B.RAMAN
A somewhat amateurish attempt to clandestinely transport a large consignment of weapons from North Korea to an as yet unknown destination has ended in the consignment, the aircraft transporting it and its crew falling into the hands of security officials from the US and Thailand, who are presently interrogating the crew and examining the consignment and its documentation.
2. The aircraft, which was transporting the consignment, has been identified as an Ilyushin 76 of a dubious background whose operators figured on the black-list of many countries either because of their poor safety standards or because of the suspicion that they were involved in gun-running. The aircraft had a crew of five of whom four were reportedly from Kazakhstan and the fifth was from Belarus.
3.The “Wall Street Journal” has quoted the AeroTransport Data Bank, an Internet service that tracks aircraft, as saying that the plane had recently been seen at airports in Podgorica, Montenegro, and Bujumbura, Burundi. According to the same paper, Russia's Interfax News Agency has cited a senior transport ministry official in Khazakstan, Radilbek Adimolda, as saying at a news conference that the detained Ilyushin-76 was previously owned by a Kazakh airline, East Wing. The plane was acquired in October by Air West Georgia. The WSJ also says that the East Wing is on the European Union's blacklist of airlines prohibited from flying in the EU because they violate global air-safety rules. According to AeroTransport Data Bank, East Wing is the successor to another Kazakh airline, GST Aero Co., which also is on the EU blacklist. The WSJ has reported that investigators at Amnesty International and other advocacy organizations have linked GST to international arms trafficking. Mr. Adimolda said the four Kazakh members of the crew were listed among East Wing's staff, but were on unpaid leave.
4.The aircraft, without any consignment on board, came to Bangkok from the United Arab Emirates on December 9. It was reportedly allowed by the Thai authorities to refuel at the Don Mueang airport in Bangkok. After refueling, it took off for Pyongyang. When it returned to Don Mueang from Pyongyang with the consignment on December 12 the Thai authorities arrested the crew and took the plane in their custody for examination of its consignment.
5. It has been reported that both during the onward and return journey the aircraft was allowed to land in a Thai military airport for refueling. This is surprising and indicates that US intelligence officials were probably already in touch with the crew before the aircraft left the UAE for Pyongyang and facilitated its refueling at the airport in Bangkok in order to lay a trap for capturing the arms consignment during the return journey. If the crew had not been co-operating with the Americans, they would have got suspicious by the ease with which they were able to get the aircraft refueled during the onward journey and avoided re-touching Bangkok during the return journey.
6. According to media reports in Thailand and South Korea, the plane was carrying about 35 tons of arms and ammunition, including surface-to-air missile parts. Though the crew have reportedly been saying that they were under the impression that the consignment consisted of oil drilling equipment and that they were not aware that it contained weapons, this is not believable. The Americans, who are closely involved in the investigation and the interrogation of the crew, must be able to find out who had ordered the consignment. The needle of suspicion points to Pakistan or Iran.
7. If it was Iran, by now, the US would have gone to town with their allegations against Teheran. The fact that they have not yet done so indicates that they are not yet certain on this. Pakistan has been clandestinely purchasing missiles and missile parts from North Korea and has been using its own aircraft as well as hired planes to transport them.
8. It is an important success for the US in its efforts to stop gun-running by North Korea, but it is unlikely to have any deterrent effect on North Korea. It will continue to look for opportunities for gun-running in order to earn foreign exchange. ( 18-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, December 18, 2009
Thursday, December 17, 2009
PAKISTAN: WHAT NEXT?
B.RAMAN
In the wake of the Pakistani Supreme Court ruling setting aside the withdrawal of the corruption cases against about 8000 public servants and political leaders, including President Asif Ali Zardari, by Pervez Musharraf through his National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), Pakistan faces a tricky political situation, which would need careful watch. A worrisome beneficiary of this situation would be the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the various anti-India terrorist groups of Punjab known collectively as the Punjabi Taliban. If the situation is not carefully handled, it could add to the difficulties of the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan.
2. Personally, Zardari has only two options---- either leave office in dignity after asking Bilawal Bhutto, now studying in London, to take over the responsibility for the day-to-day management of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and fight out the corruption cases against him in court or face the prospect of being forced to leave office in humiliation by a public agitation if he refuses to leave office by using his immunity against criminal investigation and prosecution.
3. It may be recalled that in her so-called political will, the late Benazir Bhutto had nominated Zardari as her successor as the leader of the party, but Zardari suggested that since Bilawal was not yet of the required age to be able to contest the elections, Zardari should only manage the affairs of the party as its acting or co- President while grooming Bilawal to ultimately take over all responsibilities relating to the party. Thus, the position today is that while Bilawal is the de jure head of the PPP, Zardari is its de facto head.
4. One has reasons to fear a creeping political confrontation between Zardari, who has been weakened beyond repair as the President of Pakistan, but continues to remain strong as the acting President of the PPP, and Yousef Raza Gilani, who has grown stronger as the Prime Minister with the tacit support of the Army, but has very little following in the party.
5. Though the PPP has a large base of support in Pakistan as a whole, its core strength comes from Sindh, which remains loyal to Zardari till now. Any open confrontation between Zardari and Gilani and any suspicion in Sindh that Gilani and the Army are acting in tandem to force the exit of Zardari through a public agitation could turn the confrontation between Zardari on the one side and Gilani and the Army on the other into a Sindhi-Punjabi confrontation. At a time when Pakistan is facing growing political violence in Balochistan due to the alienation of the Balochs and a growing jihadi violence in the tribal belt due to the alienation of the Pashtuns after the military raid into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July,2007, it cannot afford to have anti-Punjabi violence in Sindh. If one remembers the instances of attacks on Punjabis in Sindh after the assassination of Benazir, one will not rule out the possibility of a recrudescence of similar incidents if Zardari is sought to be humiliated by Gilani and the Army, with the support of political leaders from Punjab belonging to the Pakistan Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif, the former Prime Minister.
6. The PPP, though strong in Sindh, is not a united party. There are under the surface differences between the original Sindhi adherents of the Party, who remain loyal to the Bhutto family, and the supporters of Zardari who came into the party and allegedly captured it after Zardari married Benazir.
7. The forced exit of Zardari in humiliation could open a new Pandora's Box with the danger of a Sindhi anger against the Army further complicating the internal security situation already rendered difficult by the Baloch and Pashtun anger against the Army.
8. If the Army is wise, it would keep out of the messy political situation and avoid taking sides in the looming three-cornered political confrontation----- Zardari vs Gilani, Zardari vs Nawaz and the loyalists of Zardari vs those of Zulfiquar Ali and Benazir Bhutto.
9.If Zardari decides to leave office in dignity and asks Bilawal to take over as the de facto and the de jure President of the Party, he might still be able to retrieve the situation and prevent further political instability in Pakistan. (18-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
In the wake of the Pakistani Supreme Court ruling setting aside the withdrawal of the corruption cases against about 8000 public servants and political leaders, including President Asif Ali Zardari, by Pervez Musharraf through his National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), Pakistan faces a tricky political situation, which would need careful watch. A worrisome beneficiary of this situation would be the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the various anti-India terrorist groups of Punjab known collectively as the Punjabi Taliban. If the situation is not carefully handled, it could add to the difficulties of the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan.
2. Personally, Zardari has only two options---- either leave office in dignity after asking Bilawal Bhutto, now studying in London, to take over the responsibility for the day-to-day management of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and fight out the corruption cases against him in court or face the prospect of being forced to leave office in humiliation by a public agitation if he refuses to leave office by using his immunity against criminal investigation and prosecution.
3. It may be recalled that in her so-called political will, the late Benazir Bhutto had nominated Zardari as her successor as the leader of the party, but Zardari suggested that since Bilawal was not yet of the required age to be able to contest the elections, Zardari should only manage the affairs of the party as its acting or co- President while grooming Bilawal to ultimately take over all responsibilities relating to the party. Thus, the position today is that while Bilawal is the de jure head of the PPP, Zardari is its de facto head.
4. One has reasons to fear a creeping political confrontation between Zardari, who has been weakened beyond repair as the President of Pakistan, but continues to remain strong as the acting President of the PPP, and Yousef Raza Gilani, who has grown stronger as the Prime Minister with the tacit support of the Army, but has very little following in the party.
5. Though the PPP has a large base of support in Pakistan as a whole, its core strength comes from Sindh, which remains loyal to Zardari till now. Any open confrontation between Zardari and Gilani and any suspicion in Sindh that Gilani and the Army are acting in tandem to force the exit of Zardari through a public agitation could turn the confrontation between Zardari on the one side and Gilani and the Army on the other into a Sindhi-Punjabi confrontation. At a time when Pakistan is facing growing political violence in Balochistan due to the alienation of the Balochs and a growing jihadi violence in the tribal belt due to the alienation of the Pashtuns after the military raid into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July,2007, it cannot afford to have anti-Punjabi violence in Sindh. If one remembers the instances of attacks on Punjabis in Sindh after the assassination of Benazir, one will not rule out the possibility of a recrudescence of similar incidents if Zardari is sought to be humiliated by Gilani and the Army, with the support of political leaders from Punjab belonging to the Pakistan Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif, the former Prime Minister.
6. The PPP, though strong in Sindh, is not a united party. There are under the surface differences between the original Sindhi adherents of the Party, who remain loyal to the Bhutto family, and the supporters of Zardari who came into the party and allegedly captured it after Zardari married Benazir.
7. The forced exit of Zardari in humiliation could open a new Pandora's Box with the danger of a Sindhi anger against the Army further complicating the internal security situation already rendered difficult by the Baloch and Pashtun anger against the Army.
8. If the Army is wise, it would keep out of the messy political situation and avoid taking sides in the looming three-cornered political confrontation----- Zardari vs Gilani, Zardari vs Nawaz and the loyalists of Zardari vs those of Zulfiquar Ali and Benazir Bhutto.
9.If Zardari decides to leave office in dignity and asks Bilawal to take over as the de facto and the de jure President of the Party, he might still be able to retrieve the situation and prevent further political instability in Pakistan. (18-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, December 16, 2009
ANOTHER US-CREATED MESS IN PAKISTAN
B.RAMAN
You can depend on the US to do it--- create yet another mess in Pakistan.
2. The December 16,2009, ruling of the full-bench of the Pakistan Supreme Court declaring null and void Pervez Musharraf's National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), which paved the way for the US-desired return of Benazir Bhutto and her husband Asif Ali Zardari from political exile in 2007 to participate in the elections to the National Assembly, is a slap in the face not only for Zardari, now the President of Pakistan, but also for US policy-makers, who worked behind the scenes to pressure Musharraf to issue the NRO.
3. The NRO, widely unpopular in Pakistan and seen by many as the result of US machinations to prevent the return of Nawaz Sharif to power, closed all pending corruption cases against her and Zardari to enable them to return to active political life. She promised the US that if she returned to power she would work in tandem with Musharraf in co-operating with the US in its war against terrorism in the Af-Pak region.
4. Being the cunning person that he was and still is, Musharraf made the NRO applicable --- without any US objection --- not only to Benazir and Zardari, whom the US wanted to help, but also to about 8000 other public servants and political leaders in Pakistan, who were facing corruption cases. The US shouts from the roof-top about the need for action by President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan against corruption,but became a party to the cover-up of thousands of corruption cases in Pakistan in order to facilitate the return of Benazir to power to carry out the US agenda.
5. Action against corruption in Afghanistan will be good for the fight against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Cover-up of corruption in Pakistan will be necessary for the war against terrorism. That was the US logic and morality.
6.Commenting on the US-encouraged move for a patch-up between Musharraf and Benazir in an article of September 2,2007, titled "US PARADROP FOR A NEOBENAZIR" ( http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers24/paper2353.html ),I wrote as follows: "The much talked about US plans for a political paradrop of a neo Benazir Bhutto into Pakistan in the hope of providing the badly-needed oxygen to President General Pervez Musharraf and saving the country from Al Qaeda, the Neo Taliban and an assortment of other pro-Al Qaeda and anti-US jihadi terrorist groups is likely to create a third mess in a row for the US after the earlier two in Afghanistan and Iraq...... Sections of the US media have quoted US officials as justifying the proposed Musharraf-Benazir patch-up as the best of the bad options available. So they said, when they gave unqualified backing to Musharraf post 9/11. So they are saying now. US calculations of political stability in Pakistan under such a patch-up may be belied..... Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal need to be protected from the hands of Al Qaeda and other jihadi terrorists. Nobody can find fault with the over-all US objective, but it has been going about it in the wrong way. It should have allowed genuine democracy to take its own course, even at the risk of political forces not well disposed towards the US coming to power. Instead, by giving the impression of taking sides even before the elections and by making its ill-advised preferences known before the elections, it has given rise to the strong possibility of more instability, not less, more terrorism, not less.Even if Benazir comes to power in an election rigged by the Army,she will be seen as Pakistan's Hamid Karzai, who came to power not by the will of the people, but by riding on the shoulders of the US."
7.Things did not work out the way the US was hoping they would. Benazir was assassinated on December 27,2007, allegedly by the Pakistani Taliban then led by the late Baitullah Mehsud even before she could contest the elections. Yousef Raza Gilani, who was nominated by Zardari as the Prime Minister after the elections hoping he would be a weakling who would carry out his wishes, has proved to be a strong and cunning leader, who has quietly won the support of the Army. Musharraf could not survive in power and had to leave office and his country in total ignominy. Zardari, who succeeded Musharraf as the President much to the satisfaction of the US, finds his credibility steadily weakened. The weakening of his credibility started because of the perception that he succumbed to US pressure not to humiliate Musharraf by arresting and prosecuting him for his misdeeds and that he was quietly allowing the US drone strikes against Al Qaeda and Taliban hide-outs in the tribal areas.
8. Zardari's failure to have the NRO approved by the Parliament for want of the required majority and the latest slap in the face from the Supreme Court would further damage his credibility. The only way Zardari can survive in office is by using his immunity as the President against criminal investigation and prosecution. If he tries to do it, he is going to be a President who is constantly at the mercy of his Prime Minister and Chief of the Army Staff.
9. At a time when the State of Pakistan is reeling under the repeated blows delivered by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the form of devastating suicide attacks on soft and hard targets even in the non-tribal belt, a weakened and unpopular President will not be able to provide the kind of political leadership which Pakistan needs at this critical juncture.
10. If the US is wiser after the latest blow, it will let the democratic process take its natural course in Pakistan instead of meddling once again to shore up the position of Zardari or any other political leader. What Pakistan needs today is a political leader who can be seen by large sections of its people as owing his position to the support of his people and not to US support and as having the political will to stand up to US pressure. ( 17-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
You can depend on the US to do it--- create yet another mess in Pakistan.
2. The December 16,2009, ruling of the full-bench of the Pakistan Supreme Court declaring null and void Pervez Musharraf's National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), which paved the way for the US-desired return of Benazir Bhutto and her husband Asif Ali Zardari from political exile in 2007 to participate in the elections to the National Assembly, is a slap in the face not only for Zardari, now the President of Pakistan, but also for US policy-makers, who worked behind the scenes to pressure Musharraf to issue the NRO.
3. The NRO, widely unpopular in Pakistan and seen by many as the result of US machinations to prevent the return of Nawaz Sharif to power, closed all pending corruption cases against her and Zardari to enable them to return to active political life. She promised the US that if she returned to power she would work in tandem with Musharraf in co-operating with the US in its war against terrorism in the Af-Pak region.
4. Being the cunning person that he was and still is, Musharraf made the NRO applicable --- without any US objection --- not only to Benazir and Zardari, whom the US wanted to help, but also to about 8000 other public servants and political leaders in Pakistan, who were facing corruption cases. The US shouts from the roof-top about the need for action by President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan against corruption,but became a party to the cover-up of thousands of corruption cases in Pakistan in order to facilitate the return of Benazir to power to carry out the US agenda.
5. Action against corruption in Afghanistan will be good for the fight against Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Cover-up of corruption in Pakistan will be necessary for the war against terrorism. That was the US logic and morality.
6.Commenting on the US-encouraged move for a patch-up between Musharraf and Benazir in an article of September 2,2007, titled "US PARADROP FOR A NEOBENAZIR" ( http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers24/paper2353.html ),I wrote as follows: "The much talked about US plans for a political paradrop of a neo Benazir Bhutto into Pakistan in the hope of providing the badly-needed oxygen to President General Pervez Musharraf and saving the country from Al Qaeda, the Neo Taliban and an assortment of other pro-Al Qaeda and anti-US jihadi terrorist groups is likely to create a third mess in a row for the US after the earlier two in Afghanistan and Iraq...... Sections of the US media have quoted US officials as justifying the proposed Musharraf-Benazir patch-up as the best of the bad options available. So they said, when they gave unqualified backing to Musharraf post 9/11. So they are saying now. US calculations of political stability in Pakistan under such a patch-up may be belied..... Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal need to be protected from the hands of Al Qaeda and other jihadi terrorists. Nobody can find fault with the over-all US objective, but it has been going about it in the wrong way. It should have allowed genuine democracy to take its own course, even at the risk of political forces not well disposed towards the US coming to power. Instead, by giving the impression of taking sides even before the elections and by making its ill-advised preferences known before the elections, it has given rise to the strong possibility of more instability, not less, more terrorism, not less.Even if Benazir comes to power in an election rigged by the Army,she will be seen as Pakistan's Hamid Karzai, who came to power not by the will of the people, but by riding on the shoulders of the US."
7.Things did not work out the way the US was hoping they would. Benazir was assassinated on December 27,2007, allegedly by the Pakistani Taliban then led by the late Baitullah Mehsud even before she could contest the elections. Yousef Raza Gilani, who was nominated by Zardari as the Prime Minister after the elections hoping he would be a weakling who would carry out his wishes, has proved to be a strong and cunning leader, who has quietly won the support of the Army. Musharraf could not survive in power and had to leave office and his country in total ignominy. Zardari, who succeeded Musharraf as the President much to the satisfaction of the US, finds his credibility steadily weakened. The weakening of his credibility started because of the perception that he succumbed to US pressure not to humiliate Musharraf by arresting and prosecuting him for his misdeeds and that he was quietly allowing the US drone strikes against Al Qaeda and Taliban hide-outs in the tribal areas.
8. Zardari's failure to have the NRO approved by the Parliament for want of the required majority and the latest slap in the face from the Supreme Court would further damage his credibility. The only way Zardari can survive in office is by using his immunity as the President against criminal investigation and prosecution. If he tries to do it, he is going to be a President who is constantly at the mercy of his Prime Minister and Chief of the Army Staff.
9. At a time when the State of Pakistan is reeling under the repeated blows delivered by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the form of devastating suicide attacks on soft and hard targets even in the non-tribal belt, a weakened and unpopular President will not be able to provide the kind of political leadership which Pakistan needs at this critical juncture.
10. If the US is wiser after the latest blow, it will let the democratic process take its natural course in Pakistan instead of meddling once again to shore up the position of Zardari or any other political leader. What Pakistan needs today is a political leader who can be seen by large sections of its people as owing his position to the support of his people and not to US support and as having the political will to stand up to US pressure. ( 17-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
HEADLEY:A QUADRUPLE AGENT
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO 592
B.RAMAN
Please refer to my article of December 15,2009, titled “ Headley’s Case Figures in Senate Committee” available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3549.html .
2. A reader in the US has drawn my attention to some other references to the Headley case in the transcript of the Committee hearing. I had missed these references in my earlier article. These are annexed.
3. While forwarding these references, the reader has also made the following observations. I am not in a position to comment on his observations:
a) There have been multiple classified hearings prior to recent public revelations wherein Headley was discussed. I base this on the highlighted comment made by Senator Lieberman and by looking at the committee's calendar. It would be reasonable to infer that at least some key government elements in the US were aware of Headley's actions for a while now
(b) Also based on the same discussion, it appears that the relevant US agencies were possibly downplaying Headley's actions as only a threat outside of the US as opposed to threats to the US directly.
(c) If a well informed person like Senator Lieberman can publicly raise questions on how long Headley was being allowed to operate from the US, then so should Indian authorities.
4.In my article of November 10,2009, titled “ FBI Affidavit Against Headley: References to India” available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers35/paper3496.html I had extracted references to India from the affidavits filed by the FBI in the Chicago court. The significant extracts are again re-produced below:
On July 3, 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A sent HEADLEY an email in which Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A said, "i need to see you for some new investment plans."
On July 8, 2009, HEADLEY sent Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A an email which stated, in part: "What do you want me to do? Where are you interested in making investments?"
In another email on July 8, 2009, HEADLEY told Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A that "I think when we get a chance we should revisit our last location again and say hi to Rahul. "Following his arrest, HEADLEY acknowledged that, in this email, "Rahul" refers to a prominent Indian actor with the first name "Rahul."
Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A replied to the above email on July 8, 2009 and told HEADLEY in an email that "to see Rahul is a good idea coz have some work for you over there too. Matters are good enough to move forward...."
On July 9, 2009, HEADLEY responded: "When you say "move forward" do you mean in the North direction or towards Rahul? Also in the future if we need to meet to discuss anything, do I have to come all the way over there or can we meet somewhere in the middle like Africa or Middle East?"
The same day, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded that "I mean towards Rahul."
On July 10, 2009, HEADLEY sent an email to Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A in which he stated: "I would like to know a few things if you can tell me:1) What is the status with the Northern project, is it still postponed indefinitely? 2) The visit to Rahul's place, is it for checking out real estate property like before, or something different and if so tell me what you can please. Also is it exactly in Rahul's city or different one? 3) How long do you think I will need to stay at Rahul's place to complete this task? 4) Will I have to stay there continuously for a while, or back and forth like before?"
Based on my (FBI agent's) review of this and other communications, I believe that HEADLEY had inquired of Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A whether the Denmark project was on hold, and whether the visit to India that Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A had asked him to undertake was for the purpose of surveilling targets for a new terrorist attack.
Later on July 10, 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded to HEADLEY's email, stating, in part, that: "There are some investment plans with me, not exactly at Rahul's city but near that. Rest we can decide when meet according to your ease".
In an email to Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A on July 16, 2009, HEADLEY stated, in part: "One very important thing I need to know please is that how long do you need me for, meaning how long should it take me to finish my work, in your opinion. And is it really urgent? Before it seemed that the Northern Project was really urgent."
After Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded on July 18, 2009, that "it may take somewhere between 2 to 4 weeks," HEADLEY replied on July 19, 2009, that "I think I can manage it," and that he would be available in October. He closed his email by asking "Is the Northern Investment definitely postponed for now?"
Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A and HEADLEY continued to exchange emails through late August 2009, when HEADLEY told Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A that he "will be there end of next month."
I (FBI agent) understand these emails to reflect that beginning in July 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A was placing a higher priority on using HEADLEY to assist in planning a new attack in India than on completing the planned attack in Denmark.
5. By studying these extracts submitted by the FBI along with other FBI documents submitted by the FBI to the court and US media reports about Headley’s links with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),one can make the following assessment:
(a). Headley was not a double agent, but a quadruple agent. He initially started working for the DEA around 1998. Even if one presumes that initially the FBI and the CIA were not aware of this, they should have become aware of this by 2004 when the National Counter-Terrorism Centre with a common charter and a common data-base was set up by the Bush Administration under the newly-created post of Director National Intelligence (DNI).
(b).He started working for the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) sometime in 2005. It is not clear whether he joined the LET at his own instance or at the instance of the FBI or the CIA or both in order to penetrate it. He was already visiting Pakistan at the instance of the DEA since 1998. Since 2006, he started visiting India too. The DEA and the FBI would have been aware of his visits since every time a conscious agent of an agency travels abroad his passport is scrutinized by the controlling agency on his return. This is a security precaution followed by all intelligence agencies.
( c). He started working for the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri towards the end of 2008 and agreed to visit Copenhagen to collect operational information for a possible terrorist attack. This was probably not at the instance of the FBI, which came to know accidentally of Headley volunteering himself to undertake a task in Copenhagen while monitoring the chat room of the old students of the Army Cadet School at Hasan Abdal. Both Headley and Rana studied in the school. The FBI put Headley under electronic surveillance after obtaining orders of a relevant court.
(d). While doing the electronic surveillance to monitor his involvement in the Northern or Copenhagen or Micky Mouse project for the 313 Brigade, the FBI came across a series of E-mail intercepts in July and August,2009, which showed that Headley had helped the LET in preparing itself for the 26/11 terrorist strikes and had agreed to help the LET in carrying out another terrorist strike in India for which he was to visit India. The FBI started monitoring the meetings and conversations of Headley and Rana and recorded their conversation of September 7,2009, in a car which clearly indicated their involvement in the 26/11 terrorist strike.
(e). The communications between Headley and his LET handler intercepted by the FBI in July and August also indicated that he was planning to visit India in October to prepare the ground for another terrorist strike. The FBI had two options---either allow him to go to India, alert the Indian intelligence and keep him under surveillance or arrest him before he left for Pakistan and India. If he had been allowed to go to India, watched there and arrested by the Indian intelligence, his past contacts with the US agencies and his role in 26/11 would have come to the notice of the Indian authorities. There is no evidence so far to show that till July 2009 the FBI was aware of his active role in 26/11. They were probably only aware of his frequent visits to Pakistan and India on behalf of the DEA operations. The FBI arrested him when he was about to leave for Pakistan and India on October 3.
(f). He was also in touch with serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Army.
6. Headley’s case reflects poorly not only on the US agencies, but also on the Indian agencies. The ease with which he and Rana allegedly obtained multiple-entry business visas from Indian consular authorities despite their Pakistani origin and with which they repeatedly visited India without any alarm bell ringing in our airport immigration control shows shockingly lax immigration controls. Rana was a Canadian citizen living and working in Chicago. Was the clearance of the Indian High Commission in Ottawa obtained before issuing him a visa? Did Headley obtain the clearance of the Governments of Maharashtra and India before opening an immigration consultancy office in Mumbai? Did he inform the Income-Tax authorities? Did he obtain an income-tax clearance certificate before leaving India after each stay? (16-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE ( From the transcript of the hearing of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security )
LIEBERMAN: Let me ask you two questions that come off of the Headley case for me.One is it has been reported that Headley changed his name. He was a child of -- one parent was a Pakistani, one parent was American. He changed his name. His original name was Daood Gilani. And he changed it to David Headley, allegedly to reduce scrutiny by immigration and customs officials while traveling.And I wonder, just as this is a test case, what -- what can be done to try to avoid, to block this kind of name change being used as a way to avoid being on a watch list or being picked up by some other terrorist blockage system?I'm not sure who best to call on.
Mr. Heyman?
Mr. Healy?
You get my point: To what extent can an individual like this make it harder for him to be picked up, by changing his name, in this case, to an American or English sounding name?
HEALY: Chairman, it's difficult, because, first of all, I'm in a difficult position about commenting on a particular case.
LIEBERMAN: Yes, understood,.
HEALY: But it's -- I find my -- I find challenges in my particular position, because it's truly a balancing act. It's a balancing act between safeguarding civil liberties and protecting the American people.And the best we can do is just keep driving the intelligence and keep working the intelligence as much as we possibly can to try to get the information. I don't know how else you could do it.
LIEBERMAN: Anyone else have a response on that?
HEYMAN (?): I agree with -- with Tim Healy that this is a challenge. You know, those who are seeking to do harm are constantly hearing what we are doing, watching what we are doing and adapting to that.So changing names may be one thing. Changing secure documents or attempting to change documents, changing even biometrics, people do that.And so, we have to constantly be working to try to counter that through technology, through procedures, but also through additional layers, so that we're not just resting on one thing, one security solution.
LIEBERMAN: Yes. I think without making too much of a point of it, even though the Headley case presents challenges to the system or questions about it, the fact is that through quite remarkable work across law enforcement and intelligence (inaudible), he was identified, and was stopped.
And of course, we -- we do have -- though he traveled legally in and out of the country, we do have records, of course, of every time he traveled in and out, which are part of the case that's now been built against him.But with the indulgence of my colleagues, I want to ask you another question. This is a fact case. And I remember it was presented to us as a worry by one of your predecessors in the last administration at the Department of Homeland Security.
Which is the case, and this is something I know people worry about, where -- this is the dual passport issue -- someone with a Pakistani and U.K., United Kingdom, passport travels to Pakistan with his Pakistani documents and then comes to the U.S. with his British passport, and we don't have any record that he traveled to Pakistan.I don't know if that's a question without an answer, but I just give it to you because I remember that as a practical fear based on all the presence of all training camps and centers of world terrorism in the Pakistan/Afghanistan area, not particularly...
HEYMAN (?): Sir, that continues to be a concern. I was last in London in November. I had a two-hour dialogue with a variety of British officials on this particular issue. It is one in which we are looking to work out procedures.I can't tell you we've worked them out yet, but we're absolutely aware of this and -- and -- and looking at whether or not there are ways within our systems to be able to catch that.Because you're absolutely right. If the person left the U.K. under one passport...
LIEBERMAN: Right.
HEYMAN (?): ... and came back under another passport, being a dual citizen, that would be caught by the U.K. But to travel under a Pakistani passport isn't necessarily, under the current system, going to -- going to raise an alert. But they are looking at that system, and I think we all have to be cognizant of that.
LIEBERMAN: Well, I'm encouraged that you're raising the question. It's not easy to solve, but I appreciate that you're on it. Thank you
B.RAMAN
Please refer to my article of December 15,2009, titled “ Headley’s Case Figures in Senate Committee” available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers36/paper3549.html .
2. A reader in the US has drawn my attention to some other references to the Headley case in the transcript of the Committee hearing. I had missed these references in my earlier article. These are annexed.
3. While forwarding these references, the reader has also made the following observations. I am not in a position to comment on his observations:
a) There have been multiple classified hearings prior to recent public revelations wherein Headley was discussed. I base this on the highlighted comment made by Senator Lieberman and by looking at the committee's calendar. It would be reasonable to infer that at least some key government elements in the US were aware of Headley's actions for a while now
(b) Also based on the same discussion, it appears that the relevant US agencies were possibly downplaying Headley's actions as only a threat outside of the US as opposed to threats to the US directly.
(c) If a well informed person like Senator Lieberman can publicly raise questions on how long Headley was being allowed to operate from the US, then so should Indian authorities.
4.In my article of November 10,2009, titled “ FBI Affidavit Against Headley: References to India” available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers35/paper3496.html I had extracted references to India from the affidavits filed by the FBI in the Chicago court. The significant extracts are again re-produced below:
On July 3, 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A sent HEADLEY an email in which Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A said, "i need to see you for some new investment plans."
On July 8, 2009, HEADLEY sent Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A an email which stated, in part: "What do you want me to do? Where are you interested in making investments?"
In another email on July 8, 2009, HEADLEY told Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A that "I think when we get a chance we should revisit our last location again and say hi to Rahul. "Following his arrest, HEADLEY acknowledged that, in this email, "Rahul" refers to a prominent Indian actor with the first name "Rahul."
Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A replied to the above email on July 8, 2009 and told HEADLEY in an email that "to see Rahul is a good idea coz have some work for you over there too. Matters are good enough to move forward...."
On July 9, 2009, HEADLEY responded: "When you say "move forward" do you mean in the North direction or towards Rahul? Also in the future if we need to meet to discuss anything, do I have to come all the way over there or can we meet somewhere in the middle like Africa or Middle East?"
The same day, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded that "I mean towards Rahul."
On July 10, 2009, HEADLEY sent an email to Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A in which he stated: "I would like to know a few things if you can tell me:1) What is the status with the Northern project, is it still postponed indefinitely? 2) The visit to Rahul's place, is it for checking out real estate property like before, or something different and if so tell me what you can please. Also is it exactly in Rahul's city or different one? 3) How long do you think I will need to stay at Rahul's place to complete this task? 4) Will I have to stay there continuously for a while, or back and forth like before?"
Based on my (FBI agent's) review of this and other communications, I believe that HEADLEY had inquired of Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A whether the Denmark project was on hold, and whether the visit to India that Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A had asked him to undertake was for the purpose of surveilling targets for a new terrorist attack.
Later on July 10, 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded to HEADLEY's email, stating, in part, that: "There are some investment plans with me, not exactly at Rahul's city but near that. Rest we can decide when meet according to your ease".
In an email to Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A on July 16, 2009, HEADLEY stated, in part: "One very important thing I need to know please is that how long do you need me for, meaning how long should it take me to finish my work, in your opinion. And is it really urgent? Before it seemed that the Northern Project was really urgent."
After Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A responded on July 18, 2009, that "it may take somewhere between 2 to 4 weeks," HEADLEY replied on July 19, 2009, that "I think I can manage it," and that he would be available in October. He closed his email by asking "Is the Northern Investment definitely postponed for now?"
Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A and HEADLEY continued to exchange emails through late August 2009, when HEADLEY told Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A that he "will be there end of next month."
I (FBI agent) understand these emails to reflect that beginning in July 2009, Lashkar-e-Taiba Member A was placing a higher priority on using HEADLEY to assist in planning a new attack in India than on completing the planned attack in Denmark.
5. By studying these extracts submitted by the FBI along with other FBI documents submitted by the FBI to the court and US media reports about Headley’s links with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),one can make the following assessment:
(a). Headley was not a double agent, but a quadruple agent. He initially started working for the DEA around 1998. Even if one presumes that initially the FBI and the CIA were not aware of this, they should have become aware of this by 2004 when the National Counter-Terrorism Centre with a common charter and a common data-base was set up by the Bush Administration under the newly-created post of Director National Intelligence (DNI).
(b).He started working for the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) sometime in 2005. It is not clear whether he joined the LET at his own instance or at the instance of the FBI or the CIA or both in order to penetrate it. He was already visiting Pakistan at the instance of the DEA since 1998. Since 2006, he started visiting India too. The DEA and the FBI would have been aware of his visits since every time a conscious agent of an agency travels abroad his passport is scrutinized by the controlling agency on his return. This is a security precaution followed by all intelligence agencies.
( c). He started working for the 313 Brigade of Ilyas Kashmiri towards the end of 2008 and agreed to visit Copenhagen to collect operational information for a possible terrorist attack. This was probably not at the instance of the FBI, which came to know accidentally of Headley volunteering himself to undertake a task in Copenhagen while monitoring the chat room of the old students of the Army Cadet School at Hasan Abdal. Both Headley and Rana studied in the school. The FBI put Headley under electronic surveillance after obtaining orders of a relevant court.
(d). While doing the electronic surveillance to monitor his involvement in the Northern or Copenhagen or Micky Mouse project for the 313 Brigade, the FBI came across a series of E-mail intercepts in July and August,2009, which showed that Headley had helped the LET in preparing itself for the 26/11 terrorist strikes and had agreed to help the LET in carrying out another terrorist strike in India for which he was to visit India. The FBI started monitoring the meetings and conversations of Headley and Rana and recorded their conversation of September 7,2009, in a car which clearly indicated their involvement in the 26/11 terrorist strike.
(e). The communications between Headley and his LET handler intercepted by the FBI in July and August also indicated that he was planning to visit India in October to prepare the ground for another terrorist strike. The FBI had two options---either allow him to go to India, alert the Indian intelligence and keep him under surveillance or arrest him before he left for Pakistan and India. If he had been allowed to go to India, watched there and arrested by the Indian intelligence, his past contacts with the US agencies and his role in 26/11 would have come to the notice of the Indian authorities. There is no evidence so far to show that till July 2009 the FBI was aware of his active role in 26/11. They were probably only aware of his frequent visits to Pakistan and India on behalf of the DEA operations. The FBI arrested him when he was about to leave for Pakistan and India on October 3.
(f). He was also in touch with serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Army.
6. Headley’s case reflects poorly not only on the US agencies, but also on the Indian agencies. The ease with which he and Rana allegedly obtained multiple-entry business visas from Indian consular authorities despite their Pakistani origin and with which they repeatedly visited India without any alarm bell ringing in our airport immigration control shows shockingly lax immigration controls. Rana was a Canadian citizen living and working in Chicago. Was the clearance of the Indian High Commission in Ottawa obtained before issuing him a visa? Did Headley obtain the clearance of the Governments of Maharashtra and India before opening an immigration consultancy office in Mumbai? Did he inform the Income-Tax authorities? Did he obtain an income-tax clearance certificate before leaving India after each stay? (16-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE ( From the transcript of the hearing of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security )
LIEBERMAN: Let me ask you two questions that come off of the Headley case for me.One is it has been reported that Headley changed his name. He was a child of -- one parent was a Pakistani, one parent was American. He changed his name. His original name was Daood Gilani. And he changed it to David Headley, allegedly to reduce scrutiny by immigration and customs officials while traveling.And I wonder, just as this is a test case, what -- what can be done to try to avoid, to block this kind of name change being used as a way to avoid being on a watch list or being picked up by some other terrorist blockage system?I'm not sure who best to call on.
Mr. Heyman?
Mr. Healy?
You get my point: To what extent can an individual like this make it harder for him to be picked up, by changing his name, in this case, to an American or English sounding name?
HEALY: Chairman, it's difficult, because, first of all, I'm in a difficult position about commenting on a particular case.
LIEBERMAN: Yes, understood,.
HEALY: But it's -- I find my -- I find challenges in my particular position, because it's truly a balancing act. It's a balancing act between safeguarding civil liberties and protecting the American people.And the best we can do is just keep driving the intelligence and keep working the intelligence as much as we possibly can to try to get the information. I don't know how else you could do it.
LIEBERMAN: Anyone else have a response on that?
HEYMAN (?): I agree with -- with Tim Healy that this is a challenge. You know, those who are seeking to do harm are constantly hearing what we are doing, watching what we are doing and adapting to that.So changing names may be one thing. Changing secure documents or attempting to change documents, changing even biometrics, people do that.And so, we have to constantly be working to try to counter that through technology, through procedures, but also through additional layers, so that we're not just resting on one thing, one security solution.
LIEBERMAN: Yes. I think without making too much of a point of it, even though the Headley case presents challenges to the system or questions about it, the fact is that through quite remarkable work across law enforcement and intelligence (inaudible), he was identified, and was stopped.
And of course, we -- we do have -- though he traveled legally in and out of the country, we do have records, of course, of every time he traveled in and out, which are part of the case that's now been built against him.But with the indulgence of my colleagues, I want to ask you another question. This is a fact case. And I remember it was presented to us as a worry by one of your predecessors in the last administration at the Department of Homeland Security.
Which is the case, and this is something I know people worry about, where -- this is the dual passport issue -- someone with a Pakistani and U.K., United Kingdom, passport travels to Pakistan with his Pakistani documents and then comes to the U.S. with his British passport, and we don't have any record that he traveled to Pakistan.I don't know if that's a question without an answer, but I just give it to you because I remember that as a practical fear based on all the presence of all training camps and centers of world terrorism in the Pakistan/Afghanistan area, not particularly...
HEYMAN (?): Sir, that continues to be a concern. I was last in London in November. I had a two-hour dialogue with a variety of British officials on this particular issue. It is one in which we are looking to work out procedures.I can't tell you we've worked them out yet, but we're absolutely aware of this and -- and -- and looking at whether or not there are ways within our systems to be able to catch that.Because you're absolutely right. If the person left the U.K. under one passport...
LIEBERMAN: Right.
HEYMAN (?): ... and came back under another passport, being a dual citizen, that would be caught by the U.K. But to travel under a Pakistani passport isn't necessarily, under the current system, going to -- going to raise an alert. But they are looking at that system, and I think we all have to be cognizant of that.
LIEBERMAN: Well, I'm encouraged that you're raising the question. It's not easy to solve, but I appreciate that you're on it. Thank you
Monday, December 14, 2009
THE HEADLEY--RANA CASE: MORE Q & A
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO.591
B.RAMAN
Q: There is a growing demand in India that the Indian investigators should be allowed independent access to David Coleman Headley, the Chicago-based American member of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), who had visited India five times before 26/11 to collect pre-attack operational information for the LET. Will the FBI continue to resist this demand?
A: Any professional intelligence or investigation agency will, if it is worth its salt. Deniability is an important operational principle followed by all intelligence agencies. Once an intelligence agency grants free access to another agency to one of its sensitive sources, deniability is gone. The Intelligence Bureau will not grant the Research & Analysis Wing free access to any of its sensitive sources and vice versa. It is unrealistic to expect that any US agency---whether the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the FBI --- will grant to their Indian counterparts free access to Headley, since it has clearly come out that he was a conscious agent of the DEA at least since 1998.
Q: How about Tahawwur Hussain Rana, the other member of the LET’s Chicago cell?
A: His case seems to be qualitatively different. Firstly, whereas Rana’s lawyers have been fighting for a bail for him, Headley’s lawyers have not sought bail for him. Headley and his lawyers seem to have reconciled themselves to his being in custody till January 12 when a decision on the “status of his trial” is expected to be taken by the court. Secondly, the latest report on the various charges against Headley filed by the FBI before the court on December 7 is called the Criminal Information Report. In that report, there is no reference to any pending or proposed trial against him. As against this, the latest report filed before the court by the FBI on December 14 opposing the grant of bail to Rana says “ further support of the motion to detain defendant Rana pending trial.” From this, it is evident that while a decision has been taken to have a formal trial against Rana, no such decision has yet been taken against Headley.
Q: What does this indicate?
A: While the FBI has been handling Headley’s case cautiously since he was an agent of the DEA, it does not feel the need for such caution in the case of Rana. This is probably because Rana was not an agent of any US agency. It is also interesting to note that while the FBI had details of Headley’s pre-26/11 visits to India, it has not so far given any indication in the documents produced before the court that it was aware of Rana’s visits to India. Whatever details have appeared in the Indian media about Rana’s visits to India, have come from Indian and not US sources. This would indicate that since Headley was a source of the DEA, the FBI, through the DEA, was aware of his visits to India. Since Rana was probably not a source of any agency, no US agency was aware of his travels to India.
Q: Since Rana does not appear to have been an agent of any US agency, will the FBI allow Indian interrogators to question him?
A: Possibly, provided he is questioned in the presence of FBI officers and the questions are vetted by them and the court allows it.
Q: Is a similar procedure possible in the case of Headley?
A: Seems difficult.
Q: The US intelligence was reported to have alerted the Indian intelligence in September,2008, about the likelihood of a sea-borne terrorist attack by the LET on the hotels. Could this information have come from Headley?
A: Difficult to say. If Headley had conveyed this information to the US intelligence, he should have also told them that the LET had also targeted the Nariman House. Neither the Indian intelligence nor the Israeli agencies would appear to have been warned by the US intelligence about a likely attack on the Nariman House. At that time, George Bush was still in office. His administration had close relations with Israel. Israel would have been immediately alerted. It was apparently not. How would one explain the fact that the US intelligence was aware of the intended attack on the hotels but not of the planned attack on the Nariman House? My own suspicion is that the US warning of September 2008, came from technical intercepts or other sources in Pakistan and not from Headley.
Q: What is the most interesting part of the report filed by the FBI in the court on December 14 opposing bail to Rana?
A: Even in the earlier affidavit filed by the FBI against Rana, it was somewhat evident that the first incriminating conversation between Headley and Rana regarding future operations of the LET in India took place during a joint car drive by the two on September 7,2009. The latest report confirms it. It says: “On September 7, 2009, Headley and Rana took a long car ride and discussed several topics. This conversation was recorded. During their conversation, Headley and Rana discussed the attacks that occurred in November 2008 in Mumbai, India, in which approximately 170 people were killed. It is clear from the conversation and extrinsic corroboration that Rana was told just days before the Mumbai attacks that the attacks were about to happen.” This conversation while moving in a car could not have been recorded through telephonic or E-mail intercepts. This could have been recorded only by planting a secret recording device in the car without the knowledge of either Headley or Rana or by the FBI using Headley to pose leading questions to Rana and recording his replies without Rana’s knowledge. Neither in the affidavit filed against Headley nor in that filed against Rana after their arrest in October, was their any reference to their role in respect of 26/11. The only reference was to their agreed role in a future strike. The FBI knew about their role in 26/11 at least since September 7,2009, if not earlier. Why this was kept out of the affidavits filed initially? ( 15-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Q: There is a growing demand in India that the Indian investigators should be allowed independent access to David Coleman Headley, the Chicago-based American member of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), who had visited India five times before 26/11 to collect pre-attack operational information for the LET. Will the FBI continue to resist this demand?
A: Any professional intelligence or investigation agency will, if it is worth its salt. Deniability is an important operational principle followed by all intelligence agencies. Once an intelligence agency grants free access to another agency to one of its sensitive sources, deniability is gone. The Intelligence Bureau will not grant the Research & Analysis Wing free access to any of its sensitive sources and vice versa. It is unrealistic to expect that any US agency---whether the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the FBI --- will grant to their Indian counterparts free access to Headley, since it has clearly come out that he was a conscious agent of the DEA at least since 1998.
Q: How about Tahawwur Hussain Rana, the other member of the LET’s Chicago cell?
A: His case seems to be qualitatively different. Firstly, whereas Rana’s lawyers have been fighting for a bail for him, Headley’s lawyers have not sought bail for him. Headley and his lawyers seem to have reconciled themselves to his being in custody till January 12 when a decision on the “status of his trial” is expected to be taken by the court. Secondly, the latest report on the various charges against Headley filed by the FBI before the court on December 7 is called the Criminal Information Report. In that report, there is no reference to any pending or proposed trial against him. As against this, the latest report filed before the court by the FBI on December 14 opposing the grant of bail to Rana says “ further support of the motion to detain defendant Rana pending trial.” From this, it is evident that while a decision has been taken to have a formal trial against Rana, no such decision has yet been taken against Headley.
Q: What does this indicate?
A: While the FBI has been handling Headley’s case cautiously since he was an agent of the DEA, it does not feel the need for such caution in the case of Rana. This is probably because Rana was not an agent of any US agency. It is also interesting to note that while the FBI had details of Headley’s pre-26/11 visits to India, it has not so far given any indication in the documents produced before the court that it was aware of Rana’s visits to India. Whatever details have appeared in the Indian media about Rana’s visits to India, have come from Indian and not US sources. This would indicate that since Headley was a source of the DEA, the FBI, through the DEA, was aware of his visits to India. Since Rana was probably not a source of any agency, no US agency was aware of his travels to India.
Q: Since Rana does not appear to have been an agent of any US agency, will the FBI allow Indian interrogators to question him?
A: Possibly, provided he is questioned in the presence of FBI officers and the questions are vetted by them and the court allows it.
Q: Is a similar procedure possible in the case of Headley?
A: Seems difficult.
Q: The US intelligence was reported to have alerted the Indian intelligence in September,2008, about the likelihood of a sea-borne terrorist attack by the LET on the hotels. Could this information have come from Headley?
A: Difficult to say. If Headley had conveyed this information to the US intelligence, he should have also told them that the LET had also targeted the Nariman House. Neither the Indian intelligence nor the Israeli agencies would appear to have been warned by the US intelligence about a likely attack on the Nariman House. At that time, George Bush was still in office. His administration had close relations with Israel. Israel would have been immediately alerted. It was apparently not. How would one explain the fact that the US intelligence was aware of the intended attack on the hotels but not of the planned attack on the Nariman House? My own suspicion is that the US warning of September 2008, came from technical intercepts or other sources in Pakistan and not from Headley.
Q: What is the most interesting part of the report filed by the FBI in the court on December 14 opposing bail to Rana?
A: Even in the earlier affidavit filed by the FBI against Rana, it was somewhat evident that the first incriminating conversation between Headley and Rana regarding future operations of the LET in India took place during a joint car drive by the two on September 7,2009. The latest report confirms it. It says: “On September 7, 2009, Headley and Rana took a long car ride and discussed several topics. This conversation was recorded. During their conversation, Headley and Rana discussed the attacks that occurred in November 2008 in Mumbai, India, in which approximately 170 people were killed. It is clear from the conversation and extrinsic corroboration that Rana was told just days before the Mumbai attacks that the attacks were about to happen.” This conversation while moving in a car could not have been recorded through telephonic or E-mail intercepts. This could have been recorded only by planting a secret recording device in the car without the knowledge of either Headley or Rana or by the FBI using Headley to pose leading questions to Rana and recording his replies without Rana’s knowledge. Neither in the affidavit filed against Headley nor in that filed against Rana after their arrest in October, was their any reference to their role in respect of 26/11. The only reference was to their agreed role in a future strike. The FBI knew about their role in 26/11 at least since September 7,2009, if not earlier. Why this was kept out of the affidavits filed initially? ( 15-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
HEADLEY'S CASE FIGURES IN SENATE COMMITTEE
B.RAMAN
On December 9,2009, the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee of the US Senate held a hearing on the subject "Five Years After the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA): Stopping Terrorist Travel". Though the hearing was not specifically related to the frequent travels of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) to India before the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai and his role in allegedly collecting operational information about the various targets which the LET intended attacking, there was a reference in passing to his travels to India before 26/11 and his role.
2. In his prepared introductory remarks, Joseph Lieberman, the co-Chairman of the Committee, said: "In the months leading up to 9/11, we know that the system was “blinking red,” as then CIA Director George Tenet famously put it. The system, however, was not set up to share that information among the different federal agencies involved in a timely manner. We now have the ability to leverage the terrorist watchlist and its integrated connections with other government databases to block the accidental entry into the country of anybody suspected of participating in terrorism. We must also share information on terrorists and other criminals with our partners overseas. This is why I insisted that information-sharing agreements be mandatory for participation in the Visa Waiver Program. I am told that 13 of the 35 visa waiver nations have entered into agreements to share biometric law enforcement and terrorist watch list data with us – and the United States will be sharing the same types of information on a reciprocal basis to these nations. As a stark reminder of the urgency of these international agreements, this week an American citizen, David Headley, was charged in federal court with six counts of conspiracy to bomb public places in India, to murder and maim persons in India and Denmark, to provide material support to foreign terrorist plots, and to provide material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and six counts of aiding and abetting the murder of U.S. citizens in India. Headley is alleged to have made five trips to Mumbai from 2006 to 2008 to conduct pre-attack planning and surveillance for LeT of many of the targets that were struck in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. Because Headley was an U.S. citizen, his travel likely did not raise suspicions, and he was able to use the United States as a base of operations while helping to plan one of the most significant terrorist attacks in Indian history. Although it is not clear at this point whether Mr. Headley’s travel raised flags within the U.S. government, this case underscores the need to implement these international agreements as quickly as possible and make sure that all 35 visa waiver nations and other nations with a common interest in preventing acts of terrorism eventually participate in similar agreements."
3.David Heyman, Assistant Secretary For Homeland Security, who testified before the committee on various measures taken by his Department to monitor travels by terrorist suspects, said the circumstances surrounding the Headley investigation were changing the way authorities were looking at potential suspects. He added: "We can no longer assume that Americans are not involved in terrorism.As indicated by the recent indictments, we also see the nexus of travel in those who may get further indoctrinated abroad. This is a challenge.Those who are seeking to do harm are constantly hearing what we are doing, watching what we are doing, and adapting to that. So changing names may be one thing. Changing secure documents. Changing even biometrics."
4. Beyond these cursory remarks, there was no detailed discussion on the ease with which Headley was travelling to Pakistan and India and whether any of the US agencies had noticed this and raised an alarm over it. There was also no reference to reports carried by sections of the US media alleging that Headley was working as an informant of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) since at least 1998.
5. There were also no questions during the hearing as to whether there were any arrangements between the Governments of India and the US for the exchange of information regarding travels of terrorist suspects between the two countries. (14-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
On December 9,2009, the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee of the US Senate held a hearing on the subject "Five Years After the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA): Stopping Terrorist Travel". Though the hearing was not specifically related to the frequent travels of David Coleman Headley of the Chicago cell of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) to India before the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai and his role in allegedly collecting operational information about the various targets which the LET intended attacking, there was a reference in passing to his travels to India before 26/11 and his role.
2. In his prepared introductory remarks, Joseph Lieberman, the co-Chairman of the Committee, said: "In the months leading up to 9/11, we know that the system was “blinking red,” as then CIA Director George Tenet famously put it. The system, however, was not set up to share that information among the different federal agencies involved in a timely manner. We now have the ability to leverage the terrorist watchlist and its integrated connections with other government databases to block the accidental entry into the country of anybody suspected of participating in terrorism. We must also share information on terrorists and other criminals with our partners overseas. This is why I insisted that information-sharing agreements be mandatory for participation in the Visa Waiver Program. I am told that 13 of the 35 visa waiver nations have entered into agreements to share biometric law enforcement and terrorist watch list data with us – and the United States will be sharing the same types of information on a reciprocal basis to these nations. As a stark reminder of the urgency of these international agreements, this week an American citizen, David Headley, was charged in federal court with six counts of conspiracy to bomb public places in India, to murder and maim persons in India and Denmark, to provide material support to foreign terrorist plots, and to provide material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and six counts of aiding and abetting the murder of U.S. citizens in India. Headley is alleged to have made five trips to Mumbai from 2006 to 2008 to conduct pre-attack planning and surveillance for LeT of many of the targets that were struck in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. Because Headley was an U.S. citizen, his travel likely did not raise suspicions, and he was able to use the United States as a base of operations while helping to plan one of the most significant terrorist attacks in Indian history. Although it is not clear at this point whether Mr. Headley’s travel raised flags within the U.S. government, this case underscores the need to implement these international agreements as quickly as possible and make sure that all 35 visa waiver nations and other nations with a common interest in preventing acts of terrorism eventually participate in similar agreements."
3.David Heyman, Assistant Secretary For Homeland Security, who testified before the committee on various measures taken by his Department to monitor travels by terrorist suspects, said the circumstances surrounding the Headley investigation were changing the way authorities were looking at potential suspects. He added: "We can no longer assume that Americans are not involved in terrorism.As indicated by the recent indictments, we also see the nexus of travel in those who may get further indoctrinated abroad. This is a challenge.Those who are seeking to do harm are constantly hearing what we are doing, watching what we are doing, and adapting to that. So changing names may be one thing. Changing secure documents. Changing even biometrics."
4. Beyond these cursory remarks, there was no detailed discussion on the ease with which Headley was travelling to Pakistan and India and whether any of the US agencies had noticed this and raised an alarm over it. There was also no reference to reports carried by sections of the US media alleging that Headley was working as an informant of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) since at least 1998.
5. There were also no questions during the hearing as to whether there were any arrangements between the Governments of India and the US for the exchange of information regarding travels of terrorist suspects between the two countries. (14-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Friday, December 11, 2009
FBI AVOIDS FOCUS ON HEADLEY'S LINKS WITH NARCOTICS CONTROL AGENCY
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO. 590
B.RAMAN
In what appears to be a carefully scripted prosecution process, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the US has been trying to have the prosecution of David Coleman Headley, the Chicago-based US citizen of Pakistani origin, who allegedly helped the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in carrying out the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai last year, conducted in such a manner as to avoid any focus on his alleged links with the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
2. These links were recently alleged by “The New York Times” in a profile on Headley. It alleged that in 1998, Headley (then known as Daood Gilani) was convicted of conspiring to smuggle heroin into the US from Pakistan. It added: “Court records show that after his arrest, he provided so much information about his own involvement with drug trafficking which stretched back more than a decade and about his Pakistani suppliers that he was sentenced to less than two years in jail and later went to Pakistan to conduct undercover surveillance operations for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)".
3. Surprisingly, neither the initial affidavit nor the subsequent Criminal Information Report against him filed by the FBI in a Chicago federal court referred to his criminal record of 1998. Nor was there any reference to the fact that he was known to one of the agencies of the US Government since 1998 and had been co-operating with it in its anti-narcotics operations in the Af-Pak region. The ease with which he was getting visas for traveling frequently to Pakistan and India is attributable to the interest taken by the DEA in facilitating his travels on its behalf.
4. Indian media has reported that when he was produced before the federal judge for the first time since his arrest on December 9,2009, he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. It has missed two other significant points to which a reference has been made by sections of the US media. Firstly, “Headley told U.S. District Judge Harry D. Leinenweber that he understood the charges and was waiving any indictment in the case.” Secondly, he waived his right to a trial by a grand jury.
5. Sections of the US media have pointed out that the fact that the report filed against him by the FBI in the court on December 7 was called a Criminal Information Report and not an indictment indicates that the FBI has already reached a plea bargain deal with him under which as a quid pro quo for his admitting some charges when the trial formally commences next month, the FBI will not press other charges against him. His admitting some charges and the FBI dropping other charges will obviate the need for an elaborate trial with the introduction of detailed evidence.
6. This would prevent any deliberate or inadvertent disclosure by him of his work in the Af-Pak region for the DEA, which works in close co-operation with its Pakistani counterpart. The two have many joint operations.
7. It is very likely that the US will not allow his independent interrogation by Indian investigators and that it will not agree to his extradition to India as that might result in the Indian authorities coming to know not only of his contacts with Pakistani agencies, but also with the DEA.
8. Senior officials of the White House and the FBI have been taking close and unusual interest in the investigation and prosecution. The Director of the FBI himself was reported to have visited Chicago before Headley was produced before the court. Many in India have analysed this as indicative of the close interest taken by President Obama in counter-terrorism co-operation with India. A more plausible explanation is that this is indicative of the concerns in the White House and the FBI that if the prosecution is not properly handled, the case could result in a bombshell if it emerges that one of the active conspirators of 26/11 was an agent of a US agency. This could lead to suits for heavy damages against the US Government from the relatives of the Americans, Israelis and other foreigners killed.( 12-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
In what appears to be a carefully scripted prosecution process, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the US has been trying to have the prosecution of David Coleman Headley, the Chicago-based US citizen of Pakistani origin, who allegedly helped the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in carrying out the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai last year, conducted in such a manner as to avoid any focus on his alleged links with the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
2. These links were recently alleged by “The New York Times” in a profile on Headley. It alleged that in 1998, Headley (then known as Daood Gilani) was convicted of conspiring to smuggle heroin into the US from Pakistan. It added: “Court records show that after his arrest, he provided so much information about his own involvement with drug trafficking which stretched back more than a decade and about his Pakistani suppliers that he was sentenced to less than two years in jail and later went to Pakistan to conduct undercover surveillance operations for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)".
3. Surprisingly, neither the initial affidavit nor the subsequent Criminal Information Report against him filed by the FBI in a Chicago federal court referred to his criminal record of 1998. Nor was there any reference to the fact that he was known to one of the agencies of the US Government since 1998 and had been co-operating with it in its anti-narcotics operations in the Af-Pak region. The ease with which he was getting visas for traveling frequently to Pakistan and India is attributable to the interest taken by the DEA in facilitating his travels on its behalf.
4. Indian media has reported that when he was produced before the federal judge for the first time since his arrest on December 9,2009, he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. It has missed two other significant points to which a reference has been made by sections of the US media. Firstly, “Headley told U.S. District Judge Harry D. Leinenweber that he understood the charges and was waiving any indictment in the case.” Secondly, he waived his right to a trial by a grand jury.
5. Sections of the US media have pointed out that the fact that the report filed against him by the FBI in the court on December 7 was called a Criminal Information Report and not an indictment indicates that the FBI has already reached a plea bargain deal with him under which as a quid pro quo for his admitting some charges when the trial formally commences next month, the FBI will not press other charges against him. His admitting some charges and the FBI dropping other charges will obviate the need for an elaborate trial with the introduction of detailed evidence.
6. This would prevent any deliberate or inadvertent disclosure by him of his work in the Af-Pak region for the DEA, which works in close co-operation with its Pakistani counterpart. The two have many joint operations.
7. It is very likely that the US will not allow his independent interrogation by Indian investigators and that it will not agree to his extradition to India as that might result in the Indian authorities coming to know not only of his contacts with Pakistani agencies, but also with the DEA.
8. Senior officials of the White House and the FBI have been taking close and unusual interest in the investigation and prosecution. The Director of the FBI himself was reported to have visited Chicago before Headley was produced before the court. Many in India have analysed this as indicative of the close interest taken by President Obama in counter-terrorism co-operation with India. A more plausible explanation is that this is indicative of the concerns in the White House and the FBI that if the prosecution is not properly handled, the case could result in a bombshell if it emerges that one of the active conspirators of 26/11 was an agent of a US agency. This could lead to suits for heavy damages against the US Government from the relatives of the Americans, Israelis and other foreigners killed.( 12-12-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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