INDIAN OPTIONS AGAINST HAFEEZ MOHAMMAD SAYEED

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO  756

B.RAMAN

According to reports from Pakistan, Chaudhury Habib-ur-Rehman, who constitutes the one-man  Anti-Terrorism Special Court trying seven members of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) for conspiring to carry out the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, has accepted the objections of the LET conspirators to the admissibility of the report submitted by a Pakistani commission that had visited Mumbai in March to record the statements of some Indian witnesses.

2.The lawyers of the LET conspirators had objected to the admissibility of the commission’s report on the ground that the Government of India did not allow the Pakistani lawyers assisting the commission to cross-examine the Indian witnesses.

3.The Judge has accepted the contention of the LET lawyers and declared the report of the commission as inadmissible in the pending case. However, he has kept open the possibility of admitting in evidence the report of any new commission that might be sent to Mumbai by the Pakistan Government if its lawyers are allowed to cross-examine the witnesses by the Government of India.

4.India’s efforts to seek the co-operation of the State of Pakistan for the effective prosecution of the Pakistan-based conspirators including Hafeez Mohammad Sayeed , the head of the LET, have thus reached a dead-end. It is futile to hope for any forward movement in this direction.

5.While India should continue to keep the spotlight on Pakistan to demonstrate to the international community its machinations to avoid action against the conspirators, it should at the same time unilaterally initiate other options against Sayeed.

6.It should have Sayeed declared as a proclaimed and absconding offender in the case and offer a huge reward for anyone who could help in his capture and prosecution before the Mumbai court. The reward should be made applicable to individuals as well as organisations, so that organisations of Baloch freedom-fighters, Sindhi nationalists and Pakistani Shia fighters who are interested in availing of the reward could do so by helping in the capture of Sayeed and his being brought to India for trial.

7. Simultaneously, a special cell should be created in the R&AW for bringing Sayeed to justice in India.  (20-7-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

PREJUDICES AGAINST MINORITIES-- A FEED-BACK

 I have been in receipt of the following comment on my article on Prejudieces Against Minorities from a US-based Indian.I would like to add that the retired Muslim Major of the Army seems to have had an unpleasant experience not with the CISF, which is responsible for airport security, but with some members of the security staff of Spicejet--B.Raman

A personal incident: Couple of years ago while travelling
between two major metros in India by air I was stopped by the airport security right after the
x-ray machine scanned my handbag. The CISF officer requested me to open the bag which I
followed duly. I could see from his name tag that he belonged to a minority community.
Certainly he did his job professionally, and gave me a smile back after checking my handbag. It
was a collection of about 25 old audio cassettes neatly stacked which might have looked
like a bullet belt on the screening monitor. Before departing the security area I smiled
at him and asked him where he was from. "Kashmir" - came the pat reply. I had a pleasant
emotion. We hear all the news about violence in Kashmir, and some Kashmiris' perceived
disloyalty to the Indian state, but here is a security officer from that place taking
the air security so seriously. But I imagined that some of my close friends, who are over sensitive
on religious matters, could have misconstrued my personal incident in a completely different
way, and would have given it a communal tone. Because those twenty five old cassettes contained
spiritual/devotional songs.     It takes a little patience, a little tolerance and a little
clarity of mind from all sides to overcome communal misunderstanding which may spin out of control. I am sure every airline in India recruits people from all communities and treats them
equally. Sometimes some passengers as well as ground staff behave rudely, arrogantly
and/or insensitively which triggers misunderstandings. Often, while flying between Kolkata
and Delhi, I see people belonging to minority communities in large numbers as my
copassengers, but haven't seen or heard any discriminatory incident. Even if there is
any stray incident I hope the sane minds of all communities will come together to diffuse
such tensions.

KILLING OF INDIAN FISHERMAN BY US NAVAL SHIP REGRETTABLE, BUT CAN’T BE CONDEMNED

B.RAMAN

( To be read in continuation of my article of November 20,2008, titled Rules Of Engagement In Maritime Counter-Terrorism & Counter-Piracy at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers30%5Cpaper2930.html )

On the  evening of July 16,2012, an Indian fisherman  was killed and three others  were injured when naval personnel on board USNS Rappahannock, a fuel re-supply ship of the US Navy, opened fire on a small motor vessel near Jebel Ali port off Dubai.

2.The US fleet later issued a statement saying that the USNS Rappahannock attacked the small motorboat near the Dubai port of Jebel Ali, because the small vessel "ignored the warnings and came too close".

3."The US crew repeatedly attempted to warn the vessel's operators to turn away from their deliberate approach. When those efforts failed to deter the approaching vessel, the security team on the Rappahannock fired rounds from a .50-caliber machine gun," the statement said.

4.ABC News quoting an unnamed UAE official said the fishing boat had four Indians and two Emirate nationals on board when the incident took place in Jabel Ali, a frequent docking point for American naval vessels about 30 miles southwest of Dubai.

5.Sections of the media have quoted Lt-Gen Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, the head of the Dubai Police, as saying that according to the injured fishermen  the boat was  not warned to move away by the US naval ship. According to the local “Khaleej Times”, the injured fishermen reportedly  told the police that they did not move towards the ship and instead attempted to avoid it. The Dubai Police chief has been quoted as saying:   "According to our findings and testimonies of the injured, I believe that they told the truth."

6.”The Hindu” of July 18,2012, has reported that while US officials claimed that the incident occurred in international waters, the UAE officials said  it took place within their waters. Considerable emotions and anger have been aroused in India over the incident, which is under enquiry. “The Hindu” has called the incident “Murder In Mid-Sea”.

7.The incident needs to be analysed objectively and without emotions before jumping to conclusions on the culpability of the US naval personnel involved. Some journalists have sought to analyse the incident in the context of the running tensions between the US and Iranian navies in the Gulf.

8.A more appropriate comparison would be with the past activities of Al Qaeda in the Gulf area and the current activities of the Somali pirates both of whom operate from small boats, which pose a difficulty to naval personnel of all countries, including India, in determining whether a boat cited in  the sea is a friend or foe.

9.If there is no way of communicating with the inmates of a boat or physically verifying its contents to look for hidden explosives, naval personnel have to act on the basis of their instant assessment as to whether an approaching boat could be a friend or foe. If their instant assessment that led to a fatal firing subsequently proves to be wrong, they cannot be blamed and accused of murder.

10.Before October,2000, when neither Al Qaeda nor the Somali pirates were active in that area, the rules of engagement provided that US naval personnel should open fire on a suspicious-looking boat approaching a naval ship only if the boat opened fire first.

11.On October 12, 2000, a boat filled with explosives with a suicide bomber of Al Qaeda rammed against a US destroyer named USS Cole in the Aden harbour. In the resulting explosion, 17   US naval personnel were killed and the ship was severely damaged. A subsequent enquiry brought out that a US naval officer on watch duty on the deck of USS Cole had seen the boat approaching USS Cole at high speed, but he did not fire on it and sink it.

12.The rules of engagement of the US Navy then in force reportedly provided that US naval personnel should fire upon a suspect boat inside a harbour only if fired at. Since the Al Qaeda boat did not open fire, it was not fired at and sunk before it could ram against USS Cole. In justification of the seeming inaction of the officer on watch duty, it was stated during the enquiry that inside busy harbours such as that of Aden, many small boats operated by the harbour management keep moving around for providing logistics. It would have been difficult to assess the hostile intent of an approaching boat inside a harbour.

13.Al Qaeda’s use of small boats carrying explosives for acts of suicide terrorism in emulation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) made  the navies of many countries to  undertake an exercise to revise and update the rules of engagement when confronted with a possible maritime terrorism situation. Two possible scenarios received special attention:

    SCENARIO NO 1: An unidentified boat approaches a naval ship in or near a harbor. The revised rules of engagement reportedly provide for immediate neutralisation of such a boat before it could come within ramming or boarding distance of the ship without waiting to verify the intention of the boat. Action can be initiated even at the risk of casualties of innocent civilians.

    SCENARIO NO.2: A naval ship moving or patrolling in high seas encounters an unidentified ship or boat moving around in suspicious circumstances or which seems to be coming towards the naval ship. This scenario gives some window for verification. The revised rules of engagement provide for opening fire if the suspicious ship or boat resists attempts at verification or opens fire or seems to be planning to open fire on the naval ship. Appropriately judging the situation and acting is left to the discretion of the naval personnel depending on the circumstances of the case.

14.One understands that many navies have further refined their rules of engagement in recent years keeping in view the modus operandi adopted by the Somali pirates who operate in high seas from small boats launched from mother ships.

15. The rules of engagement have to be robust enough to allow the security personnel on board to make an instant threat assessment as to whether an approaching boat or a suspect boat in the vicinity is friend or foe. The situation can become very tricky when there is no way of communicating with the suspect boat and no means of making a physical verification.

16.Under such circumstances, the judgement of the naval security personnel should be final. All that one could insist upon is that the resulting force used on the basis of an instant threat assessment should be reasonable and appropriate to the assessment and not excessive.

17.India should deal with the incident in a logical, reasonable, professional and responsible way keeping in view the possibility that one day one of our naval ships on anti-terrorism and anti-piracy patrol might find itself in a similar situation.

18. By whipping up emotions and by making unreasonable demands on the US Navy, we should not unwittingly tie the hands of our own navy in an unpredictable situation.  (19-7-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

PREJUDICES AGAINST MINORITIES

B.RAMAN

The Buck Stops Here (TBSH) discussion of Barkha Dutt of NDTV on July 18,2012, was on the important and sensitive subject of Prejudices Against Minorities in India.

2. The discussion, which was conducted with sensitivity and candour, was triggered off by a complaint addressed to the National Minorities Commission of the Government of India by a retired Muslim Major of the Indian Army, alleging that he was subjected to improper treatment by some staff of a flight of the SpiceJet on grounds of his religion and removed from the flight for security reasons, which he has contested as false.

3. The Spicejet, which did not avail of an invitation from NDTV to join the discussion to reply to the allegations of the passenger, had sent a written rejoinder to NDTV refuting the allegations of the retired Muslim Major. The complaint lodged by him will be got enquired into by the Minorities Commission.

4. The Major had done the right thing in submitting a formal complaint to the Commission. Its enquiries will indicate whether his allegations are correct and, if so, what amends are called for. The enquiry and any follow-up action, if his allegations are correct, will have a deterrent effect on the  staff of all Airlines and prevent similar instances in future.

5.While I do not rule out the possibility of aberrations by individual members of staff, one should not generalise from a single reported instance of inappropriate behaviour that there is religious profiling in our civil aviation sector. The Major himself admitted that he had previously travelled by the same  airline and had faced no unpleasant experience. I travel by air often and have not come across any instance smacking of religious profiling.

6. The TBSH debate also focussed on the larger and what ought to be more disturbing aspect of prejudices from various sections of our society against the minorities in general and the  Muslims in particular. One cannot deny that there are perceptions in sections of the Muslim community that they are subjected to unfair and discriminatory behaviour by sections of the administration, particularly by the police.

7. Some Muslims arrested in the past for their alleged involvement in acts of terrorism did not cite discrimination against them in matters of educational and job opportunities to explain their alienation. Instead, they cited what they described as the unfair and discriminatory attitude of the Indian criminal justice system towards the Muslims. By criminal justice system, they mean the police and the judiciary.

8. This is also a complaint often voiced by organisations such as the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the Indian Mujahideen (IM). They complain that Muslim suspects are treated by the police much more harshly than non-Muslims and, when convicted, awarded much harsher sentences than non-Muslims.

9. The IM often points out that while quick and severe action was taken against the  Muslims allegedly involved in the post-Babri Masjid communal disturbances in Mumbai, no action was allegedly  taken against the non-Muslim officers found guilty by the Sri Krishna Enquiry Commission of over-reaction against the Muslims.

10. These are the kind of perceptions which can be dealt with effectively by the Government and the Police without the need for more laws. What is required is improved behaviour by our criminal justice system towards the Muslims.

11. Many, if not most, of the complaints of our Muslims, particularly the Muslim youth, are against the police and other uniformed security personnel. They have every right to act firmly against wrong-doers to whatever community or religion they might belong. At the same time, they should avoid giving to Muslims and other minorities the impression of double standards in dealing with the minorities.

12. Since the  9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, the debate on counter-terrorism has been considerably monopolised by  Western scholars and experts who have introduced concepts and ideas such as the alleged reluctance of sections of the Muslims to integrate themselves with the societies in which they live, measures to improve their integration, the so-called radicalisation of the Muslim youth, the need for their de-radicalisation etc.

13. Many in India have also started blindly borrowing these ideas and concepts from the West without realising the possible negative implications for our society.

14. Our Muslim community has shown no reluctance to integrate itself with our society. If there are some instances of lack of integration, it is because of the reluctance of non-Muslims, particularly the Hindus, to encourage  and facilitate their integration by removing prejudices in matters such as letting out or selling houses to Muslims.

15. The disturbing phenomenon that we have been seeing for some years is alienation of our minorities---whether religious or ethnic or social--- due to accumulation of unaddressed grievances. Unless their grievances are addressed sincerely and effectively by the policy-makers, political leaders and the administration, this alienation could degenerate into radicalisation as it happened in Jammu & Kashmir.

16. What is, therefore, important in India is not measures for the de-radicalisation of the minorities, but for their dealienation. The Government and the society have to play an important role in this matter (19-7-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )

RECONSTRUCTING ARMY CHANGES IN NORTH KOREA

B.RAMAN

 ( To be read in continuation of my articles of December 19,2011, titled KIM JONG-UN: LITTLE KNOWN RULER OF AN UNPREDICTABLE STATE at http://ramanstrategicanalysis.blogspot.in/2011/12/kim-jong-un-little-known-ruler-of.html      and of April 15,2012,titled Fresh sanctions against N Korea: A serious mistake by US at http://www.rediff.com/news/column/fresh-sanctions-against-n-korea-a-serious-mistake-by-us/20120415.htm )

In my article of April 15,2012, I had written as follows:

“The United States is committing a serious mistake in imposing fresh food sanctions against North Korea for attempting to launch a rocket on April 13.

“The launch -- which the US described as an attempt to test a long-range missile and North Korea projected as an attempt to put a satellite in orbit to mark the 100th anniversary of the birth of his grand-father Kim ul-Sung -- failed.

“It was a double humiliation for North Korea, its leaders and people. The first humiliation arose from the failure of the rocket and the second from the fresh food sanctions sought to be imposed on North Korea at the instance of the US for trying to test the rocket.

“The double humiliation has come at a time when Kim Jong-Un, who succeeded his father as the ruler four months ago, seemed to have consolidated his position. On the eve of the launch, he assumed the posts of the First Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission and the First Chairman of the National Defence Commission, a newly-created post.

“North Korea has had rocket/missile failures in the past which it never admitted to and instead projected as a success. This time, it had to admit the failure, because, in a rare act of transparency in an otherwise closed society, Kim Jong-Un had invited nearly 150 foreign observers for the launch, even at the risk of any failure becoming public knowledge.

“This act of transparency seems to have had two objectives. Firstly, to convince the world that North Korea was placing a satellite for peaceful purposes in orbit and not testing a long-range missile as alleged by the US and South Korea.

“Secondly, it may have been an attempt at opening up of the closed North Korean society.

“This act of transparency required great courage on his part. It should have been rewarded by the opponents of North Korea, led by the US, in order to encourage him to continue on the path of gradually opening up North Korea. Instead, by seeking to strengthen the food sanctions for attempting to launch the rocket, the US is unwittingly proving to the North Korean leadership that its experimenting with transparency was unwise.

“North Korea may now reverse its experimentation with transparency and any hopes of a wind of change in the nation under the new ruler will stand belied. By humiliating Kim in the eyes of his people, the US has lost any chance of experimenting with a new policy which would have had the objective of encouraging Kim Jong-Un to gradually come out of his shell.”

2.A day after the failure, the Chinese Xinhua news agency disseminated the following report from Pyongyang:

“Kim Jong Un, supreme commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA), has ordered promotions for 71 senior military officers, official news agency KCNA reported Saturday.( April 14)

“Kim said the Democratic People's Republic of Korea armed forces had performed great exploits for the party, revolution, country and its people and were now fully demonstrating their strength in the defense of the country and the building of a thriving nation, the report said.

"According to the order, which was issued Friday, Pak Sun Hwan has been promoted to Lieut. General, Kim Yong Hwa, Son Kyong Bok and 68 others to Maj. General.

“Kim said they would creditably discharge their duties as vanguard fighters of the Songun (military first) revolution in the sacred struggle to accomplish the revolutionary cause of Juche generation after generation, true to the behests of Kim Jong Il.

“Juche is a political thesis of Kim Il-sung, founder of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which says that the Korean masses are the masters of the country's development.

“Kim Jong Un was elected first chairman of the National Defense Commission on Friday. Earlier this week, he was appointed first secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and chairman of the party's Central Military Commission.”

3. One would have normally expected that the rocket failure could lead to action being taken against those responsible. It didn’t happen. Instead, an unusually large number of officers were promoted .One doesn’t know whether the promotion orders were issued before or after the failure, but the promotions were announced a day after the failure.

4. South Korean media reported on  June 14,2012, that Lt. Gen. Kim Rak Gyom had been appointed commanding officer of the Korean People’s Army [KPA] Strategic Rocket Force Command [SRFC] in early 2012.  Lt. Gen. Kim was later elected a member of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Military Commission [CMC] during the 4th Party Conference on  April 11, 2012.  The existence of the SRFC was first mentioned in a DPRK state media report on  March 2, 2012, when Kim Jong Un  inspected its headquarters near Kangdong County in northeast Pyongyang. The SRFC was reportedly created in 2011 when North Korea consolidated all short-, medium- and intermediate-range missile units into a unified command under the National Defense Commission [NDC].

5.South Korean media speculated that Col. Gen. Choe Sang Ryo, who was the head of the SRFC, might have been removed during the 4th Party Conference in April 2012 and replaced by Kim Rak Gyom.If so, why was he removed? There was no answer.

6.The North Korean State  media reported that a national  meeting was held on  June 18, 2012, to commemorate the 48th anniversary of Kim Jong Il beginning his career in the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee.   Present at the meeting were   Kim Yong Nam, Choe Yong Rim, Choe Ryong Hae and Ri Yong Ho, members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party.  Kim Ki Nam, a member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee, submitted a report to the meeting. It described  Kim Jong Un  as the center of the leadership and unity, thereby indicating that the publicly admitted rocket failure had not damaged his position in the Party and the Army.

7. On  July 8,2012,  Kim Jong Un  visited the  War Museum in Pyongyang to mark the 18th anniversary of the death of  Kim Il Sung.  In remarks made during the visit, he emphasised the importance of  the role of the  “youth” and the “generations to come”, indicating he was having in mind the possible future role  of North Korea’s GenNext. That would have been possible only by gradually jettisoning party  and army leaders of the older generation whom he had inherited from his father. Would he have the power to do so and if so, how soon? That was a question that defied analysis in the absence of authentic information from North Korea’s closed society.  Among those who accompanied Kim to the function were Vice Marsha  Kim Jong Gak, VM Choe Ryong Hae, VM Ri Yong Ho and VM Hyon Chol Hae.

8. The Kim Il Sung Youth League [KISYL] held a national conference  at  Pyongyang on  July 12, 2012.The conference had two agenda items, the first of which was an endorsement of the leadership of Kim Jong-Un. The second item approved a change in the designations of the Youth League officials as Chairman and Vice-Chairman instead of as First Secretary and Secretary.

9.The North Korean state media reported on  July 13,2012, that Kim Jong Un had  attended a commemorative photo session with construction workers from the Korean People’s Internal Security Forces [KPISF] .  At the photo op,  Kim Jong Un was joined by Vice Marshal Choe Ryong Hae, Jang Song Taek, Gen. Ri Myong Su, Col. Gen. Ri Pyong Sam, Ri Ryong Ha, Pak Chun Song and “generals of the KPISF.” Ri Yong Ho was not present.

9.Engineers’ units subordinate to KPISF and the Ministry of People’s Security have been responsible for some infrastructure construction, particularly tunnels.  In recent years the KPISF has built or renovated several food production facilities, including the Taedonggang Combined Fruit Farm. 

10. On July 16,2012, the North Korean media reported that Vice Marshal Ri Yong Ho had been removed from all official positions in the party and the Army due to illness. Among the posts held by him at the time of his removal were Chief of the General Staff of the Army and one of the five members of the Standing Committee of the Party Politbureau referred to as the Presidium.  

11.On September 27,2010, Kim Jong Il had issued an order in his capacity of the supreme commander of the Army promoting Ri Yong Ho to the  rank of Vice- Marshal and Kim Jong Un to that of General, a rank  below Vice- Marshal. He also nominated Kim Jong Un and Ri Yong Ho as the two Vice-Chairmen of the Central Military Commission. He did not have Kim Jong Un included in the Presidium of the Party , but he was elected to the party central committee at the Party Congress held on September 28,2010.

12.Thus while inducting Kim Jong Un into the Army and the party Central Committee in order to pave the way for his succeeding him, Kim Jong Il took care not to ruffle the feathers of Ri Yong Ho by giving him a higher position in the party and army leadership.

13. Two others who were given senior positions were Kim Kyong-hui, Kim Jong Il’s 65-year-old sister, and her husband, Jang Song-thaek, both given the rank of four-star Generals. She was elected to the Party Central Committee and Politbureau at the September 28,2010, Party Conference. Kim Song Il also had her husband appointed as the Secretary of the Administrative Department in the Party Headquarters and as one of the four Assistant  Vice-Chairmen of the National Defence Commission of the Government as distinguished from the Central Military Commission of the Party to which he was not nominated. Vice Marshal Ri Yong Ho and Kim Jong Un were nominated as the two Deputy Chairmen  of the National  Defence Commission.

14.Thus, Kim Jong Un inherited from his father on his death a triumvirate of three senior mentors in Party and Army who, his father hoped, would put him through his paces as he consolidated his position in the party and the Army. He succeeded his father as the de facto head of the  party and the Army. By April 12,2012, a day before the unsuccessful rocket test, he had made himself the de jure head by taking over as the  chairman of the National Defense Commission, the  First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and Chairman of the party's Central Military Commission.

15. However, his dependence on the triumvirate of senior mentors left behind by his father continued with Jang Song Thaek emerging to the top of the triumvirate. According to  Radiopress of Japan, Kim Jong Un made 81 reported visits during the first six months of 2012 ---  40 of  them Army-connected events and the remaining 41 civilian events. He was escorted by his brother-in-law on 61 occasions.  Second and third to him were VM  Choe Ryong Hae (Director of the Army’s General Political Department) and VM  Ri Yong Ho, both of whom had been nominated by the Party in April,2012, as Vice-Chairmen of the Central Military Commission.

16. On  July 8,2012,  Kim Jong Un had  visited the  War Museum in Pyongyang to mark the 18th anniversary of the death of  Kim Il Sung.  Among those who accompanied him was Vice-Marshal Ri Yong Ho, (aged 70) who appeared to be in good health. Within a week, he was removed from all his posts ostensibly on grounds of illness. What suddenly happened to his health within a week? If he had been taken seriously ill beyond recovery, why didn’t he resign? Why he had to be removed? No explanations were forthcoming from Pyongyang.

17. Immediately after his removal, KCNA reported that Kim Jong Un had sent a message of thanks to soldiers of the North Korean internal security forces for “their tremendous feats in major construction projects.” Kim praised the servicemen for their participation in projects including the construction of the country’s largest hydroelectric power plant, a food processing factory and a university library. This gave rise to speculation that Ri Yong Ho might have opposed the use of the military for civilian construction projects and this might have led to his removal. There is no confirmation of this.

18. On July 17,2012. North Korean Party newspaper Rodong Sinmun announced the promotion of General Hyon Yong-chol to the rank of Vice-Marshal. Little is known about his age, education or background. He was a  Lieutenant- General of the eighth army and  was promoted as General at the September 2010 Workers’ Party meeting, when Kim Jong Un made his debut in the party and the Army.

19.Vice-Marshal Hyon has not yet been designated as the successor of Ri Yong Ho as the Chief of the General Staff, which would make him the head of the Army, which is still without a head. There are four other Vice-Marshals senior to him. A more important person in the Army and Party leadership is  Choe Ryong Hae, the son of Choe Hyon who served as the North’s Defense Minister from 1968 to 1976. In April last, he became a Vice Marshal, a member of the Politburo Presidium of the Workers’ Party Central Committee, a Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and director of the Army’s General Political Bureau. Choe is considered the third most important person in the leadership as of now after Kim Jong Un and Jang Song Thaek.

20.Both Vice-Marshal Choe and VM Hyon belong to the post-Kim Ul Sung leadership, who owe their rise to Kim Jong-un, but VM Choe is alleged to have divided loyalty to Jang Song Thaek, who seemed to have played a role in his elevation.

21.If Kim Jong Un wanted as the head of the Army someone whose loyalty to him is total, he should prefer Hyon. But he would find it difficult to overlook VM Choe because of the powerful posts held by him since April,2012, and his reputed closeness to Jang Song Thaek.

22. What are the reasons for the sudden changes in the Army leadership---genuine illness of Ri Yong Ho or is there a power struggle which is continuing or has Kim Jong Un been able to assert his leadership and place in position officers totally owing their rise to him?

23. It is difficult to answer. But one thing seems likely. Things have started moving in North Korea--- away from the days of Kim Jong Un’s father. The US, South Korea, Japan and China should let things evolve---hopefully in a positive and more transparent direction, by restraining any urge to exercise pressure on the leadership. Nothing can be more counter-productive than adding to the fears of the new leadership over the intentions and agenda of the outside world.  (18-7-12)

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate, Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-Mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )