this context that Pakistan has renewed its pressure on China to take more interest in the development of Gwadar as an international commercial port and oil/gas transhipment facility to meet the external trade and energy requirements of Western China and as a major naval base to meet the Indian Ocean anti-piracy patrol requirements of the Chinese Navy.
10. The Chinese, who are already involved in an imbroglio with Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and the US over their power projection attempts in the East and South China Sea, do not want to get involved in a similar imbroglio by giving evidence of a similar power projection exercise in the Indian Ocean area. They have been trying to project their present interest in the Indian Ocean area as meant to ensure the safety of their external trade and energy supplies and nothing more.
11. At the same time, the temptation for a permanent Naval presence in the Indian Ocean area with a strategic naval base available for use by the Chinese Navy is likely to grow stronger despite their present denials of any such interest or intention. If and when that happens and if they accept the Pakistani offer to take over Gwadar for commercial and naval purposes, Gwadar could emerge as China's Okinawa in the Indian Ocean region. (19-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, September 18, 2010
HAQQANI NETWORK IN PARACHINAR
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO. 678
B.RAMAN
According to the Ahlul Bayt News Agency of Iran, 25 Shias have been killed and 80 others injured In the Parachinar area in the Kurram Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan during the last two weeks following attacks by members of the Haqqani network of the Afghan Taliban on the Kheyvas village in the Shaluzan Mountains. It claimed that the Shias put up a fierce resistance to the attack and managed to kill 10 members of the Taliban, including two commanders of the Haqqani network. The news agency has alleged that the Pakistani Army, instead of helping the Shias beat back the Taliban attack, bombed the Shia positions from the air in order to help the Taliban. All shops in the area remained closed on September 18,2010, to protest against the Pakistan Government's failure to protect the Shias of the Kurram Agency from repeated attacks by the Taliban. The news agency said: " The Kurram Agency has been virtually cut off from the rest of Pakistan for the past two years due to intense clashes between Shiite and Talibani rebels."
2. On September 18,the "News" of Pakistan reported as follows: " Clashes triggered by a dispute over the ownership of a water channel between two rival groups a month ago came to an end on Friday ( September 17) after a peace Jirga convened by the political administration succeeded in effecting a ceasefire, official sources said. The sources said the clashes had erupted between the Mangal and Turi Bangash tribes over the ownership of a watercourse in Shalozan and Khewas areas near the Pak-Afghan border. The incessant fighting left 102 people dead and over 150 injured. The fighting took a sectarian colour as the Mangal tribe belongs to the Sunni sect while Turi and Bangash are Shias. Fresh clashes erupted on Thursday (September 16) and continued on Friday (September 17), leaving 48 persons dead and 71 others wounded. Four villages — Aqal Shah Killay, Sarang Killay, Qabli and Khewas Killay — were also torched amid the exchange of heavy fire. The rival groups also took several people hostage. Alarmed by the situation, the political administration of Kurram Agency called a peace Jirga comprising Shia and Sunni elders that brought the hostilities to an end. “The Jirga was called at a checkpost on the boundary of Sadda and Kurram. The members of the peace Jirga and political administration representatives held talks with the members of the Mangal and Turi Bangash tribes. The Jirga persuaded the rival groups to agree to a ceasefire,” said Political Agent Syed Musaddiq Shah while talking to The News by telephone. He said that it was agreed to hold regular sessions of the Jirga to ensure durable peace in the area and forestall such incidents in future."
3.The Iranian news agency and the "News" are apparently referring to the same series of clashes, but the estimate of fatalities given by the "News" is much higher than that given by the Iranian agency. However, the fatalities mentioned by the Iranian agency are only of Shias, whereas those mentioned by "News" seem to include the fatalities incurred by the Shias as well as the Sunnis. If the figures given by the "News" are to be believed, the Shias seemed to have inficted more casualties on the Sunnis than vice versa. It also needs to be noted that while the Iranian news agency talks of the involvement of the Haqqani network in the clashes, with the support of the Pakistan Army, the "News" makes no reference to it.
4.In a report published on September 16, the "Dawn" of Karachi refers to the presence of the Haqqani network in the Kurram Agency, but claims that the network is actually trying to bring about a reconciliation between the Shias and the Sunnis of the area. The "Dawn" reported as follows: “A Taliban faction fighting US forces in Afghanistan is trying to end a tribal dispute which has resulted in severe clashes in Kurram Agency. According to sources, Taliban of the Jalaluddin Haqqani group are in contact with elders of rival tribes and talks between the Haqqani group and elders from Upper and Lower Kurram were held before Eidul Fitr. “Two trustworthy people of Jalaluddin Haqqani took part in the talks,” they said, adding that the next round of talks was expected soon. They said elders of Turi and Bangash tribes had said that they would attend further talks only if nine people kidnapped after an attack on two vehicles in Lower Kurram in July were freed and safety of passengers travelling between Parachinar and Peshawar was guaranteed. “These measures are necessary to build confidence among the tribes and prepare the ground for future talks,” an elder said. He said the Taliban had told them that they wanted reconciliation among the tribes and had approached all groups to start negotiations."
5. The "Dawn" report added: "The sources said the Taliban had been in contact with local tribes for some time but the talks had not produced any result so far. The first round of talks was held in Balishkhel village in March last year and was attended also by Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud. Another team of Taliban visited the area in September last year. According to the sources, a relative of a former governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and his local business partner facilitated the talks which ended without achieving anything. It may be mentioned, Nato officials and the Afghan government made similar efforts and invited elders of various tribes to Paktia province of Afghanistan in May last year to urge them to resolve their disputes. Violent clashes have been taking place in the Kurram valley since November 2007 and thousands of people have been killed or injured and hundreds of families have been displaced. The area is cut off from the rest of the country and local people travel on the Thall-Parachinar road in convoys protected by security personnel. "
6. The "Dawn" further said: "The government brokered a peace deal and an agreement to end violence was signed in Murree in October 2008, but there has been no let-up in violence in the valley. Insiders said the aim behind Taliban’s reconciliation efforts was to secure the strategic region and turn it into a safe route to Afghanistan. Kurram valley borders Afghanistan from three sides, Paktia on its west, Nangarhar on the north and Khost on the south. When militant groups signed peace deals with the government in South and North Waziristan, some armed groups tried to use Kurram for their activities in Afghanistan. Under the agreements, the militant groups operating in Waziristan were required not to infiltrate into Afghanistan. Tension flared in the area when Baitullah Mehsud, the slain chief of the banned Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, deputed Hakimullah as ‘commander’ for Kurram, Khyber and Orakzai agencies in 2008 and tribal people in Kurram opposed TTP’s activities. Local tribes blamed Taliban for violence and insecurity in their area. According to the sources, Taliban have told the elders that tension in Kurram has had an adverse effect on the ‘Jihad’ in Afghanistan and that they are interested in ending disputes among local groups. But several tribes are sceptical about the initiative and suspect that the Taliban are interested only in securing a safe passage for their cross-border movement. “Taliban are yet to show their cards, but we have already conveyed to the negotiators that people in Kurram are against the presence of outsiders in their area,” a source said. “
7. Apparently unconnected with the developments in the Kurram Agency, the "Dawn" also reported on September 16 a steep increase in US Drone (pilotless planes) strikes against the Haqqani network. It said: "“Apparently frustrated over Pakistan military’s inaction against the Haqqani network, the United States has this month unleashed a relentless wave of drone attacks in North Waziristan, hoping to downgrade the operational capabilities of the group it considers to be the most lethal militant outfit in Afghanistan. Since Sept 2, there have been 13 strikes by unmanned Predator drones in North Waziristan — the highest number in a month since the US began using them to hit targets in Pakistan in 2004. The number of drone attacks this year has already crossed 70 — the highest figure for a year. According to military sources, an operation in North Waziristan got delayed because the army was preoccupied with fighting militancy in other tribal areas and flood relief. This window was fully exploited by the group to intensify its activities, defence analysts believe.“The Americans want to check that freedom of space available to the Haqqanis through intensified drone attacks,” a source said.”
8.The “Dawn” added: “There are few takers for the Pakistani explanation in the US and many describe the delay as tactical. Besides, Pakistan had in June initiated efforts to secure a place for the Haqqanis in post-war Afghanistan by working out a rapprochement between the group and the Karzai government. US opposition to the initiative halted it. Sources suggest that Pakistan would make fresh moves to discuss peace with the Haqqanis, in the context of the overall reconciliation plan, during Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s current visit to Pakistan. The pattern of the attacks this month shows that the primary target is the Haqqani network, even though his host Hafiz Gul Bahadar and foreign militants of Al Qaeda have also been targeted.”
9.It further said: “The strikes this month have predominantly been in Miramshah sub-division, where the Haqqani network’s headquarters are based and where the group carries out its financial dealings, acquisition of weapons and strategic planning. Five of the attacks occurred in Datakhel tehsil, which is home to Gul Bahadar’s clan Uthmanzai Wazir. Dandi Derpakhel, the scene of another attack in Miramshah, is where members of Jalaluddin Haqqani’s family live. Gul Bahadar, who leads the other major militant grouping in North Waziristan, is more than a host for the Haqqanis. He not only provides them with the tribal support the Haqqanis lack, but also gives them passage to the border. The only attack this month outside Miramshah was in Shawal, where foreign fighters loyal to Al Qaeda have sanctuaries.”
10.The “Dawn” added: “The US, while targeting the Haqqanis, is pursuing the ‘hammer and anvil approach’. Alongside the spike in the drone attacks, US Special Forces have launched an intense operation against the group in eastern Afghanistan, killing a number of its ‘commanders’. The Haqqani network has been the focus of US action for the past two years. However, after the Dec 2009 suicide attack on the Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost, a key facility of the CIA, the network again came under renewed focus. In this unprecedented intense bombardment by drones, military officials see a shift in US policy in Afghanistan from counter-insurgency to counter-terrorism.” (18-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
According to the Ahlul Bayt News Agency of Iran, 25 Shias have been killed and 80 others injured In the Parachinar area in the Kurram Agency of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan during the last two weeks following attacks by members of the Haqqani network of the Afghan Taliban on the Kheyvas village in the Shaluzan Mountains. It claimed that the Shias put up a fierce resistance to the attack and managed to kill 10 members of the Taliban, including two commanders of the Haqqani network. The news agency has alleged that the Pakistani Army, instead of helping the Shias beat back the Taliban attack, bombed the Shia positions from the air in order to help the Taliban. All shops in the area remained closed on September 18,2010, to protest against the Pakistan Government's failure to protect the Shias of the Kurram Agency from repeated attacks by the Taliban. The news agency said: " The Kurram Agency has been virtually cut off from the rest of Pakistan for the past two years due to intense clashes between Shiite and Talibani rebels."
2. On September 18,the "News" of Pakistan reported as follows: " Clashes triggered by a dispute over the ownership of a water channel between two rival groups a month ago came to an end on Friday ( September 17) after a peace Jirga convened by the political administration succeeded in effecting a ceasefire, official sources said. The sources said the clashes had erupted between the Mangal and Turi Bangash tribes over the ownership of a watercourse in Shalozan and Khewas areas near the Pak-Afghan border. The incessant fighting left 102 people dead and over 150 injured. The fighting took a sectarian colour as the Mangal tribe belongs to the Sunni sect while Turi and Bangash are Shias. Fresh clashes erupted on Thursday (September 16) and continued on Friday (September 17), leaving 48 persons dead and 71 others wounded. Four villages — Aqal Shah Killay, Sarang Killay, Qabli and Khewas Killay — were also torched amid the exchange of heavy fire. The rival groups also took several people hostage. Alarmed by the situation, the political administration of Kurram Agency called a peace Jirga comprising Shia and Sunni elders that brought the hostilities to an end. “The Jirga was called at a checkpost on the boundary of Sadda and Kurram. The members of the peace Jirga and political administration representatives held talks with the members of the Mangal and Turi Bangash tribes. The Jirga persuaded the rival groups to agree to a ceasefire,” said Political Agent Syed Musaddiq Shah while talking to The News by telephone. He said that it was agreed to hold regular sessions of the Jirga to ensure durable peace in the area and forestall such incidents in future."
3.The Iranian news agency and the "News" are apparently referring to the same series of clashes, but the estimate of fatalities given by the "News" is much higher than that given by the Iranian agency. However, the fatalities mentioned by the Iranian agency are only of Shias, whereas those mentioned by "News" seem to include the fatalities incurred by the Shias as well as the Sunnis. If the figures given by the "News" are to be believed, the Shias seemed to have inficted more casualties on the Sunnis than vice versa. It also needs to be noted that while the Iranian news agency talks of the involvement of the Haqqani network in the clashes, with the support of the Pakistan Army, the "News" makes no reference to it.
4.In a report published on September 16, the "Dawn" of Karachi refers to the presence of the Haqqani network in the Kurram Agency, but claims that the network is actually trying to bring about a reconciliation between the Shias and the Sunnis of the area. The "Dawn" reported as follows: “A Taliban faction fighting US forces in Afghanistan is trying to end a tribal dispute which has resulted in severe clashes in Kurram Agency. According to sources, Taliban of the Jalaluddin Haqqani group are in contact with elders of rival tribes and talks between the Haqqani group and elders from Upper and Lower Kurram were held before Eidul Fitr. “Two trustworthy people of Jalaluddin Haqqani took part in the talks,” they said, adding that the next round of talks was expected soon. They said elders of Turi and Bangash tribes had said that they would attend further talks only if nine people kidnapped after an attack on two vehicles in Lower Kurram in July were freed and safety of passengers travelling between Parachinar and Peshawar was guaranteed. “These measures are necessary to build confidence among the tribes and prepare the ground for future talks,” an elder said. He said the Taliban had told them that they wanted reconciliation among the tribes and had approached all groups to start negotiations."
5. The "Dawn" report added: "The sources said the Taliban had been in contact with local tribes for some time but the talks had not produced any result so far. The first round of talks was held in Balishkhel village in March last year and was attended also by Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud. Another team of Taliban visited the area in September last year. According to the sources, a relative of a former governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and his local business partner facilitated the talks which ended without achieving anything. It may be mentioned, Nato officials and the Afghan government made similar efforts and invited elders of various tribes to Paktia province of Afghanistan in May last year to urge them to resolve their disputes. Violent clashes have been taking place in the Kurram valley since November 2007 and thousands of people have been killed or injured and hundreds of families have been displaced. The area is cut off from the rest of the country and local people travel on the Thall-Parachinar road in convoys protected by security personnel. "
6. The "Dawn" further said: "The government brokered a peace deal and an agreement to end violence was signed in Murree in October 2008, but there has been no let-up in violence in the valley. Insiders said the aim behind Taliban’s reconciliation efforts was to secure the strategic region and turn it into a safe route to Afghanistan. Kurram valley borders Afghanistan from three sides, Paktia on its west, Nangarhar on the north and Khost on the south. When militant groups signed peace deals with the government in South and North Waziristan, some armed groups tried to use Kurram for their activities in Afghanistan. Under the agreements, the militant groups operating in Waziristan were required not to infiltrate into Afghanistan. Tension flared in the area when Baitullah Mehsud, the slain chief of the banned Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, deputed Hakimullah as ‘commander’ for Kurram, Khyber and Orakzai agencies in 2008 and tribal people in Kurram opposed TTP’s activities. Local tribes blamed Taliban for violence and insecurity in their area. According to the sources, Taliban have told the elders that tension in Kurram has had an adverse effect on the ‘Jihad’ in Afghanistan and that they are interested in ending disputes among local groups. But several tribes are sceptical about the initiative and suspect that the Taliban are interested only in securing a safe passage for their cross-border movement. “Taliban are yet to show their cards, but we have already conveyed to the negotiators that people in Kurram are against the presence of outsiders in their area,” a source said. “
7. Apparently unconnected with the developments in the Kurram Agency, the "Dawn" also reported on September 16 a steep increase in US Drone (pilotless planes) strikes against the Haqqani network. It said: "“Apparently frustrated over Pakistan military’s inaction against the Haqqani network, the United States has this month unleashed a relentless wave of drone attacks in North Waziristan, hoping to downgrade the operational capabilities of the group it considers to be the most lethal militant outfit in Afghanistan. Since Sept 2, there have been 13 strikes by unmanned Predator drones in North Waziristan — the highest number in a month since the US began using them to hit targets in Pakistan in 2004. The number of drone attacks this year has already crossed 70 — the highest figure for a year. According to military sources, an operation in North Waziristan got delayed because the army was preoccupied with fighting militancy in other tribal areas and flood relief. This window was fully exploited by the group to intensify its activities, defence analysts believe.“The Americans want to check that freedom of space available to the Haqqanis through intensified drone attacks,” a source said.”
8.The “Dawn” added: “There are few takers for the Pakistani explanation in the US and many describe the delay as tactical. Besides, Pakistan had in June initiated efforts to secure a place for the Haqqanis in post-war Afghanistan by working out a rapprochement between the group and the Karzai government. US opposition to the initiative halted it. Sources suggest that Pakistan would make fresh moves to discuss peace with the Haqqanis, in the context of the overall reconciliation plan, during Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s current visit to Pakistan. The pattern of the attacks this month shows that the primary target is the Haqqani network, even though his host Hafiz Gul Bahadar and foreign militants of Al Qaeda have also been targeted.”
9.It further said: “The strikes this month have predominantly been in Miramshah sub-division, where the Haqqani network’s headquarters are based and where the group carries out its financial dealings, acquisition of weapons and strategic planning. Five of the attacks occurred in Datakhel tehsil, which is home to Gul Bahadar’s clan Uthmanzai Wazir. Dandi Derpakhel, the scene of another attack in Miramshah, is where members of Jalaluddin Haqqani’s family live. Gul Bahadar, who leads the other major militant grouping in North Waziristan, is more than a host for the Haqqanis. He not only provides them with the tribal support the Haqqanis lack, but also gives them passage to the border. The only attack this month outside Miramshah was in Shawal, where foreign fighters loyal to Al Qaeda have sanctuaries.”
10.The “Dawn” added: “The US, while targeting the Haqqanis, is pursuing the ‘hammer and anvil approach’. Alongside the spike in the drone attacks, US Special Forces have launched an intense operation against the group in eastern Afghanistan, killing a number of its ‘commanders’. The Haqqani network has been the focus of US action for the past two years. However, after the Dec 2009 suicide attack on the Forward Operating Base Chapman in Khost, a key facility of the CIA, the network again came under renewed focus. In this unprecedented intense bombardment by drones, military officials see a shift in US policy in Afghanistan from counter-insurgency to counter-terrorism.” (18-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, September 17, 2010
THE OMINOUS MURDER OF IMRAN FAROOQ IN UK
THE OMINOUS MURDER OF IMRAN FAROOQ IN UK
B.RAMAN
This may please be read in continuation of the following articles of mine:
(a). Article of February 7,2010, titled “Karachi & Af-Pak Policy Options” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3653.html
(b). Article of August 5,2010, titled “ Murder of Shia Mohajir Leader Sparks Fresh Carnage in Karachi” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3965.html
2. According to the “Dawn” of Karachi, (September 17,2010), Dr Imran Farooq, a founding leader of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the organisation’s first Secretary-General, was assassinated in London on the evening of September 16. According to some sources, he was attacked by some unidentified men with daggers near his London residence and died of multiple wounds, but according to another source, a lone assailant had been lying in wait inside the apartment block where Dr Farooq lived on the first floor. He was attacked with a knife when he was climbing the stairs. He died on the spot. The murder coincided with the 57th birthday celebrations of Dr.Altaf Hussain, the head of the MQM, who lives in exile in London since 1992.
3. After Altaf fled to the UK from Karachi in 1992 to escape arrest on a charge of having an army officer kidnapped and tortured, Dr.Imran Farooq went underground and was clandestinely running the party on behalf of Altaf from different hide-outs in Karachi and Hyderabad in Sindh. After some years, with the police hot on his trail, he too fled to London where he surfaced in 1999. He was reportedly given political asylum by the British authorities.
4. Dr. Imran Farooq was considered close to the late Zia-ul-Haq. At the instance of Zia, he founded the All-Pakistan Mohajir Students’ Organisation (APMSO) to counter the activities of the Sindhi and Pashtun nationalists and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) of Benazir Bhutto. It played an active role in the Mohajir-Pashtun communal clashes in Karachi during the Zia regime.
5. The APMSO was converted into the MQM under the leadership of Altaf, after Altaf returned to Karachi from the US where he was working. Altaf and Imran were very close to each other. Imran was considered the alter ego of Altaf. He kept the party intact and active after Altaf fled to the UK. He was an iconic figure to the Mohajir youth.
6. After he sought political asylum in the UK, he and Altaf worked closely together to co-ordinate the activities of the MQM in Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur to which its following was confined. They had its name changed as the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in order to attract to its fold members of all ethnic communities instead of keeping it confined as a purely Mohajir (refugee from India) party. It made some headway in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), including Gilgit-Baltistan, but not in other provinces.
7. Its activities earned for it the enmity of the Sindhis and the Pashtuns. Differences also developed in the MQM between Mohajirs (MQM), who had migrated from Uttar Pradesh in India, and Mohajirs, who had migrated from Bihar. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) managed to persuade some Mohajirs from Bihar to leave the MQM and form a new organization called the MQM (Haquiqi) meaning the real MQM. The MQM (H) was armed by the ISI and there were frequent bloody clashes between the MQM and the MQM (H).
8. The MQM has been involved in frequent clashes with the Pashtuns of the secular Awami National Party (ANP) and with the Mohajirs in the MQM (H).Karachi has more Pashtuns than even Peshawar. The Pashtuns of Karachi dominate the transport business and are prosperous. The frequent Drone strikes by the US in the Pashtun belt and the military operations of the Pakistan Army against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have seen the influx of some Pashtun members of the TTP into Karachi to take shelter there. The MQM has been alleging that there has been a steady Talibanisation of the Pashtun community in Karachi and has been indulging in targeted attacks on the Pashtuns. However, independent sources say that the secular ANP still commands the support of the majority of the Pashtun community in Karachi.
9. Another bitter adversary of the MQM is the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ). The Mohajirs are largely followers of the more tolerant Barelvi sect and strongly oppose the Wahabi/Deobandi group which supports the LEJ. At the time of the independence of Pakistan in 1947, a large number of well-to-do Shias from Lucknow and Hyderabad in India migrated to Karachi. They have prospered as doctors, lawyers and academics. Many of them support the MQM and hence are the targets of the LEJ.
10. Recently, there have been reports that differences had developed between Altaf and Imran Farooq, who found himself increasingly marginalized in the Party.
11. The murder of Imran Farooq has not been categorized by the London Police as an act of terrorism so far. It has to be treated for the time being as an act of murder due to political or ethnic or sectarian reasons. The fact that he was stabbed to death and not killed with a gun or an explosive device could indicate the possibility that another Mohajir might have been the assassin. Mohajirs in Karachi often prefer the use of knives for killing. If the involvement of a fellow-Mohajir is ruled out, the other suspects could be the LEJ and the TTP in that order. If it turns out that the LEJ or the TTP or both acting in tandem killed him, that should be a matter of serious concern to the British intelligence. That would show that the LEJ and the TTP have set up sleeper cells in the UK. (17-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
This may please be read in continuation of the following articles of mine:
(a). Article of February 7,2010, titled “Karachi & Af-Pak Policy Options” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers37/paper3653.html
(b). Article of August 5,2010, titled “ Murder of Shia Mohajir Leader Sparks Fresh Carnage in Karachi” at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3965.html
2. According to the “Dawn” of Karachi, (September 17,2010), Dr Imran Farooq, a founding leader of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the organisation’s first Secretary-General, was assassinated in London on the evening of September 16. According to some sources, he was attacked by some unidentified men with daggers near his London residence and died of multiple wounds, but according to another source, a lone assailant had been lying in wait inside the apartment block where Dr Farooq lived on the first floor. He was attacked with a knife when he was climbing the stairs. He died on the spot. The murder coincided with the 57th birthday celebrations of Dr.Altaf Hussain, the head of the MQM, who lives in exile in London since 1992.
3. After Altaf fled to the UK from Karachi in 1992 to escape arrest on a charge of having an army officer kidnapped and tortured, Dr.Imran Farooq went underground and was clandestinely running the party on behalf of Altaf from different hide-outs in Karachi and Hyderabad in Sindh. After some years, with the police hot on his trail, he too fled to London where he surfaced in 1999. He was reportedly given political asylum by the British authorities.
4. Dr. Imran Farooq was considered close to the late Zia-ul-Haq. At the instance of Zia, he founded the All-Pakistan Mohajir Students’ Organisation (APMSO) to counter the activities of the Sindhi and Pashtun nationalists and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) of Benazir Bhutto. It played an active role in the Mohajir-Pashtun communal clashes in Karachi during the Zia regime.
5. The APMSO was converted into the MQM under the leadership of Altaf, after Altaf returned to Karachi from the US where he was working. Altaf and Imran were very close to each other. Imran was considered the alter ego of Altaf. He kept the party intact and active after Altaf fled to the UK. He was an iconic figure to the Mohajir youth.
6. After he sought political asylum in the UK, he and Altaf worked closely together to co-ordinate the activities of the MQM in Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur to which its following was confined. They had its name changed as the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) in order to attract to its fold members of all ethnic communities instead of keeping it confined as a purely Mohajir (refugee from India) party. It made some headway in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), including Gilgit-Baltistan, but not in other provinces.
7. Its activities earned for it the enmity of the Sindhis and the Pashtuns. Differences also developed in the MQM between Mohajirs (MQM), who had migrated from Uttar Pradesh in India, and Mohajirs, who had migrated from Bihar. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) managed to persuade some Mohajirs from Bihar to leave the MQM and form a new organization called the MQM (Haquiqi) meaning the real MQM. The MQM (H) was armed by the ISI and there were frequent bloody clashes between the MQM and the MQM (H).
8. The MQM has been involved in frequent clashes with the Pashtuns of the secular Awami National Party (ANP) and with the Mohajirs in the MQM (H).Karachi has more Pashtuns than even Peshawar. The Pashtuns of Karachi dominate the transport business and are prosperous. The frequent Drone strikes by the US in the Pashtun belt and the military operations of the Pakistan Army against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have seen the influx of some Pashtun members of the TTP into Karachi to take shelter there. The MQM has been alleging that there has been a steady Talibanisation of the Pashtun community in Karachi and has been indulging in targeted attacks on the Pashtuns. However, independent sources say that the secular ANP still commands the support of the majority of the Pashtun community in Karachi.
9. Another bitter adversary of the MQM is the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ). The Mohajirs are largely followers of the more tolerant Barelvi sect and strongly oppose the Wahabi/Deobandi group which supports the LEJ. At the time of the independence of Pakistan in 1947, a large number of well-to-do Shias from Lucknow and Hyderabad in India migrated to Karachi. They have prospered as doctors, lawyers and academics. Many of them support the MQM and hence are the targets of the LEJ.
10. Recently, there have been reports that differences had developed between Altaf and Imran Farooq, who found himself increasingly marginalized in the Party.
11. The murder of Imran Farooq has not been categorized by the London Police as an act of terrorism so far. It has to be treated for the time being as an act of murder due to political or ethnic or sectarian reasons. The fact that he was stabbed to death and not killed with a gun or an explosive device could indicate the possibility that another Mohajir might have been the assassin. Mohajirs in Karachi often prefer the use of knives for killing. If the involvement of a fellow-Mohajir is ruled out, the other suspects could be the LEJ and the TTP in that order. If it turns out that the LEJ or the TTP or both acting in tandem killed him, that should be a matter of serious concern to the British intelligence. That would show that the LEJ and the TTP have set up sleeper cells in the UK. (17-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, September 16, 2010
KASHMIR: AN OPEN LETTER TO RAHUL GANDHI
B.RAMAN
Dear Shri Rahul Gandhi,
The All-Party Conference (APC), convened by Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh, at New Delhi on September 15,2010, to discuss measures to end the current violence in Jammu & Kashmir ended with a single agreement to send an all-party delegation headed by Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister, to the State for an on-the-spot study of the situation. After it returns and submits its report, another All-Party Conference is proposed to be held to discuss its recommendations.
2. This decision reminds one of a similar initiative taken by Shri V.P.Singh, the then Prime Minister, in 1990. Instead of cooling the tempers, Shri V.P.Singh's initiative exacerbated them. Instead of facilitating a political consensus on how to deal with the situation, Rajiv Gandhi, the then Leader of the Opposition and his aides, could not resist the temptation to use the opportunity to undermine the credibility of the V.P Singh Government in the eyes of the people. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was then supporting the V.P.Singh Government.
3. In 1989-90, the Congress (I), headed by Rajiv Gandhi, played the role of a spoiler. The BJP, now advised by L.K.Advani, is trying to play a similar role of spoiler in order to embarrass the Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh and draw political mileage out of the current crisis in J&K. During the election campaign of last year, the BJP, then headed by Advani, who was projecting himself as made-to-be Prime Minister, sought to project Dr.Manmohan Singh as a weak and soft Prime Minister. This projection failed to make an impact on the voters. Its bid to return to power fell flat.
4. The BJP is now trying to project Dr.Manmohan Singh's Kashmir-related policies as weak and soft and to blame him and the Government of J&K for the fresh wave of trouble in that State. It has also been projecting itself as an uncritical supporter of the Army and other security forces for the way they are dealing with a thankless situation and confronting head-on the proxy war being waged by Pakistan through its surrogates in J&K.
5. The BJP is calculating that by exploiting a highly emotional issue such as J&K, it could retrieve the electoral ground lost by it in last year's election. No one can question the patriotism and nationalism of the BJP. They are of high order as they have always been. But, patriotism and nationalism are not the sole driving forces of its actions and statements. Partisan political calculations are another factor just as they were in the case of the Congress (I) when V.P.Singh was the PM.
6.The no-holds-barred partisan political battle waged by the Congress (I) in 1989 -90 benefited the separatists and terrorists by showing that the Indian political class cannot unite even in the case of a major crisis. A similar battle being waged by the BJP now could have a similar result.
7.In the face of the relentless campaign of the BJP seeking to blame what it looks upon as the soft policies of the Manmohan Singh Government for the deterioration in the situation in J&K, the Congress (I) and the Government find themselves in a dilemma. There is a realization in the Congress (I)----as there is in the parties to the left of the political spectrum--- that there has been a qualitative change in the situation in J&K with mass defiance of the law and order machinery replacing terrorism as a weapon of struggle against the State. This mass defiance might not have grown to the extent it has since June if the Government of India had promptly acted on complaints of a false encounter involving the Army and regarding the initial incidents of use of force by the Police and other para-military forces against protesters breaking the law.
8.A complacent feeling in Srinagar and New Delhi that the mass protests and defiance, which started in June, would be short-lived and would fizzle out as past street protests had contributed to a lack of vigorous corrective action to moderate the use of force against the street breakers of law. The situation did not call for vigorous counter-terrorism techniques and patriotic rhetoric accompanied by demonisation campaigns against Pakistan and its surrogates in the State. It called for carefully moderated crowd control techniques and a new articulation of Government policies reflecting some empathy towards the angry youth and concerns over the perceived excessive lethality of the force being used against the young street protesters. Our appeals for calm and restraint should have been addressed more to the youth than to the conventional separatist leaders.
9. At the All-Party Conference, one could sense that while the BJP continues to be impervious to the new ground signals coming from the streets of Kashmir, the Congress (I) and the left parties have started realising that the situation in J&K since June is qualitatively different and requires a qualitatively different approach marked by reasonable firmness and not ruthlessness in action against the law-breakers and a new kind of language that would keep the fresh wave of people’s alienation contained and eventually reversed. The refreshingly different interventions of Sonia Gandhi, the leader of the Congress (I), and the leaders of the left stood in sharp contrast to the Hyde Park oratory of BJP leaders and spokesmen that one had been seeing on the TV news channels every day.
10. The comments that have come from you after the All-Party Conference calling for time and support to Shri Omar Abdullah, the battling Chief Minister of the State, show a welcome realization that it will be unwise to undermine his position whatever be his sins of omission and commission. The Prime Minister, who is constantly under attack by the Hyde park orators of the BJP, cannot be expected to show any initiative which could provide oxygen to the BJP’s ill-advised campaign against him at this critical time.
11.It is important that simultaneously with the all-party exercise initiated by the Prime Minister, the youth wing of the Congress (I) under your leadership initiates a non-governmental back-channel of communications with the angry Kashmiri youth. The first step in that exercise should be an all-party youth conference on Kashmir with two items on the agenda---- the human rights situation in the state and how to mitigate the anger of the youth. Kashmiri members of the youth wings of the political parties should play an active role in this matter.
12. The situation as it has developed in J&K is an emotional challenge to the youth of the country. All of us---whether politicians or professional bureaucrats--- who made our names in dealing ruthlessly with terrorism and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, have intellectual and professional deficiencies in understanding the current situation. It is time for the youth of the country to take the lead in thinking of meaningful gestures and non-provocative actions on the ground that could help in containing the anger in J&K before it consumes all of us ---young or old. ( 17-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies . E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Dear Shri Rahul Gandhi,
The All-Party Conference (APC), convened by Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh, at New Delhi on September 15,2010, to discuss measures to end the current violence in Jammu & Kashmir ended with a single agreement to send an all-party delegation headed by Shri P.Chidambaram, the Home Minister, to the State for an on-the-spot study of the situation. After it returns and submits its report, another All-Party Conference is proposed to be held to discuss its recommendations.
2. This decision reminds one of a similar initiative taken by Shri V.P.Singh, the then Prime Minister, in 1990. Instead of cooling the tempers, Shri V.P.Singh's initiative exacerbated them. Instead of facilitating a political consensus on how to deal with the situation, Rajiv Gandhi, the then Leader of the Opposition and his aides, could not resist the temptation to use the opportunity to undermine the credibility of the V.P Singh Government in the eyes of the people. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was then supporting the V.P.Singh Government.
3. In 1989-90, the Congress (I), headed by Rajiv Gandhi, played the role of a spoiler. The BJP, now advised by L.K.Advani, is trying to play a similar role of spoiler in order to embarrass the Government of Dr.Manmohan Singh and draw political mileage out of the current crisis in J&K. During the election campaign of last year, the BJP, then headed by Advani, who was projecting himself as made-to-be Prime Minister, sought to project Dr.Manmohan Singh as a weak and soft Prime Minister. This projection failed to make an impact on the voters. Its bid to return to power fell flat.
4. The BJP is now trying to project Dr.Manmohan Singh's Kashmir-related policies as weak and soft and to blame him and the Government of J&K for the fresh wave of trouble in that State. It has also been projecting itself as an uncritical supporter of the Army and other security forces for the way they are dealing with a thankless situation and confronting head-on the proxy war being waged by Pakistan through its surrogates in J&K.
5. The BJP is calculating that by exploiting a highly emotional issue such as J&K, it could retrieve the electoral ground lost by it in last year's election. No one can question the patriotism and nationalism of the BJP. They are of high order as they have always been. But, patriotism and nationalism are not the sole driving forces of its actions and statements. Partisan political calculations are another factor just as they were in the case of the Congress (I) when V.P.Singh was the PM.
6.The no-holds-barred partisan political battle waged by the Congress (I) in 1989 -90 benefited the separatists and terrorists by showing that the Indian political class cannot unite even in the case of a major crisis. A similar battle being waged by the BJP now could have a similar result.
7.In the face of the relentless campaign of the BJP seeking to blame what it looks upon as the soft policies of the Manmohan Singh Government for the deterioration in the situation in J&K, the Congress (I) and the Government find themselves in a dilemma. There is a realization in the Congress (I)----as there is in the parties to the left of the political spectrum--- that there has been a qualitative change in the situation in J&K with mass defiance of the law and order machinery replacing terrorism as a weapon of struggle against the State. This mass defiance might not have grown to the extent it has since June if the Government of India had promptly acted on complaints of a false encounter involving the Army and regarding the initial incidents of use of force by the Police and other para-military forces against protesters breaking the law.
8.A complacent feeling in Srinagar and New Delhi that the mass protests and defiance, which started in June, would be short-lived and would fizzle out as past street protests had contributed to a lack of vigorous corrective action to moderate the use of force against the street breakers of law. The situation did not call for vigorous counter-terrorism techniques and patriotic rhetoric accompanied by demonisation campaigns against Pakistan and its surrogates in the State. It called for carefully moderated crowd control techniques and a new articulation of Government policies reflecting some empathy towards the angry youth and concerns over the perceived excessive lethality of the force being used against the young street protesters. Our appeals for calm and restraint should have been addressed more to the youth than to the conventional separatist leaders.
9. At the All-Party Conference, one could sense that while the BJP continues to be impervious to the new ground signals coming from the streets of Kashmir, the Congress (I) and the left parties have started realising that the situation in J&K since June is qualitatively different and requires a qualitatively different approach marked by reasonable firmness and not ruthlessness in action against the law-breakers and a new kind of language that would keep the fresh wave of people’s alienation contained and eventually reversed. The refreshingly different interventions of Sonia Gandhi, the leader of the Congress (I), and the leaders of the left stood in sharp contrast to the Hyde Park oratory of BJP leaders and spokesmen that one had been seeing on the TV news channels every day.
10. The comments that have come from you after the All-Party Conference calling for time and support to Shri Omar Abdullah, the battling Chief Minister of the State, show a welcome realization that it will be unwise to undermine his position whatever be his sins of omission and commission. The Prime Minister, who is constantly under attack by the Hyde park orators of the BJP, cannot be expected to show any initiative which could provide oxygen to the BJP’s ill-advised campaign against him at this critical time.
11.It is important that simultaneously with the all-party exercise initiated by the Prime Minister, the youth wing of the Congress (I) under your leadership initiates a non-governmental back-channel of communications with the angry Kashmiri youth. The first step in that exercise should be an all-party youth conference on Kashmir with two items on the agenda---- the human rights situation in the state and how to mitigate the anger of the youth. Kashmiri members of the youth wings of the political parties should play an active role in this matter.
12. The situation as it has developed in J&K is an emotional challenge to the youth of the country. All of us---whether politicians or professional bureaucrats--- who made our names in dealing ruthlessly with terrorism and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, have intellectual and professional deficiencies in understanding the current situation. It is time for the youth of the country to take the lead in thinking of meaningful gestures and non-provocative actions on the ground that could help in containing the anger in J&K before it consumes all of us ---young or old. ( 17-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies . E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
SINGAPORE PROMOTES CHINESE NOMINEE AS PANCHEN LAMA
SINGAPORE PROMOTES CHINESE NOMINEE AS PANCHEN LAMA
B.RAMAN
Mr.George Yeo, Singapore's Foreign Minister, has hurt the feelings of large sections of the Tibetal Buddhists in China and abroad, including India, by providing legitimacy to the action of the Chinese Communist Party in arresting in 1995 His Holiness the Panchen Lama chosen by the Tibetans in accordance with their tradition and imposing on them an individual chosen by the Chinese Communist Party as the 11th Panchen Lama.
2. The nominee of the Chinese Communist Party has not been accepted by the Tibetan people and His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The Chinese have till now refused to release the Panchen Lama chosen by the Tibetans and allow him to perform his functions as a religious leader. Confronted with a situation where the Tibetans and other Buddhists of the world are not prepared to recognise the legitimacy of the Panchen Lama imposed on the Tibetan people by the Chinese Communist Party,the Chinese Government has mounted an exercise since the beginning of this year to build up the image of their nominee in the Tibetan-inhabited areas of China. In this connection reference is invited to my article of June 17,2010, titled "Bringing up their Panchen Lama" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3864.html
3.The Chinese have further extended this exercise now in order to build up his image abroad. As part of this exercise, the Chinese authorities arranged a meeting between their nominee and Mr.George Yeo at Beijing on September 14, 2010, during a visit by the Singapore Foreign Minister to China. It has been reported that the Chinese Party-nominated Panchen Lama accepted an invitation extended by Mr.George Yeo to visit Singapore. Even though this has been projected as part of an exercise to promote contacts between Buddhists in the two countries, its political significance in providing legitimacy to the actions of the Chinese Communist Party in interfering in the religious affairs of the Tibetan Buddhists and tampering with their traditions cannot be missed.
4. The Chinese have made it clear on many occasions that when His Holiness the Dalai Lama dies, his successor will be chosen by the Communist Party and Government as they did in the case of their nominee as the Panchen Lama. The action of the Singapore Foreign Minister in providing legitimacy to Chinese actions in denying freedom of religion to the Tibetan people could be a prelude to his providing legitimacy to the Chinese Party imposing on the Tibetans a Dalai Lama in Chinese Communist Party colours.
5. It is understood that Mr.George Yeo, who paid a controversial visit to Tibet in August last year, has been taking close interest in the project of the Government of India for the revival of the Nalanda University. His action in providing legitimacy to actions of the Chinese Party, which were an affront to the Tibetans and other Buddhists, has to be strongly deplored. In view of this, there is a need to re-examine his continued association with the Nalanda revival project. (16-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Mr.George Yeo, Singapore's Foreign Minister, has hurt the feelings of large sections of the Tibetal Buddhists in China and abroad, including India, by providing legitimacy to the action of the Chinese Communist Party in arresting in 1995 His Holiness the Panchen Lama chosen by the Tibetans in accordance with their tradition and imposing on them an individual chosen by the Chinese Communist Party as the 11th Panchen Lama.
2. The nominee of the Chinese Communist Party has not been accepted by the Tibetan people and His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The Chinese have till now refused to release the Panchen Lama chosen by the Tibetans and allow him to perform his functions as a religious leader. Confronted with a situation where the Tibetans and other Buddhists of the world are not prepared to recognise the legitimacy of the Panchen Lama imposed on the Tibetan people by the Chinese Communist Party,the Chinese Government has mounted an exercise since the beginning of this year to build up the image of their nominee in the Tibetan-inhabited areas of China. In this connection reference is invited to my article of June 17,2010, titled "Bringing up their Panchen Lama" at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3864.html
3.The Chinese have further extended this exercise now in order to build up his image abroad. As part of this exercise, the Chinese authorities arranged a meeting between their nominee and Mr.George Yeo at Beijing on September 14, 2010, during a visit by the Singapore Foreign Minister to China. It has been reported that the Chinese Party-nominated Panchen Lama accepted an invitation extended by Mr.George Yeo to visit Singapore. Even though this has been projected as part of an exercise to promote contacts between Buddhists in the two countries, its political significance in providing legitimacy to the actions of the Chinese Communist Party in interfering in the religious affairs of the Tibetan Buddhists and tampering with their traditions cannot be missed.
4. The Chinese have made it clear on many occasions that when His Holiness the Dalai Lama dies, his successor will be chosen by the Communist Party and Government as they did in the case of their nominee as the Panchen Lama. The action of the Singapore Foreign Minister in providing legitimacy to Chinese actions in denying freedom of religion to the Tibetan people could be a prelude to his providing legitimacy to the Chinese Party imposing on the Tibetans a Dalai Lama in Chinese Communist Party colours.
5. It is understood that Mr.George Yeo, who paid a controversial visit to Tibet in August last year, has been taking close interest in the project of the Government of India for the revival of the Nalanda University. His action in providing legitimacy to actions of the Chinese Party, which were an affront to the Tibetans and other Buddhists, has to be strongly deplored. In view of this, there is a need to re-examine his continued association with the Nalanda revival project. (16-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
EAST CHINA SEA:SINO-JAPANESE WAR OF NERVES
B.RAMAN
The Chinese leadership is increasingly concerned over the firm line till now taken by the Japanese leadership over the incident involving a Chinese fishing trawler and a Japanese Coast Guard vessel in what Japan considers its territorial waters adjoining the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
2.Japan, which considers the islands its territory, is in administrative control of the disputed small group of islands and reefs. China calls the group the Diaoyu Islands and claims that the group historically belonged to China from the days of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). The question of sovereighty over the group of islands has assumed importance due to a belief that the area is rich in oil and gas. China has been saying that Japan should concede Chinese sovereignty over the group. In return, China would agree to a joint development of the natural resources of the area by the two countries.
3.In the face of the Japanese insistence over its sovereignty, an incident involving a Chinese fishing trawler and a Japanese Coast Guard vessel in the area on September 7,2010, has to a led of war of nerves between the two countries initiated by Beijing. The Japanese Coast Guard vessel, which questioned the intrusion of the trawler into what Japan regards as its territorial waters, was involved in a collision with the trawler. The Chinese project the incident as an accidental collision. The Japanese seem to suspect that the captain of the trawler, acting on instructions from the People's Liberation Army (Navy), deliberately rammed the trawler against the Coast Guard vessel.
4. Initially, the Japanese detained the trawler and its crew, including the Captain, for investigation. They have since released the trawler and the crew except the Captain. The Captain is in the custody of the Japanese Police and is to be produced before a court on September 19. Beijing through diplomatic channels and through the Government-controlled media has mounted a war of nerves against Japan in order to intimidate Tokyo into releasing the Captain without prosecuting him. The Japanese Ambassador in Beijing was called to the Chinese Foreign Ministry five times since the incident took place to be warned of the consequences should the Captain not be released without prosecution.
5. The Japanese determination till now----apparently with quiet American backing---not to release the Captain has put Beijing in a dilemma. If it did not have its way in this war of nerves and force Tokyo to concede its demand, it could be seen as a humiliation. This could be politically embarrassing to President Hu Jintao. If the Chinese forced a naval confrontation with the Japanese Navy, this could strengthen growing fears in the Asian region that China has started using its military muscle to enforce its territorial claims. Today, the confrontation is with Japan in the East China Sea. Tomorrow, it could be with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea. The day after,in Arunchal Pradesh with India over the Chinese claims to Indian territory in that area.
6. At the same time, there is a fear in China of the implications of a likely use of China's naval force against Japan. It could strengthen anti-Chinese feelings in Japan and damage the considerable economic relations with Japan, without which the Chinese economic miracle would not have been possible.
7. After having stepped up diplomatic pressure against Japan---in vain so far---- the Chinese are trying to mobilise public pressure.Calls are going out through the Internet to Chinese netizens to demonstrate in Beijing against Japan on September 18 if the Japanese do not release the Captain by then and to boycott Japanese goods. Patriotism is a double-edged weapon. If it fails to intimidate Japan, it could acquire an anti-Japanese momentum of its own the consequences of which could be unpredictable.
8. These fears are reflected in the calls being made to Beijing by some of its analysts not to over-react by losing patience. Patriotism against Japan, yes, but with prudence so that the political leadership does not end up by dropping the stone of patriotism on its own feet instead of on the feet of Japan. This advice is reflected in an editorial on the subject carried by the party-controlled "Global Times" on September 16. The editorial is annexed. (16-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi , and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
China should not be easily irritated
( "Global Times" editorial of September 16, 2010)
The latest incident near the Diaoyu Islands has sparkled anti-Japanese sentiments among Chinese citizens.
After Japan's Prime Minister Naoto Kan won a party vote to stay in power, his ambassador to China, Uichiro Niwa, arrived at the Chinese foreign ministry later on Tuesday, asking China to take proper measures to prevent a worsening of the conflict between the two countries.
The Chinese government would never deliberately stir up domestic nationalism, because this will ultimately undermine China's own social order and national prospects.
However, along with the emergence of a diversified society, ordinary Chinese now have more courage to express themselves. Media, especially the Internet, has become the main outlet that conveys grass-roots opinions on international issues.
What the Chinese government needs to do is to facilitate orderly and effective delivery of ordinary people's voices to the outside world, whereas making sure that overly impulsive voices and actions will not bring about internal friction.
When it comes to national sovereignty and dignity, ordinary Chinese do have the right to express all kinds of notions, including radical ones.
A China without voices calling for a fight with Japan and boycotts against Japanese goods is not a real China with 1.3 billion people. But on the other hand, China has to ensure the rational transmission of various grass-roots voices. Violence that took place during the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations should not be repeated.
China is often depicted as an "irritated" country in overseas media reports. China should stay cool-headed, because radical flames can burn down sober actions. Those who provoke China are often powerful and sophisticated diplomatic veterans. What they revere is actually cool-headed wisdom as well as the deliberation of countermeasures.
The mainstream notion of external affairs is healthy in China. The minority who try to kidnap patriotism and undermine social order will always exist.
How to restrain such "patriotic thieves" and facilitate the normal expression of social thoughts is also a part of China's political enlightenment.
Bringing home the boat captain that is being illegally detained by Japanese authorities poses a challenge to both the Chinese government and ordinary people. It's necessary to let Japan feel the threat from grass-roots Chinese against its interests.
Some grass-roots organizations should help common people express and act in a proper way. Only then will Japan show honest reverence toward grass-roots Chinese.
The Chinese leadership is increasingly concerned over the firm line till now taken by the Japanese leadership over the incident involving a Chinese fishing trawler and a Japanese Coast Guard vessel in what Japan considers its territorial waters adjoining the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
2.Japan, which considers the islands its territory, is in administrative control of the disputed small group of islands and reefs. China calls the group the Diaoyu Islands and claims that the group historically belonged to China from the days of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). The question of sovereighty over the group of islands has assumed importance due to a belief that the area is rich in oil and gas. China has been saying that Japan should concede Chinese sovereignty over the group. In return, China would agree to a joint development of the natural resources of the area by the two countries.
3.In the face of the Japanese insistence over its sovereignty, an incident involving a Chinese fishing trawler and a Japanese Coast Guard vessel in the area on September 7,2010, has to a led of war of nerves between the two countries initiated by Beijing. The Japanese Coast Guard vessel, which questioned the intrusion of the trawler into what Japan regards as its territorial waters, was involved in a collision with the trawler. The Chinese project the incident as an accidental collision. The Japanese seem to suspect that the captain of the trawler, acting on instructions from the People's Liberation Army (Navy), deliberately rammed the trawler against the Coast Guard vessel.
4. Initially, the Japanese detained the trawler and its crew, including the Captain, for investigation. They have since released the trawler and the crew except the Captain. The Captain is in the custody of the Japanese Police and is to be produced before a court on September 19. Beijing through diplomatic channels and through the Government-controlled media has mounted a war of nerves against Japan in order to intimidate Tokyo into releasing the Captain without prosecuting him. The Japanese Ambassador in Beijing was called to the Chinese Foreign Ministry five times since the incident took place to be warned of the consequences should the Captain not be released without prosecution.
5. The Japanese determination till now----apparently with quiet American backing---not to release the Captain has put Beijing in a dilemma. If it did not have its way in this war of nerves and force Tokyo to concede its demand, it could be seen as a humiliation. This could be politically embarrassing to President Hu Jintao. If the Chinese forced a naval confrontation with the Japanese Navy, this could strengthen growing fears in the Asian region that China has started using its military muscle to enforce its territorial claims. Today, the confrontation is with Japan in the East China Sea. Tomorrow, it could be with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea. The day after,in Arunchal Pradesh with India over the Chinese claims to Indian territory in that area.
6. At the same time, there is a fear in China of the implications of a likely use of China's naval force against Japan. It could strengthen anti-Chinese feelings in Japan and damage the considerable economic relations with Japan, without which the Chinese economic miracle would not have been possible.
7. After having stepped up diplomatic pressure against Japan---in vain so far---- the Chinese are trying to mobilise public pressure.Calls are going out through the Internet to Chinese netizens to demonstrate in Beijing against Japan on September 18 if the Japanese do not release the Captain by then and to boycott Japanese goods. Patriotism is a double-edged weapon. If it fails to intimidate Japan, it could acquire an anti-Japanese momentum of its own the consequences of which could be unpredictable.
8. These fears are reflected in the calls being made to Beijing by some of its analysts not to over-react by losing patience. Patriotism against Japan, yes, but with prudence so that the political leadership does not end up by dropping the stone of patriotism on its own feet instead of on the feet of Japan. This advice is reflected in an editorial on the subject carried by the party-controlled "Global Times" on September 16. The editorial is annexed. (16-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi , and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
China should not be easily irritated
( "Global Times" editorial of September 16, 2010)
The latest incident near the Diaoyu Islands has sparkled anti-Japanese sentiments among Chinese citizens.
After Japan's Prime Minister Naoto Kan won a party vote to stay in power, his ambassador to China, Uichiro Niwa, arrived at the Chinese foreign ministry later on Tuesday, asking China to take proper measures to prevent a worsening of the conflict between the two countries.
The Chinese government would never deliberately stir up domestic nationalism, because this will ultimately undermine China's own social order and national prospects.
However, along with the emergence of a diversified society, ordinary Chinese now have more courage to express themselves. Media, especially the Internet, has become the main outlet that conveys grass-roots opinions on international issues.
What the Chinese government needs to do is to facilitate orderly and effective delivery of ordinary people's voices to the outside world, whereas making sure that overly impulsive voices and actions will not bring about internal friction.
When it comes to national sovereignty and dignity, ordinary Chinese do have the right to express all kinds of notions, including radical ones.
A China without voices calling for a fight with Japan and boycotts against Japanese goods is not a real China with 1.3 billion people. But on the other hand, China has to ensure the rational transmission of various grass-roots voices. Violence that took place during the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations should not be repeated.
China is often depicted as an "irritated" country in overseas media reports. China should stay cool-headed, because radical flames can burn down sober actions. Those who provoke China are often powerful and sophisticated diplomatic veterans. What they revere is actually cool-headed wisdom as well as the deliberation of countermeasures.
The mainstream notion of external affairs is healthy in China. The minority who try to kidnap patriotism and undermine social order will always exist.
How to restrain such "patriotic thieves" and facilitate the normal expression of social thoughts is also a part of China's political enlightenment.
Bringing home the boat captain that is being illegally detained by Japanese authorities poses a challenge to both the Chinese government and ordinary people. It's necessary to let Japan feel the threat from grass-roots Chinese against its interests.
Some grass-roots organizations should help common people express and act in a proper way. Only then will Japan show honest reverence toward grass-roots Chinese.
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
SELIG HARRISON'S WAKE-UP CALL: MY COMMENTS
B.RAMAN
On August 27,2010,the “New York Times” carried an article by Selig Harrison, former correspondent of the ”Washington Post” in New Delhi who now works in a Washington-based think tank, stating inter alia as follows: “While the world focuses on the flood-ravaged Indus River valley, a quiet geopolitical crisis is unfolding in the Himalayan borderlands of northern Pakistan, where Islamabad is handing over de facto control of the strategic Gilgit-Baltistan region in the northwest corner of disputed Kashmir to China. The entire Pakistan-occupied western portion of Kashmir stretching from Gilgit in the north to Azad (Free) Kashmir in the south is closed to the world, in contrast to the media access that India permits in the eastern part, where it is combating a Pakistan-backed insurgency. But reports from a variety of foreign intelligence sources, Pakistani journalists and Pakistani human rights workers reveal two important new developments in Gilgit-Baltistan: a simmering rebellion against Pakistani rule and the influx of an estimated 7,000 to 11,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army.” (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/op...20china&st=cse)
2.Selig’s wake-up call should not have been a surprise to intelligence sources and policy-makers in India and the US. They were aware of the high level of involvement of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China and its nuclear establishment in the construction and maintenance of high-altitude roads in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB).The PLA was interested in infrastructure development and maintenance in GB because of its strategic importance for possible use by the PLA in the event of another military conflict with India. China’s nuclear establishment was interested because it wanted to use the PLA-constructed Karakoram Highway (KKH) as an overland route for the movement of missiles and spare parts to Pakistan.
3. The first wake-up call that China had been using the KKH for moving missile supplies to Pakistan was sounded by the National Security Agency (NSA) of the US, which managed to take satellite photographs of such movement. On August 6 and 7,2001, the “Washington Times” gave the following details:
* The China National Machinery & Equipment Import & Export Corporation sent a dozen shipments of missile components to Pakistan since November,2000, and a US spy satellite detected the latest shipment as it arrived by truck at the mountainous Chinese-Pakistani border May 1,2001. The company supplied components for Pakistan's Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-2 missile programmes. The consignments were sent by ship and truck.
* The missile components are being used for production of the Shaheen-1, which has an estimated range of 465 miles, and the development of the Shaheen-2, which US intelligence agencies think will have a range of up to 1,240 miles.
4.Following the disclosure by the “Washington Times, Gen.Pervez Musharraf visited Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, including GB, for four days from August 27,2001. In an article of September 3,2001, titled MUSHARRAF'S VISIT TO POK & N.A. at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers4%5Cpaper307.html, I wrote as follows: “The US media reports that its intelligence agencies had detected the transport of 12 consignments of Chinese missile components by sea and land since China pledged to stop such supplies in November last. The consignments sent by trucks came via the Karakoram Highway through Xinjiang and the N.A. (Northern Areas). To avoid detection of transport by sea by US satellites or by the CIA's port-based sources, China and Pakistan had decided to move future consignments by road, which, they felt, would not be vulnerable to detection by the CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) of the US. Pakistan has also sought Chinese assistance for the movements of future consignments of missiles and components from North Korea by road through the same route. The military junta had taken considerable precautions to prevent detection of the truck movements by not associating any of the officials of the NA Administration, particularly the Shias, with the arrangements for the movement. In view of this, both Islamabad and Beijing were surprised and embarrassed by the US media reports that US intelligence had detected the truck movements. Pakistani officials claim that even if US satellites had detected the trucks, they could not have known that the consignments contained missile components. They, therefore, reportedly feel that there must have been leakage to the CIA from one of the Pakistani officials associated with the movement. Moreover, following past US detection of the storage of the earlier missiles/components in Sargoda, the military junta had drawn up alternate plans for storage in Gilgit in the hope that there would be less possibility of detection there by the CIA. Before Musharraf's arrival in the POK, Lt.Gen. Jamshed Gulzar, Corps Commander, 10 Corps based in Rawalpindi, had visited the N.A. to enquire into the leakage jointly with the Force Commander, NA, Lt-Gen Muhammad Safdar. Measures for tightening up security in N.A. was one of the subjects which figured during the discussions of Musharraf in Gilgit in which apart from senior military officers, Abbas Sarfaraz, Musharraf's Minister for Kashmir and NA Affairs, who is also the Chief Executive of the NA, also participated. “ In this connection, reference is also invited to my article of August 7,2001, titled GILGIT & BALTISTAN, CHINA & NORTH KOREA at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers3%5Cpaper289.html
5. When the KKH was constructed by Chinese engineers in the 1970s, China had no private construction company. All construction companies were State-owned. Only the Engineering units of the PLA had engineers with experience of construction at high altitudes. Right from the beginning, PLA engineers had been involved in the construction, maintenance and upgradation of the KKH. As a result, there had always been a sizable presence of engineers of the PLA in GB. This number has gone up since the beginning of this year following severe damages to the KKH by two natural disasters in January and August. Regular units of the PLA have always been deployed in the GB to provide security to the Chinese engineers and humanitarian workers. It has been difficult to estimate the total number of Chinese engineers, humanitarian workers and security personnel in GB. This number will go up further when China starts the construction of a railway line through GB.
6.While information has been coming from time to time about the role of PLA engineers in infrastructure development in GB, similar details are not available about the role of engineers of the North Korean Army. Nationalist sources from the area, who have been fighting against the Pakistan Army, have been saying that North Korean military engineers have good expertise in high-altitude tunnel construction and have been helping the Pakistan Army in the construction of roads which would facilitate all-weather road movements to the Chitral area. According to them, for part of the year, the Chitral area is cut off from the rest of Pakistan by landslides. The only way of reaching Chitral is via Afghanistan. Other sources say that the engineers involved in this are from South and not North Korea. It has not been possible to verify this.
7. Thus even before Selig sounded his wake-up call, considerable details were available for over a decade on the presence and activities of the PLA and possibly North Korean military engineers in GB. Considerable details came from GB when the Government of Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee was in power from 1998 to 2004. It was during that period that the PLA presence in GB increased. His Government failed to highlight this threat to our own population and to the international community. It is not known whether we have factored this into our plans for the protection of the Ladakh-Kargil sector. Infrastructure development in our territory in the areas bordering GB has remained neglected. It is time we sit up and pay more attention to this. If we do so, Selig’s wake-up call would have served a useful purpose. Chinese and North Korean activities in GB should also figure prominently in the talks during the visit of President Barack Obama to India in November. (15-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
On August 27,2010,the “New York Times” carried an article by Selig Harrison, former correspondent of the ”Washington Post” in New Delhi who now works in a Washington-based think tank, stating inter alia as follows: “While the world focuses on the flood-ravaged Indus River valley, a quiet geopolitical crisis is unfolding in the Himalayan borderlands of northern Pakistan, where Islamabad is handing over de facto control of the strategic Gilgit-Baltistan region in the northwest corner of disputed Kashmir to China. The entire Pakistan-occupied western portion of Kashmir stretching from Gilgit in the north to Azad (Free) Kashmir in the south is closed to the world, in contrast to the media access that India permits in the eastern part, where it is combating a Pakistan-backed insurgency. But reports from a variety of foreign intelligence sources, Pakistani journalists and Pakistani human rights workers reveal two important new developments in Gilgit-Baltistan: a simmering rebellion against Pakistani rule and the influx of an estimated 7,000 to 11,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army.” (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/op...20china&st=cse)
2.Selig’s wake-up call should not have been a surprise to intelligence sources and policy-makers in India and the US. They were aware of the high level of involvement of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China and its nuclear establishment in the construction and maintenance of high-altitude roads in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB).The PLA was interested in infrastructure development and maintenance in GB because of its strategic importance for possible use by the PLA in the event of another military conflict with India. China’s nuclear establishment was interested because it wanted to use the PLA-constructed Karakoram Highway (KKH) as an overland route for the movement of missiles and spare parts to Pakistan.
3. The first wake-up call that China had been using the KKH for moving missile supplies to Pakistan was sounded by the National Security Agency (NSA) of the US, which managed to take satellite photographs of such movement. On August 6 and 7,2001, the “Washington Times” gave the following details:
* The China National Machinery & Equipment Import & Export Corporation sent a dozen shipments of missile components to Pakistan since November,2000, and a US spy satellite detected the latest shipment as it arrived by truck at the mountainous Chinese-Pakistani border May 1,2001. The company supplied components for Pakistan's Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-2 missile programmes. The consignments were sent by ship and truck.
* The missile components are being used for production of the Shaheen-1, which has an estimated range of 465 miles, and the development of the Shaheen-2, which US intelligence agencies think will have a range of up to 1,240 miles.
4.Following the disclosure by the “Washington Times, Gen.Pervez Musharraf visited Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, including GB, for four days from August 27,2001. In an article of September 3,2001, titled MUSHARRAF'S VISIT TO POK & N.A. at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers4%5Cpaper307.html, I wrote as follows: “The US media reports that its intelligence agencies had detected the transport of 12 consignments of Chinese missile components by sea and land since China pledged to stop such supplies in November last. The consignments sent by trucks came via the Karakoram Highway through Xinjiang and the N.A. (Northern Areas). To avoid detection of transport by sea by US satellites or by the CIA's port-based sources, China and Pakistan had decided to move future consignments by road, which, they felt, would not be vulnerable to detection by the CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) of the US. Pakistan has also sought Chinese assistance for the movements of future consignments of missiles and components from North Korea by road through the same route. The military junta had taken considerable precautions to prevent detection of the truck movements by not associating any of the officials of the NA Administration, particularly the Shias, with the arrangements for the movement. In view of this, both Islamabad and Beijing were surprised and embarrassed by the US media reports that US intelligence had detected the truck movements. Pakistani officials claim that even if US satellites had detected the trucks, they could not have known that the consignments contained missile components. They, therefore, reportedly feel that there must have been leakage to the CIA from one of the Pakistani officials associated with the movement. Moreover, following past US detection of the storage of the earlier missiles/components in Sargoda, the military junta had drawn up alternate plans for storage in Gilgit in the hope that there would be less possibility of detection there by the CIA. Before Musharraf's arrival in the POK, Lt.Gen. Jamshed Gulzar, Corps Commander, 10 Corps based in Rawalpindi, had visited the N.A. to enquire into the leakage jointly with the Force Commander, NA, Lt-Gen Muhammad Safdar. Measures for tightening up security in N.A. was one of the subjects which figured during the discussions of Musharraf in Gilgit in which apart from senior military officers, Abbas Sarfaraz, Musharraf's Minister for Kashmir and NA Affairs, who is also the Chief Executive of the NA, also participated. “ In this connection, reference is also invited to my article of August 7,2001, titled GILGIT & BALTISTAN, CHINA & NORTH KOREA at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers3%5Cpaper289.html
5. When the KKH was constructed by Chinese engineers in the 1970s, China had no private construction company. All construction companies were State-owned. Only the Engineering units of the PLA had engineers with experience of construction at high altitudes. Right from the beginning, PLA engineers had been involved in the construction, maintenance and upgradation of the KKH. As a result, there had always been a sizable presence of engineers of the PLA in GB. This number has gone up since the beginning of this year following severe damages to the KKH by two natural disasters in January and August. Regular units of the PLA have always been deployed in the GB to provide security to the Chinese engineers and humanitarian workers. It has been difficult to estimate the total number of Chinese engineers, humanitarian workers and security personnel in GB. This number will go up further when China starts the construction of a railway line through GB.
6.While information has been coming from time to time about the role of PLA engineers in infrastructure development in GB, similar details are not available about the role of engineers of the North Korean Army. Nationalist sources from the area, who have been fighting against the Pakistan Army, have been saying that North Korean military engineers have good expertise in high-altitude tunnel construction and have been helping the Pakistan Army in the construction of roads which would facilitate all-weather road movements to the Chitral area. According to them, for part of the year, the Chitral area is cut off from the rest of Pakistan by landslides. The only way of reaching Chitral is via Afghanistan. Other sources say that the engineers involved in this are from South and not North Korea. It has not been possible to verify this.
7. Thus even before Selig sounded his wake-up call, considerable details were available for over a decade on the presence and activities of the PLA and possibly North Korean military engineers in GB. Considerable details came from GB when the Government of Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee was in power from 1998 to 2004. It was during that period that the PLA presence in GB increased. His Government failed to highlight this threat to our own population and to the international community. It is not known whether we have factored this into our plans for the protection of the Ladakh-Kargil sector. Infrastructure development in our territory in the areas bordering GB has remained neglected. It is time we sit up and pay more attention to this. If we do so, Selig’s wake-up call would have served a useful purpose. Chinese and North Korean activities in GB should also figure prominently in the talks during the visit of President Barack Obama to India in November. (15-9-10)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)