B.RAMAN
( Paper presented at a seminar organised by the Asia Centre, Bangalore, on Auguast 9,2008)
The Prime Minister, Dr.Manmohan Singh, met Nepal's caretaker Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala on the margins of the summitconference of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) at Colombo on August 3,2008, and reportedly assured him ofIndia's continued support to Nepal's democratic transition. During the meeting, Manmohan Singh told Koirala that he was impressed by thesteps taken by Nepal to usher in democracy, including the conduct of the Constituent Assembly elections on April 10.
2. At the time Koirala went to Colombo to attend the summit, an agreement on the formation of a new Government continued to elude themajor political formations in the newly-elected Constituent Assembly. In fact, the decision taken by Koirala without allegedly consulting theCommunist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Communist party of Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) to represent Nepal at the summit hadbecome a matter of major controversy. The Maoists, who constitute the largest single grouping in the Constituent Assembly, and theCPN--UML felt that Nepal should have been represented by the newly-elected President Ram Baran Yadav and not by the caretaker PrimeMinister, whose days in office were numbered. Ultimately, the Maoists and the CPN-UML had agreed to Koirala attending the summit afterhe reportedly apologised for not consulting them in the matter in advance. This controversy brought into focus once again the suspicion anddistrust, which continued to mark the relations among the major political formations after the elections to the Constituent Assembly, withthe Maoists smelling an Indian-inspired conspiracy to deny them the fruits of office.
3. However, after the return of Koirala to Kathmandu from Colombo, the main political parties agreed on August 5,2008, to form a nationalunity Government led by the Maoists, who will be joined by the Nepali Congress, the CPN---UML and the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF)that represents the people of the Terai region bordering India. The Maoists reached an agreement with the leaders of the other threeparties to head the coalition after what was described as ``breakthrough'' talks by Jhala Nath Khanal, the General Secretary of the CPN -UML. According to Khanal, the leaders of the four parties agreed that the coalition will remain in office at least until the Assembly approveda new constitution, a process that may take two years to complete.
4. The talks on Government formation had gone through so many ups and downs during the last four months that any optimistic conclusionthat the suspicions and distrust, which had dogged the talks till August 5, would now be a matter of the past could be misplaced. Before thecontroversy relating to Koirala's participation in the SAARC summit, there was another controversy caused by the election on July 24,2008,of Ram Baran Yadav, an ethnic Madhesi, as Nepal's first President defeating a Maoist candidate. Following this, the Maoists had withdrawnfrom the talks on Government formation in a huff. It took some time and efforts to cajole them back into the talks. The interim Government,which paved the way for the elections to the Constituent Assembly and the declaration of Nepal with a population of 26.4 million as aRepublic on May 28,2008, after ending 240 years of the monarchy, had earlier this year agreed to give the Madhesis greater representationin state and local administration in order to end 16 days of strikes and protests that paralyzed Terai and led to fuel and food shortages inKathmandu. The Terai region is Nepal's agricultural heartland and, according to the Madhesi leaders, it accounts for 48 per cent of thecountry's population and 80 per cent of its commercial and industrial activities. It is the main transport link to India, Nepal's biggest tradingpartner.
5. If the latest agreement does not break down, Puspa Kamal Dahal, the Maoist leader known as Prachanda, is expected to lead thenational unity government as Prime Minister for the next two years. The CPN (Maoist) holds 220 seats in the 601- member ConstituentAssembly, double the number of its nearest rival, the Nepali Congress. With less than forty per cent of the seats, its role inpolicy-making----whether in relation to the new Constitution or in relation to Nepal's domestic and external issues--- should normally belimited. But what it lacks in terms of seats in the Constituent Assembly will be sought to be made good by it through its well-motivated andwell-trained cadres, who would try to enable the party to have its way in matters relating to its agenda through muscle and street powerwhen the voting power is found inadequate.
6. In the list of the irreducible minimum of its agenda is the integration of suitable members of its trained army into the Nepal Army, therebygiving Nepal for the first time an ideologically indoctrinated army. A People's Liberation Army (PLA) of Nepal will be the dream of Prachanda.Will the other three political formations be able to resist the Maoists' plans to reorganise the Army and make it the tool of the ultimatecapture of total state power by the Maoists? That is the first question, which ought to be worrying Indian policy-makers.
7. In the new Government, which would guide the initial steps in Constitution and policy-making, the Maoists will be in the driving seat ofpower, but not yet in total control of it, but total control will be their ultimate aim. The Maoists have reached where they are now through amix of the Chinese and Soviet tactics.Through Chinese-style armed peasant power, they established control over large parts of the ruralareas, but when control of Kathmandu and the Indian-influenced Terai region eluded them, they joined the other political formations in ademocratic street agitation, which gave them their present share of power. In Russia, the Bolsheviks led by Lenin rode to power piggy-backon the Mensheviks. After having got a share of the power and the exit of the Tsar, they kicked the Mensheviks out and established adictatorship of the proletariat, which was to last for nearly 74 years. Is a similar scenario possible in Nepal? That is the second questionwhich should preoccupy our policy-makers. Would such a scenario be in India's interest? If not, should India actively, but discreetly work toprevent it? Who could be its objective allies if it decides or is forced to do so?
8. Prachanda has taken pains to reassure India that it will have nothing to worry about due to the rise of the Maoists to power. Politicalequidistance between India and China, but not economic equidependence has been the central theme of his pronouncements.Nepal'seconomic links with India are so strong that there would be no danger of their dilution as a result of Nepal's closer relations with China, hesays. He told Karan Thapar of the CNN-IBN in an interview on May 20,2008 when he was asked what sort of relations he would be looking atwith India: " A new relation on a new basis. The new base has been laid down with the understanding from Delhi. A new unity with Delhi isalready in process. A new relation means better relations, understanding and cooperation. We want to come closer to New Delhi on thebasis of new relations. I always said that there is a special relationship with India, geographical and cultural, and therefore we should havea special relationship with New Delhi. No one can ignore this historical, geographical and cultural fact. What I am saying is that we will notside up with one country against the other. We will maintain equidistance in political sense and not in terms of cooperation and otherthings. The culture, history and geographical relationship that Nepal has with India will remain intact. It is a historic fact and we will have tostrengthen this relationship."
9. However, there are two issues relating to India on which his heart and mind are set. The first relates to the re-negotiation of the 1950Indo-Nepal treaty and a general review of all other bilateral agreements with India. He told Karan Thapar: " Our people have put forward thisconcern that they feel that the treaty (of 1950) lacks in equality and that it is not beneficial for Nepal. We thus want to review all the pointsof the 1950 treaty. And we want to revise it according to new necessity." When asked whether he wanted to drop the provisions for openborder and the national citizenship status for the people of Nepal in India, he was evasive and said: " Not exactly right now. There are otherprovisions that we want to discuss in detail." He indicated that one of these provisions requiring re-negotiation would be the defencepurchase provision which requires Nepal to consult Delhi and only then acquire arms. He added: "That also should be reviewed and shouldbe made according to the necessity of the 21st century."
10. Karan Thapar then drew his attention to a statement made by Babu Ram Bhattarai, his party colleague, to the "Nepal Telegraph" on May10, 2008, that it was only because of the open border that Nepal could not achieve economic prosperity and asked him whether he agreedwith that. He was again evasive in his reply. He said: "In the transitional phase, right now with the processes going on, it (Bhattarai's view) isnot correct." Prachanda added: " I want to have a general review on all the treaties. But specifically I want to review the 1950 treaty. Wewant changes in the 1950 treaty, others may be okay, or may be revised, but we want to generally review them.We want to strengthenrelations by re-negotiating."
11. The other issue relating to India on which his heart and mind are set is the re-examination of the question of recruitment of Gurkhas tothe Indian and other foreign armies. He told Karan Thapar:" We want to discuss this issue. We don’t want to stop it right now. We want toreview the whole history of the development and the implication on both countries. What kind of relation is created through this institution iswhat we want to review. We want to review and discuss it. I think this will be debated in our Constituent Assembly. It is an important topic.Now we are about to draft a new constitution and that will guide us for Nepal’s vital interest. These are historical questions. We will have toreview it in that perspective. Here in Nepal there was feudal autocracy as a political system. Now we are changing that into a democraticsystem, and we are looking at rapid economic development so that our youth don’t have to look for employment in other countries. We wantto change the political and economic scenario."
12. What are the present ground realities regarding Nepal's relations with India and China? Nepal's exports to India constitute about 55 percent of its total exports and its imports from India about 44 per cent of its total imports.There are over 265 approved Indian joint ventures inNepal of which over 100 are operational, with a cumulative total Indian investment amounting to between 36-40 per cent of the totalForeign Direct Investment in Nepal. The total project cost of these 265 projects is around Rs.28.5 billion, with fixed investment amountingto Rs. 21.9 billion and the foreign investment component amounting to Rs. 7.427 billion. These joint ventures are in practically every sector,including tourism, infrastructure, consumer durables & non-durables and export oriented industries like garments and carpets. A number ofIndian companies, including Dabur, Hindustan Lever, Colgate, etc., have established their manufacturing base in Nepal with the objective toexport their finished products to India. It needs to be added that these statistics taken from the web site of the Indian Embassy inKathmandu relate to the period till 2002-03. The figures must have further gone up since then.
13.The initial focus of India's economic assistance was on infrastructural projects, involving the construction of roads, bridges, hospitalsand airports. While infrastructure continued to remain the priority focus, projects also began to include health, industrial estates and othersectors. About 80 per cent of the Mahendra Raj Marg, a highway that runs the entire length of Nepal (1024 kms.) from the east to the westalong the southern terai, has been constructed by India. In addition, roads from Kathmandu to Dakshinkali, Trishuli, Balaju, Godavari andRaxaul via Hetauda, Sunauli to Pokhara, Rajbiraj to Koshi Barrage and the Janakpur town road are contributions of Indian assistance. Indiahas also constructed a number of bridges on these roads and separately two bridges on the river Bagmati at Kathmandu and one on theriver Mohana. The bridge on the river Sirsiya between the towns of Raxaul on the Indian side and Birgunj on the Nepalese side has alsobeen completed and opened for traffic.Twenty-two other bridges were constructed with Indian assistance on the Kohalpur-Mahakali Sectorof East West Highway.
14. The total value of trade (exports plus imports) between India and Nepal is about 48 per cent of the total trade of Nepal with foreigncountries as against about 10 per cent only in the case of Nepal and China. The total number of Chinese investment projects in Nepal was44 only till 2003-04 for which statistics are available as against nearly 300 in the case of India.Of these, 25 were operational, six underconstruction and the remaining 13 licensed. Chinese investments have been mainly in hotels and restaurants, electronics, radio pagingservices, readymade garments , nursing homes, hydropower, civil construction, etc. China has helped Nepal in the construction of 11 roadswith a total length of about 600 Kms as against nearly 1500 kms in the case of India. China has also been helping Nepal in the constructionof one hydel project, one irrigation project and two electrical transmission projects.
15.In 2001, China and Nepal signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Tourism Cooperation, including Nepal into the list of the tourismdestinations for outbound Chinese travelers. Subsequently, the two countries signed an "Air Service Agreement", according to which, AirChina opened a direct air link between China and Nepal in 2004, by the route of Chengdu-Lasha-Kathmandu. In addition, the China SouthernAirline has also started operating an air service between Guangzhou and Kathmandu since February, 2007. Likewise, the Nepal Airline isoperating air services between Kathmandu and Shanghai and Kathmandu and Hongkong.
16.Military-military relationship has been given increasing attention since 1998, when the the Nepal Army started sending officers andsoldiers to study in Chinese military universities. In the academic year 2006/2007 , 21 officers and soldiers of the Nepal Army went to Chinafor training. China has sent military officers to participate in the adventure trainings organized by the Nepal Army since 2002.
17. While China's relations with Nepal have been expanding over the years, they are nowhere near the multi-faceted relationship betweenNepal and India. In terms of value and usefulness, Nepal's relations with India have been more significant than its relations with China.Nepal has benefited far more from its privileged economic relations with India than vice versa. If a Maoist-dominated Nepal tries forequidependence in its economic relations with India and China, it will be lifting a huge boulder and throwing it on its own feet. Prachandagives the impression of realising this, but not many others in the CPN(Maoist). Bhattarai blames the open border with India for Nepal'sbackwardness. One does not know how sincere is Prachanda when he talks of the importance attached by him to Nepal's relations withIndia.
18. Pro-China intellectuals in Nepal make no secret of their dislike for India.Chinese officials and diplomats keep emphasising that China'srelations with Nepal are based on the three principles of trust, equality and sincerity. They thereby hint that while China treats Nepal as anequal partner, India does not.
19.Addressing the Nepal Council of World Affairs at Kathmandu on August 5,2008, the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Zheng Xianglin said:"Nepal is situated in a favorable geographical position in South Asia, and is a passage linking China and South Asia." That is the reason forthe Chinese interest in Nepal----as a passage to South Asia and as an instrument for strengthening the Chinese presence in South Asia.China has a Look South policy to counter our Look East policy.As we try to move Eastwards to cultivate the countries of South-East Asia, itis trying to move southwards to outflank us. China is not a South Asian power, but it already has a growing South Asian strategicpresence----- in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. It is hoping to acquire a similar presence in Nepal with the co-operation of aMaoist-dominated Government. It has already acquired the status of an observer in the SAARC. Some in the SAARC would ultimately like tomake it a SAARC member to counter the presence and influence of India. Nepal in the past refrained from joining those working for theinclusion of China in the SAARC. A Maoist-dominated Government may do so in future.
20. China has already given indications of its interest in strengthening the value of Nepal as a passage to South Asia by connecting the roadnetwork in Tibet with that in Nepal and by extending the railway line to Lhasa to Kathmandu. If China succeeds in concretising theseideas, the threats to our security will be enhanced. China has other reasons to welcome the rise of the Maoists to power in Nepal. It ishoping with reason that Nepal would stop the anti-China activities of the 1000-strong community of Tibetan refugees in Nepal. They havebeen in the forefront of the agitation against the Han colonisation of Tibet. Some of them are being used by the US Govt.funded Radio FreeAsia for producing programmes directed to the Tibetans. China apprehends that if there is unrest in Tibet after the death of the Dalai Lama,these refugees might be utilised by the US----with the complicity of India--- to destabilise the Chinese presence in Tibet. It is hoping topre-empt this with the co-operation of a Maoist-dominated Government in Kathmandu.
21. India will find itself in Nepal in a situation not dissimilar to the situation in Myanmar----all the time having to compete with China forpolitical influence and economic benefits. Till now, India almost monopolised the strategic playing field in Nepal. Now, there will be a secondplayer in China. In Myanmar, whenever the military Government had to choose between Indian and Chinese interests, it always chose theChinese interests because of its fear of China and its gratitude to China for the support extended by it to the military junta in internationalfora such as the UN Security Council. In Nepal whenever there is a conflict between Indian and Chinese interests, a Maoist-dominated Govt.will choose Chinese interests not out of fear or gratitude but out of considerations of ideological affinity.
22. The relations of the State of Nepal with the State of Pakistan are miniscule and hence of no major concern to India at present. What is ofconcern to India even now and may be of greater concern in future are the activities of the Pakistani and Pakistan-based non-State actorsagainst India from sanctuaries in Nepalese territory and the growing presence and activities of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)from Nepal. In the 1980s and the 1990s, the Khalistani organisations based in Pakistan used to operate through Nepal. So too the jihadiorganisations in the 1990s and thereafter. Pakistan-based mafia groups like the one of Dawood Ibrahim have active supporters in theMuslim community in the Terai region of Nepal. After the Mumbai blasts of March,1993, some of the perpetrators fled to Karachi viaKathmandu. Large amounts of black money from India are laundered in or through Kathmandu, which is also a nodal point for the pumping ofcounterfeit currency notes by the ISI into India. Some years ago, the Government of India reportedly came to know that a cable TV network,which was to come up in Nepal, was actually funded by Dawood Ibrahim. Timely intimation of the information to the Nepalese authoritiesresulted in the withdrawal of permission for the project. Nepalese co-operation in counter-terrorism, counter-money-laundering and mutuallegal assistance are important for our intelligence and investigation agencies.
23. This co-operation and assistance were facilitated in the past by good police-to-police relations. Many of the old generation Nepalesepolice officers were trained in Indian police institutions. They networked well with their counterparts in India --- informally as well asformally. Under a Maoist-led Government, this co-operation is likely to become more and more formal and less and less informal. Over-formalised co-operation is often not very effective in the absence of the informal component.
24. Prachanda and others are yet to come out with detailed formulations on what would be Nepal's relations with the US under a Maoist-ledGovernment. The US Embassy in Kathmandu is reported to have already established lines of communications with the Maoists. The firstpriority of the US would be to discourage the Maoists from moving too close to China. This would also be in India's interest. The first priorityof the Maoists will be to have the name of the CPN (Maoists) removed from the list of terrorist organisations maintained by the US. Thisshould not be difficult since the CPN (Maoists), unlike the LTTE of Sri Lanka, has not been formally designated as a Foreign TerroristOrganisation under a 1996 US law.
25. What impact will the decision of the CPN (Maoists) to give up its armed struggle half-way through and join the democratic mainstream have on the spread of Maoism across the tribal belt of Central India? Not much. The ideological and material dependence of the NepaleseMaoists on their Indian counterparts was more than the other way round. The Indian Maoists, while complimenting their Nepalesecounterparts for their good performance in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, have at the same time been expressing theirskepticism over the success of the experiment being attempted in Nepal. Indian Maoists seem to expect that the Nepalese experiment willnot work and will come unstuck.
26. The Maoists have done well in the elections, which were widely perceived across the world as free and fair. The voters of Nepal havepreferred them over other parties, which had failed to come up to their expectations in the past. A Maoist-led Government is thefreely-expressed choice of the voters. India has no other option but to work with it so long as its policies do not take a blatantly anti-Indiandimension, which would be unacceptable to India. However, if the policies of the new Government do acquire such a dimension, India shouldhave the courage and confidence to be able to have the situation rectified with the help of its well-wishers in Nepal. Despite all that hashappened, there is still a large reservoir of well-wishers of India in Nepal. They should be nurtured and encouraged to be active---not forundermining the Maoists, but for preventing anti-Indian distortions. (7-8-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Sunday, August 10, 2008
Friday, August 8, 2008
WHO HAS THE FINGER ON THE BOLT OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL?
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE MESSY & DANGEROUS SITUATION IN PAKISTAN
B.RAMAN
This is not a structured article. Am travelling. Hence, only some quick thoughts.
Faced with the threat of impeachment proceedings by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif), the following options are available for President Pervez Musharraf:
(a). Pre-empt the impeachment proceedings through a petition before the Supreme Court. The present bench in the Supreme Court is sympathetic to him. It could oblige him, but if the Army does not want to get involved in a controversy between the popularly elected Executive and the judiciary, he may have difficulty in getting the order of the judiciary enforced.
(b). Dismiss the Government and suspend the National Assembly on the ground that the Government failed to protect the honour of the Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence and joined in a conspiracy to weaken the ISI at a time when the people in the Kashmir Valley were facing a threat to their existence due to the agitation in the Jammu area. Under the amendment to the constitution introduced by him, such a step can be taken by him only on the recommendation of the National Security Council (NSC) chaired by him. If the Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers of provinces refuse to attend the NSC meeting called for this purpose, it will lack the quorum. He can still go ahead if the chiefs of the Armed Forces and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are NSC members, attend. Gen.Pervez Ashfaq Kiyani, the Chief of the Army Staff, and the Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff, might attend. If the Air Force and Navy chiefs refuse, Musharraf will make himself liable for impeachment on grounds of creating disunityin the Armed Forces at a time when terrorism is on the increase and Kashmir is on the boil.
(c). Quit gracefully. This is not in his blood.
2. The political opposition will have the following options:
(a).Start impeachment proceedings. It does not have the required two-thirds majority in the two Houses of the Parliament. The judiciary may not support it.
(b).Create a street agitation on the ground that Musharraf's conspiracies against the elected Government are weakening national security at a time when terrorism is on the increase and Kashmir is on the boil
(c).Come to terms with the reality that it does not have the required two-thirds majority and make a lot of threatening noises in the parliament without going ahead with the impeachment.
Whichever scenario materialises, both the partices might exploit the situation in Kashmir as a stick against their opponents. It is necessary for the Indian Army to redouble its preparedness for any eventuality.
In the meanwhile, who is in charge of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal? Who has the finger on the bolt of the arsenal? A chilling question.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical Studies, Chennai.
B.RAMAN
This is not a structured article. Am travelling. Hence, only some quick thoughts.
Faced with the threat of impeachment proceedings by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif), the following options are available for President Pervez Musharraf:
(a). Pre-empt the impeachment proceedings through a petition before the Supreme Court. The present bench in the Supreme Court is sympathetic to him. It could oblige him, but if the Army does not want to get involved in a controversy between the popularly elected Executive and the judiciary, he may have difficulty in getting the order of the judiciary enforced.
(b). Dismiss the Government and suspend the National Assembly on the ground that the Government failed to protect the honour of the Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence and joined in a conspiracy to weaken the ISI at a time when the people in the Kashmir Valley were facing a threat to their existence due to the agitation in the Jammu area. Under the amendment to the constitution introduced by him, such a step can be taken by him only on the recommendation of the National Security Council (NSC) chaired by him. If the Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers of provinces refuse to attend the NSC meeting called for this purpose, it will lack the quorum. He can still go ahead if the chiefs of the Armed Forces and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are NSC members, attend. Gen.Pervez Ashfaq Kiyani, the Chief of the Army Staff, and the Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff, might attend. If the Air Force and Navy chiefs refuse, Musharraf will make himself liable for impeachment on grounds of creating disunityin the Armed Forces at a time when terrorism is on the increase and Kashmir is on the boil.
(c). Quit gracefully. This is not in his blood.
2. The political opposition will have the following options:
(a).Start impeachment proceedings. It does not have the required two-thirds majority in the two Houses of the Parliament. The judiciary may not support it.
(b).Create a street agitation on the ground that Musharraf's conspiracies against the elected Government are weakening national security at a time when terrorism is on the increase and Kashmir is on the boil
(c).Come to terms with the reality that it does not have the required two-thirds majority and make a lot of threatening noises in the parliament without going ahead with the impeachment.
Whichever scenario materialises, both the partices might exploit the situation in Kashmir as a stick against their opponents. It is necessary for the Indian Army to redouble its preparedness for any eventuality.
In the meanwhile, who is in charge of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal? Who has the finger on the bolt of the arsenal? A chilling question.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical Studies, Chennai.
Tuesday, August 5, 2008
CHINESE WORRIED BY NEW JIHADI MODUS OPERANDI
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.426
B.RAMAN
On July 2,2008, two Israelis were killed and 30 others injured when a tractor driven by an Arab resident of east Jerusalem trampled over pedestrians and vehicles and flipped over two buses in central Jerusalem.A state of emergency was declared in the city following the attack. Jerusalem Police Chief Aharon Franco told the media that a tractor driven by a terrorist began hitting vehicles and flipped over two buses." There was a similar attack a week later.
2. On August 4,2008, 16 police border guards of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security were killed at Kashgar in the Xinjiang province, when they were allegedly attacked by two Uighurs belonging to the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan (IMET). According to the initial version of the local authorities, the Uighurs came to a border post in a stolen heavy truck, jumped out and threw hand-grenades at a party of police guards doing their morning exercise. Subsequently, they said they actually threw home-made explosives at the policemen who were jogging.
3. According to a foreign blogger based in Xinjiang, there were unconfirmed reports that the police guards actually died when the two Uighurs drove their heavy truck into them. They had no explosives or weapons. If true, this seems to have been a copy-cat emulation of the modus operandi (MO) adopted by Palestinian terrorists against the Isrealis in East Jerusalem.
4. The Chinese have not admitted that the police guards were killed when the truck drove into them. They continue to maintain that the police guards were killed by explosives. They seem to be worried that this MO might be copied by other terrorist groups in Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong during the Olympics.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
On July 2,2008, two Israelis were killed and 30 others injured when a tractor driven by an Arab resident of east Jerusalem trampled over pedestrians and vehicles and flipped over two buses in central Jerusalem.A state of emergency was declared in the city following the attack. Jerusalem Police Chief Aharon Franco told the media that a tractor driven by a terrorist began hitting vehicles and flipped over two buses." There was a similar attack a week later.
2. On August 4,2008, 16 police border guards of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security were killed at Kashgar in the Xinjiang province, when they were allegedly attacked by two Uighurs belonging to the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan (IMET). According to the initial version of the local authorities, the Uighurs came to a border post in a stolen heavy truck, jumped out and threw hand-grenades at a party of police guards doing their morning exercise. Subsequently, they said they actually threw home-made explosives at the policemen who were jogging.
3. According to a foreign blogger based in Xinjiang, there were unconfirmed reports that the police guards actually died when the two Uighurs drove their heavy truck into them. They had no explosives or weapons. If true, this seems to have been a copy-cat emulation of the modus operandi (MO) adopted by Palestinian terrorists against the Isrealis in East Jerusalem.
4. The Chinese have not admitted that the police guards were killed when the truck drove into them. They continue to maintain that the police guards were killed by explosives. They seem to be worried that this MO might be copied by other terrorist groups in Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong during the Olympics.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
CHINESE DELINK XINJIANG INCIDENT FROM OLYMPICS
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.425
B.RAMAN
In an attempt to reassure the participating countries and foreign visitors that the terrorist strike by two persons, since identified as Uighurs belonging to the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan (IMET), on a group of border police guards of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security at Kashgar in the Xinjiang Province on August 4,2008, would have no impact on the security of the Beijing Olympics being inaugurated on August 8,2008, the authorities of the Public Security Department of Xinjiang have been projecting the attack as an act of reprisal for the action taken by them against the IMET. According to them, the attack, in which 16 police guards died, had nothing to do with the Olympics.
2. According to them, the two attackers were natives of Kashgar aged 28 and 33. One is a taxi driver and the other a vegetable vendor. According to the official account, they had stolen the truck in which they travelled to the police post. Initially, the local authorities had stated that the attackers jumped out of the truck and threw hand-grenades at the police guards, who were jogging and then attacked them with knives. They subsequently stated that the attackers threw country-made explosives at the police guards. They also claimed to have recovered nine home-made explosive items, one home-made gun and two knives from the attackers. They claimed that these were similar to the items recovered by the police from a training camp of the IMET in January,2007.
3. However, according to a foreign blogger living in Xinjiang, there were unconfirmed reports circulating that the police guards actually died when the two attackers drove the heavy truck into them. If true, for some reason, the local authorities do not want to admit this. However, a despatch dated August 5 of the Government-owned Xinhua news agency said as follows:"One of the attackers drove a truck to ram into a team of more than 70 policemen who were jogging during a regular exercise at about 8:00 AM. The driver and the other attacker also threw explosives at the team and the gate of the station. Road checks have been strengthened across Xinjiang and the local authorities in Kashi (Kashgar) have ordered a full security alert in public places including government office buildings, schools and hospitals." (5-8-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
In an attempt to reassure the participating countries and foreign visitors that the terrorist strike by two persons, since identified as Uighurs belonging to the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan (IMET), on a group of border police guards of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security at Kashgar in the Xinjiang Province on August 4,2008, would have no impact on the security of the Beijing Olympics being inaugurated on August 8,2008, the authorities of the Public Security Department of Xinjiang have been projecting the attack as an act of reprisal for the action taken by them against the IMET. According to them, the attack, in which 16 police guards died, had nothing to do with the Olympics.
2. According to them, the two attackers were natives of Kashgar aged 28 and 33. One is a taxi driver and the other a vegetable vendor. According to the official account, they had stolen the truck in which they travelled to the police post. Initially, the local authorities had stated that the attackers jumped out of the truck and threw hand-grenades at the police guards, who were jogging and then attacked them with knives. They subsequently stated that the attackers threw country-made explosives at the police guards. They also claimed to have recovered nine home-made explosive items, one home-made gun and two knives from the attackers. They claimed that these were similar to the items recovered by the police from a training camp of the IMET in January,2007.
3. However, according to a foreign blogger living in Xinjiang, there were unconfirmed reports circulating that the police guards actually died when the two attackers drove the heavy truck into them. If true, for some reason, the local authorities do not want to admit this. However, a despatch dated August 5 of the Government-owned Xinhua news agency said as follows:"One of the attackers drove a truck to ram into a team of more than 70 policemen who were jogging during a regular exercise at about 8:00 AM. The driver and the other attacker also threw explosives at the team and the gate of the station. Road checks have been strengthened across Xinjiang and the local authorities in Kashi (Kashgar) have ordered a full security alert in public places including government office buildings, schools and hospitals." (5-8-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, August 4, 2008
PRE-OLYMPICS JIHADI TERRORIST STRIKE IN XINJIANG
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO.424
B.RAMAN
Sixteen border police guards of China's Ministry of Public Security were killed and 16 others injured when two unidentified terrorists, whocame in a truck, jumped out of it outside their barracks compound near Kashgar(Chinese name Kashi) in the Xinjiang province at 8 AM onAugust 4,2008, and threw hand-grenades at a group of police guards doing their morning physical exercise. After throwing thehand-grenades, they took out two knives and attacked some of the injured policemen before they could be over-powered and captured.Fourteen police guards died on the spot and two others succumbed to their injuries subsequently. According to one report, the terroriststried to slit the throats of the injured police guards before they were overpowered. It was not an attack of suicide terrorism. The terroristsdid not try to kill themselves before they were overpowered and arrested.
2. The Kashgar area has been in a state of ferment since July 9, 2008, when the Chinese authorities announced the public execution oftwo Uighurs whose names (Chinese version, not their original ethnic names) were given out by them as Muheteer Setiwalidi and AbdulwailiYiming after they had been convicted by a Kashgar court on November 9, 2007, on charges of separatist activities, attending a terroristtraining camp and manufacturing explosives. According to the announcement, the court had awarded three other Uighurs suspended deathsentences and sentenced 12 other Uighurs to various terms of imprisonment. All of them were accused of being members of the IslamicMovement of East Turkestan (IMET). They were reported to have joined the IMET in August 2005 and were arrested by the Police in January,2007. The public announcement of the sentences awarded to the 17 Uighurs came a day after the police of Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang,forcibly entered a flat to arrest 15 Uighurs, who were also projected as members of the IMET. Five of them were killed by the police whenthey allegedly resisted arrest. The Chinese also ordered the closure of 40 mosques in Xinjiang on the ground that they had been startedillegally.
3.The Chinese authorities have not yet revealed the identities of the two terrorists who carried out the attack of August 4. They arepresumed to be Uighurs, but normally the Uighurs do not follow the modus operandi of slitting the throats of their victims. This is the typicalMO of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU),the Islamic Jihad Union (IMU), another Uzbeck organisation, and the Pakistani terroristorganisations as well as of Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
4. The attacked border post was near the border with Tajikistan. The two terrorists are suspected to have infiltrated into the area fromTajikistan. The IMET, which is the main organisation of the anti-Beijing Uighurs, the IMU, the IJU and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) ofPakistan had operated in the bordering areas of Tajikistan in the past. Before 9/11, the HUJI used to have a training camp in Tajikistan fortraining recruits from Xinjiang and the Central Asian Republics.
5. In January,2008, the Ministry of Public Security had claimed to have neutralised an Uighur sleeper cell in Urumqi. This was followed onMarch 7, 2008, by an aborted attempt by three Uighurs---one of them a woman--- to blow up a civil aviation plane going from Urumqi to Beijingwith the help of gasoline concealed inside a soft drink can, which had been smuggled into the plane. The attempt was thwarted by alertsecurity guards on board the plane. The fact that the airport security at Urumchi allowed the can to be carried---- when all over the worldthere is a ban on such cans and bottles being carried--- spoke poorly of the physical security at some Chinese airports,
6. The 'News" of Pakistan reported online on March 21, 2008, that two of the suspects arrested---- a woman and a man--- travelled withPakistani passports. The woman was described as an Uighur living in Pakistan and trained in a Pakistani jihadi camp and the man as a Central Asian (Uzbeck?). The third person, who escaped, but was subsequently arrested, was described as a Pakistani, who hadmasterminded the plot. The meagre facts given out by the Chinese authorities about the thwarted plot indicated deficiencies in thephysical security set-up in China. It is such deficiencies, which the jihadi terrorists wanting to disrupt the Olympics will exploit.
7. There was a demonstration against the Chinese authorities at Khotan in the Xinjiang province on March 23, 2008. About 1,000 Uighurs,including many women, participated in the demonstration. The protest was triggered off by two events. Firstly, the alleged death in thecustody of the Ministry of Public Security of Mutallip Hajim, a wealthy jade trader and popular philanthropist, who had been arrested on acharge of belonging to the sleeper cell discovered in January, 2008. Secondly, the anger of the local women over a long-standing orderbanning women from wearing scarves over their heads. Many of the Uighur women, who participated in the demonstration, defiantlycovered their heads with scarves. According to a statement from the Khotan government in the Xinjiang region, "extremist forces" tried toincite an uprising in a local market place on March 23. "A small number of elements... tried to incite splittism, create disturbances in themarket place and even trick the masses into an uprising," an official statement issued by the authorities said. It added: "Our policeimmediately intervened to prevent this and are dealing with it in accordance with the law." The local authorities undertook house-to-housesearches in the area looking for extremist suspects. Over 100 Uighur Muslims were detained for interrogation.
8.The fact that the two terrorists could mount the attack on August 4 despite the round-up of over a hundred suspected Uighur militants bythe Chinese Police since the beginning of this year underlines the continuing weaknesses of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security, whichis responsible for internal intelligence, The Ministry was taken by surprise in Tibet in March when there was a revolt by Tibetan monks andyouth. Now, it has been taken by surprise by the Uighur terrorist strike. Its continuing weaknesses should be a matter of concern to the organisers of the Olympics.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies,Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
B.RAMAN
Sixteen border police guards of China's Ministry of Public Security were killed and 16 others injured when two unidentified terrorists, whocame in a truck, jumped out of it outside their barracks compound near Kashgar(Chinese name Kashi) in the Xinjiang province at 8 AM onAugust 4,2008, and threw hand-grenades at a group of police guards doing their morning physical exercise. After throwing thehand-grenades, they took out two knives and attacked some of the injured policemen before they could be over-powered and captured.Fourteen police guards died on the spot and two others succumbed to their injuries subsequently. According to one report, the terroriststried to slit the throats of the injured police guards before they were overpowered. It was not an attack of suicide terrorism. The terroristsdid not try to kill themselves before they were overpowered and arrested.
2. The Kashgar area has been in a state of ferment since July 9, 2008, when the Chinese authorities announced the public execution oftwo Uighurs whose names (Chinese version, not their original ethnic names) were given out by them as Muheteer Setiwalidi and AbdulwailiYiming after they had been convicted by a Kashgar court on November 9, 2007, on charges of separatist activities, attending a terroristtraining camp and manufacturing explosives. According to the announcement, the court had awarded three other Uighurs suspended deathsentences and sentenced 12 other Uighurs to various terms of imprisonment. All of them were accused of being members of the IslamicMovement of East Turkestan (IMET). They were reported to have joined the IMET in August 2005 and were arrested by the Police in January,2007. The public announcement of the sentences awarded to the 17 Uighurs came a day after the police of Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang,forcibly entered a flat to arrest 15 Uighurs, who were also projected as members of the IMET. Five of them were killed by the police whenthey allegedly resisted arrest. The Chinese also ordered the closure of 40 mosques in Xinjiang on the ground that they had been startedillegally.
3.The Chinese authorities have not yet revealed the identities of the two terrorists who carried out the attack of August 4. They arepresumed to be Uighurs, but normally the Uighurs do not follow the modus operandi of slitting the throats of their victims. This is the typicalMO of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU),the Islamic Jihad Union (IMU), another Uzbeck organisation, and the Pakistani terroristorganisations as well as of Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
4. The attacked border post was near the border with Tajikistan. The two terrorists are suspected to have infiltrated into the area fromTajikistan. The IMET, which is the main organisation of the anti-Beijing Uighurs, the IMU, the IJU and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) ofPakistan had operated in the bordering areas of Tajikistan in the past. Before 9/11, the HUJI used to have a training camp in Tajikistan fortraining recruits from Xinjiang and the Central Asian Republics.
5. In January,2008, the Ministry of Public Security had claimed to have neutralised an Uighur sleeper cell in Urumqi. This was followed onMarch 7, 2008, by an aborted attempt by three Uighurs---one of them a woman--- to blow up a civil aviation plane going from Urumqi to Beijingwith the help of gasoline concealed inside a soft drink can, which had been smuggled into the plane. The attempt was thwarted by alertsecurity guards on board the plane. The fact that the airport security at Urumchi allowed the can to be carried---- when all over the worldthere is a ban on such cans and bottles being carried--- spoke poorly of the physical security at some Chinese airports,
6. The 'News" of Pakistan reported online on March 21, 2008, that two of the suspects arrested---- a woman and a man--- travelled withPakistani passports. The woman was described as an Uighur living in Pakistan and trained in a Pakistani jihadi camp and the man as a Central Asian (Uzbeck?). The third person, who escaped, but was subsequently arrested, was described as a Pakistani, who hadmasterminded the plot. The meagre facts given out by the Chinese authorities about the thwarted plot indicated deficiencies in thephysical security set-up in China. It is such deficiencies, which the jihadi terrorists wanting to disrupt the Olympics will exploit.
7. There was a demonstration against the Chinese authorities at Khotan in the Xinjiang province on March 23, 2008. About 1,000 Uighurs,including many women, participated in the demonstration. The protest was triggered off by two events. Firstly, the alleged death in thecustody of the Ministry of Public Security of Mutallip Hajim, a wealthy jade trader and popular philanthropist, who had been arrested on acharge of belonging to the sleeper cell discovered in January, 2008. Secondly, the anger of the local women over a long-standing orderbanning women from wearing scarves over their heads. Many of the Uighur women, who participated in the demonstration, defiantlycovered their heads with scarves. According to a statement from the Khotan government in the Xinjiang region, "extremist forces" tried toincite an uprising in a local market place on March 23. "A small number of elements... tried to incite splittism, create disturbances in themarket place and even trick the masses into an uprising," an official statement issued by the authorities said. It added: "Our policeimmediately intervened to prevent this and are dealing with it in accordance with the law." The local authorities undertook house-to-housesearches in the area looking for extremist suspects. Over 100 Uighur Muslims were detained for interrogation.
8.The fact that the two terrorists could mount the attack on August 4 despite the round-up of over a hundred suspected Uighur militants bythe Chinese Police since the beginning of this year underlines the continuing weaknesses of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security, whichis responsible for internal intelligence, The Ministry was taken by surprise in Tibet in March when there was a revolt by Tibetan monks andyouth. Now, it has been taken by surprise by the Uighur terrorist strike. Its continuing weaknesses should be a matter of concern to the organisers of the Olympics.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies,Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Sunday, August 3, 2008
BEIJING OLYMPICS: KEEPING THE FINGERS CROSSED
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.423
B.RAMAN
With five days to go before the grand inauguration of the Beijing Olympics on August 8,2008, the scenario relating to possible securitythreats to the Olympic Games is as follows:
TIBETAN GROUPS IN TIBET OR OUTSIDE: They have been quiet for the last one month. There is so far no information or indication of likely demonstrations or incidents of violence. However, the authorities of the Government of India should strengthen physical security outside Chinese diplomatic and consular missions and other major Chinese establishments in India to prevent any incidents by angry sections of the Tibetan youth.Low to medium probability of fresh demonstrations in Lhasa.
UIGHUR GROUPS:Medium to high probability of acts of violence, including terrorism, by Uighur elements in Xinjiang, the Central Asian Republics, Pakistan and Turkey. Uighurs do not have a demonstrated capability for major acts of terrorism in Beijing, Hong Kong anf Shanghai, where the main events of the Olympics will be held, but have a high capability in Xinjiang, the CARs and Pakistan.. The main threat, if any, will be from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which operates from North Waziristan in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. On July 25,2008, a private security consultancy agency of the US claimed to have intercepted a three-minutes Olympics-specific video message by one Sayfallah, who claimed to belong to an organisation called the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) in which he threatened acts of violence directed against the Olympics. He claimed that his organisation was responsible for the explosions in buses in Shanghai in May last and in Kunming in Yunnan in July. There is no way of verifying his claim. It is intriguing that neither he nor his organisation made any such claim immediately after the explosions took place. He said that his group is planning to attack Chinese cities"using previously unused methods". He said: " This is our last warning to China and the rest of the world. The viewers and athletes, especially those who are Muslim, who plan to go to the Olympics should change their plans and not go to China. The Turkistan Islamic Party plans military attacks on people, offices, arenas, and other activities that are connected to the Chinese Olympic Games." Some Western analysts have said that the TIP is identical with the ETIM, but there is no evidence in support of this. However, this message, even if its purpose is assumed to be to create fear and nervousness, shows that sections of Uighurs in Xinjiang as well as in Pakistan, the CARs and Turkey have been thinking of some incidents before and during the Olympics to draw attention to their cause. Likely threats from them have already been taken seriously by the Chinese authorities and have been factored into in their security planning.
PRO-UIGHUR GROUPS: In this category will come the Chechens, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union or Group, which is also an organisation of Uzbecks, the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Likely threats from them can also be categorised as medium to high. The Chechens are angry with China because of its anti-terrorism co-operation with Russia. The IMU and the IJU have close networking with the ETIM and have been training their cadres in North Waziristan. Recent reports from the tribal areas of Pakistan speak of the arrival of some Uighurs from Turkey in the IJU camps to undergo training. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have been supportive of the ETIM. Unlike the Uighur groups, none of the pro-Uighur groups have held out in public any Olympics-related threats. This should not mean that likely threats from them can be discounted.
JUNDULLAHS FROM THE UMMAH: Jundullah means a Soldier of Allah. Jundullahs are angry young Muslims, not belonging to any organisation, who give vent to their anger by indulging in acts of terrorism, including suicide terrorism. We had seen this phenomenon in the past in Chechnya and Indonesia and it has now spread to Pakistan. Most of the acts of suicide terrorism in Pakistan since the commando raid into Islamabad's Lal Masjid in July last year were committed by Jundullahs, who also attacked some Chinese nationals in Peshawar and unsuccessfully tried to attack some Chinese engineers in Hub in Balochistan. They believed that the Chinese protests over the kidnapping of some Chinese women working in Islamabad beauty parlours by students studying in the two madrasas attached to the Lal Masjid made Pervez Musharraf order the commando raid. Participants in the Olympics from the Islamic countries could turn into Jundullahs and indulge in acts of terrorism against participants from Denmark, the US and Israel. Likely threats from Jundullahs have to be taken seriously in the security planning. It can be categorised as medium to high.
2. This is the second Olympics being held since 9/11. The threat levels at the 2004 Athens Olympics were also assessed as medium to high,but the Olympics went off peacefully due to the effective security measures taken by the Greek authorities with the co-operation of thesecurity agencies of other NATO countries. The Chinese authorities have drawn from the experience of the Greek authorities andsupplemented it with their own experience and insights and put in place an effective security machinery. The entire internationalcommunity should wish them success in ensuring an incident-free Olympics. Their success in preventing any threats from the terrorists willbe an important step in the global fight against terrorism.The international community should wish them well and extend to them whateverco-operation they need. (3-8-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
With five days to go before the grand inauguration of the Beijing Olympics on August 8,2008, the scenario relating to possible securitythreats to the Olympic Games is as follows:
TIBETAN GROUPS IN TIBET OR OUTSIDE: They have been quiet for the last one month. There is so far no information or indication of likely demonstrations or incidents of violence. However, the authorities of the Government of India should strengthen physical security outside Chinese diplomatic and consular missions and other major Chinese establishments in India to prevent any incidents by angry sections of the Tibetan youth.Low to medium probability of fresh demonstrations in Lhasa.
UIGHUR GROUPS:Medium to high probability of acts of violence, including terrorism, by Uighur elements in Xinjiang, the Central Asian Republics, Pakistan and Turkey. Uighurs do not have a demonstrated capability for major acts of terrorism in Beijing, Hong Kong anf Shanghai, where the main events of the Olympics will be held, but have a high capability in Xinjiang, the CARs and Pakistan.. The main threat, if any, will be from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which operates from North Waziristan in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. On July 25,2008, a private security consultancy agency of the US claimed to have intercepted a three-minutes Olympics-specific video message by one Sayfallah, who claimed to belong to an organisation called the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) in which he threatened acts of violence directed against the Olympics. He claimed that his organisation was responsible for the explosions in buses in Shanghai in May last and in Kunming in Yunnan in July. There is no way of verifying his claim. It is intriguing that neither he nor his organisation made any such claim immediately after the explosions took place. He said that his group is planning to attack Chinese cities"using previously unused methods". He said: " This is our last warning to China and the rest of the world. The viewers and athletes, especially those who are Muslim, who plan to go to the Olympics should change their plans and not go to China. The Turkistan Islamic Party plans military attacks on people, offices, arenas, and other activities that are connected to the Chinese Olympic Games." Some Western analysts have said that the TIP is identical with the ETIM, but there is no evidence in support of this. However, this message, even if its purpose is assumed to be to create fear and nervousness, shows that sections of Uighurs in Xinjiang as well as in Pakistan, the CARs and Turkey have been thinking of some incidents before and during the Olympics to draw attention to their cause. Likely threats from them have already been taken seriously by the Chinese authorities and have been factored into in their security planning.
PRO-UIGHUR GROUPS: In this category will come the Chechens, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union or Group, which is also an organisation of Uzbecks, the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Likely threats from them can also be categorised as medium to high. The Chechens are angry with China because of its anti-terrorism co-operation with Russia. The IMU and the IJU have close networking with the ETIM and have been training their cadres in North Waziristan. Recent reports from the tribal areas of Pakistan speak of the arrival of some Uighurs from Turkey in the IJU camps to undergo training. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have been supportive of the ETIM. Unlike the Uighur groups, none of the pro-Uighur groups have held out in public any Olympics-related threats. This should not mean that likely threats from them can be discounted.
JUNDULLAHS FROM THE UMMAH: Jundullah means a Soldier of Allah. Jundullahs are angry young Muslims, not belonging to any organisation, who give vent to their anger by indulging in acts of terrorism, including suicide terrorism. We had seen this phenomenon in the past in Chechnya and Indonesia and it has now spread to Pakistan. Most of the acts of suicide terrorism in Pakistan since the commando raid into Islamabad's Lal Masjid in July last year were committed by Jundullahs, who also attacked some Chinese nationals in Peshawar and unsuccessfully tried to attack some Chinese engineers in Hub in Balochistan. They believed that the Chinese protests over the kidnapping of some Chinese women working in Islamabad beauty parlours by students studying in the two madrasas attached to the Lal Masjid made Pervez Musharraf order the commando raid. Participants in the Olympics from the Islamic countries could turn into Jundullahs and indulge in acts of terrorism against participants from Denmark, the US and Israel. Likely threats from Jundullahs have to be taken seriously in the security planning. It can be categorised as medium to high.
2. This is the second Olympics being held since 9/11. The threat levels at the 2004 Athens Olympics were also assessed as medium to high,but the Olympics went off peacefully due to the effective security measures taken by the Greek authorities with the co-operation of thesecurity agencies of other NATO countries. The Chinese authorities have drawn from the experience of the Greek authorities andsupplemented it with their own experience and insights and put in place an effective security machinery. The entire internationalcommunity should wish them success in ensuring an incident-free Olympics. Their success in preventing any threats from the terrorists willbe an important step in the global fight against terrorism.The international community should wish them well and extend to them whateverco-operation they need. (3-8-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Tuesday, July 29, 2008
ISI WITHIN ISI: EMPIRE STRIKES BACK
B. Raman
On July 26,2008, the Pakistan Government placed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB) under the direct control of the Interior Division.
2.A notification issued before the departure of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani for Washington for talks with President George Bush,said: “In terms of Rule 3(3) of the Rules of Business of 1973, the Prime Minister has approved the placement of the Intelligence Bureau and the Inter-Services Intelligence under the administrative, financial and operational control of the Interior Division with immediate effect.”
3.de jure, the ISI and the IB were working y under the Prime Minister, while the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) was being overseen by the Interior Minister, but de facto, they were reporting to President Pervez Musharraf till the elected Government under Gilani came to office in the last week of March,2008.
4. Since then, the Gilani Government was under pressure from the US to act against what had come to be known as “the ISI within the ISI”----- that is, a group of military officers in the ISI who were allegedly helping the Taliban in Afghanistan and the anti-India jihadi terrorist organizations.
5. In December,2003, Musharraf escaped two attempts to assassinate him at Rawalpindi allegedly mounted by Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda elements with the complicity of some junior officers of the Army and the Air Force. The failure of the ISI to detect this conspiracy led to fears that there are elements in the ISI, which are opposed to co-operation with the US even against Al Qaeda.
6.Dr.Aamir Liaqat Hussain, the then Minister of State for Religious Affairs, gave expression to these fears in an interview to the "Daily Times" of Lahore on May 5, 2005. He warned that Musharraf had a lot of enemies ‘within’ who could make an attempt on his life again at any time. He said that there were certain elements within the forces who could attack the General. He added: “No common people could attack President Musharraf, but certainly there are elements in the forces who can launch yet another attack against him. There is an ISI within the ISI, which is more powerful than the original and still orchestrating many eventualities in the country.” He added that he feared a threat to his own life because he supported Musharraf's call for an enlightened and moderate Islam and had been given the task of preparing the texts of sermons advocating enlightened and moderate Islam to be used at all mosques of the Armed Forces.
7. Fears that this “ISI within the ISI” had become even stronger since then increased after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in the last week of December,2007. Many police officers suspected that it had got her killed with the help of Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), but Baitullah has strongly denied that he had any role in her assassination.
8. According to Pakistani Police sources, they had strong reasons to suspect that this “ISI within the ISI” had organized the unsuccessful attempt to have President Hamid Karzai assassinated in Kabul in the last week of April,2008, and to have the Indian Embassy in Kabul blown up in July,2008.
9. While there has been talk of this ‘ISI within the ISI” since May,2005, nobody has so far been able to identify the officers constituting it. Senior Pakistani Army officers deny its existence and describe the allegations of Dr.Aamir Liaqat Hussain as a figment of his fertile imagination.
10. The transfer of the ISI and the IB to the Interior Ministry was seen by senior Army officers as an attempt by Asif Zardari to make Rehman Malik, his close confidante, who is designated as the Adviser to the Interior Ministry with the status of a Cabinet Minister, the Czar of all intelligence agencies directly reporting to him.
11. The proposed transfer met with a storm of protests from the ISI itself and from the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Army due to the following reasons:
Senior Army officers were outraged that the Director-General of the ISI, who is a Lt.Gen, should be asked to work under Malik, a retired police officer, who held a post equivalent to the rank of a Major-General when he was in service.
All the papers regarding Pakistan’s clandestine procurement of nuclear and missile technologies from China and missile technology from North Korea are in the ISI. The interrogation of A.Q.Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, in 2004 under US pressure was done by Lt.Gen.Ehsan-ul-Haq, the former DG of the ISI. All the papers relating to L’Affaire A.Q.Khan are in the ISI. In the wake of the recent allegations by A.Q.Khan about Musharraf’s prior knowledge and approval of his dealings with North Korea, the attempt to remove the ISI from the control of the Army was viewed by Musharraf and other senior Army officers as an attempt by the US to get access to these papers through Malik.
Similarly, the proposed transfer of the ISI, which is responsible for covert operations against India and Afghanistan, was viewed by them as an attempt by the US to have access to details of these operations.
12. Following these protests, the Government reversed the notification within 24 hours and restored the status quo ante. The Government issued another notification which said that the earlier notification had been ‘misunderstood’ and that the ISI would “continue to function under the Prime Minister”.“The previous notification only “re-emphasised the need for more coordination between Ministry of Interior and the ISI in relation to the war on terror and internal security.” It said a detailed notification would be issued later to clarify the situation.
13. Annexed is an updated version of article on the ISI, which I had written for an Italian journal in the last week of January,2008. (30-7-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretriat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director,Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
ANNEXURE
THE INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE OF PAKISTAN
The Intelligence Bureau (IB) of undivided India, which was created by the British colonial rulers, to collect domestic political intelligence was largely a police organization. It had no responsibility for the collection of foreign intelligence.
At the time of the partition of India in 1947, its personnel, assets and records were divided between India and Pakistan. Most of the Muslim police officers serving in the IB of undivided India chose to join the IB of Pakistan. Others stayed behind in the IB of India.
The Government of independent India placed its IB under the control of the Ministry of Home Affairs and expanded its charter to make it responsible for the collection of internal as well as foreign intelligence. This position continued till September 21,1968, when the Government of India bifurcated the IB and converted its foreign intelligence division into an independent organization called the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW). The R&AW was placed directly under the Prime Minister and was made part of the Cabinet Secretariat, which functions under the Prime Minister.
Like the IB, the R&AW too was initially a largely police organization with a small number of military officers taken on deputation to handle military intelligence. Since then, the predominance of police officers has been reduced and more officers unconnected with the police have been inducted into the R&AW. It is a largely civilian organization with a small number of military officers.
The evolution in Pakistan took a different path. The IB of Pakistan, which is part of the Ministry of the Interior, was initially a largely police organization and was given the responsibility for the collection of internal and external intelligence. However, following complaints from the Army about the poor performance of the IB and its police officers during the first Indo-Pakistan war of 1947-48 over Kashmir, the Government of Pakistan created a new organization called the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and made it responsible for the collection of foreign intelligence.
The ISI was placed under the control of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and its personnel were taken from the three wings of the armed forces. It became a military-dominated intelligence agency.
Initially, the ISI had no responsibility for the collection of internal intelligence, which continued to be collected by the police officers of the IB. This position started changing after the Army started meddling in politics in the late 1950s. Field Marshal Ayub Khan ( President during 1958-69), who distrusted the police officers of the IB, made the ISI responsible for the collection of internal intelligence too having a bearing on national security. He also created in the ISI a Covert Action Division to provide assistance to the tribal insurgents in India’s North-East.
The internal intelligence role of the ISI was further strengthened under the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) and then under the late Gen.Zia ul Haq (1977-88), who overthrew Bhutto and seized power in 1977. Both Bhutto and Zia used the Political Division of the ISI for the collection of intelligence about their political opponents and the ethnic and linguistic minorities. While the police officers of the IB continued to perform their internal intelligence collection role, the reports of the ISI were given greater credence than those of the IB.
Under Z.A.Bhutto and Zia, the role of the Covert Action Division of the ISI was expanded and strengthened in order to enable it to assist Sikh and Kashmiri separatists in India and radical elements in the Indian Muslim community. The assistance was in the form of funds, training and supply of arms, ammunition and explosives.
Z.A.Bhutto also ordered the creation of a new Division in the ISI to assist the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in the clandestine procurement of nuclear technology and equipment from abroad. This Division played an active role in helping Pakistan acquire a military nuclear capability.
Thus, when Zia overthrew Bhutto and seized power in 1977, the ISI had three important roles---collection of internal and external intelligence, covert action in India and clandestine procurement of nuclear technology and equipment.
The internal political intelligence Division of the ISI came under considerable criticism after the death of Zia in a plane crash in August,1988. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto won the elections held thereafter. The ISI, then headed by Lt.Gen.Hamid Gul, strongly opposed her taking over as the Prime Minister. It alleged that she was in touch with India when she was living in political exile in the UK and hence projected her as a security risk.
Under US pressure, the Army and the ISI agreed to her becoming the Prime Minister on condition that she would not have anything to do with the nuclear programme. Even after she had assumed office, the ISI kept disseminating reports alleging that she was an Indian agent. The ISI’s animosity to her increased when she abolished the internal political intelligence Division and ordered the Covert Action Division to stop supporting the Sikh separatists of India. However, she gave it a free hand in J&K.
The ISI’s animosity to her resulted in her dismissal by the then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in August,1990, and fresh elections. During the elections, the ISI, with money allegedly donated by a private bank, assisted the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Mr.Nawaz Sharif and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) in their election campaign and worked against the candidates of the PPP.
The PML and the JEI won the majority of seats. After taking over as the Prime Minister, Nawaz ordered the re-establishment of the internal political intelligence Division of the ISI. He also made Brig.Imtiaz, who used to head the Political Division of the ISI before 1988, the Director of the IB. Thus started the process of the militarization of the IB. This has continued since then and acquired momentum under President Pervez Musharraf.
Since 1990, there have been allegations that the Political Division of the ISI has been interfering in the conduct of the general elections in order to get candidates critical of the Army defeated through rigging and other means. These allegations gained force under Musharraf. In 2002, he was accused of misusing the ISI for ensuring the victory of the Pakistan Muslim League faction headed by Mr.Shujjat Hussain, which supported him. In the run-up to the elections on February 18,2008, there were similar allegations of the misuse of the ISI by him to influence the results.
De jure, the ISI is supposed to report to the Prime Minister, but de facto it generally reports to the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) and keeps the Prime Minister in the dark about its activities. There were, however, three instances when the heads of the ISI were more loyal to the Prime Minister than to the COAS and this created tensions in the relations between the Prime Minister and the COAS.
The first instance was during the first tenure of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister (1988 to 1990). To reduce the powers of the ISI, to re-organise the intelligence community and to enhance the powers of the police officers in the IB, she discontinued the practice of appointing a serving Lt.Gen, recommended by the COAS, as the DG, ISI, and, instead appointed Maj.Gen. (retd) Shamsur Rahman Kallue, a retired officer close to her father, as the DG in replacement of Lt.Gen.Hamid Gul in 1989 and entrusted him with the task of winding up the internal intelligence collection role of the ISI and
civilianising the IB and the ISI.
Writing in the "Nation" of July 31,1997, Brig.A.R.Siddiqui, who had served as the Press Relations Officer in the
army headquarters in the 1970s, said that this action of hers marked the beginning of her trouble with Gen.Mirza Aslam Beg, the then COAS, which ultimately led to her dismissal in August,1990. Gen.Beg stopped inviting Kallue to the Corps Commanders conferences and transferred the responsibility for covert action in India from the ISI to the Army intelligence directorate working under the Chief of the General Staff (CGS).
The second instance was during the first tenure of Nawaz Sharif (1990-93) as the Prime Minister. He appointed as the DG,ISI, Lt.Gen.Javed Nasir, a fundamentalist Kashmiri officer, though he was not recommended by Gen.Asif Nawaz Janjua, the then COAS, for the post. This created friction in the relations between Nawaz Sharif and his COAS, who excluded the ISI chief from all important Army conferences.
The third instance was during the second tenure of Nawaz Sharif (1997-99) when his action in appointing Lt.Gen. Ziauddin, an engineer, as the DG,ISI, over-riding the objection of Musharraf led to friction between the two. These instances would show that whenever an elected leadership was in power, the COAS saw to it that the elected Prime Minister did not have effective control over the ISI and that the ISI was marginalised if its head showed any loyalty to the elected Prime Minister.
In the 1990s, there was a controversy in Pakistan as to who really controlled the ISI and when was its internal Political Division set up. Air Marshal (retd) Asghar Khan, former chief of the Pakistan Air Force, filed a petition in the Supreme Court challenging the legality of the ISI's Political Division accepting a donation of Rs.140 million from a bank for use against PPP candidates during the 1990 elections. Testifying before the Supreme Court on June 16,1997, Gen. (retd) Mirza Aslam Beg claimed that though the ISI was manned by serving military officers and was part of the Ministry of Defence, it reported to the Prime Minister and not to the COAS and that its internal Political Division was actually set up by the late Z.A.Bhutto in 1975.
Many Pakistani analysts challenged this and said that the ISI, though de jure under the Prime Minister, had always been controlled de facto by the COAS and that its internal Political Division had been in existence at least since the days of Ayub Khan, if not earlier.
After the elections of 2002, Musharraf kept the ISI directly under his control and did not allow the elected Prime Minister to have any responsibility for supervising its work.
During the 1980s, the Covert Action Division of the ISI was used by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US for recruiting, training and arming not only Afghan Mujahideen, but also fundamentalist elements of Pakistan for fighting against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The Saudi intelligence agency recruited over 6,000 Arabs in West Asia and North Africa and sent them to the ISI for being trained, armed and infiltrated into Afghanistan. All the funds and arms and ammunition from the CIA and all the funds from the Saudi intelligence for use against the Soviet troops were channelled through the ISI. Among the Arabs brought in and trained were Osama bin Laden and his supporters. The ISI’s links with bin Laden and his operatives thus started from the 1980s with the knowledge and approval of the CIA.
The withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1988-89, which was due to the jihad waged by the Afghan Mujahideen, Pakistani jihadis and the Arabs under bin Laden, strengthened the reputation of the ISI. During the same period, the ISI helped DR.A.Q.Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, in the clandestine procurement and transport of nuclear equipment for the Kahuta Uranium Enrichment plant, which enabled Pakistan to acquire a military nuclear capability with the technology given by China and the equipment procured by the ISI. The US closed its eyes to the nuclear procurement activities of the ISI because of the CIA’s dependence on it for the jihad against the Soviet troops.
Differences started appearing between the CIA and the ISI in 1990. These were due to the CIA’s unhappiness over the non-co-operation of the ISI in its efforts to buy back from the Afghan Mujahideen the unused shoulder-fired Stinger missiles supplied to them for use against Soviet aircraft. The CIA’s concerns over the ISI were enhanced by reports of Pakistani assistance to Iran in the nuclear field starting from 1988 and Pakistani contacts with China and North Korea in the nuclear and missile fields.
In 1993, the Clinton Administration forced Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister, to remove from the ISI Lt.Gen. Javed Nasir, the then Director-General, and some of his officers because they were seen as non-cooperative in its efforts to buy back the Stingers. Nasir was a Deobandi fundamentalist, who belonged to the Tablighi Jamaat, a Pakistani organization to preach Islam, which was assisting the jihadi organizations in their recruitment drive in Pakistan and abroad.
In 1994, during the second tenure of Benazir as the Prime Minister, the ISI and Maj.Gen.Naseerullah Babar, her Interior Minister, acted jointly in encouraging the formation of the Taliban in order to restore law and order in Afghanistan, which had collapsed after the Afghan Mujahideen came to power in April,1992. By September,1996, the Taliban, with the ISI’s help, succeeded in capturing power in Kabul and extending its control over all the Pashtun areas.
Initially, the CIA closed its eyes to it because UNOCAL , the US oil company, was interested in the construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan and was facing difficulty in going ahead with this project due to the break-down of law and order. The US interest in seeking the assistance of the Taliban for the UNOCAL project disappeared after the UNOCAL itself abandoned it as not feasible. In 1996, Osama bin Laden and his advisers shifted from the Sudan to Afghanistan when the Taliban had not yet captured power in Kabul.
After capturing power in Kabul, the Taliban welcomed the presence of bin Laden and encouraged him to shift from Jalalabad to Kandahar. He was permitted to start his training infrastructure in Afghan territory. Alarm bells started ringing in the US over the developing nexus between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the role played by the ISI in training the Taliban and reports of the resumption of the contacts of bin Laden with his old friends in Pakistan in the ISI as well as in Pakistani fundamentalist organizations.
The US concerns over these developments increased after bin Laden formed in 1998 his International Islamic Front (IIF) For Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People and Al Qaeda organized explosions near the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam on August 7,1998. The US Cruise missile attacks on Al Qaeda’s training camps in Afghan territory on August 20,1998, were not effective.
From then on, there was increasing pressure by the US on the Government of Nawaz Sharif to either pressure the Taliban to hand over bin Laden to the CIA or to permit the US Special Forces to mount a special operation from Pakistani territory to kill or capture bin Laden. Nawaz did not do either as he was afraid of the repercussions in Pakistan if he collaborated with the US against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
After overthrowing Nawaz Sharif and seizing power in October, 1999, Musharraf appointed Lt.Gen.Mahmood Ahmed, a close friend of his, as the DG of the ISI. The US was unhappy over what it viewed as non-cooperation by the ISI in its efforts to have bin Laden killed or captured. Before it started its military strikes on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghan territory on October 7,2001, it pressured Musharraf to replace Lt.Gen.Ahmed as the DG of the ISI. Musharraf appointed Lt.Gen.Ehsan-ul-Haq as the DG. He was succeeded by Lt.Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, who has since taken over as the COAS from Musharraf. The present DG is Lt.Gen.Nadeem Taj.
Kiyani tried to keep the ISI out of political controversies. In recent months, it is the IB which is becoming increasingly controversial after Musharraf appointed Brig (retd) Ijaz Shah, a close personal friend of his, as its Director and inducted a number of retired army officers into it. He also placed the IB under the control of Shaukat Aziz, his confidante, who was the then Prime Minister. Before her assassination, Benazir used to complain that the threat to her security mainly came from Ijaz Shah, Lt.Gen.(retd) Hamid Gul and Chaudhury Pervez Elahi, former Chief Minister of Punjab, all the three of them Zia loyalists. She did not make any complaint against the ISI. However, since her assassination, there have been allegations by her party members that junior officials of the ISI might have also been involved in her assassination in addition to those named by her when she was alive. Ijaz Shah resigned after the elections.
The ISI has always had three operational priorities. Firstly, the annexation of Kashmir through covert action; secondly, acquiring a strategic depth in Afghanistan through a Government which would be favourable to Pakistani interests; and thirdly, to help the Government in its clandestine nuclear and missile procurement efforts.
These priorities have not changed. That is why it has refrained from taking action against the Pakistani jihadi organizations, which are active in India and against the Neo Taliban of Afghanistan, which is operating against the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan from sanctuaries in Balochistan and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
While pretending to extend unconditional co-operation to the US in its so-called war against terrorism, Musharraf kept the co-operation confined to action against Al Qaeda operatives based in Pakistani territory. Even the co-operation against Al Qaeda is restricted to action against Al Qaeda sleeper cells operating from non-tribal areas. He did not take any effective action against Al Qaeda sanctuaries in the FATA or against the leadership of the Neo Taliban, headed by Mulla Mohammad Omar, its Amir, operating from the tribal areas of Pakistan. Nor did he act against the terrorist infrastructure directed against India.
In December,2003, Musharraf escaped two attempts to assassinate him at Rawalpindi allegedly mounted by Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda elements with the complicity of some junior officers of the Army and the Air Force. The failure of the ISI to detect this conspiracy led to fears that there are elements in the ISI, which are opposed to co-operation with the US even against Al Qaeda.
Dr.Aamir Liaqat Hussain, the then Minister of State for Religious Affairs, gave expression to these fears in an interview to the "Daily Times" of Lahore on May 5, 2005. He warned that Musharraf had a lot of enemies ‘within’ who could make an attempt on his life again at any time. He said that there were certain elements within the forces who could attack the General. He added: “No common people could attack President Musharraf, but certainly there are elements in the forces who can launch yet another attack against him. There is an ISI within the ISI, which is more powerful than the original and still orchestrating many eventualities in the country.” He added that he feared a threat to his own life because he supported Musharraf's call for an enlightened and moderate Islam and had been given the task of preparing the texts of sermons advocating enlightened and moderate Islam to be used at all mosques of the Armed Forces.
The sympathies of many serving and retired officers of the ISI and the Army for Al Qaeda, the Neo Taliban and the Pakistani jihadi organizations and the unwillingness or inability of any Government of Pakistan to act against them are coming in the way of the success of the so-called war against global jihadi terrorism.
On July 26,2008, the Pakistan Government placed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB) under the direct control of the Interior Division.
2.A notification issued before the departure of Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani for Washington for talks with President George Bush,said: “In terms of Rule 3(3) of the Rules of Business of 1973, the Prime Minister has approved the placement of the Intelligence Bureau and the Inter-Services Intelligence under the administrative, financial and operational control of the Interior Division with immediate effect.”
3.de jure, the ISI and the IB were working y under the Prime Minister, while the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) was being overseen by the Interior Minister, but de facto, they were reporting to President Pervez Musharraf till the elected Government under Gilani came to office in the last week of March,2008.
4. Since then, the Gilani Government was under pressure from the US to act against what had come to be known as “the ISI within the ISI”----- that is, a group of military officers in the ISI who were allegedly helping the Taliban in Afghanistan and the anti-India jihadi terrorist organizations.
5. In December,2003, Musharraf escaped two attempts to assassinate him at Rawalpindi allegedly mounted by Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda elements with the complicity of some junior officers of the Army and the Air Force. The failure of the ISI to detect this conspiracy led to fears that there are elements in the ISI, which are opposed to co-operation with the US even against Al Qaeda.
6.Dr.Aamir Liaqat Hussain, the then Minister of State for Religious Affairs, gave expression to these fears in an interview to the "Daily Times" of Lahore on May 5, 2005. He warned that Musharraf had a lot of enemies ‘within’ who could make an attempt on his life again at any time. He said that there were certain elements within the forces who could attack the General. He added: “No common people could attack President Musharraf, but certainly there are elements in the forces who can launch yet another attack against him. There is an ISI within the ISI, which is more powerful than the original and still orchestrating many eventualities in the country.” He added that he feared a threat to his own life because he supported Musharraf's call for an enlightened and moderate Islam and had been given the task of preparing the texts of sermons advocating enlightened and moderate Islam to be used at all mosques of the Armed Forces.
7. Fears that this “ISI within the ISI” had become even stronger since then increased after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in the last week of December,2007. Many police officers suspected that it had got her killed with the help of Baitullah Mehsud, the Amir of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), but Baitullah has strongly denied that he had any role in her assassination.
8. According to Pakistani Police sources, they had strong reasons to suspect that this “ISI within the ISI” had organized the unsuccessful attempt to have President Hamid Karzai assassinated in Kabul in the last week of April,2008, and to have the Indian Embassy in Kabul blown up in July,2008.
9. While there has been talk of this ‘ISI within the ISI” since May,2005, nobody has so far been able to identify the officers constituting it. Senior Pakistani Army officers deny its existence and describe the allegations of Dr.Aamir Liaqat Hussain as a figment of his fertile imagination.
10. The transfer of the ISI and the IB to the Interior Ministry was seen by senior Army officers as an attempt by Asif Zardari to make Rehman Malik, his close confidante, who is designated as the Adviser to the Interior Ministry with the status of a Cabinet Minister, the Czar of all intelligence agencies directly reporting to him.
11. The proposed transfer met with a storm of protests from the ISI itself and from the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Army due to the following reasons:
Senior Army officers were outraged that the Director-General of the ISI, who is a Lt.Gen, should be asked to work under Malik, a retired police officer, who held a post equivalent to the rank of a Major-General when he was in service.
All the papers regarding Pakistan’s clandestine procurement of nuclear and missile technologies from China and missile technology from North Korea are in the ISI. The interrogation of A.Q.Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, in 2004 under US pressure was done by Lt.Gen.Ehsan-ul-Haq, the former DG of the ISI. All the papers relating to L’Affaire A.Q.Khan are in the ISI. In the wake of the recent allegations by A.Q.Khan about Musharraf’s prior knowledge and approval of his dealings with North Korea, the attempt to remove the ISI from the control of the Army was viewed by Musharraf and other senior Army officers as an attempt by the US to get access to these papers through Malik.
Similarly, the proposed transfer of the ISI, which is responsible for covert operations against India and Afghanistan, was viewed by them as an attempt by the US to have access to details of these operations.
12. Following these protests, the Government reversed the notification within 24 hours and restored the status quo ante. The Government issued another notification which said that the earlier notification had been ‘misunderstood’ and that the ISI would “continue to function under the Prime Minister”.“The previous notification only “re-emphasised the need for more coordination between Ministry of Interior and the ISI in relation to the war on terror and internal security.” It said a detailed notification would be issued later to clarify the situation.
13. Annexed is an updated version of article on the ISI, which I had written for an Italian journal in the last week of January,2008. (30-7-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretriat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director,Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
ANNEXURE
THE INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE OF PAKISTAN
The Intelligence Bureau (IB) of undivided India, which was created by the British colonial rulers, to collect domestic political intelligence was largely a police organization. It had no responsibility for the collection of foreign intelligence.
At the time of the partition of India in 1947, its personnel, assets and records were divided between India and Pakistan. Most of the Muslim police officers serving in the IB of undivided India chose to join the IB of Pakistan. Others stayed behind in the IB of India.
The Government of independent India placed its IB under the control of the Ministry of Home Affairs and expanded its charter to make it responsible for the collection of internal as well as foreign intelligence. This position continued till September 21,1968, when the Government of India bifurcated the IB and converted its foreign intelligence division into an independent organization called the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW). The R&AW was placed directly under the Prime Minister and was made part of the Cabinet Secretariat, which functions under the Prime Minister.
Like the IB, the R&AW too was initially a largely police organization with a small number of military officers taken on deputation to handle military intelligence. Since then, the predominance of police officers has been reduced and more officers unconnected with the police have been inducted into the R&AW. It is a largely civilian organization with a small number of military officers.
The evolution in Pakistan took a different path. The IB of Pakistan, which is part of the Ministry of the Interior, was initially a largely police organization and was given the responsibility for the collection of internal and external intelligence. However, following complaints from the Army about the poor performance of the IB and its police officers during the first Indo-Pakistan war of 1947-48 over Kashmir, the Government of Pakistan created a new organization called the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate and made it responsible for the collection of foreign intelligence.
The ISI was placed under the control of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and its personnel were taken from the three wings of the armed forces. It became a military-dominated intelligence agency.
Initially, the ISI had no responsibility for the collection of internal intelligence, which continued to be collected by the police officers of the IB. This position started changing after the Army started meddling in politics in the late 1950s. Field Marshal Ayub Khan ( President during 1958-69), who distrusted the police officers of the IB, made the ISI responsible for the collection of internal intelligence too having a bearing on national security. He also created in the ISI a Covert Action Division to provide assistance to the tribal insurgents in India’s North-East.
The internal intelligence role of the ISI was further strengthened under the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) and then under the late Gen.Zia ul Haq (1977-88), who overthrew Bhutto and seized power in 1977. Both Bhutto and Zia used the Political Division of the ISI for the collection of intelligence about their political opponents and the ethnic and linguistic minorities. While the police officers of the IB continued to perform their internal intelligence collection role, the reports of the ISI were given greater credence than those of the IB.
Under Z.A.Bhutto and Zia, the role of the Covert Action Division of the ISI was expanded and strengthened in order to enable it to assist Sikh and Kashmiri separatists in India and radical elements in the Indian Muslim community. The assistance was in the form of funds, training and supply of arms, ammunition and explosives.
Z.A.Bhutto also ordered the creation of a new Division in the ISI to assist the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in the clandestine procurement of nuclear technology and equipment from abroad. This Division played an active role in helping Pakistan acquire a military nuclear capability.
Thus, when Zia overthrew Bhutto and seized power in 1977, the ISI had three important roles---collection of internal and external intelligence, covert action in India and clandestine procurement of nuclear technology and equipment.
The internal political intelligence Division of the ISI came under considerable criticism after the death of Zia in a plane crash in August,1988. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto won the elections held thereafter. The ISI, then headed by Lt.Gen.Hamid Gul, strongly opposed her taking over as the Prime Minister. It alleged that she was in touch with India when she was living in political exile in the UK and hence projected her as a security risk.
Under US pressure, the Army and the ISI agreed to her becoming the Prime Minister on condition that she would not have anything to do with the nuclear programme. Even after she had assumed office, the ISI kept disseminating reports alleging that she was an Indian agent. The ISI’s animosity to her increased when she abolished the internal political intelligence Division and ordered the Covert Action Division to stop supporting the Sikh separatists of India. However, she gave it a free hand in J&K.
The ISI’s animosity to her resulted in her dismissal by the then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in August,1990, and fresh elections. During the elections, the ISI, with money allegedly donated by a private bank, assisted the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Mr.Nawaz Sharif and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) in their election campaign and worked against the candidates of the PPP.
The PML and the JEI won the majority of seats. After taking over as the Prime Minister, Nawaz ordered the re-establishment of the internal political intelligence Division of the ISI. He also made Brig.Imtiaz, who used to head the Political Division of the ISI before 1988, the Director of the IB. Thus started the process of the militarization of the IB. This has continued since then and acquired momentum under President Pervez Musharraf.
Since 1990, there have been allegations that the Political Division of the ISI has been interfering in the conduct of the general elections in order to get candidates critical of the Army defeated through rigging and other means. These allegations gained force under Musharraf. In 2002, he was accused of misusing the ISI for ensuring the victory of the Pakistan Muslim League faction headed by Mr.Shujjat Hussain, which supported him. In the run-up to the elections on February 18,2008, there were similar allegations of the misuse of the ISI by him to influence the results.
De jure, the ISI is supposed to report to the Prime Minister, but de facto it generally reports to the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) and keeps the Prime Minister in the dark about its activities. There were, however, three instances when the heads of the ISI were more loyal to the Prime Minister than to the COAS and this created tensions in the relations between the Prime Minister and the COAS.
The first instance was during the first tenure of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister (1988 to 1990). To reduce the powers of the ISI, to re-organise the intelligence community and to enhance the powers of the police officers in the IB, she discontinued the practice of appointing a serving Lt.Gen, recommended by the COAS, as the DG, ISI, and, instead appointed Maj.Gen. (retd) Shamsur Rahman Kallue, a retired officer close to her father, as the DG in replacement of Lt.Gen.Hamid Gul in 1989 and entrusted him with the task of winding up the internal intelligence collection role of the ISI and
civilianising the IB and the ISI.
Writing in the "Nation" of July 31,1997, Brig.A.R.Siddiqui, who had served as the Press Relations Officer in the
army headquarters in the 1970s, said that this action of hers marked the beginning of her trouble with Gen.Mirza Aslam Beg, the then COAS, which ultimately led to her dismissal in August,1990. Gen.Beg stopped inviting Kallue to the Corps Commanders conferences and transferred the responsibility for covert action in India from the ISI to the Army intelligence directorate working under the Chief of the General Staff (CGS).
The second instance was during the first tenure of Nawaz Sharif (1990-93) as the Prime Minister. He appointed as the DG,ISI, Lt.Gen.Javed Nasir, a fundamentalist Kashmiri officer, though he was not recommended by Gen.Asif Nawaz Janjua, the then COAS, for the post. This created friction in the relations between Nawaz Sharif and his COAS, who excluded the ISI chief from all important Army conferences.
The third instance was during the second tenure of Nawaz Sharif (1997-99) when his action in appointing Lt.Gen. Ziauddin, an engineer, as the DG,ISI, over-riding the objection of Musharraf led to friction between the two. These instances would show that whenever an elected leadership was in power, the COAS saw to it that the elected Prime Minister did not have effective control over the ISI and that the ISI was marginalised if its head showed any loyalty to the elected Prime Minister.
In the 1990s, there was a controversy in Pakistan as to who really controlled the ISI and when was its internal Political Division set up. Air Marshal (retd) Asghar Khan, former chief of the Pakistan Air Force, filed a petition in the Supreme Court challenging the legality of the ISI's Political Division accepting a donation of Rs.140 million from a bank for use against PPP candidates during the 1990 elections. Testifying before the Supreme Court on June 16,1997, Gen. (retd) Mirza Aslam Beg claimed that though the ISI was manned by serving military officers and was part of the Ministry of Defence, it reported to the Prime Minister and not to the COAS and that its internal Political Division was actually set up by the late Z.A.Bhutto in 1975.
Many Pakistani analysts challenged this and said that the ISI, though de jure under the Prime Minister, had always been controlled de facto by the COAS and that its internal Political Division had been in existence at least since the days of Ayub Khan, if not earlier.
After the elections of 2002, Musharraf kept the ISI directly under his control and did not allow the elected Prime Minister to have any responsibility for supervising its work.
During the 1980s, the Covert Action Division of the ISI was used by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US for recruiting, training and arming not only Afghan Mujahideen, but also fundamentalist elements of Pakistan for fighting against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The Saudi intelligence agency recruited over 6,000 Arabs in West Asia and North Africa and sent them to the ISI for being trained, armed and infiltrated into Afghanistan. All the funds and arms and ammunition from the CIA and all the funds from the Saudi intelligence for use against the Soviet troops were channelled through the ISI. Among the Arabs brought in and trained were Osama bin Laden and his supporters. The ISI’s links with bin Laden and his operatives thus started from the 1980s with the knowledge and approval of the CIA.
The withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1988-89, which was due to the jihad waged by the Afghan Mujahideen, Pakistani jihadis and the Arabs under bin Laden, strengthened the reputation of the ISI. During the same period, the ISI helped DR.A.Q.Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, in the clandestine procurement and transport of nuclear equipment for the Kahuta Uranium Enrichment plant, which enabled Pakistan to acquire a military nuclear capability with the technology given by China and the equipment procured by the ISI. The US closed its eyes to the nuclear procurement activities of the ISI because of the CIA’s dependence on it for the jihad against the Soviet troops.
Differences started appearing between the CIA and the ISI in 1990. These were due to the CIA’s unhappiness over the non-co-operation of the ISI in its efforts to buy back from the Afghan Mujahideen the unused shoulder-fired Stinger missiles supplied to them for use against Soviet aircraft. The CIA’s concerns over the ISI were enhanced by reports of Pakistani assistance to Iran in the nuclear field starting from 1988 and Pakistani contacts with China and North Korea in the nuclear and missile fields.
In 1993, the Clinton Administration forced Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister, to remove from the ISI Lt.Gen. Javed Nasir, the then Director-General, and some of his officers because they were seen as non-cooperative in its efforts to buy back the Stingers. Nasir was a Deobandi fundamentalist, who belonged to the Tablighi Jamaat, a Pakistani organization to preach Islam, which was assisting the jihadi organizations in their recruitment drive in Pakistan and abroad.
In 1994, during the second tenure of Benazir as the Prime Minister, the ISI and Maj.Gen.Naseerullah Babar, her Interior Minister, acted jointly in encouraging the formation of the Taliban in order to restore law and order in Afghanistan, which had collapsed after the Afghan Mujahideen came to power in April,1992. By September,1996, the Taliban, with the ISI’s help, succeeded in capturing power in Kabul and extending its control over all the Pashtun areas.
Initially, the CIA closed its eyes to it because UNOCAL , the US oil company, was interested in the construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan and was facing difficulty in going ahead with this project due to the break-down of law and order. The US interest in seeking the assistance of the Taliban for the UNOCAL project disappeared after the UNOCAL itself abandoned it as not feasible. In 1996, Osama bin Laden and his advisers shifted from the Sudan to Afghanistan when the Taliban had not yet captured power in Kabul.
After capturing power in Kabul, the Taliban welcomed the presence of bin Laden and encouraged him to shift from Jalalabad to Kandahar. He was permitted to start his training infrastructure in Afghan territory. Alarm bells started ringing in the US over the developing nexus between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the role played by the ISI in training the Taliban and reports of the resumption of the contacts of bin Laden with his old friends in Pakistan in the ISI as well as in Pakistani fundamentalist organizations.
The US concerns over these developments increased after bin Laden formed in 1998 his International Islamic Front (IIF) For Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People and Al Qaeda organized explosions near the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam on August 7,1998. The US Cruise missile attacks on Al Qaeda’s training camps in Afghan territory on August 20,1998, were not effective.
From then on, there was increasing pressure by the US on the Government of Nawaz Sharif to either pressure the Taliban to hand over bin Laden to the CIA or to permit the US Special Forces to mount a special operation from Pakistani territory to kill or capture bin Laden. Nawaz did not do either as he was afraid of the repercussions in Pakistan if he collaborated with the US against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
After overthrowing Nawaz Sharif and seizing power in October, 1999, Musharraf appointed Lt.Gen.Mahmood Ahmed, a close friend of his, as the DG of the ISI. The US was unhappy over what it viewed as non-cooperation by the ISI in its efforts to have bin Laden killed or captured. Before it started its military strikes on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghan territory on October 7,2001, it pressured Musharraf to replace Lt.Gen.Ahmed as the DG of the ISI. Musharraf appointed Lt.Gen.Ehsan-ul-Haq as the DG. He was succeeded by Lt.Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, who has since taken over as the COAS from Musharraf. The present DG is Lt.Gen.Nadeem Taj.
Kiyani tried to keep the ISI out of political controversies. In recent months, it is the IB which is becoming increasingly controversial after Musharraf appointed Brig (retd) Ijaz Shah, a close personal friend of his, as its Director and inducted a number of retired army officers into it. He also placed the IB under the control of Shaukat Aziz, his confidante, who was the then Prime Minister. Before her assassination, Benazir used to complain that the threat to her security mainly came from Ijaz Shah, Lt.Gen.(retd) Hamid Gul and Chaudhury Pervez Elahi, former Chief Minister of Punjab, all the three of them Zia loyalists. She did not make any complaint against the ISI. However, since her assassination, there have been allegations by her party members that junior officials of the ISI might have also been involved in her assassination in addition to those named by her when she was alive. Ijaz Shah resigned after the elections.
The ISI has always had three operational priorities. Firstly, the annexation of Kashmir through covert action; secondly, acquiring a strategic depth in Afghanistan through a Government which would be favourable to Pakistani interests; and thirdly, to help the Government in its clandestine nuclear and missile procurement efforts.
These priorities have not changed. That is why it has refrained from taking action against the Pakistani jihadi organizations, which are active in India and against the Neo Taliban of Afghanistan, which is operating against the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan from sanctuaries in Balochistan and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
While pretending to extend unconditional co-operation to the US in its so-called war against terrorism, Musharraf kept the co-operation confined to action against Al Qaeda operatives based in Pakistani territory. Even the co-operation against Al Qaeda is restricted to action against Al Qaeda sleeper cells operating from non-tribal areas. He did not take any effective action against Al Qaeda sanctuaries in the FATA or against the leadership of the Neo Taliban, headed by Mulla Mohammad Omar, its Amir, operating from the tribal areas of Pakistan. Nor did he act against the terrorist infrastructure directed against India.
In December,2003, Musharraf escaped two attempts to assassinate him at Rawalpindi allegedly mounted by Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda elements with the complicity of some junior officers of the Army and the Air Force. The failure of the ISI to detect this conspiracy led to fears that there are elements in the ISI, which are opposed to co-operation with the US even against Al Qaeda.
Dr.Aamir Liaqat Hussain, the then Minister of State for Religious Affairs, gave expression to these fears in an interview to the "Daily Times" of Lahore on May 5, 2005. He warned that Musharraf had a lot of enemies ‘within’ who could make an attempt on his life again at any time. He said that there were certain elements within the forces who could attack the General. He added: “No common people could attack President Musharraf, but certainly there are elements in the forces who can launch yet another attack against him. There is an ISI within the ISI, which is more powerful than the original and still orchestrating many eventualities in the country.” He added that he feared a threat to his own life because he supported Musharraf's call for an enlightened and moderate Islam and had been given the task of preparing the texts of sermons advocating enlightened and moderate Islam to be used at all mosques of the Armed Forces.
The sympathies of many serving and retired officers of the ISI and the Army for Al Qaeda, the Neo Taliban and the Pakistani jihadi organizations and the unwillingness or inability of any Government of Pakistan to act against them are coming in the way of the success of the so-called war against global jihadi terrorism.
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