Friday, November 20, 2009

HEADLEY--RANA CASE : NEED FOR CAUTION

B.RAMAN

The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) of the Government of India is reported to have entrusted the newly-created National Intelligence Agency (NIA) with the task of follow-up investigation into the presence, travels and activities of David Coleman Headley, an American national of Chicago, and Tawahuur Hussain Rana, a Canadian national resident in Chicago, in India since 2006 and after the terrorist attack of 26/11 in Mumbai by 10 Pakistani members of the Lashksar-e-Toiba (LET).

2. Preliminary investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation between October,2008, and October 2,2009, brought out their suspected links with the LET. It also brought out that they were part of a conspiracy sought to be orchestrated from Pakistan to carry out a terrorist attack against a Danish journal, which had published cartoons of the Prophet in 2005, and a new terrorist strike in India by the LET. Both of them are of Pakistani origin.

3. Acting on preliminary evidence, which consisted largely of technical intercepts of the telephone and E-mail communications of the two, the FBI had arrested Headley on October 3,2009 and Rana on October 16,2009. According to the affidavits filed by the FBI in a Chicago court, Headley has waived his right against self-incrimination and has been talking voluntarily to the FBI interrogators.

4. The affidavits, which are available to the public, contain only that evidence which justified the decision to arrest and interrogate them. Evidence obtained during the still on-going interrogation, which would be necessary to prosecute them, has not been disclosed to the public. As and when one phase of the interrogation is over, evidence obtained during that phase is being put in a sealed cover and deposited with the court to enable the court to decide on the FBI's applications for further detention of the two suspects.

5. The FBI will be interrogating them from two angles---- their plans for future terrorist strikes and their activities in India before and after 26/11 in order to see whether they had any role in the terrorist attacks of 26/11 in which US nationals were among the foreigners killed.

6. While the US law and courts may not come in the way of the FBI sharing with India and Denmark information obtained during the interrogation which would enable the Indian and Danish Police to prevent future attacks, the FBI may not have a free hand at present in sharing with India any evidence pertaining to their role, if any, in the 26/11 terrorist attacks.

7.Any information obtained by the FBI relating to 26/11 from the two suspects has to be got verified by the FBI though the Indian NIA. For that purpose, the FBI will have to share even this information with the NIA. From its side, the FBI has taken care to see that none of the information being disclosed by the suspects during the interrogation leaks to the media and the public. The US media, which is more responsible than the Indian media, has refrained from publishing speculative stories relating to their interrogation so that the suspects continue to speak voluntarily to their interrogators.

8. Many sections of the Indian media have not been observing such restraint. There has been frenzied speculation and some journalists----in their attempts to sound more credible than others---- are even claiming to have obtained their information from "FBI sources", which one finds it difficult to believe.

9. If this kind of ill-advised speculation continues, it may come in the way of the FBI being able to share with India all the information that comes to its notice about the past and the future. The Government should caution its officials against talking to the media about the progress of the investigation and also issue an advisory to the media against frenzied speculation, which could be exploited by the lawyers of the two suspects to argue that the sharing of the information by the FBI with the Indian agencies might affect the legal rights of their clients. (21-11-09)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

EXPECTATIONS FROM MANMOHAN SINGH'S VISIT TO THE US


B.RAMAN

The following are the comments sent by me on the subject mentioned above in response to a query from a US think-tank:

How to address a complex mix of interests, concerns and policy preoccupations in a manner that will retain the US influence in the Af-Pak region without jeopardising the beginnings of its strategic presence and influence in India? That is the question that will be before Obama and his advisers during their talks with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. They have not found an answer to this dilemma and hence the spotlight more on style than on substance.

Efforts will be made to make India amenable to a resumption of the composite dialogue with Pakistan and to be more responsive to Pakistani concerns relating to Afghanistan.Will Obama use a promise of US support for India's permanent membership of the UN Security Council as a lollipop in return for Indian gestures to Pakistan?

The limitations on the US ability and willingness to make Pakistan address India's concerns on terrorism have been amply demonstrated time and again. To expect that Manmohan Singh will respond to US entreaties in the absence of a demonstrated US ability to make Pakistan act may be unrealistic.

Common concerns over China brought India and the US together under the Bush Administration. With Obama projecting China as a benign power and not as a power to be concerned about, China will no longer be a uniting factor between the two countries.

There is considerable confusion about Obama in India. He has clearly accorded a pre-eminent role to China not only in the rest of Asia, but even in South Asia. He is reluctant to act against Pakistan as vigorously as India would like him to.India is still keeping its fingers crossed as to whether he would keep up his promise to adhere to the commitments made by the Bush Administration on civil nuclear co-operation and transfer of dual-use technology.

During Manmohan Singh's visit to the US in July,2005, Bush managed to establish an excellent personal chemistry with him, which has served well the Indo-US relations.Obama's interactions with his foreign interlocutors have clearly brought out his inability to establish such personal chemistry. Indian policy-makers and analysts have, therefore been cautious in their expectations from the visit.( 20-11-09)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

Thursday, November 19, 2009

INDIA, THE US & CHINA

B.RAMAN

The following are the comments given by me in response to queries from an American analyst in connection with the forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, to the US, from November 23 to 26,2009:

(a). No thinking has been ever done in India as to what it expects out of a long-term strategic relationship with the US. It is always the US which decides what it will give to India and it is New Delhi which accepts. It was so with the nuclear deal which was offered by Bush in July 2005.Manmohan Singh was pleasantly surprised when Bush offered it and then we followed it up.India's expectations from the US in the past were limited to US pressure on Pakistan to stop using terrorism against India, removal of restrictions on the supply of modern dual-use technology to India and US support for India's permanent membership of the UNSC. They remain the same.Any strategic relationship has to be a quid pro quo relationship. Since the US has hardly any dependence on India in any matter, there is no scope for any quid pro quo.

(b). India visualises itself as an Asian power on par with China. Beijing does not see it this way.China views India as a sub-regional Asian power and wants to keep its influence restricted to its immediate neighbourhood. Obama's visit to China has uncomfortably brought out to India that there is a convergence of perceptions between China and the Obama Administration on the limited regional role of India.China's pre-eminence has been recognised by Obama. Obama has re-hyphenated India-Pakistan relations and quietly relegated India to the role of a sub-regional power whose aspirations of having a status on par with China are unrealistic.

(c).In geopolitical matters, there is no futuristic thinking in India. The quality of Indian thinking and analysis----strategic and tactical----is poor. What passes for analysis in India is just wishful-thinking. Nobody in India has realised and brought out that for the first time the US, Japan and Australia have a leadership which does not rate highly India's potential as an emerging power. There is less and less talk of Chindia.Even today, many in India are not aware that the new Japanese Govt is not as enthusiastic about India as its predecessor Govt.was.There has been no exercise in India to analyse future scenarios in US-Japan relationship..

(d).Someone ( was it Henry Kissinger?) once said that power and influence are not given. They are taken. China has shown how to take it. India does not have the political will and courage to fight for it and take it. It is hoping that the US will give it. Bush and Condolleezza Rice seemed inclined to bestow on India the status of an Asian power on par with China. The Obama Administration does not seem to be so inclined.

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

OBAMA FAILS TO UNDERSTAND INDIA'S DISTRUST OF CHINA

B.RAMAN

The failure of President Barack Obama to understand the distrust of China in large sections of the Indian civil society has landed the US in a situation in which the considerable goodwill between India and the US created during the administration of his predecessor George Bush stands in danger of being diluted by his unthinking words and actions.

2. The distrust of China in the Indian civil society is much deeper than even the distrust of Pakistan. Even today, despite Pakistan's continued use of terrorism against India, there is some goodwill for the people of Pakistan in many sections of the Indian civil society. As against this, outside the traditional communist and other leftist circles, one would hardly find any section which trusts China ---its Government as well as its people.

3. The Indian distrust of China arises mainly from three factors. First, the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Second, China's role in giving Pakistan a military nuclear and missile capability for use against India. Third, the Chinese blockage of the pre 26/11 efforts in the sanctions committee of the UN Security Council to declare the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the parent organisation of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), as a terrorist organisation and its subsequent opposition for a similar declaration against the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JED).

4. The dubious Chinese stand on the issue of Pakistani use of terrorism against India is viewed by many in India as amounting to collusion.

5. The Indian suspicions of China have been magnified in recent years by Beijing's Look South policy. China is not a South Asian power, but it has sought to create for itself a large South Asian presence by developing a military supply relationship with the countries of the region, by helping India's neighbours in the development of their infrastructure of strategic importance such as ports and by supporting the Maoists of Nepal.

6. At a time when concerns in India over the increasing Chinese strategic presence and influence in India's neigbourhood have been increasing, it is an amazingly shocking act of insensitivity on the part of Obama and his policy advisers to project China as a benign power with a benevolent role in South Asia---- whether for promoting understanding between India and Pakistan or for influencing developments in other countries of the region.

7. It is politically naive on the part of Obama to expect that Indian political and public opinion will accept any role for China in South Asia in matters which impact on India's core interests. Bush's China policy had favourable vibrations in India by highlighting the threats that are likely to be posed by its military modernisation made possible by its economic power. A convergence of concerns over China between Washington and New Delhi laid the foundation for the strategic relationship between the countries.

8. Obama's projection of China as a trustworthy partner of the US in jointly tackling long-standing contentious issues in South Asia shows a shocking ignorance of the fact that China was one of the causes of the persistence of these issues. Its effort has always been not to promote mutual understanding and harmony in South Asia, but to keep India isolated by keeping alive the old distrusts and animosities and creating new ones.

9. At a time when Indian public opinion was looking forward to fruitful results from the forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the US, reports from Beijing on Obama's visit to China would strengthen the impression that Obama is not India's cup of tea. (19-11-09)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

OBAMA & CHINA: THE COMING SHOCKS ( WHAT I WROTE ON OCTOBER 6,2009)

B.RAMAN

Extracts from my article at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers35/paper3445.html

The Obama Administration is showing signs of greater sensitivity to the concerns and interests of China than those of India. Reliable reports indicate that it is veering towards a policy of neutrality on the issue of Arunachal Pradesh, which has been a major bone of contention between India and China. It is believed to be dragging its feet on the implementation of the understanding reached between the preceding Bush Administration and the Govt. of India for the US Air Force to undertake searches in Arunachal Pradesh territory for US Air Force personnel, who were missing in action during the Second World War.

It is learnt that the formats of the joint exercices between the three wings of the Armed Forces of the two countries, which were agreed upon during the Bush Administration, are being reviewed in order to delete elements, which could cause concern to not only China, but also Pakistan--- such as joint exercises between the two armies in the Siachen area to enable US Army personnel to get exposed to high altitude conditions, joint naval exercises in the seas to the east of India etc.

While the Obama Administration wants to go ahead with the over-all format of the strategic relationship with India as laid down by the Bush Administration, it wants to have a second look at those aspects, which could cause concern to China.

There was one joint naval exercise off Japan involving ships of the navies of India, the US and Japan after Obama assumed office. Such exercises are likely to be avoided in future.

There is also a possibility of the US abstaining when the specific proposal for assistance from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for a flood control project in Arunachal Pradesh comes up for approval before the ADB.The ADB's Board of Governors had earlier this year, after Obama came to office, approved a basket of projects proposed by India despite opposition ftrom China. It is learnt that ADB officials have been saying that approval for the package as a whole did not mean approval of each individual item in the package and that each individual item has to be approved separately. Efforts are being made to scuttle ADB support for the individual proposal relating to Arunachal Pradesh.

The Obama Administration seems to be thinking that all that it needs to do to humour India and soften the blow due to its steady reversal of the pro-India policies initiated by the Bush Administration is to accord the honours of a State visit to Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh in November and play up the ceremonial honours accorded to him. In the last few days, officials of the US State Department have been briefing the media about the kind of honours which will be accorded to Dr.Manmohan Singh when he visits Washington. These are meant to show that there has been no change in the US policies towards India under the Obama Administration. The reality is that on every matter, which is of concern to India, greater attention is being paid to China's sensitivities and concerns.

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institite For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

Monday, November 16, 2009

GEN. FONSEKA DEVALUES HIMSELF

B.RAMAN

The Khalistani terrorism in India and the terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka are two unique instances in the history of terrorism where the State prevailed over the terrorists without conceding their demands.

2. The threat faced by Sri Lanka was more complex and difficult to handle than the threat faced by India. Sri Lanka was confronted with a ruthless mix of a full-blown insurgency seeking territorial control and terrorism seeking to intimidate the civil society. The Khalistani terrorism was a purely terrorist movement with no mix of an insurgency.

3. The situation, which Sri Lanka faced, was similar to that faced by the US and other NATO forces and the Afghan National Army in Afghanistan. They have not yet been able to find an effective answer to the complex mix of insurgent and terrorist tactics used by the Neo Taliban.

4. It goes to the credit of the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism machinery of Sri Lanka that after having struggled against the LTTE for nearly 23 years till 2006, they were able to fashion an appropriate mix of tactics to prevail over the LTTE.

5. This mix had a number of components. The political component, which was handled by President Mahinda Rajapaksa himself, focussed on giving the security forces and the intelligence agencies the resources and capacities needed by them to prevail over the LTTE and at the same time, ensuring that the counter-terrorist and counter-insurgency operations of the security forces did not drive more Tamils into the arms of the LTTE.

6. The diplomatic component, which was handled by Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama, ensured the diplomatic isolation of the LTTE. In fact, it was the success of the Sri Lankan diplomacy in getting the LTTE declared as a terrorist organisation by the European Union countries and in persuading the US, the EU countries and the Governments in South-East Asia to act energetically against the flow of money and weapons to the LTTE, which laid the foundation for the ultimate success of the Army on the ground.

7. If Sri Lankan diplomacy had not acted as energetically as it did in getting the sources of weapons supply to the LTTE choked off, the LTTE might not have collapsed as completely as it did.

8. It also goes to the credit of Rajapaksa and his Foreign Office that they realised the importance of India in any effective strategy to defeat the LTTE. China and Pakistan might have supplied arms and ammunition to the SL security forces, but what really helped the security forces was the assistance rendered by the Indian Navy, Coast Guard and intelligence to their SL counterparts in ensuring that the LTTE was not able to smuggle in fresh stocks of weapons from abroad. Another contribution made by the Government of India was in the handling of any political fall-out in Tamil Nadu to prevent any backlash against the Sri Lankan operations in Indian territory.

9. It is the political and diplomatic handling of the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency campaign by Rajapaksa and his political aides such as his Foreign Minister and professional aides such as his brother Gothbaya Rajapaksa, who as the Defence Secretary was the Chief Co-ordinator, that paved the way for the ultimate success of the armed forces.

10. The Armed Forces fought bravely. The credit for working out a ground strategy, which will prevail against the LTTE, should go to Gen.Sarath Fonseka, the chief of the Army, who subsequently became the Chief of the Defence Staff after the victory over the LTTE. The victory of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces over the LTTE was even more remarkable than that of the Indian security forces over the Khalistani terrorists, who were as ruthless as the LTTE.

11. We were not able to neutralise the command and control and leadership of the Khalistani terrorists as completely as the Sri Lankan Armed Forces under the leadership of Fonseka were able to do in respect of the LTTE. In any history of counter-terrorism, the way the entire Sri Lankan counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency machinery under Rajapaksa fought against the LTTE and prevailed over it would form an important chapter.

12. In his newly-assumed post of the Chief of the Defence Staff, Fonseka would have been able to do a retrospective analysis of the entire evolution of the LTTE and the way different SL Governments had handled the threat in order to draw lessons for the future. Such an exercise would have been of immense benefit to his own country as well as to India and others who face similar problems.

13. instead of doing so, he has allowed his pique over perceived slights by the Government to get the better of him and has resigned from his post as the CDS after making a series of allegations against the Government. A perusal of his letter to Rajapaksa does not speak well of his intellectual maturity as an individual. He was a brilliant professional, but professionalism alone does not make a good leader.

14.Media reports say that he has developed political ambitions of contesting the next Presidential elections against Rajapaksa. He has every right to do so as a Sri Lankan citizen. Unfortunately, his letter to Rajapaksa does not bring out any latent political acumen in him. They only bring out his huge ego and his pique. The message which comes out of the letter is: " I am the super hero of the success against the LTTE. My role in the triumph has not been sufficiently recognised."

15. As one reads his letter, one's mind goes back to our triumph against Khalistani terrorism. The success was achieved when K.P.S.Gill was the Director-General of Police of Punjab. He has never projected himself as the super hero of the success. He is always the first to admit that the success of the Punjab Police under his leadership would not have been possible without the political leadership and guidance of Narasimha Rao as the Prime Minister and Beant Singh as the Chief Minister of Punjab, without the team work put in by the police, the armed forces, the intelligence agencies and the Foreign Office and without the co-operation of foreign intelligence agencies which gave a lot of valuable intelligence.

16. Punjab is the most important of our successes against terrorism and insurgency, but not the only one. We have had other successes in Nagaland, Tripura, Mizoram and Kashmir.The professionals--- whether from the Armed Forces, the police or the intelligence agencies--- who were instrumental in making those successes possible, did not go around projecting themselves as super heroes. They recognised the role of others and maintained their sense of balance.

17. By failing to maintain his sense of balance and by allowing his pique to get the better of him, Fonseka has only devalued himself. The political forces in Sri Lanka which are exploiting his pique as a stick to beat Rajapaksa with are playing an unwise game. They may end up by diluting the professionalism of the SL Army. (17-11-2009)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )

Sunday, November 15, 2009

THE 313 BRIGADE

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO. 579

B.RAMAN

There are two jihadi terrorist organisations by the name the 313 Brigade. The first is Kashmir-centric and is associated with the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) of Qari Saifullah Akhtar. It has been in existence since at least 1999 and is a member of the United Jihad Council, based in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, which is headed by Syed Salahuddin of the Hizbul Mujahideen. It looks upon India as its main enemy and is not against the Government of Pakistsan, its Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

2.On December 15,1999, a Rashtriya Rifles unit in Jammu & Kashmir had killed one Sher Khan, who was described as the chief commander of a newly formed 313 Brigade and a HUJI commander called Nadeem Khan during an encounter in the Marot forest area of Surankote. The "Excelsior", a daily newspaper published from Jammu, had quoted Indian defence sources as saying that the 313 Brigade had been formed by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) a few days earlier.They claimed to have killed its leader within a few days of its formation and infiltration into J&K.

3. Thereafter, from to time, there were references to the activities of the 313 Brigade in the Surankote area of J & K. In October 2004, a Rashtriya Rifles unit captured one Sabzar Ahmed, a resident of the Surankote area, who was described as a member of the 313 Brigade.

4. On March 17,2006, "The Nation", the Pakistani daily, had carried a report on a letter jointly written to Pervez Musharraf by the members of the United Jihad Council of Kashmir protesting against his Government succumbing to pressure from the George Bush administration to discontinue support to the Kashmir-related jihadi organisations. Among those who had signed the letter was one Munir Ahmed of the 313 Brigade.

5.In April 2006, the US State Department issued the 2006 "Country Reports on Terrorism," which listed a number of designated "foreign terrorist organizations" and also listed "other selected terrorist groups also deemed to be of relevance to the global war on terrorism." The HUJI was listed in the latter category. The report noted the group's "links to al Qaeda," and that the "HUJI's operations in Kashmir were led by Commander Ilyas Kashmiri, a former commander in the Afghan jihad, .... who was arrested in October2005 on charges of attacks against President Musharraf in 2003."

6. Reports in the Pakistani media indicated that Ilyas Kashmiri, who headed the 313 Brigade of the HUJI in J&K, was released by the Pakistani authorities on the intervention of Syed Salahuddin and had shifted from Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), where he was previously based, to the Waziristan area of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

7. A second organisation also known as the 313 Brigade is Pakistan-centric and is the fighting arm of the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People formed by Osama bin Laden in 1998 in association with a number of terrorist organisations of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Uzbekistan and other countries. It came into existence after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. It looks upon the US and Israel as its main enemies. It is strongly against the Pakistan Govt, its Army and the ISI because of their alleged co-operation with the US in Afghanistan.

8. While the Kashmir-centric 313 Brigade claims responsibility for its actions in Jammu & Kashmir, the Pakistan-centric 313 Brigade does not admit its operations in Pakistan. Till 2007, the responsibility for the attacks on Pakistani army and ISI officers was claimed by organisations with names such as the Islambouli Brigade, the Jundullah etc. After the raid by the Special Services Group (SSG) of the Pakistan Army into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July,2007, the responsibility for many of the attacks on military establishments and personnel has been claimed by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

9. Among the terrorist attacks in Pakistani territory in which the Pakistan-centric 313 Brigade was suspected were:

(a). The two attempts to kill Pervez Musharraf in Rawalpindi in December,2003.

(b). The attempts to kill the Corps Commander of Karachi and Shaukat Aziz, the then Finance Minister who had been nominated by Musharraf to take over as the Prime Minister, at Fateh Jang in the Attock constituency of Punjab in 2004. Shaukat Aziz escaped an assassination attempt while he was canvassing a bye-election campaign.

(c). The murder of two officers of the Intelligence Bureau at Kohat in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in 2004.

(d). The attack on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in September 2008.The Danish diplomatic staff were functioning from there.

(e).The November 19,2008,assassination of Maj-Gen Amir Faisal Alvi, who headed the SSG in 2003-2005 before he was removed by Musharraf for unworthy conduct.

10. Immediately after the attempt on Shaukat Aziz, an Islamic web site had quoted a group calling itself the Islambouli Brigade as claiming that it had targeted one of the men of the "American infidel group in Pakistan". Lt Khaled Islambouli was the leader of the group of soldiers, who assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat during a military parade in Cairo in 1981.Though the statement did not mention Aziz by name, it was apparent the reference was to him. It said: "One of our blessed battalions tried to hunt a head of one of America’s infidels in Pakistan while he was returning from Fateh Jang, but God wanted him to survive. With this blow, we are delivering a message to the Pakistani Government and its head Pervez Musharraf, who is still extraditing the Mujahideen to America to appease it." . It accused the person targetted at Fateh Jang of being "a follower of the wicked Bush and his cronies."

11."Yesterday’s attack will be followed by more painful blows if you do not stop blindly obeying the orders of that Bush. If you don’t stop, the Mujahideen will wage a bloody war in Pakistan," it added. It said it was giving the Musharraf Government a "period of truce" to stop handing over arrested persons to the US, failing which the brigade "will behave in a different way." The statement did not say how long the truce would last, but it warned that its message was "the last warning. "Within the coming few days, our brigade will speak with the language of blood which is the only language you understand," it further warned.

12.In an interview to the "News", the prestigious Pakistani daily, apparently given after the attempt to kill Aziz, the 45-year-old Haji Mohammad Omar, who had succeeded Nek Mohammad as the leader of the pro-Taliban elements in South Waziristan, warned: "The rulers would not be safe if the Pakistan Government with US assistance targets our leaders. We are convinced that commander Nek Muhammad was killed by the US military with the connivance of our own government.The rocket attacks on Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps camps and assets in South Waziristan and the resistance being put up by the militants there are largely fuelled by the US military involvement in the so-called campaign against al-Qaeda and Taliban in Pakistan.The militants target only those places where US military personnel and spies are stationed. Our men take maximum care not to harm Pakistani soldiers and militiamen."He alleged that hundreds of US troops and intelligence agents had been secretly deployed in South Waziristan and that US military planes and helicopter gunships were operating in Pakistani territory and air space.

13. The attack came at a time when there were reports that the so-called 313 Brigade of the International Islamic Front (IIF), as distinguished from the 313 Brigade of the HUJI in J&K, had stepped up its campaign against the Pervez Musharraf Government in Pakistan and the Islam Karimov Government in Uzbekistan for co-operating with the USA in its war against terrorism.

14. The attack also come at a time when the Iraqi resistance and foreign jihadi terrorist groups in Iraq had stepped up their campaign against Saudi Arabia and Pakistan for allegedly letting themselves be used by the Bush administration for suppressing the Iraqi people. They were virulently criticising Jehangir Ashraf Qazi, the Pakistani diplomat, for agreeing to work as the UN Representative in Iraq and warning Pakistan against sending its troops to Iraq to protect the UN office.

15. Two Kashmiris from the POK, who had gone to Iraq to work for a US contractor, were captured by unidentified elements and beheaded as a warning to people in Pakistan not to volunteer to work for US contractors in Iraq. The responsibility for the beheading was claimed in the name of an organisation called the Jaish-e-Islam (Army of Islam).

16. These attacks followed after a statement issued by Osama bin Laden in 2003 calling Pakistan an apostate State for co-operating with the US and a virulent statement by his No.2 Ayman al-Zawahiri calling for action against Musharraf. In the meanwhile, the investigation into the two attempts to kill Musharrafr reportedly brought out the involvement of some junior officers of the Army and the Air Force in the conspiracy along with members of the HUJI, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) and the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ).

17. The various reports received during this period indicated that at the instance of Al Qaeda, the IIF had revamped its 313 Brigade by including in it select volunteers from not only the Pakistani jihadi organisations, but also sympathetic military personnel for carrying out reprisal attacks to protest against the Pakistani , co-operation with the US.

18. After the attacks on Musharraf, Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the Amir of the HUJI, ran away from Pakistan. He was arrested by the Dubai Police on August 6,2004, and handed over to the Pakistani authorities. Surprisingly, the Pakistani authorities did not prosecute him just as they did not prosecute Ilyas Kashmiri. They released him after keeping him under informal detention for some months. After the failed attempt to kill her at Karachi on October 17,2007, Benazir Bhutto had named the Qari as the principal suspect. He was again arrested, but released after some weeks without being prosecuted.

19. The 313 Brigade of the IIF, which has been focussing on attacking Pakistani targets as distinguished from the 313 Brigade in J&K which attacks Indian targets, is a shadowy organisation. Media reports project Ilyas Kashmiri as the head of the 313 Brigade of the IIF. In a press interview, Ilyas himself has sought to give the impression that he heads it. He has been saying that unless the US and its collaborators in Pakistan are defeated, the so-called struggle against India in J&K will not progress. He thus now gives primacy to the jihadi campaign against the US and its alleged collaborators in Pakistan.

20. Ilyas sees himself as another Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and wants to carry out a spectacular terrorist strike in a Western country. The purpose of his trying to use David Coleman Headley, of Chicago arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Chicago on October 3, 2009, was for an attack on the Danish journal, which carried caricatures of the Prophet in 2005. A perusal of the FBI's affidavit against Headley shows that while Ilyas wanted a Mumbai--26/11 style attack in Copenhagen, Headley felt that a more feasible option would be to assassinate the cartoonist and his Editor.

21. Where do the statements of the TTP claiming responsibility for attacks on Pakistani military personnel fit in? What is the relationship between the TTP, Ilyas and his 313 Brigade? What happened to the 313 Brigade of J&K? Does it continue its separate existence? Answers to these questions are not available.

22. The jihadi picture in Pakistan is getting murkier and murkier. Nobody----neither Pakistan's political and military leaders nor the US intelligence agencies and military leadership nor the mushrooming community of terrorism analysts all over the world---- seems to understand what the hell is going on in Pakistan, which is inexorably becoming a country beyond understanding and beyond redemption. (16-11-09)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )