B.RAMAN
The US pressured India into not retaliating against Pakistan after the attempted attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistani terrorists onDecember 13,2001, and promised that Pakistan would be made to dismantle the anti-Indian terrorist infrastructure in its territory. Inresponse to the US pressure, India exercised moderation and did not exercise its right to retaliate. The promises made to India were neverkept. The anti-Indian terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory continued to grow without the West taking any action against Pakistan.
2. The result: the savage attack of November 26-29,2008, in Mumbai by 10 Pakistani terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET). The US and theother Western countries have been conducting themselves in exactly the same way as they did in 2002---- expressions of outrage over theterrorist strike, pretense of solidarity with India, but at the same time ill-concealed attempts to protect Pakistan and its military-intelligencecomplex from the consequences of their continuing to sponsor terrorism against India in Indian territory.
3. Pakistan's behaviour----whether it is ruled by elected political or military rulers---- has not changed one iota since it started using terrorismagainst India in 1981. It would organise an act of terrorism and to pre-empt a possible Indian retaliation would project itself as thevictim-State threatened by India and manipulate Western policy-makers into rationalising its use of terrorism against India and pressuringIndia not to retaliate against Pakistan.
4. One thought and hoped that the West would act more firmly against Pakistan this time than it had done in the past because of the factthat the LET terrorists, who attacked Mumbai, killed nine Israelis and some nationals of the US, the UK, France, Italy,Germany, Canada andAustralia,in addition to killing about 160 India nationals. These hopes are on the way to being belied.
5. Instead of stepping up the pressure on Pakistan to dismantle the LET's terrorist infrastructure in Pakistani territory and arrest and handover to India those involved in the orchestration of the terrorist strike in Mumbai, pressue is being stepped up on India not to retaliateagainst Pakistan---not even politically. Instead of calling Pakistan to account for the outrage, attempts are being to mollify it by acceptingthe various conditions sought to be imposed by it, one of the conditions being that it would, if India produces evidence, prosecute theterrorists in its own courts and would not hand them over to India.
6. This is the fifth time Pakistan has been defying international pressure to hand over suspects for investigation and prosecution. The firstwas Omar Sheikh, one of the principal accused in the case relating to the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, atKarachi in January-February,2002. It got him tried and sentenced to death by one of its courts. The hearing on his appeal has beenadjourned by the anti-terrorism court over a hundred times. In the meanwhile, reports from Pakistan say that he has been given all thefacilities such as mobile phones etc that he asked for and that with these he is once again active from jail in guiding the pro-Al Qaeda jihaditerrorist organisations like the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM).
7. The second is Dawood Ibrahim, the Indian mafia leader, who is the principal accused in the case relating to the serial explosions inMumbai in March,1993. He was designated by the US Department of Treasury as an international terrorist in October,2003, because of hislinks with Al Qaeda and the LET. Pakistan has avoided handing him over either to India or the US. He continues to live under an assumedname as a Pakistani national at Karachi. Even though sections of the Pakistani media have been periodically reporting about his presenceand activities at Karachi, Pakistan continues to deny his presence in Pakistani territory.
8. The third is A.Q.Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, found guilty of clandestinely transfering military nuclear technology to North Korea,Iran and Libya. Both the previous Government headed by Pervez Musharraf and the present Government headed by Asif Ali Zardari haveconsistently opposed demands that an international team of experts should be allowed to interrogate him outside Pakistan.
9. The fourth is Rashid Rauf, a British citizen of Mirpuri (Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir ) origin, who was arrested by the Pakistani authorities inAugust,2006, on suspicion of his involvement in a plot discovered by the London Police to blow up a number of US-bound planes originatingfrom British airports. He was the brother-in-law of Maulana Masood Azhar, the Amir of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). The Pakistaniauthorities repeatedly evaded action on a British request to hand him over so that they could interrogate him not only in connection with thealleged plot to blow up planes, but also in connection with the alleged murder of one of his relatives in Birmingham before he fled toPakistan. He escaped from police custody under mysterious circumstances in December,2007, and died in a missile strike by a US Predator(pilotless) plane on a suspected Al Qaeda- hide-out in North Waziristan on November 15,2008. The leaders of the LET wanted by India inconnection wit the Mumbai attack constitute the fifth instance .
10. Pakistan's reluctance to hand over Omar Sheikh was due to the long history of contacts between him and the Inter-Services Intelligenceand between him and Osama bin Laden. According to Karachi police sources, he had claimed during his interrogation that during a visit toKandahar to meet Osama bin Laden before 9/11, he had come to know of Al Qaeda's plans for the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US homelandand that on his return from Kandahar he had met Lt.Gen.Ehsanul Haq, the then Corps Commander at Peshawar, and told him about AlQaeda's plans. After 9/11, Musharraf, under US pressure, had appointed Ehsanul Haq as the Director-General of the ISI in replacement ofLt.Gen.Mahmodd Ahmed whom the US did not trust. It was believed that Musharraf was worried that if Omar Sheikh was handed over to theUS, he could mention during his interrogation by the FBI about his telling Ehsanul Haq regarding Al Qaeda's plans and the question mightarise as to why Pakistan did not pass on this information to the US, which might have prevented the 9/11 strikes.
11. Fears that Dawood Ibrahim's long history of contacts with the ISI, his contacts with Al Qaeda and the LET and his role in helpingA.Q.Khan in clandestinely transporting nuclear material to North Korea, Iran and Libya and North Korean missiles to Pakistan might cometo the notice of the US during any interrogation have stood in the way of Pakistan handing him over either to India or the US. In the case ofA.Q.Khan, fears that he might reveal the role of the political and military rulers in his clandestine proliferation activities are behindPakistan's refusal to permit any independent interrogation of him. When the restrictions on his house arrest were relaxed after the electionsof March last year, he allegedly told some foreign journalists that Musharraf was totally in the picture about his nuclear and missile dealingswith North Korea. The Government strongly denied these allegations and re-imposed the restrictions on him.
12. In the case of Rashid Rauf, police sources say that he was aware of the contacts of the JEM with the ISI. Moreover, according to thesame sources, he was also aware that the four suicide bombers, who carried out the London blasts of July 2005, had been trained by theJEM in one of its camps in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) at the request of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the NO.2 to bin Laden. TheISI's anxiety to cover up these facts should explain the decision not to hand him over to the British Police.
13.The LET's close links with the ISI on the one side and with Al Qaeda on the other is believed to be behind the present refusal to handover the masterminds behind the Mumbai attack to the Indian authorities.
14. Under these circumstances, the Pakistani leadership----political as well as military--- is determined not to hand over any of the LEToperatives either to India or to the US. If the US, through independent sources, collects more irrefutable evidence and maintains thepressure on Pakistan, the most Pakistan might do is to hold a proforma trial against the LET operatives, get them jailed and allow them toguide the LET activities from jail in the same manner as Omar Sheikh has been guiding the activities of the JEM from jail.
15. If the US is really concerned over the refusal of Pakistan to act against the LET's terrorist infrastructure and operatives, it could declarePakistan as a state-sponsor of terrorism and stop all military and economic assistance to it.However, it is unlikely to take this step due tofears that this might affect even the limited co-operation which Pakistan has been extending to the US in targeting Al Qaeda sanctuaries inNorth Waziristan.
16. India should not, therefore, have any illusions that the US would act decisively against Pakistan. It is our problem and we have to dealwith it on our own through appropriate political, diplomatic and operational means. It is a pity that all the strong statements on the optionsbefore India are coming from Shri Pranab Mukherjee, the Minister For External Affairs, and not from the Prime Minister, Dr.Manmohan Singh.He mostly maintains a discreet silence. Some comments which he did make like ruling out a military option have had the effect of dilutingthe uncertainty and anxiety caused in the minds of the Pakistanis by the strong statements of Shri Mukherjee.
17. This impression of Indian softness, if not removed, would encourage the Pakistani political and military leaders to continue with theirpresent policy of inaction against the LET. (3-1-09)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, January 3, 2009
Friday, January 2, 2009
SRI LANKA: MISSION ACCOMPLISHED?
B.RAMAN
There have been understandable scenes of jubilation in Colombo and other Sinhalese majority areas of Sri Lanka over the occupation of Kilinochchi, which used to be the administrative capital of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), by the Sri Lankan Army on January 2,2008. These scenes bring to one's mind similar scenes one witnessed after the US army moved without resistance into Baghdad vacated by Saddam Hussein's army in 2003 and shortly thereafter President George Bush proclaimed "Mission Accomplished". Almost six years later, the violence still continues in Iraq. His proclamation of "Mission Accomplished" has kept haunting him since then. Shortly after the US troops entered Baghdad, I had pointed out that the US Army's entry into Baghdad marked the end of one phase of the war and the beginning of another.
2. So too in Afghanistan where the Taliban, whose death was proclaimed with fanfare in December 2001, rose from its proclaimed grave and staged a come-back causing much bleeding and destruction. The fighting is still going on in Afghanistan.
3. To mention all this is not to under-estimate the significane of the LTTE's loss of control over Kilinochchi after remaining in occupation of it for 12 years, but to stress the inadvisability of premature claims of victory in unconventional conflicts between a State actor and a non-State actor.
4. The re-occupation of Kilinochchi by the Sri Lankan Army will naturally add to the pride, confidence and morale of the Sri Lankan Army. This does not mean that it will necessarily undermine the motivation and morale of the LTTE. Its motivation and morale would have been undermined if it was an unexpected rout for the LTTE. From all indications, it was not. It was a denouement for which it had prepared itself and the Tamil population of the area on which it depends for support. It has lost territory whose gain was symbolically important to the SL Army. But this does not mean the end of the LTTE's campaign of insurgency-cum-terrorism.
5. The end of the LTTE's campaign will come not when it loses an important piece of territory, but when it loses the support of the Tamil people in the areas still controlled by it and in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora.
6. In an unconventional warfare, there is no victory day when the war definitively ends with the adversary vanquished once and for all. Victory comes invisibly when the insurgent or terrorist organisation either realises that continued fighting or violence is no longer a viable option as it happened in Mizoram or when it totally loses the support of the people on whose behalf it claims to be fighting the State as it happened in the case of Khalistani terrorism in Punjab.
7. We must be proud of our political leaders. They did not indulge in scenes of jubilation when Laldenga, the leader of the Mizo National Front, sought peace talks with the Government of India in 1975 . Nor did they indulge in triumphalism when they realised by the end of the 1990s that the Khalistan movement has withered away without their even realising it due to the aversion of the overwhelming majority of the Sikhs to the movement.
8. Turning points in unconventional warfare are brought about not through the force of arms, but through the force of wisdom. Arms do play an impiortant role if they are wielded with wisdom.One is yet to see such signs of wisdom in Colombo. The turning point in Sri Lanka will come the day the Tamils realise that Prabhakaran has become a liability for their cause and get rid of him. If there is to be real peace in Sri Lanka, the end of Prabhakaran has to be brought about by the Tamils themselves and not by the Sinhalese army. Has that day been brought nearer by the entry of the Sinhalese Army into Kilinochchi? One has to keep one's fingers crossed .(2-1-2009)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
There have been understandable scenes of jubilation in Colombo and other Sinhalese majority areas of Sri Lanka over the occupation of Kilinochchi, which used to be the administrative capital of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), by the Sri Lankan Army on January 2,2008. These scenes bring to one's mind similar scenes one witnessed after the US army moved without resistance into Baghdad vacated by Saddam Hussein's army in 2003 and shortly thereafter President George Bush proclaimed "Mission Accomplished". Almost six years later, the violence still continues in Iraq. His proclamation of "Mission Accomplished" has kept haunting him since then. Shortly after the US troops entered Baghdad, I had pointed out that the US Army's entry into Baghdad marked the end of one phase of the war and the beginning of another.
2. So too in Afghanistan where the Taliban, whose death was proclaimed with fanfare in December 2001, rose from its proclaimed grave and staged a come-back causing much bleeding and destruction. The fighting is still going on in Afghanistan.
3. To mention all this is not to under-estimate the significane of the LTTE's loss of control over Kilinochchi after remaining in occupation of it for 12 years, but to stress the inadvisability of premature claims of victory in unconventional conflicts between a State actor and a non-State actor.
4. The re-occupation of Kilinochchi by the Sri Lankan Army will naturally add to the pride, confidence and morale of the Sri Lankan Army. This does not mean that it will necessarily undermine the motivation and morale of the LTTE. Its motivation and morale would have been undermined if it was an unexpected rout for the LTTE. From all indications, it was not. It was a denouement for which it had prepared itself and the Tamil population of the area on which it depends for support. It has lost territory whose gain was symbolically important to the SL Army. But this does not mean the end of the LTTE's campaign of insurgency-cum-terrorism.
5. The end of the LTTE's campaign will come not when it loses an important piece of territory, but when it loses the support of the Tamil people in the areas still controlled by it and in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora.
6. In an unconventional warfare, there is no victory day when the war definitively ends with the adversary vanquished once and for all. Victory comes invisibly when the insurgent or terrorist organisation either realises that continued fighting or violence is no longer a viable option as it happened in Mizoram or when it totally loses the support of the people on whose behalf it claims to be fighting the State as it happened in the case of Khalistani terrorism in Punjab.
7. We must be proud of our political leaders. They did not indulge in scenes of jubilation when Laldenga, the leader of the Mizo National Front, sought peace talks with the Government of India in 1975 . Nor did they indulge in triumphalism when they realised by the end of the 1990s that the Khalistan movement has withered away without their even realising it due to the aversion of the overwhelming majority of the Sikhs to the movement.
8. Turning points in unconventional warfare are brought about not through the force of arms, but through the force of wisdom. Arms do play an impiortant role if they are wielded with wisdom.One is yet to see such signs of wisdom in Colombo. The turning point in Sri Lanka will come the day the Tamils realise that Prabhakaran has become a liability for their cause and get rid of him. If there is to be real peace in Sri Lanka, the end of Prabhakaran has to be brought about by the Tamils themselves and not by the Sinhalese army. Has that day been brought nearer by the entry of the Sinhalese Army into Kilinochchi? One has to keep one's fingers crossed .(2-1-2009)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, December 29, 2008
PASHTUNS AREN'T IRAQIS: TALIBAN'S MESSAGE TO GEN.PETRAEUS
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.486
B.RAMAN
Gen.David Petraeus, the Commander of the US Central Command, who previously headed the US forces in Iraq, was credited with bringing down the level of violence in Iraq and weakening the capability of Al Qaeda in Iraq by creating a divide between the secular Baathist Arabs of Saddam Hussein's army and local administration and the Wahabi Arabs of Al Qaeda by strengthening various local militias with names such as the Awakening Councils, which had come into existence even before he took over in Iraq.
2. When he was appointed by President George Bush to be the head of the Central Command, which, inter alia, is responsible for the US operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and in the bordering Pashtun areas of Pakistan, he was reported to have set up a brains trust to advise him on a new strategy to be followed against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. While the new strategy is still being worked out, some elements of it are already in the process of being implemented.
3. These include a planned surge in the US forces in Afghanistan in the coming months by inducting another 30,000 troops and the setting up of local militias, which would work on the pattern of the Awakening Councils in Iraq. Many Afghan observers have been expressing doubts whether Petraeus' ideas would work in Afghanistan. The Pashtun society---particularly in Afghanistan--- is different from the Iraqi society. Hatred of non-Muslim foreigners is very strong among the Pashtuns and the hatred of Pashtuns who are perceived as collaborating with non-Muslim foreigners is even stronger. Moreover, the Pashtuns look upon the Arabs of Al Qaeda, now operating from sanctuaries in the North Waziristan area of Pakistan's Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), as their honoured guests and as their co-religionists, who had helped them in driving out the Soviet troops in the 1980s and who are now helping them in their fight to drive out the Americans and other NATO forces.
4. These observers have been saying that the intensifying violence in Afghanistan and the inability of the US-led forces to control it are due to the sanctuaries available to Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban in Pakistani territory and the inability or relcutance of the Pakistan Army to destroy these sanctuaries. While the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda in North Waziristan and of the Taliban in South Waziristan are being repeatedly attacked by the unmanned Predator aircraft of the US intelligence community, those of the Taliban in the Quetta area of Balochistan have largely been left untouched with neither the Pakistan Army nor the American Predator aircraft targeting them. These observers are of the view that unless these sanctuaries are destroyed no amount of surge and local militias will help.
5. The current operations of the Pakistan Army in the Bajaur Agency of the FATA and the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) are mainly targeting the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which poses a threat to Pakistan and not the Afghan Taliban, headed by the Quetta-based Mulla Mohammad Omar, which the Pakistan Army continues to perceive as its strategic ally. While the Pakistan Army has reduced the scale of its operations in the Bajaur Agency and its presence in South Waziristan, where Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the TTP is based, in order to re-deploy the troops thus relieved on the Indian border particularly in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), its operations against the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), headed by Maulana Fazlullah, in the Swat Valley have not so far been reduced.
6. While the Mehsuds and the Ahmedzai Wazirs of South Waziristan, who were in the forefront of the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir in 1947-48 and in 1965, have informally agreed not to take advantage of the thinning out of the Pakistani forces in these areas, the Pakistan Army has not yet been able to reach a similar informal agreement with the TNSM, despite the fact that it is a component of the TTP. Moreover, the Pakistan Army is prepared to face the risk of a temporary dilution of the Pakistani writ in the Bajaur Agency and South Waziristan if the Mehsuds and the Ahmedzai Wazirs do not keep up their informal agreement not to create problems for the Army and the Frontier Corps.
7. It is not prepared to face a similar risk in the Swat Valley, which it sees as important for maintaining its writ in the NWFP. It is concerned over the recent increase in the activities of the Pakistani Taliban in Peshawar and is determined not to allow the TNSM undermine the Government position in the NWFP. The operations against the TNSM in the Swat Valley, which started in November,2007, have been continuing for over a year now without the Army and the Frontier Corps being able to make any headway in neutralising the TNSM. Even long before the Pakistan Army thinned out its presence in the FATA in the wake of the tensions with India after the terrorist attack by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET)----acting alone or in association with Al Qaeda--- in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, it was facing difficulty in reinforcing its presence in the Swat Valley.
8. Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), borrowed some of the Iraqi ideas of Gen.Petraeus even before the latter assumed command of the US Central Command. He set up in some villages of the Swat Valley as well as the FATA people's militias called Lashkars, which were trained and armed to counter the Sunni forces of the TNSM and the Pakistani Taliban. A large number of Shia Pashtuns were recruited by Kayani into these Lashkars and they were given the task of countering the TNSM and the TTP. The Sunnis of the Pakistani Taliban retaliated with vigour against these Lashkars and killed a large number of them.
9.In October, 82 persons were killed and 241 injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up in a grand Jirga held at Khadizai area of the predominantly Shia Alikhel sub-tribe of the Pashtuns. The Jirga was specially convened to form a tribal Lashkar against the Taliban.
10.Thirty-two people were killed and over 120 others injured in a blast just outside a Shia Imambargah called Alamdar in Koocha-e-Risaldar, located behind the historic Qissa Khwani Bazaar, in the Peshawar area on December 5,2008. A vehicle driven by a suicide bomber destroyed a multi-storey hotel, a girls’ school, and dozens of shops selling crockery and plastic-wares.
11.On December 7,2008, the Afghan Islamic Press disseminated a message purported to have been issued by Mulla Omar, which warned the US as follows in response to the reported new strategy of Petraeus without, however, naming him: “Today the world’s economy is facing growing risk from meltdown owing to the belligerent and expansionist policies of US. This has left its negative impact on the globe and it is the collective duty of all to work for a lasting peace in the world. You should understand that no puppet regime will ever stand up to the current resistance movement. Nor you will justify the occupation of the Islamic countries under the so-called slogan of rehabilitation anymore. Deployment of more troops (by the US) would lead to battles everywhere. The current armed clashes will spiral and your current casualties of hundreds will jack up to thousands.The US has imposed the war on the Afghan nation and the followers of the path of Islamic resistance will never abandon their legitimate struggle. The invading forces wrongly contemplate that they will be able to pit the Afghans against the mujahideen under the so-called label of tribal militias. No Afghan will play into the hands of the aliens and fight against his own brothers for worldly pleasure.”
12.On December 13,2008,Pir Samiullah, who had formed one of the Lashkars at the request of the Army, and eight of his followers were killed by the TNSM in Swat . The TNSM members captured over 50 AK-47 rifles with ammunition and two rocket launchers issued to the Lashkar by the Pakistan Army
13.Over 40 persons, many of them Shias, including two policemen and four children, were killed and 20 others injured when a suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden car into a polling station set up in a school in Shalbandai village, located about six kilometres south of the Buner district headquarters, Daggar, on December 28,2008.The Swat chapter of the TTP has claimed responsibility for the attack.Speaking on the group’s illegal FM radio channel, TTP Swat chapter Deputy Head Maulana Shah Dauran said the bombing was in retaliation for the death of six TTP members gunned down in Shalbandai by a local Lashkar set up by the Army.He warned that the revenge wasn’t yet over and that every person in Shalbandai would be eliminated for killing the Taliban members.
14. In addition to stepping up the attacks on the Lashkars, the TTP has also embarked on a programme of disrupting the movement of supplies to the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan from the Karachi port.About 150 containers go to Afghanistan from Karachi every day. A majority of these containers crosses the Torkham border in the NWFP into Afghanistan while others take the Chaman route in Balochistan. In addition to this, about 150 to 200 oil tankers transport fuel from Karachi to Afghanistan via Torkham every day.About 100 tankers carry fuel through the Chaman border post.Around 300 vehicles and containers have been burnt in six attacks since December 1. The TTP has projected these attacks as in retaliation for the Predator strikes on the TTP hide-outs in South Waziristan.
15. Concerned over the attacks, US and other NATO officials have reportedly been negotiating with the authorities of Russia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for alternate routes to reduce their dependence on the Pakistan route. Not only the TTP, even the religious political parties of Pakistan and Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League are opposed to the movement of supplies to the NATO forces in Afghanistan through Pakistani territory.
16. The TTP, which has till now been attacking the trucks and tankers only after they reach Peshawar, has warned that if the Predator strikes do not stop it will start attacking the supplies everywhere in Pakistan. This would include at the Karachi port itself as the supplies are brought by ships. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Group (IMG), a splinter group of the IMU, are also likely to attack the supply convoys in Central Asia when the US starts using the alternate routes. (29-12-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
Gen.David Petraeus, the Commander of the US Central Command, who previously headed the US forces in Iraq, was credited with bringing down the level of violence in Iraq and weakening the capability of Al Qaeda in Iraq by creating a divide between the secular Baathist Arabs of Saddam Hussein's army and local administration and the Wahabi Arabs of Al Qaeda by strengthening various local militias with names such as the Awakening Councils, which had come into existence even before he took over in Iraq.
2. When he was appointed by President George Bush to be the head of the Central Command, which, inter alia, is responsible for the US operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and in the bordering Pashtun areas of Pakistan, he was reported to have set up a brains trust to advise him on a new strategy to be followed against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. While the new strategy is still being worked out, some elements of it are already in the process of being implemented.
3. These include a planned surge in the US forces in Afghanistan in the coming months by inducting another 30,000 troops and the setting up of local militias, which would work on the pattern of the Awakening Councils in Iraq. Many Afghan observers have been expressing doubts whether Petraeus' ideas would work in Afghanistan. The Pashtun society---particularly in Afghanistan--- is different from the Iraqi society. Hatred of non-Muslim foreigners is very strong among the Pashtuns and the hatred of Pashtuns who are perceived as collaborating with non-Muslim foreigners is even stronger. Moreover, the Pashtuns look upon the Arabs of Al Qaeda, now operating from sanctuaries in the North Waziristan area of Pakistan's Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), as their honoured guests and as their co-religionists, who had helped them in driving out the Soviet troops in the 1980s and who are now helping them in their fight to drive out the Americans and other NATO forces.
4. These observers have been saying that the intensifying violence in Afghanistan and the inability of the US-led forces to control it are due to the sanctuaries available to Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban in Pakistani territory and the inability or relcutance of the Pakistan Army to destroy these sanctuaries. While the sanctuaries of Al Qaeda in North Waziristan and of the Taliban in South Waziristan are being repeatedly attacked by the unmanned Predator aircraft of the US intelligence community, those of the Taliban in the Quetta area of Balochistan have largely been left untouched with neither the Pakistan Army nor the American Predator aircraft targeting them. These observers are of the view that unless these sanctuaries are destroyed no amount of surge and local militias will help.
5. The current operations of the Pakistan Army in the Bajaur Agency of the FATA and the Swat Valley of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) are mainly targeting the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which poses a threat to Pakistan and not the Afghan Taliban, headed by the Quetta-based Mulla Mohammad Omar, which the Pakistan Army continues to perceive as its strategic ally. While the Pakistan Army has reduced the scale of its operations in the Bajaur Agency and its presence in South Waziristan, where Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the TTP is based, in order to re-deploy the troops thus relieved on the Indian border particularly in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), its operations against the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), headed by Maulana Fazlullah, in the Swat Valley have not so far been reduced.
6. While the Mehsuds and the Ahmedzai Wazirs of South Waziristan, who were in the forefront of the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir in 1947-48 and in 1965, have informally agreed not to take advantage of the thinning out of the Pakistani forces in these areas, the Pakistan Army has not yet been able to reach a similar informal agreement with the TNSM, despite the fact that it is a component of the TTP. Moreover, the Pakistan Army is prepared to face the risk of a temporary dilution of the Pakistani writ in the Bajaur Agency and South Waziristan if the Mehsuds and the Ahmedzai Wazirs do not keep up their informal agreement not to create problems for the Army and the Frontier Corps.
7. It is not prepared to face a similar risk in the Swat Valley, which it sees as important for maintaining its writ in the NWFP. It is concerned over the recent increase in the activities of the Pakistani Taliban in Peshawar and is determined not to allow the TNSM undermine the Government position in the NWFP. The operations against the TNSM in the Swat Valley, which started in November,2007, have been continuing for over a year now without the Army and the Frontier Corps being able to make any headway in neutralising the TNSM. Even long before the Pakistan Army thinned out its presence in the FATA in the wake of the tensions with India after the terrorist attack by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET)----acting alone or in association with Al Qaeda--- in Mumbai from November 26 to 29,2008, it was facing difficulty in reinforcing its presence in the Swat Valley.
8. Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), borrowed some of the Iraqi ideas of Gen.Petraeus even before the latter assumed command of the US Central Command. He set up in some villages of the Swat Valley as well as the FATA people's militias called Lashkars, which were trained and armed to counter the Sunni forces of the TNSM and the Pakistani Taliban. A large number of Shia Pashtuns were recruited by Kayani into these Lashkars and they were given the task of countering the TNSM and the TTP. The Sunnis of the Pakistani Taliban retaliated with vigour against these Lashkars and killed a large number of them.
9.In October, 82 persons were killed and 241 injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up in a grand Jirga held at Khadizai area of the predominantly Shia Alikhel sub-tribe of the Pashtuns. The Jirga was specially convened to form a tribal Lashkar against the Taliban.
10.Thirty-two people were killed and over 120 others injured in a blast just outside a Shia Imambargah called Alamdar in Koocha-e-Risaldar, located behind the historic Qissa Khwani Bazaar, in the Peshawar area on December 5,2008. A vehicle driven by a suicide bomber destroyed a multi-storey hotel, a girls’ school, and dozens of shops selling crockery and plastic-wares.
11.On December 7,2008, the Afghan Islamic Press disseminated a message purported to have been issued by Mulla Omar, which warned the US as follows in response to the reported new strategy of Petraeus without, however, naming him: “Today the world’s economy is facing growing risk from meltdown owing to the belligerent and expansionist policies of US. This has left its negative impact on the globe and it is the collective duty of all to work for a lasting peace in the world. You should understand that no puppet regime will ever stand up to the current resistance movement. Nor you will justify the occupation of the Islamic countries under the so-called slogan of rehabilitation anymore. Deployment of more troops (by the US) would lead to battles everywhere. The current armed clashes will spiral and your current casualties of hundreds will jack up to thousands.The US has imposed the war on the Afghan nation and the followers of the path of Islamic resistance will never abandon their legitimate struggle. The invading forces wrongly contemplate that they will be able to pit the Afghans against the mujahideen under the so-called label of tribal militias. No Afghan will play into the hands of the aliens and fight against his own brothers for worldly pleasure.”
12.On December 13,2008,Pir Samiullah, who had formed one of the Lashkars at the request of the Army, and eight of his followers were killed by the TNSM in Swat . The TNSM members captured over 50 AK-47 rifles with ammunition and two rocket launchers issued to the Lashkar by the Pakistan Army
13.Over 40 persons, many of them Shias, including two policemen and four children, were killed and 20 others injured when a suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden car into a polling station set up in a school in Shalbandai village, located about six kilometres south of the Buner district headquarters, Daggar, on December 28,2008.The Swat chapter of the TTP has claimed responsibility for the attack.Speaking on the group’s illegal FM radio channel, TTP Swat chapter Deputy Head Maulana Shah Dauran said the bombing was in retaliation for the death of six TTP members gunned down in Shalbandai by a local Lashkar set up by the Army.He warned that the revenge wasn’t yet over and that every person in Shalbandai would be eliminated for killing the Taliban members.
14. In addition to stepping up the attacks on the Lashkars, the TTP has also embarked on a programme of disrupting the movement of supplies to the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan from the Karachi port.About 150 containers go to Afghanistan from Karachi every day. A majority of these containers crosses the Torkham border in the NWFP into Afghanistan while others take the Chaman route in Balochistan. In addition to this, about 150 to 200 oil tankers transport fuel from Karachi to Afghanistan via Torkham every day.About 100 tankers carry fuel through the Chaman border post.Around 300 vehicles and containers have been burnt in six attacks since December 1. The TTP has projected these attacks as in retaliation for the Predator strikes on the TTP hide-outs in South Waziristan.
15. Concerned over the attacks, US and other NATO officials have reportedly been negotiating with the authorities of Russia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for alternate routes to reduce their dependence on the Pakistan route. Not only the TTP, even the religious political parties of Pakistan and Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League are opposed to the movement of supplies to the NATO forces in Afghanistan through Pakistani territory.
16. The TTP, which has till now been attacking the trucks and tankers only after they reach Peshawar, has warned that if the Predator strikes do not stop it will start attacking the supplies everywhere in Pakistan. This would include at the Karachi port itself as the supplies are brought by ships. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Group (IMG), a splinter group of the IMU, are also likely to attack the supply convoys in Central Asia when the US starts using the alternate routes. (29-12-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, December 27, 2008
CHINA'S ANTI-PIRACY PATROL --- STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS
B.RAMAN
Three ships of the Chinese Navy------ the missile-armed destroyers "DDG-171 Haikou" and "DDG-169 Wuhan" and the suply ship "Weishanhu"---are reported to have sailed from the Yalong Bay naval base on the Hainan Island on January 26,2008, on a three-month mission toundertake anti-piracy patrol for the protection of Chinese ships and crew from attacks by Somali pirates. This will be the first time ships ofthe Chinese Navy will be operating in far-away waters outside the Pacific on defensive missions----though only against non-State actors. The three-ship task force will have a Chinese special forces unit (strength not known) and two helicopters.
2.The Chinese announcement came shortly after nine pirates attacked "Zhenhua 4", a Chinese cargo ship with 30 crewmen, in Somaliwaters on December 17,2008. The Chinese ship, owned by the China Communications Construction Co, was rescued by two warships and ahelicopter of Malaysia.Twenty per cent of the 1,265 Chinese ships that have passed through the Somali waters in the first 11 months of thisyear, have faced pirate attacks, according to a spokesman of the company. Seven of these ships were hijacked, and the pirates were stillholding a Chinese fishing ship and 18 sailors.China's decision came after the UN Security Council, in an unanimous vote on December16,2008, gave nations fighting against pirates in the Gulf of Aden a one-year mandate to act inside and off Somalia.
3.The State-owned Xinhua news agency quoted Wu Shengli, the Commander of the Chinese Navy, as telling the 1000 sailors of the threeships at a function before the Task Force set sail as follows: "It's the first time we go abroad to protect our strategic interests armed withmilitary force.It's the first time for us to organise a naval force on an international humanitarian mission and the first time for our navy toprotect important shipping lanes far from our shores."
4. The Chinese task force will be joining more than a dozen warships from Italy, Greece, Turkey, India, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, France,Russia, Britain, Malaysia and the US, who have already undertaken an anti-piracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden. With China sending its ships, theNavies of all the five permanent members of the UN Security Council will now be co-operating in the fight against piracy. Japan has alreadyannounced its intention of sending one of its ships too.
5.Even though Admiral Timothy Keating, the Commander of the US Pacific Command in Hawaii, has welcomed the Chinese decision andexpressed the hope that the operations of the US and Chinese naval ships side by side in the Somali waters might lead to a resumption ofthe military-military contacts between the two countries, which are in a state of suspension since October, 2008, due to Chineseunhappiness over the supply of US military equipment to Taiwan, the US cannot but be concerned over the long-term implications of theChinese naval presence in an area of strategic importance to the US.
6.Admiral Keating was quoted by the media as saying immediately after the Chinese announcement of its decision to send the ships onanti-piracy patrol: "China's plans to join the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia could lead to a renewal of military exchangesbetween Beijing and Washington. I think this could be a springboard for a resumption of dialogue between PLA forces and US PacificCommand forces."
7.Commenting on the US Admiral's statement, Peng Guangqian, a Chinese strategic expert working in the Chinese Academy of MilitarySciences, was quoted as saying on Decemmber 22,2008, that the armed forces of China and the US would be cooperating for the first timein a real security environment off Somalia's coast. He added: "The military cooperation between the two sides should be based oninternational laws and codes, mutual respect and equal consultation. Only this way can bilateral military cooperation proceed steadily."
8. The Chinese decision has been widely welcomed by Chinese Internet chatters and bloggers as a moment of great pride for China. It hasalso been welcomed by the community of Chinese strategic experts;. Typical among the comments are:
Li Wei, Director of the Anti-terrorism Research Centre of the China Institute of Contemporary Relations: "It is a huge breakthrough in China's concepts about security.It sends a strong political message to the international community that China with its improved economic and military strength is willing to play a larger role in maintaining world peace and security."
Prof. Li Jie, a naval researcher: "Joining other countries to fight Somali pirates would be a very good opportunity for the Chinese Navy to get into the thick of the action. Apart from fighting pirates, another key goal is to register the presence of the Chinese Navy.If the navy's special forces join in, that will be in order to counter the pirates' attempt to board other ships. In general, the mission is to deter pirates, because that is the basic objective."
Prof Pang Zhongying at Renmin University of China: "Joining other fleets in the Somali waters will contribute to international security. Earlier, Chinese army personnel joining UN peacekeeping missions were engineering and medical staff, police, or peacekeepers. But now, dispatching naval ships would not be a problem as the menace of Somali piracy has become a common threat to the whole international community.China's image as a responsible sovereign nation will improve by participating in such missions.The number of troops in any such mission would not be high. It would be on a limited scale initially." .
9. It is not yet clear which port the Chinese ships will be using for refuelling and re-stocking purposes during the three months they will beaway from China, but reports from Pakistani sources say that the Pakistan Navy has already offered the use of the Karachi port for thispurpose. The Gwadar port is not presently under consideration for this purpose since part of the construction has not yet been completed.Even though Part I has been completed and a small number of foreign commercial ships has started using it, the refuelling and re-stockingfacilities in Gwadar are not yet satisfactory.
10. The Pakistani offer of the use of Karachi was reported to have been discussed with Chinese officials during the recent visit to China bythe Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) General Tariq Majid for the sixth round of the Pakistan-China Defence and SecurityTalks. On December 15,2008, Gen.Majid and General Chen Bingde, Chief of the General Staff, People's Liberation Army, signed anagreement on military co-operation. Though details of this agreement were not disclosed, it is believed that Pakistan has offered the use ofthe Karachi port to the Chinese ships under this agreement. This visit was fixed long before the Chinese decision to undertake anti-piracy patrols.
11.India, which has sent a ship of its own navy to the Gulf of Aden on anti-piracy patrol, cannot object to the Chinese ships joining the patrol,but it would be justified in keeping a wary eye on the Chinese ships. What is now projected by the Chinese as a temporary measure ofself-defence and peace-keeping against pirates, could develop into a permanent presence of strategic value to the Chinese Navy in terms ofpower projection in the waters to the West of India. It could develop as a Chinese counter to India's power projection in the seas to the Eastof India.
12. Pakistan's immediate interest in the Chinese using Karachi as a possible base for their operations in the Somali waters arises from thehope that it could act as a deterrent to any Indian threat to Karachi in the event of the current tensions between India and Pakistan afterthe terrorist attack in Mumbai on November 26,2008, leading to a military confrontation between the two countries. (27-12-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Three ships of the Chinese Navy------ the missile-armed destroyers "DDG-171 Haikou" and "DDG-169 Wuhan" and the suply ship "Weishanhu"---are reported to have sailed from the Yalong Bay naval base on the Hainan Island on January 26,2008, on a three-month mission toundertake anti-piracy patrol for the protection of Chinese ships and crew from attacks by Somali pirates. This will be the first time ships ofthe Chinese Navy will be operating in far-away waters outside the Pacific on defensive missions----though only against non-State actors. The three-ship task force will have a Chinese special forces unit (strength not known) and two helicopters.
2.The Chinese announcement came shortly after nine pirates attacked "Zhenhua 4", a Chinese cargo ship with 30 crewmen, in Somaliwaters on December 17,2008. The Chinese ship, owned by the China Communications Construction Co, was rescued by two warships and ahelicopter of Malaysia.Twenty per cent of the 1,265 Chinese ships that have passed through the Somali waters in the first 11 months of thisyear, have faced pirate attacks, according to a spokesman of the company. Seven of these ships were hijacked, and the pirates were stillholding a Chinese fishing ship and 18 sailors.China's decision came after the UN Security Council, in an unanimous vote on December16,2008, gave nations fighting against pirates in the Gulf of Aden a one-year mandate to act inside and off Somalia.
3.The State-owned Xinhua news agency quoted Wu Shengli, the Commander of the Chinese Navy, as telling the 1000 sailors of the threeships at a function before the Task Force set sail as follows: "It's the first time we go abroad to protect our strategic interests armed withmilitary force.It's the first time for us to organise a naval force on an international humanitarian mission and the first time for our navy toprotect important shipping lanes far from our shores."
4. The Chinese task force will be joining more than a dozen warships from Italy, Greece, Turkey, India, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, France,Russia, Britain, Malaysia and the US, who have already undertaken an anti-piracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden. With China sending its ships, theNavies of all the five permanent members of the UN Security Council will now be co-operating in the fight against piracy. Japan has alreadyannounced its intention of sending one of its ships too.
5.Even though Admiral Timothy Keating, the Commander of the US Pacific Command in Hawaii, has welcomed the Chinese decision andexpressed the hope that the operations of the US and Chinese naval ships side by side in the Somali waters might lead to a resumption ofthe military-military contacts between the two countries, which are in a state of suspension since October, 2008, due to Chineseunhappiness over the supply of US military equipment to Taiwan, the US cannot but be concerned over the long-term implications of theChinese naval presence in an area of strategic importance to the US.
6.Admiral Keating was quoted by the media as saying immediately after the Chinese announcement of its decision to send the ships onanti-piracy patrol: "China's plans to join the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia could lead to a renewal of military exchangesbetween Beijing and Washington. I think this could be a springboard for a resumption of dialogue between PLA forces and US PacificCommand forces."
7.Commenting on the US Admiral's statement, Peng Guangqian, a Chinese strategic expert working in the Chinese Academy of MilitarySciences, was quoted as saying on Decemmber 22,2008, that the armed forces of China and the US would be cooperating for the first timein a real security environment off Somalia's coast. He added: "The military cooperation between the two sides should be based oninternational laws and codes, mutual respect and equal consultation. Only this way can bilateral military cooperation proceed steadily."
8. The Chinese decision has been widely welcomed by Chinese Internet chatters and bloggers as a moment of great pride for China. It hasalso been welcomed by the community of Chinese strategic experts;. Typical among the comments are:
Li Wei, Director of the Anti-terrorism Research Centre of the China Institute of Contemporary Relations: "It is a huge breakthrough in China's concepts about security.It sends a strong political message to the international community that China with its improved economic and military strength is willing to play a larger role in maintaining world peace and security."
Prof. Li Jie, a naval researcher: "Joining other countries to fight Somali pirates would be a very good opportunity for the Chinese Navy to get into the thick of the action. Apart from fighting pirates, another key goal is to register the presence of the Chinese Navy.If the navy's special forces join in, that will be in order to counter the pirates' attempt to board other ships. In general, the mission is to deter pirates, because that is the basic objective."
Prof Pang Zhongying at Renmin University of China: "Joining other fleets in the Somali waters will contribute to international security. Earlier, Chinese army personnel joining UN peacekeeping missions were engineering and medical staff, police, or peacekeepers. But now, dispatching naval ships would not be a problem as the menace of Somali piracy has become a common threat to the whole international community.China's image as a responsible sovereign nation will improve by participating in such missions.The number of troops in any such mission would not be high. It would be on a limited scale initially." .
9. It is not yet clear which port the Chinese ships will be using for refuelling and re-stocking purposes during the three months they will beaway from China, but reports from Pakistani sources say that the Pakistan Navy has already offered the use of the Karachi port for thispurpose. The Gwadar port is not presently under consideration for this purpose since part of the construction has not yet been completed.Even though Part I has been completed and a small number of foreign commercial ships has started using it, the refuelling and re-stockingfacilities in Gwadar are not yet satisfactory.
10. The Pakistani offer of the use of Karachi was reported to have been discussed with Chinese officials during the recent visit to China bythe Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) General Tariq Majid for the sixth round of the Pakistan-China Defence and SecurityTalks. On December 15,2008, Gen.Majid and General Chen Bingde, Chief of the General Staff, People's Liberation Army, signed anagreement on military co-operation. Though details of this agreement were not disclosed, it is believed that Pakistan has offered the use ofthe Karachi port to the Chinese ships under this agreement. This visit was fixed long before the Chinese decision to undertake anti-piracy patrols.
11.India, which has sent a ship of its own navy to the Gulf of Aden on anti-piracy patrol, cannot object to the Chinese ships joining the patrol,but it would be justified in keeping a wary eye on the Chinese ships. What is now projected by the Chinese as a temporary measure ofself-defence and peace-keeping against pirates, could develop into a permanent presence of strategic value to the Chinese Navy in terms ofpower projection in the waters to the West of India. It could develop as a Chinese counter to India's power projection in the seas to the Eastof India.
12. Pakistan's immediate interest in the Chinese using Karachi as a possible base for their operations in the Somali waters arises from thehope that it could act as a deterrent to any Indian threat to Karachi in the event of the current tensions between India and Pakistan afterthe terrorist attack in Mumbai on November 26,2008, leading to a military confrontation between the two countries. (27-12-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, December 8, 2008
COUNTER-TERRORISM: SIGNS OF RHETORIC FATIGUE
B.RAMAN
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is not such cat's whiskers in counter-terrorism as it projects itself to be.
2. That seems to be the conclusion of the voters in the elections to the State Assemblies of Delhi and Rajasthan, the results of which wereannounced in Delhi on December 8,2008. The Congress (I) has retained power in Delhi despite any public anger over its failure to prevent theterrorist strikes of September 13 and to have them investigated satisfactorily . The BJP has failed to retain power in Rajasthan, which alsosaw serial explosions in Jaipur in May.
3. If one excludes the terrorist strikes in Assam in October, the responsibility for which is not yet clearly established, there have been fivemajor terrorist strikes this year---three of them in the BJP ruled States of Rajasthan, Karnataka and Gujarat and two in Cong (I) ruled Delhiand Maharashtra. These strikes clearly showed that the counter-terrorism machinery in the BJP-ruled States is as bad as it has been in theCongress (I) ruled States. Both parties are equally responsible for neglecting the important task of revamping the counter-terrorismapparatus.
4. Despite this, the BJP might have still got the support of the voters on the terrorism issue if it had placed before them a comprehensivealternate strategy for dealing with terrorism. Despite the strong rhetoric of the BJP on the terrorism issue, its campaign did not show that itunderstood the issue of terrorism any better than the Congress (I). The two showed themselves to be equally confused on the issue ofcounter-terrorism. If the BJP was good in rhetoric, the Congress (I) was good in giving sermons to the people on the issue of terrorism.Caught between the rhetoric of the BJP and the sermons of the Congress (I), the voters decided to keep aside the issue of terrorism andvote on the basis of other issues, which are very important for their day-to-day living.
5. Apart from advocating the restoration of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), the BJP has hardly come out with any new ideas on howit will deal with terrorism, which will be qualitatively different from the way the Congress (I) has been dealing with it.
6. The people are greatly concerned over terrorism----not merely in the urban areas. They want more energetic steps by the Government todeal with it. They are not satisfied with the way it has been dealt with by the BJP-ruled as well as the Congress (I)-ruled States. But theywant new ideas and signs of a clear determination to implement them. Rhetoric alone will not do.
7. There is a rhetoric fatigue on the issue of terrorism. This has come out clearly in the just announced State Assembly election results.(8-12-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is not such cat's whiskers in counter-terrorism as it projects itself to be.
2. That seems to be the conclusion of the voters in the elections to the State Assemblies of Delhi and Rajasthan, the results of which wereannounced in Delhi on December 8,2008. The Congress (I) has retained power in Delhi despite any public anger over its failure to prevent theterrorist strikes of September 13 and to have them investigated satisfactorily . The BJP has failed to retain power in Rajasthan, which alsosaw serial explosions in Jaipur in May.
3. If one excludes the terrorist strikes in Assam in October, the responsibility for which is not yet clearly established, there have been fivemajor terrorist strikes this year---three of them in the BJP ruled States of Rajasthan, Karnataka and Gujarat and two in Cong (I) ruled Delhiand Maharashtra. These strikes clearly showed that the counter-terrorism machinery in the BJP-ruled States is as bad as it has been in theCongress (I) ruled States. Both parties are equally responsible for neglecting the important task of revamping the counter-terrorismapparatus.
4. Despite this, the BJP might have still got the support of the voters on the terrorism issue if it had placed before them a comprehensivealternate strategy for dealing with terrorism. Despite the strong rhetoric of the BJP on the terrorism issue, its campaign did not show that itunderstood the issue of terrorism any better than the Congress (I). The two showed themselves to be equally confused on the issue ofcounter-terrorism. If the BJP was good in rhetoric, the Congress (I) was good in giving sermons to the people on the issue of terrorism.Caught between the rhetoric of the BJP and the sermons of the Congress (I), the voters decided to keep aside the issue of terrorism andvote on the basis of other issues, which are very important for their day-to-day living.
5. Apart from advocating the restoration of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), the BJP has hardly come out with any new ideas on howit will deal with terrorism, which will be qualitatively different from the way the Congress (I) has been dealing with it.
6. The people are greatly concerned over terrorism----not merely in the urban areas. They want more energetic steps by the Government todeal with it. They are not satisfied with the way it has been dealt with by the BJP-ruled as well as the Congress (I)-ruled States. But theywant new ideas and signs of a clear determination to implement them. Rhetoric alone will not do.
7. There is a rhetoric fatigue on the issue of terrorism. This has come out clearly in the just announced State Assembly election results.(8-12-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Wednesday, December 3, 2008
PAKISTAN: THUS FAR & NO FURTHER
B.RAMAN
You cannot convince somebody, who does not want to be convinced, who is not prepared to be convinced.
That has been our experience since 1981 when Pakistan started using terrorism as a weapon to keep India bleeding and to weaken it, in the hope that, by doing so, it will be able to force India to agree to a change in the status quo in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).
The recovery by the Dubai authorities in 1983 from a Khalistani hijacker of a revolver which the German authorities certified in writing was from a consignment sold to the Pakistan Army; the recovery from the perpetrators of the March,1993, blasts of hand-grenades which Austrian experts certified in writing had been manufactured in Pakistan with technology and equipment sold by Austria to the Army-run Pakistan ordnance factories; the recovery from them of a chemical timer which the US certified in an unsigned note was part of a consignment supplied by the US to Pakistan in the 1980s and more and more and more.
The more the evidence we collected, the stronger the rejection---particularly from the US. Not sufficient enough. Does not directly implicate the Government of Pakistan. That was the stock reply we received repeatedly.
The US was interested only in protecting the lives and property of its citizens and in preventing another 9/11 in the US homeland from Pakistani territory. So long as Pakistan was co-operating with the US in action against Al Qaeda, the US closed its eyes and continues to close its eyes to Pakistani support for acts of jihadi terrorism directed against India.
One would have expected that the US attitude after the Mumbai terrorist strikes would have been different because the terrorists of the Pakistan Government-raised and backed Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) killed not only about 160 Indians, but also 25 foreigners-----six of them Israelis and another six Americans.
The Jewish civilians killed by the terrorists in the Narriman House were subjected to brutalities the like of which the world has not seen since the brutalities inflicted on the Jewish people by the Nazis during the Second World War.
And yet, the attitude of the US and other Western countries has been the same as it has always been. Where is the evidence, we are asked.
What evidence?
Evidence of the death of 160 Indians?
Evidence of the death of six Americans?
Evidence of the death of six Israelis?
Evidence of the brutalities inflicted by the terrorists on the Jewish people?
Is not the capture by the public of one of the perpetrators, a Pakistani national, who has confessed that he is from Pakistan and that he belonged to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and that the entire operation was mounted by the LET evidence enough?
Are not the intercepted telephone conversations between the perpetrators and their handlers in Pakistan evidence enough?
Are not the movement and activities of Prof.Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the Amir of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the political wing of the LET, in Pakistan as reported in the Pakistani media and in its own web site evidence enough?
Is not the continued existence of the training camps of the LET in Pakistani territory, including at Muridke, its headquarters near Lahore, evidence enough?
Is not the refusal of the Pakistan Government----whether of Pervez Musharraf or Asif Ali Zardari---- to arrest the operatives of the LET and close their camps despite an ostensible ban on it evidence enough?
What more evidence do the Americans want?
What evidence did they have when Ronald Reagan ordered the bombing of Libya in 1986 after an explosion in a West Berlin discotheque, which killed some Americans?
What evidence did they have before Bill Clinton ordered the Cruise missile attacks on jihadi training camps in Afghan territory in August,1998?
What evidence did they have against Al Qaeda and the Taliban before they bombed Afghanistan from October 7,2001?
What evidence did they have against the Saddam Hussain Government before they invaded and occupied Iraq in 2003?
In every case affecting American nationals and interests, they bombed and then collected evidence. They did not wait till they had collected all the evidence possible before they bombed.
They did not act on the basis of evidence accepted by the international community. They acted on the basis of their conviction as to where from the attacks on Americans came.
Their actions were motivated by the need to show that nobody can play with American lives and get away with it.
We should stop demeaning ourselves as a nation by going to the Americans and others with evidence. I am shocked by suggestions that we should produce the evidence before the UN Security Council. I cannot think of a more naïve idea. It is as stupid as the advice given by the British to Jawaharlal Nehru to take the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council with a promise that it would do justice by India.
The time for action against Pakistan has come. Action based on our conviction that the terrorists came from a Pakistani terrorist organization, which enjoys the patronage of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
The objective of the action should be to force Pakistan to act effectively against the LET and its terrorist infrastructure. It should also be to mount a no-holds barred covert operation against the LET through our own resources and methods.
Two steps the Government can take immediately:
·
STEP No.1: Downgrade the diplomatic relations with Pakistan, terminate all economic relations including bilateral trade and communication links, suspend the confidence-building measures and the so-called peace process, terminate the talks on the gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan and withdraw from the so-called joint counter-terrorism mechanism, which has been a farce forced on Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh by the US. Announce that these actions will remain in force till Pakistan acts against the LET and its terrorist leaders and infrastructure and hands over to India the terrorists wanted for trial in India.
·
STEP No. 2: Revive immediately the covert action capability of the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), which was wound up by Inder Gujral, when he was the Prime Minister in 1997, and empower it to impose prohibitive costs on Pakistan till it stops using jihadi terrorism against India. The R&AW imposed heavy costs on Pakistan for supporting the Khalistanis and should be able to do so now for its support to the LET and other jihadi terrorist organizations.
If step 2 has to be effective, there is an urgent need for a revamping of the R&AW. The organization has been in a bad state of affairs with low staff morale, factionalism and internal bickerings. Unfortunately, at this critical time in the nation’s history, the R&AW has no covert action specialists at the top of its pyramid. Get a suitable officer from the IB or the Army. If necessary, make him the head of the organization..
This is not the time for a direct military confrontation with Pakistan. It could prove counter-productive. It would enable the Pakistan Army to divert its troops from the Pashtun tribal belt to the Indian border and could unite the various jihadi organizations against India.
A divided Pakistan, a bleeding Pakistan, a Pakistan ever on the verge of collapse without actually collapsing----that should be our objective till it stops using terrorism against India.
We should be realistic enough to anticipate that Pakistan will step up terrorism in Indian territory if we adopt such a policy. This should not deter us from embarking on this policy. The policy of active defence against Pakistan should be accompanied by time-bound action to strengthen our counter-terrorism capability at home. (3-12-08)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
You cannot convince somebody, who does not want to be convinced, who is not prepared to be convinced.
That has been our experience since 1981 when Pakistan started using terrorism as a weapon to keep India bleeding and to weaken it, in the hope that, by doing so, it will be able to force India to agree to a change in the status quo in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).
The recovery by the Dubai authorities in 1983 from a Khalistani hijacker of a revolver which the German authorities certified in writing was from a consignment sold to the Pakistan Army; the recovery from the perpetrators of the March,1993, blasts of hand-grenades which Austrian experts certified in writing had been manufactured in Pakistan with technology and equipment sold by Austria to the Army-run Pakistan ordnance factories; the recovery from them of a chemical timer which the US certified in an unsigned note was part of a consignment supplied by the US to Pakistan in the 1980s and more and more and more.
The more the evidence we collected, the stronger the rejection---particularly from the US. Not sufficient enough. Does not directly implicate the Government of Pakistan. That was the stock reply we received repeatedly.
The US was interested only in protecting the lives and property of its citizens and in preventing another 9/11 in the US homeland from Pakistani territory. So long as Pakistan was co-operating with the US in action against Al Qaeda, the US closed its eyes and continues to close its eyes to Pakistani support for acts of jihadi terrorism directed against India.
One would have expected that the US attitude after the Mumbai terrorist strikes would have been different because the terrorists of the Pakistan Government-raised and backed Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) killed not only about 160 Indians, but also 25 foreigners-----six of them Israelis and another six Americans.
The Jewish civilians killed by the terrorists in the Narriman House were subjected to brutalities the like of which the world has not seen since the brutalities inflicted on the Jewish people by the Nazis during the Second World War.
And yet, the attitude of the US and other Western countries has been the same as it has always been. Where is the evidence, we are asked.
What evidence?
Evidence of the death of 160 Indians?
Evidence of the death of six Americans?
Evidence of the death of six Israelis?
Evidence of the brutalities inflicted by the terrorists on the Jewish people?
Is not the capture by the public of one of the perpetrators, a Pakistani national, who has confessed that he is from Pakistan and that he belonged to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and that the entire operation was mounted by the LET evidence enough?
Are not the intercepted telephone conversations between the perpetrators and their handlers in Pakistan evidence enough?
Are not the movement and activities of Prof.Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the Amir of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), the political wing of the LET, in Pakistan as reported in the Pakistani media and in its own web site evidence enough?
Is not the continued existence of the training camps of the LET in Pakistani territory, including at Muridke, its headquarters near Lahore, evidence enough?
Is not the refusal of the Pakistan Government----whether of Pervez Musharraf or Asif Ali Zardari---- to arrest the operatives of the LET and close their camps despite an ostensible ban on it evidence enough?
What more evidence do the Americans want?
What evidence did they have when Ronald Reagan ordered the bombing of Libya in 1986 after an explosion in a West Berlin discotheque, which killed some Americans?
What evidence did they have before Bill Clinton ordered the Cruise missile attacks on jihadi training camps in Afghan territory in August,1998?
What evidence did they have against Al Qaeda and the Taliban before they bombed Afghanistan from October 7,2001?
What evidence did they have against the Saddam Hussain Government before they invaded and occupied Iraq in 2003?
In every case affecting American nationals and interests, they bombed and then collected evidence. They did not wait till they had collected all the evidence possible before they bombed.
They did not act on the basis of evidence accepted by the international community. They acted on the basis of their conviction as to where from the attacks on Americans came.
Their actions were motivated by the need to show that nobody can play with American lives and get away with it.
We should stop demeaning ourselves as a nation by going to the Americans and others with evidence. I am shocked by suggestions that we should produce the evidence before the UN Security Council. I cannot think of a more naïve idea. It is as stupid as the advice given by the British to Jawaharlal Nehru to take the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council with a promise that it would do justice by India.
The time for action against Pakistan has come. Action based on our conviction that the terrorists came from a Pakistani terrorist organization, which enjoys the patronage of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
The objective of the action should be to force Pakistan to act effectively against the LET and its terrorist infrastructure. It should also be to mount a no-holds barred covert operation against the LET through our own resources and methods.
Two steps the Government can take immediately:
·
STEP No.1: Downgrade the diplomatic relations with Pakistan, terminate all economic relations including bilateral trade and communication links, suspend the confidence-building measures and the so-called peace process, terminate the talks on the gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan and withdraw from the so-called joint counter-terrorism mechanism, which has been a farce forced on Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh by the US. Announce that these actions will remain in force till Pakistan acts against the LET and its terrorist leaders and infrastructure and hands over to India the terrorists wanted for trial in India.
·
STEP No. 2: Revive immediately the covert action capability of the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), which was wound up by Inder Gujral, when he was the Prime Minister in 1997, and empower it to impose prohibitive costs on Pakistan till it stops using jihadi terrorism against India. The R&AW imposed heavy costs on Pakistan for supporting the Khalistanis and should be able to do so now for its support to the LET and other jihadi terrorist organizations.
If step 2 has to be effective, there is an urgent need for a revamping of the R&AW. The organization has been in a bad state of affairs with low staff morale, factionalism and internal bickerings. Unfortunately, at this critical time in the nation’s history, the R&AW has no covert action specialists at the top of its pyramid. Get a suitable officer from the IB or the Army. If necessary, make him the head of the organization..
This is not the time for a direct military confrontation with Pakistan. It could prove counter-productive. It would enable the Pakistan Army to divert its troops from the Pashtun tribal belt to the Indian border and could unite the various jihadi organizations against India.
A divided Pakistan, a bleeding Pakistan, a Pakistan ever on the verge of collapse without actually collapsing----that should be our objective till it stops using terrorism against India.
We should be realistic enough to anticipate that Pakistan will step up terrorism in Indian territory if we adopt such a policy. This should not deter us from embarking on this policy. The policy of active defence against Pakistan should be accompanied by time-bound action to strengthen our counter-terrorism capability at home. (3-12-08)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, November 30, 2008
TIBETAN DIASPORA AND INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS
by B. Raman
( This is the text of a presentation made by me at a seminar on China at New Delhi on November 27,2008. This incorporates and updates some of my earlier views on the subject as expressed in articles written after the Tibetan uprising of March-April,2008, in China. The updating has been done in the light of subsequent developments -----B.Raman)
The Government of India adopted a two-pronged policy in relation to the outbreak of a revolt in Tibet and other Tibetan-inhabited areas of China in March,2008, in protest against the continued occupation of Tibet and other Tibetan-inhabited areas by China and the violation of the human rights of the Tibetans by the Chinese.
2. It prevented the Tibetan refugees in India from indulging in activities which might have resulted in acts of violence or disruption directed against Chinese nationals and interests in India and in dramatic acts such as their professed intention of crossing the border into Tibet. At the same time, it expressed its distress over the situation in Tibet and called for a dialogue so that the Tibetans didn't feel the need to take to acts of violence in their desperation.
3.A spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India said on March 15, 2008: "We would hope that all those involved will work to improve the situation and remove the causes of such trouble in Tibet, which is an autonomous region of China, through dialogue and non-violent means."
4. This was the right approach--- expressing our moral support to the Tibetans in accordance with our national interests without identifying
ourselves with the attempts of anti-China activists in the West---particularly the US--- to exploit the continued alienation of the Tibetans and their desperation to create embarrassment for China.
5. Our aim should be not to embarrass and humiliate China, but to persuade it to change its policy on Tibet and reach a negotiated settlement with His Holiness through a sustained dialogue. India should play the role of a facilitator of such a dialogue. After the March-April ,2008, uprising in the Tibetan inhabited areas, India did well in expressing openly
its distress over the turn of events in Tibet and in expressing its interest in a dialogue and not a street confrontation between the Chinese
and the Tibetans.
6.India should consider one more step at this important point in the history of the Tibetan issue----- removing all informal restrictions on official and social interactions with the Dalai Lama and his advisers. Though not openly admitted, such informal restrictions exist. We saw it at the end of last year, when the Cabinet Secretary to the Government of India was reported to have advised all Ministers of the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, not to attend a public reception for the Dalai Lama to felicitate him on the award of
the Congressional Medal of Honour to him in the US. After the uprising, there were reports in sections of the media that His Holiness was to make a courtesy call on Dr.Hamid Ansari, the Vice-President. This was strongly denied by the Government, presumably because the news had leaked out. What was the need for secrecy in this matter? What was the need for canceling any meeting with His Holiness just because the media had come to know about it? Why the reluctance to interact with him publicly?
7. Till now, our policy has been to make a clear distinction between the religious and political dimensions of our stand with regard to the
Dalai Lama. We have been saying that the courtesies and honour extended by us to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees is because of his stature as a highly respected Buddhist leader in the land where Buddhism was born, but it has no political significance and does not
imply our tacit support for his political views. We should now make it clear that we consider that the Dalai Lama is also an important
political figure in the eyes of the Tibetans and hence, his political views have to be considered in determining our policy on Tibet.
8. Expressing our moral support to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans, without damaging our relations with the Chinese leadership and
people----that should be the objective of our policy.
9. There will be many landmines in the path of policy-making and implementation. As we fine-tune our policy and push it forward gradually,
there could be misperceptions and misinterpretations in China with not only negative impact on our relations with China, but also with renewed tensions across the border, particularly in the Arunachal Pradesh sector. We are seeing a possible reversion back to the period between the 1960s and the 1980s when the Chinese military was in the driving seat of policy-making on Tibet. It was during that period that we saw the military confrontation of 1962 and the subsequent tensions in Sino-Indian relations.
10.The Advisers of His Holiness attribute the failure of their eighth round of talks with the Chinese held at Beijing from October 30 to November 5,2008, and the post—Olympics hardening of the Chinese stand on Tibet to the fact that hardliners are back in the driving seat of policy-making on Tibet. Recent writings by supposedly non-Governmental Chinese strategic analysts in the Chinese language press and Chinese blogs analysed by Shri D.S.Rajan, who had worked for over 30 years as a China analyst in our intelligence community, are disturbing. (http://www.c3sindia.org/strategicissues/419 ).They indicate that the official hardening of the attitude on Tibet has been accompanied by a surge in non-governmental rhetoric on relations with India, in the light of the continuing border dispute and India’s refusal to concede their demand on Arunachal Pradesh.
11.Some of these so-called non-Governmental experts are even talking of the possibility or feasibility of what they describe as a partial war to restore what they project as Chinese sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh, which they call Southern Tibet. We should not dismiss such writings as non-governmental jingoism, which would have no impact on the cordial relations with China.
12.The post-Olympics hardening of the Chinese stand on Tibet has been reflected not only in their refusal to discuss the issue of autonomy with the advisers of His Holiness, but also in their repudiation of promises and commitments made in this regard by Deng Xiaoping on March 12,1979, during a meeting with Gyalo Thondup, the elder brother of the Dalai Lama, and reiterated subsequently by Li Peng, the then Prime Minister, on May 19, 1991. If they can so brazenly, without batting an eyelid, repudiate their solemn promises to discuss the issue of autonomy with the representatives of His Holiness, what is the guarantee that they will not similarly repudiate their commitments on Sikkim or their policy of peace and tranquility in the Arunachal Pradesh sector?
13. The confidence of the Chinese political leadership that they have pacified Tibet and its people once and for all has been badly shaken.
The revolt of March-April, 2008,showed that there has been no emotional integration between the Tibetans and the Han settlers in Tibet. The fear of the masses could once again distort the Chinese military mindset in Tibet. They would not admit that their policies towards the Tibetan people are responsible for the continuing alienation. Instead, they would see with greater conviction than in the past that the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees
in India are the source of all their problems in Tibet and not their policies. The temptation to divert international attention away from Tibet
to Arunachal Pradesh and Dharamsala by engaging in military moves in the Arunachal Pradesh area would be strong.
14. Renewed cross-border military tensions----even Chinese incursions of a major nature--- in the Arunachal Pradesh sector if the Tibetan issue keeps bothering the Chinese and if India remains firm in its stand that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India are a possibility to be factored into in our scenario-buiding and policy-making exercise.
15.The debate on Tibet, which started after the violent incidents of March-April, 2008, in the Tibetan inhabited areas has failed to distinguish between the "Tibetan card" and the 'Tibetan issue". Many in India and the West look upon the post-March developments as providing a "Tibetan card", which can be exploited against China for different strategic objectives.
16.Many in India want the Government to use the Tibetan card to correct the past policy mistakes relating to the totally unwise Indian action in recognising Tibet as an integral part of China without a quid pro quo from Beijing in the form of a recognition of Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of India.
17. This will be an unsophisticated approach which could prove counter-productive. We should not give the impression that we are exploiting the spilling of Tibetan blood and the justified emotional outburst of Tibetan youth not for getting a better future for the Tibetans, but only to serve our own national interest. Nothing can be more unfortunate than such an mpression among the Tibetans.
18. We need policies and an approach in India as well as the West based on the conviction that the long-neglected Tibetan issue---meaning the observance of human rights and giving the Tibetans a genuine voice and genuine political opportunities and religious freedom in their own homeland-- has led to the present situation and that unless the grievances and anger of the Tibetan people are addressed in a satisfactory manner the problem is likely to continue. Our policies should be based on a genuine interest in the Tibetan people, their plight and their future and not on exploiting their uprising for serving our own national interest. We must keep the spotlight on the TIBETAN ISSUE and resist the temptation to use the Tibetan anger as a card for our national purposes.
19.Despite the widespread adverse reactions against China all over the world, the Chinese have not blinked and are unlikely to blink even if there are more violent incidents in Tibet. In their
apprehension, any weakening of their stand on Tibet could mark the beginning of their losing control over China's sensitive periphery consisting of Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.
20. A message, which comes out loud and clear , is that despite being away from Tibet for nearly 50 years now, the Dalai Lama continues to command the respect of the Tibetan people inside China. Chinese attempts to demonise him and project him as the problem have not succeeded. A vast majority of the Tibetan people in China continue to look up to him with undiminished reverence as their political and spiritual leader.
21.By solely relying on their security forces and on the Han settlers for strengthening their hold on the Tibetan-inhabited areas, the Chinese have created for themselves a situation similar to what the Soviets had created for themselves in the Baltic States. They forcibly incorporated them into the USSR and tried to change the demographic complexion of the States by settling a large number of Russians----many of them ex-servicemen-- in the Baltic States. They got caught in a vicious circle. The more the suppression, the more the people's anger. The more the people's anger, the more the suppression. The more the Russian settlers, the more the hatred for them. The more the hatred for them, the more the Russian settlers. Ultimately, the Soviets had to watch helplessly as the Baltic States threw off the Soviet yoke and re-gained their independence. Can a similar situation develop in the Tibetan-inhabited areas and in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia? If it does, what should be India’s options? These questions need careful consideration.
22. China is waiting for the Dalai Lama to die so that it could nominate his successor. It is hoping and calculating that the death of His Holiness would mark the beginning of the end of the Tibetan issue. There ought to be a convergence between Indian and Tibetan interests in ensuring that even after his death, the Tibetan issue would not disappear from the attention of the world till a settlement on their future acceptable to the Tibetans is reached. The Tibetan issue should not be allowed to die with His Holiness.
23.How to help the Tibetans in keeping alive their cause and ultimately securing their goal of autonomy without our help leading to a confrontational situation with China on our border with that country? How to prepare ourselves for such a confrontation if it materialises despite our best efforts to avoid it? These are questions which need careful consideration.
24.So long as the Tibetan issue is not resolved to the mutual satisfaction of the Chinese and the Tibetans and so long as the border dispute is not resolved to the mutual satisfaction of India and China, we cannot rule out another military confrontation imposed on us by China. The implementation of the projects already initiated by the Government for strengthening the infrastructure in the Arunachal Pradesh area and for giving our armed forces greater teeth to meet any Chinese miscalculation should be pushed ahead. Avoidance of unwise rhetoric, which may bring about a confrontation before we are ready for it, and a quiet determination and preparedness to face such a confrontation, if it is forced on us, should be the cornerstones of our policy. (27-11-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies.E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
( This is the text of a presentation made by me at a seminar on China at New Delhi on November 27,2008. This incorporates and updates some of my earlier views on the subject as expressed in articles written after the Tibetan uprising of March-April,2008, in China. The updating has been done in the light of subsequent developments -----B.Raman)
The Government of India adopted a two-pronged policy in relation to the outbreak of a revolt in Tibet and other Tibetan-inhabited areas of China in March,2008, in protest against the continued occupation of Tibet and other Tibetan-inhabited areas by China and the violation of the human rights of the Tibetans by the Chinese.
2. It prevented the Tibetan refugees in India from indulging in activities which might have resulted in acts of violence or disruption directed against Chinese nationals and interests in India and in dramatic acts such as their professed intention of crossing the border into Tibet. At the same time, it expressed its distress over the situation in Tibet and called for a dialogue so that the Tibetans didn't feel the need to take to acts of violence in their desperation.
3.A spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India said on March 15, 2008: "We would hope that all those involved will work to improve the situation and remove the causes of such trouble in Tibet, which is an autonomous region of China, through dialogue and non-violent means."
4. This was the right approach--- expressing our moral support to the Tibetans in accordance with our national interests without identifying
ourselves with the attempts of anti-China activists in the West---particularly the US--- to exploit the continued alienation of the Tibetans and their desperation to create embarrassment for China.
5. Our aim should be not to embarrass and humiliate China, but to persuade it to change its policy on Tibet and reach a negotiated settlement with His Holiness through a sustained dialogue. India should play the role of a facilitator of such a dialogue. After the March-April ,2008, uprising in the Tibetan inhabited areas, India did well in expressing openly
its distress over the turn of events in Tibet and in expressing its interest in a dialogue and not a street confrontation between the Chinese
and the Tibetans.
6.India should consider one more step at this important point in the history of the Tibetan issue----- removing all informal restrictions on official and social interactions with the Dalai Lama and his advisers. Though not openly admitted, such informal restrictions exist. We saw it at the end of last year, when the Cabinet Secretary to the Government of India was reported to have advised all Ministers of the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, not to attend a public reception for the Dalai Lama to felicitate him on the award of
the Congressional Medal of Honour to him in the US. After the uprising, there were reports in sections of the media that His Holiness was to make a courtesy call on Dr.Hamid Ansari, the Vice-President. This was strongly denied by the Government, presumably because the news had leaked out. What was the need for secrecy in this matter? What was the need for canceling any meeting with His Holiness just because the media had come to know about it? Why the reluctance to interact with him publicly?
7. Till now, our policy has been to make a clear distinction between the religious and political dimensions of our stand with regard to the
Dalai Lama. We have been saying that the courtesies and honour extended by us to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees is because of his stature as a highly respected Buddhist leader in the land where Buddhism was born, but it has no political significance and does not
imply our tacit support for his political views. We should now make it clear that we consider that the Dalai Lama is also an important
political figure in the eyes of the Tibetans and hence, his political views have to be considered in determining our policy on Tibet.
8. Expressing our moral support to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetans, without damaging our relations with the Chinese leadership and
people----that should be the objective of our policy.
9. There will be many landmines in the path of policy-making and implementation. As we fine-tune our policy and push it forward gradually,
there could be misperceptions and misinterpretations in China with not only negative impact on our relations with China, but also with renewed tensions across the border, particularly in the Arunachal Pradesh sector. We are seeing a possible reversion back to the period between the 1960s and the 1980s when the Chinese military was in the driving seat of policy-making on Tibet. It was during that period that we saw the military confrontation of 1962 and the subsequent tensions in Sino-Indian relations.
10.The Advisers of His Holiness attribute the failure of their eighth round of talks with the Chinese held at Beijing from October 30 to November 5,2008, and the post—Olympics hardening of the Chinese stand on Tibet to the fact that hardliners are back in the driving seat of policy-making on Tibet. Recent writings by supposedly non-Governmental Chinese strategic analysts in the Chinese language press and Chinese blogs analysed by Shri D.S.Rajan, who had worked for over 30 years as a China analyst in our intelligence community, are disturbing. (http://www.c3sindia.org/strategicissues/419 ).They indicate that the official hardening of the attitude on Tibet has been accompanied by a surge in non-governmental rhetoric on relations with India, in the light of the continuing border dispute and India’s refusal to concede their demand on Arunachal Pradesh.
11.Some of these so-called non-Governmental experts are even talking of the possibility or feasibility of what they describe as a partial war to restore what they project as Chinese sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh, which they call Southern Tibet. We should not dismiss such writings as non-governmental jingoism, which would have no impact on the cordial relations with China.
12.The post-Olympics hardening of the Chinese stand on Tibet has been reflected not only in their refusal to discuss the issue of autonomy with the advisers of His Holiness, but also in their repudiation of promises and commitments made in this regard by Deng Xiaoping on March 12,1979, during a meeting with Gyalo Thondup, the elder brother of the Dalai Lama, and reiterated subsequently by Li Peng, the then Prime Minister, on May 19, 1991. If they can so brazenly, without batting an eyelid, repudiate their solemn promises to discuss the issue of autonomy with the representatives of His Holiness, what is the guarantee that they will not similarly repudiate their commitments on Sikkim or their policy of peace and tranquility in the Arunachal Pradesh sector?
13. The confidence of the Chinese political leadership that they have pacified Tibet and its people once and for all has been badly shaken.
The revolt of March-April, 2008,showed that there has been no emotional integration between the Tibetans and the Han settlers in Tibet. The fear of the masses could once again distort the Chinese military mindset in Tibet. They would not admit that their policies towards the Tibetan people are responsible for the continuing alienation. Instead, they would see with greater conviction than in the past that the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees
in India are the source of all their problems in Tibet and not their policies. The temptation to divert international attention away from Tibet
to Arunachal Pradesh and Dharamsala by engaging in military moves in the Arunachal Pradesh area would be strong.
14. Renewed cross-border military tensions----even Chinese incursions of a major nature--- in the Arunachal Pradesh sector if the Tibetan issue keeps bothering the Chinese and if India remains firm in its stand that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India are a possibility to be factored into in our scenario-buiding and policy-making exercise.
15.The debate on Tibet, which started after the violent incidents of March-April, 2008, in the Tibetan inhabited areas has failed to distinguish between the "Tibetan card" and the 'Tibetan issue". Many in India and the West look upon the post-March developments as providing a "Tibetan card", which can be exploited against China for different strategic objectives.
16.Many in India want the Government to use the Tibetan card to correct the past policy mistakes relating to the totally unwise Indian action in recognising Tibet as an integral part of China without a quid pro quo from Beijing in the form of a recognition of Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of India.
17. This will be an unsophisticated approach which could prove counter-productive. We should not give the impression that we are exploiting the spilling of Tibetan blood and the justified emotional outburst of Tibetan youth not for getting a better future for the Tibetans, but only to serve our own national interest. Nothing can be more unfortunate than such an mpression among the Tibetans.
18. We need policies and an approach in India as well as the West based on the conviction that the long-neglected Tibetan issue---meaning the observance of human rights and giving the Tibetans a genuine voice and genuine political opportunities and religious freedom in their own homeland-- has led to the present situation and that unless the grievances and anger of the Tibetan people are addressed in a satisfactory manner the problem is likely to continue. Our policies should be based on a genuine interest in the Tibetan people, their plight and their future and not on exploiting their uprising for serving our own national interest. We must keep the spotlight on the TIBETAN ISSUE and resist the temptation to use the Tibetan anger as a card for our national purposes.
19.Despite the widespread adverse reactions against China all over the world, the Chinese have not blinked and are unlikely to blink even if there are more violent incidents in Tibet. In their
apprehension, any weakening of their stand on Tibet could mark the beginning of their losing control over China's sensitive periphery consisting of Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.
20. A message, which comes out loud and clear , is that despite being away from Tibet for nearly 50 years now, the Dalai Lama continues to command the respect of the Tibetan people inside China. Chinese attempts to demonise him and project him as the problem have not succeeded. A vast majority of the Tibetan people in China continue to look up to him with undiminished reverence as their political and spiritual leader.
21.By solely relying on their security forces and on the Han settlers for strengthening their hold on the Tibetan-inhabited areas, the Chinese have created for themselves a situation similar to what the Soviets had created for themselves in the Baltic States. They forcibly incorporated them into the USSR and tried to change the demographic complexion of the States by settling a large number of Russians----many of them ex-servicemen-- in the Baltic States. They got caught in a vicious circle. The more the suppression, the more the people's anger. The more the people's anger, the more the suppression. The more the Russian settlers, the more the hatred for them. The more the hatred for them, the more the Russian settlers. Ultimately, the Soviets had to watch helplessly as the Baltic States threw off the Soviet yoke and re-gained their independence. Can a similar situation develop in the Tibetan-inhabited areas and in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia? If it does, what should be India’s options? These questions need careful consideration.
22. China is waiting for the Dalai Lama to die so that it could nominate his successor. It is hoping and calculating that the death of His Holiness would mark the beginning of the end of the Tibetan issue. There ought to be a convergence between Indian and Tibetan interests in ensuring that even after his death, the Tibetan issue would not disappear from the attention of the world till a settlement on their future acceptable to the Tibetans is reached. The Tibetan issue should not be allowed to die with His Holiness.
23.How to help the Tibetans in keeping alive their cause and ultimately securing their goal of autonomy without our help leading to a confrontational situation with China on our border with that country? How to prepare ourselves for such a confrontation if it materialises despite our best efforts to avoid it? These are questions which need careful consideration.
24.So long as the Tibetan issue is not resolved to the mutual satisfaction of the Chinese and the Tibetans and so long as the border dispute is not resolved to the mutual satisfaction of India and China, we cannot rule out another military confrontation imposed on us by China. The implementation of the projects already initiated by the Government for strengthening the infrastructure in the Arunachal Pradesh area and for giving our armed forces greater teeth to meet any Chinese miscalculation should be pushed ahead. Avoidance of unwise rhetoric, which may bring about a confrontation before we are ready for it, and a quiet determination and preparedness to face such a confrontation, if it is forced on us, should be the cornerstones of our policy. (27-11-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies.E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
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