B.RAMAN
On October 12,2011, the ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) and the Vietnam Oil and Gas Group PetroVietnam (PV) signed at New Delhi an agreement on cooperation in the field of oil and gas. It was signed in the presence of the President of Vietnam Mr. Truong Tan Sang, who was on a visit to India, and Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh.
2.It will be a framework agreement, which will be in force for three years. Its aim is to promote long-term cooperation in the field of oil and gas. The co-operation, which is already in force since 1988 under framework agreements signed from time to time since then, covers aspects such as the exchange of information on the petroleum industry, exchange of working visits by officials and specialists in various domains of the petroleum industry, new investments, expansion and operations of oil and gas exploration and production including refining, transportation and supply in Vietnam and India, and as well as to third countries.
3. The starting-block of the co-operation was the signing of a Production Sharing Contract ( PSC) between the Hydrocarbon India Ltd., (renamed later as ONGC Videsh Limited) and PetroVietnam on May 19, 1988, under which the Indian company was allowed to explore for gas in Block 06.1. This block contributes about 50% of the gas requirement of Vietnam.
4. Subsequently, in June 2006, PetroVietnam awarded two more blocks for exploration to the Indian company. These blocks called blocks 127 and 128 in the Phu Kanh basin in Vietnam were awarded to OVL after a regular bidding process.
5. Details of these three blocks as disseminated by the Indian company through the web are as follows:
Block 06.1 :
Participating Companies and their Shares :OVL-45%,BP-35% ,PV-20% ,(Operator - British Petroleum (BP))
OVL, British Petroleum (Operator) and PetroVietnam have developed the Lan Tay field in Block 06.1 offshore Vietnam. The field started commercial production of Gas in January, 2003. The project is operated by British Petroleum. OVL’s share of production from the project was 2.249 BCM of gas and 0.038 MMT of condensate during 2010-11 as compared to 1.967 BCM of gas and 0.042 MMT of condensate during 2009-10. OVL’s share of the development expenditure was about USD 244 Million till March 31, 2011.
Block 127 :
It is an offshore deepwater Block, located at water depth of more than 400 meters with 9,246 sq km area in Vietnam. The PSC for the Block was signed on 24th May, 2006. OVL holds 100% stake in the Block with Operatorship. OVL has acquired 1,150 sq km 3D seismic data in the Block and the interpretation of the seismic data has been completed. Location for drilling of exploration well was identified and a well was drilled in July 2009 to a depth of 1265 mts. As there was no hydrocarbon presence, the Company has decided to relinquish the block to Petrovietnam. The Company had invested approx USD 68 million till March 31, 2010.
Block 128 :
OVL signed a contract for 100% stake in the project in May, 2006. The project is operated by OVL. OVL had deployed the Rig Hakuryu-V on well B 128-RV-1X on 2nd September 2009 for drilling. However, the rig could not be anchored despite adding Piggy Back to the existing anchors. The drilling activity was terminated and it is planned that the location would be drilled in 2012 subject to successful field testing of anchors. OVL has invested about USD 46 million till March 31, 2011.
6. In June 2006, the OVL had said as follows: “With this, OVL has bagged both blocks it had bid for among nine offered for global competitive bidding in Vietnam's 2004 Licensing Round. "With the award of Blocks 127 and 128 for offshore exploration in Vietnam, OVL is consolidating its existing presence with 45 percent participating interest in the gas-producing properties of Lan Do and Lan Tay offshore blocks," said OVL chairman Subir Raha. Blocks 127 and 128 are close to Nam Con Son project that sources gas from Lan Do and Lan Tay fields discovered by OVL (then Hydrocarbons India Ltd) in 1992 and 1993 respectively. OVL holds 45 percent participating interest in exploration activities in what is the biggest oil and gas project in Vietnam. The new exploration blocks awarded to OVL have in-place reserves of around 190 million tonnes of oil and oil-equivalent gas. With oil equity or participating interests in over a dozen countries including Russia and Sudan, OVL now has operatorship in four offshore exploration blocks. This includes the Farsi block in Iran, Najweet Najeem in Qatar and Blocks 127 and 128 in Vietnam. OVL is also the operator of an onshore exploration block in Libya.”
7. In September 2010,PetroVietnam chairman Dinh La Thang confirmed that his group had planned to submit a proposal to buy stakes in BP’s upstream offshore projects. Vietnam and BP are involved in four projects, the Lan Tay-Lan Do gas field in Block 06.1, Nam Con Son pipeline system, Phu My 3 power plant and BP Petco lubricant joint venture. BP planned to transfer stakes from the first three projects, but not the last one. A BP Vietnam representative said BP had informed the Vietnamese Government of its intention to explore options for divestment of its upstream assets and was now awaiting approval. She said: “Our top priority is to continue safe and reliable operations now, during transition and thereafter.”
8.Dinh was quoted by the local press as saying that under the agreement signed among partners of the above projects, if one of the partners wanted to withdraw the investment capital or quit the project it would offer priority rights to buy stakes to the other partners in the project. “We have already made a plan to coordinate with the Indian partner [the third partner in those projects] to buy those stakes,” he said. Sections of the media quoted India’s then Petroleum Secretary S Sundareshan as saying that India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and PetroVietnam would jointly bid for BP’s assets in Vietnam.
9. Thus, since May 1988,the OVL had been involved in oil and gas exploration in Vietnam. In the first block 06.1 awarded in May 1988, the OVL had a 45 per cent stake, the BP had a 35 per cent stake and the PV a 20 per cent stake. Even though the project has been working successfully, BP decided last year to disinvest its holdings reportedly due to poor security conditions and talks were on for the OVL and the PV to buy it.
10. In the remaining two blocks awarded to the OVL in 2006, the OVL has a 100 per cent stake. In Block 127 no oil or gas has been found and there were reports that the OVL was planning to disinvest it to the PV. Exploration work is still going on in Block 128 without any discovery of oil or gas so far. In the meanwhile, there have been reports that Essar, another Indian company, was also planning to enter the field of oil and gas exploration in co-operation with the PV.
11. China did not formally raise any objection to any of the agreements or projects till last year despite the fact that Indo-Vietnamese co-operation in the field of oil and gas is now 23 years old. Last year on two occasions, Chinese officials were reported to have privately informed their US counterparts that China considered the South China Sea also as its core interest in addition to Taiwan and Tibet. By core interest, China means an issue on which no compromise on the question of sovereignty is possible. Neither the US nor the ASEAN countries have accepted the new Chinese assertion of the South China Sea as of core interest to China with Chinese sovereignty paramount.
12. Since the beginning of this year, sections of the Chinese media and non-Governmental experts have mounted a campaign to oppose the Vietnamese action in awarding these three blocks to an Indian company for exploration on the ground that these blocks belonged to China. The Chinese contention has been rejected by Vietnam.
13. The firm adherence of the OVL and the PV to the contracts of 1988 and 2006 in respect of these blocks has infuriated the Chinese. After the signing of the three-year framework agreement at New Delhi on October 12, the party-owned “Global Times” and the “China Energy News”, owned by the party-owned “People’s Daily”, have come out with comments of a jingoistic nature on the subject.
14. In an editorial published on October 14, the “Global Times” wrote: “Both countries clearly know what this means for China. China may consider taking actions to show its stance and prevent more reckless attempts in confronting China in the area. By inking pacts with Vietnam, India probably has deeper considerations in its regional strategy than simply getting barrels of oil and gas. India is willing to fish in the troubled waters of the South China Sea so as to accumulate bargaining chips on other issues with China. There is strong political motivation behind the exploration projects. China's vocal objections may not be heeded. China must take practical and firm actions to make these projects fall through. China should denounce this agreement as illegal. Once India and Vietnam initiate their exploration, China can send non-military forces to disturb their work, and cause dispute or friction to halt the two countries' exploration. In other words, China should let them know that economic profits via such cooperation can hardly match the risk.” .
15.In a front-page commentary published on October 16, the “China Energy News” said: “India is playing with fire by agreeing to explore for oil with Vietnam in the disputed South China Sea. India's energy strategy is slipping into an extremely dangerous whirlpool. On the question of cooperation with Vietnam, the bottom line for Indian companies is that they must not enter into the disputed waters of the South China Sea. Challenging the core interests of a large, rising country for unknown oil at the bottom of the sea will not only lead to a crushing defeat for the Indian oil company, but will most likely seriously harm India's whole energy security and interrupt its economic development. Indian oil company policy makers should consider the interests of their own country, and turn around at the soonest opportunity and leave the South China Sea."
16.The association of the Indian company with exploration for oil and gas in the blocks awarded by Vietnam is 23 years old. One of the blocks is already producing gas, in one block exploration has been given up as there was no oil or gas and in the third the exploration is still going on.
17.After having kept quiet for 23 years, sections of the party-owned media in China have mounted a jingoistic campaign against India and Vietnam ---more particularly against India--- on the ground that the exploration violates China’s core interest. Till now, for the last 23 years, China had never tried to disrupt the Indian exploration through the use of force, but now the “Global Times” has urged the Government to use force to disrupt the Indian exploration.
18.It is not yet known whether the media comments reflect the views of the Chinese Government. The options available to India if the Chinese security forces use force in future to disrupt the exploration have to be carefully examined so that we are not taken by surprise. At the same time, the matter has to be discussed at the diplomatic level with the Chinese authorities. It is apparent from the campaign that there is a lot of lack of knowledge of the long Indian association with oil/gas exploration in the community of Chinese strategic analysts. This has to be rectified. ( 17-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, October 17, 2011
Saturday, October 15, 2011
CALL FOR PROTESTS BY TIBETANS ON OCTOBER 19
B.RAMAN
According to Tibetan sources in the Sichuan province of China, leaflets in the Tibetan language have been circulating in the Tibetan areas of the province calling for a day of protests and fasting on October 19 in solidarity with a similar observance by Tibetans all over the world to condemn the continued oppression of the Tibetans by the Chinese and the military detention of a large number of Tibetan monks of the Kirti monastery in the province since March following the self-immolation of a young monk.
2. Anger over the military detention of the monks ostensibly for self-education has led to seven incidents of self-immolation by monks since then. The anger has been further aggravated by the arrests of many monks by the Chinese on charges of abetment at suicide for not stopping the self-immolations and by the Chinese refusal to hand over the dead bodies of the monks who committed self-immolation to the monastery or the village to which they belonged. The Chinese have been cremating the dead bodies and handing over only the ashes.
3. Since the beginning of this month there has been a number of incidents of peaceful street protests and closing down of shops by Tibetans in the Sichuan province. Three days of protests and shop closures between October 8 and 10 have been reported from the Ngaba area of Sichuan . There have been many incidents of Tibetan flags being hoisted in public places after removing the Chinese national flags. The Chinese authorities have detained a number of persons to interrogate them as to who is behind these incidents, but they have not been able to stop such incidents
4. In one incident reported on October 13 from the Khakor subdistrict of Serthar (in Chinese, Seda) county of Kardze (in Chinese, Ganzi) prefecture, some local Tibetans managed to remove a Chinese flag from a police station and hoist a Tibetan flag .
5. On October 1, the Chinese National Day, about 200 Tibetans had staged a protest demonstration at Serthar after the police tore a Tibetan flag and a large photo of his Holiness the Dalai Lama from a building and threw them into the street.
6. There has been a war of words between the Chinese authorities and the Tibetan Government-in-exile headed by Harvard-educated Prime Minister Lobsang Sangay over these incidents. On October 11, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin accused the members of the so-called "Dalai clique" of not only failing to condemn the self-immolations, but also publicizing them to inspire more self-immolations. The Tibetan government-in-exile condemned these remarks and said that China should first put an end to its "repression" in Tibet. It also accused Chinese security personnel of violating basic human rights by assaulting monks who attempted self-immolation.
7. No incidents have been reported from Tibet itself. The protest movement has till now been confined to the Sichuan province. (15-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
According to Tibetan sources in the Sichuan province of China, leaflets in the Tibetan language have been circulating in the Tibetan areas of the province calling for a day of protests and fasting on October 19 in solidarity with a similar observance by Tibetans all over the world to condemn the continued oppression of the Tibetans by the Chinese and the military detention of a large number of Tibetan monks of the Kirti monastery in the province since March following the self-immolation of a young monk.
2. Anger over the military detention of the monks ostensibly for self-education has led to seven incidents of self-immolation by monks since then. The anger has been further aggravated by the arrests of many monks by the Chinese on charges of abetment at suicide for not stopping the self-immolations and by the Chinese refusal to hand over the dead bodies of the monks who committed self-immolation to the monastery or the village to which they belonged. The Chinese have been cremating the dead bodies and handing over only the ashes.
3. Since the beginning of this month there has been a number of incidents of peaceful street protests and closing down of shops by Tibetans in the Sichuan province. Three days of protests and shop closures between October 8 and 10 have been reported from the Ngaba area of Sichuan . There have been many incidents of Tibetan flags being hoisted in public places after removing the Chinese national flags. The Chinese authorities have detained a number of persons to interrogate them as to who is behind these incidents, but they have not been able to stop such incidents
4. In one incident reported on October 13 from the Khakor subdistrict of Serthar (in Chinese, Seda) county of Kardze (in Chinese, Ganzi) prefecture, some local Tibetans managed to remove a Chinese flag from a police station and hoist a Tibetan flag .
5. On October 1, the Chinese National Day, about 200 Tibetans had staged a protest demonstration at Serthar after the police tore a Tibetan flag and a large photo of his Holiness the Dalai Lama from a building and threw them into the street.
6. There has been a war of words between the Chinese authorities and the Tibetan Government-in-exile headed by Harvard-educated Prime Minister Lobsang Sangay over these incidents. On October 11, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin accused the members of the so-called "Dalai clique" of not only failing to condemn the self-immolations, but also publicizing them to inspire more self-immolations. The Tibetan government-in-exile condemned these remarks and said that China should first put an end to its "repression" in Tibet. It also accused Chinese security personnel of violating basic human rights by assaulting monks who attempted self-immolation.
7. No incidents have been reported from Tibet itself. The protest movement has till now been confined to the Sichuan province. (15-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Friday, October 14, 2011
MANY MORE ABBOTTABADS WAITING TO BE DISCOVERED IN PAKISTAN
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR—PAPER NO 741
B.RAMAN
When Abu Zubaidah, who was reportedly No.3 of Al Qaeda at the time of 9/11, was ultimately traced to his rabbit-hole and arrested, it was not in the tribal belt. It was in the house of a local office-bearer of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in Faislabad, a city of Pakistani Punjab.
2. When Ramzi Binalshib, another top gun of Al Qaeda, was ultimately traced to his rabbit-hole and arrested, it was found to be in Karachi.
3. When Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who co-ordinated the 9/11 strikes in the US on behalf of Osama bin Laden and who slit the throat of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, was ultimately traced to his rabbit-hole and arrested, it was found to be in the house of a women’s wing leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) in Rawalpindi right under the nose of the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army.
4. When Osama bin Laden himself was ultimately traced to his rabbit-hole and killed, it was found to be in Abbottabad near the training academy of the Pakistan Army.
5. The US is now looking for the rabbit-holes of Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has taken over the leadership of Al Qaeda, Jallaludin and Serajuddin Haqqani of the so-called Haqqani network, Mulla Mohammad Omar of the Afghan Taliban, and Hakimullah Mehsud of the Pakistani Taliban.
6.Their rabbit-holes are likely to be in areas outside the reach of the Drones. While continuing the Drone strikes to keep the jihadi top guns running for cover, the US should also look for other Abbottabads strewn across Pakistan.
7. It was good human intelligence that led the CIA to the rabbit-hole of OBL. The Navy SEALS followed later. It is good human intelligence which will again lead the CIA to the rabbit-holes of others badly wanted.
8. The US should seek allies in this hunt. Those allies could come from the Mohajirs of Karachi, the Balochs of Karachi and Balochistan and the Shias of the Kurram Agency and Gilgit-Baltistan. They are as fed up with the jihadis and their ISI master as the US.
9. The US should constitute them into a Southern Alliance against terrorism and give them the capability and the resources to hunt effectively. They will expect a quid pro quo in the form political support for their grievances. The US should not hesitate to give them the support they want.
10. It is time to think strategically of a future dispensation in Pakistan that would help in achieving final and durable victory against jihadi terrorism with ISI’s characteristics. A Southern Alliance of non-radical elements of the present Pakistan, which are as unhappy about jihadi terrorism and the ISI as the US, has to be the linchpin of such a strategy.
11. Start thinking, start acting. ( 15-10-11 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
B.RAMAN
When Abu Zubaidah, who was reportedly No.3 of Al Qaeda at the time of 9/11, was ultimately traced to his rabbit-hole and arrested, it was not in the tribal belt. It was in the house of a local office-bearer of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) in Faislabad, a city of Pakistani Punjab.
2. When Ramzi Binalshib, another top gun of Al Qaeda, was ultimately traced to his rabbit-hole and arrested, it was found to be in Karachi.
3. When Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, who co-ordinated the 9/11 strikes in the US on behalf of Osama bin Laden and who slit the throat of Daniel Pearl, the US journalist, was ultimately traced to his rabbit-hole and arrested, it was found to be in the house of a women’s wing leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) in Rawalpindi right under the nose of the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army.
4. When Osama bin Laden himself was ultimately traced to his rabbit-hole and killed, it was found to be in Abbottabad near the training academy of the Pakistan Army.
5. The US is now looking for the rabbit-holes of Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has taken over the leadership of Al Qaeda, Jallaludin and Serajuddin Haqqani of the so-called Haqqani network, Mulla Mohammad Omar of the Afghan Taliban, and Hakimullah Mehsud of the Pakistani Taliban.
6.Their rabbit-holes are likely to be in areas outside the reach of the Drones. While continuing the Drone strikes to keep the jihadi top guns running for cover, the US should also look for other Abbottabads strewn across Pakistan.
7. It was good human intelligence that led the CIA to the rabbit-hole of OBL. The Navy SEALS followed later. It is good human intelligence which will again lead the CIA to the rabbit-holes of others badly wanted.
8. The US should seek allies in this hunt. Those allies could come from the Mohajirs of Karachi, the Balochs of Karachi and Balochistan and the Shias of the Kurram Agency and Gilgit-Baltistan. They are as fed up with the jihadis and their ISI master as the US.
9. The US should constitute them into a Southern Alliance against terrorism and give them the capability and the resources to hunt effectively. They will expect a quid pro quo in the form political support for their grievances. The US should not hesitate to give them the support they want.
10. It is time to think strategically of a future dispensation in Pakistan that would help in achieving final and durable victory against jihadi terrorism with ISI’s characteristics. A Southern Alliance of non-radical elements of the present Pakistan, which are as unhappy about jihadi terrorism and the ISI as the US, has to be the linchpin of such a strategy.
11. Start thinking, start acting. ( 15-10-11 )
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com .Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
WHAT DOES RECOVERY OF EXPLOSIVES IN AMBALA PORTEND?
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR---PAPER NO 740
B.RAMAN
Acting on an alert from the Delhi Police, the Haryana Police are reported to have seized a car containing concealed explosives ( about 5 KGs), five detonators and two timers which had been parked in a parking lot of the Ambala Railway Station on October 13,2011.
2. The owners of the car and those responsible for keeping the explosive, detonators and timers in the car have not yet been found. The source information of the Delhi Police is that the car had probably come to Ambala from the Jammu area and that the improvised explosive device materials found in the car were meant to be used for causing an explosion in Delhi around Diwali (October 25-26). The Delhi Police’s source information is that the explosive materials were intended to be used in a joint operation of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI).
3. Of the various Khalistani terrorist organisations, the BKI, after the Dal Khalsa, has had the longest history of contacts with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).Talwinder Singh Parmar of the BKI, Vancouver, who had masterminded the blowing-up of the Kanishka aircraft of Air India in June,1985, had been given shelter in Palistan by the ISI after the terrorist attack on the plane.
4. In 1992, one of the Western intelligence agencies established his presence in Pakistan. The ISI asked him to leave Pakistan. He crossed over into Indian Punjab where he was killed in an encounter by the Punjab Police. Since then other BKI leaders such as Wadhwa Singh had been living in Pakistan.
5.The ISI started helping the various Khalistani organisations such as the Dal Khalsa, the BKI and the International Sikh Youth Federation in the 1970s with a view to using them to destabilise Punjab. They were given training assistance and supplied with arms and ammunition and explosives.
6. The ISI believed that the destabilisation of Punjab would weaken the ability of the Indian security forces to deal with terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir and thereby facilitate a change of the status quo in J&K.
7. The ISI was helping the Khalistani terrorists directly as well as through the Jamaat-e-Islami. In addition, when Nawaz Sharif was the Chief Minister of Punjab after the death of Zia-ul-Haq in 1988, the Khalistani terrorists were also in receipt of assistance from the Special Branch of the Punjab Police.
8. The ISI had code-named the operation for using the Khalistani terrorists to destabilise Punjab and weaken the capability of the Indian security forces in J&K as the K-2 project---meaning the Kashmir-Khalistan project. The JEI and jihadi terrorist organisations under the control of the ISI such as the LET were also sought to be used for the execution of the K-2 project.
9. The recovery of the explosive-laden car and the source information of the Delhi Police indicate an attempt by the ISI to revive the K-2 project . ( 14-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com. Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
B.RAMAN
Acting on an alert from the Delhi Police, the Haryana Police are reported to have seized a car containing concealed explosives ( about 5 KGs), five detonators and two timers which had been parked in a parking lot of the Ambala Railway Station on October 13,2011.
2. The owners of the car and those responsible for keeping the explosive, detonators and timers in the car have not yet been found. The source information of the Delhi Police is that the car had probably come to Ambala from the Jammu area and that the improvised explosive device materials found in the car were meant to be used for causing an explosion in Delhi around Diwali (October 25-26). The Delhi Police’s source information is that the explosive materials were intended to be used in a joint operation of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI).
3. Of the various Khalistani terrorist organisations, the BKI, after the Dal Khalsa, has had the longest history of contacts with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).Talwinder Singh Parmar of the BKI, Vancouver, who had masterminded the blowing-up of the Kanishka aircraft of Air India in June,1985, had been given shelter in Palistan by the ISI after the terrorist attack on the plane.
4. In 1992, one of the Western intelligence agencies established his presence in Pakistan. The ISI asked him to leave Pakistan. He crossed over into Indian Punjab where he was killed in an encounter by the Punjab Police. Since then other BKI leaders such as Wadhwa Singh had been living in Pakistan.
5.The ISI started helping the various Khalistani organisations such as the Dal Khalsa, the BKI and the International Sikh Youth Federation in the 1970s with a view to using them to destabilise Punjab. They were given training assistance and supplied with arms and ammunition and explosives.
6. The ISI believed that the destabilisation of Punjab would weaken the ability of the Indian security forces to deal with terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir and thereby facilitate a change of the status quo in J&K.
7. The ISI was helping the Khalistani terrorists directly as well as through the Jamaat-e-Islami. In addition, when Nawaz Sharif was the Chief Minister of Punjab after the death of Zia-ul-Haq in 1988, the Khalistani terrorists were also in receipt of assistance from the Special Branch of the Punjab Police.
8. The ISI had code-named the operation for using the Khalistani terrorists to destabilise Punjab and weaken the capability of the Indian security forces in J&K as the K-2 project---meaning the Kashmir-Khalistan project. The JEI and jihadi terrorist organisations under the control of the ISI such as the LET were also sought to be used for the execution of the K-2 project.
9. The recovery of the explosive-laden car and the source information of the Delhi Police indicate an attempt by the ISI to revive the K-2 project . ( 14-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com. Twitter @SORBONNE75 )
Wednesday, October 12, 2011
RECTIFICATION OF PAST: MYANMAR GOVT TAKES FIRST HESITANT STEPS
B.RAMAN
In an attempt to rectify the anti-democratic policies and human rights violations of the past by the military junta that ruled the country for 23 years till a few months ago, the Government of President Thein Sein, a military strongman-turned civilian to head an ostensibly civilian Government, has started releasing from October 12,2011, political prisoners who were languishing in jail under the military dictatorship for many years.
2. The decision to release the prisoners under a general amnesty came in the wake of talks held by the Government –including the President-- with Ms.Aung San Sui Kyi, the leader of the pro-democracy movement, who was released earlier this year.
3. The decision to grant an amnesty was a sequel not only to the talks between her and the Government, but also to stepped-up interactions between the Government and US interlocutors, including Mr.Kurt Campbell, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, who has been monitoring developments in Myanmar on behalf of President Barack Obama in order to nudge the Government to make a break with the authoritarian past .
4. In recent weeks---particularly after the dialogue between Suu Kyi and the Government started--- there were signs of excitement in the international community over what seemed to be the beginning of the blowing of winds of change in Myanmar. International observers noted that their fears that the Government of Thein Sein, which came to office after an election manipulated to keep Suu Kyi and her associates out of power, might turn out to be nothing but the old military wine in a new civilian bottle had not proved correct.
5.The seemingly civilian Government, which consists of many military members of the previous junta who had discarded their uniforms and projected themselves as civilian political leaders, started giving indications of new thinking on the road ahead for Myanmar.
6. Two indicators of the new thinking were reports that the Government seemed keen to find ways of associating Suu Kyi with the new dispensation without letting her get into the driving seat of power and the decision to suspend the construction of a huge hydel project by a Chinese company in the Northern Kachin State because of strong opposition to the project on environmental and other grounds by Suu Kyi and her party, by Kachin leaders and non-governmental environment protection groups.
7. The significant decision to suspend the Chinese-driven project, which would have benefited the Yunan province of China more than the Kachin State of Myanmar, gave cause for hope that Chinese interests, which played an important role in influencing the decisions and policies of the military junta, may no longer play the same role under the new Government.
8. Will the winds of change affect positively not only the political and economic landscape of Myanmar, but also its future diplomacy? That was a question that increasingly excited analysts.
9. In the context of these developments, it was, therefore, no wonder that in remarks made in Bangkok on October 10, Campbell hailed the recent developments in Myanmar, including what he described as "very consequential dialogue" between Suu Kyi and the leadership. Campbell, one of many US officials to hold rare talks with Myanmar Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin in Washington recently, added that while concerns remained, "it is also undeniably the case that there are dramatic developments under way".
10. Against this background, the release of the first batch of political prisoners by the Government on October 12 was less daring and more hesitant. The first batch consisted largely of those arrested in recent years, including some activists of the monks’ unrest of 2007, but did not include any of the founding fathers of the pro-democracy movement who took to the streets in 1988, thereby triggering off a ruthless retaliation by the Army.
11. No exact figures of those released on October 12 are available. The Government itself has put the number at about 300 out of a total of about 2000 political prisoners. Non-Governmental organisations such as the Human Rights Watch of the US say that the number involved is less, including 28 monks. Among the prominent persons released were comedian Zarganar, who was arrested in June 2008 and sentenced to 59 years imprisonment for criticising the military junta’s poor and inhuman response to a cyclone disaster that allegedly killed 140,000 people, Sai Say Htan, an ethnic Shan leader sentenced to 104 years in 2005 for refusing to help draft a new constitution, and Su Su Nway, who was serving a 12-year jail term since 2008. Among the more prominent persons not released so far are the then student leaders of the 1988 movement, including Min Ko Naing. Some of them have been in jail for over two decades.
12. While the evidently hesitant first steps have been welcomed by Myanmar political activists, there are concerns that a group of pro-Chinese hardliners from the Army who had served in the junta in the past might be exercising pressure on Thein Sein to go slow and even reverse his policies. In this context, the visit of the Foreign Minister to Beijing reportedly for talks with the Chinese authorities on the decision to suspend the construction of the Chinese-driven hydel project has been noted with concern.
13. According to China’s State-owned Xinhua news agency, talks were held in Beijing on October 10 between Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and his Myanmar counterpart U Wunna Maung Lwin, who was visiting China as a special envoy of President Thein Sein. A press release issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry after the talks said that the two sides conducted a thorough consultation over the Myitsone hydel project, which was ordered to be suspended by Myanmar's President. The two Foreign Ministers also exchanged views on bilateral relations and other issues of common concern, with both voicing commitments to push forward the bilateral comprehensive and strategic partnership in a bid to achieve joint development, the press release said. The visiting Myanmar Foreign Minister was also received by Vice President Xi Jinping.
14. It is not known whether the Myanmar Foreign Minister’s visit had been previously scheduled before the suspension of the hydel project or was triggered off by expressions of Chinese unhappiness over the suspension.
15. Suu Kyi has said she believes Thein Sein genuinely wants to push through reforms, but cautioned it was too soon to say whether he would succeed. The release of the first batch of prisoners came shortly before the departure of President Thein Sein, who has already visited China after assuming office, on his first visit to India.
16. While India has reasons to be gratified over the rectification of the past---even if it be hesitant---- it should avoid any expressions or actions that could create an impression of a policy convergence on Myanmar between India and the US. The situation in Myanmar is still delicate.India should carefully watch its steps and control its mouth. ( 13-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
In an attempt to rectify the anti-democratic policies and human rights violations of the past by the military junta that ruled the country for 23 years till a few months ago, the Government of President Thein Sein, a military strongman-turned civilian to head an ostensibly civilian Government, has started releasing from October 12,2011, political prisoners who were languishing in jail under the military dictatorship for many years.
2. The decision to release the prisoners under a general amnesty came in the wake of talks held by the Government –including the President-- with Ms.Aung San Sui Kyi, the leader of the pro-democracy movement, who was released earlier this year.
3. The decision to grant an amnesty was a sequel not only to the talks between her and the Government, but also to stepped-up interactions between the Government and US interlocutors, including Mr.Kurt Campbell, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, who has been monitoring developments in Myanmar on behalf of President Barack Obama in order to nudge the Government to make a break with the authoritarian past .
4. In recent weeks---particularly after the dialogue between Suu Kyi and the Government started--- there were signs of excitement in the international community over what seemed to be the beginning of the blowing of winds of change in Myanmar. International observers noted that their fears that the Government of Thein Sein, which came to office after an election manipulated to keep Suu Kyi and her associates out of power, might turn out to be nothing but the old military wine in a new civilian bottle had not proved correct.
5.The seemingly civilian Government, which consists of many military members of the previous junta who had discarded their uniforms and projected themselves as civilian political leaders, started giving indications of new thinking on the road ahead for Myanmar.
6. Two indicators of the new thinking were reports that the Government seemed keen to find ways of associating Suu Kyi with the new dispensation without letting her get into the driving seat of power and the decision to suspend the construction of a huge hydel project by a Chinese company in the Northern Kachin State because of strong opposition to the project on environmental and other grounds by Suu Kyi and her party, by Kachin leaders and non-governmental environment protection groups.
7. The significant decision to suspend the Chinese-driven project, which would have benefited the Yunan province of China more than the Kachin State of Myanmar, gave cause for hope that Chinese interests, which played an important role in influencing the decisions and policies of the military junta, may no longer play the same role under the new Government.
8. Will the winds of change affect positively not only the political and economic landscape of Myanmar, but also its future diplomacy? That was a question that increasingly excited analysts.
9. In the context of these developments, it was, therefore, no wonder that in remarks made in Bangkok on October 10, Campbell hailed the recent developments in Myanmar, including what he described as "very consequential dialogue" between Suu Kyi and the leadership. Campbell, one of many US officials to hold rare talks with Myanmar Foreign Minister Wunna Maung Lwin in Washington recently, added that while concerns remained, "it is also undeniably the case that there are dramatic developments under way".
10. Against this background, the release of the first batch of political prisoners by the Government on October 12 was less daring and more hesitant. The first batch consisted largely of those arrested in recent years, including some activists of the monks’ unrest of 2007, but did not include any of the founding fathers of the pro-democracy movement who took to the streets in 1988, thereby triggering off a ruthless retaliation by the Army.
11. No exact figures of those released on October 12 are available. The Government itself has put the number at about 300 out of a total of about 2000 political prisoners. Non-Governmental organisations such as the Human Rights Watch of the US say that the number involved is less, including 28 monks. Among the prominent persons released were comedian Zarganar, who was arrested in June 2008 and sentenced to 59 years imprisonment for criticising the military junta’s poor and inhuman response to a cyclone disaster that allegedly killed 140,000 people, Sai Say Htan, an ethnic Shan leader sentenced to 104 years in 2005 for refusing to help draft a new constitution, and Su Su Nway, who was serving a 12-year jail term since 2008. Among the more prominent persons not released so far are the then student leaders of the 1988 movement, including Min Ko Naing. Some of them have been in jail for over two decades.
12. While the evidently hesitant first steps have been welcomed by Myanmar political activists, there are concerns that a group of pro-Chinese hardliners from the Army who had served in the junta in the past might be exercising pressure on Thein Sein to go slow and even reverse his policies. In this context, the visit of the Foreign Minister to Beijing reportedly for talks with the Chinese authorities on the decision to suspend the construction of the Chinese-driven hydel project has been noted with concern.
13. According to China’s State-owned Xinhua news agency, talks were held in Beijing on October 10 between Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and his Myanmar counterpart U Wunna Maung Lwin, who was visiting China as a special envoy of President Thein Sein. A press release issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry after the talks said that the two sides conducted a thorough consultation over the Myitsone hydel project, which was ordered to be suspended by Myanmar's President. The two Foreign Ministers also exchanged views on bilateral relations and other issues of common concern, with both voicing commitments to push forward the bilateral comprehensive and strategic partnership in a bid to achieve joint development, the press release said. The visiting Myanmar Foreign Minister was also received by Vice President Xi Jinping.
14. It is not known whether the Myanmar Foreign Minister’s visit had been previously scheduled before the suspension of the hydel project or was triggered off by expressions of Chinese unhappiness over the suspension.
15. Suu Kyi has said she believes Thein Sein genuinely wants to push through reforms, but cautioned it was too soon to say whether he would succeed. The release of the first batch of prisoners came shortly before the departure of President Thein Sein, who has already visited China after assuming office, on his first visit to India.
16. While India has reasons to be gratified over the rectification of the past---even if it be hesitant---- it should avoid any expressions or actions that could create an impression of a policy convergence on Myanmar between India and the US. The situation in Myanmar is still delicate.India should carefully watch its steps and control its mouth. ( 13-11-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
Monday, October 10, 2011
CHINESE LEADERS LESS NERVOUS OF THE PAST
B.RAMAN
The Communist Party of China (CPC) and its leaders headed by President Hu Jintao are less nervous about the likely impact of memories of past events on China’s Generation Next.
2 This has become evident from the observance of two important anniversaries in Beijing. The first was the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, which overthrew one of the longest spells of autocratic rule in the world by the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and ushered in a republican Government, which gave way 38 years later to the one-party rule of the CPC.
3.It was a genuine democratic revolution which began with an armed uprising on October 10,1911 in the central city of Wuchang, part of present-day Wuhan, resulting in the fall of the Qing dynasty the next year. Since the CPC came to power in 1949, there has been less and less recall of the democratic revolution by the CPC and Governmental leadership lest the autocratic rule of the CPC be challenged by the people by taking inspiration from the struggle against the autocratic rule of the Qing dynasty.
4. In the light of the concerns of the leadership over the dangers of commemorating an event that led to the end of a long spell of autocratic rule of one kind, different from the autocratic rule of the CPC, many analysts were closely watching to see whether the present leadership would have the political courage and confidence to commemorate the event.
5.The priority given by the leadership to the observance in June last of the 90th anniversary of the founding of the CPC and the silence on the approaching 100th anniversary of the 1911 revolution made it appear that the CPC leadership still did not have the courage and confidence to celebrate an event that might remind China’s GenNext that it has had other political role models in past history different from the models of the CPC.
6. It, therefore, came as a refreshing surprise that the CPC observed in public the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution at a function in Beijing on October 9 chaired by President Hu Jintao and attended, among others, by some of the past leaders of the CPC, including former President Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of Hu, who had disappeared from the public view ( but not from the social media networks) since his participation in the function held in June to mark the 90th anniversary of the CPC. His absence since then had given rise to feverish Net speculation that he was seriously ill or even dead.
7. In his keynote address as reported by the State-controlled Xinhua news agency, President Hu Jintao described the 1911 Revolution as "a thoroughly modern, national and democratic revolution" which shook the world and ushered in unprecedented social changes in China. He praised Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the 1911 revolution, as "a great national hero, a great patriot and a great leader of the Chinese democratic revolution". Hu added that the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation must be achieved by adhering to socialism with Chinese characteristics, with patriotism, and by upholding peace, development and cooperation. Hu said that the mainland and Taiwan should work together for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and called for the peaceful reunification of China.
8. While celebrating the event and recalling the role of Sun Yat-sen in seeking to usher in democracy in China, the CPC leadership has sought to emphasise the continuity of the CPC rule by projecting the emergence of the CPC as a natural outcome of the 1911 Revolution and not a distortion of it.
9.Beijing-based dissident historian Shi Binhai has been quoted by Radio Free Asia, sponsored by the US State Department, as saying that Jiang's appearance at the function served as a reminder that the Communist Party's line on historical events, and on Taiwan, would remain unchanged.
10. Chinese political dissidents and human rights activists have alleged that while holding a strictly-controlled and CPC-sponsored celebration of the 1911 Revolution, the Chinese security agencies stepped up surveillance on suspected dissidents in the main cities of the country---particularly in Wuhan. They also closely monitored the Net due to apparent concerns that the GenNext might exploit the even to revive its attempts for a Jasmine Revolution in China for the restoration of the long-lost democracy.
11. Radio Free Asia has quoted veteran pro-democracy activist He Depu as saying as follows in Beijing: “It has been 100 years since the 1911 revolution, when they overthrew the Qing dynasty to build a democratic China. We have struggled all these years and we still haven't made that happen." Despite the strict surveillance of micro-blogs, some of them managed to post calls for a new democratic revolution in China.
12. The second important anniversary that has been observed not by the CPC or the Government, but by a group of non-Governmental and non-party activists is the 35th anniversary of the fall of the Gang of Four headed by the wife of Mao Zedong, which led to the rise of Deng Xiaoping with his policy of economic reforms.
13.The event held in Beijing on October 5,2011, was titled "Remembering the smashing of the Gang of Four, 35 Years On". It was reportedly organised by Hu Deping, son of late disgraced former Premier Hu Yaobang, whose funeral sparked the 1989 student movement. Participants included the son of Hua Guofeng, Mao's short-tenured designated successor, and the daughter of Li Xiannian, Hua's chief economic adviser.
14.Some of the participants allegedly called for a new Cultural Revolution to put an end to corruption and moral decay, but their call did not find majority support among the about 200 participants from the past. The majority view was that genuine democracy and the rule of law were the only ways of achieving these laudable objectives.
15. The observance of these two anniversaries---one on the initiative of the CPC itself and the other on that of some political remnants of the past without much political influence---- indicates a continuing confidence in the present leadership that it has the on-going debate on the need for political reforms to buttress the economic reforms firmly under control and that revival of memories of certain past events would not divert the debate in a direction not desired by the Party.
16. It also reflects the assessment of the present leadership that China’s GenNext, while increasingly articulate and active in the Net in discussing new political ideas and models, would not create instability. China’s GenNext has benefited from China’s economic progress and would not like this to be jeopardised by destabilising political ideas and movements. ( 11-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and , presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Asssociate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
The Communist Party of China (CPC) and its leaders headed by President Hu Jintao are less nervous about the likely impact of memories of past events on China’s Generation Next.
2 This has become evident from the observance of two important anniversaries in Beijing. The first was the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, which overthrew one of the longest spells of autocratic rule in the world by the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and ushered in a republican Government, which gave way 38 years later to the one-party rule of the CPC.
3.It was a genuine democratic revolution which began with an armed uprising on October 10,1911 in the central city of Wuchang, part of present-day Wuhan, resulting in the fall of the Qing dynasty the next year. Since the CPC came to power in 1949, there has been less and less recall of the democratic revolution by the CPC and Governmental leadership lest the autocratic rule of the CPC be challenged by the people by taking inspiration from the struggle against the autocratic rule of the Qing dynasty.
4. In the light of the concerns of the leadership over the dangers of commemorating an event that led to the end of a long spell of autocratic rule of one kind, different from the autocratic rule of the CPC, many analysts were closely watching to see whether the present leadership would have the political courage and confidence to commemorate the event.
5.The priority given by the leadership to the observance in June last of the 90th anniversary of the founding of the CPC and the silence on the approaching 100th anniversary of the 1911 revolution made it appear that the CPC leadership still did not have the courage and confidence to celebrate an event that might remind China’s GenNext that it has had other political role models in past history different from the models of the CPC.
6. It, therefore, came as a refreshing surprise that the CPC observed in public the 100th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution at a function in Beijing on October 9 chaired by President Hu Jintao and attended, among others, by some of the past leaders of the CPC, including former President Jiang Zemin, the predecessor of Hu, who had disappeared from the public view ( but not from the social media networks) since his participation in the function held in June to mark the 90th anniversary of the CPC. His absence since then had given rise to feverish Net speculation that he was seriously ill or even dead.
7. In his keynote address as reported by the State-controlled Xinhua news agency, President Hu Jintao described the 1911 Revolution as "a thoroughly modern, national and democratic revolution" which shook the world and ushered in unprecedented social changes in China. He praised Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the 1911 revolution, as "a great national hero, a great patriot and a great leader of the Chinese democratic revolution". Hu added that the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation must be achieved by adhering to socialism with Chinese characteristics, with patriotism, and by upholding peace, development and cooperation. Hu said that the mainland and Taiwan should work together for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and called for the peaceful reunification of China.
8. While celebrating the event and recalling the role of Sun Yat-sen in seeking to usher in democracy in China, the CPC leadership has sought to emphasise the continuity of the CPC rule by projecting the emergence of the CPC as a natural outcome of the 1911 Revolution and not a distortion of it.
9.Beijing-based dissident historian Shi Binhai has been quoted by Radio Free Asia, sponsored by the US State Department, as saying that Jiang's appearance at the function served as a reminder that the Communist Party's line on historical events, and on Taiwan, would remain unchanged.
10. Chinese political dissidents and human rights activists have alleged that while holding a strictly-controlled and CPC-sponsored celebration of the 1911 Revolution, the Chinese security agencies stepped up surveillance on suspected dissidents in the main cities of the country---particularly in Wuhan. They also closely monitored the Net due to apparent concerns that the GenNext might exploit the even to revive its attempts for a Jasmine Revolution in China for the restoration of the long-lost democracy.
11. Radio Free Asia has quoted veteran pro-democracy activist He Depu as saying as follows in Beijing: “It has been 100 years since the 1911 revolution, when they overthrew the Qing dynasty to build a democratic China. We have struggled all these years and we still haven't made that happen." Despite the strict surveillance of micro-blogs, some of them managed to post calls for a new democratic revolution in China.
12. The second important anniversary that has been observed not by the CPC or the Government, but by a group of non-Governmental and non-party activists is the 35th anniversary of the fall of the Gang of Four headed by the wife of Mao Zedong, which led to the rise of Deng Xiaoping with his policy of economic reforms.
13.The event held in Beijing on October 5,2011, was titled "Remembering the smashing of the Gang of Four, 35 Years On". It was reportedly organised by Hu Deping, son of late disgraced former Premier Hu Yaobang, whose funeral sparked the 1989 student movement. Participants included the son of Hua Guofeng, Mao's short-tenured designated successor, and the daughter of Li Xiannian, Hua's chief economic adviser.
14.Some of the participants allegedly called for a new Cultural Revolution to put an end to corruption and moral decay, but their call did not find majority support among the about 200 participants from the past. The majority view was that genuine democracy and the rule of law were the only ways of achieving these laudable objectives.
15. The observance of these two anniversaries---one on the initiative of the CPC itself and the other on that of some political remnants of the past without much political influence---- indicates a continuing confidence in the present leadership that it has the on-going debate on the need for political reforms to buttress the economic reforms firmly under control and that revival of memories of certain past events would not divert the debate in a direction not desired by the Party.
16. It also reflects the assessment of the present leadership that China’s GenNext, while increasingly articulate and active in the Net in discussing new political ideas and models, would not create instability. China’s GenNext has benefited from China’s economic progress and would not like this to be jeopardised by destabilising political ideas and movements. ( 11-10-11)
( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and , presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Asssociate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com . Twitter: @SORBONNE75 )
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