B.RAMAN
As the first anniversary of the pre-Olympic uprising in Tibet and other Tibetan-inhabited areas in March-April last year approaches, theChinese authorities have expedited the trial of those arrested in connection with the uprising of last year inflicting harsh sentences onthem. At the same time, they have launched a new "Strike Hard" campaign against suspected Tibetan dissidents in order to prevent a freshuprising this year.
2.The new 'Strike Hard" campaign was launched on January 18,2009, when holders of mobile phones in the Tibetan-inhabited areasreceived text messages appealing to them to demonstrate peacefully during the Tibetan New Year and during the first anniversary of theuprising of March,2008. The State-controlled "Lhasa Evening News" reported as follows:"Within three days of the launch of the winter"Strike Hard" campaign on Jan. 18, 2009, the Lhasa municipal public security bureau had deployed 600 officers and around 160 policevehicles, and had conducted raids on seven housing blocks, 2,922 rented houses, 14 guest house and hotels, 18 bars and three Internetcafés in Lhasa. The police have rounded up 5,766 suspects for questioning.",
3. Among the recently available signs of the unrest are:
Pema Tsepak, 24, a resident of the Punda town in the Dzogang county of Tibet’s Chamdo prefecture, was arrested by the police on January 20,2009, on a charge of demonstrating against the Chinese rule. Subsequently, the police informed his relatives that he died accidentally when he jumped from the roof of the police station in an attempt to escape. Local Tibetans have alleged that he was tortured to death by the police. Between January 20 and 22,2009, the Chinese police detained six other Tibetans of the same area for demonstrating against the Chinese rule.
A group of five Tibetan monks staged a demonstration in support of Tibetan independence near a monastery in the Dege (Derge in Tibetan) region of the Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in the Sichuan province on January,27,2009. They were arrested by the local police.
On January 27 and 28,2009, posters calling for Tibetan independence were found pasted on public buildings in the Serthar area of the province. Chinese flags on some public buildings in the Khekor and Nyitoe areas were found hauled down by some unknown elements.
Pamphlets calling for the non-observance of the Tibetan New Year on February 26,2009, as a mark of respect to the Tibetans who died during last year's uprising have been circulating in Tibet and Sichuan. To counter this, the Chinese authorities have launched a drive for the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the introduction of the so-called democratic reforms in Tibet. These State-sponsored celebrations will coincide with the Tibetan New Year.
4.Protests by Tibetan exiles and human rights activists have marked the visit the the Chinese Prime Minister, Mr.Wen Jiabo, to the UK. Ashoe was thrown at him as he was addressing a meeting at the Cambridge University on February 2,2009. The shoe fell away from him anddid not hit him. The person who threw the shoe shouted "dictator".
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, February 2, 2009
Saturday, January 31, 2009
PRO-LTTE WEB SITES TARGET INDIA AS THE VILLAIN
B.RAMAN
In a desperate attempt to secure a pause in the fighting in the Vanni area of Northern Sri Lanka in order to be able to regroup, the LiberationTigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has been emulating the tactics of human shields or human buffers used by the Hizbollah in the Lebanon in2006 and by the Hamas in Gaza recently to slow down the Israeli military strikes.
2. While refusing to let the civilians in the areas still controlled by it to move to the safe zones proclaimed by the Sri Lankan Governmentunder the pretext that the civilians cannot be forced to move against their will unless there is an internationally-guaranteed ceasefire, it hasactivated the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in the West and Australia to demonstrate in large numbers in the streets to highlight the plight ofthe civilians. It has mobilised the support of foreign human rights organisations on this issue. Impressive demonstrations were held by largenumbers of Sri Lankan Tamils in different Western cities on January 31,2009.
3. At the same time, pro-LTTE web sites have been highlighting the protests launched by some political parties and by some sections ofstudents and lawyers in Tamil Nadu against the alleged violations of the human rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils and their calls for Indianintervention in support of the Sri Lankan Tamils. They have been trying to project as if the protest campaign in Tamil Nadu has beengathering momentum.
4. Some of the pro-LTTE web sites in the Tamil language have been carrying inflammatory articles projecting India as the villain forallegedly providing military assistance to Sri Lanka in its counter-terrorism campaign against the LTTE. They indirectly admit that duringthe last two years the LTTE has suffered a series of set-backs and attribute these set-backs to the assistance allegedly given by India tothe Sri Lankan Army.
5. One such article calls upon the members of the Sri Lankan diaspora abroad to hold continuous demonstrations outside Indian diplomaticmissions in protest against India's role in Sri Lanka. The pro-LTTE web sites have been directing their criticism against the Government ofIndia as well as the Congress (I), which is projected as the "Sonia Congress". Some of the criticism is personally directed at Mrs.SoniaGandhi.
6. They have been accusing the Congress (I) of taking vengeance on the Sri Lankan Tamil community for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhiin 1991. (1-2-2009)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
In a desperate attempt to secure a pause in the fighting in the Vanni area of Northern Sri Lanka in order to be able to regroup, the LiberationTigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has been emulating the tactics of human shields or human buffers used by the Hizbollah in the Lebanon in2006 and by the Hamas in Gaza recently to slow down the Israeli military strikes.
2. While refusing to let the civilians in the areas still controlled by it to move to the safe zones proclaimed by the Sri Lankan Governmentunder the pretext that the civilians cannot be forced to move against their will unless there is an internationally-guaranteed ceasefire, it hasactivated the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in the West and Australia to demonstrate in large numbers in the streets to highlight the plight ofthe civilians. It has mobilised the support of foreign human rights organisations on this issue. Impressive demonstrations were held by largenumbers of Sri Lankan Tamils in different Western cities on January 31,2009.
3. At the same time, pro-LTTE web sites have been highlighting the protests launched by some political parties and by some sections ofstudents and lawyers in Tamil Nadu against the alleged violations of the human rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils and their calls for Indianintervention in support of the Sri Lankan Tamils. They have been trying to project as if the protest campaign in Tamil Nadu has beengathering momentum.
4. Some of the pro-LTTE web sites in the Tamil language have been carrying inflammatory articles projecting India as the villain forallegedly providing military assistance to Sri Lanka in its counter-terrorism campaign against the LTTE. They indirectly admit that duringthe last two years the LTTE has suffered a series of set-backs and attribute these set-backs to the assistance allegedly given by India tothe Sri Lankan Army.
5. One such article calls upon the members of the Sri Lankan diaspora abroad to hold continuous demonstrations outside Indian diplomaticmissions in protest against India's role in Sri Lanka. The pro-LTTE web sites have been directing their criticism against the Government ofIndia as well as the Congress (I), which is projected as the "Sonia Congress". Some of the criticism is personally directed at Mrs.SoniaGandhi.
6. They have been accusing the Congress (I) of taking vengeance on the Sri Lankan Tamil community for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhiin 1991. (1-2-2009)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
CYBER WAR---HOW REAL? HOW SOON? HOW FAR?
B.RAMAN
These are comments sent by me on a draft paper prepared by a US think-tank----B.Raman
a). India has terrorism of various hues----separatist, ethnic, ideological (Maoist), and jihadi (indigenous as well as originating from Pakistan and Bangladesh). Till 2007, only the jihadi terrorists originating from the Pakistan-Afghanistan region had shown a worrisome interest in using the Internet for operational purposes---- such as propaganda, communications,motivation, training, data-mining and disruption. The interest of other terrorist groups in the Internet remained confined to propaganda and psy-war and communications. They did not show any interest in the use of the Internet for disruptionn purposes..
(b). Jihadi terrorists operating in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, including Al Qaeda, have been exhibiting an increasing mastery of the use of the Internet for propaganda, communications, motivation, recruitment and training, but one has not seen any confirmed instance of their using or attempting to use the Internet for disruption purposes.
(c).Neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan has a large reservoir of IT-savvy anti-Western Muslims. India has a reservoir, but it cannot as yet be described as large. So too, the Pakistani and Indian Muslim diaspora in the West. Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda organisations are focussing on them for the recruitment of their future IT warriors. The Indian Mujahideen has come to notice for recruiting at least three , but they were used for primitive purposes such as sending claims of responsibility without being traced back.
(d). Indian Muslims are technically less qualified than the rest of the population, but better educated and qualified than the Muslims in most of the Islamic world. They have the same access to IT education as a person of any other religion and the same job opportunity. As Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda organisations start looking for recruits with a capability for disruption, they are likely to depend increasingly on the IT-savvy Muslims of India and the Indian and Pakistani Muslim diaspopra in the West.
(e). How to disrupt their efforts at such recruitment? That is a question, which would the need the attention of the intelligence agencies of India and the West.
(f). All Islamic fundamentalist organisations----including the Taliban---- have realised the importance of IT.The curricula of most madrasas exclude physical sciences, western philosophy, logic, etc, but include training in the use of computers, which are seen as an asset for waging a jihad. In the 1990s, I had contributed to the quarterly journal of the United Service Institution of India, based in New Delhi,two articles on likely future threats from "microchip moles" and the computer as a "weapon of mass disruption." These threats have not yet materialised, but it is only a question of time before they do. A weapon of mass destruction requires qualified manpower, financial resources and a place to test away from the attention of the intelligence agencies. A weapon of mass disruption requires only qualified manpower and limited financial resources. This is a weapon which can be launched from anywhere. In most cases, the intelligence agencies will become aware of one's capability in the field only after one has used it and not before.
(g). State-spnsored cyber war, that is, the use of lone wolf cyber warriors by States for achieving their intelligence-collection and disruption objectives, is a threat, which is already staring us in the face. Deniability is strong in the case of state-sponsored cyber warriors. Protective technology has to keep ahead of technology, which lends itself to disruptive uses. Is it doing so? (1-2-09)
These are comments sent by me on a draft paper prepared by a US think-tank----B.Raman
a). India has terrorism of various hues----separatist, ethnic, ideological (Maoist), and jihadi (indigenous as well as originating from Pakistan and Bangladesh). Till 2007, only the jihadi terrorists originating from the Pakistan-Afghanistan region had shown a worrisome interest in using the Internet for operational purposes---- such as propaganda, communications,motivation, training, data-mining and disruption. The interest of other terrorist groups in the Internet remained confined to propaganda and psy-war and communications. They did not show any interest in the use of the Internet for disruptionn purposes..
(b). Jihadi terrorists operating in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, including Al Qaeda, have been exhibiting an increasing mastery of the use of the Internet for propaganda, communications, motivation, recruitment and training, but one has not seen any confirmed instance of their using or attempting to use the Internet for disruption purposes.
(c).Neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan has a large reservoir of IT-savvy anti-Western Muslims. India has a reservoir, but it cannot as yet be described as large. So too, the Pakistani and Indian Muslim diaspora in the West. Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda organisations are focussing on them for the recruitment of their future IT warriors. The Indian Mujahideen has come to notice for recruiting at least three , but they were used for primitive purposes such as sending claims of responsibility without being traced back.
(d). Indian Muslims are technically less qualified than the rest of the population, but better educated and qualified than the Muslims in most of the Islamic world. They have the same access to IT education as a person of any other religion and the same job opportunity. As Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda organisations start looking for recruits with a capability for disruption, they are likely to depend increasingly on the IT-savvy Muslims of India and the Indian and Pakistani Muslim diaspopra in the West.
(e). How to disrupt their efforts at such recruitment? That is a question, which would the need the attention of the intelligence agencies of India and the West.
(f). All Islamic fundamentalist organisations----including the Taliban---- have realised the importance of IT.The curricula of most madrasas exclude physical sciences, western philosophy, logic, etc, but include training in the use of computers, which are seen as an asset for waging a jihad. In the 1990s, I had contributed to the quarterly journal of the United Service Institution of India, based in New Delhi,two articles on likely future threats from "microchip moles" and the computer as a "weapon of mass disruption." These threats have not yet materialised, but it is only a question of time before they do. A weapon of mass destruction requires qualified manpower, financial resources and a place to test away from the attention of the intelligence agencies. A weapon of mass disruption requires only qualified manpower and limited financial resources. This is a weapon which can be launched from anywhere. In most cases, the intelligence agencies will become aware of one's capability in the field only after one has used it and not before.
(g). State-spnsored cyber war, that is, the use of lone wolf cyber warriors by States for achieving their intelligence-collection and disruption objectives, is a threat, which is already staring us in the face. Deniability is strong in the case of state-sponsored cyber warriors. Protective technology has to keep ahead of technology, which lends itself to disruptive uses. Is it doing so? (1-2-09)
Friday, January 30, 2009
LTTE'S BITTER ATTACK ON THE GOVT. OF INDIA & THE CONGRESS PARTY
B.RAMAN
In the wake of the visit of our Foreign Minister, Shri Pranab Mukherjee, to Colombo for talks with the Sri Lankan President, Mr.Mahinda Rajapaksa, the Tamilnet, the web site in the English language associated with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), has disseminated on January 30,2009, an article attributed to "a political analyst in Vanni", which has accused "the present Indian Establishment run by Sonia Congress of waging its own proxy war in the island of Sri Lanka, concurrent to Colombo's war against Tamil Nationalism."
2. The article, which evidently represents the views of the LTTE leadership, warns the "Indian Establishment" as follows: "In its frustration arising from its incapability of achieving anything positive, India is not only heading for maintaining perpetual trouble in Sri Lanka, but also is inviting turmoil to a part of its own country." It also says: "The net result of the Indian game, without enjoying any popular support from any quarter concerned, can only be autocratic and will prove to be devastating to the entire island. Repercussions arising from resentment, coupled with re-emergence of a dormant LTTE, will only see a raging political inferno and bloodbath. This time the war is not going to be confined to the island of Sri Lanka, but will be fought involving Tamil Nadu too."
3. It further says: "It ( the Indian Establishment) also doesn’t want to see Tamil nationalism or an independent Tamil nation state in the island, but it is accountable to the people of Tamil Nadu. Public opinion is important to continue the ‘dynasty’ in the throne of Delhi. Above all it has to maintain ‘checks and balances’ with Colombo. What it is desperately attempting now is re-organization of its own quislings among Eezham Tamils with promises of arranging political solution, aiming to replace LTTE leadership. But the important qualification to become a quisling, as specified by the Indian recruiting agents, is to drop the Tamil national aspiration. Soon one may find a set of propped up leaders, camouflaged initiatives in the diaspora and international conferences in New Delhi. But, for everything, the war has to be over soon at least with the semblance of conclusiveness. If it doesn’t end soon, indications are there that the Indian establishment may even physically try a hand at it, as time is running out for it with elections around the corner in April.Already there are reports of the physical presence of Indian soldiers in the war front and recent Indian supplies of tanks and aircraft to Colombo’s arsenal. Whatever India may do to Sri Lanka to win the war against Tamils, it is never going to get the reward of popular support to any of its aims from the Sinhala masses. The popularity of the ruling Indian Establishment is at its lowest ebb in Tamil Nadu. Its name has become repulsive to Eezham Tamils. Having all these discredits on its side, what really India can achieve in bringing out an acceptable political solution is anybody’s guess. The present Indian Establishment is simply incapable of doing anything constructively new, other than destroying Tamil safeguards."
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
In the wake of the visit of our Foreign Minister, Shri Pranab Mukherjee, to Colombo for talks with the Sri Lankan President, Mr.Mahinda Rajapaksa, the Tamilnet, the web site in the English language associated with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), has disseminated on January 30,2009, an article attributed to "a political analyst in Vanni", which has accused "the present Indian Establishment run by Sonia Congress of waging its own proxy war in the island of Sri Lanka, concurrent to Colombo's war against Tamil Nationalism."
2. The article, which evidently represents the views of the LTTE leadership, warns the "Indian Establishment" as follows: "In its frustration arising from its incapability of achieving anything positive, India is not only heading for maintaining perpetual trouble in Sri Lanka, but also is inviting turmoil to a part of its own country." It also says: "The net result of the Indian game, without enjoying any popular support from any quarter concerned, can only be autocratic and will prove to be devastating to the entire island. Repercussions arising from resentment, coupled with re-emergence of a dormant LTTE, will only see a raging political inferno and bloodbath. This time the war is not going to be confined to the island of Sri Lanka, but will be fought involving Tamil Nadu too."
3. It further says: "It ( the Indian Establishment) also doesn’t want to see Tamil nationalism or an independent Tamil nation state in the island, but it is accountable to the people of Tamil Nadu. Public opinion is important to continue the ‘dynasty’ in the throne of Delhi. Above all it has to maintain ‘checks and balances’ with Colombo. What it is desperately attempting now is re-organization of its own quislings among Eezham Tamils with promises of arranging political solution, aiming to replace LTTE leadership. But the important qualification to become a quisling, as specified by the Indian recruiting agents, is to drop the Tamil national aspiration. Soon one may find a set of propped up leaders, camouflaged initiatives in the diaspora and international conferences in New Delhi. But, for everything, the war has to be over soon at least with the semblance of conclusiveness. If it doesn’t end soon, indications are there that the Indian establishment may even physically try a hand at it, as time is running out for it with elections around the corner in April.Already there are reports of the physical presence of Indian soldiers in the war front and recent Indian supplies of tanks and aircraft to Colombo’s arsenal. Whatever India may do to Sri Lanka to win the war against Tamils, it is never going to get the reward of popular support to any of its aims from the Sinhala masses. The popularity of the ruling Indian Establishment is at its lowest ebb in Tamil Nadu. Its name has become repulsive to Eezham Tamils. Having all these discredits on its side, what really India can achieve in bringing out an acceptable political solution is anybody’s guess. The present Indian Establishment is simply incapable of doing anything constructively new, other than destroying Tamil safeguards."
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Thursday, January 29, 2009
TIME FOR SRI LANKAN TAMIL DIASPORA TO SPEAK OUT
B.RAMAN
"An organisation headed by a leader, who understands only terrorism, is unlikely to rehabilitate itself in the eyes of the internationalcommunity. Prabakaran is a liability for the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Tamils in the post-9/11 world. The time has come for the LTTE leadersand the Sri Lankan Tamils---including their overseas diaspora--- to do an introspection on their future course of action. If they have topreserve the gains made by thousands of their cadres since 1983, they have to find a new leadership. Prabakaran is no longer the man ofthe future. He is passe. He has become a liability for the Tamil cause. The sooner the Sri Lankan Tamils realise it, the better for them."
---------- Extract from my article of January 22,2007, titled LTTE AVOIDS BATTLE OF ATTRITION IN THE EAST available athttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers22/paper2105.html
------------------------------------------------------
The reports regarding the desperate plight of about 1,50,000 Sri Lankan Tamils caught up between an advancing Sri Lankan Army and aretreating Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Wanni area of northern Sri Lanka are confusing.
2. Many have reportedly died and many, including many children, have been injured in the exchange of artillery fire between the two sides.In a situation like this, it is impossible to establish whose artillery killed whom. All one can say is that innocent civilians are paying a heavyprice for the heavy exchange of artillery.
3. The Sri Lankan Army is disinclined to agree to a ceasefire to let the civilians be evacuated by the International Committee of the RedCross (ICRC) lest the LTTE take advantage of it to regroup. The LTTE is disinclined to let the civilians move to the safety zones set up by theGovernment lest this facilitate the advance of the Army.
4. The international community, including the Government of India, are unable to effectively bring pressure on both sides to help out thecivilians. The Sri Lankan Army has estimated that it is only a few weeks away from totally eliminating the capability of the LTTE forconventional fighting and it is determined to achieve that objective even at the risk of some collateral damage to the civilians. The LTTE isafraid that if it lets the civilians go, it will have a face-to-face confrontation with the Army in which it is unlikely to do well.
5. Prabakaran, who is believed to be still commanding the retreating LTTE fighters, does not seem to realise that the chances of the LTTEstaging a spectacular come-back as it did in the 1990s and recaptured Kilinochchi and Mulaithivu are remote. The loss of control overterritory in the Northern Province is not so devastaing for him as the loss of control over the Tamil population in the Eastern Province. In thepast, many of the conventional fighters of the LTTE came from the Eastern Province and many of the terrorists from the Northern Province.It is no longer possible for him to get new recruits from the Eastern Province. The recent fighting in the North has indicated that the LTTE'sshortages in arm and ammunition and explosives are much more serious than originally estimated. With the rapidly decreasing possibility offinding replacement of human and material resources, his chances of staging a come-back conventionally are much less than what theywere in the 1990s.
6. The terrorist wing of the LTTE also seems to be facing severe problems due to a shortage of explosive material, a drop in volunteers forsuicide terrorism and the lack of time and space in the midst of a furious conventional war to motivate and train new volunteers and mountoperations.
7. The use of the civilians to avert an impending final defeat on the ground should be condemned by all the political parties in Tamil Nadu,by the Government of India and the international community. Prabakaran has been living in a world of illusions just as Hitler was in the final days of the defeat of the Nazi Army before he and his mistress committed suicide in a Berlin bunker to avoid being captured by theadvancing Soviet Army. Till he decided to kill himself, Hitler was fondly hoping that a reversal of fortunes was still possible.So too,Prabakaran seems to be having a fond hope that he and his men can stage a come-back even at this stage.
8. It is time for the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora to assert itself and call upon the LTTE cadres to overthrow Prabakaran and other leaders,arrest them, hand them over to the Sri Lankan authorities and proclaim a unilateral ceasefire. It is time for the diaspora to come to termswith the reality and act before more civilians are killed.If they fail to do so and continue to encourage Prabakaran in his irrational illusions,history will judge them harshly. ( 29-1-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
"An organisation headed by a leader, who understands only terrorism, is unlikely to rehabilitate itself in the eyes of the internationalcommunity. Prabakaran is a liability for the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Tamils in the post-9/11 world. The time has come for the LTTE leadersand the Sri Lankan Tamils---including their overseas diaspora--- to do an introspection on their future course of action. If they have topreserve the gains made by thousands of their cadres since 1983, they have to find a new leadership. Prabakaran is no longer the man ofthe future. He is passe. He has become a liability for the Tamil cause. The sooner the Sri Lankan Tamils realise it, the better for them."
---------- Extract from my article of January 22,2007, titled LTTE AVOIDS BATTLE OF ATTRITION IN THE EAST available athttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers22/paper2105.html
------------------------------------------------------
The reports regarding the desperate plight of about 1,50,000 Sri Lankan Tamils caught up between an advancing Sri Lankan Army and aretreating Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the Wanni area of northern Sri Lanka are confusing.
2. Many have reportedly died and many, including many children, have been injured in the exchange of artillery fire between the two sides.In a situation like this, it is impossible to establish whose artillery killed whom. All one can say is that innocent civilians are paying a heavyprice for the heavy exchange of artillery.
3. The Sri Lankan Army is disinclined to agree to a ceasefire to let the civilians be evacuated by the International Committee of the RedCross (ICRC) lest the LTTE take advantage of it to regroup. The LTTE is disinclined to let the civilians move to the safety zones set up by theGovernment lest this facilitate the advance of the Army.
4. The international community, including the Government of India, are unable to effectively bring pressure on both sides to help out thecivilians. The Sri Lankan Army has estimated that it is only a few weeks away from totally eliminating the capability of the LTTE forconventional fighting and it is determined to achieve that objective even at the risk of some collateral damage to the civilians. The LTTE isafraid that if it lets the civilians go, it will have a face-to-face confrontation with the Army in which it is unlikely to do well.
5. Prabakaran, who is believed to be still commanding the retreating LTTE fighters, does not seem to realise that the chances of the LTTEstaging a spectacular come-back as it did in the 1990s and recaptured Kilinochchi and Mulaithivu are remote. The loss of control overterritory in the Northern Province is not so devastaing for him as the loss of control over the Tamil population in the Eastern Province. In thepast, many of the conventional fighters of the LTTE came from the Eastern Province and many of the terrorists from the Northern Province.It is no longer possible for him to get new recruits from the Eastern Province. The recent fighting in the North has indicated that the LTTE'sshortages in arm and ammunition and explosives are much more serious than originally estimated. With the rapidly decreasing possibility offinding replacement of human and material resources, his chances of staging a come-back conventionally are much less than what theywere in the 1990s.
6. The terrorist wing of the LTTE also seems to be facing severe problems due to a shortage of explosive material, a drop in volunteers forsuicide terrorism and the lack of time and space in the midst of a furious conventional war to motivate and train new volunteers and mountoperations.
7. The use of the civilians to avert an impending final defeat on the ground should be condemned by all the political parties in Tamil Nadu,by the Government of India and the international community. Prabakaran has been living in a world of illusions just as Hitler was in the final days of the defeat of the Nazi Army before he and his mistress committed suicide in a Berlin bunker to avoid being captured by theadvancing Soviet Army. Till he decided to kill himself, Hitler was fondly hoping that a reversal of fortunes was still possible.So too,Prabakaran seems to be having a fond hope that he and his men can stage a come-back even at this stage.
8. It is time for the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora to assert itself and call upon the LTTE cadres to overthrow Prabakaran and other leaders,arrest them, hand them over to the Sri Lankan authorities and proclaim a unilateral ceasefire. It is time for the diaspora to come to termswith the reality and act before more civilians are killed.If they fail to do so and continue to encourage Prabakaran in his irrational illusions,history will judge them harshly. ( 29-1-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, January 27, 2009
THE INVISIBLE HYPHENS IN OBAMA'S POLICY-MAKING
B.RAMAN
President Barack Obama has been in office hardly for a week now. It will be too early to expect a comprehensive security strategy in thePakistan-Afghanistan region to emerge from his administration. All one can say is that an exercise to evolve a strategy, which will beconsiderably different from that followed by George Bush, has been undertaken at various levels in the White House itself, in the NationalSecurity Council, in the State Department and in the Pentagon and that some Pakistani analysts such as Ahmed Rashid, the well-knownAfghan expert, are playing an active behind-the-scene role in this exercise There has been no involvement of any Indian analyst----eitherIndia or US based--- in this exercise. As a result, non-American inputs for this exercise have been coming largely from Pakistan.
2. On the basis of the initial comments of Obama himself, Vice-President Joe Biden, Richard Holbrooke, the newly-appointed SpecialRepresentative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and others, one could already make a reasonable assessment that certain aspects of thepolicy followed by the Bush Administration are unlikely to change and that certain other aspects are likely to change.
3. What are the aspects that are unlikely to change?
The US commitment to the war against the remnants of Al Qaeda operating from sanctuaries in the Pakistani territory till Al Qaeda ceases to be a threat to the security of the US homeland and US interests abroad. This commitment is expected to be reinforced with the induction of more US troops (an estimate given is about 30,000) into Afghanistan. The US is prepared to face the risk of increased American fatalities resulting from this surge.
The primacy given by the Bush administration to the military option will stay.Holbrooke has been quoted as saying on January 25,2009: " We plan to work closely with General Petraeus, Centcom, Admiral Mullen, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General McKiernan and the command in Afghanistan, to create a more coherent programme.”
The rules of engagement against suspected terrorists operating from the Pakistani territory as formulated by the Bush Administration will be adhered to. These rules provided for unilateral Predator (unmanned aircraft) strikes against suspected terrorist hide-outs in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan without prior intimation to Pakistan lest the information leak out. Such strikes in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) will be more an exception than the rule and will be avoided in Balochistan where the command and contreol of the Afghan Neo Taliban, headed by its Amir Mulla Mohammad Omar, is allegedly based. There has already been at least one--possibly two--- Predator strikes in Pakistani territory after Obama assumed office. The Bush policy of avoiding ground strikes in Pakistani territory unless there is specific intelligence about the presence of high-value targets such as Osama bin Laden himself and his No.2 Ayman al-Zawahiri will continue.
4. What are the aspects that could change as a result of the on-going exercise?
A greater priority to non-military aid to Pakistan than to military aid as was the case under Bush.
Linking all aid----whether military or non-military---- to Pakistan's performance in acting against Al Qaeda and the Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistani territory. In an article, which appeared in the "Foreign Affairs" magazine last year, Holbrooke said that the Obama Administration would face many tough challenges with regard to the war in Afghanistan and global peace, but the toughest was the insurgent sanctuaries in the tribal areas of Pakistan. There will, however, be no such linkage with the Pakistani action against anti-India terrorist sanctuaries such as those of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET, which was involved in the terrorist attack in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008. The pressure on Pakistan in respect of Al Qaeda and the Taliban will be diplomatic as well as punitive. There will be no punitive element in respect of the anti-India terrorist infrastructure.
A greater attention to the political dimensions of the security strategy than was given under the Bush Administration. While continuing to say that the US wants to strengthen democracy and improve governance in both Pakistan and Afgfhanistan, but has no interest in specific personalities, the Obama Administration will work discreetly to strengthen the position of Asif Ali Zardari in Pakistan and to have Hamid Karzai eased out-----if possible, before the Afghan Presidential elections due in October,2009, or at least during the elections. Obama's advisers are evidently worried that if Zardari is discredited and falls, his replacement may be either the army or Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League, who has been strongly critical of the US policies in the region. Obama and his advisers do not feel comfortable with either.Disappointment with the alleged unsatisfactory record of Karzai----without, however, namimg him--- whether in improving governance or security is evident in all statements on Afghanistan emanating from Obama and his entourage.
Giving a more strategic dimension to the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban than was done under the Bush Administration. It is in the context of this strategtic dimension that one has been seeing repeatedly comments from Obama and others about the need for a regional approach----whether in relation to the restoration of normalcy in Afghanistan or the fight against jihadi terrorism emanating from the Pakistani territory.
5. India comes into their policy calculations with regard to this regional approach. Pakistani analysts such as Ahmed Rashid have been ableto sell the idea to the advisers of Obama that a regional approach to the question of restoration of normalcy In Afghanistan would have toaddress the concerns of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment over what they view as the increasing Indian presence inAfghanistan. This presence is viewed by the military-intelligence establishment as detrimental to Pakistan's historic interests in Afghanistanand its internal security, particularly in Balochistan. Till 2004, the Bush Administration was attentive to Pakistani concerns and sought todiscourage an increase in the Indian presence in Afghanistan. Its policy changed thereafter due to the belief that greater interactionsbetween India and Afghanistan could contribute to the strengthening of democracy and governance in Afghanistan.
6. Similarly, analysts such as Ahmed Rashid have been able to convince Obama and his advisers that without a more active role by the US infacilitating a search for a solution to the Kashmir issue, there will be no incentive for Pakistan to act sincerely and effectively against theterrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory. The Bush Administratiion was disinclined to follow an activist policy on Kashmir and acceptedIndia's stand that it was a bilteral issue between India and Pakistan in which others should have no role. Obama and his advisers areprepared to revisit this policy, if not immediately, at a later date.
7. In response to Indian sensitivities, the announcement regarding the appointment of Holbrooke and his terms of reference have avoidedany reference to India or Kashmir. Despite this, it was clear from the confident remarks of Ahmed Rashid in his interview to Karan Thapartelecast by the CNBC-TV 18 TV channel on January 27,2009,that while Kashmir may not figures in his terms of reference just now, thequestion of addressing Pakistani concerns over India's relations with Afghanistan would be very much part of his agenda even though notopenly so stated. According to Ahmed Rashid, for this purpose Holbrooke will have to interact with India. There are wheels within wheelsand invisible hyphens within hyphens in the whole exercise relating to Obama's policy making on the security strategy in this region and theexpected role of Holbrooke in it.
8. It is important for India to make it clear to the Obama Administration at an appropriate stage that any departures from the past USpolicies on these two issues will have a negative impact on the growing strategic relationship between India and the US. A frank and firmexpression of the Indian views on this subject and a strict adherence to those views in our policy-making will be necessary not on the basisof what interested analysts such as Ahmed Rashid have been saying, but in response to any discreet pressures from the ObamaAdministration. (28-1-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
President Barack Obama has been in office hardly for a week now. It will be too early to expect a comprehensive security strategy in thePakistan-Afghanistan region to emerge from his administration. All one can say is that an exercise to evolve a strategy, which will beconsiderably different from that followed by George Bush, has been undertaken at various levels in the White House itself, in the NationalSecurity Council, in the State Department and in the Pentagon and that some Pakistani analysts such as Ahmed Rashid, the well-knownAfghan expert, are playing an active behind-the-scene role in this exercise There has been no involvement of any Indian analyst----eitherIndia or US based--- in this exercise. As a result, non-American inputs for this exercise have been coming largely from Pakistan.
2. On the basis of the initial comments of Obama himself, Vice-President Joe Biden, Richard Holbrooke, the newly-appointed SpecialRepresentative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and others, one could already make a reasonable assessment that certain aspects of thepolicy followed by the Bush Administration are unlikely to change and that certain other aspects are likely to change.
3. What are the aspects that are unlikely to change?
The US commitment to the war against the remnants of Al Qaeda operating from sanctuaries in the Pakistani territory till Al Qaeda ceases to be a threat to the security of the US homeland and US interests abroad. This commitment is expected to be reinforced with the induction of more US troops (an estimate given is about 30,000) into Afghanistan. The US is prepared to face the risk of increased American fatalities resulting from this surge.
The primacy given by the Bush administration to the military option will stay.Holbrooke has been quoted as saying on January 25,2009: " We plan to work closely with General Petraeus, Centcom, Admiral Mullen, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General McKiernan and the command in Afghanistan, to create a more coherent programme.”
The rules of engagement against suspected terrorists operating from the Pakistani territory as formulated by the Bush Administration will be adhered to. These rules provided for unilateral Predator (unmanned aircraft) strikes against suspected terrorist hide-outs in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan without prior intimation to Pakistan lest the information leak out. Such strikes in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) will be more an exception than the rule and will be avoided in Balochistan where the command and contreol of the Afghan Neo Taliban, headed by its Amir Mulla Mohammad Omar, is allegedly based. There has already been at least one--possibly two--- Predator strikes in Pakistani territory after Obama assumed office. The Bush policy of avoiding ground strikes in Pakistani territory unless there is specific intelligence about the presence of high-value targets such as Osama bin Laden himself and his No.2 Ayman al-Zawahiri will continue.
4. What are the aspects that could change as a result of the on-going exercise?
A greater priority to non-military aid to Pakistan than to military aid as was the case under Bush.
Linking all aid----whether military or non-military---- to Pakistan's performance in acting against Al Qaeda and the Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistani territory. In an article, which appeared in the "Foreign Affairs" magazine last year, Holbrooke said that the Obama Administration would face many tough challenges with regard to the war in Afghanistan and global peace, but the toughest was the insurgent sanctuaries in the tribal areas of Pakistan. There will, however, be no such linkage with the Pakistani action against anti-India terrorist sanctuaries such as those of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET, which was involved in the terrorist attack in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008. The pressure on Pakistan in respect of Al Qaeda and the Taliban will be diplomatic as well as punitive. There will be no punitive element in respect of the anti-India terrorist infrastructure.
A greater attention to the political dimensions of the security strategy than was given under the Bush Administration. While continuing to say that the US wants to strengthen democracy and improve governance in both Pakistan and Afgfhanistan, but has no interest in specific personalities, the Obama Administration will work discreetly to strengthen the position of Asif Ali Zardari in Pakistan and to have Hamid Karzai eased out-----if possible, before the Afghan Presidential elections due in October,2009, or at least during the elections. Obama's advisers are evidently worried that if Zardari is discredited and falls, his replacement may be either the army or Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League, who has been strongly critical of the US policies in the region. Obama and his advisers do not feel comfortable with either.Disappointment with the alleged unsatisfactory record of Karzai----without, however, namimg him--- whether in improving governance or security is evident in all statements on Afghanistan emanating from Obama and his entourage.
Giving a more strategic dimension to the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban than was done under the Bush Administration. It is in the context of this strategtic dimension that one has been seeing repeatedly comments from Obama and others about the need for a regional approach----whether in relation to the restoration of normalcy in Afghanistan or the fight against jihadi terrorism emanating from the Pakistani territory.
5. India comes into their policy calculations with regard to this regional approach. Pakistani analysts such as Ahmed Rashid have been ableto sell the idea to the advisers of Obama that a regional approach to the question of restoration of normalcy In Afghanistan would have toaddress the concerns of the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment over what they view as the increasing Indian presence inAfghanistan. This presence is viewed by the military-intelligence establishment as detrimental to Pakistan's historic interests in Afghanistanand its internal security, particularly in Balochistan. Till 2004, the Bush Administration was attentive to Pakistani concerns and sought todiscourage an increase in the Indian presence in Afghanistan. Its policy changed thereafter due to the belief that greater interactionsbetween India and Afghanistan could contribute to the strengthening of democracy and governance in Afghanistan.
6. Similarly, analysts such as Ahmed Rashid have been able to convince Obama and his advisers that without a more active role by the US infacilitating a search for a solution to the Kashmir issue, there will be no incentive for Pakistan to act sincerely and effectively against theterrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory. The Bush Administratiion was disinclined to follow an activist policy on Kashmir and acceptedIndia's stand that it was a bilteral issue between India and Pakistan in which others should have no role. Obama and his advisers areprepared to revisit this policy, if not immediately, at a later date.
7. In response to Indian sensitivities, the announcement regarding the appointment of Holbrooke and his terms of reference have avoidedany reference to India or Kashmir. Despite this, it was clear from the confident remarks of Ahmed Rashid in his interview to Karan Thapartelecast by the CNBC-TV 18 TV channel on January 27,2009,that while Kashmir may not figures in his terms of reference just now, thequestion of addressing Pakistani concerns over India's relations with Afghanistan would be very much part of his agenda even though notopenly so stated. According to Ahmed Rashid, for this purpose Holbrooke will have to interact with India. There are wheels within wheelsand invisible hyphens within hyphens in the whole exercise relating to Obama's policy making on the security strategy in this region and theexpected role of Holbrooke in it.
8. It is important for India to make it clear to the Obama Administration at an appropriate stage that any departures from the past USpolicies on these two issues will have a negative impact on the growing strategic relationship between India and the US. A frank and firmexpression of the Indian views on this subject and a strict adherence to those views in our policy-making will be necessary not on the basisof what interested analysts such as Ahmed Rashid have been saying, but in response to any discreet pressures from the ObamaAdministration. (28-1-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, January 26, 2009
INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS AFTER 26/11
B.RAMAN
(Written exclusively for the journal of the Elcano Institute of Madrid at their request. Cannot be reproduced until their journal carries it )
THEME: Prospects for Indo-Pakistan relations after the terrorist attack in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008.
SUMMARY: The terrorist attack in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, has caused renewed tensions in Indo-Pakistan relations. While fears of a military confrontation have subsided, the bilateral dialogue on various political and economic issues is in a state of suspension. A return to the pre-November 26 civility in bilateral relations and a resumption of the dialogue could be delayed by the temporary absence of India’s Prime Minister, Dr.Manmohan Singh, from his duties due to a cardiac surgery and the forthcoming elections to the Lok Sabha, the lower House of the Indian Parliament, which have to be held by April,2009. If there is another terrorist attack from Pakistani territory, the possibility of India exercising a military strike against the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory will increase. The revival of the unwise talk in the West about a linkage between terrorism against India and Kashmir has created a dangerous impression in the minds of the Pakistani military leadership that the use of terrorism has started paying results. This impression could come in the way of Pakistan sincerely acting against the terrorists. Therein lies the danger of a future military conflict between the two countries on the issue of terrorism. If that happens, the West will be largely to blame for creating such an impression in the minds of the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment.
ANALYSIS: 138 Indian nationals and 25 foreigners----nine of them Jewish persons from Israel and the US---- were killed when 10 Pakistani nationals belonging to a Pakistani jihadi organization called the Lashkar-e-Toiba (Army of the Pure) , who had clandestinely traveled by sea from Karachi without being intercepted by the Indian Navy and Coast Guard, landed in Mumbai, split into four groups and spread death and destruction in the sea front area of Mumbai for about 60 hours from the night of November 26,2008, till the morning of November 29, 2008.
Five of the fatalities were caused by explosives and the remaining 158 by hand-held weapons (assault rifles and hand-grenades). This was the third act of mass casualty terrorism with fatalities of over 150 in the Indian territory outside Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) since jihadi terrorism made its appearance in India in 1989. All the three were committed in Mumbai, which is the financial capital of India. It is also the corporate capital of India with many of the Indian and foreign corporate houses having their headquarters in Mumbai. In the first act in March,1993, a group of Indian Muslims trained and armed by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) carried out a series of timed explosions against a number of economic targets and killed 257 civilians. In the second incident in July,2006, 181 commuters and others were killed when a mixed group of Indian and Pakistani Muslims trained and armed by the LET in Pakistani territory carried out a series of explosions in suburban trains.
The November 26, 2008, attack differed from the earlier mass casualty attacks in some important aspects. Firstly, 158 out of the 163 fatalities were caused by hand-held weapons. Explosives played a minor role in the attack. Secondly, the terrorists attacked a mix of targets---- ordinary people in public places such as a railway terminus, a hospital, a restaurant, a café etc and the affluent social and business elite ---Indians as well as foreigners--- in two principal hotels of Mumbai , namely, the Taj Mahal and the Oberoi/Trident hotels and in a Jewish religious-cum-cultural centre located in a building called the Nariman House. Thirdly, they killed a selected group of foreigners---- nine from Israel and 12 from the US and other Western countries who had contributed troops to the NATO contingent in Afghanistan. The other four were from South-East Asian countries. Fourthly, it was not a classical case of hostage-taking. They were not interested in using the hostages for achieving any demands. Their interest was in a prolonged armed confrontation with the security forces, which would get them publicity. Fifthly, all the 10 perpetrators were Pakistanis specially recruited and trained by the LET in camps in Pakistani territory. Sixthly, it was a case of suicidal terrorism similar to what one had witnessed during the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13,2001. Nine of the terrorists died in the confrontation with the security forces. One ----Ajmal Amir Kasab---was caught alive.
The terrorists had a mix of motives. They wanted to weaken the credibility of the Indian counter-terrorism machinery in the eyes of the Indian public as well as the foreigners. They wanted to shake the confidence of the foreign business community in the ability of the Indian State to protect the lives and property of foreign business people and thereby retard the rise of India as a major economic power. They wanted to punish Israel and the US for their developing strategic relations with India. They wanted to retaliate against Western nations contributing troops to the NATO contingent in Afghanistan. Neither the Kashmir issue nor the grievances of the Indian Muslims against the Government of India had motivated the terrorist strike as it had in the earlier two instances of mass casualty terrorism, in which the anger of sections of the Indian Muslim youth against the Government of India for various reasons was the dominant motive.
The successful terrorist strike was a major political embarrassment for the Government of India. It came after four other major terrorist strikes with timed explosions in public places, which had taken place during 2008 in Jaipur (May,2008), Bangalore (July,2008), Ahmedabad (July,2008) and Delhi (September,2008). The perpetrators in these four attacks were young Indian Muslims, who projected themselves as belonging to an organization called the Indian Mujahideen. They denied they had any links either with Pakistan’s ISI or with any of the jihadi organizations based in Pakistan. Many of those involved in the explosions had studied in secular educational institutions. Three of them were experts in information technology, with one of them occupying a well-paid position in the Indian office of an American IT company. These explosions caused considerable anger against the Government of India for following what was perceived as a soft counter-terrorism strategy marked by a reluctance to act against Muslims involved in terrorism because of what is called in India as the “vote bank politics”. There are over 160 million Muslims in India and their votes are important in certain States----particularly in North India.
It was alleged that electoral calculations came in the way of the Government of India following a stronger policy towards jihadi terrorism by giving the police the additional powers that they needed and setting up a central agency for a co-ordinated investigation of terrorist attacks. However, these explosions did not cause any undue public anger against Pakistan because there was no involvement of any Pakistani national and there was no reason to suspect the involvement of the ISI.
As against this, the Mumbai terrorist attack of 26/11 caused an outburst of public anger against the Government of India as well as against Pakistan. The public anger against the Government of India was because of its failure to revamp the counter-terrorism machinery. There was a colossal failure of physical and coastal security in Mumbai despite the reports received from the Indian and American intelligence in September,2008, about the plans of the LET to launch a sea-borne terrorist attack on some hotels on the Mumbai sea front. The Taj Mahal Hotel was specifically mentioned in these reports as one of the likely targets of the terrorists. The public anger against the Government of India was also due to its perceived failure to put a stop to the ISI’s use of terrorism as a weapon against India for achieving Pakistan’s strategic objectives.
Pakistan’s strategic objectives have been three in number. Firstly, to change the status quo in J&K and force the Government of India to reach a compromise with Pakistan which will concede at least part of the territory to Pakistan. Secondly, to hinder the emergence of India as a major power of the Asian region on par with China. This is an objective which Pakistan and China share. Thirdly, to disrupt the growing strategic relationship of India with the US and Israel. While China has no reasons to be worried over India’s relations with Israel, it is concerned over the growing military--military co-operation between India and the US-----particularly over the co-operation between the two navies and their joint exercises in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. It suspects that this Indo-US co-operation is directed at containing the Chinese naval power.
The public anger against the Government of India and Pakistan after the Mumbai attack was unprecedented. One had not seen such anger even after the attempted terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament House in New Delhi on December 13,2001 by some terrorists belonging to the LET and another Pakistani jihadi terrorist organization called the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). This unprecedented public anger was due to the fact that the terrorists of the LET targeted at Mumbai the cream of the cream of India’s business and social elite. In the past, large sections of this elite used to exercise restraint on Government’s policies towards Pakistan and advocated confidence-building measures and more people-to-people contacts. They were outraged that despite their past benign role towards Pakistan, they should have been targeted and attacked by the terrorists.
Mumbai contributes a substantial share of the tax revenue of the Government of India. It also contributes a substantial portion of the advertisement revenue of the Indian media, particularly the privately-owned electronic media. Influential sections of the media were in the forefront of those demanding immediate action to empower the intelligence agencies and the police to deal more effectively with jihadi terrorism and to counter Pakistan’s continued use of terrorism against India. Many so-called doves of the past became hawks with regard to Pakistan post-26/11.
Faced with this unprecedented anger, the Government of India could not but act. Shivraj Patil, who was the Minister in charge of the Home Ministry, which is responsible, inter alia, for counter-terrorism, resigned in response to public demands for action against him. Legislation was passed post-hate by the Parliament with the support of most political parties to give additional powers to the Police and to create a national investigation agency. Other action was initiated by P.Chidambaram, the new Home Minister, to revamp the counter-terrorism machinery. The Navy and the Coast Guard were ordered to strengthen coastal security in the waters to the West of India which had remained relatively neglected till recently because of the Indian Navy’s over-focus on the waters to the East of India because of the China factor and the opportunity it provided for power-projection in the friendly South-East Asian region.
In response to the demand not only from large sections of the public but also from influential sections of the media for action against Pakistan, the Government adopted a nuanced policy. While dangling the Damocle’s sword of military strikes against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory through repeated statements by Pranab Mukherjee, India’s Minister for External Affairs, that “all options are open”, it avoided the actual mobilization of the armed forces on the ground and their deployment on the border with Pakistan as the predecessor Government of Atal Behari Vajpayee had done in 2002 after the attempted attack on the Indian Parliament. It froze the bilateral dialogue process on various issues, including Kashmir, without officially abandoning it, thereby keeping open the possibility of reviving it at a later date if Pakistan satisfied India’s demands. It stepped up diplomatic pressure on Pakistan----directly as well as through the US and other Western supporters of Pakistan--- to act as demanded by India.
India’s demands have been three in number. First, the arrest and handing over to India of the Pakistan-based operatives of the LET who have been named by the lone terrorist survivor as the brains behind the terrorist attack. Second, the dismantling of the anti-India terrorist infrastructure of the LET and other Pakistani jihadi organizations in Pakistani territory. Third, it also revived a long-pending demand for the arrest and handing over of 20 other suspects---- Indians as well as Pakistanis, Muslims as well as Sikhs---- wanted for prosecution in India on charges of terrorism.
Since the Mumbai attack lasted about 60 hours and targeted not only Indian nationals, but also nationals of Israel, the US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Australia , the intelligence agencies of Israel, the US and the UK had also been closely monitoring the conversations of the terrorists over mobile phone with their headquarters in Pakistan. Moreover, even before 26/11, the US intelligence, at the same time as the Indian intelligence, had collected advance intelligence about the plans of the Pakistan-based LET to launch a sea-borne attack on some hotels in Mumbai. Thus, all these intelligence agencies independently of their Indian counterparts had collected intelligence which convinced them that the attack was made by 10 Pakistani terrorists of the LET, who had traveled to Mumbai by sea. They also had a lot of intelligence in their archives, which showed that the ISI had been using since 1993 the LET against India. However, they were not prepared to accept the Indian allegation that the 26/11 attack was masterminded by the ISI. They continue to insist that they have seen no evidence to show that the ISI was behind the attack, as alleged by India.
The Western approach has been to continue exercising pressure on Pakistan to arrest those involved in Pakistani territory and either hand them over to India or prosecute them before a Pakistani court and to dismantle the anti-India terrorist infrastructure. Initially, Pakistan totally denied the involvement of any Pakistani national or organization. Now, under sustained US pressure, it has admitted that the terrorist caught alive by the Mumbai police is a Pakistani national. It has set up a team of three senior officers of its Federal Investigation Agency to enquire into Indian allegations of the involvement of the LET and has promised to prosecute before its courts anyone found involved. How sincerely it will carry out this promise remains to be seen.
In response to a post-26/11 resolution of the UN Security Council’s Anti-Terrorism committee declaring the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the Pakistan-based political wing of the LET, and some of its leaders as involved in terrorism, it has placed the leaders under house arrest and has claimed to have closed down some of their training camps and taken over the management of the madrasas and medical centres run by the JUD at its headquarters at Muridke, near Lahore. How far this is true remains to be seen.
China’s attitude in respect of Pakistani use of terrorism against India has always been marked by double standards. It has consistently refused to admit that there has been any terrorism in J&K. It shares Pakistan’s description of the terrorism in J&K as a freedom struggle. It does accept that some jihadi groups have been indulging in acts of terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K. At the same time, it is not prepared to accept that Pakistan-based organizations are involved in these acts.
The resolution for declaring the JUD as a terrorist organization and some of its leaders as international terrorists was repeatedly coming up before the committee of the UNSC since April, 2006. The resolution on this subject failed to obtain a consensus thrice due to opposition from China, which accepted the Pakistani claim that the JUD was a charitable and not a terrorist organization. Only after 26/11, it joined the consensus in declaring the JUD as a terrorist organization. That too only after Pakistan had told Beijing that it would have no objection to the resolution being passed. But, even now, China has not come out in support of the Indian demand for action against the Pakistani nationals involved in 26/11 and dismantling the anti-India terrorist infrastructure.
The uncertainty and concern over the possible Chinese attitude in the event of India launching military strikes against the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory is one of the factors coming in the way of a military strike by India. China has a long-pending claim to the Tawang area of Arunachal Pradesh in India’s North-East adjoining the Tibetan border. The border negotiations between the two countries have not made any progress because of the Chinese refusal to give up their claim to the Tawang Tract. There is reason to fear that if India is engaged in a military conflict with Pakistan, the Chinese might take advantage of it to occupy Tawang.
Immediately after the 26/11 attack, the West was totally behind India. Pakistan stood isolated. But, through skilful diplomacy, it has managed to come out of this isolation by projecting itself as willing to undertake a thorough investigation of the Indian allegations and prosecute those found guilty and by once again selling to the West its idea that any enduring end to terrorism will not be possible without addressing the Kashmir issue.
Even before 26/11, President Barack Obama and his advisers were expressing the view that the Kashmir question has to be addressed as part of a regional approach to the threat from jihadi terrorism in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region. During his recent visit to India and Pakistan in the middle of January, David Miliband, the British Foreign Secretary, spoke of the linkage between Kashmir and the activities of the LET. India has indignantly denied any such linkage and pointed out that the terrorists, who attacked Mumbai, had nothing to do with Kashmir. Their objectives were more global than sub-continental and directed against Israel, the US and the rest of the West.
CONCLUSION: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has skillfully handled the wave of public anger against his own Government for inaction and against Pakistan for using terrorism against India. He has undertaken measures for strengthening the counter-terrorism machinery, which he had been avoiding till now out of electoral considerations. He and his new Home Minister P.Chidambaram have been projecting these measures as directed against terrorism and not against the Muslim community. In response to the public clamour for action against Pakistan, his Government through Pranab Mukherjee, his Minister for External Affairs, has mounted a diplomatic drive to force Pakistan to act against those involved in planning and carrying out the attack and against their terrorist infrastructure. While proclaiming that his Government was prepared to consider any option if Pakistan does not act, he has avoided the military option. He has not allowed the public clamour for a military strike against Pakistan to hustle him into taking the military option. While freezing the bilateral dialogue process, he has avoided a rupture of the normal diplomatic and economic relations with Pakistan. He was admitted into hospital on January 23,2009, for undergoing a cardiac surgery. The surgery, which has been successful, will keep him out of action for about two to three weeks. No major development in Indo-Pakistan relations is expected during this period.
After he resumes normal duties, he is expected to be preoccupied with the forthcoming elections to the Parliament. He would not like to give the opposition parties an opportunity to project him as weak in dealing with Pakistan. He is, therefore, expected to continue his present policy of a dialogue freeze and stepped up political and diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to make it act against the terrorists. If the coalition led by his Congress (I) returns to power and if there is no more major act of terrorism from Pakistani territory, one could see the beginning of a thaw after the elections. However, if the opposition coalition led by the hardline Bharatiya Janata Party returns to power, one could find the present tensions escalating further and the possibility of a military strike against the terrorist infrastructure in the Pakistani territory increasing. The public clamour for action against Pakistan has subsided. It could revive if Pakistan fails to act against the terrorists. If there is another major attack from Pakistani territory, renewed public pressure might leave the Government with no other option but to act against Pakistan----whichever party may be in power.
The revival of the unwise talk in the West about a linkage between terrorism against India and Kashmir has created a dangerous impression in the minds of the Pakistani military leadership and the ISI that the use of terrorism has started paying results. This impression could come in the way of Pakistan sincerely acting against the terrorists. Therein lies the danger of a future military conflict between the two countries on the issue of terrorism. If that happens, the West will be largely to blame for creating such an impression in the minds of the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment. (3500 words)
( The writer had served in the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), India’s external intelligence Agency, since 1968 and had headed its counter-terrorism division for six years before retiring in August,1994. He was a member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) of the Government of India from 2000 to 2002. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
(Written exclusively for the journal of the Elcano Institute of Madrid at their request. Cannot be reproduced until their journal carries it )
THEME: Prospects for Indo-Pakistan relations after the terrorist attack in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008.
SUMMARY: The terrorist attack in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, has caused renewed tensions in Indo-Pakistan relations. While fears of a military confrontation have subsided, the bilateral dialogue on various political and economic issues is in a state of suspension. A return to the pre-November 26 civility in bilateral relations and a resumption of the dialogue could be delayed by the temporary absence of India’s Prime Minister, Dr.Manmohan Singh, from his duties due to a cardiac surgery and the forthcoming elections to the Lok Sabha, the lower House of the Indian Parliament, which have to be held by April,2009. If there is another terrorist attack from Pakistani territory, the possibility of India exercising a military strike against the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory will increase. The revival of the unwise talk in the West about a linkage between terrorism against India and Kashmir has created a dangerous impression in the minds of the Pakistani military leadership that the use of terrorism has started paying results. This impression could come in the way of Pakistan sincerely acting against the terrorists. Therein lies the danger of a future military conflict between the two countries on the issue of terrorism. If that happens, the West will be largely to blame for creating such an impression in the minds of the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment.
ANALYSIS: 138 Indian nationals and 25 foreigners----nine of them Jewish persons from Israel and the US---- were killed when 10 Pakistani nationals belonging to a Pakistani jihadi organization called the Lashkar-e-Toiba (Army of the Pure) , who had clandestinely traveled by sea from Karachi without being intercepted by the Indian Navy and Coast Guard, landed in Mumbai, split into four groups and spread death and destruction in the sea front area of Mumbai for about 60 hours from the night of November 26,2008, till the morning of November 29, 2008.
Five of the fatalities were caused by explosives and the remaining 158 by hand-held weapons (assault rifles and hand-grenades). This was the third act of mass casualty terrorism with fatalities of over 150 in the Indian territory outside Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) since jihadi terrorism made its appearance in India in 1989. All the three were committed in Mumbai, which is the financial capital of India. It is also the corporate capital of India with many of the Indian and foreign corporate houses having their headquarters in Mumbai. In the first act in March,1993, a group of Indian Muslims trained and armed by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) carried out a series of timed explosions against a number of economic targets and killed 257 civilians. In the second incident in July,2006, 181 commuters and others were killed when a mixed group of Indian and Pakistani Muslims trained and armed by the LET in Pakistani territory carried out a series of explosions in suburban trains.
The November 26, 2008, attack differed from the earlier mass casualty attacks in some important aspects. Firstly, 158 out of the 163 fatalities were caused by hand-held weapons. Explosives played a minor role in the attack. Secondly, the terrorists attacked a mix of targets---- ordinary people in public places such as a railway terminus, a hospital, a restaurant, a café etc and the affluent social and business elite ---Indians as well as foreigners--- in two principal hotels of Mumbai , namely, the Taj Mahal and the Oberoi/Trident hotels and in a Jewish religious-cum-cultural centre located in a building called the Nariman House. Thirdly, they killed a selected group of foreigners---- nine from Israel and 12 from the US and other Western countries who had contributed troops to the NATO contingent in Afghanistan. The other four were from South-East Asian countries. Fourthly, it was not a classical case of hostage-taking. They were not interested in using the hostages for achieving any demands. Their interest was in a prolonged armed confrontation with the security forces, which would get them publicity. Fifthly, all the 10 perpetrators were Pakistanis specially recruited and trained by the LET in camps in Pakistani territory. Sixthly, it was a case of suicidal terrorism similar to what one had witnessed during the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13,2001. Nine of the terrorists died in the confrontation with the security forces. One ----Ajmal Amir Kasab---was caught alive.
The terrorists had a mix of motives. They wanted to weaken the credibility of the Indian counter-terrorism machinery in the eyes of the Indian public as well as the foreigners. They wanted to shake the confidence of the foreign business community in the ability of the Indian State to protect the lives and property of foreign business people and thereby retard the rise of India as a major economic power. They wanted to punish Israel and the US for their developing strategic relations with India. They wanted to retaliate against Western nations contributing troops to the NATO contingent in Afghanistan. Neither the Kashmir issue nor the grievances of the Indian Muslims against the Government of India had motivated the terrorist strike as it had in the earlier two instances of mass casualty terrorism, in which the anger of sections of the Indian Muslim youth against the Government of India for various reasons was the dominant motive.
The successful terrorist strike was a major political embarrassment for the Government of India. It came after four other major terrorist strikes with timed explosions in public places, which had taken place during 2008 in Jaipur (May,2008), Bangalore (July,2008), Ahmedabad (July,2008) and Delhi (September,2008). The perpetrators in these four attacks were young Indian Muslims, who projected themselves as belonging to an organization called the Indian Mujahideen. They denied they had any links either with Pakistan’s ISI or with any of the jihadi organizations based in Pakistan. Many of those involved in the explosions had studied in secular educational institutions. Three of them were experts in information technology, with one of them occupying a well-paid position in the Indian office of an American IT company. These explosions caused considerable anger against the Government of India for following what was perceived as a soft counter-terrorism strategy marked by a reluctance to act against Muslims involved in terrorism because of what is called in India as the “vote bank politics”. There are over 160 million Muslims in India and their votes are important in certain States----particularly in North India.
It was alleged that electoral calculations came in the way of the Government of India following a stronger policy towards jihadi terrorism by giving the police the additional powers that they needed and setting up a central agency for a co-ordinated investigation of terrorist attacks. However, these explosions did not cause any undue public anger against Pakistan because there was no involvement of any Pakistani national and there was no reason to suspect the involvement of the ISI.
As against this, the Mumbai terrorist attack of 26/11 caused an outburst of public anger against the Government of India as well as against Pakistan. The public anger against the Government of India was because of its failure to revamp the counter-terrorism machinery. There was a colossal failure of physical and coastal security in Mumbai despite the reports received from the Indian and American intelligence in September,2008, about the plans of the LET to launch a sea-borne terrorist attack on some hotels on the Mumbai sea front. The Taj Mahal Hotel was specifically mentioned in these reports as one of the likely targets of the terrorists. The public anger against the Government of India was also due to its perceived failure to put a stop to the ISI’s use of terrorism as a weapon against India for achieving Pakistan’s strategic objectives.
Pakistan’s strategic objectives have been three in number. Firstly, to change the status quo in J&K and force the Government of India to reach a compromise with Pakistan which will concede at least part of the territory to Pakistan. Secondly, to hinder the emergence of India as a major power of the Asian region on par with China. This is an objective which Pakistan and China share. Thirdly, to disrupt the growing strategic relationship of India with the US and Israel. While China has no reasons to be worried over India’s relations with Israel, it is concerned over the growing military--military co-operation between India and the US-----particularly over the co-operation between the two navies and their joint exercises in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. It suspects that this Indo-US co-operation is directed at containing the Chinese naval power.
The public anger against the Government of India and Pakistan after the Mumbai attack was unprecedented. One had not seen such anger even after the attempted terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament House in New Delhi on December 13,2001 by some terrorists belonging to the LET and another Pakistani jihadi terrorist organization called the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). This unprecedented public anger was due to the fact that the terrorists of the LET targeted at Mumbai the cream of the cream of India’s business and social elite. In the past, large sections of this elite used to exercise restraint on Government’s policies towards Pakistan and advocated confidence-building measures and more people-to-people contacts. They were outraged that despite their past benign role towards Pakistan, they should have been targeted and attacked by the terrorists.
Mumbai contributes a substantial share of the tax revenue of the Government of India. It also contributes a substantial portion of the advertisement revenue of the Indian media, particularly the privately-owned electronic media. Influential sections of the media were in the forefront of those demanding immediate action to empower the intelligence agencies and the police to deal more effectively with jihadi terrorism and to counter Pakistan’s continued use of terrorism against India. Many so-called doves of the past became hawks with regard to Pakistan post-26/11.
Faced with this unprecedented anger, the Government of India could not but act. Shivraj Patil, who was the Minister in charge of the Home Ministry, which is responsible, inter alia, for counter-terrorism, resigned in response to public demands for action against him. Legislation was passed post-hate by the Parliament with the support of most political parties to give additional powers to the Police and to create a national investigation agency. Other action was initiated by P.Chidambaram, the new Home Minister, to revamp the counter-terrorism machinery. The Navy and the Coast Guard were ordered to strengthen coastal security in the waters to the West of India which had remained relatively neglected till recently because of the Indian Navy’s over-focus on the waters to the East of India because of the China factor and the opportunity it provided for power-projection in the friendly South-East Asian region.
In response to the demand not only from large sections of the public but also from influential sections of the media for action against Pakistan, the Government adopted a nuanced policy. While dangling the Damocle’s sword of military strikes against the anti-India terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory through repeated statements by Pranab Mukherjee, India’s Minister for External Affairs, that “all options are open”, it avoided the actual mobilization of the armed forces on the ground and their deployment on the border with Pakistan as the predecessor Government of Atal Behari Vajpayee had done in 2002 after the attempted attack on the Indian Parliament. It froze the bilateral dialogue process on various issues, including Kashmir, without officially abandoning it, thereby keeping open the possibility of reviving it at a later date if Pakistan satisfied India’s demands. It stepped up diplomatic pressure on Pakistan----directly as well as through the US and other Western supporters of Pakistan--- to act as demanded by India.
India’s demands have been three in number. First, the arrest and handing over to India of the Pakistan-based operatives of the LET who have been named by the lone terrorist survivor as the brains behind the terrorist attack. Second, the dismantling of the anti-India terrorist infrastructure of the LET and other Pakistani jihadi organizations in Pakistani territory. Third, it also revived a long-pending demand for the arrest and handing over of 20 other suspects---- Indians as well as Pakistanis, Muslims as well as Sikhs---- wanted for prosecution in India on charges of terrorism.
Since the Mumbai attack lasted about 60 hours and targeted not only Indian nationals, but also nationals of Israel, the US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Australia , the intelligence agencies of Israel, the US and the UK had also been closely monitoring the conversations of the terrorists over mobile phone with their headquarters in Pakistan. Moreover, even before 26/11, the US intelligence, at the same time as the Indian intelligence, had collected advance intelligence about the plans of the Pakistan-based LET to launch a sea-borne attack on some hotels in Mumbai. Thus, all these intelligence agencies independently of their Indian counterparts had collected intelligence which convinced them that the attack was made by 10 Pakistani terrorists of the LET, who had traveled to Mumbai by sea. They also had a lot of intelligence in their archives, which showed that the ISI had been using since 1993 the LET against India. However, they were not prepared to accept the Indian allegation that the 26/11 attack was masterminded by the ISI. They continue to insist that they have seen no evidence to show that the ISI was behind the attack, as alleged by India.
The Western approach has been to continue exercising pressure on Pakistan to arrest those involved in Pakistani territory and either hand them over to India or prosecute them before a Pakistani court and to dismantle the anti-India terrorist infrastructure. Initially, Pakistan totally denied the involvement of any Pakistani national or organization. Now, under sustained US pressure, it has admitted that the terrorist caught alive by the Mumbai police is a Pakistani national. It has set up a team of three senior officers of its Federal Investigation Agency to enquire into Indian allegations of the involvement of the LET and has promised to prosecute before its courts anyone found involved. How sincerely it will carry out this promise remains to be seen.
In response to a post-26/11 resolution of the UN Security Council’s Anti-Terrorism committee declaring the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the Pakistan-based political wing of the LET, and some of its leaders as involved in terrorism, it has placed the leaders under house arrest and has claimed to have closed down some of their training camps and taken over the management of the madrasas and medical centres run by the JUD at its headquarters at Muridke, near Lahore. How far this is true remains to be seen.
China’s attitude in respect of Pakistani use of terrorism against India has always been marked by double standards. It has consistently refused to admit that there has been any terrorism in J&K. It shares Pakistan’s description of the terrorism in J&K as a freedom struggle. It does accept that some jihadi groups have been indulging in acts of terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K. At the same time, it is not prepared to accept that Pakistan-based organizations are involved in these acts.
The resolution for declaring the JUD as a terrorist organization and some of its leaders as international terrorists was repeatedly coming up before the committee of the UNSC since April, 2006. The resolution on this subject failed to obtain a consensus thrice due to opposition from China, which accepted the Pakistani claim that the JUD was a charitable and not a terrorist organization. Only after 26/11, it joined the consensus in declaring the JUD as a terrorist organization. That too only after Pakistan had told Beijing that it would have no objection to the resolution being passed. But, even now, China has not come out in support of the Indian demand for action against the Pakistani nationals involved in 26/11 and dismantling the anti-India terrorist infrastructure.
The uncertainty and concern over the possible Chinese attitude in the event of India launching military strikes against the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory is one of the factors coming in the way of a military strike by India. China has a long-pending claim to the Tawang area of Arunachal Pradesh in India’s North-East adjoining the Tibetan border. The border negotiations between the two countries have not made any progress because of the Chinese refusal to give up their claim to the Tawang Tract. There is reason to fear that if India is engaged in a military conflict with Pakistan, the Chinese might take advantage of it to occupy Tawang.
Immediately after the 26/11 attack, the West was totally behind India. Pakistan stood isolated. But, through skilful diplomacy, it has managed to come out of this isolation by projecting itself as willing to undertake a thorough investigation of the Indian allegations and prosecute those found guilty and by once again selling to the West its idea that any enduring end to terrorism will not be possible without addressing the Kashmir issue.
Even before 26/11, President Barack Obama and his advisers were expressing the view that the Kashmir question has to be addressed as part of a regional approach to the threat from jihadi terrorism in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region. During his recent visit to India and Pakistan in the middle of January, David Miliband, the British Foreign Secretary, spoke of the linkage between Kashmir and the activities of the LET. India has indignantly denied any such linkage and pointed out that the terrorists, who attacked Mumbai, had nothing to do with Kashmir. Their objectives were more global than sub-continental and directed against Israel, the US and the rest of the West.
CONCLUSION: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has skillfully handled the wave of public anger against his own Government for inaction and against Pakistan for using terrorism against India. He has undertaken measures for strengthening the counter-terrorism machinery, which he had been avoiding till now out of electoral considerations. He and his new Home Minister P.Chidambaram have been projecting these measures as directed against terrorism and not against the Muslim community. In response to the public clamour for action against Pakistan, his Government through Pranab Mukherjee, his Minister for External Affairs, has mounted a diplomatic drive to force Pakistan to act against those involved in planning and carrying out the attack and against their terrorist infrastructure. While proclaiming that his Government was prepared to consider any option if Pakistan does not act, he has avoided the military option. He has not allowed the public clamour for a military strike against Pakistan to hustle him into taking the military option. While freezing the bilateral dialogue process, he has avoided a rupture of the normal diplomatic and economic relations with Pakistan. He was admitted into hospital on January 23,2009, for undergoing a cardiac surgery. The surgery, which has been successful, will keep him out of action for about two to three weeks. No major development in Indo-Pakistan relations is expected during this period.
After he resumes normal duties, he is expected to be preoccupied with the forthcoming elections to the Parliament. He would not like to give the opposition parties an opportunity to project him as weak in dealing with Pakistan. He is, therefore, expected to continue his present policy of a dialogue freeze and stepped up political and diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to make it act against the terrorists. If the coalition led by his Congress (I) returns to power and if there is no more major act of terrorism from Pakistani territory, one could see the beginning of a thaw after the elections. However, if the opposition coalition led by the hardline Bharatiya Janata Party returns to power, one could find the present tensions escalating further and the possibility of a military strike against the terrorist infrastructure in the Pakistani territory increasing. The public clamour for action against Pakistan has subsided. It could revive if Pakistan fails to act against the terrorists. If there is another major attack from Pakistani territory, renewed public pressure might leave the Government with no other option but to act against Pakistan----whichever party may be in power.
The revival of the unwise talk in the West about a linkage between terrorism against India and Kashmir has created a dangerous impression in the minds of the Pakistani military leadership and the ISI that the use of terrorism has started paying results. This impression could come in the way of Pakistan sincerely acting against the terrorists. Therein lies the danger of a future military conflict between the two countries on the issue of terrorism. If that happens, the West will be largely to blame for creating such an impression in the minds of the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment. (3500 words)
( The writer had served in the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), India’s external intelligence Agency, since 1968 and had headed its counter-terrorism division for six years before retiring in August,1994. He was a member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) of the Government of India from 2000 to 2002. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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