BENAZIR'S DEATH: ARMY,ISI KEEP LOW PROFILE
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.341
B.RAMAN
The Pakistan Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have been maintaining a discreet silence on the assassination of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto by as yet unidentified elements at Rawalpindi on December 27,2007. Gen.Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), was on a visit to Army establishments in Karachi at the time of her assassination. He immediately cancelled his engagements and returned to Rawalpindi. He and his officers in the General Headquarters (GHQ) as well as in the ISI have avoided any comments or statements or background briefings for the media on her killing. Gen.Kiyani is keeping a tight control over his officers in order to ensure that they do not add to the messy sequel as a result of the loose talk emanating from the Ministry of the Interior, which was responsible for her protection.
2. Most of the controversy relating to the circumstances surrounding her killing, the cause of her death and the alleged responsibility of Baitullah Mehsud for her death, which has been denied by a spokesman of Baitullah, has been caused by the retired Army officers, who were inducted into the Ministry of the Interior and the Police by Gen.Pervez Musharraf after he seized power in 1999.After coming to power, Musharraf had inducted a large number of retired military officers into the police of the provinces as well as into the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which is part of the Interior Ministry, and into the Ministry itself. He appointed Brig. (retd) Ijaz Shah, who was the Home Secretary of Punjab at the time of the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, in January-February,2002, as the Director of the IB.Omar Sheikh, the principal accused in the Pearl case, had surrendered to him in Lahore when he was the Home Secretary.
3. Musharraf also inducted Brig. (retd) Javed Iqbal Cheema, another crony of his, into the Interior Ministry and made him in charge of the crisis management cell in the Ministry, which also co-ordinates counter-terrorism actions and investigations. Many other retired military officers were inducted at different levels of the Ministry and the IB. Of course, Mr.Nawaz Sharif also, as the Prime Minister (1990-93), had made Brig. (retd) Imtiaz, a highly controversial retired army officer known for his dislike of Benazir, as the DIB, but there was no systematic militarisation of the IB under Nawaz, similar to what one had been seeing under Musharraf.
4. As a consequence of Musharraf's policy of militarisation of the Police and the IB, there was a steep fall in the professionalism of these agencies. They were neither able to prevent the increasing number of acts of suicide terrorism nor successfully detect them. The number of acts of suicide terrorism have shot up from six in 2006 to 55 in 2007, including the one involving the murder of Benazir. Most of them have so far remained undetected.
5.The police in Rawalpindi, where she was killed, come under the dual control of the Ministry of the Interior and the Punjab Government, both hotbeds of Zia-ul-Haq loyalists. Chaudhury Pervez Elahi, who was the Chief Minister of Punjab till December,2007, and his cousin Chaudhury Shujjat Hussain, who is the leader of the pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League (Qaide Azam), have always been bitter enemies of the Bhutto family. Ijaz Shah and Lt.Gen.(retd) Hamid Gul, who was the Director-General of the ISI for some months during her first tenure as the Prime Minister (1988 to 90), are also known Zia loyalists.
6. There are presently not many remnants of the coterie of Zia loyalists among the serving senior officers (Lt.Gens. and above) of the Army and the ISI. Most of the remnants are to be found in the Ministry of the Interior, the IB and the Punjab administration. That is why Benazir apprehended a threat to her security to emanate from these elements. In a letter to Musharraf written before she returned to Pakistan on October 18,2007, she had allegedly named three in particular---- Ijaz Shah, Pervez Elahi and Hamid Gul. Musharraf disregarded her allegations and concerns and entrusted the responsibility for her security to the very elements from which she apprehended a threat to her security.
7. A careful reading of the comments of Mr.Asif Ali Zardari, her husband, and other leaders of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), known to have been cloe to her, would indicate that they have been taking care not to implicate the Army and the ISI as institutions in her murder. Instead, they have been directing the needle of suspicion at the persons named by her.
8. There has been a steady infiltration of Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda elements at the lower and middle levels of the Army and the Air Force and into the GHQ itself. Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda organisations were unhappy with her statements that she would allow US troops to hunt for bin Laden in Pakistani territory and the International Atomic Energy Agency at Vienna to interrogate A.Q.Khan, the nuclear scientist. Benazir and her associates were aware of the threat to her security from these Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda organisations such as the Jaish-e-Mohammad and the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), but they strongly believed that these organisations would not be able to carry out their threat without the complicity of the Zia loyalists in the physical security apparatus.
9. While there is no evidence so far of any active complicity by the Zia loyalists, there is clear-cut evidence of glaring negligence in physical security, which made the assassination possible. In their frantic efforts to cover up their responsibility for her death, the retired military officers in the Interior Ministry and the Police----particularly Javed Iqbal Cheema--- have been disseminating one contradictory version after another. During an interaction with the media on December 31,2007, Mr.Mohammadmian Soomro, the caretaker Prime Minister, is reported to have indicated his embarrassment over the clumsy manner in which Cheema had handled the sequel to her killing. But, intriguingly, Musharraf has remained silent in the midst of all this controversy and not taken any action against these officers. (1-1-08)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, December 31, 2007
Sunday, December 30, 2007
PAKISTAN: POSSIBLE POST-BENAZIR SCENARIOS
B.RAMAN
The Pakistani Election Commissions seems to be diffident whether it would be able to hold the general elections on January 8,2008, asscheduled. This is because much of the public anger in Sindh over the assassination of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto has been directed against thelocal offices of the Election Commission and their officials. Mobs have set fire to at least eight offices of the Election Commission and burntdown their records, including the ballot papers.
2. President Pervez Musharraf has wisely indicated that he would go by the advice of Benazir's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) as to whetherhe should postpone the elections and , if so, by how many weeks. Mr.Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), who initiallyindicated in the moments after her assassination that his party would not contest the elections so long as Musharraf was the President,now seems to be having second thoughts under American prodding. His supporters have been saying that they will go by the advice of thenew PPP leadership. If the new leadership decides to participate in the postponed elections, so will the PML, they say.
3. A much embarrassed and chastised Musharraf has also been sending assurances to the parties opposed to him that the elections wouldbe free and fair and that he would have no difficulty in working with the new PPP leadership, if it won the elections. He has, however, beensilent on his position if the PML of Nawaz Sharif wins the elections.
4. The credibility of the Musharraf Government, which was already weakened due to its failure to protect Benazir, has been further damagedby the shockingly inept manner in which the Ministry of the Interior, which was responsible for her protection, handled the sequel to theassassination. They first planted stories in the media that the Interior Ministry had recommended security for Benazir at the same level asprovided for a serving Prime Minister, but the Prime Minister's office did not act on the Interior Ministry's recommendation. Thus, a clumsyattempt was made to pass on the blame to Mr.Shaukat Aziz, the former Prime Minister, and Mr.Mohammadmian Soomro, the presentcaretaker Prime Minister.
5. Then, a totally unwarranted story was given to the media that while she was the target of a terrorist attack involving the use of a revolverand an improvised explosive device (IED), her death was not caused by either the bullets fired or by the suicide bomber. According to itsversion, the death was caused by a skull fracture which she sustained when her head struck the lever of the vehicle due to the impact ofthe explosion.
6. The Interior Ministry's version has been strongly repudiated by those in the entourage of Benazir when she was killed as well as by mediapersonnel. According to Benazir's associates, when she stood up to greet her supporters, an unidentified person among the by-standersopened fire on her from close range with a revolver. The bullets struck her neck and head. She collapsed inside the car. Only after shecollapsed, did the explosion take place. According to one media account, someone fired at her. She collapsed bleeding heavily. The driverimmediately drove the car away and then only the explosion took place. That is how neither her car nor any of its occupants sustained anydamage due to the explosion.
7. In an editorial, the "Daily Times" of Lahore (December 30,2007) said: "Originally, there was a statement from the interior minister that MsBhutto was hit in the neck and head by a shrapnel from the bomb explosion and she bled to death in hospital. There was no mention of anygunman or bullets fired at Ms Bhutto. However, this was contradicted by Mr Amin Fahim who was sitting next to Ms Bhutto when she firststood up and waved to the crowd from the sunroof of the bullet proof car and later slumped to her seat, following which there was a bombexplosion a minute or two later. In Mr Amin’s version, the explosion happened after she had already slumped in her seat and not before.Later, when eye-witness reports came in, including one from a foreign photographer who was twenty yards from the slow moving car whenhe heard the shots and ducked, followed by an explosion after the car had passed, the government admitted that a gunman had beenpresent and fired at her from short range before detonating himself and unleashing an explosion."
8. Talking to the media separately after the Interior Ministry's briefing, some of the doctors, who attended to Benazir after she was broughtto a Rawalpindi hospital, said that in their joint report they had merely said that her death was caused by an "open head injury withdepressed skull fracture, leading to cardiopulmonary arrest." The inference that this head injury must have been caused by her headstriking against the lever of the vehicle was that of the Interior Ministry and not of the doctors. The doctors said that since they did not havean opportunity to perform an autopsy, they were not in a position to say what might have caused the injury.
9. Embarrassed by this, officials of the Interior Ministry have been claiming that autopsy was not performed since Benazir's family wasagainst it and that now to remove the suspicions, they would be prepared to have the body exhumed in order to permit an autopsy.
10. Similarly, Baitullah Mehsud's reported denial of the Interior Ministry's claim that two of his followers had killed her has added to theembarrassment of the Government. Close associates of Benazir have revealed that after the October 18,2007, attack on her at Karachi,Baitullah had sent her a message denying any involvement in the attempt and assuring her that he did not pose any threat to her.
11. The panic and confusion in the Interior Ministry after the assassination have given rise to a flood of rumours, with some alleging that theman who fired at Benazir with a revolver was a retired commando of the US-trained Special Services Group, of which Musharraf himselfused to be a member, and that in an attempt to cover this up, the Interior Ministry fabricated an alleged intercept of a telephoneconversation between Baitullah and one of his associates regarding the assassination.
12. There are three possible political scenarios in the aftermath of Benazir's assassination:
SCENARIO NO.1: The PPP elects either Mr.Asif Zardari, Benazir's husband, or Bilawal, her son, as the new President and goes to the polls under the new leadership. Profiting from the sympathy wave, it would emerge as the largest single party, if not as a party with an absolute majority. Musharraf would invite it to form the Government. It is unlikely to last long and would, most probably, be ineffective. While Musharraf and his senior officers would not oppose it in the circumstances after Benazir's assassination, they would feel uncomfortable with it because of their dislike for Zardari. Moreover, Nawaz Sharif's PML would find it difficult to co-operate with it. There could also be a sharpening of the differences inside the PPP between the Zardari loyalists and the traditional party loyalists, who do not like Zardari.
SCENARIO No.2: Zardari and the family decide not to push forward their claim for leadership and propose Maqdoom Amin Fahim, the present No. 2 in the party, as the leader. The PPP comes to power under Amin's leadership. This is a scenario which both Musharraf and the US would prefer. Musharraf and the senior Army officers feel comfortable with Amin. After the 2002 elections, Musharraf had tried to wean him away from Benazir by offering him the post of Prime Minister. Amin declined and remained loyal to her. During Benazir's second tenure as the Prime Minister (1993 to 96), Amin was her Oil Minister. He played a key role in the negotiations involving the Unocal, the US oil company, and the Governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan for the construction of oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to Pakistan. In 1995, during a visit of the then President of Turkmenistan to New York, Unocal had hosted a high-profile reception for him. Benazir had asked Amin to represent her Government in the reception. Amin is fairly well known to the US oil companies and to the officials of the US State Department who held office during the Clinton Administration. Nawaz too may not be averse to supporting Amin in the short term.
SCENARIO No.3: Despite the sympathy wave for the PPP, the PML of Nawaz, secretly or openly supported by the pro-Musharraf PML (Qaide Azam), might emerge as the largest single party or even as a party with an absolute majority. Since Nawaz Sharif is legally barred from contesting the elections and holding office as Prime Minister, his party elects Mr.Shabaz Sharif, his younger brother, as the leader to stake claim as the Prime Minister. His nomination papers have been rejected on the ground that he was an accused in a criminal case, but he is not a convict. Musharraf should not have difficulty in finding a way for him to contest the elections. After the Amin scenario, the Shabaz scenario will be the second preference for Musharraf and the US. The senior Army officers feel comfortable with him. While they would be opposed to Nawaz becoming the Prime Minister, they are unlikely to oppose Shahbaz becoming the Prime Minister. He was the Chief Minister of Punjab when Nawaz was the Prime Minister between 1996 and 99 and Nawaz was using him as his back channel with the US State Department and the Pentagon for secret discussions on various issues such as action against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, threats to Nawaz from Musharraf after the Kargil conflict etc. Shahbaz was in regular touch with Mr.Strobe Talbot and Mr.Karl Inderfurth in the State Department on behalf of Nawaz. The US bureaucracy used to feel comfortable with him and there is no reason why they should not feel comfortable with him in future too.
13. However, a problem, which cannot be avoided, is that after the death of Benazir, Nawaz is the only leader with a national stature, but heand Musharraf cannot get along. Amin and Shahbaz can get along with Musharraf and the US, but neither of them has a national stature.
14. After Benazir's assassination, Pakistan faces a situation in which there is a looming disaster if Musharraf continues in power and anequal disaster without Musharraf. With Al Qaeda and the pro-Al Qaeda organisations spreading their influence into the vitals of the securityestablishment, it will be dangerous to jettison Musharraf abruptly. He has to continue at least for the time being, but the longer he lasts thegreater will be the anger against him among the tribals thereby further exacerbating the problem of jihadi terrorism.
15. While seemingly getting along with him, the US policy-makers should covertly, but energetically facilitate the emergence of a newmilitary leadership, which would vigorously act against Al Qaeda and Taliban while , at the same time, not coming in the way of therestoration of democravy under the pretext of fighting against terrorism. (30-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies. Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
The Pakistani Election Commissions seems to be diffident whether it would be able to hold the general elections on January 8,2008, asscheduled. This is because much of the public anger in Sindh over the assassination of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto has been directed against thelocal offices of the Election Commission and their officials. Mobs have set fire to at least eight offices of the Election Commission and burntdown their records, including the ballot papers.
2. President Pervez Musharraf has wisely indicated that he would go by the advice of Benazir's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) as to whetherhe should postpone the elections and , if so, by how many weeks. Mr.Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), who initiallyindicated in the moments after her assassination that his party would not contest the elections so long as Musharraf was the President,now seems to be having second thoughts under American prodding. His supporters have been saying that they will go by the advice of thenew PPP leadership. If the new leadership decides to participate in the postponed elections, so will the PML, they say.
3. A much embarrassed and chastised Musharraf has also been sending assurances to the parties opposed to him that the elections wouldbe free and fair and that he would have no difficulty in working with the new PPP leadership, if it won the elections. He has, however, beensilent on his position if the PML of Nawaz Sharif wins the elections.
4. The credibility of the Musharraf Government, which was already weakened due to its failure to protect Benazir, has been further damagedby the shockingly inept manner in which the Ministry of the Interior, which was responsible for her protection, handled the sequel to theassassination. They first planted stories in the media that the Interior Ministry had recommended security for Benazir at the same level asprovided for a serving Prime Minister, but the Prime Minister's office did not act on the Interior Ministry's recommendation. Thus, a clumsyattempt was made to pass on the blame to Mr.Shaukat Aziz, the former Prime Minister, and Mr.Mohammadmian Soomro, the presentcaretaker Prime Minister.
5. Then, a totally unwarranted story was given to the media that while she was the target of a terrorist attack involving the use of a revolverand an improvised explosive device (IED), her death was not caused by either the bullets fired or by the suicide bomber. According to itsversion, the death was caused by a skull fracture which she sustained when her head struck the lever of the vehicle due to the impact ofthe explosion.
6. The Interior Ministry's version has been strongly repudiated by those in the entourage of Benazir when she was killed as well as by mediapersonnel. According to Benazir's associates, when she stood up to greet her supporters, an unidentified person among the by-standersopened fire on her from close range with a revolver. The bullets struck her neck and head. She collapsed inside the car. Only after shecollapsed, did the explosion take place. According to one media account, someone fired at her. She collapsed bleeding heavily. The driverimmediately drove the car away and then only the explosion took place. That is how neither her car nor any of its occupants sustained anydamage due to the explosion.
7. In an editorial, the "Daily Times" of Lahore (December 30,2007) said: "Originally, there was a statement from the interior minister that MsBhutto was hit in the neck and head by a shrapnel from the bomb explosion and she bled to death in hospital. There was no mention of anygunman or bullets fired at Ms Bhutto. However, this was contradicted by Mr Amin Fahim who was sitting next to Ms Bhutto when she firststood up and waved to the crowd from the sunroof of the bullet proof car and later slumped to her seat, following which there was a bombexplosion a minute or two later. In Mr Amin’s version, the explosion happened after she had already slumped in her seat and not before.Later, when eye-witness reports came in, including one from a foreign photographer who was twenty yards from the slow moving car whenhe heard the shots and ducked, followed by an explosion after the car had passed, the government admitted that a gunman had beenpresent and fired at her from short range before detonating himself and unleashing an explosion."
8. Talking to the media separately after the Interior Ministry's briefing, some of the doctors, who attended to Benazir after she was broughtto a Rawalpindi hospital, said that in their joint report they had merely said that her death was caused by an "open head injury withdepressed skull fracture, leading to cardiopulmonary arrest." The inference that this head injury must have been caused by her headstriking against the lever of the vehicle was that of the Interior Ministry and not of the doctors. The doctors said that since they did not havean opportunity to perform an autopsy, they were not in a position to say what might have caused the injury.
9. Embarrassed by this, officials of the Interior Ministry have been claiming that autopsy was not performed since Benazir's family wasagainst it and that now to remove the suspicions, they would be prepared to have the body exhumed in order to permit an autopsy.
10. Similarly, Baitullah Mehsud's reported denial of the Interior Ministry's claim that two of his followers had killed her has added to theembarrassment of the Government. Close associates of Benazir have revealed that after the October 18,2007, attack on her at Karachi,Baitullah had sent her a message denying any involvement in the attempt and assuring her that he did not pose any threat to her.
11. The panic and confusion in the Interior Ministry after the assassination have given rise to a flood of rumours, with some alleging that theman who fired at Benazir with a revolver was a retired commando of the US-trained Special Services Group, of which Musharraf himselfused to be a member, and that in an attempt to cover this up, the Interior Ministry fabricated an alleged intercept of a telephoneconversation between Baitullah and one of his associates regarding the assassination.
12. There are three possible political scenarios in the aftermath of Benazir's assassination:
SCENARIO NO.1: The PPP elects either Mr.Asif Zardari, Benazir's husband, or Bilawal, her son, as the new President and goes to the polls under the new leadership. Profiting from the sympathy wave, it would emerge as the largest single party, if not as a party with an absolute majority. Musharraf would invite it to form the Government. It is unlikely to last long and would, most probably, be ineffective. While Musharraf and his senior officers would not oppose it in the circumstances after Benazir's assassination, they would feel uncomfortable with it because of their dislike for Zardari. Moreover, Nawaz Sharif's PML would find it difficult to co-operate with it. There could also be a sharpening of the differences inside the PPP between the Zardari loyalists and the traditional party loyalists, who do not like Zardari.
SCENARIO No.2: Zardari and the family decide not to push forward their claim for leadership and propose Maqdoom Amin Fahim, the present No. 2 in the party, as the leader. The PPP comes to power under Amin's leadership. This is a scenario which both Musharraf and the US would prefer. Musharraf and the senior Army officers feel comfortable with Amin. After the 2002 elections, Musharraf had tried to wean him away from Benazir by offering him the post of Prime Minister. Amin declined and remained loyal to her. During Benazir's second tenure as the Prime Minister (1993 to 96), Amin was her Oil Minister. He played a key role in the negotiations involving the Unocal, the US oil company, and the Governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan for the construction of oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to Pakistan. In 1995, during a visit of the then President of Turkmenistan to New York, Unocal had hosted a high-profile reception for him. Benazir had asked Amin to represent her Government in the reception. Amin is fairly well known to the US oil companies and to the officials of the US State Department who held office during the Clinton Administration. Nawaz too may not be averse to supporting Amin in the short term.
SCENARIO No.3: Despite the sympathy wave for the PPP, the PML of Nawaz, secretly or openly supported by the pro-Musharraf PML (Qaide Azam), might emerge as the largest single party or even as a party with an absolute majority. Since Nawaz Sharif is legally barred from contesting the elections and holding office as Prime Minister, his party elects Mr.Shabaz Sharif, his younger brother, as the leader to stake claim as the Prime Minister. His nomination papers have been rejected on the ground that he was an accused in a criminal case, but he is not a convict. Musharraf should not have difficulty in finding a way for him to contest the elections. After the Amin scenario, the Shabaz scenario will be the second preference for Musharraf and the US. The senior Army officers feel comfortable with him. While they would be opposed to Nawaz becoming the Prime Minister, they are unlikely to oppose Shahbaz becoming the Prime Minister. He was the Chief Minister of Punjab when Nawaz was the Prime Minister between 1996 and 99 and Nawaz was using him as his back channel with the US State Department and the Pentagon for secret discussions on various issues such as action against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, threats to Nawaz from Musharraf after the Kargil conflict etc. Shahbaz was in regular touch with Mr.Strobe Talbot and Mr.Karl Inderfurth in the State Department on behalf of Nawaz. The US bureaucracy used to feel comfortable with him and there is no reason why they should not feel comfortable with him in future too.
13. However, a problem, which cannot be avoided, is that after the death of Benazir, Nawaz is the only leader with a national stature, but heand Musharraf cannot get along. Amin and Shahbaz can get along with Musharraf and the US, but neither of them has a national stature.
14. After Benazir's assassination, Pakistan faces a situation in which there is a looming disaster if Musharraf continues in power and anequal disaster without Musharraf. With Al Qaeda and the pro-Al Qaeda organisations spreading their influence into the vitals of the securityestablishment, it will be dangerous to jettison Musharraf abruptly. He has to continue at least for the time being, but the longer he lasts thegreater will be the anger against him among the tribals thereby further exacerbating the problem of jihadi terrorism.
15. While seemingly getting along with him, the US policy-makers should covertly, but energetically facilitate the emergence of a newmilitary leadership, which would vigorously act against Al Qaeda and Taliban while , at the same time, not coming in the way of therestoration of democravy under the pretext of fighting against terrorism. (30-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies. Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, December 28, 2007
BENAZIR'S ASSASSINATION: THE AFTERMATH
B.RAMAN
The assassination of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto on December 27,2007, has considerably embarrassed President Pervez Musharraf. This was because the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which comes under the Ministry of the Interior, had the over-all responsibility for her security and it was headed by Brig (retd).Ijaz Shah, a close associate of Musharraf, against whom she and her husband Mr.Asif Zardari had been repeatedly complaining ever since the first attempt to kill her at Karachi on October 18,2007. Musharraf's perceived failure to address her concerns and to respond to her requests for better security have created a widespread perception of wilful negligence in protecting her.
2. There was definitely negligence in protecting her, but it is difficult to say at what level of the intelligence and security establishment. In the short term, Musharraf should be able to get over this embarrassment provided the street reaction to the assassination does not become widespread and uncontrollable. There have been violent street protests---particularly in Sindh, as expected, and in pockets of Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)--- resulting in the deaths of over 30 persons and extensive damage to publioc and private property. But, surprisingly, the street protests have thus far remained controllable and have been no more serious in Karachi than those witnessed earlier this year over the suspension of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury of the Supreme Court.
3. One had expected the whole of Sindh to blow up and rise against Musharraf after the assassination. Surprisingly, this has not happened so far---not even after the funeral of Benazir in her native village. The absence so far of uncontrollable street anger probably indicates a certain disenchantment with her attempts to make a deal with the Army before she returned from exile on October 18,2007, and with her pro-US policies. Her strongly pro-US statements did not apparently go down well even in Sindh and this is reflected in the absence of massive protests so far.
4. The support for Musharraf from the Army is unlikely to be weakened as a result of the assassination unless the street protests become massive in the days to come, thereby making his position increasingly untenable. If the protests remain at the present level and show signs of losing steam in the days to come, he may be tempted to go ahead with the elections even in the face of a boycott by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Mr.Nawaz Sharif. The long-suppressed differences inside the PPP between the Zardari loyalists and the traditional loyalists are likely to sharpen. Sindhi leaders such as Makhdoom Amin Fahim have always had their own secret personal ambitions, though they remained loyal to her till the last. Now that she is no more, personal ambitions would increasingly play a more important role than party loyalty in influencing their behaviour and Musharraf should be able to exploit this to draw them into a coalition with the Pakistan Muslim League (Qaide Azam) engineered by him in 2002.
5. The removal of Benazir from the scene is unlikely to redound to the benefit of Nawaz Sharif in any substantial measure. Thus, the short-term political beneficiary of the removal of Benazir from the scene would be Musharraf and the PML (QA). Musharraf would find it hard to resist the temptation to exploit the situation to strengthen the political backing for him by going ahead with the elections.
6. The US is in a dilemma. It realises the folly of uncritical dependence on Musharraf. Had Benazir been there and done well in the elections, she would have provided it with another card. With her gone, the US is back to its pre-October 18 position of having only the Musharraf card. It would not like to throw away this card for the present. The US has reasons to be alarmed by indications of the spread of Al Qaeda's tentacles to Rawalpindi. Countering Al Qaeda is more important in its eyes than really nurturing democracy. Pro forma support for a transition to democracy and carrying along with Musharraf despite all that has happened till an acceptable alternative is on the horizon will be its policy. For this purpose, it would want Musharraf to go ahead with the elections even if their credibility had been weakened. (28-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
B.RAMAN
The assassination of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto on December 27,2007, has considerably embarrassed President Pervez Musharraf. This was because the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which comes under the Ministry of the Interior, had the over-all responsibility for her security and it was headed by Brig (retd).Ijaz Shah, a close associate of Musharraf, against whom she and her husband Mr.Asif Zardari had been repeatedly complaining ever since the first attempt to kill her at Karachi on October 18,2007. Musharraf's perceived failure to address her concerns and to respond to her requests for better security have created a widespread perception of wilful negligence in protecting her.
2. There was definitely negligence in protecting her, but it is difficult to say at what level of the intelligence and security establishment. In the short term, Musharraf should be able to get over this embarrassment provided the street reaction to the assassination does not become widespread and uncontrollable. There have been violent street protests---particularly in Sindh, as expected, and in pockets of Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)--- resulting in the deaths of over 30 persons and extensive damage to publioc and private property. But, surprisingly, the street protests have thus far remained controllable and have been no more serious in Karachi than those witnessed earlier this year over the suspension of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhury of the Supreme Court.
3. One had expected the whole of Sindh to blow up and rise against Musharraf after the assassination. Surprisingly, this has not happened so far---not even after the funeral of Benazir in her native village. The absence so far of uncontrollable street anger probably indicates a certain disenchantment with her attempts to make a deal with the Army before she returned from exile on October 18,2007, and with her pro-US policies. Her strongly pro-US statements did not apparently go down well even in Sindh and this is reflected in the absence of massive protests so far.
4. The support for Musharraf from the Army is unlikely to be weakened as a result of the assassination unless the street protests become massive in the days to come, thereby making his position increasingly untenable. If the protests remain at the present level and show signs of losing steam in the days to come, he may be tempted to go ahead with the elections even in the face of a boycott by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) of Mr.Nawaz Sharif. The long-suppressed differences inside the PPP between the Zardari loyalists and the traditional loyalists are likely to sharpen. Sindhi leaders such as Makhdoom Amin Fahim have always had their own secret personal ambitions, though they remained loyal to her till the last. Now that she is no more, personal ambitions would increasingly play a more important role than party loyalty in influencing their behaviour and Musharraf should be able to exploit this to draw them into a coalition with the Pakistan Muslim League (Qaide Azam) engineered by him in 2002.
5. The removal of Benazir from the scene is unlikely to redound to the benefit of Nawaz Sharif in any substantial measure. Thus, the short-term political beneficiary of the removal of Benazir from the scene would be Musharraf and the PML (QA). Musharraf would find it hard to resist the temptation to exploit the situation to strengthen the political backing for him by going ahead with the elections.
6. The US is in a dilemma. It realises the folly of uncritical dependence on Musharraf. Had Benazir been there and done well in the elections, she would have provided it with another card. With her gone, the US is back to its pre-October 18 position of having only the Musharraf card. It would not like to throw away this card for the present. The US has reasons to be alarmed by indications of the spread of Al Qaeda's tentacles to Rawalpindi. Countering Al Qaeda is more important in its eyes than really nurturing democracy. Pro forma support for a transition to democracy and carrying along with Musharraf despite all that has happened till an acceptable alternative is on the horizon will be its policy. For this purpose, it would want Musharraf to go ahead with the elections even if their credibility had been weakened. (28-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Thursday, December 27, 2007
AL QAEDA IN GHQ,RAWALPINDI
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.335
B.RAMAN
Since 9/11, there has been hardly any jihadi terrorist strike anywhere in the world in which there was no Pakistani connection.
2. Since 2002, there has been hardly any jihadi terrorist strike in Pakistani territory in which there was no connection of the GeneralHeadquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army. By GHQ, one does not mean the entire army. One means some elements in the GHQ.
3. The first wake-up call about the possible presence of one or more sleeper cells of Al Qaeda in Rawalpindi came in March,2003, whenKhalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), who allegedly orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, was found living in the house of a woman'swing office-bearer of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Rawalpindi. She had relatives in the army, including an officer of a Signal Regiment.
4. The second wake-up call came after the two attempts to assassinate President Pervez Musharraf in Rawalpindi in December,2003.ThePakistani authorities have not so far taken their public into confidence regarding the details of the two plots.All that they admitted wasthat four junior officers of the Army and six of the Air Force were allegedly involved. One of the army officers named Islamuddin wascourt-martialed and sentenced to death even before the investigation was complete. Another army officer named Havaldar Younis wassentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment. Much to the discomfiture of the authorities, one of the Air Force officers, a civilian,who wasbeing held in custody in an Air Force station, managed to escape.
5.There are still many unanswered questions about the conspiracy to kill Musharraf. Who took the initiative in planning this conspiracy? Thearrested junior officers of the Army and the Air Force or the leaders of the suspected jihadi organisations? When was the conspiracyhatched? How did Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Intelligence Directorates-General of the Army and the Air Force remainunaware of this conspiracy despite the fact that the conspirators had allegedly held some of their preparatory meetings in their livingquarters in military cantonments and Air Force stations? Was there a complicity of some in the intelligence establishment itself? If so, atwhat level? Why was the Government unable to identify those in the intelligence establishment involved in the conspiracy? Was there aninvolvement of the Hizbut Tehrir?
6.These questions re-surfaced in the wake of the arrest of Abu Faraj al-Libi of Al Qaeda and the re-arrest of the civilian employee of the AirForce involved in the conspiracy, who had managed to escape from custody in November,2004, while under interrogation. That there wereapprehensions in the minds of those close to Musharraf over the role of sections of the intelligence establishment in the entire conspiracyand over the failure of the investigating agencies to unravel the entire conspiracy became evident from an interview given by Dr.AamirLiaqat Hussain, the then Minister of State for Religious Affairs, to the "Daily Times" on May 5,2005.
7.The Minister warned that Musharraf had a lot of enemies ‘within’ who could make an attempt on his life again at any time. He said thatthere were certain elements within the forces who could attack the General. He added: “No common people could attack PresidentMusharraf, but certainly there are elements in the forces who can launch yet another attack against him. There is an ISI within the ISI,which is more powerful than the original and still orchestrating many eventualities in the country.” He added that he feared a threat to hisown life because he supported Musharraf's call for an enlightened and moderate Islam and had been given the task of preparing the textsof sermons advocating enlightened and moderate Islam to be used at all mosques of the Armed Forces.
8.Well-informed sources in Pakistan said that apart from the failure of the intelligence establishment to identify and weed out the pro-jihadielements in the Armed Forces and the intelligence establishment, another cause for serious concern was the continuing failure of theintelligence establishment to identify all the Pakistani leaders of the highly secretive Hizbut Tehrir (HT) and its supporters in the ArmedForces and arrest them.The HT ideology and operational methods were imported into Pakistan from the UK by its supporters in thePakistani community in the UK in 2000. It was said that within five years it was able to make considerable progress not only in setting up itsorganisational infrastructure, but also in recruiting dedicated members in the civil society as well as the Armed Forces. It was also reportedthat no other jihadi organisation had been able to attract as many young and educated members and as many supporters in the ArmedForces as the HT.
9.Physical security regulations in an office of the ISI at Rawalpindi exempt officers of the rank of Brigadier and above coming in their ownvehicle from frisking at the outer gate. They undergo a frisking only after they have entered the premises, parked their car in the spaceallotted to them in the garage and then enter the building in which their office is located. Officers below the rank of Brigadier undergofrisking twice, whether they are in their own vehicle or in a bus ----at the outer gate and again inside before they enter the building. At theouter gate, they have to get out of their vehicle, undergo frisking and then get into their vehicle and drive in.
10. Since all officers travel in civilian clothes in unmarked vehicles, which cannot be identified with the Army or the ISI, there is a special hand signalling system for Brigadiers and above by which the security staff at the outer gate can recognise their rank and let them drive inwithout undergoing frisking. This hand signalling is changed frequently.
11. On the morning of November 24, 2007, a car reached the outer gate and the man inside showed a hand signal, which was in use till theprevious day. It had been changed on November 23 and a new signal was in force from the morning of November 24, 2007. He was notaware of it. The security staff got suspicious and did not allow the car to drive in. They asked the man driving it to get out for questioningand frisking. He blew himself up.
12. As he did so, an unmarked chartered bus carrying over 40 civilian and junior military employees of the ISI reached the outer gate andstopped so that those inside can get out for frisking. The bus bore the brunt of the explosion, which caused the death of about 35persons---- from among those inside the bus as well as the security staff. The Pakistani authorities admitted the death of only 18 persons.
13. Around the same time, a man driving a vehicle towards the premises of the GHQ in another part of Rawalpindi was stopped by thesecurity staff at a physical security barrier. He blew himself up killing two of the security staff. These two well-synchronised suicide strikesin Rawalpindi, the sanctum sanctorum of Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment, came about six weeks after a similar attacktargeting the ISI and the Army at Rawalpindi at the same time. On September 4, 2007. a suicide attacker blew himself up after boarding abus carrying ISI employees. A roadside bomb went off near a commercial area in Rawalpindi, while a car carrying an unidentified seniorArmy officer to the GHQ was passing. Twenty-five persons died in the two attacks. The Army officer escaped unhurt. On October 30, 2007, asuicide bomber blew himself up at a checkpoint several hundred yards from the GHQ killing seven persons, most of the from the securitystaff.
14.The two attacks directed at the ISI and another at a Pakistan Air Force bus at Sargodha were based on inside information. In the case ofthe explosion at the outer gate of the ISI complex on November 24, 2007, the suicide bomber was aware of the hand signalling code forBrigadiers and above. However, he was not aware that the signal code had been changed the previous day. Since these codes arecommunicated personally to Brigadiers and above, their existence is supposed to be known only to Brigadiers and above and the physicalsecurity staff. The suicide bomber's inside accomplice was either an ISI officer of the rank of Brigadier or above or a member of the physicalsecurity staff.
15. There are two alarming aspects of the security situation in Pakistan. The first is the upsurge in acts of suicide terrorism directed againstsecurity and intelligence personnel and their establishments. These give clear evidence of the penetration of pro-Al Qaeda jihadi elementsinside the Armed Forces, the intelligence agencies and the Police. The second is the inability or unwillingness of the Police to vigorouslyinvestigate these incidents, including the attempt to kill Mrs. Benazir Bhutto in Karachi on October 18,2007. Nobody knows definitively tilltoday who are responsible for these suicide attacks---- tribal followers of Baitullah Mehsud of South Waziristan or those of Maulana Fazlullahof the Swat Valley or the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), the anti-Shia sectarian organisation, or Al Qaeda and its Uzbek associates or the angrystudents of the two madrasas run by the Lal Masjid in Islamabad?
16. The Rawalpindi cantonment where the headquarters of the Army and other sensitive units of the Pakistan Army and the ISI are located,and the adjoining Islamabad, the capital, where the headquarters of the federal Government and the National Assembly are located, hadseen terrorist strikes even in the past. Amongst them, one could mention the 1989 explosion in the Rawalpindi office of Dr. Farooq Haider,the then President of one of the factions of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which was attributed to a rival faction led byAmanullah Khan; the explosion outside the Egyptian Embassy at Islamabad in the 1990s, which was attributed to some Egyptian opponentsof President Hosni Mubarak; the grenade attack inside an Islamabad church frequented by the diplomatic community in March 2002 inwhich the wife of a US diplomat and their daughter were killed; the unsolved assassination of Maulana Azam Tariq, the Amir of theSipah-eSahaba, Pakistan, the political wing of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, at Islamabad in 2003, the terrorist attack on a a group of workers ofthe Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Benazir Bhutto in Islamabad earlier this year, the alleged firing of a rocket on Musharraf's plane fromthe terrace of a house in Islamabad again earlier this year and the alleged firing of rockets by unidentified elements from a park inIslamabad last year.
17. If one leaves aside the JKLF factional politics, the only terrorist organisations which had operated in the Islamabad-Rawalpindi area inthe past (before July 2007) were the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), which was blamed for the church grenade attack; the Sipah Mohammad, theShia terrorist organisation, which was suspected in the murder of Azam Tariq; and Al Qaeda. Many Pakistani and Kashmiri jihadiorganisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Hizbul Mujahideen, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) etc have their offices in Rawalpindi, butdo not indulge in terrorist activities there.
18. There was no evidence to show that the Egyptians responsible for the explosion outside the Egyptian Embassy were then the followersof Osama bin Laden. The first indication of some local support for Al Qaeda in Rawalpindi came in March, 2003, when Khalid SheikhMohammad (KSM), supposedly the man who co-ordinated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, was arrested from the house of a women's wingleader of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) in Rawalpindi by the Pakistani authorities and handed over to the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI).
19. KSM was living in Karachi till September, 2002, when he fled from there to Quetta in Balochistan following the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh,another Al Qaeda operative there. From Quetta, he shifted to Rawalpindi in the beginning of 2003, fearing betrayal by the Shias of Quetta. After his arrest, no thorough enquiries would appear to have been made either by the ISI or the Police to determine why he took shelter inRawalpindi, a highly guarded military cantonment. Did he and/or Al Qaeda have any other accomplices in Rawalpindi, in addition to the JEIleader and the members of her family, who included one junior Army officer belonging to a signals battalion, who was also detained forinterrogation? Did Al Qaeda or the Pakistani organisations allied to it in the International Islamic Front (IIF) have a sleeper cell or cells in thecantonment? If they had, the sleeper cells could have functioned undetected only with the complicity of at least some in the Armed Forces.
20. After the arrest and the handing-over of KSM to the US, anti-Musharraf and pro-jihadi pamphlets typed on the official letter-head used inthe army offices in the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi started circulating in Rawalpindi and Islamabad. The ISI and the Policewere unable to determine who was circulating these pamphlets and no arrests were made in this connection. Instead, a leader of the NawazSharif-led faction of the Pakistan Muslim League, who drew the attention of the Parliament and the public to these pamphlets, was orderedto be arrested by Musharraf on a charge of treason.
21. After the April, 2003, arrest in Karachi of Waleed bin Attash of Al Qaeda, one of the suspects in the case relating to the Al Qaeda attackon the US naval ship USS Cole at Aden in October, 2000, many of the Al Qaeda members living in Karachi were reported to have shifted tothe North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Balochistan , the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Rawalpindi.
22. Their shifting to Rawalpindi and taking shelter there would not have been possible without the complicity of not only the Pakistani jihadigroups, but also supporters in the Armed Forces and the police. The Pakistani security agencies have not been able to identify anddismantle Al Qaeda and IIF cells in the Rawalpindi cantonment. The fact that the perpetrators of the two attacks of December,2003, onMusharraf , whether they belonged to Al Qaeda or to any of the Pakistani components of the IIF, chose to act on both the occasions fromRawalpindi instead of Karachi where Musharraf was before the first attack on December 14 showed their confidence in being able tooperate undetected from Rawalpindi rather than from Karachi.
23. I do not believe Musharraf had prior knowledge of the plot to kill Benazir in Rawalpindi. But he has to be held responsible for failing toprovide effective physical security to her. He and his officers kept disregarding her growing fears about threats to her security. He failed toensure a vigorous investigation of the first attempt to kill her at Karachi on October,18,2007.
24. The infiltration of traditional fundamentalist political parties into the GHQ started under the late Zia-ul-Haq. Since Musharraf took over,there has been an infiltration of Al Qaeda into the Pakistani Armed Forces and into their sactum sanctorum in Rawalpindi. These elementsare against Musharraf too, but they were much more against Benazir because of the fact that she was a woman and she had been sayingopenly that she would allow the US to hunt for bin Laden in Pakistani territory and the International Atomic Energy Agency at Vienna tointerrogate A.Q.Khan, the nuclear scientist. Al Qaeda and the pro-Al Qaeda jihadis wanted to eliminate both Musharraf and her because theywere seen as apostate and as collaborators of the US.
25. They have succeeded in killing her. They will now step up their efforts to eliminate Musharraf. Whoever was responsible for killing hercould not have done it without inside complicity. If Al Qaeda is already having sleeper cells in the GHQ, there is an equal danger that italready has sleeper cells inside Pakistan's nuclear establishment too.
26. Musharraf is either knowingly dishonest or is living in a make-believe world of his own, unaware of the ground realities. Only a few daysbefore Benazir's assassination, he was bragging to officer trainees in the Defence Services Staff College in Quetta that he had defeated theterrorists outside the tribal belt and would soon be defeating them in the tribal belt too. His reluctance to order an enquiry into the extent ofinfiltration of Al Qaeda into the GHQ is disturbing. He has convinced himself that not only he is the most popular leader of Pakistan, but alsothat the entire Armed Forces are devoted to him. Anybody who says otherwise is treated by him as a traitor, arrested and harassed.
27. It is high time he and the US realise that Al Qaeda is not just in the tribal belt. It is right under their nose in Rawalpindi. (28-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER NO.335
B.RAMAN
Since 9/11, there has been hardly any jihadi terrorist strike anywhere in the world in which there was no Pakistani connection.
2. Since 2002, there has been hardly any jihadi terrorist strike in Pakistani territory in which there was no connection of the GeneralHeadquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army. By GHQ, one does not mean the entire army. One means some elements in the GHQ.
3. The first wake-up call about the possible presence of one or more sleeper cells of Al Qaeda in Rawalpindi came in March,2003, whenKhalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), who allegedly orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, was found living in the house of a woman'swing office-bearer of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Rawalpindi. She had relatives in the army, including an officer of a Signal Regiment.
4. The second wake-up call came after the two attempts to assassinate President Pervez Musharraf in Rawalpindi in December,2003.ThePakistani authorities have not so far taken their public into confidence regarding the details of the two plots.All that they admitted wasthat four junior officers of the Army and six of the Air Force were allegedly involved. One of the army officers named Islamuddin wascourt-martialed and sentenced to death even before the investigation was complete. Another army officer named Havaldar Younis wassentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment. Much to the discomfiture of the authorities, one of the Air Force officers, a civilian,who wasbeing held in custody in an Air Force station, managed to escape.
5.There are still many unanswered questions about the conspiracy to kill Musharraf. Who took the initiative in planning this conspiracy? Thearrested junior officers of the Army and the Air Force or the leaders of the suspected jihadi organisations? When was the conspiracyhatched? How did Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Intelligence Directorates-General of the Army and the Air Force remainunaware of this conspiracy despite the fact that the conspirators had allegedly held some of their preparatory meetings in their livingquarters in military cantonments and Air Force stations? Was there a complicity of some in the intelligence establishment itself? If so, atwhat level? Why was the Government unable to identify those in the intelligence establishment involved in the conspiracy? Was there aninvolvement of the Hizbut Tehrir?
6.These questions re-surfaced in the wake of the arrest of Abu Faraj al-Libi of Al Qaeda and the re-arrest of the civilian employee of the AirForce involved in the conspiracy, who had managed to escape from custody in November,2004, while under interrogation. That there wereapprehensions in the minds of those close to Musharraf over the role of sections of the intelligence establishment in the entire conspiracyand over the failure of the investigating agencies to unravel the entire conspiracy became evident from an interview given by Dr.AamirLiaqat Hussain, the then Minister of State for Religious Affairs, to the "Daily Times" on May 5,2005.
7.The Minister warned that Musharraf had a lot of enemies ‘within’ who could make an attempt on his life again at any time. He said thatthere were certain elements within the forces who could attack the General. He added: “No common people could attack PresidentMusharraf, but certainly there are elements in the forces who can launch yet another attack against him. There is an ISI within the ISI,which is more powerful than the original and still orchestrating many eventualities in the country.” He added that he feared a threat to hisown life because he supported Musharraf's call for an enlightened and moderate Islam and had been given the task of preparing the textsof sermons advocating enlightened and moderate Islam to be used at all mosques of the Armed Forces.
8.Well-informed sources in Pakistan said that apart from the failure of the intelligence establishment to identify and weed out the pro-jihadielements in the Armed Forces and the intelligence establishment, another cause for serious concern was the continuing failure of theintelligence establishment to identify all the Pakistani leaders of the highly secretive Hizbut Tehrir (HT) and its supporters in the ArmedForces and arrest them.The HT ideology and operational methods were imported into Pakistan from the UK by its supporters in thePakistani community in the UK in 2000. It was said that within five years it was able to make considerable progress not only in setting up itsorganisational infrastructure, but also in recruiting dedicated members in the civil society as well as the Armed Forces. It was also reportedthat no other jihadi organisation had been able to attract as many young and educated members and as many supporters in the ArmedForces as the HT.
9.Physical security regulations in an office of the ISI at Rawalpindi exempt officers of the rank of Brigadier and above coming in their ownvehicle from frisking at the outer gate. They undergo a frisking only after they have entered the premises, parked their car in the spaceallotted to them in the garage and then enter the building in which their office is located. Officers below the rank of Brigadier undergofrisking twice, whether they are in their own vehicle or in a bus ----at the outer gate and again inside before they enter the building. At theouter gate, they have to get out of their vehicle, undergo frisking and then get into their vehicle and drive in.
10. Since all officers travel in civilian clothes in unmarked vehicles, which cannot be identified with the Army or the ISI, there is a special hand signalling system for Brigadiers and above by which the security staff at the outer gate can recognise their rank and let them drive inwithout undergoing frisking. This hand signalling is changed frequently.
11. On the morning of November 24, 2007, a car reached the outer gate and the man inside showed a hand signal, which was in use till theprevious day. It had been changed on November 23 and a new signal was in force from the morning of November 24, 2007. He was notaware of it. The security staff got suspicious and did not allow the car to drive in. They asked the man driving it to get out for questioningand frisking. He blew himself up.
12. As he did so, an unmarked chartered bus carrying over 40 civilian and junior military employees of the ISI reached the outer gate andstopped so that those inside can get out for frisking. The bus bore the brunt of the explosion, which caused the death of about 35persons---- from among those inside the bus as well as the security staff. The Pakistani authorities admitted the death of only 18 persons.
13. Around the same time, a man driving a vehicle towards the premises of the GHQ in another part of Rawalpindi was stopped by thesecurity staff at a physical security barrier. He blew himself up killing two of the security staff. These two well-synchronised suicide strikesin Rawalpindi, the sanctum sanctorum of Pakistan's military-intelligence establishment, came about six weeks after a similar attacktargeting the ISI and the Army at Rawalpindi at the same time. On September 4, 2007. a suicide attacker blew himself up after boarding abus carrying ISI employees. A roadside bomb went off near a commercial area in Rawalpindi, while a car carrying an unidentified seniorArmy officer to the GHQ was passing. Twenty-five persons died in the two attacks. The Army officer escaped unhurt. On October 30, 2007, asuicide bomber blew himself up at a checkpoint several hundred yards from the GHQ killing seven persons, most of the from the securitystaff.
14.The two attacks directed at the ISI and another at a Pakistan Air Force bus at Sargodha were based on inside information. In the case ofthe explosion at the outer gate of the ISI complex on November 24, 2007, the suicide bomber was aware of the hand signalling code forBrigadiers and above. However, he was not aware that the signal code had been changed the previous day. Since these codes arecommunicated personally to Brigadiers and above, their existence is supposed to be known only to Brigadiers and above and the physicalsecurity staff. The suicide bomber's inside accomplice was either an ISI officer of the rank of Brigadier or above or a member of the physicalsecurity staff.
15. There are two alarming aspects of the security situation in Pakistan. The first is the upsurge in acts of suicide terrorism directed againstsecurity and intelligence personnel and their establishments. These give clear evidence of the penetration of pro-Al Qaeda jihadi elementsinside the Armed Forces, the intelligence agencies and the Police. The second is the inability or unwillingness of the Police to vigorouslyinvestigate these incidents, including the attempt to kill Mrs. Benazir Bhutto in Karachi on October 18,2007. Nobody knows definitively tilltoday who are responsible for these suicide attacks---- tribal followers of Baitullah Mehsud of South Waziristan or those of Maulana Fazlullahof the Swat Valley or the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), the anti-Shia sectarian organisation, or Al Qaeda and its Uzbek associates or the angrystudents of the two madrasas run by the Lal Masjid in Islamabad?
16. The Rawalpindi cantonment where the headquarters of the Army and other sensitive units of the Pakistan Army and the ISI are located,and the adjoining Islamabad, the capital, where the headquarters of the federal Government and the National Assembly are located, hadseen terrorist strikes even in the past. Amongst them, one could mention the 1989 explosion in the Rawalpindi office of Dr. Farooq Haider,the then President of one of the factions of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which was attributed to a rival faction led byAmanullah Khan; the explosion outside the Egyptian Embassy at Islamabad in the 1990s, which was attributed to some Egyptian opponentsof President Hosni Mubarak; the grenade attack inside an Islamabad church frequented by the diplomatic community in March 2002 inwhich the wife of a US diplomat and their daughter were killed; the unsolved assassination of Maulana Azam Tariq, the Amir of theSipah-eSahaba, Pakistan, the political wing of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, at Islamabad in 2003, the terrorist attack on a a group of workers ofthe Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Benazir Bhutto in Islamabad earlier this year, the alleged firing of a rocket on Musharraf's plane fromthe terrace of a house in Islamabad again earlier this year and the alleged firing of rockets by unidentified elements from a park inIslamabad last year.
17. If one leaves aside the JKLF factional politics, the only terrorist organisations which had operated in the Islamabad-Rawalpindi area inthe past (before July 2007) were the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), which was blamed for the church grenade attack; the Sipah Mohammad, theShia terrorist organisation, which was suspected in the murder of Azam Tariq; and Al Qaeda. Many Pakistani and Kashmiri jihadiorganisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Hizbul Mujahideen, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) etc have their offices in Rawalpindi, butdo not indulge in terrorist activities there.
18. There was no evidence to show that the Egyptians responsible for the explosion outside the Egyptian Embassy were then the followersof Osama bin Laden. The first indication of some local support for Al Qaeda in Rawalpindi came in March, 2003, when Khalid SheikhMohammad (KSM), supposedly the man who co-ordinated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, was arrested from the house of a women's wingleader of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) in Rawalpindi by the Pakistani authorities and handed over to the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI).
19. KSM was living in Karachi till September, 2002, when he fled from there to Quetta in Balochistan following the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh,another Al Qaeda operative there. From Quetta, he shifted to Rawalpindi in the beginning of 2003, fearing betrayal by the Shias of Quetta. After his arrest, no thorough enquiries would appear to have been made either by the ISI or the Police to determine why he took shelter inRawalpindi, a highly guarded military cantonment. Did he and/or Al Qaeda have any other accomplices in Rawalpindi, in addition to the JEIleader and the members of her family, who included one junior Army officer belonging to a signals battalion, who was also detained forinterrogation? Did Al Qaeda or the Pakistani organisations allied to it in the International Islamic Front (IIF) have a sleeper cell or cells in thecantonment? If they had, the sleeper cells could have functioned undetected only with the complicity of at least some in the Armed Forces.
20. After the arrest and the handing-over of KSM to the US, anti-Musharraf and pro-jihadi pamphlets typed on the official letter-head used inthe army offices in the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi started circulating in Rawalpindi and Islamabad. The ISI and the Policewere unable to determine who was circulating these pamphlets and no arrests were made in this connection. Instead, a leader of the NawazSharif-led faction of the Pakistan Muslim League, who drew the attention of the Parliament and the public to these pamphlets, was orderedto be arrested by Musharraf on a charge of treason.
21. After the April, 2003, arrest in Karachi of Waleed bin Attash of Al Qaeda, one of the suspects in the case relating to the Al Qaeda attackon the US naval ship USS Cole at Aden in October, 2000, many of the Al Qaeda members living in Karachi were reported to have shifted tothe North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Balochistan , the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Rawalpindi.
22. Their shifting to Rawalpindi and taking shelter there would not have been possible without the complicity of not only the Pakistani jihadigroups, but also supporters in the Armed Forces and the police. The Pakistani security agencies have not been able to identify anddismantle Al Qaeda and IIF cells in the Rawalpindi cantonment. The fact that the perpetrators of the two attacks of December,2003, onMusharraf , whether they belonged to Al Qaeda or to any of the Pakistani components of the IIF, chose to act on both the occasions fromRawalpindi instead of Karachi where Musharraf was before the first attack on December 14 showed their confidence in being able tooperate undetected from Rawalpindi rather than from Karachi.
23. I do not believe Musharraf had prior knowledge of the plot to kill Benazir in Rawalpindi. But he has to be held responsible for failing toprovide effective physical security to her. He and his officers kept disregarding her growing fears about threats to her security. He failed toensure a vigorous investigation of the first attempt to kill her at Karachi on October,18,2007.
24. The infiltration of traditional fundamentalist political parties into the GHQ started under the late Zia-ul-Haq. Since Musharraf took over,there has been an infiltration of Al Qaeda into the Pakistani Armed Forces and into their sactum sanctorum in Rawalpindi. These elementsare against Musharraf too, but they were much more against Benazir because of the fact that she was a woman and she had been sayingopenly that she would allow the US to hunt for bin Laden in Pakistani territory and the International Atomic Energy Agency at Vienna tointerrogate A.Q.Khan, the nuclear scientist. Al Qaeda and the pro-Al Qaeda jihadis wanted to eliminate both Musharraf and her because theywere seen as apostate and as collaborators of the US.
25. They have succeeded in killing her. They will now step up their efforts to eliminate Musharraf. Whoever was responsible for killing hercould not have done it without inside complicity. If Al Qaeda is already having sleeper cells in the GHQ, there is an equal danger that italready has sleeper cells inside Pakistan's nuclear establishment too.
26. Musharraf is either knowingly dishonest or is living in a make-believe world of his own, unaware of the ground realities. Only a few daysbefore Benazir's assassination, he was bragging to officer trainees in the Defence Services Staff College in Quetta that he had defeated theterrorists outside the tribal belt and would soon be defeating them in the tribal belt too. His reluctance to order an enquiry into the extent ofinfiltration of Al Qaeda into the GHQ is disturbing. He has convinced himself that not only he is the most popular leader of Pakistan, but alsothat the entire Armed Forces are devoted to him. Anybody who says otherwise is treated by him as a traitor, arrested and harassed.
27. It is high time he and the US realise that Al Qaeda is not just in the tribal belt. It is right under their nose in Rawalpindi. (28-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
US Paradrop Lands Benazir in the Midst of Jihadis
International Terrorism Monitor--- Paper No. 289 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers25/paper2419.html
By B. Raman
(This article was written by me after the first attempt to kill Mrs.Benazir Bhutto at Karachi on October 18,2007)
"The much talked about US plans for a political paradrop of a neo Benazir Bhutto into Pakistan in the hope of providing the badly-needed oxygen to President General Pervez Musharraf and saving the country from Al Qaeda, the Neo Taliban and an assortment of other pro-Al Qaeda and anti-US jihadi terrorist groups is likely to create a third mess in a row for the US after the earlier two in Afghanistan and Iraq." So I wrote in my article of September 2, 2007, titled "US PARADROP FOR A NEOBENAZIR", which is available at http://www.saag.org/papers24/paper2353.html.
2. The US paradrop seems to have landed her right in the midst of jihadis of various hues. It was due to God's grace ----and not due to the skills of Pakistan's police and intelligence agencies---- that she escaped the two explosions on the night of October 18, 2007, which were meant to kill her, but killed instead over 130 persons---members of her party, police personnel and innocent civilians The world only saw on the TV the huge crowds, mobilised by her party, which greeted her after she arrived in Karachi ending eight years of political exile with the blessings of the US. It could not have seen the thousands of invisible enemies she has. No other political leader of Pakistan has as many personal enemies as Mrs. Benazir. Her support is confined to Sindh and to the Seraiki areas of Southern Punjab. In the rest of the country, she has as many enemies as she has friends. Even in Sindh, the Mohajirs and the Sindhi nationalists dislike her. Even in her own Pakistan People's Party (PPP), she is strongly disliked by the supporters of her brothers Shah Nawaz Bhutto, who was allegedly poisoned by the Inter-Services Intelligence in Southern France in 1985, and Murtaza Bhutto, who was allegedly killed by the Karachi Police in a staged encounter in September, 1996, when she was the Prime Minister.
3. There are many in Pakistan----not just Al Qaeda--- who would be happy to see her killed. She was lucky on October 18. She has to be lucky every time a plot is hatched to kill her by some group or the other, by some individual or the other. Many commentators---including some in India---have described her as a brave woman, who dared to return to Pakistan as scheduled on October 18 without worrying about the threats held out against her. Brave, she was, but wise, definitely not.
4. Any wise leader would have noticed the widespread anti-Americanism in Pakistan and realised the importance of not projecting himself or herself as a leader blessed by the US and as the US choice to facilitate the transition of Pakistan back to democracy. He or she would have also realised the importance of keeping one's thoughts to oneself at a time when widespread anger against the US and Gen. Pervez Musharraf in the wake of the commando raid into the Lal Masjid in Islamabad from July 10 to 13, 2007, has let loose a wave of suicide terrorist attacks, many of them directed against the security forces and other public servants.
5. Many of her statements were like the red rag to the jihadi bulls---- that she would hand over A. Q. Khan, Pakistan's nuclear scientist, to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna for interrogation, that she would co-operate with the US in the war on terrorism, that she would hand over Dawood Ibrahim, the Indian mafia leader living in Karachi, to India etc etc.
6. Benazir and Musharraf have many things in common. One of them is an inability to keep their mouth shut. The second is a weakness for the TV cameras. The third is an eagerness to be liked by the Americans. The result: All anti-American groups in Pakistan were waiting for an opportunity to kill her.
7. The Karachi blast highlights once again the poor state of Pakistan's counter-terrorism and security apparatus. It also shows the extent of the penetration of terrorist elements into all parts of Pakistan---tribal as well as non-tribal, urban as well as rural. Pakistan is a society inextricably caught in the clutches of the jihadis. The jihadis are not yet in a position to capture power, but they are in a position to keep the country bleeding and targeting its leaders and public servants.
8. Extricating Pakistan from their clutches and defeating them will be a long drawn-out process. It can be done only by a leader, who is genuinely convinced of the need to defeat them and tries to do it on his or her own instead of seeming to do so to please the US. What Pakistan needs at this critical hour in its history is a leader, who is widely perceived as independent and not an American stooge. Neither Musharraf nor Mrs. Benazir is such a leader. Mr. Nawaz Sharif, if he is able to come back to power, could turn out to be such a leader. He has maintained a distance from the US. He does not fawn on the US like Mrs. Benazir does. Pakistan needs Mr. Nawaz Sharif more than it needs Musharraf or Benazir.
9. If the US really wants to save Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal from the clutches of the terrorists, it would be wise enough to encourage a genuine transition to democracy without any favourites. Let the people of Pakistan ----and not the US policy-makers and academics---decide whom they want to be their leader in free and fair elections. Let the leader so chosen deal with the terrorists in his own independent manner.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
International Terrorism Monitor--- Paper No. 289 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers25/paper2419.html
By B. Raman
(This article was written by me after the first attempt to kill Mrs.Benazir Bhutto at Karachi on October 18,2007)
"The much talked about US plans for a political paradrop of a neo Benazir Bhutto into Pakistan in the hope of providing the badly-needed oxygen to President General Pervez Musharraf and saving the country from Al Qaeda, the Neo Taliban and an assortment of other pro-Al Qaeda and anti-US jihadi terrorist groups is likely to create a third mess in a row for the US after the earlier two in Afghanistan and Iraq." So I wrote in my article of September 2, 2007, titled "US PARADROP FOR A NEOBENAZIR", which is available at http://www.saag.org/papers24/paper2353.html.
2. The US paradrop seems to have landed her right in the midst of jihadis of various hues. It was due to God's grace ----and not due to the skills of Pakistan's police and intelligence agencies---- that she escaped the two explosions on the night of October 18, 2007, which were meant to kill her, but killed instead over 130 persons---members of her party, police personnel and innocent civilians The world only saw on the TV the huge crowds, mobilised by her party, which greeted her after she arrived in Karachi ending eight years of political exile with the blessings of the US. It could not have seen the thousands of invisible enemies she has. No other political leader of Pakistan has as many personal enemies as Mrs. Benazir. Her support is confined to Sindh and to the Seraiki areas of Southern Punjab. In the rest of the country, she has as many enemies as she has friends. Even in Sindh, the Mohajirs and the Sindhi nationalists dislike her. Even in her own Pakistan People's Party (PPP), she is strongly disliked by the supporters of her brothers Shah Nawaz Bhutto, who was allegedly poisoned by the Inter-Services Intelligence in Southern France in 1985, and Murtaza Bhutto, who was allegedly killed by the Karachi Police in a staged encounter in September, 1996, when she was the Prime Minister.
3. There are many in Pakistan----not just Al Qaeda--- who would be happy to see her killed. She was lucky on October 18. She has to be lucky every time a plot is hatched to kill her by some group or the other, by some individual or the other. Many commentators---including some in India---have described her as a brave woman, who dared to return to Pakistan as scheduled on October 18 without worrying about the threats held out against her. Brave, she was, but wise, definitely not.
4. Any wise leader would have noticed the widespread anti-Americanism in Pakistan and realised the importance of not projecting himself or herself as a leader blessed by the US and as the US choice to facilitate the transition of Pakistan back to democracy. He or she would have also realised the importance of keeping one's thoughts to oneself at a time when widespread anger against the US and Gen. Pervez Musharraf in the wake of the commando raid into the Lal Masjid in Islamabad from July 10 to 13, 2007, has let loose a wave of suicide terrorist attacks, many of them directed against the security forces and other public servants.
5. Many of her statements were like the red rag to the jihadi bulls---- that she would hand over A. Q. Khan, Pakistan's nuclear scientist, to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna for interrogation, that she would co-operate with the US in the war on terrorism, that she would hand over Dawood Ibrahim, the Indian mafia leader living in Karachi, to India etc etc.
6. Benazir and Musharraf have many things in common. One of them is an inability to keep their mouth shut. The second is a weakness for the TV cameras. The third is an eagerness to be liked by the Americans. The result: All anti-American groups in Pakistan were waiting for an opportunity to kill her.
7. The Karachi blast highlights once again the poor state of Pakistan's counter-terrorism and security apparatus. It also shows the extent of the penetration of terrorist elements into all parts of Pakistan---tribal as well as non-tribal, urban as well as rural. Pakistan is a society inextricably caught in the clutches of the jihadis. The jihadis are not yet in a position to capture power, but they are in a position to keep the country bleeding and targeting its leaders and public servants.
8. Extricating Pakistan from their clutches and defeating them will be a long drawn-out process. It can be done only by a leader, who is genuinely convinced of the need to defeat them and tries to do it on his or her own instead of seeming to do so to please the US. What Pakistan needs at this critical hour in its history is a leader, who is widely perceived as independent and not an American stooge. Neither Musharraf nor Mrs. Benazir is such a leader. Mr. Nawaz Sharif, if he is able to come back to power, could turn out to be such a leader. He has maintained a distance from the US. He does not fawn on the US like Mrs. Benazir does. Pakistan needs Mr. Nawaz Sharif more than it needs Musharraf or Benazir.
9. If the US really wants to save Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal from the clutches of the terrorists, it would be wise enough to encourage a genuine transition to democracy without any favourites. Let the people of Pakistan ----and not the US policy-makers and academics---decide whom they want to be their leader in free and fair elections. Let the leader so chosen deal with the terrorists in his own independent manner.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For topical studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
BENAZIR'S ASSASSINATION
B.RAMAN
The shocking assassination of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto at Rawalpindi on December 27,2007, is likely to have been the outcome of a conspiracyinvolving anti-US, pro-Al Qaeda jihadi elements, the Zia-ul-haq loyalists and junior members of the Army and possibly the Air Force.
2. Since 2003, there have been a number of terrorist incidents in Rawalpindi----including the two attempts to kill President Pervez Musharrafin December,2003, the firing of rockets by unidentified elements from a park last year, the attempt to fire at Musharraf's plane with ananti-aircraft gun earlier this year from the terrace of a building, two suicide attacks at the Army's General Headquarters and two outside theoffices of the Inter-Services Intelligence after the commando raid into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July,2007. The two attempts to killMusharraf were found to have been the result of a conspiracy involving Al Qaeda (Abu Faraj al-Libi, now in the Guantanamo Bay detentioncentre), the Jaish-e-Mohammad and junior officers of the Army and Air Force. In the other incidents also, involvement of junior officers of theArmy and Air Force was suspected. In connection with the rocket attacks, the son of a retired Brigadier was arrested.
3. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, was arrested in the Rawalpindi house of a womanoffice-bearer of the Jamaat-e-Islami, having a relative in a Signals regiment of the Army, who was arrested. All these incidents indicated astrong penetration of Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda organisations into the lower and middle levels of the armed forces personnel stationed inRawalpindi. Rashid Rauf, a Mirpuri resident of the UK, who was a prime suspect in the case involving an Al Qaeda attempt to blow up 10-USbound planes in the UK last year, escaped last week while being taken from a court in Rawalpindi to his jail. Complicity of security personnelin his escape was suspected.
4. Neither the ISI nor the IB nor the Police had been able to thoroughly investigate these cases and establish the identities of thoseinvolved. Only the identities of the junior officials involved in the attempts to kill Musharraf were established. They were arrested andcourt-martialled. But the authorities were not able to establish the extent of the penetration of Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda elements into theArmed Forces.
5. Since Benazir returned ftrom exile on October 18,2007, the Zia loyalists in the Government and among the retired officers of the army andthe ISI were carrying on a bitter campaign against her. They were determined to see that she did not return to power in the elections ofJanuary 8,2008. Benazir herself was worried that Brig. (retd) Ijaz Shah, the Director of the IB, was ill-disposed towards her and hadrepeatedly complained in public that there could be a threat to her security from the IB.
6. All the jihadi organisations were opposed to her coming to power firstly, because she was a woman and secondly, because of herstatements that she would allow US troops to hunt for Osama bin Laden in Pakistani territory and let the International Atomic EnergyAgency interrogate A.Q.Khan, the nuclear scientist.
7. Only on December 26,2007, after her visit to Peshawar, where there were some explosions coinciding with her visit, she had expressedher dissatisfaction with the security arrangements for her. She complained that the electronic jammers issued to her staff for protectionagainst remote-control devices were faulty.
8. Her repeated pleas to seek the help of Western intelligence agencies for the investigation into the blast at Karachi on October 18,2007,from which she narrowly escaped and to let her hire private security guards from the West were turned down by Musharraf.
9.There is likely to be widespread anti-Musharraf and anti-Army disturbances in Sindh and possibly southern Punjab, her traditionalstrongholds, which may make it difficult to hold the elections and for Musharraf to continue in power for long.
B.RAMAN
The shocking assassination of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto at Rawalpindi on December 27,2007, is likely to have been the outcome of a conspiracyinvolving anti-US, pro-Al Qaeda jihadi elements, the Zia-ul-haq loyalists and junior members of the Army and possibly the Air Force.
2. Since 2003, there have been a number of terrorist incidents in Rawalpindi----including the two attempts to kill President Pervez Musharrafin December,2003, the firing of rockets by unidentified elements from a park last year, the attempt to fire at Musharraf's plane with ananti-aircraft gun earlier this year from the terrace of a building, two suicide attacks at the Army's General Headquarters and two outside theoffices of the Inter-Services Intelligence after the commando raid into the Lal Masjid of Islamabad in July,2007. The two attempts to killMusharraf were found to have been the result of a conspiracy involving Al Qaeda (Abu Faraj al-Libi, now in the Guantanamo Bay detentioncentre), the Jaish-e-Mohammad and junior officers of the Army and Air Force. In the other incidents also, involvement of junior officers of theArmy and Air Force was suspected. In connection with the rocket attacks, the son of a retired Brigadier was arrested.
3. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who orchestrated the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, was arrested in the Rawalpindi house of a womanoffice-bearer of the Jamaat-e-Islami, having a relative in a Signals regiment of the Army, who was arrested. All these incidents indicated astrong penetration of Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda organisations into the lower and middle levels of the armed forces personnel stationed inRawalpindi. Rashid Rauf, a Mirpuri resident of the UK, who was a prime suspect in the case involving an Al Qaeda attempt to blow up 10-USbound planes in the UK last year, escaped last week while being taken from a court in Rawalpindi to his jail. Complicity of security personnelin his escape was suspected.
4. Neither the ISI nor the IB nor the Police had been able to thoroughly investigate these cases and establish the identities of thoseinvolved. Only the identities of the junior officials involved in the attempts to kill Musharraf were established. They were arrested andcourt-martialled. But the authorities were not able to establish the extent of the penetration of Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda elements into theArmed Forces.
5. Since Benazir returned ftrom exile on October 18,2007, the Zia loyalists in the Government and among the retired officers of the army andthe ISI were carrying on a bitter campaign against her. They were determined to see that she did not return to power in the elections ofJanuary 8,2008. Benazir herself was worried that Brig. (retd) Ijaz Shah, the Director of the IB, was ill-disposed towards her and hadrepeatedly complained in public that there could be a threat to her security from the IB.
6. All the jihadi organisations were opposed to her coming to power firstly, because she was a woman and secondly, because of herstatements that she would allow US troops to hunt for Osama bin Laden in Pakistani territory and let the International Atomic EnergyAgency interrogate A.Q.Khan, the nuclear scientist.
7. Only on December 26,2007, after her visit to Peshawar, where there were some explosions coinciding with her visit, she had expressedher dissatisfaction with the security arrangements for her. She complained that the electronic jammers issued to her staff for protectionagainst remote-control devices were faulty.
8. Her repeated pleas to seek the help of Western intelligence agencies for the investigation into the blast at Karachi on October 18,2007,from which she narrowly escaped and to let her hire private security guards from the West were turned down by Musharraf.
9.There is likely to be widespread anti-Musharraf and anti-Army disturbances in Sindh and possibly southern Punjab, her traditionalstrongholds, which may make it difficult to hold the elections and for Musharraf to continue in power for long.
Wednesday, December 26, 2007
INDIA-CHINA JOINT ANTI-TERROR EXERCISE: AN ASSESSMENT
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER No.333
B.RAMAN
The Chinese Armed Forces have been holding joint anti-terrorism exercises with the armed forces of different countries since 2002. TillAugust,2007, they had held the following anti-terror exercises :
Oct. 10-11, 2002: The Chinese and the Kyrgyzstan armies held a joint anti-terror military exercise code-named " Exercise-01" on the border of the two countries.
Aug. 6-12, 2003: Armed Forces from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan took part in a joint anti-terror exercise code-named "Coalition-2003" in Kazakhstan's border city of Ucharal and Ili and in China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. It was a multilateral exercise under the auspices of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO). About 1,300 troops participated in the exercise.
Aug. 6, 2004: Armed Forces of China and Pakistan held their first-ever joint anti-terrorism exercise code-named "Friendship-2004" in Xinjiang's Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County, which is located on the Pamirs at over 4,000 meters, bordering Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. About 200 border troops from both sides participated.
Aug. 18-25, 2005:China and Russia held their first joint anti-terror military exercise code-named "Peace Mission-2005". The one-week exercise , which involved 10,000 troops from the two countries, started in Vladivostok in Russia's Far East and later moved to east China's Shandong Peninsula.
Sept. 22-23, 2006:China and Tajikistan held their first joint anti-terror military exercise code-named "Coordination-2006" in Kulyab, Tajikistan. More than 300 Tajik troops from the artillery, infantry and airborne divisions and about 150 Chinese troops participated.
Dec.11-18, 2006: Armed Forces of China and Pakistan held their second joint anti-terror military exercise code-named "Friendship-2006" in the hilly area of northern Pakistan's Abbottabad. More than 400 troops from both armies took part.
July 16-29, 2007:China and Thailand held their first-ever combined anti-terror training of special troops code-named "Strike-2007" in Guangzhou, capital of south China's Guangdong Province. The two-week exercise involved 30 soldiers from the special commando forces of the two countries.
Aug. 9-17, 2007, Under the auspices of the SCO, a second joint anti-terrorism military exercise code-named "Peace Mission-2007" was held in Chelyabinsk in Russia's Ural mountainous region and Urumqi, capital of China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. More than 4,000 troops from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan participated in the exercise, the largest of its kind within the framework of the SCO since the organization was founded on June 15, 2001.
2. Thus, till August,2007, China had participated in eight anti-terror military exercises. Of these, two were multilateral under the SCO and theremaining six bilateral---- two with Pakistan and one each with Russia,Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan and Thailand. The smallest in terms of troopparticipation was with Thailand and the largest with Russia. The bilateral exercise with Russia was even larger than the multilateralexercises under the SCO.
3. The following were the defining characteristics of these exercises:
Totally confined to the Armed Forces.
No participation by civilian counter-terrorism agencies either as observers or in any other capacity.
The focus was on the military (commando) approach to counter-terrorism in certain situations such as cross-border terrorism, hostage-taking in urban areas and aircraft hijacking.
The objective of the exercises was to familiarise each other with their respective capabilities for countering terrorism, with their training methods and methods of action; to demonstrate separately each other's methods of action and to have a joint exercise at the end in which the two sides can test their ability to act jointly.
There was no brain-storming on the experiences and insights of the participants in dealing with specific situations in the past and the lessons drawn.
4. The limited scope of these exercises did not permit them to be trend-setters in the joint fight against terrorism. Their main achievementwas in enabling military officers of the participating countries to get to know each other and in increasing their comfort level towards eachother.
5. The first India-China joint anti-terror military exercise ("Hand-in-Hand,2007") held at Kunming in the Yunnan province of China fromDecember 19 to 25,2007, which involved 103 troops each from the two armies,was no different in its scope and limited significance fromthe eight exercises held earlier with other countries. This was admitted by the Chinese themselves in a round-up of the exercise carried bythe "People's Daily" on December 26,2007. It said: "Although some military and diplomatic observers said that the joint training is moresymbolic than substantial, many acknowledged that the point is not the scale of the joint training or what specific anti-terrorism skills areinvolved. The point is that the soldiers on both sides are moving toward each other in a friendly way."
6. The comments of Chinese officials and non-governmental analysts too stressed the significance of the exercise in the larger context of State-to-State and military-military relations and not in the specific context of their political willingness to fight against terrorism jointly. Toquote some of these comments:
Mr. Ye Hailin, of the Asia-Pacific Studies Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: "It is great progress. It demonstrates that the military mutual-trust has markedly improved, which is beneficial to regional security".
Mr.Ma Jiali, a research fellow of the Academy of China Contemporary International Relations:"The military relationship between China and India is like half a glass of water. Optimists will say we're lucky to have half a glass of water, while pessimists will sigh and say we have only half a glass.In any case, the first-ever military training between the two armies will help boost the bilateral relations of China and India."
Lt.Gen.Ma Xiaotian, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, who headed the Chinese military observer delegation to the joint exercise: "There are border issues yet to be resolved, because the two sides have different stances and take different approaches to problems.China insists on solving problems through negotiation, which requires communication and understanding between the two sides.The joint exercises will play an active role in enhancing understanding and trust and deepening defense exchanges and cooperation. China will continue to push forward military exchanges and cooperation with India in an effort to safeguard regional security and stability.Military ties are an important part of bilateral relations. Military cooperation will be carried on in the spirit of mutual respect, equal consultation and mutual benefits to contribute to the building of a harmonious region with long-lasting peace and common prosperity.Promoting military communication and cooperation will play an important role in developing strategic partnership of the two neighbors, also the leading developing nations in the world.A number of bilateral military exchanges in recent years, including official visits, meetings on defense and safety issues, and searching and rescue manoeuver on the sea, reflected the common efforts and desire of both sides in deepening cooperation."
Mr.Qin Gang,Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman: "The military training was intended to enhance mutual understanding and trust and strengthen bilateral exchanges in the field of anti-terrorism, deter the "three evil forces" of terrorism, separatism and extremism, and promote the development of the bilateral strategic partnership."
7. The exercise, which was held at a hilly terrain near Kunming, had the following theme:" 56 "terrorists" from "an international terroristorganization" have entered the border area of China and India. They have "established" a training base and intend to attack a trading poston the border between the two countries.The two armies establish a joint command post and joint battle decision-making and carry outan anti-terrorism operation before wiping out the group of "terrorists" and rescuing the hostages."
8. The theme reflected more Chinese concerns over the possibility of alleged Tibetan extremists from the diaspora staging cross-borderraids into Tibet in the event of instability in Tibet after the death of the Dalai Lama. This theme would be of little relevance to India since wehave no reason to fear any cross-border terrorism against India originating from Chinese territory unless one day Al Qaeda seizes control ofXinjiang in China and the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) of Pakistan. Such a possibility is remote.
9. A more useful theme would have been to visualise different terrorist scenarios during and before next year's Beijing Olympics and seehow the intelligence,counter-terrorism agencies and the armed forces of the two countries could co-operate with each other to deal withthe situation.
10. Even though there is no convergence of assessments between India and China on what is terrorism and which are the terroristorganisations, which should be of common concern to the two countries, certain kinds of scenarios should be of common concern---such asa Munich-1972 like scenario during the Beijing Olympics; aircraft hijacking; threats to the Embassies of the two countries etc. Neither sidewill allow the other to join in any counter-terrorist operations inside its territory, but there can be an exchange of ideas and expertise as tohow deal with such situations.
11. That should be the objective of future co-operation between the two countries against terrorism. Far-fetched scenarios such as the twoarmies mounting a joint operation against a large group of terrorists across the Sino-Indian border will serve little purpose professionally.(26-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR--PAPER No.333
B.RAMAN
The Chinese Armed Forces have been holding joint anti-terrorism exercises with the armed forces of different countries since 2002. TillAugust,2007, they had held the following anti-terror exercises :
Oct. 10-11, 2002: The Chinese and the Kyrgyzstan armies held a joint anti-terror military exercise code-named " Exercise-01" on the border of the two countries.
Aug. 6-12, 2003: Armed Forces from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan took part in a joint anti-terror exercise code-named "Coalition-2003" in Kazakhstan's border city of Ucharal and Ili and in China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. It was a multilateral exercise under the auspices of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO). About 1,300 troops participated in the exercise.
Aug. 6, 2004: Armed Forces of China and Pakistan held their first-ever joint anti-terrorism exercise code-named "Friendship-2004" in Xinjiang's Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County, which is located on the Pamirs at over 4,000 meters, bordering Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. About 200 border troops from both sides participated.
Aug. 18-25, 2005:China and Russia held their first joint anti-terror military exercise code-named "Peace Mission-2005". The one-week exercise , which involved 10,000 troops from the two countries, started in Vladivostok in Russia's Far East and later moved to east China's Shandong Peninsula.
Sept. 22-23, 2006:China and Tajikistan held their first joint anti-terror military exercise code-named "Coordination-2006" in Kulyab, Tajikistan. More than 300 Tajik troops from the artillery, infantry and airborne divisions and about 150 Chinese troops participated.
Dec.11-18, 2006: Armed Forces of China and Pakistan held their second joint anti-terror military exercise code-named "Friendship-2006" in the hilly area of northern Pakistan's Abbottabad. More than 400 troops from both armies took part.
July 16-29, 2007:China and Thailand held their first-ever combined anti-terror training of special troops code-named "Strike-2007" in Guangzhou, capital of south China's Guangdong Province. The two-week exercise involved 30 soldiers from the special commando forces of the two countries.
Aug. 9-17, 2007, Under the auspices of the SCO, a second joint anti-terrorism military exercise code-named "Peace Mission-2007" was held in Chelyabinsk in Russia's Ural mountainous region and Urumqi, capital of China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. More than 4,000 troops from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan participated in the exercise, the largest of its kind within the framework of the SCO since the organization was founded on June 15, 2001.
2. Thus, till August,2007, China had participated in eight anti-terror military exercises. Of these, two were multilateral under the SCO and theremaining six bilateral---- two with Pakistan and one each with Russia,Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan and Thailand. The smallest in terms of troopparticipation was with Thailand and the largest with Russia. The bilateral exercise with Russia was even larger than the multilateralexercises under the SCO.
3. The following were the defining characteristics of these exercises:
Totally confined to the Armed Forces.
No participation by civilian counter-terrorism agencies either as observers or in any other capacity.
The focus was on the military (commando) approach to counter-terrorism in certain situations such as cross-border terrorism, hostage-taking in urban areas and aircraft hijacking.
The objective of the exercises was to familiarise each other with their respective capabilities for countering terrorism, with their training methods and methods of action; to demonstrate separately each other's methods of action and to have a joint exercise at the end in which the two sides can test their ability to act jointly.
There was no brain-storming on the experiences and insights of the participants in dealing with specific situations in the past and the lessons drawn.
4. The limited scope of these exercises did not permit them to be trend-setters in the joint fight against terrorism. Their main achievementwas in enabling military officers of the participating countries to get to know each other and in increasing their comfort level towards eachother.
5. The first India-China joint anti-terror military exercise ("Hand-in-Hand,2007") held at Kunming in the Yunnan province of China fromDecember 19 to 25,2007, which involved 103 troops each from the two armies,was no different in its scope and limited significance fromthe eight exercises held earlier with other countries. This was admitted by the Chinese themselves in a round-up of the exercise carried bythe "People's Daily" on December 26,2007. It said: "Although some military and diplomatic observers said that the joint training is moresymbolic than substantial, many acknowledged that the point is not the scale of the joint training or what specific anti-terrorism skills areinvolved. The point is that the soldiers on both sides are moving toward each other in a friendly way."
6. The comments of Chinese officials and non-governmental analysts too stressed the significance of the exercise in the larger context of State-to-State and military-military relations and not in the specific context of their political willingness to fight against terrorism jointly. Toquote some of these comments:
Mr. Ye Hailin, of the Asia-Pacific Studies Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences: "It is great progress. It demonstrates that the military mutual-trust has markedly improved, which is beneficial to regional security".
Mr.Ma Jiali, a research fellow of the Academy of China Contemporary International Relations:"The military relationship between China and India is like half a glass of water. Optimists will say we're lucky to have half a glass of water, while pessimists will sigh and say we have only half a glass.In any case, the first-ever military training between the two armies will help boost the bilateral relations of China and India."
Lt.Gen.Ma Xiaotian, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, who headed the Chinese military observer delegation to the joint exercise: "There are border issues yet to be resolved, because the two sides have different stances and take different approaches to problems.China insists on solving problems through negotiation, which requires communication and understanding between the two sides.The joint exercises will play an active role in enhancing understanding and trust and deepening defense exchanges and cooperation. China will continue to push forward military exchanges and cooperation with India in an effort to safeguard regional security and stability.Military ties are an important part of bilateral relations. Military cooperation will be carried on in the spirit of mutual respect, equal consultation and mutual benefits to contribute to the building of a harmonious region with long-lasting peace and common prosperity.Promoting military communication and cooperation will play an important role in developing strategic partnership of the two neighbors, also the leading developing nations in the world.A number of bilateral military exchanges in recent years, including official visits, meetings on defense and safety issues, and searching and rescue manoeuver on the sea, reflected the common efforts and desire of both sides in deepening cooperation."
Mr.Qin Gang,Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman: "The military training was intended to enhance mutual understanding and trust and strengthen bilateral exchanges in the field of anti-terrorism, deter the "three evil forces" of terrorism, separatism and extremism, and promote the development of the bilateral strategic partnership."
7. The exercise, which was held at a hilly terrain near Kunming, had the following theme:" 56 "terrorists" from "an international terroristorganization" have entered the border area of China and India. They have "established" a training base and intend to attack a trading poston the border between the two countries.The two armies establish a joint command post and joint battle decision-making and carry outan anti-terrorism operation before wiping out the group of "terrorists" and rescuing the hostages."
8. The theme reflected more Chinese concerns over the possibility of alleged Tibetan extremists from the diaspora staging cross-borderraids into Tibet in the event of instability in Tibet after the death of the Dalai Lama. This theme would be of little relevance to India since wehave no reason to fear any cross-border terrorism against India originating from Chinese territory unless one day Al Qaeda seizes control ofXinjiang in China and the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) of Pakistan. Such a possibility is remote.
9. A more useful theme would have been to visualise different terrorist scenarios during and before next year's Beijing Olympics and seehow the intelligence,counter-terrorism agencies and the armed forces of the two countries could co-operate with each other to deal withthe situation.
10. Even though there is no convergence of assessments between India and China on what is terrorism and which are the terroristorganisations, which should be of common concern to the two countries, certain kinds of scenarios should be of common concern---such asa Munich-1972 like scenario during the Beijing Olympics; aircraft hijacking; threats to the Embassies of the two countries etc. Neither sidewill allow the other to join in any counter-terrorist operations inside its territory, but there can be an exchange of ideas and expertise as tohow deal with such situations.
11. That should be the objective of future co-operation between the two countries against terrorism. Far-fetched scenarios such as the twoarmies mounting a joint operation against a large group of terrorists across the Sino-Indian border will serve little purpose professionally.(26-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For TopicalStudies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, December 24, 2007
SAY YOU ARE A HINDU, HOLD YOUR HEAD HIGH
B.RAMAN
"Maut ka Saudagar", 'Liar", "the Ugly Indian" etc etc etc.
All the kind of epithets, the like of which till now used to come easily out of the mouth of President George Bush of the US and the pens of his Neo Conservative supporters.
Mr.Bush should be worried that he has now a growing number of competitors in the coining of demonising epithets in the community of the self-styled secularists of India .
What epithets they did not use against Shri Narendra Modi for the last five years and particularly in the weeks before the recent elections to the Gujarat Legislative Assembly, in which the Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won a spectacular victory despite the best (or worst) efforts of these self-styled secularists to demonise him day in and day out!
The pathological dislike----even hatred--- that some of our journalists----particularly in the electronic media--- have for Modi could be seen or sensed as one watched the TV coverage of the counting of votes on December 23,2007. Initially, as it appeared that the BJP might not do well in the final tally, there was excitement among many of the TV anchors. They thought they have tasted blood. After an hour, the BJP candidates started racing ahead and it became clear the the Congress (I) was in for a drubbing.
The disappointment on the faces of some of the anchors was to be seen to be believed. A five-star lady anchor could not help remarking: "Modi might be able to win the elections in Gujarat, but he still can't get a visa to go to the US and other Western countries." Some consolation!
Instead of spending their time searching for abusive expressions in the dictionary and in their copy-book of such expressions, if these self-styled secularists had only visited the web sites, discussion groups and blogspots of members of the Hindu community not only in India, but also in other countries of the world----particularly in the US--- they would have noticed something, which might have given them cause for introspection.
They would have noticed that Modi is becoming the icon of a growing number of Hindus not only in India, but also in the Hindu diaspora spread across the world. The support for him is not confined only to the Gujarati-speaking Hindus of the world. It is spread right across the Hindu spectrum---- whatever be the language or ethnicity or place of origin of the Hindus concerned.
They would have noticed that in the Hindu diaspora in the West, more young people admire Modi than grown-ups. Many of his young admirers in the US were born and brought up there and had the benefit of the best of secular education. In spite of this, there is a sense of pride in them that the Hindu community has at long last produced a leader of the calibre of Modi.
What is it they see in him?
His simple and austere living of the kind associated with the late Kamaraj of Tamil Nadu, but not seen in the leaders of today?
His reputation as an incorruptible politician, the like of which is not found anywhere in India----not even in his own party?
His style of development-oriented governance, which even his detractors on other grounds do not hesitate to praise?
The fruits of his policy, which Gujarat and its people are already enjoying?
His tough stance on terrorism?
His lucid-thinking on matters concerning our national security?
His defiance in the face of the greatest campaign of demonisation mounted against him, the like of which only Indira Gandhi had faced from her political opponents and sections of the media in the 1970s?
All these are factors, which influence their favourable perception of him, and which have already been highlighted and analysed in the articles on his impressive election victory.
But there is one factor, which is more important than these and which has not found mention in the analyses.
That is, for large sections of the Hindus----young and old, even more among the young than among the old--- he gave them a sense of pride in their identity as Hindus.
They feel that he removed from their minds long habits of defensiveness as Hindus carefully nurtured by the self-styled secularists.
As if to proclaim one's Hindu identity and to assert one's rights as Hindus in their own homeland in which they are in a vast majority (80 per cent of the population) is to be communal, is to become an ugly Indian.
For these self-styled secularists, a pretty Indian is a Hindu, who is all the time on the defensive, fights shy of proclaiming his Hindu personality and asserting his rights as a member of the majority community.
These self-styled secularists would not address their sermons of secularism to the Islamic countries, where for a Muslim to convert a non-Muslim into Islam is an act blessed by Allah, but for a non-Muslim to convert a Muslim into his religion is a crime calling for the death penalty.
For them, secularism is a virtue which a Hindu should practise towards others, but not others towards him.
It is Modi's rejection of this hypocrisy of the self-styled secularists, which makes him stand apart as a Hindu leader with a difference in the eyes of his admirers.
Bharathiyar, the Tamil poet who inspired millions of Tamil youth to join the independence struggle under Mahatma Gandhi, wrote: "Tamizhanenru Chollada, Talai Nimirndhu Nillada"
"Say You Are a Tamil, Hold Your Head High."
The growing legion of Modi's admirers in the Hindu community all over the world are saying: "Hindu Enru Chollada, Talai Nimirndu Nillada."
"Say You Are A Hindu, Hold Your Head High."
They are no longer prepared to be defensive in proclaiming their Hindu idenity, in asserting their rights as Hindus.
They are secular in the genuine sense of the word, but for them secularism does not mean developing a guilt complex about being a Hindu and all the time conceding the rights of others. They do not accept the argument that a Hindu, who asserts his rights, ceases to be a secularist. (24-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
"Maut ka Saudagar", 'Liar", "the Ugly Indian" etc etc etc.
All the kind of epithets, the like of which till now used to come easily out of the mouth of President George Bush of the US and the pens of his Neo Conservative supporters.
Mr.Bush should be worried that he has now a growing number of competitors in the coining of demonising epithets in the community of the self-styled secularists of India .
What epithets they did not use against Shri Narendra Modi for the last five years and particularly in the weeks before the recent elections to the Gujarat Legislative Assembly, in which the Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won a spectacular victory despite the best (or worst) efforts of these self-styled secularists to demonise him day in and day out!
The pathological dislike----even hatred--- that some of our journalists----particularly in the electronic media--- have for Modi could be seen or sensed as one watched the TV coverage of the counting of votes on December 23,2007. Initially, as it appeared that the BJP might not do well in the final tally, there was excitement among many of the TV anchors. They thought they have tasted blood. After an hour, the BJP candidates started racing ahead and it became clear the the Congress (I) was in for a drubbing.
The disappointment on the faces of some of the anchors was to be seen to be believed. A five-star lady anchor could not help remarking: "Modi might be able to win the elections in Gujarat, but he still can't get a visa to go to the US and other Western countries." Some consolation!
Instead of spending their time searching for abusive expressions in the dictionary and in their copy-book of such expressions, if these self-styled secularists had only visited the web sites, discussion groups and blogspots of members of the Hindu community not only in India, but also in other countries of the world----particularly in the US--- they would have noticed something, which might have given them cause for introspection.
They would have noticed that Modi is becoming the icon of a growing number of Hindus not only in India, but also in the Hindu diaspora spread across the world. The support for him is not confined only to the Gujarati-speaking Hindus of the world. It is spread right across the Hindu spectrum---- whatever be the language or ethnicity or place of origin of the Hindus concerned.
They would have noticed that in the Hindu diaspora in the West, more young people admire Modi than grown-ups. Many of his young admirers in the US were born and brought up there and had the benefit of the best of secular education. In spite of this, there is a sense of pride in them that the Hindu community has at long last produced a leader of the calibre of Modi.
What is it they see in him?
His simple and austere living of the kind associated with the late Kamaraj of Tamil Nadu, but not seen in the leaders of today?
His reputation as an incorruptible politician, the like of which is not found anywhere in India----not even in his own party?
His style of development-oriented governance, which even his detractors on other grounds do not hesitate to praise?
The fruits of his policy, which Gujarat and its people are already enjoying?
His tough stance on terrorism?
His lucid-thinking on matters concerning our national security?
His defiance in the face of the greatest campaign of demonisation mounted against him, the like of which only Indira Gandhi had faced from her political opponents and sections of the media in the 1970s?
All these are factors, which influence their favourable perception of him, and which have already been highlighted and analysed in the articles on his impressive election victory.
But there is one factor, which is more important than these and which has not found mention in the analyses.
That is, for large sections of the Hindus----young and old, even more among the young than among the old--- he gave them a sense of pride in their identity as Hindus.
They feel that he removed from their minds long habits of defensiveness as Hindus carefully nurtured by the self-styled secularists.
As if to proclaim one's Hindu identity and to assert one's rights as Hindus in their own homeland in which they are in a vast majority (80 per cent of the population) is to be communal, is to become an ugly Indian.
For these self-styled secularists, a pretty Indian is a Hindu, who is all the time on the defensive, fights shy of proclaiming his Hindu personality and asserting his rights as a member of the majority community.
These self-styled secularists would not address their sermons of secularism to the Islamic countries, where for a Muslim to convert a non-Muslim into Islam is an act blessed by Allah, but for a non-Muslim to convert a Muslim into his religion is a crime calling for the death penalty.
For them, secularism is a virtue which a Hindu should practise towards others, but not others towards him.
It is Modi's rejection of this hypocrisy of the self-styled secularists, which makes him stand apart as a Hindu leader with a difference in the eyes of his admirers.
Bharathiyar, the Tamil poet who inspired millions of Tamil youth to join the independence struggle under Mahatma Gandhi, wrote: "Tamizhanenru Chollada, Talai Nimirndhu Nillada"
"Say You Are a Tamil, Hold Your Head High."
The growing legion of Modi's admirers in the Hindu community all over the world are saying: "Hindu Enru Chollada, Talai Nimirndu Nillada."
"Say You Are A Hindu, Hold Your Head High."
They are no longer prepared to be defensive in proclaiming their Hindu idenity, in asserting their rights as Hindus.
They are secular in the genuine sense of the word, but for them secularism does not mean developing a guilt complex about being a Hindu and all the time conceding the rights of others. They do not accept the argument that a Hindu, who asserts his rights, ceases to be a secularist. (24-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Monday, December 17, 2007
INDIA, CHINA TO STRENGTHEN MYANMAR'S IT CAPABILITY
B.RAMAN
India and China have been competing with each other not only in helping Myanmar's military junta in the exploitation of its vast gas reserves in the Arakan area, but also in strengthening its IT capability. The Junta, which is keen to develop an IT capability, which will not be dependent on Western companies and which it can strictly control without letting it be exploited by pro-democracy elements, has sought the help of India and China. Both have responded positively.
2. On December 12,2007, during the visit of U Kyaw Thu,Myanmar's Deputy Foreign Minister, to New Delhi, India and Myanmar were reported to have signed a Memorandum of Understandg (MOU) under which India will help Myanmar to establish an India-Myanmar Centre for Enhancement of Information Technology Skills (IMCEITS) in Yangon (Rangoon).
3. On December 14,2007, the Junta inaugurated at a place near Pyin Oo Lwin town in the Mandalay area, Myanmar's second IT park called the Yadanabon Cyber City. Myanmar's first IT park, which is called the Myanmar Information and Communication Technology (MICT) Park, is located in Yangon.
4.To start with, the Yadanabon Cyber City has a cross border fiber ink from China, which is already functional. The Junta is reportedly proposing to have a similar link from India and Thailand. Initially, the Cyber City will focus on the production of software, but will ultimately undertake the production of hardware too. The Junta is hoping to get the co-operation of Indian software companies for developing its software capability.
5.In the meanwhile, reports emanating from Washington DC indicate that President George Bush is likely to drop plans for an US-ASEAN summit in his Texan ranch.During the summit conference of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC) at Sydney in September,2007, Mr.Bush was reported to have invited the leaders of the ASEAN countries to his ranch for a summit to discuss US-ASEAN relations. The US is since reported to have indicated to the ASEAN countries that in view of the recent brutal suppression of an agitation by students and monks in Myanmar by the Junta in August-September,2007, the US may have difficulty in organising this summit. Myanmar is a member of the ASEAN and the US would find it difficult to invite Myanmar at any level. (18-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies . E-mail:seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
India and China have been competing with each other not only in helping Myanmar's military junta in the exploitation of its vast gas reserves in the Arakan area, but also in strengthening its IT capability. The Junta, which is keen to develop an IT capability, which will not be dependent on Western companies and which it can strictly control without letting it be exploited by pro-democracy elements, has sought the help of India and China. Both have responded positively.
2. On December 12,2007, during the visit of U Kyaw Thu,Myanmar's Deputy Foreign Minister, to New Delhi, India and Myanmar were reported to have signed a Memorandum of Understandg (MOU) under which India will help Myanmar to establish an India-Myanmar Centre for Enhancement of Information Technology Skills (IMCEITS) in Yangon (Rangoon).
3. On December 14,2007, the Junta inaugurated at a place near Pyin Oo Lwin town in the Mandalay area, Myanmar's second IT park called the Yadanabon Cyber City. Myanmar's first IT park, which is called the Myanmar Information and Communication Technology (MICT) Park, is located in Yangon.
4.To start with, the Yadanabon Cyber City has a cross border fiber ink from China, which is already functional. The Junta is reportedly proposing to have a similar link from India and Thailand. Initially, the Cyber City will focus on the production of software, but will ultimately undertake the production of hardware too. The Junta is hoping to get the co-operation of Indian software companies for developing its software capability.
5.In the meanwhile, reports emanating from Washington DC indicate that President George Bush is likely to drop plans for an US-ASEAN summit in his Texan ranch.During the summit conference of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC) at Sydney in September,2007, Mr.Bush was reported to have invited the leaders of the ASEAN countries to his ranch for a summit to discuss US-ASEAN relations. The US is since reported to have indicated to the ASEAN countries that in view of the recent brutal suppression of an agitation by students and monks in Myanmar by the Junta in August-September,2007, the US may have difficulty in organising this summit. Myanmar is a member of the ASEAN and the US would find it difficult to invite Myanmar at any level. (18-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. He is also associated with the Chennai Centre For China Studies . E-mail:seventyone2@gmail.com )
Saturday, December 15, 2007
GOVT. OF MUSHARRAF, BY MUSHARRF, FOR MUSHARRAF
B.RAMAN
As expected,President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan announced on December 15,2007, the lifting of the State of Emergency imposed by him on November 3,2007, and the restoration of the Constitution, which had remained suspended since then.
2. A proclamation issued by him says that the Constitution of 1973 stands restored. This has been welcomed by his Western well-wishers, with Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the UK being the first to welcome it.
3. A careful perusal of the Constitution, which was restored on December 15,2007, would show that it is not the Constitution as conceived by the founding fathers of Pakistan. Nor is it the Constitution of 1973 as amended from time to time by the National Assembly. In fact, it is virtually a new Constitution unrecognisable from that of 1973. It has only one founding father---Musharraf--- and incorporates all the executuive orders issued by him since he proclaimed the Emergency on November 3,2007. The purpose of these orders was to protect his right to continue in power for as long as he considered it necessary----in the "supreme national interest" to quote an oft-repeated phrase of his.
4. Another purpose was to ensure that his unconstitutional and unlawful actions cannot be questioned either by the judiciary or the National Assembly and he cannot be impeached by the Assembly for any of his unlawful acts.
5. The history of Pakistan since Musharraf seized power after overthrowing Mr.Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister, on October 12,2007, will go down as the history of the manoeuvres of one man to keep himself in power by hook or by crook and to protect himself from any accountability for his wrong-doings. The Constitution of 2007, euphemistically called the Constitution of 1973, has not ushered in a Government of the people, by the people, for the people, but a Government of Musharraf, byMusharraf, for Musharraf.
6. Unwritten Constitutional conventions in the UK hold that "the King can do wrong". One cannot hold the King or the Queen accountable before the Parliament or the courts for any wrongs done by him or her. In net effect, the various provisions incorporated in the Constitution by Musharraf enshrine the principle that "Musharraf can do no wrong."
7. Pakistan's past military dictators too--- self-proclaimed Field Marshal Ayub Khan, Gen.Yahya Khan and Gen. Zia-ul-Haq--- had sought to give themselves immunity from impeachment or judicial proceedings for their wrongful acts, but they did so through an Act of Indemnity passed by a rubber-stamp National Assembly. Musharraf is not very sure whether the National Assembly to be elected on January 8,2008, will agree to pass an Act of Indemnity to give him the required immunity. He has, therefore, sought to give the immunity to himself. Musharraf protects Musharraf----that is the meaning of the restored Constitution.
8. These provisions giving immunity to Musharraf can be removed from the Constitution only if his opponents manage to win two-thirds of the seats in the new National Assembly. His efforts hereafter will be to ensure that his opponents will not be in a position to remove these provisions from the Constitution.
9. There was speculation in Pakistan till December 14,2007, that before restoring a drastically altered Constitution, Musharraf would remove an earlier amendment got introduced by him before the elections of 2002 that no one can hold office as the Prime Minister for more than two terms. He has not yet done so. He apparently wants to await the results of the elections before deciding to remove this bar. If Mrs.Benazir Bhutto emerges from the elections as the leader with the largest support in the National Assembly, he might do so. On the other hand, if Mr.Nawaz Sharif so emerges, he would not.
10. The two main political formations of Pakistan---the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Benazir and the Pakistan Muslim League (N) of Nawaz--have decided to contest the elections. The keenness of Benazir to contest the elections----- which reflected not only her keenness, but also the US desire that she should not damage the credibility of Musharraf's electoral exercise by boycotting the polls--- left Nawaz with no other option but to contest lest his party finds itself marginalised. The marginalisation of the PML (N), which is not comfortable with the US agenda for Pakistan, is what both Musharraf and the US want. The PML (N) would be committing a strategic mistake if it allowed their plans to succeed.
11. Among other parties, which are contesting the elections are the Musharraf-engineered PML (Qaide Azzam) headed by Chaudhury Shujjat Hussain, which is a party of Zia and Musharraf loyalists, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI) of Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) of Mr. Altaf Hussain, still living in political exile in the UK, and the small Awami National Party (ANP) of the North-west Frontier Province (NWFP).
12. The political base of the JUI and the ANP are confined to the NWFP and the Pashtun-majority areas of Balochistan, where they are expected to win some seats. The political base of the MQM is confined to the urban areas of Sindh having a large number of Mohajirs (migrants from India). It should do well there---particularly in Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur.
13. In the rest of Pakistan, the electoral battle will mainly involve the Zia and Musharraf loyalists of the PML (QA), the Benazir loyalists of the PPP and the Nawaz loyalists of the PML (N). If the elections are free and fair, the PML (QA) will be marginalised and the PPP and the PML (N) will put up a strong showing--- the PPP in the rural areas of Sindh and in the Seraiki areas of southern Punjab and the PML (N) in the rest of Punjab and in some constituencies of Sindh, where there are a large number of Punjabi ex-servicemen settled by Zia. If this happens, Musharraf's political manoeuvrability will be considerably reduced. He will, therefore, see that the PML (QA) does not getr marginalised in Central and Northern Punjab. He will work towards a hung Assembly in which all contesting formations will have important strengths, but not an absolute majority, thereby making a coalition Government unavoidable.
14. There are as at present two openly-indicated---but not announced--- Prime Ministerial aspirants---- Benazir and Chaudhury Pervez Elahi of PML (QA). Pervez Elahi was earlier the Chief Minister of Punjab and is a strong Zia loyalist. He and Mr.Ejaz-ul-Haq, the son of Zia who was the Minister for Religious Affairs in the Government of Mr.Shaukat Aziz, have been strongly critical of Benazir. They project her father the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto as responsible for the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. They accuse the Al Zulfiquar, an anti-Army militant organisation formed by her brother, the late Murtaza Ali Bhutto, of being responsible for the assassination of some pro-Zia political leaders in the 1980s.
15.Nawaz has already stated that he would not serve in any capacity under Musharraf. That would leave Mr.Shabaz Sharif, his brother, as the party's choice for the post of Prime Minister. He is a good networker and has many well-wishers among the Punjabi Lt.Gens. If the US and Musharraf manoeuvre to make Benazir the Prime Minister, the PML (QA) could split, with the Zia loyalists joining hands with PML (N) to keep her out. The Zia loyalists have nothing against Nawaz, who was, in fact, the creation of Zia. Nawaz, while criticising Musharraf, takes care not to criticise Zia, his former mentor.
16.There are three possible post-election scenarios--- either a coalition of the Musharraf loyalists in the PML (QA), the Bhutto loyalists in the PPP, the MQM and the JUI headed by Benazir or a nominee of Musharraf; or a coalition of the PPP, the PML (N), the JUI and the ANP headed by Benazir or a coalition of the Zia loyalists and the PML (N) headed by either Pervez Elahi or a nominee of Nawaz acceptable to Musharraf. The likelihood of the emergence of a single party with an absolute majority does not appear very high at present. If a party with an absolute majority materialises, this could be only either the PPP or the PML (N).
17. Whichever scenario emerges, there will be continuing political instability with confrontation rather than consensus the order of the day. The ability of such a Government to deal effectively with jihadi terrorism threatening the rest of the world from Pakistani sanctuaries will be doubtful.
18. The continuance of Musharraf in power is a factor for instability and not stability in Pakistan. Unless and until the US realises it and works for scenarios not involving his continuance in power, Pakistan will keep haunting US policy-makers.
19. It is in the interest of India that it does not say or do anything in public that could discourage the pro-democracy and anti-Army forces in Pakistan, which have been agitating against Musharraf. While India has to do business with him so long as he is in power, it should resist from making any observations which could create a wrong impression that it is supporting the US agenda of working for his continuance in power, even if that be detrimental to democracy. In this context, one has valid reasons to be disturbed by the positive remarks of Musharraf's handling of the crisis in Pakistan by Shri M.K.Narayanan, India's National Security Adviser, in an interview to Shri Karan Thapar of CNN-IBN in his Devil's Advocate programme to be telecast on the night of December 16,2007. (15-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
B.RAMAN
As expected,President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan announced on December 15,2007, the lifting of the State of Emergency imposed by him on November 3,2007, and the restoration of the Constitution, which had remained suspended since then.
2. A proclamation issued by him says that the Constitution of 1973 stands restored. This has been welcomed by his Western well-wishers, with Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the UK being the first to welcome it.
3. A careful perusal of the Constitution, which was restored on December 15,2007, would show that it is not the Constitution as conceived by the founding fathers of Pakistan. Nor is it the Constitution of 1973 as amended from time to time by the National Assembly. In fact, it is virtually a new Constitution unrecognisable from that of 1973. It has only one founding father---Musharraf--- and incorporates all the executuive orders issued by him since he proclaimed the Emergency on November 3,2007. The purpose of these orders was to protect his right to continue in power for as long as he considered it necessary----in the "supreme national interest" to quote an oft-repeated phrase of his.
4. Another purpose was to ensure that his unconstitutional and unlawful actions cannot be questioned either by the judiciary or the National Assembly and he cannot be impeached by the Assembly for any of his unlawful acts.
5. The history of Pakistan since Musharraf seized power after overthrowing Mr.Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister, on October 12,2007, will go down as the history of the manoeuvres of one man to keep himself in power by hook or by crook and to protect himself from any accountability for his wrong-doings. The Constitution of 2007, euphemistically called the Constitution of 1973, has not ushered in a Government of the people, by the people, for the people, but a Government of Musharraf, byMusharraf, for Musharraf.
6. Unwritten Constitutional conventions in the UK hold that "the King can do wrong". One cannot hold the King or the Queen accountable before the Parliament or the courts for any wrongs done by him or her. In net effect, the various provisions incorporated in the Constitution by Musharraf enshrine the principle that "Musharraf can do no wrong."
7. Pakistan's past military dictators too--- self-proclaimed Field Marshal Ayub Khan, Gen.Yahya Khan and Gen. Zia-ul-Haq--- had sought to give themselves immunity from impeachment or judicial proceedings for their wrongful acts, but they did so through an Act of Indemnity passed by a rubber-stamp National Assembly. Musharraf is not very sure whether the National Assembly to be elected on January 8,2008, will agree to pass an Act of Indemnity to give him the required immunity. He has, therefore, sought to give the immunity to himself. Musharraf protects Musharraf----that is the meaning of the restored Constitution.
8. These provisions giving immunity to Musharraf can be removed from the Constitution only if his opponents manage to win two-thirds of the seats in the new National Assembly. His efforts hereafter will be to ensure that his opponents will not be in a position to remove these provisions from the Constitution.
9. There was speculation in Pakistan till December 14,2007, that before restoring a drastically altered Constitution, Musharraf would remove an earlier amendment got introduced by him before the elections of 2002 that no one can hold office as the Prime Minister for more than two terms. He has not yet done so. He apparently wants to await the results of the elections before deciding to remove this bar. If Mrs.Benazir Bhutto emerges from the elections as the leader with the largest support in the National Assembly, he might do so. On the other hand, if Mr.Nawaz Sharif so emerges, he would not.
10. The two main political formations of Pakistan---the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Benazir and the Pakistan Muslim League (N) of Nawaz--have decided to contest the elections. The keenness of Benazir to contest the elections----- which reflected not only her keenness, but also the US desire that she should not damage the credibility of Musharraf's electoral exercise by boycotting the polls--- left Nawaz with no other option but to contest lest his party finds itself marginalised. The marginalisation of the PML (N), which is not comfortable with the US agenda for Pakistan, is what both Musharraf and the US want. The PML (N) would be committing a strategic mistake if it allowed their plans to succeed.
11. Among other parties, which are contesting the elections are the Musharraf-engineered PML (Qaide Azzam) headed by Chaudhury Shujjat Hussain, which is a party of Zia and Musharraf loyalists, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Islam (JUI) of Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) of Mr. Altaf Hussain, still living in political exile in the UK, and the small Awami National Party (ANP) of the North-west Frontier Province (NWFP).
12. The political base of the JUI and the ANP are confined to the NWFP and the Pashtun-majority areas of Balochistan, where they are expected to win some seats. The political base of the MQM is confined to the urban areas of Sindh having a large number of Mohajirs (migrants from India). It should do well there---particularly in Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur.
13. In the rest of Pakistan, the electoral battle will mainly involve the Zia and Musharraf loyalists of the PML (QA), the Benazir loyalists of the PPP and the Nawaz loyalists of the PML (N). If the elections are free and fair, the PML (QA) will be marginalised and the PPP and the PML (N) will put up a strong showing--- the PPP in the rural areas of Sindh and in the Seraiki areas of southern Punjab and the PML (N) in the rest of Punjab and in some constituencies of Sindh, where there are a large number of Punjabi ex-servicemen settled by Zia. If this happens, Musharraf's political manoeuvrability will be considerably reduced. He will, therefore, see that the PML (QA) does not getr marginalised in Central and Northern Punjab. He will work towards a hung Assembly in which all contesting formations will have important strengths, but not an absolute majority, thereby making a coalition Government unavoidable.
14. There are as at present two openly-indicated---but not announced--- Prime Ministerial aspirants---- Benazir and Chaudhury Pervez Elahi of PML (QA). Pervez Elahi was earlier the Chief Minister of Punjab and is a strong Zia loyalist. He and Mr.Ejaz-ul-Haq, the son of Zia who was the Minister for Religious Affairs in the Government of Mr.Shaukat Aziz, have been strongly critical of Benazir. They project her father the late Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto as responsible for the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. They accuse the Al Zulfiquar, an anti-Army militant organisation formed by her brother, the late Murtaza Ali Bhutto, of being responsible for the assassination of some pro-Zia political leaders in the 1980s.
15.Nawaz has already stated that he would not serve in any capacity under Musharraf. That would leave Mr.Shabaz Sharif, his brother, as the party's choice for the post of Prime Minister. He is a good networker and has many well-wishers among the Punjabi Lt.Gens. If the US and Musharraf manoeuvre to make Benazir the Prime Minister, the PML (QA) could split, with the Zia loyalists joining hands with PML (N) to keep her out. The Zia loyalists have nothing against Nawaz, who was, in fact, the creation of Zia. Nawaz, while criticising Musharraf, takes care not to criticise Zia, his former mentor.
16.There are three possible post-election scenarios--- either a coalition of the Musharraf loyalists in the PML (QA), the Bhutto loyalists in the PPP, the MQM and the JUI headed by Benazir or a nominee of Musharraf; or a coalition of the PPP, the PML (N), the JUI and the ANP headed by Benazir or a coalition of the Zia loyalists and the PML (N) headed by either Pervez Elahi or a nominee of Nawaz acceptable to Musharraf. The likelihood of the emergence of a single party with an absolute majority does not appear very high at present. If a party with an absolute majority materialises, this could be only either the PPP or the PML (N).
17. Whichever scenario emerges, there will be continuing political instability with confrontation rather than consensus the order of the day. The ability of such a Government to deal effectively with jihadi terrorism threatening the rest of the world from Pakistani sanctuaries will be doubtful.
18. The continuance of Musharraf in power is a factor for instability and not stability in Pakistan. Unless and until the US realises it and works for scenarios not involving his continuance in power, Pakistan will keep haunting US policy-makers.
19. It is in the interest of India that it does not say or do anything in public that could discourage the pro-democracy and anti-Army forces in Pakistan, which have been agitating against Musharraf. While India has to do business with him so long as he is in power, it should resist from making any observations which could create a wrong impression that it is supporting the US agenda of working for his continuance in power, even if that be detrimental to democracy. In this context, one has valid reasons to be disturbed by the positive remarks of Musharraf's handling of the crisis in Pakistan by Shri M.K.Narayanan, India's National Security Adviser, in an interview to Shri Karan Thapar of CNN-IBN in his Devil's Advocate programme to be telecast on the night of December 16,2007. (15-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
Friday, December 14, 2007
INTERNATIONAL JIHADI TERRORISM—AN OVERVIEW
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR:PAPER NO.322
B.RAMAN
(Power Point presentation made at a conference in New Delhi on December 13,2007 )
CHARACTERISTICS
· MIX OF OLD & NEW TERRORISM.OLD MEANING TARGETED KILLING OF SELECT INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS. NEW MEANING MASS CASUALTY, MASS DESTRUCTION, MASS DIRUPTION.
· INDIFFERENCE TO IMPACT OF THEIR ACTIONS ON PUBLIC OPINION.
· ROOT CAUSES NOT CONTEMPORARY. ARISE FROM THEIR PERCEPTION OF ISLAMIC HISTORY--- DESIRE TO RE-CREATE A CALIPHATE & RESTORE “HISTORIC” MUSLIM LANDS NOW WITH NON-MUSLIMS BACK TO THE UMMAH.
· CONVENTIONAL ROOT CAUSES SUCH AS UMEMPLOYMENT, POVERTY, SOCIAL INJUSTICE ETC DO NOT APPLY. BIN LADEN DOES NOT EVEN TALK OF SUCH ISSUES. HE TALKS ONLY OF HISTORIC ISSUES SUCH AS WRONGS COMMITTED TO MUSLIMS OVER COURSE OF HISTORY. FOCUS ON MUSLIMS AS A COMMUNITY,ON ISLAM AS A RELIGION. NOT ON MUSLIMS AS INDIVIDUALS.
•
· NOT OF CLASSICAL PATTERN. MANY OPERATIVES AFFLUENT OR WELL-TO-DO, EDUCATED & WELL-EMPLOYED TYPES.
· NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMBATANTS AND NON-COMBATANTS OR BETWEEN MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN. JIHADI TERRORISTS HAVE KILLED MORE INNOCENT CIVILIANS THAN ALL OTHER TERRORISTS PUT TOGETHER.
· MAINLY USING EXPLOSIVES. PREPARED TO USE ANY MEANS OF MASS CASUALTIES, EVEN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD).
· TACTICAL OBJECTIVES---MAINLY ACTS OF REPRISAL FOR PALESTINE, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN & OTHER PERCEIVED WRONGS TO MUSLIMS.
· STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES---MASSIVE ECONOMIC DISRUPTION. TARGETS: TRANSPORT,TOURISM, MARITIME TRADE, OIL/GAS PRODUCTION & TRANSPORTATION, CRITICAL INFRACTRUCTURE.
· PREVIOUSLY WANTED TO TARGET ONLY OIL/GAS TRANSPORTATION, BUT NOT PRODUCTION FACILITIES LOCATED IN MUSLIM LANDS. LATEST INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO TARGET PRODUCTION FACILITIES TOO, EVEN IN MUSLIM NATIONS.
· SELF-SUSTAINING MOMENTUM. ELIMINATION OF ICONIC LEADERS HAS HAD NO IMPACT ON MOMENTUM.RANK & FILE TERRORISM. INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS CAPABLE OF AUTONOMOUS OPERATIONS EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ICONIC LEADER.
· FROM THE PRE-9/11 HIERARCHIAL SET-UP AL QAEDA HAS EVOLVED INTO A SET-UP OF CONCENTRIC CIRCLES, WITH EACH CIRCLE REPRESENTING A LOCAL INITIATIVE WITH THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND & CONTROL AT THE CENTRE AVAILABLE FOR GUIDANCE WHEN REQUIRED, BUT NOT OTHERWISE INTERVENING
· IMPORTANCE OF MARTYRDOM OPERATIONS (SUICIDE TERRORISM).
· TWO-PRONGED OPERATIONS---MARTYRDOM & INTIFADA TACTICS FOR THOSE WHO ARE DISINCLINED TO COMMIT MARTYRDOM.
· AFFILIATION TO ORGANISATIONS NOT OBLIGATORY.A MUSLIM IS FREE TO WAGE A JIHAD EITHER AS A MEMBER OF AN ORGANISATION OR AS AN INDIVIDUAL.
· THE JUNDULLAH (SOLDIERS OF ALLAH) PHENOMENON. INDIVIDUAL MUSLIMS NOT BELONGING TO ANY ORGANISATION SEEKING MARTYRDOM.ON THE INCREASE IN PAKISTAN. THERE WERE FOUR SUICIDE ATTACKS IN 2002,TWO IN 2003, FIVE IN 2004, TWO IN 2005, SIX IN 2006 AND 41 TILL OCTOBER 28,2007. TOTAL DEATHS 796---SOURCE NEWS OF OCTOBER 29,2007. MOST OF THE CASES OF 2006 & 2007 REMAIN UNDETECTED.SUSPECTED REASON: INDIVIDUALS WITH NO PREVIOUS HISTORY & WITH NO PREVIOUS ORGANISATIONAL AFFILIATION INVOLVED.
· SUNNI A-BOMB VS SHIA A-BOMB. SUPPORT FOR SUNNI A-BOMB. SILENCE ON IRAN’S RIGHT TO ACQUIRE AN A-BOMB.
· LOUD CONDEMNATION OF US INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN & IRAQ. MUTED REACTIONS TO REPORTED US PLANS TO INTERVENE IN IRAN.
· BIN LADEN’S SO-CALLED INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT IS, IN FACT, AN INTERNATIONAL WAHABI FRONT AGAINST CHRISTIANS, JEWISH PEOPLE, HINDUS & SHIAS AND THEIR MUSLIM STATE SUPPORTERS.
· MUSLIMS KILLING MUSLIMS. WAHABI SUNNIS KILLING SHIAS & SUNNI KURDS IN IRAQ. WAHABI SUNNIS KILLING SHIAS & BARELVI SUNNIS IN PAKISTAN. ANTI-US WAHABI SUNNIS KILLING PRO-US WAHABI SUNNIS IN AFGHANISTAN & WAHABI SUNNIS KILLING NON-WAHABI SUNNIS IN INDIA. ALL IN THE NAME OF GLOBAL JIHAD.
GROUND SITUATION
· TENTATIVE SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT IN IRAQ. U.S. military deaths dropped 63 per cent, from 101 in June 2007 to 37 in November 2007. _U.S. military deaths in Baghdad also decreased by 78 per cent, from 40 in June 2007 to nine in November 2007. Deaths from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) continue to be the highest incident type, but dropped by 72 per cent since 2007 summer. Iraqi civilian deaths from war-related violence dropped 56 per cent over the past six months, from at least 1,640 in June to 718 in November,2007.
· NO SIGNIFICANT SIGN OF IMPROVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. The Neo Taliban & its associates caused 346 civilian deaths while NATO and Afghan forces caused 337 civilian deaths till October-end. Military fatalities since October 7,2001:
• United States 469Britain 85Canada 73Spain 23Germany 26Other nations 66TOTAL: 742
· According to a UN study, the number of suicide bombings in Afghanistan increased from 17 in 2005 to 123 in 2006 and touched 103 till August 31, 2007.
· A UNIQUE SITUATION --- A MIX OF INSURGENCY & TERRORISM, OF CONVENTIONAL & UNCONVENTIONAL MODUS OPERANDI (MO). NEO TALIBAN IN THE DRIVING SEAT & NOT AL QAEDA
· WORRISOME DETERIORATION IN PAKISTAN. SOUTH & NORTH WAZIRISTAN IN THE FEDERALLY-ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FATA) UNDER DE FACTO CONTROL OF A HOTCH-POTCH OF TERRORISTS---AL QAEDA, LOCAL TRIBAL GROUPS CLOSE TO NEO TALIBAN, UZBECK & PAKISTANI JIHADI GROUPS, INDIVIDUAL JUNDULLAHS. SPREADING TO AREAS OUTSIDE FATA.
· SUICIDE TERRORISM– FOUR IN 2002, TWO IN 2003, FIVE IN 2004, TWO IN 2005, SIX IN 2006 & 41 IN 2007 TILL OCT-END. FATALITIES—796.
· FOUR ATTACKS IN RAWALPINDI---TWO AGAINST ARMY AND TWO AGAINST ISI;ONE AGAINST AIR FORCE IN SARGODHA & ONE AGAINST US-TRAINED SPECIAL SERVICES GROUP IN TARBELA. MANY ATTACKS ON POLICE IN THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE (NWFP).
· IN INDIA, IMPROVEMENT IN JAMMU & KASHMIR.
· CIVILIAN FATALITIES IN J&K: 521 IN 2005,349 IN 2006 &162 TILL DEC.5,2007.
· SECURITY FORCES FATALITIES IN J&K—218 IN 2005,168 IN 2006 & 120 TILL DEC.5,2007.
· WORRISOME IN THE REST OF INDIA. THREE TERRORIST STRIKES IN 2005; THREE IN 2006; AND EIGHT IN 2007. OF 14 ATTACKS SINCE 2005, THREE WERE ON MUSLIM PLACES OF WORSHIP, THREE ON LEGAL COMMUNITY, TWO ON TRANSPORT, TWO ON HINDU HOLY PLACES,THREE IN PUBLIC PLACES & ONE ON A MEETING OF SCIENTISTS.ONE ATTACK WITH A GUN & REMAINING 13 WITH IEDS.ESTIMATED FATALITIES—300. MORE USE OF HAND-HELD WEAPONS IN J&K. MORE USE OF IEDS IN REST OF INDIA.
· OPERATIONAL CONTROL IS STILL DONE BY PAKISTAN’S ISI, BUT THE COMMAND & CONTROL INCREASINGLY OPERATES FROM BANGLADESH AFTER PERVEZ MUSHARRAF ASSURED INDIA IN JANUARY,2004, THAT HE WOULD NOT ALLOW ANY TERRITORY UNDER PAK CONTROL TO BE USED BY ANTI-INDIA TERRORISTS.ISI CONTINUES TO USE PRO-AL QAEDA TERRORISTS AGAINST INDIA AND HELP NEO TALIBAN AGAINST AFGHANISTAN.
· REST OF THE WORLD---SPORADIC AS EVER, BUT LETHAL AS EVER. NEW JIHADI SPOTS: SOMALIA & ALGERIA.NEW LIKELY DANGER SPOTS---GERMANY, DENMARK, FRANCE & CANADA.
· LARGER RESERVOIR OF OPERATIVES THAN PRE-9/11--- ARABS, PAKISTANIS IN PAKISTAN & DIASPORA, UZBECKS & INDIAN MUSLIMS.
PAKISTAN:LOOKING TO FUTURE
· SENIOR ARMY LEADERSHIP SEES NO ALTERNATIVE TO MUSHARRAF IN THE DRIVING SEAT OF NATIONAL SECURITY.
· HIS OPERATIONAL MANOEUVRABILITY DILUTED BY HIS MAKING GEN.ASHFAQ PERVEZ KIYANI AS THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY STAFF (COAS). WHEN MUSHARRAF CHAIRED CORPS COMMANDERS MEETINGS AS COAS, HIS OFFICERS AVOIDED OPENLY VOICING THEIR RESERVATIONS OVER HIS POLICIES. THEY WILL BE LESS INHIBITED IN VOICING THEIR RESERVATIONS IN MEETINGS CHAIRED BY KIYANI. HE HAS TO TAKE THEM INTO CONSIDERATION.
· UPSURGE IN TRIBAL ANGER AFTER COMMANDO ACTION IN ISLAMABAD’S LAL MASJID CONTINUES.INSTABILITY IN PASHTUN BELT WILL CONTINUE IN SHORT & MEDIUM TERMS.
· UPSURGE IN TERRORISM WILL CONTINUE. TRIBAL AREAS WILL REMAIN UNGOVERNABLE. NON-TRIBAL AREAS WILL KEEP BLEEDING INTERMITTENTLY. THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS WILL CONTINUE TILL THE JIHADI SANCTUARIES & TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE IN PAK TERRITORY ARE EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATED – WHETHER THEY ARE DIRECTED AGAINST INDIA, AFGHANISTAN OR US.
· NO END TO JIHADI TERRORISM ORIGINATING FROM PAK TERRITORY SO LONG AS US KEEPS GIVING MUSHARRAF CAUSE FOR BELIEF THAT THE US WILL CLOSE ITS EYES TO HIS JIHADI TERRORISM AGAINST INDIA PROVIDED HE HELPS IN PREVENTING ANOTHER 9/11 IN US TERRITORY.
· NIGHTMARE OVER PAK NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ROGUE NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS WILL CONTINUE HAUNTING US SO LONG AS JIHADIS CONTINUE TO FLOURISH IN PAKISTANI TERRITORY.IF THERE IS ANOTHER 9/11 IN THE US AND IF IT INVOLVES THE USE OF WMD, IT WOULD HAVE ORIGINATED FROM PAKISTANI TERRITORY.
COUNTER-TERRORISM INADEQUACIES
· ACTION AGAINST FUNDING LARGELY FOCUSSED ON FORMAL CHANNELS SUCH AS BANKING. INFORMAL CHANNELS SUCH AS HAWALA, USE OF BUSINESS COMPANIES & STOCK MARKETS ETC NOT EFFECTIVELY ADDRESSED.
· INEFFECTIVE NARCOTICS CONTROL.
· INEFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST SANCTUARIES & TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURES IN PAKISTAN & BANGLADESH.
· INEFFECTIVE PSYWAR. TERRORISTS MAKE BETTER USE OF SOFT POWER AGAINST STATE ACTORS THAN VICE VERSA.
· INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION CONFINED TO INTELLIGENCE-SHARING. VERY LITTLE JOINT OPERATIONS. RELUCTANCE TO SHARE APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGIES.
AL QAEDA & INDIA
· AL QAEDA AS AN ARAB ORGANISATION HAS NOT SO FAR OPERATED IN INDIA.
· BUT FOUR OF THE FIVE PAKISTANI MEMBERS OF BIN LADEN’S INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT (IIF) HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN INDIA. THESE ARE THE HARKAT-UL-MUJAHIDEEN (HUM), THE HARKAT-UL-JIHAD-AL ISLAMI (HUJI), THE LASHKAR-E-TOIBA (LET) AND THE JAISH-E-MOHAMMASD (JEM). THE HUM IS A FOUNDING MEMBER OF THE IIF SINCE 1998. THE OTHERS JOINED SUBSEQUENTLY. THE ONLY PAKISTANI ORGANISATION NOT ACTIVE IN INDIA IS THE ANTI-SHIA LASHKAR-E-JHANGVI (LEJ).
· SINCE APRIL,2006, AL QAEDA HAS BEEN PROJECTING THE GLOBAL JIHAD AS DIRECTED AGAINST THE CHRISTIANS, THE JEWISH PEOPLE & THE HINDUS.
· BEFORE APRIL,2006, IT USED TO PROJECT IT AS DIRECTED AGAINST THE CHRISTIANS & THE JEWISH PEOPLE ONLY.
· SINCE 2002, THERE HAS BEEN A FLOW OF INDIAN MUSLIM VOLUNTEERS FROM INDIA & THE GULF TO THE FOUR PAKISTANI ORGANISATIONS MENTIONED ABOVE.
· AL QAEDA HAD DEFINITELY USED ONE INDIAN-ORIGIN MUSLIM IN THE UK FOR INTELLIGENCE-COLLECTION & TARGET SELECTION IN THE US. ONE OTHER INDIAN MUSLIM IN THE UK WAS SUSPECTED OF ASSOCIATION WITH THE LONDON BOMBERS OF JULY,2005. THE THIRD INDIAN MUSLIM INVOLVED IN THE GLASGOW INCIDENT OF JUNE,2007, WAS ACTING INDIVIDUALLY. NO EVIDENCE OF ORGANISATIONAL AFFILIATION.
· KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMAD, WHO IS IN US CUSTODY, REPORTEDLY TOLD US INTERROGATORS THAT AL QAEDA WANTED TO STRIKE THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN NEW DELHI, BUT COULD NOT.
· IT IS ASSESSED THAT AL QAEDA WILL CONTINUE TO LEAVE THE OPERATIONS AGAINST INDIAN TARGETS TO ITS PAKISTANI ASSOCIATES, BUT WILL KEEP LOOKING FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRIKE AT US & ISRAELI TARGETS IN INDIA.
INDIA: DIFFICULTIES
· WIDE GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD. INVOLVES CO-ORDINATION AMONG MANY STATES.
· GYPSY-LIKE TERRORISM--- KEEP THEIR AREA OF OPERATIONS SHIFTING FROM STATE TO STATE.
· UNESTIMATED, BUT LARGE POPULATION OF ILLEGAL MIGRANTS FROM BANGLADESH ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. THEY PROVIDE THE LOGISTICS SUPPORT.
· RELUCTANCE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP TO GIVE ADDITIONAL POWERS TO THE POLICE ON PAR WITH THOSE IN THE WEST.
· RELUCTANCE TO ACT AGAINST ILLEGAL BANGLADESHI MIGRANTS.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
· CONVENTIONAL ROOT CAUSES & HEARTS & MINDS APPROACHES DO NOT APPLY TO JIHADI TERRORISM SINCE ITS SO-CALLED GRIEVANCES ARE NOT CONTEMPORARY. IT HAS TO BE EFFECTIVELY NEUTRALISED THROUGH SECURITY MEASURES—DEFENSIVE & OFFENSIVE.
· OVER-MILITARISED US COUNTER-TERRORISM METHODS, WITH DISPROPORTIONATE USE OF FORCE THROUGH AIR & ARTILLERY STRIKES ADDING TO MUSLIM ANGER & DRIVING MORE MUSLIMS INTO THE WAITING ARMS OF AL QAEDA. NEED FOR MID-COURSE CORRECTIONS. INDIA’S NON-MILITARY APPROACH WORTHY OF EMULATION.
· INDIAN MODEL---POLICE, THE WEAPON OF FIRST RESORT IN COUNTER-TERRORISM & ARMY THE WEAPON OF FIRST RESORT IN COUNTER-INFILTRATION IN BORDER AREAS.
· PAKISTAN HAS BEEN THE MOST IMPORTANT BREEDING GROUND OF INTERNATIONAL JIHADI TERRORISM. BANGLADESH NEXT. THE ARMIES IN BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE NOT SINCERELY ADDRESSED THIS MENACE. THERE IS A NEED FOR A NEW LEADERSHIP IN BOTH COUNTRIES, WHICH WILL TACKLE THE MENACE SINCERELY & EFFECTIVELY.
· INTELLIGENCE HAS IMPROVED, BUT STILL FACING DIFFICULTIES IN PENETRATING NON-STATE ACTORS.
· PHYSICAL SECURITY HAS IMPROVED BUT STILL FACING DIFFICULTIES AGAINST SUICIDE TERRORISM & ATTACKS ON SOFT TARGETS.
· NO BREAKTHROUGH IN DEVELOPING TECHNOLOGIES TO DETECT SUICIDE BOMBERS FROM A DISTANCE.
· DRAMATIC DETERIORATION IN POLICE MORALE IN PAKISTAN UNDER MUSHARRAF.
A THOUGHT FOR THE ROAD
US CAUGHT IN A VICIOUS CIRCLE IN PAKISTAN. THE MORE IT SUPPORTS MUSHARRAF, THE MORE THE ANTI-MUSHARRAF, ANTI-US ANGER. THE MORE THE ANTI-MUSHARRAF, ANTI-US ANGER, THE MORE THE JIHADI TERRORISM. THE MORE THE JIHADI TERRORISM,THE MORE THE DANGERS OF PAK NUCLEAR ARSENAL FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF JIHADI TERRORISTS. THE MORE THE DANGERS OF THE PAK NUCLEAR ARSENAL FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF JIHADI TERRORISTS, THE MORE THE US SUPPORT TO MUSHARRAF. SO LONG AS THE US DOES NOT GET OUT OF THIS VICIOUS CIRCLE, ITS TROOPS WILL CONTINUE BLEEDING IN THIS REGION. NO HOME BEFORE X’MAS FOR THEM. NOT FOR THIS X’MAS. NOT FOR MANY X’MASES FOR YEARS TO COME.
(13-12-07)
•
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR:PAPER NO.322
B.RAMAN
(Power Point presentation made at a conference in New Delhi on December 13,2007 )
CHARACTERISTICS
· MIX OF OLD & NEW TERRORISM.OLD MEANING TARGETED KILLING OF SELECT INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS. NEW MEANING MASS CASUALTY, MASS DESTRUCTION, MASS DIRUPTION.
· INDIFFERENCE TO IMPACT OF THEIR ACTIONS ON PUBLIC OPINION.
· ROOT CAUSES NOT CONTEMPORARY. ARISE FROM THEIR PERCEPTION OF ISLAMIC HISTORY--- DESIRE TO RE-CREATE A CALIPHATE & RESTORE “HISTORIC” MUSLIM LANDS NOW WITH NON-MUSLIMS BACK TO THE UMMAH.
· CONVENTIONAL ROOT CAUSES SUCH AS UMEMPLOYMENT, POVERTY, SOCIAL INJUSTICE ETC DO NOT APPLY. BIN LADEN DOES NOT EVEN TALK OF SUCH ISSUES. HE TALKS ONLY OF HISTORIC ISSUES SUCH AS WRONGS COMMITTED TO MUSLIMS OVER COURSE OF HISTORY. FOCUS ON MUSLIMS AS A COMMUNITY,ON ISLAM AS A RELIGION. NOT ON MUSLIMS AS INDIVIDUALS.
•
· NOT OF CLASSICAL PATTERN. MANY OPERATIVES AFFLUENT OR WELL-TO-DO, EDUCATED & WELL-EMPLOYED TYPES.
· NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMBATANTS AND NON-COMBATANTS OR BETWEEN MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN. JIHADI TERRORISTS HAVE KILLED MORE INNOCENT CIVILIANS THAN ALL OTHER TERRORISTS PUT TOGETHER.
· MAINLY USING EXPLOSIVES. PREPARED TO USE ANY MEANS OF MASS CASUALTIES, EVEN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD).
· TACTICAL OBJECTIVES---MAINLY ACTS OF REPRISAL FOR PALESTINE, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN & OTHER PERCEIVED WRONGS TO MUSLIMS.
· STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES---MASSIVE ECONOMIC DISRUPTION. TARGETS: TRANSPORT,TOURISM, MARITIME TRADE, OIL/GAS PRODUCTION & TRANSPORTATION, CRITICAL INFRACTRUCTURE.
· PREVIOUSLY WANTED TO TARGET ONLY OIL/GAS TRANSPORTATION, BUT NOT PRODUCTION FACILITIES LOCATED IN MUSLIM LANDS. LATEST INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO TARGET PRODUCTION FACILITIES TOO, EVEN IN MUSLIM NATIONS.
· SELF-SUSTAINING MOMENTUM. ELIMINATION OF ICONIC LEADERS HAS HAD NO IMPACT ON MOMENTUM.RANK & FILE TERRORISM. INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS CAPABLE OF AUTONOMOUS OPERATIONS EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ICONIC LEADER.
· FROM THE PRE-9/11 HIERARCHIAL SET-UP AL QAEDA HAS EVOLVED INTO A SET-UP OF CONCENTRIC CIRCLES, WITH EACH CIRCLE REPRESENTING A LOCAL INITIATIVE WITH THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND & CONTROL AT THE CENTRE AVAILABLE FOR GUIDANCE WHEN REQUIRED, BUT NOT OTHERWISE INTERVENING
· IMPORTANCE OF MARTYRDOM OPERATIONS (SUICIDE TERRORISM).
· TWO-PRONGED OPERATIONS---MARTYRDOM & INTIFADA TACTICS FOR THOSE WHO ARE DISINCLINED TO COMMIT MARTYRDOM.
· AFFILIATION TO ORGANISATIONS NOT OBLIGATORY.A MUSLIM IS FREE TO WAGE A JIHAD EITHER AS A MEMBER OF AN ORGANISATION OR AS AN INDIVIDUAL.
· THE JUNDULLAH (SOLDIERS OF ALLAH) PHENOMENON. INDIVIDUAL MUSLIMS NOT BELONGING TO ANY ORGANISATION SEEKING MARTYRDOM.ON THE INCREASE IN PAKISTAN. THERE WERE FOUR SUICIDE ATTACKS IN 2002,TWO IN 2003, FIVE IN 2004, TWO IN 2005, SIX IN 2006 AND 41 TILL OCTOBER 28,2007. TOTAL DEATHS 796---SOURCE NEWS OF OCTOBER 29,2007. MOST OF THE CASES OF 2006 & 2007 REMAIN UNDETECTED.SUSPECTED REASON: INDIVIDUALS WITH NO PREVIOUS HISTORY & WITH NO PREVIOUS ORGANISATIONAL AFFILIATION INVOLVED.
· SUNNI A-BOMB VS SHIA A-BOMB. SUPPORT FOR SUNNI A-BOMB. SILENCE ON IRAN’S RIGHT TO ACQUIRE AN A-BOMB.
· LOUD CONDEMNATION OF US INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN & IRAQ. MUTED REACTIONS TO REPORTED US PLANS TO INTERVENE IN IRAN.
· BIN LADEN’S SO-CALLED INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT IS, IN FACT, AN INTERNATIONAL WAHABI FRONT AGAINST CHRISTIANS, JEWISH PEOPLE, HINDUS & SHIAS AND THEIR MUSLIM STATE SUPPORTERS.
· MUSLIMS KILLING MUSLIMS. WAHABI SUNNIS KILLING SHIAS & SUNNI KURDS IN IRAQ. WAHABI SUNNIS KILLING SHIAS & BARELVI SUNNIS IN PAKISTAN. ANTI-US WAHABI SUNNIS KILLING PRO-US WAHABI SUNNIS IN AFGHANISTAN & WAHABI SUNNIS KILLING NON-WAHABI SUNNIS IN INDIA. ALL IN THE NAME OF GLOBAL JIHAD.
GROUND SITUATION
· TENTATIVE SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT IN IRAQ. U.S. military deaths dropped 63 per cent, from 101 in June 2007 to 37 in November 2007. _U.S. military deaths in Baghdad also decreased by 78 per cent, from 40 in June 2007 to nine in November 2007. Deaths from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) continue to be the highest incident type, but dropped by 72 per cent since 2007 summer. Iraqi civilian deaths from war-related violence dropped 56 per cent over the past six months, from at least 1,640 in June to 718 in November,2007.
· NO SIGNIFICANT SIGN OF IMPROVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. The Neo Taliban & its associates caused 346 civilian deaths while NATO and Afghan forces caused 337 civilian deaths till October-end. Military fatalities since October 7,2001:
• United States 469Britain 85Canada 73Spain 23Germany 26Other nations 66TOTAL: 742
· According to a UN study, the number of suicide bombings in Afghanistan increased from 17 in 2005 to 123 in 2006 and touched 103 till August 31, 2007.
· A UNIQUE SITUATION --- A MIX OF INSURGENCY & TERRORISM, OF CONVENTIONAL & UNCONVENTIONAL MODUS OPERANDI (MO). NEO TALIBAN IN THE DRIVING SEAT & NOT AL QAEDA
· WORRISOME DETERIORATION IN PAKISTAN. SOUTH & NORTH WAZIRISTAN IN THE FEDERALLY-ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FATA) UNDER DE FACTO CONTROL OF A HOTCH-POTCH OF TERRORISTS---AL QAEDA, LOCAL TRIBAL GROUPS CLOSE TO NEO TALIBAN, UZBECK & PAKISTANI JIHADI GROUPS, INDIVIDUAL JUNDULLAHS. SPREADING TO AREAS OUTSIDE FATA.
· SUICIDE TERRORISM– FOUR IN 2002, TWO IN 2003, FIVE IN 2004, TWO IN 2005, SIX IN 2006 & 41 IN 2007 TILL OCT-END. FATALITIES—796.
· FOUR ATTACKS IN RAWALPINDI---TWO AGAINST ARMY AND TWO AGAINST ISI;ONE AGAINST AIR FORCE IN SARGODHA & ONE AGAINST US-TRAINED SPECIAL SERVICES GROUP IN TARBELA. MANY ATTACKS ON POLICE IN THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE (NWFP).
· IN INDIA, IMPROVEMENT IN JAMMU & KASHMIR.
· CIVILIAN FATALITIES IN J&K: 521 IN 2005,349 IN 2006 &162 TILL DEC.5,2007.
· SECURITY FORCES FATALITIES IN J&K—218 IN 2005,168 IN 2006 & 120 TILL DEC.5,2007.
· WORRISOME IN THE REST OF INDIA. THREE TERRORIST STRIKES IN 2005; THREE IN 2006; AND EIGHT IN 2007. OF 14 ATTACKS SINCE 2005, THREE WERE ON MUSLIM PLACES OF WORSHIP, THREE ON LEGAL COMMUNITY, TWO ON TRANSPORT, TWO ON HINDU HOLY PLACES,THREE IN PUBLIC PLACES & ONE ON A MEETING OF SCIENTISTS.ONE ATTACK WITH A GUN & REMAINING 13 WITH IEDS.ESTIMATED FATALITIES—300. MORE USE OF HAND-HELD WEAPONS IN J&K. MORE USE OF IEDS IN REST OF INDIA.
· OPERATIONAL CONTROL IS STILL DONE BY PAKISTAN’S ISI, BUT THE COMMAND & CONTROL INCREASINGLY OPERATES FROM BANGLADESH AFTER PERVEZ MUSHARRAF ASSURED INDIA IN JANUARY,2004, THAT HE WOULD NOT ALLOW ANY TERRITORY UNDER PAK CONTROL TO BE USED BY ANTI-INDIA TERRORISTS.ISI CONTINUES TO USE PRO-AL QAEDA TERRORISTS AGAINST INDIA AND HELP NEO TALIBAN AGAINST AFGHANISTAN.
· REST OF THE WORLD---SPORADIC AS EVER, BUT LETHAL AS EVER. NEW JIHADI SPOTS: SOMALIA & ALGERIA.NEW LIKELY DANGER SPOTS---GERMANY, DENMARK, FRANCE & CANADA.
· LARGER RESERVOIR OF OPERATIVES THAN PRE-9/11--- ARABS, PAKISTANIS IN PAKISTAN & DIASPORA, UZBECKS & INDIAN MUSLIMS.
PAKISTAN:LOOKING TO FUTURE
· SENIOR ARMY LEADERSHIP SEES NO ALTERNATIVE TO MUSHARRAF IN THE DRIVING SEAT OF NATIONAL SECURITY.
· HIS OPERATIONAL MANOEUVRABILITY DILUTED BY HIS MAKING GEN.ASHFAQ PERVEZ KIYANI AS THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY STAFF (COAS). WHEN MUSHARRAF CHAIRED CORPS COMMANDERS MEETINGS AS COAS, HIS OFFICERS AVOIDED OPENLY VOICING THEIR RESERVATIONS OVER HIS POLICIES. THEY WILL BE LESS INHIBITED IN VOICING THEIR RESERVATIONS IN MEETINGS CHAIRED BY KIYANI. HE HAS TO TAKE THEM INTO CONSIDERATION.
· UPSURGE IN TRIBAL ANGER AFTER COMMANDO ACTION IN ISLAMABAD’S LAL MASJID CONTINUES.INSTABILITY IN PASHTUN BELT WILL CONTINUE IN SHORT & MEDIUM TERMS.
· UPSURGE IN TERRORISM WILL CONTINUE. TRIBAL AREAS WILL REMAIN UNGOVERNABLE. NON-TRIBAL AREAS WILL KEEP BLEEDING INTERMITTENTLY. THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS WILL CONTINUE TILL THE JIHADI SANCTUARIES & TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURE IN PAK TERRITORY ARE EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATED – WHETHER THEY ARE DIRECTED AGAINST INDIA, AFGHANISTAN OR US.
· NO END TO JIHADI TERRORISM ORIGINATING FROM PAK TERRITORY SO LONG AS US KEEPS GIVING MUSHARRAF CAUSE FOR BELIEF THAT THE US WILL CLOSE ITS EYES TO HIS JIHADI TERRORISM AGAINST INDIA PROVIDED HE HELPS IN PREVENTING ANOTHER 9/11 IN US TERRITORY.
· NIGHTMARE OVER PAK NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ROGUE NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS WILL CONTINUE HAUNTING US SO LONG AS JIHADIS CONTINUE TO FLOURISH IN PAKISTANI TERRITORY.IF THERE IS ANOTHER 9/11 IN THE US AND IF IT INVOLVES THE USE OF WMD, IT WOULD HAVE ORIGINATED FROM PAKISTANI TERRITORY.
COUNTER-TERRORISM INADEQUACIES
· ACTION AGAINST FUNDING LARGELY FOCUSSED ON FORMAL CHANNELS SUCH AS BANKING. INFORMAL CHANNELS SUCH AS HAWALA, USE OF BUSINESS COMPANIES & STOCK MARKETS ETC NOT EFFECTIVELY ADDRESSED.
· INEFFECTIVE NARCOTICS CONTROL.
· INEFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST SANCTUARIES & TRAINING INFRASTRUCTURES IN PAKISTAN & BANGLADESH.
· INEFFECTIVE PSYWAR. TERRORISTS MAKE BETTER USE OF SOFT POWER AGAINST STATE ACTORS THAN VICE VERSA.
· INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION CONFINED TO INTELLIGENCE-SHARING. VERY LITTLE JOINT OPERATIONS. RELUCTANCE TO SHARE APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGIES.
AL QAEDA & INDIA
· AL QAEDA AS AN ARAB ORGANISATION HAS NOT SO FAR OPERATED IN INDIA.
· BUT FOUR OF THE FIVE PAKISTANI MEMBERS OF BIN LADEN’S INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT (IIF) HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN INDIA. THESE ARE THE HARKAT-UL-MUJAHIDEEN (HUM), THE HARKAT-UL-JIHAD-AL ISLAMI (HUJI), THE LASHKAR-E-TOIBA (LET) AND THE JAISH-E-MOHAMMASD (JEM). THE HUM IS A FOUNDING MEMBER OF THE IIF SINCE 1998. THE OTHERS JOINED SUBSEQUENTLY. THE ONLY PAKISTANI ORGANISATION NOT ACTIVE IN INDIA IS THE ANTI-SHIA LASHKAR-E-JHANGVI (LEJ).
· SINCE APRIL,2006, AL QAEDA HAS BEEN PROJECTING THE GLOBAL JIHAD AS DIRECTED AGAINST THE CHRISTIANS, THE JEWISH PEOPLE & THE HINDUS.
· BEFORE APRIL,2006, IT USED TO PROJECT IT AS DIRECTED AGAINST THE CHRISTIANS & THE JEWISH PEOPLE ONLY.
· SINCE 2002, THERE HAS BEEN A FLOW OF INDIAN MUSLIM VOLUNTEERS FROM INDIA & THE GULF TO THE FOUR PAKISTANI ORGANISATIONS MENTIONED ABOVE.
· AL QAEDA HAD DEFINITELY USED ONE INDIAN-ORIGIN MUSLIM IN THE UK FOR INTELLIGENCE-COLLECTION & TARGET SELECTION IN THE US. ONE OTHER INDIAN MUSLIM IN THE UK WAS SUSPECTED OF ASSOCIATION WITH THE LONDON BOMBERS OF JULY,2005. THE THIRD INDIAN MUSLIM INVOLVED IN THE GLASGOW INCIDENT OF JUNE,2007, WAS ACTING INDIVIDUALLY. NO EVIDENCE OF ORGANISATIONAL AFFILIATION.
· KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMAD, WHO IS IN US CUSTODY, REPORTEDLY TOLD US INTERROGATORS THAT AL QAEDA WANTED TO STRIKE THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN NEW DELHI, BUT COULD NOT.
· IT IS ASSESSED THAT AL QAEDA WILL CONTINUE TO LEAVE THE OPERATIONS AGAINST INDIAN TARGETS TO ITS PAKISTANI ASSOCIATES, BUT WILL KEEP LOOKING FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRIKE AT US & ISRAELI TARGETS IN INDIA.
INDIA: DIFFICULTIES
· WIDE GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD. INVOLVES CO-ORDINATION AMONG MANY STATES.
· GYPSY-LIKE TERRORISM--- KEEP THEIR AREA OF OPERATIONS SHIFTING FROM STATE TO STATE.
· UNESTIMATED, BUT LARGE POPULATION OF ILLEGAL MIGRANTS FROM BANGLADESH ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. THEY PROVIDE THE LOGISTICS SUPPORT.
· RELUCTANCE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP TO GIVE ADDITIONAL POWERS TO THE POLICE ON PAR WITH THOSE IN THE WEST.
· RELUCTANCE TO ACT AGAINST ILLEGAL BANGLADESHI MIGRANTS.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
· CONVENTIONAL ROOT CAUSES & HEARTS & MINDS APPROACHES DO NOT APPLY TO JIHADI TERRORISM SINCE ITS SO-CALLED GRIEVANCES ARE NOT CONTEMPORARY. IT HAS TO BE EFFECTIVELY NEUTRALISED THROUGH SECURITY MEASURES—DEFENSIVE & OFFENSIVE.
· OVER-MILITARISED US COUNTER-TERRORISM METHODS, WITH DISPROPORTIONATE USE OF FORCE THROUGH AIR & ARTILLERY STRIKES ADDING TO MUSLIM ANGER & DRIVING MORE MUSLIMS INTO THE WAITING ARMS OF AL QAEDA. NEED FOR MID-COURSE CORRECTIONS. INDIA’S NON-MILITARY APPROACH WORTHY OF EMULATION.
· INDIAN MODEL---POLICE, THE WEAPON OF FIRST RESORT IN COUNTER-TERRORISM & ARMY THE WEAPON OF FIRST RESORT IN COUNTER-INFILTRATION IN BORDER AREAS.
· PAKISTAN HAS BEEN THE MOST IMPORTANT BREEDING GROUND OF INTERNATIONAL JIHADI TERRORISM. BANGLADESH NEXT. THE ARMIES IN BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE NOT SINCERELY ADDRESSED THIS MENACE. THERE IS A NEED FOR A NEW LEADERSHIP IN BOTH COUNTRIES, WHICH WILL TACKLE THE MENACE SINCERELY & EFFECTIVELY.
· INTELLIGENCE HAS IMPROVED, BUT STILL FACING DIFFICULTIES IN PENETRATING NON-STATE ACTORS.
· PHYSICAL SECURITY HAS IMPROVED BUT STILL FACING DIFFICULTIES AGAINST SUICIDE TERRORISM & ATTACKS ON SOFT TARGETS.
· NO BREAKTHROUGH IN DEVELOPING TECHNOLOGIES TO DETECT SUICIDE BOMBERS FROM A DISTANCE.
· DRAMATIC DETERIORATION IN POLICE MORALE IN PAKISTAN UNDER MUSHARRAF.
A THOUGHT FOR THE ROAD
US CAUGHT IN A VICIOUS CIRCLE IN PAKISTAN. THE MORE IT SUPPORTS MUSHARRAF, THE MORE THE ANTI-MUSHARRAF, ANTI-US ANGER. THE MORE THE ANTI-MUSHARRAF, ANTI-US ANGER, THE MORE THE JIHADI TERRORISM. THE MORE THE JIHADI TERRORISM,THE MORE THE DANGERS OF PAK NUCLEAR ARSENAL FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF JIHADI TERRORISTS. THE MORE THE DANGERS OF THE PAK NUCLEAR ARSENAL FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF JIHADI TERRORISTS, THE MORE THE US SUPPORT TO MUSHARRAF. SO LONG AS THE US DOES NOT GET OUT OF THIS VICIOUS CIRCLE, ITS TROOPS WILL CONTINUE BLEEDING IN THIS REGION. NO HOME BEFORE X’MAS FOR THEM. NOT FOR THIS X’MAS. NOT FOR MANY X’MASES FOR YEARS TO COME.
(13-12-07)
•
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
Sunday, December 9, 2007
INDIA-MALAYSIA RELATIONS
B.RAMAN
A summit of the Group of 15 nations of the Non-Aligned Conference, which discusses economic issues, was to be held in New Delhi in 1993 when Shri Narasimha Rao was the Prime Minister. The administration of Mr.Bill Clinton, then in office, mounted an exercise through President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to sabotage this summit. Some leaders of member-countries, including Mr.Mubarak, informed Shri Rao that they would not be able to attend the summit due to domestic preoccupation. The real reason was the US pressure not to attend. The summit had to be postponed since it would not have had the minimum quorum of 12. It was held next year after reducing the quorum requirement to five heads of State or Government and three deputy heads. This came to be known as the five plus three formula.
2.The postponement of the 1993 summit due to US machinations and the collusion of Mr.Mubarak with the US caused considerable embarrassment for Shri Rao and India. Despite the postponement, Dr.Mahatir Mohamad, the then Malaysian Prime Minister, and President Suharto of Indonesia visited Delhi to express their solidarity with the Government of India at the time of its discomfiture. Policy-makers in Delhi even now remember the role played by Mr.Mubarak in sabotaging the proposed New Delhi summit of 1993. That was one of the reasons why, when a subsequent summit of the Group was held in Cairo, Shri A.B.Vajpayee, the then Indian Prime Minister, did not attend it.
3.How many of us remember the campaign carried on by the Clinton Administration against Malaysia and Dr.Mahatir Mohamad? Dr.Mahatir became a persona non grata with the Clinton Administration because of his independent political and economic policies. He was one of the very few Asian leaders not invited to the US so long as Mr.Clinton was the President. He followed independent policies not only vis-a-vis the US, but also against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other US-dominated international financial institutions. When the economies of South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines collapsed in 1997, the Malaysian economy remained largely unaffected, thanks to the vision of Dr.Mahatir.Even after the crisis broke out causing panic and demoralisation across South-East and East Asia, he maintained his independent line and resisted many of the ideas emanating from US-dominated financial institutions.
4. After having realised that Malaysia and its leaders could not be bullied, the US administration changed its policies after Mr.George Bush took over as the President in 2001. Dr. Mahatir was invited to Washington DC after 9/11. The relations have since improved, but even now the Malaysian political leadership resists US-inspired ideas, which it fears could be detrimental to its national interests. A good example is its opposition to US-inspired ideas for strengthening maritime security in the Malacca Strait.
5. What I had stated above would illustrate two things. Firstly, it is not correct that Malaysia as a State has been ill-disposed towards India. Secondly, it has a proud political leadership, which has not hesitated even to defy the world's sole super-power when it felt it was necessary to do so in its national interests.
6. It is important to remember this because in the wake of the recent demonstrations by a large number of Malaysian citizens of Indian origin in Kuala Lumpur and the visit to India of an important leader of the Hindu Rights Action Front (HINDRAF), a coalition of Indian-origin organisations in Malaysia, all sorts of bizarre ideas have been floating around for being tough with Malaysia in order to protect the interests of the Indian-origin Malaysians. Any idea of using the big stick against Malaysia---- even the very talk of it--- could not only damage the State-to-State relations between the countries, but prove detrimental to the relations of the Indian-origin Malaysian citizens with the Muslim Malay majority. If we think we can cow down Malaysia through such strong talk, we are mistaken---- as the US and China learnt in the past.Let us not hurt the sentiments of the proud leadership in Malaysia by indulging in such talk, even if we don't follow this up.
7. India has four main interests with regard to the Indian-origin Malaysian citizens: Firstly, that they progress economically and get their due share of the national cake; secondly, that the Malaysian authorities refrain from actions such as the demolition of Hindu temples and idols, which hurt the sentiments of Hindus not only in Malaysia, but also all over the world; and thirdly, that the Indian-origin Malaysians maintain harmonious relations with the Malay Bhumiputras and the Chinese-origin Malaysians. These interests should be taken up informally through back channels anbd not through public statements.
8. India should not give any impression that it has been showing belated interest in these issues--- after having remained oblivious of them for years--- because of the agitation of the HINDRAF. The HINDRAF is not the only representative of the Indian-origin Malaysians. One does not even know the background of its leaders and the extent of following they have in the Indian-origin community. The Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), which is part of the ruling coalition, and some non-political opinion-makers of the Indian-origin Malaysians have shown signs of discomfort and concern over the manner in which the leaders of the HINDRAF have been agitating and projecting India as the mother country, which should come to their help.
9. A group of Malaysian Tamil writers, which had recently visited Tamil Nadu, had disagreed with the kind of picture being painted by the HINDRAF leaders. It would be unwise for India to let itself be influenced by the rhetoric of the HINDRAF leaders. The Malaysian Government has been unwise in trying to project the HINDRAF leaders as sympathisers of the LTTE and as acting at the behest of Hindutva elements in India. We will be equally unwise if we treat them as the sole and genuine representatives of the Indian-origin people and let ourselves be influenced by their rhetoric.
10. Hindus all over the world have genuine reasons for anger over some of the policies of successive Malaysian Governments as pointed out by me in my previous article titled "Root Causes of Hindu Anger in Malaysia". As good friends and well-wishers of Malaysia, we have a right to expect that Kuala Lumpur will address these causes. But we have no right under international law to act as the de jure protector of the interests of the Indian-origin Malaysians.
11. During the Cultural Revolution in China under Mao-Zedong, the Chinese authorities assumed aggressive postures as protectors of the interests of the overseas Chinese all over the world. The ultimate result: The overseas Chinese population was viewed in many countries as having extra-territorial loyalties to China. By our words and statements, we should not unwittingly create similar suspicions about the Indian-origin communities abroad.
12. When Mr.Vajpayee was the Prime Minister, many felt concerned over the high-profile interest taken by his Government in cultivating the Indian-origin diaspora abroad and over its implications for India's relations with countries where these people live and for the future well-being of the Indian-origin communities themselves. A well-argued article on this subject was written in 2003 by the late Shri J.N.Dixit, former Foreign Secretary, who subsequently became the National Security Adviser to Dr.Manmohan Singh. A copy of his article is annexed. (10-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi,and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
Diaspora conference: doubtful decisions and dual loyalties
By J.N. Dixit
The much-publicised Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, or Indian Diaspora Day, was celebrated this month with the government playing host to hundreds of overseas Indians.
The objective of the conference was to affirm that the Indian people and government now acknowledge that the Indian diaspora has become a significant factor in the country's external relations as well as domestic politics.
The diaspora is being perceived as a possible source of influence and inputs, both abroad and in India, serving Indian interests.
A number of policy decisions were announced, indicating the government's appreciation of the incremental role being played by Indians abroad. One of the most important decisions was granting of dual citizenship to certain categories of Indians living abroad who have acquired foreign citizenship.
The government had earlier decided to issue persons of Indian origin (PIO) cards to overseas Indians. During the last four years, the government had also extended privileges and facilities with regard to grant of visas and education in technical and professional institutions for children of non-resident Indians (NRIs) and so on.
The decision to grant dual citizenship has been opposed on various grounds, which are rooted in some fundamental questions.
The first question is how granting Indian citizenship to PIOs who have acquired foreign nationality would serve India's substantive interests. What are the motivations of Indians abroad for demanding dual citizenship and of the Indian government for granting it?
The presumption or anticipation is that giving dual citizenship to Indians will give them a greater sense of identity with India. Secondly, privileges such as travel, acquisition of property and extension of educational facilities would result in their becoming more obligated and involved in the developmental and economic progress of India. Thirdly, grant of such citizenship will increase their commitment to India in the countries where they reside.
This raises the question why such decisions should be on a quid pro quo basis. Is citizenship an issue to be settled on the basis of a bargain?
The objectives behind the decision can be met without the grant of dual citizenship if the government is sufficiently flexible in providing facilities to PIOs and the latter are sufficiently emotionally committed to their linkages with India and India's causes.
The fact that the Indian community abroad insists on dual citizenship implies that they predicate their involvement with India on New Delhi granting them privileges of citizenship despite their having acquired foreign citizenship voluntarily. This does not show much of a commitment or involvement with India.
The other reason why this is an avoidable gesture is because it is being granted on a selective basis. It is not being extended to all Indians who are foreign nationals living in all parts of the world. Out of 20 million Indians living in different parts of the world, dual citizenship is likely to be granted to 4.5 to 5 million Indians living in Western Europe, the U.S., Canada and other prosperous countries like Japan and Australia.
PIOs in other parts of the world will not be eligible for this facility. Then, again, the grant of dual citizenship is a conferment of facilities and privileges without obligations on the part of Indian beneficiaries abroad.
They will not be part of political processes of India. There will be no obligation on their part to serve the Indian government if it becomes necessary. They can detach themselves from obligations towards India by claiming their basic national identity with a foreign country.
Leaving aside some marginal economic and social benefits, the grant of dual citizenship results in the phenomenon of ambiguous loyalty amongst those who get it.
The resentment and angst the large numbers of PIOs in other parts of the world would feel about this selective grant of dual citizenship can create tensions in Indian communities abroad as well as problems for India's foreign policy. This is apart from the fact that a fair segment of Indian public opinion does not see any justification for the grant of dual citizenship.
Out of 184 countries that are members of the U.N., only about 40 countries allow dual citizenship to their communities living abroad. Apart from aberrations resulting from dual loyalties, travel and property facilities resulting from the grant of dual citizenship can create problems of security and socio-economic tensions within India.
This is particularly so in a poor country like India where the proposal would give benefits to well-to-do Indians living abroad whose only merit is their having gone abroad and become rich.
This decision is rooted in many of the political parties in India, particularly the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), depending on funds from foreign nationals of Indian origin living in the more prosperous countries of the world. India could have avoided this decision, which is based essentially on narrow short-term motivations.
A majority of the Indian community in the Gulf is unhappy with the decision regarding selective grant of dual citizenship.
Two other decisions announced also smack of ad-hocism and lack of reason. The "Pravasi Bharatiya Samman" was awarded to a number of persons of Indian origin. No doubt all the awardees are eminent in their respective spheres of achievement, but an award by the Indian government to a PIO should primarily be for activities by the individuals concerned that have served India's cause or Indian interests.
PIOs, who might have established educational institutions in India or contributed to the social and developmental projects benefiting the people, should have been chosen for the honour. There is no rationale for conferring this award on persons like Nobel laureate V.S. Naipaul who have lived all their lives abroad and whose only claim to the award was their international stature.
Then there is the decision to give facilities to children of PIOs to get admission in Indian technical and scientific institutions. This will be at the cost of Indian students who have to face tough competition to get admission to these institutions.
How justified is it to extend this facility to children of PIOs who are in any case well to do and live in countries where such facilities are available? The obvious reason behind the decision is to help children of PIOs who are not sure of making it to foreign institutions through competition.
Another question requiring an answer is the quantity and extent to which the Indian diaspora has contributed to India's economic development in terms of investment, building of infrastructure or augmenting India's economic growth.
Barring a few individual cases of NRIs building educational institutions in some places near their alma maters in India, one has not seen any significantly broad trend of NRIs and PIOs being involved in the building of India. Had there been some emerging trend over the last decade, the hoopla at the disapora conference here would have been justified.
Vast sections of PIOs even from North America and Western Europe -- the major beneficiaries of the Pravasi Bharatiya exercise -- had kept away from the conference and were critical of its proceedings as being a purely partisan exercise by the BJP.
It is a pity the government forgot Jawaharlal Nehru's advice to the Indian communities abroad in the years following the country's independence to integrate themselves fully with the people of the countries of their adoption, as their first loyalty should be to the country of their choice.
Pravasi Bharatiya Divas was in direct contradiction to those words of wisdom of Nehru.
(The writer is a former foreign secretary)
--Indo-Asian News Service
B.RAMAN
A summit of the Group of 15 nations of the Non-Aligned Conference, which discusses economic issues, was to be held in New Delhi in 1993 when Shri Narasimha Rao was the Prime Minister. The administration of Mr.Bill Clinton, then in office, mounted an exercise through President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to sabotage this summit. Some leaders of member-countries, including Mr.Mubarak, informed Shri Rao that they would not be able to attend the summit due to domestic preoccupation. The real reason was the US pressure not to attend. The summit had to be postponed since it would not have had the minimum quorum of 12. It was held next year after reducing the quorum requirement to five heads of State or Government and three deputy heads. This came to be known as the five plus three formula.
2.The postponement of the 1993 summit due to US machinations and the collusion of Mr.Mubarak with the US caused considerable embarrassment for Shri Rao and India. Despite the postponement, Dr.Mahatir Mohamad, the then Malaysian Prime Minister, and President Suharto of Indonesia visited Delhi to express their solidarity with the Government of India at the time of its discomfiture. Policy-makers in Delhi even now remember the role played by Mr.Mubarak in sabotaging the proposed New Delhi summit of 1993. That was one of the reasons why, when a subsequent summit of the Group was held in Cairo, Shri A.B.Vajpayee, the then Indian Prime Minister, did not attend it.
3.How many of us remember the campaign carried on by the Clinton Administration against Malaysia and Dr.Mahatir Mohamad? Dr.Mahatir became a persona non grata with the Clinton Administration because of his independent political and economic policies. He was one of the very few Asian leaders not invited to the US so long as Mr.Clinton was the President. He followed independent policies not only vis-a-vis the US, but also against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other US-dominated international financial institutions. When the economies of South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines collapsed in 1997, the Malaysian economy remained largely unaffected, thanks to the vision of Dr.Mahatir.Even after the crisis broke out causing panic and demoralisation across South-East and East Asia, he maintained his independent line and resisted many of the ideas emanating from US-dominated financial institutions.
4. After having realised that Malaysia and its leaders could not be bullied, the US administration changed its policies after Mr.George Bush took over as the President in 2001. Dr. Mahatir was invited to Washington DC after 9/11. The relations have since improved, but even now the Malaysian political leadership resists US-inspired ideas, which it fears could be detrimental to its national interests. A good example is its opposition to US-inspired ideas for strengthening maritime security in the Malacca Strait.
5. What I had stated above would illustrate two things. Firstly, it is not correct that Malaysia as a State has been ill-disposed towards India. Secondly, it has a proud political leadership, which has not hesitated even to defy the world's sole super-power when it felt it was necessary to do so in its national interests.
6. It is important to remember this because in the wake of the recent demonstrations by a large number of Malaysian citizens of Indian origin in Kuala Lumpur and the visit to India of an important leader of the Hindu Rights Action Front (HINDRAF), a coalition of Indian-origin organisations in Malaysia, all sorts of bizarre ideas have been floating around for being tough with Malaysia in order to protect the interests of the Indian-origin Malaysians. Any idea of using the big stick against Malaysia---- even the very talk of it--- could not only damage the State-to-State relations between the countries, but prove detrimental to the relations of the Indian-origin Malaysian citizens with the Muslim Malay majority. If we think we can cow down Malaysia through such strong talk, we are mistaken---- as the US and China learnt in the past.Let us not hurt the sentiments of the proud leadership in Malaysia by indulging in such talk, even if we don't follow this up.
7. India has four main interests with regard to the Indian-origin Malaysian citizens: Firstly, that they progress economically and get their due share of the national cake; secondly, that the Malaysian authorities refrain from actions such as the demolition of Hindu temples and idols, which hurt the sentiments of Hindus not only in Malaysia, but also all over the world; and thirdly, that the Indian-origin Malaysians maintain harmonious relations with the Malay Bhumiputras and the Chinese-origin Malaysians. These interests should be taken up informally through back channels anbd not through public statements.
8. India should not give any impression that it has been showing belated interest in these issues--- after having remained oblivious of them for years--- because of the agitation of the HINDRAF. The HINDRAF is not the only representative of the Indian-origin Malaysians. One does not even know the background of its leaders and the extent of following they have in the Indian-origin community. The Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), which is part of the ruling coalition, and some non-political opinion-makers of the Indian-origin Malaysians have shown signs of discomfort and concern over the manner in which the leaders of the HINDRAF have been agitating and projecting India as the mother country, which should come to their help.
9. A group of Malaysian Tamil writers, which had recently visited Tamil Nadu, had disagreed with the kind of picture being painted by the HINDRAF leaders. It would be unwise for India to let itself be influenced by the rhetoric of the HINDRAF leaders. The Malaysian Government has been unwise in trying to project the HINDRAF leaders as sympathisers of the LTTE and as acting at the behest of Hindutva elements in India. We will be equally unwise if we treat them as the sole and genuine representatives of the Indian-origin people and let ourselves be influenced by their rhetoric.
10. Hindus all over the world have genuine reasons for anger over some of the policies of successive Malaysian Governments as pointed out by me in my previous article titled "Root Causes of Hindu Anger in Malaysia". As good friends and well-wishers of Malaysia, we have a right to expect that Kuala Lumpur will address these causes. But we have no right under international law to act as the de jure protector of the interests of the Indian-origin Malaysians.
11. During the Cultural Revolution in China under Mao-Zedong, the Chinese authorities assumed aggressive postures as protectors of the interests of the overseas Chinese all over the world. The ultimate result: The overseas Chinese population was viewed in many countries as having extra-territorial loyalties to China. By our words and statements, we should not unwittingly create similar suspicions about the Indian-origin communities abroad.
12. When Mr.Vajpayee was the Prime Minister, many felt concerned over the high-profile interest taken by his Government in cultivating the Indian-origin diaspora abroad and over its implications for India's relations with countries where these people live and for the future well-being of the Indian-origin communities themselves. A well-argued article on this subject was written in 2003 by the late Shri J.N.Dixit, former Foreign Secretary, who subsequently became the National Security Adviser to Dr.Manmohan Singh. A copy of his article is annexed. (10-12-07)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi,and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com )
ANNEXURE
Diaspora conference: doubtful decisions and dual loyalties
By J.N. Dixit
The much-publicised Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, or Indian Diaspora Day, was celebrated this month with the government playing host to hundreds of overseas Indians.
The objective of the conference was to affirm that the Indian people and government now acknowledge that the Indian diaspora has become a significant factor in the country's external relations as well as domestic politics.
The diaspora is being perceived as a possible source of influence and inputs, both abroad and in India, serving Indian interests.
A number of policy decisions were announced, indicating the government's appreciation of the incremental role being played by Indians abroad. One of the most important decisions was granting of dual citizenship to certain categories of Indians living abroad who have acquired foreign citizenship.
The government had earlier decided to issue persons of Indian origin (PIO) cards to overseas Indians. During the last four years, the government had also extended privileges and facilities with regard to grant of visas and education in technical and professional institutions for children of non-resident Indians (NRIs) and so on.
The decision to grant dual citizenship has been opposed on various grounds, which are rooted in some fundamental questions.
The first question is how granting Indian citizenship to PIOs who have acquired foreign nationality would serve India's substantive interests. What are the motivations of Indians abroad for demanding dual citizenship and of the Indian government for granting it?
The presumption or anticipation is that giving dual citizenship to Indians will give them a greater sense of identity with India. Secondly, privileges such as travel, acquisition of property and extension of educational facilities would result in their becoming more obligated and involved in the developmental and economic progress of India. Thirdly, grant of such citizenship will increase their commitment to India in the countries where they reside.
This raises the question why such decisions should be on a quid pro quo basis. Is citizenship an issue to be settled on the basis of a bargain?
The objectives behind the decision can be met without the grant of dual citizenship if the government is sufficiently flexible in providing facilities to PIOs and the latter are sufficiently emotionally committed to their linkages with India and India's causes.
The fact that the Indian community abroad insists on dual citizenship implies that they predicate their involvement with India on New Delhi granting them privileges of citizenship despite their having acquired foreign citizenship voluntarily. This does not show much of a commitment or involvement with India.
The other reason why this is an avoidable gesture is because it is being granted on a selective basis. It is not being extended to all Indians who are foreign nationals living in all parts of the world. Out of 20 million Indians living in different parts of the world, dual citizenship is likely to be granted to 4.5 to 5 million Indians living in Western Europe, the U.S., Canada and other prosperous countries like Japan and Australia.
PIOs in other parts of the world will not be eligible for this facility. Then, again, the grant of dual citizenship is a conferment of facilities and privileges without obligations on the part of Indian beneficiaries abroad.
They will not be part of political processes of India. There will be no obligation on their part to serve the Indian government if it becomes necessary. They can detach themselves from obligations towards India by claiming their basic national identity with a foreign country.
Leaving aside some marginal economic and social benefits, the grant of dual citizenship results in the phenomenon of ambiguous loyalty amongst those who get it.
The resentment and angst the large numbers of PIOs in other parts of the world would feel about this selective grant of dual citizenship can create tensions in Indian communities abroad as well as problems for India's foreign policy. This is apart from the fact that a fair segment of Indian public opinion does not see any justification for the grant of dual citizenship.
Out of 184 countries that are members of the U.N., only about 40 countries allow dual citizenship to their communities living abroad. Apart from aberrations resulting from dual loyalties, travel and property facilities resulting from the grant of dual citizenship can create problems of security and socio-economic tensions within India.
This is particularly so in a poor country like India where the proposal would give benefits to well-to-do Indians living abroad whose only merit is their having gone abroad and become rich.
This decision is rooted in many of the political parties in India, particularly the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), depending on funds from foreign nationals of Indian origin living in the more prosperous countries of the world. India could have avoided this decision, which is based essentially on narrow short-term motivations.
A majority of the Indian community in the Gulf is unhappy with the decision regarding selective grant of dual citizenship.
Two other decisions announced also smack of ad-hocism and lack of reason. The "Pravasi Bharatiya Samman" was awarded to a number of persons of Indian origin. No doubt all the awardees are eminent in their respective spheres of achievement, but an award by the Indian government to a PIO should primarily be for activities by the individuals concerned that have served India's cause or Indian interests.
PIOs, who might have established educational institutions in India or contributed to the social and developmental projects benefiting the people, should have been chosen for the honour. There is no rationale for conferring this award on persons like Nobel laureate V.S. Naipaul who have lived all their lives abroad and whose only claim to the award was their international stature.
Then there is the decision to give facilities to children of PIOs to get admission in Indian technical and scientific institutions. This will be at the cost of Indian students who have to face tough competition to get admission to these institutions.
How justified is it to extend this facility to children of PIOs who are in any case well to do and live in countries where such facilities are available? The obvious reason behind the decision is to help children of PIOs who are not sure of making it to foreign institutions through competition.
Another question requiring an answer is the quantity and extent to which the Indian diaspora has contributed to India's economic development in terms of investment, building of infrastructure or augmenting India's economic growth.
Barring a few individual cases of NRIs building educational institutions in some places near their alma maters in India, one has not seen any significantly broad trend of NRIs and PIOs being involved in the building of India. Had there been some emerging trend over the last decade, the hoopla at the disapora conference here would have been justified.
Vast sections of PIOs even from North America and Western Europe -- the major beneficiaries of the Pravasi Bharatiya exercise -- had kept away from the conference and were critical of its proceedings as being a purely partisan exercise by the BJP.
It is a pity the government forgot Jawaharlal Nehru's advice to the Indian communities abroad in the years following the country's independence to integrate themselves fully with the people of the countries of their adoption, as their first loyalty should be to the country of their choice.
Pravasi Bharatiya Divas was in direct contradiction to those words of wisdom of Nehru.
(The writer is a former foreign secretary)
--Indo-Asian News Service
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