B. Raman
The Iranian authorities reportedly suspect that the May 28 explosion in the second biggest Shia mosque in Zahidan, capital of Sistan-Balochistan, the Sunni majority Baloch province of Iran, was planned by the Jundullah, a Sunni extremist organisation, from its sanctuary in Pakistan's Balochistan province. They claim that the three members of the Jundullah, who were executed in public after the suicide explosion, confessed during their interrogation that they brought the explosive device from Pakistan and gave it to the suicide bomber.
2. While the Iranian authorities accuse the Jundullah of acting at the behest of the US and Israel, other reports indicate that the Jundullah cadres are trained by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), a Sunni extremist organisation of Pakistan, in its training camps in South Waziristan in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. The LEJ, whose involvement along with Al Qaeda was suspected in the huge explosion in the Marriott Hotel of Islamabad in September last year, has been operating jointly with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) headed by Baitullah Mehsud of South Waziristan.
3. The Iranian authorities, who have officially taken up with the Pakistani authorities their information about the terrorist infrastructure of the Jundullah in Pakistani territory, allege that Abdulmalek Rigi, whom they accuse of being the Amir of the Jundullah, operates from Pakistani territory.
4. Citing the Fars News Agency of Iran, the "Dawn" of Karachi reported on June 1, 2009, as follows: ' The chief of the Iranian armed forces, General Hassan Firouzabadi, said Iran had located the base of the group and informed the Pakistani Government of Abdulmalek Rigi’s position.....So far Jundullah has claimed responsibility for a dozen terrorist operations in Iran, however according to the FNA, they have managed to escape punishment by crossing into Pakistan. Tehran has warned Islamabad that it has the power and military means to trace and hunt down terrorist groups in Pakistan if such activity is not stopped by Pakistan. Since the suicide attack, Iran has closed down its border with Pakistan." The Pakistan Foreign Office has denied the "Dawn" report about the closing of the border.
5. The " News" of June 1, 2009, carried the following report by its well-informed correspondent Amir Mir: "The rising terrorist activities of the Pakistan-based militant organisation, Jundullah (Soldiers of God) threatens not only the Pak-Iran diplomatic ties but also the future of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, which was signed on May 22 by President Asif Zardari and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran. According to well-placed diplomatic sources in Islamabad, Tehran has lodged a strong protest with Islamabad over the failure of its law enforcement agencies to dismantle the Jundullah network in Pakistan, which has claimed responsibility for the May 28 deadly suicide attack inside the Ameer al-Momenin mosque in Zahedan that killed 25 people and wounded 125 others. The sources said Iranian officials had expressed their deep concern over the failure of the Pakistani authorities to proceed against the Jundullah network in Pakistan despite having been given specific intelligence. The Pakistani Ambassador was told that the Zahedan suicide attack could have been averted had Islamabad acted in time on the Iranian intelligence information.The Iranian authorities had reportedly told the Pakistani Ambassador that the three terrorists (Haji Noti Zehi, Gholam Rasoul Shahi Zehi and Zabihollah Naroui), hanged publicly on May 30 in Zahedan for their alleged participation in the mosque bombing, had confessed to illegally bringing explosives from Pakistan into Iran and giving them to the main person behind the suicide attack. Diplomatic circles in Islamabad say Tehran's concern over the growing terrorist activities of Jundullah, across the border in Iran, could be gauged from the fact that its Ambassador to Pakistan Mashallah Shakeri had addressed an unusual press conference in Islamabad on March 20, accusing Pakistan of allowing its soil to be used against Iran and demanding concrete steps to contain its activities. While claiming that the Jundullah network was located inside the Balochistan province, Shakeri had asked Islamabad to curb its anti-Iran activities by taking a decisive action against its leadership. The Iranian Ambassador had given broad hints at that time that an Iranian diplomat, who had disappeared in Peshawar in 2008, could also have been kidnapped by Jundullah. In his reaction the same day, a Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman had stated that Islamabad was determined that the Pakistani soil would not be allowed to be used by Jundullah in any manner to destabilise the Iranian government. However, the diplomatic circles in Islamabad say the Iranian authorities had warned the Pakistani Ambassador to Tehran on May 30 that Islamabad's failure to act against the Jundullah network in Balochistan could also jeopardise the future of the recently-signed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project. They pointed out that the Pakistani and the Iranian Presidents had only signed the initial agreement after 14 years of delayed negotiations and the most crucial gas sales and purchase agreement had not yet been finalised."
6. In the meanwhile, the Jundullah of Iran has disseminated the following statement: "Ayatollah Khamenaei, the supreme leader of Iran, officially interpreted the natural death of Fatema, the daughter of the holy Prophet, as martyrdom, thus justifying the actions of those who have organised Omar Denunciation Ceremonies. The ceremonies began about two months ago in Baluchistan where the majority of the people are Sunnis and resulted in widespread conflicts between Baluch Sunnis and Iranian security forces. The tension mounted when the People's Resistance Movement of Iran, Jondollah, initiated a bomb blast in a mosque that was dominated by the security forces and Iranian militia. The fanatics supported by the militia and security forces published huge posters in the streets and began denunciation speeches with mobile speakers in moving cars in different streets of Zahedan. Jondollah warned these groups to halt their offending ceremonies to one billion Moslems throughout the world but they ignored the warnings and continued displaying posters in their street gatherings. Other Baluch and Sunni leaders requested the Iranian authorities to prevent these provocative ceremonies but they did not stop. The Jondollah bombed the mosque that has become the centre of various provocations and the headquarters of these ceremonies after all other peaceful requests were exhausted. Ayatollah Khamenaei said a few weeks ago in Kurdistan that any action that may create divisions between Shias and Sunnis is treason, but now it is certain that he was behind all the offences that have been officially made against the second Caliph."
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Thursday, June 4, 2009
Wednesday, June 3, 2009
BIN LADEN TALKS AGAIN OF AN INDIA-ISRAEL-US PLOT
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR-- PAPER NO.532
B.RAMAN
For the first time in April 2006, shortly after the visit of the then US President George Bush to India, Osama bin Laden projected the global jihad as being waged against a joint India-Israel-US plot against Islam. This theme was not repeated in his subsequent messages.
2. He has reverted to this theme in his latest audio message broadcast by Al Jazeera on June 3, 2009. The message focusses on the on-going operation of the Pakistan Army in the Swat Valley and the suffering caused by it to the people of the area, but it has been released by Al Qaeda to coincide with the arrival of President Barack Obama in Saudi Arabia from where he will be going to Egypt. Obama is expected to deliver a significant speech at the Cairo University , which is being billed in advance by US spokesmen as an important message of goodwill to the Islamic world.
3. Al Qaeda has released two messages coinciding with Obama's tour. The first by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's No.2, is totally focussed on Obama's visit. It is highly vituperative. Zawahiri, who is an Egyptian, denounces the leaders of Egypt as butchers and criminals. He uses language, which is virulently denunciatory.
4. The message of bin Laden is more balanced. He does not stoop to the level of his No.2. The main focus is not on Obama's tour, but on the on-going military operation in the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province. He tries to project that Obama is no different from George Bush and that his policies towards the Muslims are full of hatred and are no different from those of Bush. He indirectly warns of the consequences of such policy. The warning is more general than specific. It cannot be interpreted as an indicator of a coming Al Qaeda strike against the US.
5. The message says: "U.S. policy in Pakistan has generated new seeds of hatred and revenge against America.Obama has ordered Zardari to prevent the people of Swat from implementing sharia law.....All this led to the displacement of about a million Muslim elders, women and children from their villages and homes. They became refugees in tents after they were honored in their own homes.This basically means that Obama and his administration put new seeds of hatred and revenge against America. The number of these seeds is the same as the number of those victims and refugees in Swat and the tribal area in northern and southern Waziristan.The American people need to prepare to only gain what those seeds bring up."
6. bin Laden has been very critical of President Asif Ali Zardari and Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). He accuses them of continuing to divert the army's main role from protecting the nation to fighting Islam and its followers and adds that the war is also hurting Pakistan's economy, endangering the country's religion and security and "fulfilling an American, Jewish and Indian plot."It further says: "Most of the Pakistani people reject this unjust war. Zardari did this in response to the ones paying him in the White House --not 10 per cent but multiple folds of that."
7.In this context, bin Laden says: "It is easy for India to subject the disassembled territories of Pakistan, one after another, for its own benefit, like the case of eastern Pakistan before, or even worse. This way, America eases its worry towards Pakistan's nuclear weapons."
8.Zawahiri's message accuses Obama of threatening to interfere in Pakistan to secure its nuclear weapons, "meaning he considers these weapons owned by America and under its control." What is sought to be conveyed to the Pakistani people by these two messages is that as a result of the co-operation of its rulers with the US, Pakistan stands in danger of losing its sovereignty not only over its territory, but also over its nuclear arsenal.
9. Why does bin Laden consider it necessary to place before the Pakistani people the spectre of an Indian role in the alleged US-Israeli conspiracy against Pakistan? He does not explain, but after carefully reading the message, one can see that he is hinting to the Pakistanis the danger of shifting Pakistani troops away from the Indian border, as suggested by the Obama Administration, in order to use them in the operations against the Pakistani Taliban.
10. Pro-Al Qaeda organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) are likely to interpret bin Laden's message as encouragement of another major terrorist strike in India, in the hope that the resulting fresh tension between India and Pakistan would make the Pakistan Army slow down its anti-Taliban operation.(4-6-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and,presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
For the first time in April 2006, shortly after the visit of the then US President George Bush to India, Osama bin Laden projected the global jihad as being waged against a joint India-Israel-US plot against Islam. This theme was not repeated in his subsequent messages.
2. He has reverted to this theme in his latest audio message broadcast by Al Jazeera on June 3, 2009. The message focusses on the on-going operation of the Pakistan Army in the Swat Valley and the suffering caused by it to the people of the area, but it has been released by Al Qaeda to coincide with the arrival of President Barack Obama in Saudi Arabia from where he will be going to Egypt. Obama is expected to deliver a significant speech at the Cairo University , which is being billed in advance by US spokesmen as an important message of goodwill to the Islamic world.
3. Al Qaeda has released two messages coinciding with Obama's tour. The first by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's No.2, is totally focussed on Obama's visit. It is highly vituperative. Zawahiri, who is an Egyptian, denounces the leaders of Egypt as butchers and criminals. He uses language, which is virulently denunciatory.
4. The message of bin Laden is more balanced. He does not stoop to the level of his No.2. The main focus is not on Obama's tour, but on the on-going military operation in the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province. He tries to project that Obama is no different from George Bush and that his policies towards the Muslims are full of hatred and are no different from those of Bush. He indirectly warns of the consequences of such policy. The warning is more general than specific. It cannot be interpreted as an indicator of a coming Al Qaeda strike against the US.
5. The message says: "U.S. policy in Pakistan has generated new seeds of hatred and revenge against America.Obama has ordered Zardari to prevent the people of Swat from implementing sharia law.....All this led to the displacement of about a million Muslim elders, women and children from their villages and homes. They became refugees in tents after they were honored in their own homes.This basically means that Obama and his administration put new seeds of hatred and revenge against America. The number of these seeds is the same as the number of those victims and refugees in Swat and the tribal area in northern and southern Waziristan.The American people need to prepare to only gain what those seeds bring up."
6. bin Laden has been very critical of President Asif Ali Zardari and Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). He accuses them of continuing to divert the army's main role from protecting the nation to fighting Islam and its followers and adds that the war is also hurting Pakistan's economy, endangering the country's religion and security and "fulfilling an American, Jewish and Indian plot."It further says: "Most of the Pakistani people reject this unjust war. Zardari did this in response to the ones paying him in the White House --not 10 per cent but multiple folds of that."
7.In this context, bin Laden says: "It is easy for India to subject the disassembled territories of Pakistan, one after another, for its own benefit, like the case of eastern Pakistan before, or even worse. This way, America eases its worry towards Pakistan's nuclear weapons."
8.Zawahiri's message accuses Obama of threatening to interfere in Pakistan to secure its nuclear weapons, "meaning he considers these weapons owned by America and under its control." What is sought to be conveyed to the Pakistani people by these two messages is that as a result of the co-operation of its rulers with the US, Pakistan stands in danger of losing its sovereignty not only over its territory, but also over its nuclear arsenal.
9. Why does bin Laden consider it necessary to place before the Pakistani people the spectre of an Indian role in the alleged US-Israeli conspiracy against Pakistan? He does not explain, but after carefully reading the message, one can see that he is hinting to the Pakistanis the danger of shifting Pakistani troops away from the Indian border, as suggested by the Obama Administration, in order to use them in the operations against the Pakistani Taliban.
10. Pro-Al Qaeda organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) are likely to interpret bin Laden's message as encouragement of another major terrorist strike in India, in the hope that the resulting fresh tension between India and Pakistan would make the Pakistan Army slow down its anti-Taliban operation.(4-6-09)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and,presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT IN COUNTER-TERRORISM & COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGIES
( Based on a talk delivered on March 28,2009, at a seminar at Guwahati organized by the Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies of Kolkata )
B.RAMAN
India faces three kinds of terrorism ---the indigenous by some sections of our own people, the foreign sponsored and the foreign-aided. The indigenous terrorism itself has different motives----political and religious as in the case of the terrorist groups in Jammu & Kashmir, purely religious as in the case of the jihadi terrorist groups operating outside J&K, ethnic as in the case of Assam and ideological and economic as in the case of the Maoist or Naxalite groups operating in the tribal belt of Central India.
2. Foreign-sponsored terrorism is mainly due to jihadi organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI ) and the Jaish-eMohammad (JEM) operating from Pakistani territory and the HUJI operating from Bangladesh. Their members are Pakistani or Bangladeshi nationals or other foreign Muslims and their activities in the Indian territory are sponsored by the intelligence agencies of these countries in order to serve their own purpose. The intelligence agencies of Pakistan and Bangladesh have a common purpose of creating a polarization between the Muslim and Hindu communities in India. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has the additional purpose of forcing a change in the status quo in J&K through terrorism.
3. Foreign-aided terrorism refers to indigenous terrorist groups receiving assistance in the form of training, financial assistance and arms and ammunition from the terrorist organizations and the intelligence services of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Examples would be the Khalistani terrorists who used to be active in Punjab and Delhi till 1995, the Kashmiri terrorist groups, the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the so-called Indian Mujahideen (IM) and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Assisting them helps the purpose of creating instability in India and keeping the Indian security forces preoccupied with internal security problems.
4. There are two approaches to dealing with terrorism---- the counter-terrorist and the counter-terrorism approaches. The counter-terrorist approach deals with terrorism as a threat to national security and seeks to put out of action the terrorists, their leaders and organizations through the use of the security forces. The counter-terrorism approach treats terrorism as a phenomenon with many aspects----political, economic, social, religious etc--- in addition to having a security dimension. The counter-terrorism approach underlines that counter-terrorist methods will not be sufficient to deal with the threat effectively. In addition, the political, economic, social and other aspects have to be addressed simultaneously by the political leadership.
5. There is only one way of dealing with foreign-sponsored terrorist groups---- through counter-terrorist methods. Foreign nationals indulging in acts of terrorism in our territory have to be neutralized by the security forces without any mercy. The use of such terrorists by Pakistan and Bangladesh amounts to indirect aggression in our territory. There are two methods of dealing with foreign-sponsored terrorists-----passive defence and active defence. Passive defence refers to strengthening internal security measures in our own territory in order to make it almost impossible for Pakistani and Bangladeshi terrorists to operate in our territory. Active defence refers to our right to take our counter-terrorism operations to the territories of Pakistan and Bangladesh in order to pre-empt their plans for a terrorist strike in our territory.
6. Countries facing the menace of foreign-sponsored terrorism adopt a mix of passive defence and active defence methods. India follows a policy of only passive defence. The Indian political leadership is not prepared to consider active defence. Passive defence requires effective preventive capability. Active defence requires an effective and deniable retaliatory capability. We have not built for ourselves such a retaliatory capability. After the Mumbai terrorist strike of November 26-29,2008, many foreign terrorism experts have assessed that India may continue to face such strikes because it does not have either an effective preventive or retaliatory capability. This assessment needs to be taken seriously by our political leadership and policy-makers and appropriate correctives in our strategy introduced.
7. In the case of purely indigenous terrorism, effective physical security alone will not produce enduring results unless accompanied by appropriate political action to address the anger and grievances of the community from which the terrorists have arisen. Unaddressed anger is a common root cause of all terrorism--- whether ethnic, separatist, religious, jihadi or ideological. Even in the case of the indigenous terrorists, those who take to terrorism have to face the consequences of their action. At the same time, it is important to prevent the flow of new recruits to the terrorist organizations. This can be done only by identifying the causes of anger in the community and addressing them.
8. For many years, there has been an endless debate in the community of security analysts about the linkage between security and development in any counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency strategy. Without effective security, there cannot be satisfactory development. Without satisfactory development, there cannot be effective security. Hardline security analysts----who believe in the security first approach--- even argue that if large funds are sanctioned for development in the terrorism or insurgency affected areas much of the money might leak into the coffers of the terrorists or insurgents.
9. This is an unwise approach, which would be counter-productive. Fortunately, our political leaders have rejected the arguments of such hardline security experts. They have been trying to give simultaneous attention to requirements of security and development even at the risk of some of the funds allotted for development leaking to the terrorists or insurgents.
10. At the same time, the priorities tend to be misplaced. For example, in the Naxalism affected areas we tend to focus more on development packages for the affected areas. It is important to pay equal, if not more, attention to the development of the tribal areas not affected by Naxalism in order to demonstrate to people the dividends of observing law and order and keeping away from terrorists and insurgents.
11.In the North-East, there has been peace in Nagaland and Mizoram. Arunachal Pradesh has remained unaffected by insurgency. In Tripura, there has been a decrease in insurgency. We should have undertaken a crash programme for the economic development of these areas to provide a demonstration of a peace dividend for areas which have given up insurgency or for areas, which have remained away from insurgency. But the importance of this has not been realised by our policy-makers.
12. The third type of terrorism in which Pakistani and Bangladeshi terrorist organizations and intelligence services use our nationals for acts of terrorism calls for a nuanced approach. Just because some of our nationals are acting at the behest of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, we should not look upon the entire community with suspicion. Our aim should be to identify grievances---legitimate or otherwise---- in the community which are exploited by the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis and try to address them.
13.There is no copybook on counter-terrorism, which can apply to all situations and to all kinds of terrorism. Our strategies should be tailor-made to suit different situations and to deal with different kinds of terrorism. There should be a fair balance between the requirements of security and development in strategies dealing with indigenous terrorism.
(The author is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
India faces three kinds of terrorism ---the indigenous by some sections of our own people, the foreign sponsored and the foreign-aided. The indigenous terrorism itself has different motives----political and religious as in the case of the terrorist groups in Jammu & Kashmir, purely religious as in the case of the jihadi terrorist groups operating outside J&K, ethnic as in the case of Assam and ideological and economic as in the case of the Maoist or Naxalite groups operating in the tribal belt of Central India.
2. Foreign-sponsored terrorism is mainly due to jihadi organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI ) and the Jaish-eMohammad (JEM) operating from Pakistani territory and the HUJI operating from Bangladesh. Their members are Pakistani or Bangladeshi nationals or other foreign Muslims and their activities in the Indian territory are sponsored by the intelligence agencies of these countries in order to serve their own purpose. The intelligence agencies of Pakistan and Bangladesh have a common purpose of creating a polarization between the Muslim and Hindu communities in India. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has the additional purpose of forcing a change in the status quo in J&K through terrorism.
3. Foreign-aided terrorism refers to indigenous terrorist groups receiving assistance in the form of training, financial assistance and arms and ammunition from the terrorist organizations and the intelligence services of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Examples would be the Khalistani terrorists who used to be active in Punjab and Delhi till 1995, the Kashmiri terrorist groups, the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the so-called Indian Mujahideen (IM) and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Assisting them helps the purpose of creating instability in India and keeping the Indian security forces preoccupied with internal security problems.
4. There are two approaches to dealing with terrorism---- the counter-terrorist and the counter-terrorism approaches. The counter-terrorist approach deals with terrorism as a threat to national security and seeks to put out of action the terrorists, their leaders and organizations through the use of the security forces. The counter-terrorism approach treats terrorism as a phenomenon with many aspects----political, economic, social, religious etc--- in addition to having a security dimension. The counter-terrorism approach underlines that counter-terrorist methods will not be sufficient to deal with the threat effectively. In addition, the political, economic, social and other aspects have to be addressed simultaneously by the political leadership.
5. There is only one way of dealing with foreign-sponsored terrorist groups---- through counter-terrorist methods. Foreign nationals indulging in acts of terrorism in our territory have to be neutralized by the security forces without any mercy. The use of such terrorists by Pakistan and Bangladesh amounts to indirect aggression in our territory. There are two methods of dealing with foreign-sponsored terrorists-----passive defence and active defence. Passive defence refers to strengthening internal security measures in our own territory in order to make it almost impossible for Pakistani and Bangladeshi terrorists to operate in our territory. Active defence refers to our right to take our counter-terrorism operations to the territories of Pakistan and Bangladesh in order to pre-empt their plans for a terrorist strike in our territory.
6. Countries facing the menace of foreign-sponsored terrorism adopt a mix of passive defence and active defence methods. India follows a policy of only passive defence. The Indian political leadership is not prepared to consider active defence. Passive defence requires effective preventive capability. Active defence requires an effective and deniable retaliatory capability. We have not built for ourselves such a retaliatory capability. After the Mumbai terrorist strike of November 26-29,2008, many foreign terrorism experts have assessed that India may continue to face such strikes because it does not have either an effective preventive or retaliatory capability. This assessment needs to be taken seriously by our political leadership and policy-makers and appropriate correctives in our strategy introduced.
7. In the case of purely indigenous terrorism, effective physical security alone will not produce enduring results unless accompanied by appropriate political action to address the anger and grievances of the community from which the terrorists have arisen. Unaddressed anger is a common root cause of all terrorism--- whether ethnic, separatist, religious, jihadi or ideological. Even in the case of the indigenous terrorists, those who take to terrorism have to face the consequences of their action. At the same time, it is important to prevent the flow of new recruits to the terrorist organizations. This can be done only by identifying the causes of anger in the community and addressing them.
8. For many years, there has been an endless debate in the community of security analysts about the linkage between security and development in any counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency strategy. Without effective security, there cannot be satisfactory development. Without satisfactory development, there cannot be effective security. Hardline security analysts----who believe in the security first approach--- even argue that if large funds are sanctioned for development in the terrorism or insurgency affected areas much of the money might leak into the coffers of the terrorists or insurgents.
9. This is an unwise approach, which would be counter-productive. Fortunately, our political leaders have rejected the arguments of such hardline security experts. They have been trying to give simultaneous attention to requirements of security and development even at the risk of some of the funds allotted for development leaking to the terrorists or insurgents.
10. At the same time, the priorities tend to be misplaced. For example, in the Naxalism affected areas we tend to focus more on development packages for the affected areas. It is important to pay equal, if not more, attention to the development of the tribal areas not affected by Naxalism in order to demonstrate to people the dividends of observing law and order and keeping away from terrorists and insurgents.
11.In the North-East, there has been peace in Nagaland and Mizoram. Arunachal Pradesh has remained unaffected by insurgency. In Tripura, there has been a decrease in insurgency. We should have undertaken a crash programme for the economic development of these areas to provide a demonstration of a peace dividend for areas which have given up insurgency or for areas, which have remained away from insurgency. But the importance of this has not been realised by our policy-makers.
12. The third type of terrorism in which Pakistani and Bangladeshi terrorist organizations and intelligence services use our nationals for acts of terrorism calls for a nuanced approach. Just because some of our nationals are acting at the behest of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, we should not look upon the entire community with suspicion. Our aim should be to identify grievances---legitimate or otherwise---- in the community which are exploited by the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis and try to address them.
13.There is no copybook on counter-terrorism, which can apply to all situations and to all kinds of terrorism. Our strategies should be tailor-made to suit different situations and to deal with different kinds of terrorism. There should be a fair balance between the requirements of security and development in strategies dealing with indigenous terrorism.
(The author is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, June 2, 2009
FRESH OXYGEN TO LET
International Terrorism Monitor -- Paper No. 531
B. Raman
A three-member bench of the Lahore High Court held illegal on June 2, 2009, the house arrest of Prof. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the Amir of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the political wing of the Lashkar-e-ToIba (LET), and his associate Col.(retd) Nazir Ahmed and ordered their release. The court has not yet given the reasons for its order. These will be announced later.
2. In the wake of the Mumbai terrorist strike of November 26-29, 2008, carried out by 10 terrorists of the LET, the Government of Pakistan took two actions. It ordered the arrest of five members of the LET against whom specific evidence of their involvement had been produced by the Government of India. It was reported that the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had also collected independence evidence against them. A case against them has been registered for investigation and prosecution and their judicial remand is being extended from time to time by an Anti-terrorism court of Islamabad. A charge-sheet against them is yet to be filed. Only when the Pakistani authorities do so, can one say definitely how serious are they about their intention to prosecute them and get them convicted.
3. The second action was the placing under house arrest of Prof. Saeed, Nazir Ahmed and some others not on the ground of their involvement in the Mumbai attack, but on the ground that they belonged to an organisation, which had been designated by the counter-terrorism sanctions committee of the UN Security Council as a terrorist organisation. While placing them under house arrest, the Government did not officially ban their organisation as a terrorist set-up.
4. The Review Board set up by the Government to review the legality of the house arrests had upheld the Government decision. However, Prof. Saeed and Nazir Ahmed had challenged their house arrest as illegal before the Lahore High Court. Their lawyer appealed to the court to set aside their house arrest on two grounds. The first was that they were not supplied with the grounds of their house arrest as required under the law within the time-limit laid down. This vitiated the procedure followed. The second ground was that the Government had passed its order of house arrest purely on the basis of the resolution of the UN Sanctions Committee, without any independent evidence of its own necessitating their house arrest.
5. In response to these arguments, the Government contended that it had independent evidence, including evidence of the LET's links with Al Qaeda, and showed the evidence privately to the Bench without sharing it with the lawyers to Sayeed and his associate. The lawyers held this also as illegal since their clients had been deprived of their right to know all the grounds for their house arrest including the evidence on which they were based.
6. It is after considering these arguments that the court has passed the orders for their release. From the way the case was handled from the beginning, it was evident that the Government, while acting against those LET operatives whose involvement in the Mumbai attack was not deniable, wanted to protect Prof. Saeed, his organisation and their terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory. The whole case was handled in such a manner as to make their release by the court inevitable.
7. Reports regarding the equal lack of seriousness seen in the other case too against five operatives of the LET for their involvement in the Mumbai attack make it likely that the second case might also meet with a similar fate. International pressure made Pakistan act against Saeed and Nazir Ahmed as well as the five involved in the Mumbai attack. Now, the Pakistan Government calculates that the international pressure will be less because of the appreciation for the strong action it has supposedly taken against the Taliban, which is of greater concern to the US and other countries of the West than the LET. It hopes to take advantage of this for once again ensuring that the LET and its capability for terrorism against India remain unimpaired.
8. Even if it tries to pass a fresh order of house arrest against Saeed and Nazir Ahmed in order to quieten concerns in the West, its intentions and sincerity will continue to be suspect.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
B. Raman
A three-member bench of the Lahore High Court held illegal on June 2, 2009, the house arrest of Prof. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the Amir of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the political wing of the Lashkar-e-ToIba (LET), and his associate Col.(retd) Nazir Ahmed and ordered their release. The court has not yet given the reasons for its order. These will be announced later.
2. In the wake of the Mumbai terrorist strike of November 26-29, 2008, carried out by 10 terrorists of the LET, the Government of Pakistan took two actions. It ordered the arrest of five members of the LET against whom specific evidence of their involvement had been produced by the Government of India. It was reported that the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had also collected independence evidence against them. A case against them has been registered for investigation and prosecution and their judicial remand is being extended from time to time by an Anti-terrorism court of Islamabad. A charge-sheet against them is yet to be filed. Only when the Pakistani authorities do so, can one say definitely how serious are they about their intention to prosecute them and get them convicted.
3. The second action was the placing under house arrest of Prof. Saeed, Nazir Ahmed and some others not on the ground of their involvement in the Mumbai attack, but on the ground that they belonged to an organisation, which had been designated by the counter-terrorism sanctions committee of the UN Security Council as a terrorist organisation. While placing them under house arrest, the Government did not officially ban their organisation as a terrorist set-up.
4. The Review Board set up by the Government to review the legality of the house arrests had upheld the Government decision. However, Prof. Saeed and Nazir Ahmed had challenged their house arrest as illegal before the Lahore High Court. Their lawyer appealed to the court to set aside their house arrest on two grounds. The first was that they were not supplied with the grounds of their house arrest as required under the law within the time-limit laid down. This vitiated the procedure followed. The second ground was that the Government had passed its order of house arrest purely on the basis of the resolution of the UN Sanctions Committee, without any independent evidence of its own necessitating their house arrest.
5. In response to these arguments, the Government contended that it had independent evidence, including evidence of the LET's links with Al Qaeda, and showed the evidence privately to the Bench without sharing it with the lawyers to Sayeed and his associate. The lawyers held this also as illegal since their clients had been deprived of their right to know all the grounds for their house arrest including the evidence on which they were based.
6. It is after considering these arguments that the court has passed the orders for their release. From the way the case was handled from the beginning, it was evident that the Government, while acting against those LET operatives whose involvement in the Mumbai attack was not deniable, wanted to protect Prof. Saeed, his organisation and their terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory. The whole case was handled in such a manner as to make their release by the court inevitable.
7. Reports regarding the equal lack of seriousness seen in the other case too against five operatives of the LET for their involvement in the Mumbai attack make it likely that the second case might also meet with a similar fate. International pressure made Pakistan act against Saeed and Nazir Ahmed as well as the five involved in the Mumbai attack. Now, the Pakistan Government calculates that the international pressure will be less because of the appreciation for the strong action it has supposedly taken against the Taliban, which is of greater concern to the US and other countries of the West than the LET. It hopes to take advantage of this for once again ensuring that the LET and its capability for terrorism against India remain unimpaired.
8. Even if it tries to pass a fresh order of house arrest against Saeed and Nazir Ahmed in order to quieten concerns in the West, its intentions and sincerity will continue to be suspect.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Sunday, May 31, 2009
VIOLENCE CONTINUES IN IRANIAN BALOCHISTAN
B.RAMAN
A report received on May 31,2009, from a source believed to be based in Zahidan, the capital of the Iranian province of Sistan-Balochistan,speaks of an exchange of fire between groups of Shias and Sunnis in different parts of Zahidan following an unsuccessful attempt by unidentified persons to kill Mulla Abdol Hamid, a senior Sunni leader. While he survived the attack, many of his body guards were reportedly injured.
2.According to the Government controlled IRNA news agency, three persons were injured on May 29,2009, when unidentified gunmen attacked the election office of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at Zahidan. Ahmadinejad is contesting re-election as the President. The polling is scheduled for June 12,2009.
3.Meanwhile, the Iranian authorities have blamed the US and Israel for the suicide attack in a Shia mosque on May 28,2009. They have already announced the hanging in public in Zahidan of three persons in connection with the attack. While the authorities have accused them of having been involved in the attack, independent reports claim that these persons were already in the custody of the police when the suicide attack took place in the mosque.
4.Jalal Sayah, Deputy Governor-General of Sistan-Balochistan, has been quoted by the semi-official Fars news agency as saying: “Three people involved with the terrorist incident were arrested.According to the information obtained, they were hired by America and the agents of the arrogance.” Interior Minister Sadegh Mahsooli said: “The terror agents are neither Sunni nor Shia but Americans and Israelis seeking a Shia-Sunni divide." The Agence France Presse has quoted Ian Kelly, a spokesman of the US State Department, as saying: “The US strongly condemns all forms of terrorism. We do not sponsor any form of terrorism in Iran and we continue to work with the international community to try to prevent any attacks against innocent civilians anywhere.”
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
A report received on May 31,2009, from a source believed to be based in Zahidan, the capital of the Iranian province of Sistan-Balochistan,speaks of an exchange of fire between groups of Shias and Sunnis in different parts of Zahidan following an unsuccessful attempt by unidentified persons to kill Mulla Abdol Hamid, a senior Sunni leader. While he survived the attack, many of his body guards were reportedly injured.
2.According to the Government controlled IRNA news agency, three persons were injured on May 29,2009, when unidentified gunmen attacked the election office of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at Zahidan. Ahmadinejad is contesting re-election as the President. The polling is scheduled for June 12,2009.
3.Meanwhile, the Iranian authorities have blamed the US and Israel for the suicide attack in a Shia mosque on May 28,2009. They have already announced the hanging in public in Zahidan of three persons in connection with the attack. While the authorities have accused them of having been involved in the attack, independent reports claim that these persons were already in the custody of the police when the suicide attack took place in the mosque.
4.Jalal Sayah, Deputy Governor-General of Sistan-Balochistan, has been quoted by the semi-official Fars news agency as saying: “Three people involved with the terrorist incident were arrested.According to the information obtained, they were hired by America and the agents of the arrogance.” Interior Minister Sadegh Mahsooli said: “The terror agents are neither Sunni nor Shia but Americans and Israelis seeking a Shia-Sunni divide." The Agence France Presse has quoted Ian Kelly, a spokesman of the US State Department, as saying: “The US strongly condemns all forms of terrorism. We do not sponsor any form of terrorism in Iran and we continue to work with the international community to try to prevent any attacks against innocent civilians anywhere.”
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
SRI LANKA: INDIA'S ROLE
B. Raman
Many Sri Lankan Tamils were killed during the anti-Tamil riots in Colombo in 1983. In their anxiety to suppress details of the exact number of fatalities from being known to the international community, the Sri Lankan authorities allegedly decided to secretly burn the dead bodies of the Tamils killed in mass cremations without informing the relatives. Much before any agency of the Government of India, Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, came to know about it and took action to stop it.
2. Her information came from Tamil families in Tamil Nadu with links or contacts with Tamils in Sri Lanka, I am mentioning this to underline that if there is any large-scale massacre of Tamils in Sri Lanka by State agencies, Tamil families in Tamil Nadu would generally come to know about it much before anybody else in India or in the rest of the world. The fact that there has been no such tom-toming across Tamil Nadu of independent stories----- and not stories disseminated by Western sources--- about large-scale massacre of Tamil civilians in the Northern Province by the Sri Lankan security forces would underline the need for caution in accepting stories being disseminated by Western media and human rights organisations about the alleged massacre of nearly 20,000 Tamils during the final weeks of the Sri Lankan Army's counter-insurgency operations against the LTTE.
3. Had there been really such massacres as alleged by Western sources on the basis of purported leaks from unidentified members of the junior staff of the United Nations, people in Tamil Nadu would have come to know of these alleged massacres long before anybody else. Yes, there was concern over the use of air strikes and heavy artillery by the Sri Lankan security forces. These concerns were voiced by political and non-political elements in Tamil Nadu. There was equally a feeling in Tamil Nadu that the number of casualties suffered by the civilians during the final days of the fighting must have been more than the figures given by the Sri Lankan Government. In counter-insurgency situations, it happens often that the authorities tend to underestimate civilian casualties. We saw it in Iraq and we have been seeing it in Afghanistan. The debate regarding the number of civilian fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan goes on without anybody being to establish the exact figure. But nobody accuses the US-led forces in Iraq and Afghanistan of deliberately indulging in large-scale massacres of civilians. Nobody is asking for an international tribunal to try those in charge of operations in those two countries.
4. A campaign has been started in the West to embarrass the Sri Lankan Government and to put its senior officers, who were in charge of counter-insurgency, in the dock by disseminating unauthenticated high figures of civilian fatalities in the Northern Province. India should keep away from this campaign, which seems to be motivated not necessarily by wholly humanitarian considerations. India is uniquely placed in having a better and more objective idea of what happened in the Northern Province and should act according to its judgement without being influenced by the anti-Colombo campaign mounted in the West.
5. Now that the LTTE's insurgency is over, three issues have acquired priority. The first priority is relief and rehabilitation of the Tamil civilians affected by the counter-insurgency operations. The second is post-conflict economic reconstruction in Sri Lanka as a whole and in the Tamil areas in particular. The third is addressing the Tamil anger through an appropriate political package. The LTTE may be gone, but not the Tamil anger.
6. Since the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and more particularly since 2002, India has been playing second fiddle in Sri Lanka. It has left it to Western powers such as Norway and the US as well as to Japan to play an activist role in helping Sri Lanka. The time has come for India to once again play an activist role in respect of all the priorities cited above. India should assume the leadership role in helping Sri Lanka in its relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction tasks.
7. The goodwill for India in Sri Lanka has never been higher than it is after the defeat of the LTTE. It is not because India played any active role in its defeat. It is because India did not try to hamper the counter-insurgency operations of the Sri Lankan security forces. This was interpreted by them as India's moral support for their operations. Many Sri Lankans with whom I have interacted in recent weeks have frankly admitted that India's moral support was much more crucial than any material support from Pakistan or China in their counter-insurgency operations.
8. India should try to build up on this goodwill and strengthen it further by taking the leadership role in international efforts to help Sri Lanka after the conflict. If this goodwill is not frittered away and is strengthened further, that could give India a moral authority to nudge the Sri Lankan Government towards a politicasl solution which would be meaningful to the Tamils and acceptable to the Sinhalese.
9. In many articles in the past, I had expressed my fears that once the SL security forces win against the LTTE, the SL Government would try to impose a dictated peace on the Tamils. Those fears remain. All the more reason for India to play the leadership role to ensure that these fears are belied. These fears, even if valid, should not be allowed to inhibit our initiatives in Sri Lanka.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
NORTH KOREA & IRAN
B.RAMAN
The following is the text of an E-mail interview given by me to The Yomiuri Shimbun of Japan :
QUESTION NO.1 With Obama behaving like this, spreading impression he is a nice guy but not to be feared, are you more or less certain the United States will not be able to stop crisis in Iran's nuclear development or Af-Pak situation to be worsened?
MY REPLY: Iran has seen how North Korea has been able to defy theUS and the international community with impunity.Due to the failure ofthe US to act against North Korea before it acquired its military nuclear capability, a pre-emption is no longer an option. North Korea's conventional military capability and its missiles capable of hitting Japan and South Korea rule out the use of the military option against North Korea.. The soft policy of the Obama Administration towards Iran and its inability to take a strong line against North Korea are likely to encourage the hard-liners in Iran who want Iran to acquire a military nuclear capability. The image of Obama as a soft President who tends to avoid a confrontation will also encourage the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda to step up their activities against the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan and could derail its Af-Pak policy sooner rather than later.
QUESTION NO.2 Regarding North Korea, where should Obama begin to roll back? Reports from Washington indicate he is about to put more emphasison pressuring Pyongyang rather than pursuing dialogue. Is that the right direction?
MY REPLY: As I see it, the only option left for Obama and Japan is to threaten Beijing with the danger of Japan going nuclear if China does not pressure North Korea to de-nuclearise.One does not know whether this option will work or not, but it deserves to be tried.This fear of a nuclear Japan must be constantly kept before the eyes of Beijing.
QUESTION NO.3: What do you think was North Korea's purpose in carrying out a nuclear explosion at this point? What kind of concessions are they willing to get from the U.S. as well as the international community?
MY REPLY: North Korea wants the international community to accept as a reality its present nuclear stockpile of about six A-bombs and its missile and space capability in return for its agreeing to freeze any further production of fissile material. It also wants assurances of energy supplies and economic assistance.
QUESTION NO.4: Eleven years ago this month, it was India and Pakistan that were in the position of today's North Korea, being under attack from all over the world for carrying out nuclear tests. Many people now suspect North Korea is following the examples of India and Pakistan for defying the NPT regime to win recognition as de facto nuclear powers. Those people therefore still condemn India and Pakistan for their "bad examples" that have compromised the nonproliferation regime. How do you respond to such criticism? Why India's case was different from today's North Korea?
MY REPLY: India is a democratic and open society. It is not a rogue State like North Korea. It is not a state sponsor of terrorism like North Korea. India has an adversary in China, which has a military nuclear capability since 1964. South Korea and Japan, which North Korea looks upon as adversaries, do not have a military nuclear capability.
The following is the text of an E-mail interview given by me to The Yomiuri Shimbun of Japan :
QUESTION NO.1 With Obama behaving like this, spreading impression he is a nice guy but not to be feared, are you more or less certain the United States will not be able to stop crisis in Iran's nuclear development or Af-Pak situation to be worsened?
MY REPLY: Iran has seen how North Korea has been able to defy theUS and the international community with impunity.Due to the failure ofthe US to act against North Korea before it acquired its military nuclear capability, a pre-emption is no longer an option. North Korea's conventional military capability and its missiles capable of hitting Japan and South Korea rule out the use of the military option against North Korea.. The soft policy of the Obama Administration towards Iran and its inability to take a strong line against North Korea are likely to encourage the hard-liners in Iran who want Iran to acquire a military nuclear capability. The image of Obama as a soft President who tends to avoid a confrontation will also encourage the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda to step up their activities against the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan and could derail its Af-Pak policy sooner rather than later.
QUESTION NO.2 Regarding North Korea, where should Obama begin to roll back? Reports from Washington indicate he is about to put more emphasison pressuring Pyongyang rather than pursuing dialogue. Is that the right direction?
MY REPLY: As I see it, the only option left for Obama and Japan is to threaten Beijing with the danger of Japan going nuclear if China does not pressure North Korea to de-nuclearise.One does not know whether this option will work or not, but it deserves to be tried.This fear of a nuclear Japan must be constantly kept before the eyes of Beijing.
QUESTION NO.3: What do you think was North Korea's purpose in carrying out a nuclear explosion at this point? What kind of concessions are they willing to get from the U.S. as well as the international community?
MY REPLY: North Korea wants the international community to accept as a reality its present nuclear stockpile of about six A-bombs and its missile and space capability in return for its agreeing to freeze any further production of fissile material. It also wants assurances of energy supplies and economic assistance.
QUESTION NO.4: Eleven years ago this month, it was India and Pakistan that were in the position of today's North Korea, being under attack from all over the world for carrying out nuclear tests. Many people now suspect North Korea is following the examples of India and Pakistan for defying the NPT regime to win recognition as de facto nuclear powers. Those people therefore still condemn India and Pakistan for their "bad examples" that have compromised the nonproliferation regime. How do you respond to such criticism? Why India's case was different from today's North Korea?
MY REPLY: India is a democratic and open society. It is not a rogue State like North Korea. It is not a state sponsor of terrorism like North Korea. India has an adversary in China, which has a military nuclear capability since 1964. South Korea and Japan, which North Korea looks upon as adversaries, do not have a military nuclear capability.
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